Chapter 13
“A Miserable Business”
Grant’s actions had been assisted by the dash of Col. Benjamin Grierson’s column of cavalry, which had departed La Grange on April 17 and cut its way through Mississippi and Louisiana. The cavalry tore up railroad track, cut telegraph lines, and made its way back to Union lines at Baton Rouge. Grierson’s Raid distracted Pemberton’s attention away from Grant as he began his inland campaign against Vicksburg.2
The now-dependable supply route provided by the Mississippi River made it easier to maintain the Army of the Tennessee, which had largely lived off the land during its inland thrust. However, the army would still suffer from a number of deprivations as well as the stifling heat of a Mississippi summer while it invested the embattled Confederate garrison.
Grant’s 50,000-man army would eventually form a 12-mile ring around Vicksburg. Whether early in the campaign or weeks later, the men in blue felt little comfort gazing at the imposing defenses of Vicksburg. Even today, the intervening 150 years have done little to dull the overpowering presence of the fortifications. Grass, shrubs, and trees barely conceal the ugly scars cut into the land by the men who built the Vicksburg line, and the trenches dug by those seeking to pierce the defenses. The distance between the Union and Confederate lines shrank with each passing day, as the Union engineers inched their way closer and closer, tightening Grant’s grip on the city.
A staff officer in McPherson’s corps, which included the 17th Illinois, described what the Union army faced. “The approaches to this position were frightful—enough to appall the stoutest heart,” he affirmed. “A long line of high, rugged, irregular bluffs clearly cut against the sky, crowned with cannon which peered ominously from embrasures to the right and left as far as the eye can see. Lines of heavy rifle-pits, surmounted with head logs, ran along the bluffs, connecting with the fort, and filled with veteran infantry.”3
Once he had driven Pemberton’s 30,000 men inside the Confederate lines, Grant decided to move quickly to complete his victory while his opponent was off balance. He knew Confederate president Jefferson Davis would not sit idly by and let Vicksburg fall without a fight, and that Davis was already cobbling together an “Army of Relief” to move against Grant’s rear. This command, now under Gen. Joseph Johnston, posed a real danger to Grant, especially if Johnston was able to combine his army with Pemberton’s command. The existence of this threat in his rear convinced Grant that he did not have the time to engage in siege operations against Pemberton. He would have to take the city by assault. That meant the men of the Army of the Tennessee had hard fighting in their immediate future.4
Outside Vicksburg, the 17th Illinois caught up with the other regiments of its new brigade under Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson. Stevenson was a lawyer, former legislator, and a veteran of the Mexican War who had started his Civil War service as the colonel of the 7th Missouri. In 1861, Stevenson’s 7th Missouri was known as the “Missouri Irish Brigade” and demonstrated it was willing to fight anyone—Rebel or Yankee. A soldier of the 13th Illinois, writing of the 7th’s arrival in camp in August 1861, reported, “It is said there are 800 men, and the first day they came here there were 900 fights.” Writing about Stevenson, another observer noted, “He is a person of much talent, but a grumbler. He was one of the oldest colonels in the volunteer service, but because he had always been an anti-slavery man all the others were promoted before him. This is still one of his grounds for discontent…. Thus all the world will not go to suit him.” The 7th Missouri remained part of Stevenson’s brigade, along with the 8th and 81st Illinois, the 32nd Ohio, and Josiah’s 17th Illinois.5
McPherson’s troops occupied the center of the Union line roughly opposite the Confederate strongpoints of the 3rd Louisiana Redan and the Great Redoubt, where the Jackson Road crossed into the enemy defensive line. William Sherman’s XV Corps was deployed on McPherson’s right and held a line running north all the way to the Mississippi River. John McClernand’s XIII Corps held the left flank.
