War weariness leads to easy illusions. It was natural for people everywhere, when fighting ended, to hope that peace and harmony would come at once and without too much effort. But keeping the peace is a vast undertaking, and constant vigilance and effort are needed to keep conflicting interests from destroying it.

Many differences among the Allies had been subordinated during the war, but now that the common enemy was defeated, the problems of peace had brought these differences to the surface. We had already discovered how difficult the Russians could be, but in the months that immediately followed the war this was revealed even further.

Secretary Byrnes went to London in September to attend the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers set up by the Potsdam conference, and at this meeting Molotov proved to be much more difficult than he had ever been. On September 22, eleven days after the opening of the conference, Byrnes felt compelled to ask me to intervene personally with Stalin to prevent a breakup of the meeting.

I was spending a brief weekend at Jefferson Island in Chesapeake Bay when I received a message from Admiral Leahy through the code room aboard the Williamsburg. The admiral had just held a teletype conversation with Secretary Byrnes in London during which the Secretary of State reported that on the first day of the conference it had been unanimously agreed that France and China would participate in discussions, but could not vote on matters which did not directly concern them. Now, however, Molotov declared that he would attend no further meetings unless France and China were excluded from all matters where they were not directly concerned as signatories of an armistice agreement. Byrnes believed this to be only an excuse for Molotov to leave the conference and that the fact was that he was angry because the United States and Britain would not recognize Rumania. Byrnes suggested that I wire Stalin immediately, asking him to communicate with Molotov and not allow the Council to be broken up. Since I was en route to the Williamsburg at the time the teletype conversation took place, Byrnes and Leahy, realizing that the situation could not wait until my arrival at the ship, took the unusual step of anticipating my approval and agreed on a message to be sent to Stalin in my name. This read as follows:

“I am informed that Mr. Molotov is considering withdrawing from the Council of Foreign Ministers in London because of difficulty in reaching agreement as to the participation of France and China in discussions of the Balkan situation.

“I urgently request that you communicate with Mr. Molotov telling him that because of the bad effect it would have on world peace he should not permit the Council to be broken up.”

I was informed of this action by Byrnes and Leahy immediately upon my arrival at the Williamsburg, and I sent word to Leahy that I approved the message to Stalin. Meanwhile, Leahy had another teletype conversation with London in which Byrnes suggested that a more specific message be sent to Stalin. This was the second message:

“The Secretary of State has fully informed me of the difficulty encountered at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

“I agree that under a strict interpretation of the language of the Potsdam Agreement, France and China have not the right to participate in the construction of peace treaties unless they are signatories to the surrender terms or unless they are invited under paragraph 3 (2) of the Potsdam Agreement which provides that members of the Council other than the signatories may by agreement be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

“It is my recollection that at the conference table at Potsdam it was agreed during the discussion that members not signatory could be present and participate in the discussion but could not vote. It seems the first day the Council met, it was unanimously agreed that members not signatories could participate in the discussion, but could not vote. If we now change this rule and deny France and China because they are not signatories to the surrender the right even to discuss a matter in which they state they are interested, I fear it will create a bad impression. It will be charged that the three big powers are denying other members of the Council an opportunity even to present their views.

“Can’t we agree to regard the unanimous action of the Council on the opening day as an invitation to France and China to participate under the Potsdam Agreement? This is too small a matter to disrupt the work of the Council and delay progress toward peace and better understanding.”

In approving this message, I instructed Leahy to send the full text of both messages to Prime Minister Attlee at once. Later that day, I received a copy of a message which Attlee had sent to Stalin. It enumerated, in more detail than my message, the difficulties that had developed and ended with this appeal to the Russian leader: “. . . I earnestly hope that you will agree to authorize your delegation to adhere to the decision taken on September 11. After all it is peace we are endeavoring to establish, which is more important than procedure.”

Stalin replied in two messages. In the first one, he noted that he was still awaiting a reply to his own inquiry from Molotov but commented on the issue in such a way that it was plain that he would not concede anything. The second message, sent the following day, after he had heard from Molotov, made it clear that he intended to stand his ground. Here are these two messages:

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERALISSIMO STALIN, 22 SEPTEMBER 1945.

I received your message.

I inquired Molotov, but have not yet his answer. I became acquainted with the matter and came to a conclusion that if the question relates to the participation of France and China in the settlement of the Balkan affairs, these governments, according to the exact meaning of the decisions of the Berlin conference, must not be invited to participate.

FROM GENERALISSIMO J.V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT H. S. TRUMAN

I have received your second message regarding the Council of Ministers.

