THE SUMMER OF 1862
The order to send troops to Washington was certainly a very inconsiderate one.
—HENRY W. HALLECK, JULY 3, 1862
IN EARLY JUNE 1862, Halleck had not yet decided upon his next move. He stressed to Buell the importance of opening up communications with the long-suffering General Ormsby Mitchel—still deep in the South and knocking at the gates of Chattanooga—and warned that Buell’s army might soon be ordered in that direction.1 Securing logistical lines, not fighting the enemy, became Halleck’s focus, though the spring retreat of the rivers from their winter heights certainly merited some attention to this, as the Union would soon lose some of its ability to ship men and supplies via water.2
Indirectly, McClellan intervened to give Halleck some direction. Lincoln passed to Halleck a note in which McClellan once more referred to his earlier plans: “May I again invite your excellency’s attention to the great importance of occupying Chattanooga and Dalton by our Western forces? The evacuation of Corinth would appear to render this very easy. The importance of this move and force cannot be exaggerated.”3 Some of McClellan’s eagerness for such a move undoubtedly related to his own position on the Peninsula.
Others also pushed Halleck eastward. Tennessee governor Andrew Johnson wanted him to move into eastern Tennessee to support Unionists there and also pointed out a missed opportunity: “If there could have been more forces left in the middle part of the State it would have convinced the rebels that there was no chance of a successful rising up, and by this time the disunionists would have been put completely down, and the forces could have entered East Tennessee by way of Chattanooga, while General [G. W.] Morgan would have entered by way of Cumberland Gap, and the whole army in East Tennessee would have been bagged and the people relieved.”4 The failure by both Halleck and Buell to grasp the importance of Chattanooga had compounded Buell’s earlier failure to clear eastern Tennessee and push forces to Cumberland Gap. Both objectives had been within reach. Mitchel could have taken Chattanooga in April 1862. Union major general George H. Thomas, who was not noted for his aggressiveness, believed that, properly supported, he could have taken eastern Tennessee in October 1861.5 Accomplishing both of these things, particularly the capture of Chattanooga, would have laid the foundation for delivering a punishing and perhaps decisive campaign into the heartland of the Confederacy. Opportunities not grasped meant a longer war.
Halleck replied to Lincoln via telegram, insisting that he had made the decision to move against Chattanooga five days before and that the troops were already on the move.6 Halleck had begun receiving rumors of the Confederates ordering forces to Chattanooga on June 6 and now considered it an operational objective.7
Whether Halleck was acting because he saw the need to take Chattanooga or because the intelligence reports convinced him he had to meet Confederate concentration in a like manner remains a difficult question to answer. His correspondence on the matter points more toward a primary concern with opening communications with Mitchel. Halleck was probably reacting to enemy movements rather than seizing the initiative. Two things support this conclusion. First, previously Halleck had sent Grant to take Fort Henry not because he had some desire to actually act against the enemy but because of information (which later proved false) about the Rebels reinforcing the fort. Second, a note Halleck had sent Buell about the misuse of engineering troops as pickets reveals a fear about the movements of the Confederate forces. “This is all wrong,” Halleck had written, “his whole force not required in defense should work with all possible energy to open our communication with Mitchel, so that you can meet Breckinridge with superior numbers, as he has gone to Chattanooga.”8
Meanwhile, Mitchel and his subordinates were still fighting the good fight for Chattanooga and its approaches. On June 5, some of his forces under Brigadier General James S. Negley defeated a Confederate detachment and united with other Union troopers at Jasper, about a dozen miles from Chattanooga. Mitchel gave Negley the freedom to take the city if he could.9
Lincoln asked Halleck whether he deemed it possible in his drive on Chattanooga to also push with the Union forces under Brigadier General George Washington Morgan into Cumberland Gap.10 Halleck did not respond directly to Lincoln’s suggestion regarding the Gap, but he did wire his intentions. He would send Buell with four divisions to unite with Mitchel, telling Stanton that this move would be slow and consume most of Halleck’s logistical capability to keep it supplied.11 Instead of pursuing the Confederates deeper into Mississippi, Halleck proposed sending some of the forces not required to hold the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to the relief of General Samuel Curtis, commander of the Union forces in Arkansas, and the others to eastern Tennessee.12 Stanton replied immediately: “Your proposed plan of operations is cordially approved.” But then he brought up another issue, one particularly pressing at that moment: “I suppose you contemplate the occupation of Vicksburg and clearing out the Mississippi to New Orleans. If it should in any contingency become necessary, can you lend a hand to Butler?”13 At that very moment Farragut and Butler were making preparations for their second attempt at Vicksburg. Stanton could have directly ordered Halleck to support this move rather than merely inquired about it; he didn’t. Halleck therefore charted his own course, which included operations in Arkansas and eastern Tennessee that contributed little to achieving the Union’s political objective of forcing the South into line.
