The conduct of the war and the management of foreign affairs had crowded into my life with such speed and insistence that I could not find all the time I needed to devote to domestic matters.

The San Francisco conference, the surrender of Germany, the Potsdam conference, the birth of the atomic age, the surrender of Japan - all these transpired within a period of just three months.

All the immediate domestic problems of converting back to a peace economy had to be taken care of in the midst of these and other events of major significance that followed the collapse of the Axis. Each of these events, even for a President who had been in office for many years, would have been a time-consuming job requiring weeks of preparation and consultation.

For me, who had been suddenly catapulted into the midst of world-shaking episodes, who had to learn about the past at the same time that I had to act for the present and plan for the future, too little time was left for long-range domestic planning.

On September 6, 1945, I sent to the Congress one of the most important messages of my administration. It contained the twenty-one points of domestic legislation which, in effect, constituted the platform of my administration.

This twenty-one-point message marked the beginning of the “Fair Deal,” and September 6, 1945, is the date that symbolizes for me my assumption of the office of President in my own right. It was on that day and with this message that I first spelled out the details of the program of liberalism and progressivism which was to be the foundation of my administration. It was my opportunity as President to advocate the political principles and economic philosophy which I had expressed in the Senate and which I had followed all my political life.

In a sense, my twenty-one-point message was like a combination of a first inaugural and a first State of the Union message - it was to set the tone and direction for the rest of my administration and the goals toward which I would try to lead the nation. In my senatorial experience, I had followed the leadership and the political and economic program of Franklin Roosevelt. I had campaigned and been elected on Roosevelt’s platform. As a delegate to the Democratic convention, I had helped to write the platform of 1944. Now it became my responsibility to lead - to recommend legislation, to administer the government, and to use the prestige and power of the presidency to induce sound social and political action.

I had given these matters considerable thought during my first four months in office, even though war matters and foreign-policy problems had occupied most of my time. I actually started work on this comprehensive program while I was on my way home from the Potsdam conference. Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, the counsel to the President, had joined me at the conference and, returning home with me, was helping me prepare my report to the Congress and to the nation on the recently adjourned Big Three conference. One evening in my cabin aboard the Augusta, as I was putting the finishing touches on my report, I said to Rosenman:

“Sam, one of the first things I want to do after we get home and make this report is to get busy on my domestic program. I would like to submit most of it at the same time instead of on a piecemeal basis. Ordinarily that would be done in a State of the Union message next January, but I cannot wait that long. What I think I will do is to send up a message as soon as we can get one up. Will you start to get together the material and perhaps get up a rough draft?”

Judge Rosenman had been counsel to Franklin Roosevelt as governor and as President, and his personal friend and adviser for almost two decades. He was familiar with the facts and the philosophy of the New Deal, and I had persuaded him to stay on with me as counsel to the President.

“Fine,” he replied. “What in general are the things you would like to say?” And he reached for a pencil and pad. I reviewed to him my views on the social and economic problems that had faced the nation before the collapse of the early thirties, and my views on the measures which the Roosevelt administration had taken for economic recovery and social reform. I spoke then of my own plans and policies for future legislation - the general direction in which I thought the United States ought to go in the years after the war. As we discussed these long-range policies and the legislation I was suggesting to carry them out, Rosenman leaned forward.

“You know, Mr. President,” he said eagerly, “this is the most exciting and pleasant surprise I have had in a long time.”

“How is that?” I asked.

“Well,” he replied, “I suppose I have been listening too much to rumors about what you are going to do - rumors which come from some of your conservative friends, and particularly from some of your former colleagues up on Capitol Hill. They say you are going to be quite a shock to those who followed Roosevelt - that the New Deal is as good as dead - that we are all going back to ‘normalcy’ and that a good part of the so-called ‘Roosevelt nonsense’ is now over. In other words, that the conservative wing of the party has now taken charge. I never really believed any of that in view of your long voting record in the Senate - on the basis of which President Roosevelt was so anxious that you become the vice- presidential candidate, just in case anything happened to him.

“But this seems to settle it,” he continued. “This really sets forth a progressive political philosophy and a liberal program of action that will fix the theme for your whole term in office. It is one thing to vote for this kind of a program when you are following the head of your party; it is quite another to be the head of a party and recommend and fight for it.”