Determined to take the city immediately, Grant launched his first assault against the Vicksburg defenses on May 19. He ordered Sherman to attack a heavily fortified position northeast of the city known as the Stockade Redan. At 2:00 p.m., Sherman’s troops lined up along what would turn out to be an appropriately named route: Graveyard Road. Despite outstanding bravery and good fighting, the effort failed miserably. Sherman lost 942 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Confederate losses were perhaps 200.6
Though the attack did not come close to success, Grant decided to expand the effort with a more general assault by all three of his corps. Over the next two days the Federals inched their lines closer to the Vicksburg fortifications. On the evening of May 21, the army received orders to make the attack the next morning at 10:00 a.m. Union artillery would pound the Rebel lines prior to the attack. Grant ordered that only skirmishers and sharpshooters would be allowed to fire their weapons on the approach, and that all others would advance with their bayonets fixed but not stop to fire.
Stevenson’s brigade assaulted the Great Redoubt on May 22, the most impressive fortification on the entire battlefield. The bastion sat astride the Jackson Road, a main artery connecting Vicksburg with the state capital at Jackson. At its tallest point the fortification measured 21 feet. To further impede a Yankee assault, at the base of the fort the Confederates had cut a ditch 14 feet deep and eight feet wide. Troops from Louisiana, the 21st and portions of the 22nd regiments, garrisoned the fort, which was also directly supported by three artillery pieces.7
When he heard the attack plan, William Alexander, George Smith’s “bunkmate for a year,” replied, “George, if we go into the fight tomorrow I will be killed.” Alexander was 26 years old and a farmer who had signed the company’s muster sheet immediately after Smith. His bunkmate admitted feeling the same premonition, but “prayed to God and promised him that if spared I would serve Him the rest of my life.”8
Others in the regiment had similar forebodings. Men took the opportunity the evening before the attack to write letters home. They handed the letters, along with other personal effects, such as photographs and rings, to the unit’s cooks, who would send the articles to the families if the soldier fell in battle.9
Union artillery bombarded the Confederate strongpoints throughout the night of May 21 and into the daylight hours of the 22nd. Stevenson, meanwhile, moved his troops up to within 200 yards of the Rebel lines into a sheltered ravine. “We drove in the enemy outposts at an early hour then held an advanced position until the storming column was formed,” recalled Smith.10
Most assaults during the period of the Civil War used linear tactics, meaning the assaulting troops lined up in ranks, like a wave designed to roll over opposing lines, and move forward. For this attack, however, Stevenson formed his men into columns, deeper than they were wide. He placed the 7th Missouri and 81st Illinois on the right of the formation, with the 8th Illinois and 32nd Ohio on the left. Josiah and the men of the 17th were deployed in front as skirmishers, moving and shooting at the Confederate line to force the defenders to keep their heads down and make it more difficult for the gray artillerymen to work their pieces against the attacking columns. Major Frank Peats commanded the 17th in the absence of Lt. Col. Smith, who had been commanding the regiment in the absence of Col. Addison Norton, who was in a Louisiana hospital. About 30 or 40 of Stevenson’s men carried ladders to climb the steep earthen walls and get into the works.11
For one of the first times in military history, members of the attacking forces synchronized their watches so all the assaulting columns would move at the same time. The Union assault began promptly at 10:00 a.m. In Stevenson’s brigade, the 17th made the initial advance, followed by the other four regiments. Josiah commanded the right wing of the thinly deployed regiment. William McClanahan of Josiah’s Company F, now promoted to lieutenant, led skirmishers in front of the 17th’s advance. In his report, The enemy, wrote Stevenson, opened with their artillery, “literally sweeping down officers and men.” Iron and lead struck down six successive color bearers of the flag of the 7th Missouri.12
Making matters worse, the fire from some of the Union guns supporting the assault fell short of the enemy lines. Acting Sgt. Frank Smith of the 17th’s Company C claimed that shrapnel from Capt. Samuel DeGolyer’s battery of Michigan artillery wounded several men in the attacking column. “You can imagine that our yells back at DeGollyer’s were not honey sweet,” he added.13
The columns stormed forward to the base of the Rebel fortification. The Irish of the 7th Missouri planted their green flag with its Irish harp in the ditch. Above them fluttered a nearly identical flag, held by Confederates of Irish heritage also from Missouri. One of the Confederates opposing Stevenson’s brigade was Capt. David Todd, President Lincoln’s brother-in-law.14