Confusion in the West
Region of Buell’s Advance and Mitchel’s Operations, Summer 1862. Adapted from Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1958), 559.
Halleck’s immediate concern remained restoring his lines of communication, particularly with Mitchel. He told Buell to do this, while warning that Buell’s entire army would “probably move west.”14 Mitchel had troops fighting on the outskirts of Chattanooga on June 7.15 This displeased Buell, who thought Mitchel lacked the troops to march on Chattanooga, and wrote that even if he took the city “he would jeopardize the force sent there and expose Middle Tennessee.”16 Mitchel thought differently. “I am of the opinion that every effort should be made to maintain the position we now hold,” he told Buell. “If we fall back we open the door to pour in troops at the exact point they are already determined to use, and if we once commence to fall back it is difficult to determine when we can halt.” Mitchel worried about reports of a looming Confederate move against Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Union communications line between Stevenson, Alabama, and Nashville.17
Mitchel told Halleck what he believed was coming. “Since the fall of Corinth the enemy, being relieved from the necessity of concentrating all his strength at that point, will be at liberty to advance through Cumberland Gap into Kentucky from Knoxville, across the mountains, into Nashville, and from Chattanooga into Northern Alabama.”18
In a reply to Stanton’s letter announcing the extension of Buell’s control over the eastern areas of Tennessee and Kentucky (and in which Stanton’s and Lincoln’s concerns about these areas were expressed), Buell gave his own view of the Union situation, a mirror image of Mitchel’s except in the degree of concern.19 Buell agreed it was time to act—and quickly—but saw no cause for worry because the enemy having its army in the vicinity of Corinth freed Union forces “for operations in Kentucky and Tennessee, where it is certainly very much needed.” He also explained what he had been trying to do in his command area: “My disposition of the troops left in Tennessee had in view the defense of Nashville and Middle Tennessee against invasion by the way of Chattanooga and Stevenson or directly from East Tennessee, and finally active operations against the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Decatur and Bridgeport, if circumstances favored it. The latter was very happily accomplished by General Mitchel’s activity and energy.” To Buell, the next things on the Union agenda should be making Tennessee safe and driving the Confederates entirely from the state. Moreover, instead of trying to take Chattanooga or help someone else do so, Buell criticized Mitchel for advancing to the city (arguing that doing so endangered Nashville) and then praised him for pulling back.20
On June 10, Halleck began the next phase of the war in the West. Abandoning his slavishness toward operational concentration, he split his army into three forces led respectively by Grant (Army of the Tennessee), Buell (Army of the Ohio), and Pope (Army of the Mississippi), the last of whom was almost immediately called to the Eastern Theater. They devoted the bulk of their time to repairing railroad lines.21
By mid-June Halleck began looking beyond Chattanooga, telling Stanton: “If the enemy should have evacuated East Tennessee and Cumberland Gap, as reported, Buell will probably move on Atlanta. It will probably take some time to clean out the guerrilla parties in West Tennessee and North Mississippi.” Halleck also had a column moving on Memphis, and if the expected two-pronged naval attack on Vicksburg failed, he would send forces against this objective after he reinforced Arkansas.22
He also gave Buell a clear operational objective: Chattanooga. Halleck had decided that seizing the city would put Union troops in control of the most important rail connection to Atlanta and prevent Confederate generals Edmund Kirby Smith and P. G. T. Beauregard from uniting their forces. Smith would be forced to “abandon East Tennessee or be captured.” Halleck also wanted Mitchel to leave troops at McMinnville, Tennessee, or along the railroad to Nashville to thwart any Confederate advance.23
These orders arrived too late. The day they came, June 11, Mitchel reported word of Confederate reinforcements in Chattanooga—more than 12,000— and warned (prematurely, it proved) of a Confederate offensive.24 Moreover, as always (and as expected), Buell insisted he faced insurmountable problems.25 Halleck urged him on.26
