If few people nowadays have heard of the Zeebrugge Raid, even fewer have heard of the Dover Patrol. Yet the Dover Patrol was one of the most important features in the First World War and is closely connected with the Zeebrugge Raid. The Dover Patrol was a miscellany of escort craft whose task was to protect the transports which conveyed Allied troops and stores to and from France. The magnitude of this task will be appreciated when it is realised that by 1918, at Dover alone, one million wounded men had been evacuated and every day 12,000 to 15,000 men were transported. All this was through a Channel littered with wrecks, full of mines and vulnerable to enemy submarines, destroyers or air attacks. By the end of the war some 10,000,000 men had passed through Dover, and even more through Folkestone.
To protect this vital traffic the Dover Patrol had an assortment of shipping, which for most of the time comprised an obsolete battleship, a few cruisers, a varying number of destroyers, a cross-channel steamer which had been converted into a floating sea-plane base and a motley collection of trawlers, drifters, armed yachts and motor launches.
This little fleet was based at Dover and Dunkirk. It performed magnificently and went beyond the normal limits of human endurance, so much so that after the first few encounters German coastal shipping was reluctant to try any venture likely to bring it into contact with the Patrol. (On one occasion, the night of 13th February 1918, a German destroyer did take a chance and undetected, through signalling mishaps, sank several drifters and a trawler before streaking for home again; the success of this daring venture was largely due to the fact that British ships in the Channel could not believe that any surface craft heard or seen in the dark could be anything but their own.)
Not least of the achievements of the Dover Patrol was maintaining an illuminated route from England to France – protected by minefields and surface craft. Although an illuminated route was itself partly vulnerable, its drawbacks were nullified by the fact that the presence of this lighted strip made it impossible for German craft to pass on the surface through the Channel. Initially attempts to stop German submarines using the Channel route to the Allied transatlantic shipping lanes had been made with patrols, minefields and anti-submarine nets. It would not be possible to keep the U-boats out of the Atlantic altogether but they might be forced to the longer route around Scotland to get there. However the Germans soon discovered that if they travelled through the Channel on the surface at night, they could cruise at their best speed over the top of the nets which inevitably drooped in the water. In emergencies they could dive (hoping to avoid mines) and wait till danger had passed. However, surface travel came to an end when the Channel crossing was properly illuminated. During the whole period the German submarines tried to avoid drawing attention to themselves in the Channel as they would be much safer preying on merchant shipping in the Atlantic. The illuminations were the result of the fertile brain of Wing-Commander F. A. Brock who will be mentioned again later. A submarine which can travel on the surface avoids nets and below-surface mines, but it dare not do so if the area is lit up.
The Dover Patrol had been only too well aware of the Zeebrugge problem, and as early as the autumn of 1914 there had been a suggestion to block Zeebrugge and Ostend harbours. Nothing came of the first suggestion but the scheme was again raised in 1916 and considered in detail. Again it was rejected. In 1917 a more ambitious proposal was put forward; this involved the capture and occupation of Zeebrugge and its subsequent use for an expeditionary force to march to Antwerp and thus get in behind the German army. This plan was abandoned not so much because it was hazardous as that it was thought to be unnecessary. Military optimism was considerable at this time and there were confident assumptions of overrunning Belgium and thus of our needing the Belgian ports in an undamaged state. These expectations were soon found to be unrealistic and once again the plan to block the ports came to the fore.
On 28th December 1917 Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes, aged 45, had been appointed to the Dover Command, with the rank of Vice-Admiral. Keyes was the sort of man who inspires others to give of their best under all conditions. Almost immediately he improved the illuminated strip by giving every encouragement to the ingenious Wing Commander Brock. Eleven days after the embarrassing German destroyer raid referred to earlier, on 24th February 1918, Keyes was proposing to the Admiralty a scheme for blocking Zeebrugge and Ostend; it was approved. This was offensive defence.