Stevenson’s men reached the base of the Rebel fortifications only to discover, to their horror, that the ladders carried forward to climb into the fort were too short. Unable to scale the steep and tall walls the attackers huddled at the base of the Great Redoubt, understandably reluctant to retreat across the open field that was now being inundated with artillery iron and small arms fire. Some found that huddling against the walls of the fortification kept them out of the line of fire—until Confederates inside the fort began rolling hand grenades into the ditch, where they exploded among the throngs crowded against the walls. Finally, with the 17th Illinois providing cover, the survivors of Stevenson’s brigade withdrew across the killing fields to where they had begun the attack. Both George Smith and William Alexander survived the attack.15
At 3:00 p.m., while the men of the 17th were being relieved by other troops, a Confederate bullet fulfilled Alexander’s deadly premonition. According to Josiah, Alexander “was shot in the left lower jaw—the ball entering in the upper lip and passing out under the ear. He was carried off the field alive but died immediately.” Smith recalled that he missed the call to retire and was not present for roll call. The man sent to relieve him was killed immediately.16
General Stevenson commended the regiment for “services rendered in protecting their comrades in the advance and … the hot fire poured into the enemy as the column retired.” The men had shed much blood for no gain. Four of the brigade’s officers and 30 enlisted men were killed, along with 15 officers and 230 enlisted men wounded, all in about half an hour. “Oh it is a miserable business,” lamented a member of the 8th Illinois. “It is an almost if not entirely human impossibility to take this fort from this side.” Three men of the 17th, including Alexander, were killed, and 22 others wounded. There is no reliable record on the number of Confederate casualties.17
Sergeant Duncan’s log entry of the next day was as mournful as it was brief. “Last night berried Will Alexander and Thos. Nelson.” Thomas Nelson, a recruit who had joined the unit in October 1862, was a native of Nova Scotia. He was married and had enlisted at the age of 28, but missed the fights at Fredericktown, Donelson, and Shiloh. The Vicksburg assaults were his first real battles. Nelson was shot through the left temple and died instantly. “He rested his head on his knee and remained in this position,” observed Josiah.18
The 77th Illinois, absent Andie Lindsay, attacked another fortification on May 22 called the Railroad Redoubt. The regiment was part of the line commanded by General McClernand, under whom the 17th had fought at Fort Donelson and Shiloh. Although the Union troops pushed near the top of the redoubt, they were ultimately as unsuccessful as the rest of the Federal assaults. The 77th Illinois lost heavily, with 130 men were killed or wounded.19
The assault effectively marked the end of McClernand’s time with the Army of the Tennessee. During the battle, McClernand claimed he was on the verge of a breakthrough and requested reinforcements. He mismanaged the additional troops sent to him, and afterward made disparaging remarks about other troops and officers not under his command. The targets of his vitriol included Grant himself. McClernand’s behavior added to the bad blood that already existed between he and his commander, and Grant took the opportunity to relieve him on June 18.20
Frank Peats had served under McClernand at Shiloh and had an equally bad opinion of that officer. McClernand, Peats wrote his wife, was “the most intensely selfish man I ever knew.” He added that he “has a violent temper which he does not try to control, vindictive and overbearing makes him insolent to his peers and abusive to his subordinates.” Peats also expressed concern for McClernand’s young wife, who had accompanied her husband throughout the campaign, complete with baggage and servants. “I am afraid under present circumstances his retirement will not prove conducive to domestic felicity,” he added, “for he is very irritable and his connubial abilities are not very fascinating.”21
After the May 22 assault, Grant had no choice but to resort to siege operations in an effort to “outcamp the enemy.” He had Vicksburg surrounded and would now see how long the Rebel garrison could last. The men of the Army of the Tennessee “went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will,” wrote Grant. The boys from Warren County, Illinois, dug into the earth around Warren County, Mississippi, as a deadly game of sharpshooting replaced frontal assaults. There was no respite for men on either side, either from enemy lead and iron or from the unrelenting Mississippi weather. The men of the 17th Illinois would be without any kind of shelter until the city surrendered.22
A few days after the fight of May 22, Union troops spotted a white flag over the Confederate parapet. Hopes soared that the end was at hand. Unfortunately for the tired, dirty, and hungry men on both sides, it was not to be. Pemberton’s men could simply no longer stand the stench of the unburied Union soldiers who had perished in the fighting and still lay unburied beneath the walls where they fell. Pemberton wanted a truce to bury the bodies.23
1 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 629-631.
