THE MOUNTAINS OF ARIZONA and New Mexico are high, steep, tangled, rocky, slashed by deep canyons and gorges, and for humans on foot or horseback, except the Apaches, virtually impossible to penetrate except at lower elevations and along the rivers and creeks that flow from their heights. South of the international boundary, similar ranges of mountains carpet both Chihuahua and Sonora, dominated by the towering Sierra Madre separating the two Mexican states. The mountains of Mexico resemble some of the most rugged north of the border, but the Sierra Madre dwarf all others in tortuous topography.
No Indian tribe mastered a hostile environment more perfectly than the Apaches. Trained from birth, they could live off the land or by plundering neighboring tribes or European newcomers. Man, woman, and child, they could move swiftly through desert and mountain, enduring long journeys without rest, food, or water, intimately familiar with the terrain and skilled in employing it as a weapon in warfare, hiding in mountain recesses unseen and unapproachable by anyone not welcomed. They could “read” the land in every aspect, from the meaning of the unnatural position of a stone or a twig to virtually invisible sign on boulders or rocky slopes. Ever on the alert, with acute vision, hearing, and smell, rarely could they be surprised.
Of all Apache tribes, the Chiricahuas excelled in these traits. The final two years of liberty from American oversight vividly illustrated Chiricahua command of the environment.
The Chiricahua breakout of May 17, 1885, demonstrated the incredible ability of Apaches to move fast, night and day, avoid troops except in ambush, wreak havoc on ranchers and their stock, and go where they wanted. All the Chiricahua leaders who led in the outbreak possessed these virtues. All moved in a body at times and divided into several bodies when pressed too closely. As he had shown in the abduction of Loco in 1882, Geronimo proved especially adept at confronting the challenges, exercising influence both when traveling with his own followers or when traveling with all the components.
Well aware that troops and scouts would take their trail quickly, the Chiricahuas journeyed swiftly through the night of May 17. Before reaching Eagle Creek on May 18, they glimpsed pursuers behind them. Descending to and crossing the creek, they scaled steep, canyon-scored mountains on the other side. Pushing through these mountains on May 19, the women and children scattered, to rejoin later. To slow soldiers behind them, the men took the most forbidding course possible through rocks and gorges, leaving a dim trail designed to prevent pursuit on horseback and exhaust pursuers on foot. White men they encountered they killed and robbed. After traveling all night, on May 20 they crossed Blue Creek and, coming on a cattle ranch, burned the house, killed two men, lanced the cattle, and made off with the horses and mules. Traveling up the San Francisco River on May 21, they entered a recently settled area and killed every white traveler they encountered.
Somewhere along this river, they paused to rest, Chihuahua’s and Naiche’s people in one group, those of Mangas and Geronimo in another. A raiding party returned with plunder, and one of the three Chiricahua scouts who had deserted told Chihuahua that Lieutenant Davis and Chatto had not been killed, as Geronimo had assured Chihuahua and Naiche on the evening of the breakout. Enraged over the deception, Chihuahua vowed to kill Geronimo. Rifles in hand, Chihuahua, his brother Ulzana, and the scout deserter headed for Geronimo’s group. But someone had tipped off Geronimo, and by the time Chihuahua reached their resting place Geronimo and Mangas had gathered their following and fled, shortly turning east and south on Devils Creek. Chihuahua continued north up the San Francisco River, intending to hide in the mountains until the excitement quieted and he could slip back to the reservation. Naiche had traveled with Chihuahua but was in Mangas’s group when they fled the wrath of Chihuahua and was forced to stay with it. He sent word to his wife to take their child and return to the reservation.1
Geronimo’s role in the last outbreak reveals an unflattering element of his character. Because other chiefs refused to follow his lead, he deceived them. If Lieutenant Davis and Chatto had been assassinated, Chihuahua, Naiche, and others would be forced to join in Geronimo’s outbreak or bear the consequences. Geronimo may have thought his scheme had been carried out when he told the other chiefs. He may simply have expected it to happen and told the other chiefs prematurely. In any event, such efforts to manipulate the other leaders show that Geronimo was willing to intrigue against his own people as well as white authority.
General Crook received his first intimation of an impending breakout at his Prescott headquarters on the afternoon of May 17, 1885, when Captain Pierce telegraphed from San Carlos that Lieutenant Davis, at Turkey Creek, feared that the Chiricahuas were preparing to bolt the reservation that evening. Of course, if Crook had received Davis’s telegram of May 15, pigeonholed at San Carlos by Captain Pierce, Crook would have been alerted to brewing trouble two days earlier and probably could have headed it off. Because the telegraph line between Fort Apache and San Carlos had been cut, Crook did not learn until the afternoon of the May 18 of the breakout of the previous evening. With the Fort Apache garrison already in pursuit, the general began ordering troops from other Arizona forts into the field and warning citizens to the east. He also established contact with Colonel Luther Bradley, commanding the District of New Mexico.