Lincoln, meanwhile, wanted to know how his cherished operations in east Tennessee were proceeding.27 Finally things were moving. On June 18, the same day Lincoln inquired, Brigadier General G. W. Morgan took Cumberland Gap, which he called “the American Gibraltar.”28 Halleck expected the Confederates to leave eastern Tennessee.29
At this moment, though, McClellan’s operations around Richmond were Lincoln’s priority.30 This resulted in an order during the last week of June for Halleck to detach 25,000 men and send them east.31 Halleck had earlier resisted such demands from Washington, discounting reports that elements of Beauregard’s army had been sent to Virginia.32 In fact, he insisted that Beauregard would attack him if his forces were weakened.33 Again, Halleck fought back, not like a lion, but like a mother hen protecting her nest: “I think under the circumstances the Chattanooga expedition better be abandoned or at least be diminished. If not, I doubt our ability to hold West Tennessee after detaching so large a force as that called for.”34
This pleased neither Stanton nor Lincoln. “The Chattanooga expedition must not on any account be given up,” Stanton wrote. “The President regards that and the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the capture of Richmond.”35 Lincoln also personally reiterated the request for 25,000 troops, though he left Halleck an out, telling him, “Please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga.” Moreover, the president stressed the importance of taking the railroads east of the key Tennessee city. Interestingly, in his hierarchy of strategic importance Lincoln ranked the seizure of pro-Union areas of eastern Tennessee, as well as the region’s railroads, as being on a par with taking Richmond.36 Yet in the larger scope of the war, eastern Tennessee mattered not at all; capture of the region’s railroads would be helpful but not decisive. Richmond was the arms-producing capital of the South and the logistical and command hub of the Confederate armies in the east. Its fall meant the loss of Virginia, enabling Union armies to push into North Carolina. Chattanooga, though, was not only an easier target but also a critical one. Its possession would allow the severing of critical rail lines while giving the Union a springboard for throwing an army into the heart of the Confederacy.
Lincoln’s orders angered Halleck. “The defeat of General McClellan near Richmond has produced another stampede at Washington,” he wrote contemptuously. He planned for the movement of four divisions eastward while predicting disaster on his front: “The entire campaign in the West is broken up by these orders and we shall very probably lose all we have gained.” He imputed to the Confederates immense powers of perception: “The enemy on Saturday advanced twenty-five regiments to Fulton and undoubtedly intend to cut that line. They know all.” He went on to forecast the loss of Arkansas and western Tennessee, and revolts in Tennessee and Kentucky that would make these areas more difficult to control than Missouri.37 Lincoln relented. He wanted reinforcements for the East, but not if they delayed the push against Chattanooga.38 The irony, of course, is that had Halleck and Buell taken Chattanooga when they had the chance, they would have been able to reinforce McClellan, or to press the South at other points.
On July 4, Lincoln was again asking Halleck for men, but this time only 10,000.39 Halleck polled his commanders. All agreed they could spare none. Halleck endorsed their decision, using against the president Lincoln’s own argument about not giving up territory more important than Richmond and not abandoning a Chattanooga campaign. Halleck suggested Lincoln remove troops from the Shenandoah Valley, “which at this time has no strategic importance… . A week or two may change the aspect of affairs here.”40
Lincoln bent again, telling Halleck not to send off any forces if it threatened his position or operations. He also sent Governor William Sprague of Rhode Island to talk to Halleck about coming east. Big changes were near for the Union high command.41
THE IMPENDING SHIFTin the Union military leadership was echoed in the South. When Braxton Bragg replaced Beauregard, Davis told him that his appointment to the West would probably be temporary.42 It turned out to be a very long “temporary”—too long in the eyes of many in the Confederacy.