2 Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War, 155.
3 Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South, 450.
4 Shea and Winschel, Vicksburg is the Key, 167-170. None of the troops for Johnston’s Army of Relief would come from Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. In early May Lee won a decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville. After convincing Davis that an invasion of the North was the best way for Lee to help Pemberton, Lee moved north into Pennsylvania, an offensive that created near-panic in cities such as Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia. His move ended in disaster at Gettysburg (July 1-3) and did not help Pemberton in any meaningful way. Coddington, Gettysburg Campaign, 5-6.
5 Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 798; Kaiser, Letters from the Front, 151; Robert Girardi, The Civil War Generals (Minneapolis, MN 2013), 172.
6 Shea and Winschel, Vicksburg is the Key, 146-147.
7 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 407-412; Drawings of the defenses in the collection of Vicksburg National Military Park.
8 Smith, History of the 17th Illinois.
9 Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War, 169.
10 OR 24, pt. 1, 719-720; Smith, History of the 17th Illinois.
11 Ed Bearss, “The Fall of Vicksburg,” in Civil War Times Magazine (July 2006), 25.
12 Monmouth College, Oracle, 39-40; OR 24, PT. 1, 719-720.
13 Letter from Frank Smith in the possession of the Vicksburg National Military Park.
14 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 414.
15 Shea and Winschel, Vicksburg is the Key, 150; Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 439; OR 24, pt. 1, 719-720.
16 Letter from Josiah Moore in the June 12, 1863 edition of the Monmouth Atlas; Smith, History of the 17th.
17 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 414; Bearss, The Vicksburg Campaign: Unvexed to the Sea, 822. Other attacks were made all along the lines, but none succeeded. Union casualties were reported as 502 killed, 2,550 wounded, and nearly 150 missing, roughly equally divided between the three corps. Rebel losses are unknown, but probably did not exceed 500. Peats, who had led regiment in the failed effort, told his wife that he blamed the failure on the “want of cooperation among the general officers.” In that same letter, Peats noted that Smith returned to command that same day. Letter from Frank Peats to wife, May 28th, 1863
18 Illinois Civil War Muster and Descriptive Rolls Database; Letter from Josiah Moore in the June 12, 1863 edition of the Monmouth Atlas.
19 Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War, 172-174.
20 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 431-433.
21 Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant, 189; Letter from Frank Peats to his wife, June 24, 1863.
22 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 532; Pension papers of Robert Duncan, NARA.
23 Shea and Winschel, Vicksburg is the Key, 151. Grant was still concerned with the Confederate Army of Relief forming around Jackson and Canton in his rear under General Johnston. A pair of divisions were allocated to cover his rear and protect against any surprise attack. As the siege dragged on, Grant was reinforced by the IX Corps under Maj. Gen. John Parke, which was assigned to also keep Johnston at bay. Sherman was put in overall command of the effort, and Brig. Gen. Frederick Steele replaced him at the head of XV Corps. Johnston delayed moving too long and complained that he did not have enough men to make a difference. After some preliminary movements in late June, too late to do anything of substance, Pemberton surrendered on July 4. For more information, see Jim Woodrick, Civil War Siege of Jackson, Mississippi (Arcadia Publishing, 2016).