I have received today a reply from Mr. V. M. Molotov who informed me that he is acting in accordance with the decision of the Berlin Conference and considers that this decision should not be violated. On my part, I have to remind you that at the Berlin Conference neither a decision was adopted nor was it agreed among us that the members of the Council who did not sign the terms of surrender could participate in the discussions but could not vote. I consider that the position of Molotov to adhere strictly to the decision of the Berlin Conference cannot make a bad impression and should not offend anybody.

September 24, 1945.

I saw no reason for further immediate communication with Stalin on this subject. The conference adjourned on October 2. The newspapers called it a failure. But I do not feel that all such conferences should be expected always to produce immediate tangible results. It was another stage in our efforts to reach an ultimate understanding if we could. In politics, national or international, we often spend a good deal of time trying to find out just where we stand with the other parties. I have always felt that it does not help to keep a running box score on international events. Nor do I think it is ever helpful to have the newspapers shout “Failure!” when our diplomatic discussions do not result in the full retreat of the other nations. There are many issues that cannot be solved by the surrender of either side, but only through a reasonable compromise which does not sacrifice principles.

Russia was proving herself equally difficult in the Pacific. The British had raised no objections to the manner in which we handled the occupation in Japan and Korea. But Russia had, up to now, declined to take any part in the meetings of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, which had been convened in Washington in the fall. We had been unable to arrive at any formula to bring about Russian cooperation in the occupation of Japan.

This occupation was succeeding beyond our expectations, Dr. Karl T. Compton, the distinguished president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had spent some time in Japan in order to learn what advances Japanese scientists and technicians had made in the course of the war. Upon his return, he came to the White House and gave me a most enlightening account of the success of our occupation, which I asked him then to reduce to a memorandum.

“We were all very much surprised,” he wrote in his report, “at the apparent absence of rancor and the apparent eagerness of practically all the Japanese with whom we had contact to help us and to show us what they had been doing. We attributed this to several factors, such as (a) their inferiority complex which impels them to seek recognition and appreciation of their accomplishments, (b) the fact that the emperor had ordered their cooperation and hence they could give it without feeling of disgrace or disloyalty, (c) the fact that they have actually been a nation of serfs under a feudal system in which the military were the overlords. The ordinary civilian in Japan has therefore been shifted in obedience from one overlord to another, in the present case our own forces of occupation. To many of them this shift means very little provided their opportunities for livelihood are maintained under the new regime. General MacArthur stresses this latter factor.”

Edwin A. Locke, Jr., whom I had sent on an economic mission to China, had stopped off in Japan to talk with MacArthur.

“General MacArthur,” Locke wrote me on October 19, 1945, “gave considerable emphasis to the influence of Russia on Japanese affairs, expressing concern over ‘underground Communist agitation’ in Japan. Many of the so-called liberal elements of Japan are Communistic, he stated, and in his opinion, Japanese Communism is dominated from Moscow.”

Locke also reported that “General MacArthur mentioned several times his difficulty in obtaining what he felt were prompt and understanding responses to cabled messages sent to Washington by the Supreme Allied Command.” The general also told Locke that, in his opinion, policies relative to the control of Japan should for the most part be made in Tokyo rather than in Washington. The general “spoke feelingly” of the problems created for him by policy pronouncements made in Washington without prior consultation with him.

Washington, however, had cause to complain in turn about pronouncements made by General MacArthur without any clearance by his superiors in the national capital. On September 17, for instance, he gave out word that the strength of the occupation forces could be pared to 200,000 men. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and I first learned of this announcement through the press. This was not only embarrassing but actually affected the position the administration could take, both at home and abroad.

Twice - first on September 17 and again on October 19 - I had Marshall invite MacArthur to return to the States to receive the plaudits of a grateful nation. I felt that he was entitled to the same honors that had been given to General Eisenhower. And, like Eisenhower, he could have returned to his post after a brief sojourn here. But the general declined.

The first message sent General MacArthur by General Marshall was as follows:

“When the situation in Japan permits I suggest that you make a visit home. Undoubtedly a series of welcome celebrations will be proposed. This would amount to visits to several representative cities throughout the United States, including a stop in your state. Admiral Leahy has communicated with you in reference to a request from the Governor of Wisconsin that you come home there. In Washington the Congress would certainly invite you to address a joint session and there would be a reception or dinner by the President. Following all this you will probably want to consider a period of rest. Available is a completely staffed deluxe cottage at Ashford General Hospital which was formerly the Greenbriar Hotel at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. I believe your return should best be timed with the hearings of the Congressional Committees on the postwar national defense. They have indicated their desire to have you testify. I understand these hearings will be conducted during late October and November.