On the day of his confirmation to command, Bragg received a note from Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles, in Grenada, Mississippi, asking whether or not he should hold on the line of the Tallahatchie River. Bragg’s response showed that some things, at least, had changed in the West. He ordered Ruggles not just to hold “but to take the offensive.” Moreover, he ordered Brigadier General John B. Villepigue, whom Ruggles had ordered to stay put, to move on Memphis, insisting that Villepigue had the troops to take the city and “if he can ought to do it.”43
Davis, for his part, was optimistic about the prospects afforded by the change of command, telling his wife, “Bragg may effect something since Halleck has divided his force and I hope will try.”44 W. P. Johnston, Davis’s aide-de-camp, reported that Bragg was considering a number of options but had not yet set upon a plan of attack.45 He would, but it would take some time, and be driven partially by the actions of the enemy, particularly Buell’s. Moreover, though Bragg inclined toward offensive action, he had a difficult time deciding where to strike. He dithered between pushing northward from his base in Tupelo, Mississippi, and moving eastward. A picture of hesitation, or perhaps indecision, emerges.46
On July 14, Kirby Smith wrote from Tennessee urging concentration to oppose the growing danger from the force under Buell. He believed that this “overwhelming” Union element could not be resisted without help from Bragg. Bragg had dispatched 3,000 men on June 26. Smith added them to his forces. He also took some aggressive action. He sent 1,300 cavalry under Colonel John Hunt Morgan to raid into Kentucky and three additional regiments of cavalry under Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest into middle Tennessee to delay Buell until Bragg arrived with help.47 Morgan, in a twenty-four-day, 1,000-mile ride through Union territory, captured garrisons and supply depots and took more than 1,200 prisoners. Forrest, a six-foot-two Mississippian who combined natural military genius with utter ruthlessness, caused so much destruction to the rail lines that the Union had to allocate two divisions to their protection.48 These raids inaugurated the beginning of a series of successful Confederate strikes at the extended Union supply lines—a key element of how the South would fight its war, especially in the West.
Buell began advancing with what Smith believed was 20,000–30,000 men. By July 19, Smith was convinced of the imminence of an attack on Chattanooga, as well as the impossibility of his holding it. He issued a number of pleas for help, telling Bragg, “Your co-operation is much needed. It is your time to strike at Middle Ten.”49 Meanwhile, Smith’s dispatch of Morgan and Forrest continued to pay off for the Confederacy when Forrest captured Murfreesboro. Davis asked Bragg whether he could cooperate “to save that important position and perhaps crush the invading detachments.”50 Morgan’s raid had also made a good impression on Lee, who wrote encouragingly to Davis about action by Bragg and Smith, as well as by W. W. Loring in Virginia’s southwest, believing the time had come for them to act.51 Lee’s unfolding counteroffensive against Pope undoubtedly influenced his suggestion.
Bragg, who realized the importance of Chattanooga to the Confederate strategic position, also received pressure to move eastward from his most important superior. In March, April, and June, his wife, Elise Bragg, pressed him to take the offensive. In a June 8 note she insisted that the worst thing to do would be to pursue a Fabian strategy of avoiding battle. Railroads and steam navigation of rivers, she argued, had made this approach to war-fighting obsolete. “Why not … take your army round into Tennessee & thence into Kentucky. You leave the enemy in your rear—true, but is not that better than an enemy in your midst, starvation.”52
A desire for offensive action, Buell’s movements, Kirby Smith’s pleas (some historians say manipulation), the successful raids by Forrest and Morgan, Davis’s prod, and finally his wife’s timely advice all combined to make up Bragg’s mind. This also determined one of the primary theaters of Civil War combat over the next two years.
Bragg told Davis he could not push from Tupelo but would go to Chattanooga, leaving the Tupelo line well defended, and immediately advance from there. He left Major General Earl Van Dorn at Vicksburg and Major General Sterling Price at Tupelo and wrote to President Davis that “Obstacles in front connected with danger to Chattanooga induce a change of base. Fully impressed with great importance of that line, am moving to East Tennessee. Produce rapid offensive from there following the consternation now being produced by our cavalry.”53 Here, in cooperation with the cavalry raids against Union supply lines, the Confederates found an opportunity.