My attention to the framing of this important message, however, was interrupted by the sudden capitulation of Japan and the international problems that were involved. It was not until the end of August that I could get around to it again. By that time Rosenman had prepared a rough draft, and it had been on my desk for several days. It was a good beginning, too, and I worked on it for ten days - adding sections, eliminating some points, and editing the document thoroughly, I sent the final revised version to the printer, and when the galley proofs were ready I called Clark Clifford, John Steelman, John Snyder, Charlie Ross, and several other advisers. With Rosenman, we went over the proofs point by point, and many suggestions were made, some of which were adopted. Then I had the corrected proofs sent to the various agencies and Cabinet members for their comments. In this manner, I gave all the major officers in the executive branch a voice in the formulation of the message.

Most of my advisers agreed with the message, but some of my more conservative associates advised me against this definite commitment to such liberal measures. One of these was John Snyder, who at that time was Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Privately, he expressed his disagreement to me in the frankest and most explicit terms. But his loyalty and friendship for me kept him from voicing any public opposition. I listened very carefully to Snyder’s advice, for it has always been my policy to hear all sides on every question before coming to a decision, and now I listened particularly because of the high regard I had for Snyder’s judgment.

Early in my administration, I set out to achieve a balance between conservative and liberal points of view among the members of my Cabinet and other advisers. I wanted to be exposed to opposite poles of opinion in forming my own conclusions and making my own decisions on basic policy matters. With this in mind, I listened to various objections to the contents of the message, but I saw little reason to change it. On September 6 - four days after my proclamation of V-J Day - I sent the twenty-one points up to the Congress.

I considered the time of Congress’ reconvening as one of great emergency, as I stated at the beginning of the message. Reconversion from a wartime economy to one of peace raised great problems, and in the message I outlined the policy that had been laid down for re-establishing an expanded peacetime industry, trade, and agriculture as quickly as possible. I stated that I would follow eight specific policies:

(1) Demobilize as soon as possible the armed forces no longer needed;

(2) cancel and settle war contracts as quickly as possible;

(3) clear the war plants in order to permit contracts to proceed with peacetime production;

(4) hold the line on prices and rents until fair competition could operate to prevent inflation and undue hardship on consumers;

(5) hold wages in line where their increase would cause inflationary price rises;

(6) remove all possible wartime government controls in order to speed and encourage reconversion and expansion;

(7) keep only those controls that were necessary to help reconversion and expansion by preventing bottlenecks, shortages of material, and inflation; and

(8) prevent rapid decrease of wage incomes or purchasing power.

This was an ambitious program, and to show that it was not unrealistic I described in detail each of the twenty-one points and the legislative steps required to carry out the policies.

One of the key items in the program was the recommendation for a national reassertion of the right to work for every American citizen able and willing to work. It was a declaration of the ultimate duty of government to use all of its resources, if supply-and-demand methods should fail, to prevent prolonged unemployment. I felt that in normal times we had to look first to private enterprise to provide jobs and that the government should do all it could to inspire enterprise with confidence. But that confidence, I emphasized in the message, would have to come mainly from deeds, not words.

I asked for speedy action on the full-employment legislation to assure sustained confidence in our economy and prosperity. And I recommended legislation that would provide the machinery for a continuous full-employment policy based on the co-operation of industry, agriculture, and labor, and between the Congress and the Chief Executive, and between the people and their government.

I was convinced that along with full employment there had to be equal opportunity for all races, religions, and colors. This fundamental of our political philosophy should also be an integral part of our economy. The Fair Employment Practices Committee, which had operated during the war, was continuing through the transition period. I had already requested legislation placing this committee on a permanent basis, and I repeated that recommendation in the twenty-one-point message.

This was one of the lengthiest messages that a President had ever sent to the Congress. Containing approximately 16,000 words, it was the longest one since 1901, when Theodore Roosevelt had addressed the Congress with a 20,000-word message. I did not attempt to deliver it in person but had printed copies sent to every member of the House and the Senate. The actual reading of the message was done by reading clerks in both Houses.

On October 4, 1945, I sent a letter to various Cabinet members and agency heads, assigning to each specific responsibility for legislative measures necessary to carry out those portions of the message that properly fell within the department or agency affected. I asked from each a brief report on current developments on the first and fifteenth day of each month.

The message, in its formal proposals and in its language, contained the rudiments of the Fair Deal program. But within ten weeks after it was read before the Congress, I sent up several more messages, each adding new recommendations to be included in the Fair Deal. The new elements dealt with health insurance and prepaid medical care, nationalization of atomic energy, the development of the St. Lawrence seaway project, and federal aid to education.

