The Value of Knowledge
If the primary aim of inquiry is the acquisition of true beliefs, where does this leave knowledge? Isn’t it more valuable than mere true belief? But if so, why? And if knowledge is really more valuable than true belief, does this mean that it rather than true belief should be the primary aim of inquiry? On some accounts of knowledge, it is surprisingly difficult to deal with such questions.
If, for example, justification traditionally understood or some close cousin of it is thought to be the property that turns true belief into knowledge, and if it is assumed, as it often is, that having justified beliefs is valuable because it increases one’s chances of having true beliefs, then as a number of philosophers have observed, knowledge would seem to be no more valuable than true belief. If something A is valuable only as a means to B, A + B is not more valuable than B alone.1
Suppose, on the other hand, that justification is said to be valuable for its own sake, and it is this that explains why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Problems then arise from a different direction. Having justified beliefs is essentially a matter of putting one’s own intellectual house in order. There are different accounts of what this involves, but on any of these views it is problematic to understand why knowledge should be the primary goal of inquiry, since this would seem to make inquiry too self-involved. When one inquires and deliberates about an issue P, the focus shouldn’t be on oneself but on acquiring truths about P.2
Consider an analogy with ethical motivation. Imagine a philanthropist whose contributions to relief efforts are motivated not by a desire to relieve suffering but rather a desire to be virtuous. This philanthropist is not cynical in the manner of counterfeit do-gooders, that is, those who merely want to be seen as virtuous, but it is still awry, because her focus is on herself as opposed to others. One’s intellectual motivations are analogously awry to the degree that one’s inquiries and deliberations are aimed at producing beliefs that are justified as opposed to ones that are true.3
If the property that turns true belief into knowledge is said not to be justification but the reliability of the faculties or methods that produce the belief, similar problems arise. The most natural construal of why it is valuable to have reliably produced beliefs is that they are likely to be true. But then, a reliably produced true belief P is no more valuable than a true belief P that is not reliably produced. Kobe Bryant on average makes over 80 percent of his free throws, whereas Shaquille O’Neal makes only 50 percent, but a successful free throw by Kobe is not thereby more valuable than a successful one by Shaq.4
Each of these accounts is seeking an X distinct from true belief that is capable of turning true belief into knowledge, but in each case the proposed X leads to puzzles or at least awkward questions. Proponents of the accounts try to untangle the puzzles and smooth over the awkwardness,5 but it is a warning sign that there are problems at all. It ought not to be so difficult to explain both why knowledge is a proper aim of inquiry and why knowing P is usually more valuable than merely having a true belief P.
The view that knowledge is adequate information does better. Much better. There are straightforward ways of explaining both. I say “ways” because the explanation comes in two stages.
To know P, one cannot lack important true beliefs. Thus ordinarily, when one knows P, one has not only a true belief P but also a substantial number of neighboring true beliefs. Why then is knowing P usually more valuable than merely having a true belief P? Because on the assumption that true belief is valuable, one has at least as much and usually more of this valuable commodity when one knows P than when one merely has a true belief P. There is no need to look for something beyond true beliefs to explain why knowledge is usually more valuable than mere true belief. True beliefs themselves provide the explanation.
Similarly, there are no difficulties in explaining why both knowledge and true belief are the aims of inquiry. The two blend into one another. Having true beliefs is the aim of inquiry, and having knowledge is not something distinct from this. It is a matter of having enough true beliefs.6
Two additional points, both familiar, need to be folded in to get to the next stage of explanation. The first is that it is more important to have true beliefs about some issues than others, and the second is that the standards of importance are not solely intellectual.
It is, for example, more important to have true beliefs about how cells age than about the number of grains of salt in the saltshakers in the apartments of the Breevoort Building at 11 Fifth Avenue in New York City. As a result, it makes sense to devote more time, energy, and resources to the former than the latter. Yet, the former is neither intrinsically more important than the latter nor more important solely for intellectual reasons. Its greater importance derives rather from its being more closely connected in varied and complex ways with the central values, needs, and purposes of human lives.
In a parallel fashion, the considerations relevant for determining whether S knows P are varied and complex, and include practical as well as intellectual considerations. This can make it difficult to resolve disputes over whether S knows P, but it also points the way to a deeper explanation of the value of knowledge.
If S has a true belief P but does not know, there are important truths she lacks. The kind of importance at issue in assessments of knowledge is importance with respect to having adequate information about the situation in question, where the full range of human concerns and values is potentially relevant in appraising what counts as adequate. In particular, the stakes involved in being right or wrong about P help determine the amount and kind of information S needs in order to have adequate information. There is thus a conceptual link between knowledge and the core concerns of human lives, but no such conceptual link between mere true beliefs and these concerns. It is this difference that most fully explains the differential value of knowledge and true belief.
Consider the point through the lens of the question, why is a set of true beliefs about P that rises to the level of knowledge usually more valuable than an equally large set of true beliefs about P that does not constitute knowledge?7
If true beliefs were valuable only by virtue of being either intrinsically valuable or connected with other true beliefs that are intrinsically valuable, there would be no easy answer to this question. If however a set of true beliefs acquires much of whatever value it has through its associations with the various goals, purposes, and needs that make up human lives, and if the concept of knowledge is itself linked to a set of true beliefs having such associations, there is a straightforward answer to this question. If S has a large number of true beliefs about P but they do not constitute knowledge, she lacks truths about P that are important. By contrast, when her beliefs about P rise to the level of knowledge, there are no important gaps in her information about P and hence her beliefs are ordinarily more valuable.8