Bragg began concentrating his army in Chattanooga.54 From Tupelo he also wrote to Beauregard, asking the sick-listed general’s opinion of his plan. He was combining his 34,000 men with Smith’s 20,000 to “take the offensive.” To Bragg, it was a choice of doing nothing in Mississippi or positive action in Tennessee. “My reasons are: Smith is so weak as to give me great uneasiness for the safety of his line, to lose which would be a great disaster. They refuse to aid him from the east or south and put the whole responsibility on me. To aid him at all from here necessarily renders me too weak for the offensive against Halleck, with at least 60,000 strongly intrenched in my front. With the country between us reduced almost to a desert by two armies and a drouth of two months, neither of us could well advance in the absence of rail transportation. It seemed to me then I was reduced to the defensive altogether or to the move I am making.” Bragg had high hopes for the future, believing that “before they can know my movement I shall be in front of Buell at Chattanooga, and by cutting off his transportation may have him in a tight place. Van Dorn will be able to hold his own with about 20,000 on the Mississippi. Price stays here with 16,000.”55 Bragg relayed the same information to Richmond.56 Davis, for his part, approved “heartily” of the plan and hoped that the combined columns of Bragg and Smith would destroy Buell, force the Union from Tennessee, and help the Confederates seize Kentucky.57
Smith also saw the same opportunities as Bragg, and even before Bragg’s decision he had urged him to come to Chattanooga with the bulk ofhis forces, rather than just send reinforcements. “There is yet time for a brilliant summer campaign,” he insisted. He offered to place himself under Bragg’s command and, using Chattanooga as a base, support him in an advance aimed at recovering central Tennessee and possibly Kentucky as well.58
Bragg arrived in Chattanooga on July 30. He believed it would be ten days to two weeks before his troops could take the field, but he and Smith quickly drew up a plan for a counteroffensive. Smith’s troops would attack Cumberland Gap. If he succeeded, they would throw their “entire force” into central Tennessee to isolate Buell’s army. If the Union tried to help Buell by sending troops west of the Tennessee River, “then Van Dorn and Price can strike and clear West Tennessee of any force that can be left to hold it.” Meanwhile, they counted on Confederate cavalry to keep the Union forces north of Tupelo, Mississippi, in check.59
Moreover, based upon information gathered during the raids by Forrest and Morgan, Bragg believed that there were deep wells of anti-Union feeling in middle Tennessee and Kentucky, “and nothing is wanted but arms and support to bring the people into our ranks, for they have found that neutrality has afforded them no protection.”60 Davis quickly developed high expectations for the Confederate counteroffensive, believing that if Buell’s railway support was broken as reported, Bragg could “fight the enemy in detachments.” With Buell defeated, Bragg, if he had the resources, could march on Nashville, forcing Grant either to retreat and give up central and eastern Tennessee or to pursue Bragg. “His Government will probably require the latter course,” he added shrewdly. This, Davis thought, would deliver both Kentucky and Tennessee.61
The plan that came together so quickly fell apart at an even faster pace. Kirby Smith promptly forgot his promise to serve under Bragg and began making changes to support his own agenda, which was within his power because he and Bragg commanded different departments. (Davis had refused an earlier request by Bragg to place Smith officially under Bragg’s command.) Instead of taking Cumberland Gap, Smith decided that he would simply cover it with part of his forces and march on Lexington, Kentucky, with the rest.62
Bragg now had to change his operational plan. He would push his forces into middle Tennessee, avoiding the strong Union positions at Murfreesboro (which was back in Union hands), Stevenson, and other spots, his army amid the forces of Smith and Buell. Bragg thought this would keep Chattanooga from Union hands because it would force Buell to retreat to cover his lines of supply. He warned Smith about the danger of moving too far into Kentucky when leaving Union troops in his rear before Bragg had met Buell’s army, and he reiterated the roles of Price and Van Dorn in menacing western Tennessee with around 25,000 men drawn from their forces. These were to at least pin the enemy and, if possible, retake territory. In the interim, Bragg wrote, he trusted that Smith could deal with the Union forces at Cumberland Gap.63