The proposals I submitted in my first comprehensive domestic message were designed to be as liberal and as far-reaching as the prewar 1940 Democratic campaign. I was also determined to carry out the campaign pledges of 1944 to which Roosevelt and I were committed.

This legislative program promulgated in 1945 became the domestic goal of the administration. It was a reminder to the Democratic Party, to the country, and to the Congress that progress in government lies along the road of sound reform in our private-enterprise system and that progressive democracy has to continue to keep pace with changing conditions.

High on my list of priorities in the reconversion program was organizing the machinery of government to meet the new needs and responsibilities that had arisen. I had realized long before I became President that a reorganization of the executive branch was desirable and, in some respects, necessary. Common sense told me that a better-organized executive branch would operate more efficiently. History records many instances of former Presidents urging the Congress to provide the necessary legislation to make the executive branch operate along more efficient lines. My own experience had already demonstrated to me that substantial progress could be made in this respect through action initiated by the President.

The Reorganization Act of 1939 provided a method for improving the organization of the executive branch of the government and of the executive agencies. This act enabled the President to initiate improvements and changes, subject only to disapproval by each of the two Houses of Congress within a period of sixty days. There was also the First War Powers Act of 1941, which empowered the President to make necessary adjustments in the organization of the executive branch in relation to the conduct of the war. These two pieces of legislation provided the basis for many of the changes which President Roosevelt made during the war years.

The problem I now faced was that the First War Powers Act would expire automatically six months after the end of the war. I saw the need for legislation generally similar to the Reorganization Act of 1939 that would be of a permanent character and broad enough to include ail executive departments and agencies, yet flexible enough to permit any form of adjustment that might be necessary.

On May 24, 1945, I had sent a message to Congress requesting such legislation. I was advised by congressional leaders in June that action on my proposal would be delayed until the Congress had reconvened in the fall. In my message to the Congress of September 6, therefore, I again pointed out the urgent need for increased presidential authority over executive agencies. After some debate in both the House and the Senate, most of which concerned the exemption of specified agencies from the provisions of the act, a compromise bill was sent to me, and I signed it on December 20.

I had already issued executive orders abolishing a number of the wartime agencies. Many of these had been created by executive orders and were scheduled to terminate at the end of the war or at the President’s pleasure. Included in the list of the agencies terminated were the National War Labor Board, the Foreign Economic Administration, the War Production Board, the Office of Economic Stabilization, the Office of Censorship, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of War Information, the Petroleum Adminstration for War, and the War Shipping Administration. Others were retained for specially needed services during the reconversion period.

One problem with which I was particularly concerned in regard to strengthening the executive branch had to do with the existing vacancy in the office of the Vice President. I felt that the law governing the order of succession to the office of Chief Executive needed to be changed so that only an elective official of the government might succeed to the presidency upon the death of the President or his inability to fill the post. Under the Presidential Succession Law of 1886, the Secretary of State was next in line after the President and Vice President. Other members of the Cabinet then followed in order under that law. Since the members of the Cabinet are all presidential appointees, the law gave me the power to appoint my own successor until a new Vice President could be elected almost four years later. This is a power which I believe no President ought to possess.

Inasmuch as the President and Vice President are the only officers of the government elected by all the voters of the United States, I felt that the Speaker of the House of Representatives most nearly represents selection by the people, because, as a member of the House, he is elected to the Congress by the voters of his district, and as Speaker, he is chosen by a majority of the representatives from all of the states. Accordingly, I had recommended a bill providing for these changes early in my administration. It was passed by the House on June 29, 1945, but it failed to pass the Senate. Finally the bill passed and became law. I believe some way should be found to elect a successor to the Vice President when he takes over the office of President. It seems to me that presidential electors or the House of Representatives could function in such an election. I think the electors would probably do a better job of it.

But as we were shaping our plans to tighten up the executive branch, we had to deal with the major problem of inflation. Four days after the surrender of Japan, I had issued what amounted to a declaration of war against this new enemy of the United States. In an Executive Order on August 18, 1945, I set forth the guiding policies of the administration for stabilizing the economy during the reconversion period.

The order, which had its authority in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Stabilization Act of the same year, called upon the Office of Price Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture to work directly with the Director of Economic Stabilization to take all the steps necessary to keep the cost of living and the general level of prices from going up. I proposed several specific measures for combating both inflationary and deflationary influences.