The task which the Navy had set itself might well have been thought to be verging on the impossible. It was envisaged that Zeebrugge could be blocked simultaneously with Ostend at a date early in April. In the event the first plan was postponed, happily perhaps, because eventually it took place on St George’s Day, 23rd April. It would be difficult enough to sail into an enemy-occupied and well-fortified port but it was infinitely more so at Zeebrugge which had the advantage of being screened by a long mole. That mole was, and is, the longest in the world. Its total length is just over 1½ miles. It begins on the west of the canal entrance and curves north-east in an arc. The Mole itself was joined to the shore by a causeway three hundred yards long. The fact that this was a viaduct made a most important part of the operations feasible. The Mole itself has subsequently been widened and dockyard buildings occupy part of the extension today. However it is perfectly possible to see the original form of the Mole and, as there is a plaque in the wall at the point, to see where HMS Vindictive came alongside. The visitor will note the considerable drop from the parapet to the lower platform; this proved to be no slight problem on the night itself in spite of suitable preparations for it.
Although the Germans did not expect the Mole to be attacked they had taken every precaution to make such a procedure highly dangerous for anyone venturesome enough to attempt it. This fact was known to the British through previous aerial reconnaissance. Preparations had included the installation of a dozen heavy guns (some 5.9 inch), anti-aircraft guns, machine-guns, blockhouses, barbed wire, a seaplane base, four hangars, a submarine shelter and accommodation for the garrison of a thousand. The raiding party would therefore not only be outgunned but also outnumbered if successful in setting foot on the Mole. There were additional hazards such as the constantly changing sandbanks which lay off the Belgian coast. Pre-war the hazards had been marked by buoys but the Germans had thoughtfully removed these as being likely to be of more assistance to a potential enemy than to themselves. This was not quite all a raider would have to contend with for in order to block the Bruges canal, which lay some distance back from the harbour, quite large – and thus easily hittable – ships would have to cover half a mile under intensive fire. Looked at with the advantage of hindsight the Zeebrugge Raid was not merely suicidal; it was attempting the impossible. But perhaps the Royal Navy’s motto is: The difficult we do at once; the impossible takes us just a little longer.’
The aim of the raid was first to block the Bruges Canal by sinking several blockships at the point where it entered the harbour and at the same time damage the port installations at Zeebrugge as much as possible. Simultaneously the canal to Ostend was also to be blocked by sealing up the harbour. In the event the Ostend raid, both on 23rd April and when attempted later on 9th/10th May, failed through unpredictable hazards. Nevertheless it should not be overlooked that as much courage and ingenuity went into the Ostend raids as did into Zeebrugge.
The core of the Zeebrugge problem was the Mole itself. Being of stone it could not be effectively damaged by bombardment, even from monitors. Monitors carried heavy guns on platforms which proceeded under escort to points at which they could bombard the enemy shore. Captain Coxon of the Dover Patrol described them thus: ‘Of all the hideous monstrosities it is possible to conceive in the shape of naval architecture, commend me to them.’ Nevertheless these ungainly monsters were used both at Zeebrugge and Ostend to ‘soften up’ (in modern parlance) the enemy before the raid and again during the raids when they fired into the area from which German reinforcements would be forthcoming. So that the preliminary bombardment gave no hint of forthcoming events, it had been started some time before as a routine operation.
As it was clearly impossible to neutralize the Mole itself by bombardment alone, its defences had to be tackled in some other way. It would be impossible to sail blockships through Zeebrugge harbour and into the canal entrance unless the attention of those manning the guns on the Mole was suitably occupied. Passing the end of the Mole the blockships would be engaged by five guns (4.1 and 3.5) and that would be only the beginning of their problems – if they survived the experience.
There was therefore mounted a ‘diversion’ in the shapes of an old cruiser HMS Vindictive, and two ferry steamers, Iris and Daffodil, specially brought from the Mersey. The ferry boats had the advantage of a very shallow draught, which would enable them to ride over and clear any mines (it was hoped). The inhabitants of Merseyside were not pleased when they saw their ferry-boats departing in early April but accepted their removal philosophically when told they were urgently needed to ferry more troops – mainly American – over to France. When they saw them after the raid and learnt the truth, pride and astonishment knew no bounds. One of the tasks of the ferryboats at the Mole was to press alongside the Vindictive and keep her in position.