Bragg, at first unsure about the operational objective of his own advance, contemplated both Nashville and Lexington, initially leaning toward Lexington. Later he decided to try to “occupy such position as to threaten Buell and prevent his moving any forces to the rear” and, at Smith’s suggestion, to try to move behind Nashville. Optimistically, Bragg hoped to join hands with Smith, Price, and Van Dorn in Ohio. About Buell he echoed Davis’s remarks: “By rapid movements and vigorous blows we may beat him in detail, or by gaining his rear very much increase his demoralization and break him up.”64
Buell’s Lament, Halleck’s Rise
WHILE THE CONFEDERATES PLANNED his demise, Buell slogged on. This provoked his superiors in Washington, and Halleck passed along their criticism: “The President telegraphs that your progress is not satisfactory and that you should move more rapidly. The long time taken by you to reach Chattanooga will enable the enemy to anticipate you by concentrating a large force to meet you… . I communicate his views,” added Halleck, “hoping that your movements hereafter may be so rapid as to remove all cause of complaint, whether well founded or not.”65 Buell offered extended excuses, including blaming his subordinate, Mitchel.66
Halleck expressed sympathy, imputing Washington’s attitude to a lack of understanding of the length of the operational and defensive lines maintained by Union commanders in the West, as well as being unnerved by events on the Peninsula.67
But the Confederates were now making what should have been the easy Union capture of Chattanooga much more difficult. Buell had to deal with the Rebel cavalry raiders and began receiving reports of heavy Confederate troop concentrations in the city.68 Morgan’s raid proved such a distraction that Halleck took his goggling eyes off the ball. “Do all in your power to put down the Morgan raid even if the Chattanooga expedition should be delayed,” he told Buell.69 Three days later, reluctantly, Halleck decamped for the East and a new job as general in chief of the Union army.70
AS WE’VE SEEN, after McClellan’s removal from the post of general in chief, Lincoln and Stanton tried unsuccessfully to fill his shoes. Moreover, events on the Peninsula left matters in the West to Halleck (which meant that the Union campaign there lost energy and focus). Something had to be done. Lincoln consulted with Winfield Scott as well as with Pope, who served a short tenure as an advisor to Lincoln before returning to the field. Both gave the same answer: Halleck.71
The choice was in many ways understandable. Halleck had an excellent reputation among his peers. Moreover, despite the torpid nature of his drive on Corinth, in comparison to McClellan he seemed positively Mercury-like. His superiors congratulated him after Corinth’s fall, but Lincoln wanted to know what he planned for a sequel. Halleck suggested pushing Buell into eastern Tennessee, which sat well with Lincoln’s perceptions (somewhat misguided, as we’ve seen) about the region’s importance.72
On July 2, 1862, Lincoln’s summons to greater things reached Halleck. Old Brains grasped the chance slowly. He delayed his departure, insisting that Bragg would soon attack. But the pressure on him increased. Lincoln sent a messenger “to convince Halleck to come east with 50,000 troops for McClellan.” Halleck agreed to come (without the troops), but only if he was given command over all the forces in the Eastern Theater. Lincoln did Halleck one better, making him general in chief of the Union army.73
Halleck’s arrival in Washington coincided with the escalation of the war that followed the failure of the Peninsula Campaign. Union leaders and soldiers increasingly wanted to force the South to pay. On July 22, 1862, Lincoln issued an order that ratcheted up the Union army’s ability to make the South feel the impact of the struggle. General Orders No. 109 reiterated permission to seize property and supplies in Southern states for use in the war, but raised the conflict’s destructive tenor by allowing that “property may be destroyed for proper military objects.” Lincoln also ordered the employment of blacks as laborers, though with careful records kept, so that compensation could be made to their owners.74
On July 25, 1862, Congressman Elihu B. Washburne wrote to Grant about the growing popular sentiment for a harsher and more aggressive war against Southerners and their property. “They want to see more immediate moving upon the ‘enemy’s works,’ “ Washburne wrote. “In fact they want to see war.” Moreover, the administration had concluded that the contest had to be more forcefully and fully waged by all means possible, which meant using blacks as soldiers or laborers.75 This aligned well with the tougher mind-set growing within the ranks of the Union army.