“Please let me have your views concerning such a proposed visit together with your desires. It would be well to consider bringing back in your party some representative enlisted men, as well as officers and naval officers in addition to members of your staff.”

On September 19 General MacArthur replied:

“Appreciate very much your message. I naturally look forward to a visit home, from which I have been absent more than eight years. The delicate and difficult situation which prevails here, however, would make it unwise for me to leave until conditions are far more stabilized than at present. I believe a considerable period of time must elapse before I can safely leave.

“I am deeply grateful for the courtesies that have been planned. When I do return, I would hope to bring with me as a group such officers as Krueger, Kenney, Kinkaid, Sutherland, Eichelberger, Whitehead, Barbey and others. I would not wish to return on such a visit without these men whose magnificently united efforts so largely brought about the defeat of Japan. Such a visit home, symbolizing the contribution to victory made by the commands with which I have been associated, would make me very desirous of avoiding complications in any way involved in appearances before Congressional committees on any extraneous issues such as postwar organization or any other matters. It would completely negative the character of the trip, involving me in controversial issues which I do not feel I should undertake at that time and under such circumstances.”

On October 19, 1945, I instructed Marshall to send this second message to General MacArthur:

“The President has asked me to inform you that he wishes you to understand that he would like you to make a trip home at such time you feel that you can safely leave your duties. Our liaison contact with Congress indicated that as soon as they have something fairly definite about your plans they wish to extend you a formal invitation to return and address the Congress in joint session. I shall do nothing further until I hear from you.”

Two days later General MacArthur cabled:

“I am deeply grateful and most appreciative of the general action of Congress and the sympathetic attitude of the President and yourself. Nothing ordinarily would please me more than to accept this invitation without delay. A realization however of the extraordinarily dangerous and inherently inflammable situation which exists here compels me to suggest that this visit be delayed. The desperation of the coming winter here cannot be overestimated. I would feel that I were failing in my duty and obligations were I to delegate this responsibility. Be assured that as soon as I feel conditions are safe I shall report myself with a heart full of thanks and gratitude. Please convey this message to the President.”

MacArthur’s conversation with Locke had also revealed that the general was increasingly concerned over developments in Korea. Reports which I had received from that country had, indeed, been discouraging. The 38th parallel, fixed originally as a mere convenience to decide who should accept the Japanese surrender in a given locality, had become a rigid boundary, with the Russians to the north permitting none of our people to see what was going on. Korea, instead of being helped to become a free and independent nation, was on the way to being divided. And there were reports that both in Korea and Manchuria, the Russians were stripping the factories and shipping the machinery to Russia. I therefore sent for Ed Pauley to make a study of reparations in the Far East. I asked him to find out for me, on the spot, whether the reports we received from Korea and Manchuria were correct.

On the other side of the world, trouble was beginning to brew in Greece. That country had been occupied by the Germans after a truly heroic resistance. It had suffered badly during the war, and its recovery was dangerously slow. It is more than likely that only the aid which UNRRA furnished had prevented a complete collapse.

Greece occupied a highly sensitive position. To the north, all its neighbors had fallen under the sway of the Communists, and even within Greece there was evidence that the Communists were ready to take over, with help from Communists abroad, whenever the situation degenerated from instability to chaos. State Department reports to me described the situation in Greece in the fall of 1945 this way: “Severe inflation, high governmental expenditure and low revenue, disrupted Civil Service, stagnant industry and trade, and widespread unemployment.”

The British, after V-E Day, had assumed the principal responsibility for aid to Greece, but it became evident that our help would be needed. I was unwilling to put American money into Greece, however, until there was some indication that the Greeks themselves would act to get their house in order. I authorized the State Department to inform the British government of our position and to send a note to the government of Greece that would urge them to adopt a program of economic stabilization. I added that the extent to which we would help would depend on the effectiveness of the Greek action.

In the Middle East, the situation in Iran had suddenly taken a turn for the worse. That country had served as a vital connecting link between us and the Russians during the war, especially in the earlier years, when it was important to reinforce Russian resistance against Hitler with Lend-Lease supplies. To secure the supply line, Russian troops bad been stationed in northern Iran, and British and American forces were garrisoned in the southern part of the country. Early in September, I had received the first reports of Russian actions that appeared to be undue interference in Iran’s internal affairs. Russian Army units were apparently stopping Iranian police from moving into areas where the Tudeh party, the local version of the Communists, was making trouble. Later that month, I was informed by the State Department that the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, which adjoins Soviet territory, was torn by unrest. A movement for autonomy seemed under way which was encouraged, if not actually inspired, by the Russians.