HMS Vindictive was a curious looking ship even before she was converted for the raid. She had been commissioned in 1898 and at no time in her life had she looked an elegant craft. She had three large funnels, for she was a coal-burning ship. It was astonishing that after the battering she had received on the night of the raid she was still able to proceed back to Dover under her own power.
W. J. Maxey was a Stoker 1st Class on Vindictive. As he was working away in the stokehold in an inferno of noise, an exceptionally loud crash caused him to look upwards. To his surprise he could see the stars, for part of the deck had been blown clean off. As he said in 1977, ‘Not many stockers have the benefit of a view of the night sky when they are doing their work.’ After the First World War he joined the Territorial Army and became a machine gunner with the Middlesex Regiment. At 0630 on the morning of D-Day on 6th June 1944 he landed with his battalion on the Normandy beaches. Like many others he had taken part in the ballot for a VC after Zeebrugge but only a limited number were awarded and he was one of the unlucky ones. There were others on the Zeebrugge raid who also took part in the Second World War. One of them was Able Seaman R. S. Wright. He has a scar from a spear wound on his wrist, sustained in New Guinea in 1914. A naval party, of which he was one, had been despatched to eject the Germans from a wireless station they occupied there. The Germans had some local levies armed with spears. Wright served again in the Second World War in Combined Operations on the North African coast. Today, aged 88, he looks all the better for his experiences and could be mistaken for twenty years younger.)
To return to Vindictive and the operation. As soon as it was in position – and it was hoped that the smoke screen laid by the escorting craft would enable it to travel most of the way undetected (in the event this proved not to be) – an assault party would land on the Mole, deal with any opposition, and then destroy the German guns which would otherwise be preventing the three blockships Thetis, Intrepid and Iphigenia, from reaching the Bruges Canal where they planned to scuttle themselves. All three were obsolete cruisers, and for their task would be heavily loaded with cement, making them sink quickly; it would also make them very difficult to remove. Two other craft were to play an important part in the operation. They were two old C-class submarines and their assignment was to be loaded with explosives and proceed to the arches under the viaduct. There the explosives would be detonated taking a substantial portion of viaduct with them. Of this more later.
In addition to the main elements – the assault craft for the Mole and the blockships – there were a host of other craft involved. They included the two monitors, Erebus and Terror, whose duties were described above. There was a variety of destroyers: Termagant, Truculent, Manly, Scott, Ullswater, Teazer, Stork, Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield, Whirlwind, Myngs, Velox, Morris, Moorsom, Melpomene, and, of course, Admiral Keyes’ flagship, the destroyer Warwick. There were thirty-three motor launches (MLs) which had a variety of tasks, but most of them were required to lay a smoke-screen for the approach. There was a patrol boat and a picket boat (to evacuate the crews of the submarines), there was a paddle mine-sweeper, and there were sixteen Coastal Motor Boats. In view of the vagaries of the Channel weather, which can match the worst in the world, the voyages of some of the small craft were likely to be nothing if not adventurous. In all there were seventy-eight craft of varying sizes engaged at Zeebrugge. (For Ostend there were fifty-nine.) Both raids were covered in case of interference by the enemy, going or coming, by a naval squadron from Harwich. For escort duties there was attached the 61st Wing of the Royal Air Force and for attacking duties there was 65th Wing. These were for the operation only, not for subsequent employment.
The old cruisers which were to be used as blockships and the aged C class submarines were regarded as expendable, but it was hoped that the ferry boats and the Vindictive might return under their own power, which they did. In view of their experiences Iris, Daffodil and Vindictive might well have thought themselves lucky. The destroyers were, of course, well able to look after themselves as well as others. Casualties among the MLs, which took impossible risks, were surprisingly low. The MLs and CMBs require a little explanation. MLs were mainly required for smoke-laying duties but they cheerfully took on other duties too. CMBs were faster than MLs but only, it seemed, because they were lighter. Their extra speed gave them a chance, when not laying smoke, of nipping in under the guns of enemy craft and despatching torpedoes to suitable destinations. No form of existence could be more hazardous and less comfortable than on these small craft, whizzing back and forth in the Channel, but no posting was more eagerly sought after than to them. They made war a very personal and individual matter. There are some remarkable accounts of incidents on these small craft among the letters quoted later.