Also indicative of this hardening in attitude toward the South and its supporters was one of Halleck’s August 1862 orders. He told Grant to “clean out West Tennessee and North Mississippi of all organized enemies,” even imprisoning and expelling “active sympathizers,” treating “that class without gloves” and seizing “their property for public use.” Moreover, he told Grant to take as much of his supplies as possible from the enemy in Mississippi. “It is time that they should begin to feel the presence of war on our side.”76 This pleased Grant greatly.77
On the heels of this, on August 15, Halleck’s General Orders No. 107 outlined procedures for seizing enemy property for government use and the organization and conduct of foraging parties. The order carefully defined the difference between pillage and “property lawfully taken from the enemy.” Accurate inventories had to be kept of all property confiscated, and officers were responsible for the actions of foragers. The military could seize suitable “private property for the subsistence, transportation, and other uses of the army.”78
UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON Halleck got sucked into the increasingly desperate and confused Union situation in the East. “I have had no time to attend to matters in the West,” he wrote his friend Sherman on August 25, “and they seem to be going on badly.”79 McClellan and Virginia exerted their twin influences, leaving Union forces in the West rudderless. Grant, writing from Corinth, tried to initiate action in his sector, telling Halleck that most of the Rebels to his fore had departed, and suggesting throwing the Confederates back to Columbus, Mississippi.80 But nothing came of this, and Grant lapsed into a period of inactivity, one likely imposed by the fact that Halleck still officially controlled the Union forces Grant now led. Old Brains also kept Grant on a tight leash.81
Halleck eventually gave some thought to the West, contemplating a movement against Vicksburg as early as August 7. He also wanted to reorganize and focus Union forces for effective action. He was far from optimistic: “As Missouri and Tennessee are now seriously threatened and raids made into Kentucky, every available man in the West is required in the field. McClellan is barely able to hold his position, and the forces here are insufficient for the defense of Washington.” He added, “I find our entire Army so divided and scattered that very little can be done till they are more concentrated or largely reinforced. I am trying to do both.”82 His solution, as always: concentrate— and wait.
But in Washington, Halleck found things worse than he had anticipated. This meant there would be no immediate offensive action. He told Sherman at the end of August that they would need to wait until the troops were organized. In the meantime, they should hold their positions and prepare.83Halleck was now looking toward the fall for any significant move.
He also had to immediately deal with the administration’s anger. Should Buell fail to act, his removal would be imminent. “There is great dissatisfaction here at the slow movement of your army toward Chattanooga,” he wired Buell. “It is feared that the enemy will have time to concentrate his entire army against you.”84 That was exactly what happened. Two months after the fall of Corinth, Buell had still not reached Chattanooga, despite inklings since the end of July that something was up. Instead, Bragg stole a march on the Union.85
AS BRAGG PREPARED HIS OFFENSIVE, Van Dorn, the Confederate commander at Vicksburg, fought his war. When Memphis fell and the Confederates abandoned Fort Pillow, the Union launched an attack against Vicksburg with a flotilla of more than forty gunboats. The bombardment began on July 12. Van Dorn sent the ironclad Arkansas against the Union vessels. By July 27 the Union’s gunboats withdrew after more than two months of trying and failing to reduce the city.86
In the wake of this Van Dorn ordered an attack on the Louisiana capital, Baton Rouge, about 40 miles south of the mouth of the Red River. Van Dorn believed that it was critical to hold the Mississippi at two points in order to facilitate the supply of Vicksburg and guarantee communications with the Trans-Mississippi. Holding Baton Rouge and Vicksburg would provide these two points and open navigation on the Mississippi and Red rivers while increasing opportunities for an attack on New Orleans.87
Later, Van Dorn believed that had they had more troops, they potentially could have retaken New Orleans. His problem was that he had little chance of gathering more men. Even as early as 1862, the Confederacy was already stretched with regard to its manpower availability, particularly in the West. Van Dorn reported that there were plantations without any white males.88