Agreement had been reached at the London conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946. But reports reaching me in October told of additional Russian troops being sent in. It all seemed to add up to a planned move on the part of the Russians to get at least northern Iran under their control. Together with the threat of a Communist coup in Greece, this began to look like a giant pincers movement against the oil-rich areas of the Near East and the warm-water ports of the Mediterranean.

These were ominous signs which called for every effort we could make through the United Nations to compel the Russians to carry out the London agreement and get out of Iran.

While these tensions were building up in Europe and in Asia, our policy was to act swiftly and decisively wherever trouble developed.

Ever since Hiroshima, I had never stopped thinking about the frightful implications of the atomic bomb. We knew that this revolutionary scientific creation could destroy civilization unless put under control and placed at the service of mankind. On August 8, 1945, I received a message from Prime Minister Attlee, who suggested that we issue a joint statement that might serve to reassure the world.

“There is widespread anxiety,” he observed, “as to whether the new power will be used to serve or to destroy civilization.” The economic effects of the discovery would probably not reveal themselves for some years, he pointed out, but its influence on international relations would be immediate. He urged, therefore, that we, as heads of the two governments, should without delay make a joint declaration of our intentions to utilize the existence of this great power “not for our own ends, but as trustees for humanity in the interests of all peoples in order to promote peace and justice to the world.”

In my reply, I assured the Prime Minister that I shared his views entirely. In fact, I had already prepared, for inclusion in my radio report to the nation on the Potsdam Conference, a declaration that it was our intention to make the new force of atomic energy into a weapon for peace.

Attlee cabled at once that “this statement . . . in fact amounts to a declaration of intentions of the kind I had in mind. In these circumstances I think that any joint declaration should wait until the means of control and the implications in the field of international relations have been more fully considered between those concerned.” Attlee advised that he intended to issue a statement for his government that would conclude with this declaration:

“President Truman in his broadcast of August 9th has spoken of the preparation of plans for the future control of the bomb, and of a request to Congress to cooperate to the end that its production and use may be controlled and that its power may be made an overwhelming influence towards world peace. It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to put all their efforts into the promotion of the objects thus foreshadowed, and they will lend their full cooperation to the end.”

We now had to find some way to control this new force. The destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was lesson enough to me. The world could not afford to risk war with atomic weapons. But until a practical and foolproof method of control could be found, it was important to retain the advantage which possession of the bomb had given us. In other words, it was now more than ever necessary to guard and maintain the secrecy of the bomb, and I issued the following order to the principal officials concerned as soon as hostilities in the Pacific ended:

15 August 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design or production of the atomic bomb; or in regard to its employment in military or naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the President in each instance.

Vigilance at the various installations of the Manhattan District was intensified. The basic facts about nuclear reactions - long known to world scientists - were made public in the Smyth report. But our possession of the secret of harnessing atomic energy already had far-reaching effects on our relations with other nations.

On September 11, Secretary Stimson sent me a memorandum setting forth his views on the atomic bomb and our relations with the Russians. Secretary Stimson had given a great deal of thought to this subject, since he had played an important role in the development of atomic energy. He proposed that the United States make a direct approach to Russia with a view of reaching some agreement about the future use of atomic bombs. “In my judgment,” he wrote, “the Soviets would be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of expressed or implied threats in our peace negotiations.

“My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purpose. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the U.K. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.”

Stimson did not propose that we “turn the bomb over” to Russia. As far as I was concerned, this was not a matter for discussion. I had decided that the secret of the manufacture of the weapon would remain a secret with us. At the weekly Cabinet luncheon on September 18, I started a discussion of atomic energy, as a result of which I decided that there would be one item only on the agenda of the next formal Cabinet meeting on September 21, and that was atomic energy.

This was Secretary Stimson’s last Cabinet meeting. His resignation was already in my hands, and immediately after the meeting ended, he left Washington, thus ending one of the most distinguished careers of public service to this nation. I was sorry to see him go. Stimson was an honest man. As was said of Enoch, he was a just man. He had the ability to express his views in plain language, I respected and trusted him.

I opened the meeting by calling on Stimson to present his views to the Cabinet. In his statement, he pointed out that the future of atomic energy would fall into two major areas: the further pursuit of scientific investigation, and the application of the newly won knowledge to industrial uses. It was his opinion that the scientific secrets were in fact not secrets - not in the sense in which the ordnance or weapon developments could be kept secret. The problem, Stimson said, was how to treat these secrets in order to assure the safety of the world, and he thereupon put forward the proposal contained in his memorandum to me.

Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, sitting in for Byrnes, who was in London, expressed general agreement with Stimson. He said safeguards were needed in any mutual sharing of scientific knowledge. American scientists would have to be fully informed of Soviet developments so that there would be no one-sided exchange in which we gave information and received none in return. He said the United Nations could not function in the atomic energy field without agreement among the United States, Great Britain, and Russia.

Secretary of the Treasury Fred M. Vinson took strong issue with the Secretary of War. Why, he asked, if we wanted to share any part of our knowledge of atomic energy, would we not also want to share all the military secrets? He was opposed to that, and he expressed fear that an exchange of information would be a one-sided affair, with our receiving little or nothing in return. Attorney General Clark agreed with Vinson. He said he saw no reason, with the world situation as it was, for sharing our secrets.

I interrupted to point out that we were not discussing the question of giving the secret of the bomb itself to the Russians or to anyone else, but the best methods of controlling bomb warfare and the exchange only of scientific information.

Postmaster General Bob Hannegan expressed his respect for Stimson’s judgment and supported his position. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal declared that the problem had a military as well as a civilian aspect and that both needed to be considered. He said that no precipitate action should be taken before further study, and he offered to submit a memorandum on the subject. I thanked him for this suggestion, and I asked the others present to submit written memoranda fully expressing their views. Secretary of Agriculture Anderson then went on with the discussion, saying that he was strongly opposed to revealing any scientific or commercial secrets any more than we should reveal the military secret of atomic energy. He added that he did not trust the Russians or their willingness to reciprocate in any arrangement. Henry Wallace said he wanted to know whether we were to follow the line of bitterness, as he put it, or the line of peace. He said that scientific progress could not be held down by man-made laws.

Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson, whom I would name a few days later to succeed Stimson, expressed agreement with Stimson. Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach, Major General Philip B. Fleming, Administrator of the Federal Works Agency, and Paul McNutt expressed, more or less, agreement with Stimson.

Leo Crowley said that it would be difficult to divorce other aspects of atomic energy from the bomb, and Julius Krug expressed the opinion that we ought to delay any decision for six months, to permit a general cooling off. John Snyder and Senator McKellar stated that they shared this view. The discussion had been lively, and it was this kind of interchange of opinion that I liked to see at Cabinet meetings. This Cabinet meeting showed that honest men can honestly disagree, and a frank and open argument of this kind is the best form of free expression in which a President can get all points of view needed for him to make decisions. The decisions had to be mine to make.

I had asked also for a memorandum from Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Bush said he believed a proposal to Russia for exchange of scientific information would open the door to international collaboration in the field of atomic energy and eventually to effective control, the alternative being an atomic bomb race.

“The move does not involve ‘giving away the secret of the atomic bomb,’” wrote Dr. Bush. “That secret resides principally in the details of construction of the bombs themselves, and in the manufacturing processes. What is given and what is received is scientific knowledge. Under an attempted closed system, and scientific espionage, it is probable that Russia would benefit to a considerable degree by our scientific progress, and we would benefit little by hers. Moreover, we cannot keep scientific secrets from Russia without also keeping them from the major portion of American scientists.

“We have a problem before us,” added Dr. Bush. “Can we work with Russia and trust Russia? To some extent this move would enable us to find out. But the general advantage is that this move, when it became known, would announce to the world that we wish to proceed down the path of international good will and understanding.”

Admiral Leahy sent me a memorandum incorporating the views of the Chiefs of Staff, although this did not reach me until a few weeks later. But I had already discussed the problems of atomic energy with Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, and the other Chiefs of Staff, and their views were known to me as I studied all the memoranda I had asked for at the Cabinet meeting of September 21.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States retain all existing secrets with respect to the atomic weapons. Although the principles of nuclear physics underlying atomic explosives are widely known throughout the world, they said, many of the technical procedures and manufacturing processes used for atomic weapons were still secret. And in the absence of agreement among the great powers on fundamental international political problems, they said, they felt the release of information on atomic weapons would speed up an atomic armament race and expose the United States to greater danger. The Chiefs of Staff urged that steps of “political nature should be promptly and vigorously pressed during the probably limited period of American monopoly” to bring about international control for restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons. “The possibility,” they concluded, “that other nations may succeed in developing atomic weapons in the not too distant future suggests that the question of political controls is a matter of immediate importance.”