The fact was that the administration was not seeking more government controls, but fewer. In a radio address on October 30, I made the statement that we should drop as quickly as practicable wartime government controls and that we must get back to the free operation of our competitive system. I made it clear that the only workable alternative to government price controls was the wholehearted co-operation of business, labor, industry, agriculture, the Congress, and the American public. We were ready to go along with a concerted voluntary program to fight inflation rather than resort to the use of controls. Inflationary pressures were still great, and danger signals were pointing to a further building up through the winter and spring.

By December, it was obvious that decontrol of prices would not work, at least until the emergency was less threatening. When the Second War Powers Act was extended for six months by the Congress during the last week of December, this brief extension would not meet the full needs. The economy was certain to be plagued by war-born shortages for a considerable time, and I urged further legislation to cover the period after June 30, 1946.

Despite the promises that had been made for the co-operation and teamwork of all parties involved in holding the line against inflation, I had to report to the Congress in my radio talk to the people on January 3, 1946, that not all these promises had been kept. It would be necessary to extend price and rent controls before their expiration date, June 30. In that message I sounded the warning that pressure groups were at work in the Congress and outside, constantly pushing, lobbying, and arguing for the end of price controls, regardless of the consequences.

Realizing that price-control adjustments would be necessary in certain cases where the Price Administrator should find that an industry was in a position of real hardship as a consequence of an approved increase in wages or salaries, I issued an Executive Order on February 14 that permitted such temporary adjustments. It was my desire to be fair to all sides, and the purpose of this order was to allow producers to increase prices in those instances where an increase was justifiable. This was an emergency increase only and required the joint approval of the Price Administrator, the Director of Economic Stabilization, and the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

The Office of Economic Stabilization had been abolished soon after the end of the war, but the growing economic problems made it necessary that I re-establish that wartime agency. On February 25, I signed the order calling it back into being and charged it with the responsibility for the administration of the government’s wage and price policy. Chester Bowles resigned as head of OPA to become Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization, and Paul Porter succeeded him as Price Administrator.

The obstructionist tactics of special privilege groups continued to impede our natural reconversion to stable prices. I understood their methods and their objectives from the beginning and tried to expose them at every opportunity. In an address to the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, which I made at Columbus, Ohio, on March 6, I said, “If certain interests were not so greedy for gold, there would be less pressure and lobbying to induce the Congress to allow the Price Control Act to expire, or to keep down minimum wages, or to permit further concentration of economic power.” These were strong words, but they were true.

As the date of expiration of the law drew nearer, I made another appeal in a public statement on April 3 for early extension of price control and for stabilization laws, which were desperately needed. Without them, I warned, our progress would be turned into economic chaos. However, the bill which Congress was then writing would not work. It would, in fact, throw the doors wide open to inflation. Nevertheless, the House passed it, and it seemed destined for Senate approval, as well.

Chester Bowles, who had supported me in my opposition to this “amended” price-control legislation, flatly charged that under the new bill effective control of prices and rents would be impossible. He submitted his resignation as Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization on June 28, stating, as one of his reasons, “Clearly I could not remain here in any event to administer the inflationary bill which the Congress is about to present for your signature.”

“In accepting your resignation,” I replied in part, “I want to assure you, and at the same time every American, that this administration will never give up the fight. We shall continue the battle against inflation with every weapon at our disposal, and shall not rest until this country has reached permanent high levels of production, prosperity and employment.”

On June 29, I vetoed House Resolution 6042 amending the price-control laws and extending them for another year. I did so because under this bill it was not a choice between continued price stability and inflation, but a choice between inflation with a statute and inflation without one.

My fundamental objection to the bill was to the numerous amendments that would raise the price of essential cost-of-living commodities. The most damaging of these was the price-raising amendment for manufacturers introduced by Senator Taft and operating in conjunction with the revised price-raising amendment for distributors introduced by Senator Wherry. While giving the delusion of protection, the bill would permit prices to pyramid spectacularly, thus providing a sure formula for inflation.