Davis replied that while “the importance of the object at which you aim cannot be overestimated,” no more troops from Bragg’s army would be forthcoming. Davis did promise to send him something and gave advice about where to obtain more men.89
Van Dorn put the Baton Rouge mission in the hands of the former vice president turned major general, John C. Breckinridge, with 6,000 men and some gunboats. They intended to mount a joint attack from the land and water.90 Breckinridge began his offensive on July 30. Sickness quickly reduced the force by 3,000 men. Finding himself outnumbered and the Union forces supported by three gunboats, he appealed for help from the Arkansas. Promised that the Arkansas would appear on the morning of August 5, Breckin-ridge launched his attack in the dawn hours, certain that the Arkansas would soon arrive. It never did; it broke down on the way, only 4 miles from Baton Rouge, and ran aground. The attack failed. And so did a Confederate effort at joint warfare.91 The next day, its crew destroyed the disabled ship, though not before giving her one last chance to engage the enemy. Lieutenant Stevens, her commander, “cut her from her moorings, fired her with his own hands, and turned her adrift down the river. WiThevery gun shotted, our flag floating from her bow, and not a man on board, the Arkansas bore down upon the enemy and gave him battle. The guns were discharged as the flames reached them, and when her last shot was fired the explosion of her magazine ended the brief but glorious career of the Arkansas. ‘It was beautiful,’ said Lieutenant Stevens, while the tears stood in his eyes, ‘to see her, when abandoned by commander and crew and dedicated to sacrifice, fighting the battle on her own hook.’ “92
In the wake of his defeat Van Dorn ordered positions established at Port Hudson as Confederate troops held Baton Rouge “in menace.” After two weeks of this, the Union abandoned the Louisiana capital to the Confederates. Control of Baton Rouge opened 200 miles of the Mississippi to Confederate navigation, as well as the Red River, which provided a water connection between the eastern and western parts of the Confederacy.93
The fact that this was going on at the same time that Bragg was shifting his forces to Chattanooga in preparation for a sweeping Confederate offensive demonstrates the divided nature of the Confederate command structure in the West, making cooperation more difficult and encouraging scattered responses. The South needed to concentrate its forces in the region. Instead, it frequently made poor use of them, mounting local attacks too often unrelated to any larger purpose. The Southern cause would have been better served by preserving the Arkansas for the defense of Vicksburg and sending Breckinridge’s men to strengthen Van Dorn’s prong of Bragg’s coming offensive. By trying to do too much, the South accomplished too little.
ON JUNE 29, 1862, BUELL ARRIVED in Huntsville, Alabama, with his army. Mitchel met him. Mitchel wanted to immediately push into eastern Tennessee, sending 10,000 men to take Chattanooga and the nearby railroads, while other similarly sized units attacked Rome, Georgia, and the railroads west of Knoxville. Meanwhile, Morgan, then at Cumberland Gap, would capture the rail lines “presumably around Knoxville.” The pair argued for three days; Buell refused to decide. Fed up, Mitchel resigned. He was ordered back to Washington, given a new command at Port Royal, and, tragically, succumbed to yellow fever a few months later.94
The failure of Union commanders to follow through on the western tenets of McClellan’s original grand plan in a timely manner, as well as the personal sloth, indecision, and general strategic and operational incompetence of Halleck and Buell, haunted Union offensive efforts in the West. The result: in the summer of 1862 great opportunities slipped through Union hands.
The Confederates had their own problems and their own failings. Their command structure sin the West was broken. No one ruled, so little got done, and what was accomplished was done slowly, such as Bragg’s decision to move to Chattanooga, or done badly, as was the case with Van Dorn’s attempt on Baton Rouge. The command problems so apparent in the summer would not be resolved in the fall, when they would matter even more.
The summer also produced something else: Lincoln decided that it was imperative to control the Mississippi. “I will tell you—I am determined to open it,” he told Senator Orville Browning on July 24, “and, if necessary will take all these negroes to open it, and keep it open.”95
The Confederate offensives, Summer–Fall 1862.