Shortly after the Chiricahuas entered New Mexico and turned toward the Mogollon Mountains and the Black Range, General Crook moved his headquarters to Fort Bayard, New Mexico, the better to move his troops and cooperate with Colonel Bradley. During these days he learned once again what he would always preach—regular soldiers were no match for Apaches:
The whole country north, east, and west of Fort Bayard was filled with troops. No less than twenty troops of cavalry and more than one hundred Indian scouts were moved in every direction either to intercept or follow the trails of the hostiles. But with the exception of the capture of a few animals by the Indian scouts under Chatto, and a slight skirmish with their rear guard by the troops from Apache under Captain Smith on May 22, in which three of his command were wounded, the Indians were not even caught sight of by the troops, and finally crossed into Mexico about June 10. … In the twenty-three days from the outbreak until the Indians crossed into Mexico, every possible effort was made by the troops, which were pushed to the limits of endurance of men and animals, but without result other than to drive the Indians out of the Black Range and the Mogollons, and also to save the lives, probably, of many ranchmen and prospectors.2
On June 5, 1885, Crook moved his headquarters from Fort Bayard to Deming, New Mexico, on the Southern Pacific Railroad. He knew that another campaign into Mexico such as he commanded in 1883 would be necessary. The railroad and telegraph line afforded the means of organizing and assembling the troops and scouts.
After confounding all the troops and scouts General Crook and Colonel Bradley could mobilize against them in New Mexico, Geronimo and the other leaders slipped across the boundary into Mexico. Geronimo and Mangas crossed at Lake Palomas, Chihuahua. Chihuahua, after surprising and destroying a cavalry supply base in Guadalupe Canyon, continued down the San Bernardino River to the Bavispe River. Naiche followed and joined Chihuahua. By mid-June 1885, all had hidden themselves in favorite refuges in the Sierra Madre. Chihuahua and Naiche made camp on a ridge at the junction of several deep canyons northeast of Oputo, although Naiche soon left to find Geronimo. Farther south, northeast of Nácori Chico, Geronimo and Mangas hid in their old haunt of Bugatseka.
Contrasting with their masterful evasion of troops and scouts in New Mexico’s mountains after the breakout of May 17, 1885, once in Mexico the Apache leaders grew careless. They knew Crook would be after them once again, and soon. They knew he would use Apache scouts, recruited from the White Mountains if not their own Chiricahuas. They could not have forgotten how doggedly he ran them down in 1883. Yet twice in the summer of 1885 they allowed themselves to be surprised in their Sierra Madre bastions.
On June 23, little more than a month after the breakout, Chihuahua and his people went about their morning business at their ranchería laid out on a ridge northeast of Oputo. Heavy rain had fallen all night. About 9:00 a.m., as the sun broke through the overcast skies, volleys of gunfire from two directions swept the camp. The surprised Chiricahuas scattered. A man quickly hid the families in a cave, and then joined the other men in scrambling down the intersecting canyons with Indian scouts following and shooting at them. After several miles, as the men scattered farther, the scouts called off the chase and returned to the ranchería. They easily found the hidden women and children. Among the fifteen were Chihuahua’s entire family and Ulzana’s wife and two children. Chihuahua and his men had left behind not only their families but the camp containing the horses, guns, and ammunition seized from the cavalry supply camp at Guadalupe Canyon.
Before this disaster, Chihuahua’s men had raided for cattle on the Yaqui River. Likewise, Geronimo and Mangas had raided extensively along the Sonora River. But they happened to be in their stronghold at Bugatseka on August 7. Early in the afternoon they heard a mule bray and, too late, took alert. Indian scouts swept to the attack, dropping five to the ground dead (three men, one woman, and one boy about thirteen). Geronimo scooped up his young son and dashed into surrounding brush. Recognizing him, the scouts directed a heavy enough fire to cause him to drop the child, but he escaped. As with Chihuahua, the families were not so fortunate. Fifteen women and children fell captive to the scouts. They included three wives and five children of Geronimo’s—two daughters wounded, one in an arm, the other in a lung. Among the captives also were Nana’s wife and the wife of Mangas, Huera (the expert maker of tiswin whose provocative rhetoric caused much of the trouble that led to the outbreak of May 17). Horses, mules, and all the camp impedimenta had also been abandoned.3
The stock and other camp equipage forfeited in June by Chihuahua and in August by Geronimo and Mangas accounted for little loss. They could readily be replaced by another raid. But for all the leaders, the capture of their families represented a devastating blow. Apache families were very close, as illustrated time and again by the furor over Apache captives held by Mexico. Depending on where the families had been taken after their seizure, getting them back ranged from impossible to doubtful. At the same time, two such calamitous surprises instilled a new caution that would make the task of the Apache scouts more daunting.