Reminding the Congress that since September 6, 1945, I had continued to request an extension of price-control legislation without crippling amendments, I now asked, on behalf of the American people, a resolution by the Congress continuing the current controls for the short period of time necessary to write a workable bill. I also explained to the nation, by radio, my reasons for considering this bill inadequate. I announced that I had submitted to the Congress a plan for price-control legislation which we regarded as fair and effective. I called upon every businessman, every producer, and every landlord to adhere to existing regulations, even though for a short period they might not have the effect of law. I also requested every employee of the OPA to stay at his battle station and continue the effort to make price control a success until the Congress adopted the kind of bill that could be made to work.

It was necessary for me to issue an Executive Order on July 1 providing for the continuation of certain functions and powers of the OPA which did not terminate with the expiration of the Price Control and Stabilization Acts. These functions and powers were delegated under Title III of the Second War Powers Act, which was, of course, still in effect. The order did not cover prices or rents.

I was asked at a press conference held on July 17, for a group of editors and executives of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, if I thought that the figures of rising prices since July 1 had borne out the predictions I had made in my veto speech. I replied that, according to the figures in the New York Journal of Commerce, it was very conclusively proven. I stated that I was sure that prices were going higher unless we got an OPA bill soon.

What had actually happened was revealed in a report to me from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As a result of the price spurt following the failure of the Congress to renew the Price Control Act, the index of prices had risen 25 percent during the first sixteen days of July. Steel scrap, copper, tin, rubber, burlap, and sugar were the only commodities in the index to show no price change since June 28. Most of these commodities, however, had their prices set by the government; without them, the index showed an increase of 35 percent in prices for all twenty-eight commodities listed.

On July 25, I signed a new act which extended the price-control law for another year, but I sent a message to the Congress explaining that I was approving the bill with reluctance. While it corrected some of the graver abuses of the Taft-Wherry amendments, it still fell far short of giving the government the necessary machinery for assuring the stability of prices. It was, nevertheless, a better bill than the one I had vetoed.

The threat of inflation not only presented one of the biggest domestic problems during the reconversion period, but it also created other economic conditions which caused me a great deal of concern. I was especially anxious about the effect which the attitude of several business groups toward price and rent control might have on production and employment.

I knew that full production would be our greatest weapon against inflation. But if manufacturers and producers chose to hold back goods and products in anticipation of higher prices, which inevitably prevail in postwar periods, they would slow down production and create needless unemployment.

That was my reason for requesting, in the twenty-one-point message to the Congress on September 6, 1945, full-employment legislation. My objective was to carry out, during the reconversion period, the economic bill of rights which had been formulated by President Roosevelt.

By full employment, I meant the opportunity to get a good peacetime job for every worker who was ready, able, and willing to take one. Making jobs, or making people work, was in no sense a part of the full-employment program. I did feel, however, that it was the responsibility of the government to inspire private enterprise with confidence by giving assurances that all the facts about full employment and opportunity would be gathered periodically for the use of all; assurance of stability and consistency in public policy, so that enterprise could plan better by knowing what the government intended to do; assurance that every governmental policy and program would be pointed to promote maximum production and employment in private enterprise; and assurance that priority would be given to doing those things first which stimulated normal employment most.

When I first proposed full-employment legislation, it was with the thought that we might have from 2 to 8 million people out of work in this country, if the pattern of the 1920s was any guide. No one really knew what would happen as far as American production and employment were concerned. But I wanted to exert every effort to prevent the terrible unemployment experiences of past decades.

The full-employment item was one of the twenty-one points on which I particularly wanted swift action, because the problem promised to grow as soon as wartime production was curtailed, and demobilization was stepped up. I urged John McCormack, the House majority leader, to speed the bill along, as the following letter indicates:

October 29, 1945

Dear John:

I am most anxious that the House Committee on Expenditures of Executive Departments report out the Full Employment legislation. Such legislation is of the utmost urgency and importance to the future of our nation.

I feel sure that the people in every state of the Union are for this kind of measure and are looking to their Congress to act.

It is already two and a half months since Japan surrendered. Reconversion of our plant to peacetime production is well along. The future is rushing toward us.

It is not enough to make a transition to temporary prosperity. We cannot repeat the mistakes made after the last war. This time we must build on a more solid foundation. We must take those steps now that will move us with firm purpose toward full employment and keep us there.

There are some who say, “Let’s wait and see what happens.” Such a course would be the height of recklessness. We must look ahead. If we wait for protracted mass unemployment to come upon us, we face another disaster. To no major situation has it been more applicable that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”

It is time that the people be reassured by the Congress that the government stands for full employment, full production and prosperity, not unemployment and relief.