Thus far we have discussed the Zeebrugge operation almost exclusively. Although it was obviously going to be more difficult than Ostend this did not mean that Ostend was considered to be of lesser importance. Fifty-nine ships were allotted to the Ostend operation, of which eleven were French. Unfortunately the Ostend operation failed both on the night of 23rd April and again on the night of 9th–10th May. The first attempt on Ostend, carried out simultaneously with the Zeebrugge raid, failed because of an ingenious piece of German deception. Although for the most part the Germans had removed marker buoys from the hazards around the Belgian coast, which was renowned for its drifting sandbanks, they had left a few in position at harbour entrances. However, at Ostend they had gone a step further and re-positioned a marker buoy, thereby creating an unsuspected hazard for any craft trying to enter the harbour without the knowledge and approval of the German command. The removal of the Stroom Bank buoy therefore completely deceived the two incoming blockships, Sirius and Brilliant, which both ran aground. Both ships were so damaged in the grounding that it was impossible to tow them off. The crews were evacuated by MLs and the two blockships blown up. As the Germans were well aware of what was happening and raked the whole area extensively with gunfire the task of the MLs may be imagined. The only gain from this was that for any future operation which might rely on enemy marker buoys there would be a careful aerial reconnaissance immediately to check that all buoys were where they might be expected to be.
The commanders of both Brilliant (Commander A. E. Godsal) and Sirius (Lieutenant-Commander H. N. M. Hardy), who had been rescued, begged to be allowed to make another attempt. This was permitted on the night of 9th May but was scarcely more successful. On the second occasion the much-battered Vindictive was allotted as one blockship and Sappho as another. On the night of the operation Sappho blew a hole in one of her boilers just when starting out and had to be left behind. Vindictive, now under command of Commander Godsal, reached the entrance to the harbour, although greatly hampered by thick fog. Eventually to disperse the fog one of the CMBs was instructed to light a million candle-power flare. This dispersed the fog but exposed Vindictive to all the firepower the Germans could muster. Godsal was killed with many others. Owing to the damage, Vindictive was not quite able to reach the position she wished, although the position she did reach caused the Germans considerable inconvenience. Again the smaller craft distinguished themselves in rescue operations.
After the end of the war it was discovered that submarines were unable to use the Bruges-Ostend canal as it was too shallow, although they used the harbour. The blocking of Ostend was therefore not as important as the blocking of Zeebrugge. A casualty of Ostend was Keyes’ flagship, Warwick, which was damaged by a mine but managed to return to Dover.
As regards the effectiveness of the Zeebrugge blocking, it is interesting to note the observations of Captain Ion Hamilton Benn, who commanded the ML flotilla at Ostend on both occasions – at the age of 55. He was in Zeebrugge in charge of clearing the harbour the following October. He examined the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal and reported (in a private account) :
The two blockships that got into the canal on 23rd April completely blocked it and several German submarines that were inside fell into our hands when the Germans retreated from the area. The canal had been used as their base; several little docks had been cut in the side of the canal and roofed over with corrugated iron which was covered by a foot or two of turf, so as to be quite invisible from the air.
Unfortunately Captain Benn’s account was only written for his family and circulated privately. Had the fact been published that he had seen German submarines trapped in the canal six months after the Zeebrugge raid, this would have put on record the fact that the raid was a complete success in its objectives and that those who believed otherwise were sadly and foolishly mistaken. Ironically the failure of the Ostend attempts made no difference to the achievement of Zeebrugge for the Bruges-Ostend canal was not navigable by submarines.
Captain Hamilton Benn, who died fifteen years ago, lived to the age of 99½. If he had had time to think of such matters as he stood off Ostend in a highly vulnerable ML in 1918, it seems unlikely that he would have rated his chances of reaching such an age very high.