By June 7, 1885, General Crook knew that he confronted another grueling campaign into Mexico and had moved from Fort Bayard, New Mexico, to Deming, where he could communicate quickly by telegraph. He had already summoned Captain Emmet Crawford from his regiment in Texas. He arrived at Deming on June 6, together with a train from the east bearing thirty Indian scouts and a troop of cavalry. Crook assigned Crawford to lead an immediate campaign into Mexico. He would move by rail to the west, then strike south and unite with Lieutenant Britton Davis. With Chatto and sixty scouts, Davis had been busy trying to flush the Chiricahuas out of New Mexico’s mountains. Crawford and Davis merged as directed and with the cavalry troop and two pack trains crossed into Mexico, headed for the Sierra Madre.4
As Crook relocated his field headquarters west to Fort Bowie, he recognized that circumstances had changed since his 1883 campaign. The Southwest had been filled with even more stockmen and miners, and their newspapers unrelentingly blasted Crook for not stopping Apache outrages. Moreover, the election of 1884 had placed Democrat Grover Cleveland in the executive mansion. William C. Endicott held the position of secretary of war. General Sherman had retired and been succeeded as head of the army by Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan. Neither Cleveland nor Endicott knew anything about Indians. Sheridan knew nothing about Apaches, but he relied heavily on Crook, a West Point classmate. Even so, he was skeptical of Crook’s use of Indian scouts, and he found both Cleveland and Endicott hard taskmasters as reports, most exaggerated, reached the president of Apaches running wild in the Southwest.
Crook’s strategy in 1885 differed from that of 1883. Instead of personally leading an expedition into Mexico, he would send two columns of Indian scouts under experienced officers. Captain Crawford had crossed into Mexico on June 11, but the second column, under Captain Wirt Davis, did not leave Fort Bowie until July 7. Crook had sent Lieutenant Gatewood and his scouts into the mountains of New Mexico to make sure the Chiricahuas had all left. Wirt Davis needed Gatewood’s scouts because they knew the Sierra Madre. When they finally arrived, he headed for Mexico with one hundred scouts, his own troop of cavalry, and a pack train. Gatewood returned to Fort Apache, exhausted and out of favor with Crook. He would remain there during this campaign.5
For the expeditions into Mexico, Crook relied almost exclusively on the Apache scouts. For this mission he had no confidence in regular cavalry. Only Apaches could find Apaches in the Sierra Madre. Crawford and Davis could use the regulars however they wanted, but the few who participated engaged primarily in escorting the mule pack trains on which Crook relied for transporting supplies from the base at Lang’s Ranch, near the border at the southern end of the Animas Valley, New Mexico. If fact, the astute Crawford ultimately dispensed with cavalry altogether, entrusting Chatto to employ the Apache scouts as he saw fit.
Crook hastened to assure his Washington superiors that he intended to make prominent use of the regulars. Indeed, he had to do all he could to bar the Chiricahuas from raiding back into the United States and further infuriating the public. He therefore stationed three lines of troops from the border to the railroad. In New Mexico Colonel Bradley did the same.6
Crook knew that the Apaches could slip through his border blockade whenever they wanted, so he placed his main reliance and attention on the ability of Captains Crawford and Davis to surprise the Chiricahuas in their mountain hideouts. Thus on June 23 Crawford’s scouts, led by Chatto, surprised and attacked Chihuahua northeast of Oputo, and on August 7 Wirt Davis’s seventy-eight scouts under Lieutenant Matthias W. Day surprised Geronimo at Bugatseka. Crook decided to hold the families and other relatives seized at both places in camp at Fort Bowie as a bargaining chip.7
Furious over the loss of his family in the attack led by Chatto on June 23, 1885, Chihuahua cut a bloody path west and northwest across Sonora, sometimes uniting with Naiche, sometimes separating from him. On July 23, Chihuahua even struck into Arizona southwest of Fort Huachuca, seizing cattle and horses but also testing whether he could break through to Fort Apache and look for his family. Almost at once troops struck his mountain camp and seized twenty-four horses. Chihuahua then discovered two scout units on his trail and, dropping all his stolen stock, veered back into Mexico, reuniting with Naiche in the mountains southwest of Cananea.8
Meantime, following their surprise at Bugatseka on August 7, the followers of Geronimo and Mangas spent several days rounding up their people. The two then parted, Mangas to lose himself in the Sierra Madre at Juh’s old refuge of Guaynopa, across the summit in Chihuahua. Geronimo and Nana pushed directly east, into the Sierra Madre. Knowing that scouts would be on their trail, they chose the roughest mountain heights to cross the summit and descend into Chihuahua. Daily downpours soaked the Chiricahuas but made their trail harder to follow.
Geronimo had probably already decided to try to recover his family, whom he wrongly assumed had been taken to Fort Apache. Near San Buenaventura, Chihuahua, he turned southeast, crossed the Santa Clara River, and hid the women and children in the mountains to the east. His horses broken down, he raided around the town of Santa Clara and obtained fresh remounts. He then pushed directly north, toward New Mexico. Near Janos, Nana turned into the mountains to the northwest of the city.9
Once again, Geronimo would cross the border and race for the Mogollons, from which he could pounce quickly on the Chiricahua camp at Fort Apache and retrieve his family. General Crook had been astute in holding them at Fort Bowie.