I have talked to hundreds of workers and hundreds of our veterans. These men and women who have worked and fought to defend our American institutions expect us to take the steps necessary to translate their victory on the battlefield to peacetime jobs with security and opportunity.

Full employment legislation has the firm and complete support of my administration. The Senate has already passed such legislation, and I am sure that the House will want to make its position clear to the American people at the first possible opportunity.

I do not refer to any specific bill. I refer to the general purposes and principles of full employment legislation.

If this legislation could be reported out of committee so that it could be passed by the Congress by Thanksgiving, it would give that day particular significance for millions of American families who remember only too well the dark days of the depression, and want reassurance that we shall never again have another 1932.

Very sincerely,

Harry S. Truman

I was able to report at my November 29 press conference that total employment had already returned to the V-J Day level, after the greatest part of layoffs from war plants had been completed. Unemployment was so far less than had been expected, and employment in non-war activities was increasing at a satisfactory rate. Three and a half million men and women had been demobilized, and 93 percent of our plants had been reconverted from wartime to peacetime production.

By January 1946, the picture was even brighter. Despite numerous strikes and lockouts, 52 million workers were already employed in civilian jobs. With full employment calculated by some at 53.5 million jobs, it seemed that this goal would be reached much sooner than had been expected. There were still 2 million unemployed, but these represented no more than the fractional unemployment percentage which the country would have even with full employment.

The real problem was not how to achieve full employment. It was how to maintain it. That was the purpose of the Employment Act of 1946, which I signed on February 20.

While the full-employment bill had undergone some considerable changes in the process of being shaped into law, it still retained the essential features of my original proposal. The bill made it the responsibility of the federal government to co-ordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of maintaining conditions under which there would be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those seeking to work.

The act included a significant provision to facilitate cooperation between the Executive and the Congress in the formulation of policies and to accomplish the purpose of the act. It established a joint congressional committee consisting of seven members of the Senate and seven members of the House to study and report to the Congress on the President’s recommendations regarding the employment program.

While the measure was concerned primarily with the problems of unemployment and economic depression, one of its major provisions authorized the establishment of a Council of Economic Advisers within the Executive Office of the President. The job of the three-man council was to help the administration decide what the government should do to help the nation’s economy function smoothly and prosperously. The council was also assigned the duty of assisting and advising the President in the preparation of an economic report to be submitted to the Congress within sixty days after the beginning of each regular session.

Even before passage of the act, I had discussed plans for the economic council with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, with whom the council would, of course, have to work very closely. But it was not until July 1946 that the membership was named. I appointed Dr. John Davidson Clark, Leon H. Keyserling, and Edwin G. Nourse, the latter to act as chairman.

Dr. Clark came to the White House from the University of Nebraska, where he had been dean of the School of Business Administration. He had had a long career as a lawyer and had been a vice president of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana.

Leon Keyserling was a product of the New Deal. A Harvard law graduate, he had come to Washington in 1933, first as a lawyer with the AAA. At the time of his appointment to the Council of Economic Advisers, he was the general counsel of the National Housing Agency.

Dr. Nourse was the vice president of the Brookings Institution, a distinguished and highly respected research organization in Washington. Earlier, he had spent several years teaching economics and agricultural economics in the Middle West.

These were eminently qualified men. They differed greatly in point of view and, in the years ahead, were to disagree sharply. I knew this when I appointed them. I believe that I was well-advised in their selection by the very fact that they were not all of one mind.

In accordance with the provisions of the act, I transmitted an economic message at the beginning of each regular session of Congress. We fully realized that neither this legislation nor the machinery it established would automatically give the nation full employment and full production, or full protection from economic depression. That was a goal that could be achieved only by the concerted efforts of all segments of our society in cooperation with the government. But the full-employment act did give us a clear-cut declaration of national policy to enable us to attain many of our desired objectives. It gave positive expression to a deep-seated desire of the American people for a sustained attack upon the perennial problem of mass unemployment.

A proposed statement by Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson for my use in connection with the signing of the Employment Act of 1946, which I did not use at the time, but which is still in my files, contains the following paragraph, which reflects the hope and the confidence with which I regarded this legislation:

“Occasionally, as we pore through the pages of history, we are struck by the fact that some incident, little noted at the time, profoundly affects the whole subsequent course of events. I venture the prediction that history, someday, will so record the enactment of the Employment Act of 1946.”