Captain Carpenter said of the small craft, ‘We felt they could be relied upon to tackle any situation, however difficult or unexpected.’ He went on to quote the case of one of the CMBs which had its bows damaged in a collision. One of the sailors promptly put his backside in the hole and kept it there while the boat gathered sufficient speed for the bows to ride clear of the water. The CMB was then proceeding at 27 knots and had to continue at this speed circling the convoy which was only making 10 knots. Another CMB had engine trouble just after setting out, was towed back into Dover by a trawler, repaired the engines and set off again – five hours late. They then crossed the Channel – 60 miles in two hours – and arrived so fast they nearly ran ashore at Blankenberghe. This was on the earlier expedition; a similar incident occurred on the 22nd April.
An ML normally could carry 40–50 passengers. At Zeebrugge and Ostend, when they were picking up survivors, some carried over 100.
*
From C. Saunders: a liking for danger
My uncle, Lieutenant-Commander Raphael Saunders, commanding ML 128, was ordered to approach the Mole and send up flares. However, his engine failed as he was going through the smoke screen, and his ship drifted out of the smoke to within range of the defences. He himself seemed to bear a charmed life; the crew member beside him was killed, the ship was riddled with bullets, and a fragment broke the glass of the binnacle (compass housing) under his hand, without even scratching him.
He was a member of the RNVR before the war, and joined up as an Able Seaman. He received special promotion for the Zeebrugge raid, and the DSO for Ostend.
When the Second World War broke out he badgered the Admiralty for a ship. As he was then 64 years old they would only offer him a desk job; getting bored with that he joined the bomb disposal squad, until he was retired!
I am sorry I cannot tell you any more, but he was essentially a reticent man, except for telling us of incidents which did not reflect glory on himself. But he had a dry wit, and although he died in 1959 aged 83 he is still often missed.
Lieutenant Raphael Saunders received special promotion at Zeebrugge. He volunteered for rescue work but owing to a breakdown in his engines did not arrive in time. He however went in and took off the crew of Motor Launch 424, when that vessel was sinking under heavy fire. At Ostend he was awarded the DSO. Together with ML 283 he went in after Vindictive to look for survivors. When near the shore he came under heavy fire – his signalman was killed, and Lieutenant Brayfield and one of the crew wounded. He showed great coolness, setting a fine example to his men throughout, and was of the greatest assistance in organizing the smoke screen.
*
From R. Cunningham: missing at sea
My cousin has sent me a slip from the Daily Telegraph of 7.3.77 about Zeebrugge. My brother Andrew C. Cunningham, a midshipman in the RNR, was reported missing on 12th April 1918, during a preliminary attack, to test out the defences of Zeebrugge, prior to the big attack on the entrance to Zeebrugge Harbour when a blockship was sunk to seal off the harbour to German Submarines both in and outside the harbour. My brother’s body was never recovered, but a Lieutenant Lawson, I think, and a few other members of the coastal motor boat crews’ bodies were washed ashore at Ostend. These CMBs were used as submarine chasers at that time in the Channel or stationed at Dover and Ostend, i.e. the Dover Patrol. During the preliminary raid in Zeebrugge their job was to go in close to the Mole at Zeebrugge and throw up flares, while the Naval battleships lying far from land bombarded Zeebrugge harbour, to test the German defences for the big attack on the 23.4.18. The British Official Report stated that one of their coastal motor boats had been sunk and the Official German Report said that they had sunk a British torpedo boat. I contacted the German Red Cross at that time for any news of my brother, but their reply was negative; no prisonsers had been taken, and no bodies had been recovered by the Germans.
I read a book cany years ago, giving an account of war in the air, and the author mentioned being shot down in the sea by attack fire, and picked up by a CMB off Zeebrugge, but this story gave the date of 10.4.18 and not 12th April, when the Admiralty informed my father that my brother Andrew was posted missing, so there is some confusion by the book’s date and the Admiralty’s date. My brother Andrew was first a cadet on HMS training ship the Conway on the Mersey. Then he joined the RNR, and was posted as midshipsman on HMS Changunola and for three years patrolled on that ship between Glasgow and Iceland and was waiting for his promotion to sub-lieutenant, when he was with the Dover Patrol and killed at Zeebrugge.
He would have been 19 years old if he had lived to his birthday, 24th June 1918. I understand that there is a monument to the Dover Patrol standing on the cliffs of Dover and when I left London to come to South Africa on 25th January 1924, was passed through the Straits of Dover about 3 p.m. and saw what looked like a monument or war memorial on the cliffs and thought that is where Andrew’s name is on the monument to the Dover Patrol. His name is also on the War Memorial at my old home town Moffat in Scotland and in the book of Scottish dead at Edinburgh Castle and at my old school at Beith in Ayrshire.
I understand that the CMBs at that time were the fastest boats in the Navy doing over 45 knots and that they carried depth charges, and if a German periscope was sighted, the CMB went for same at full speed, and threw two depth charges, one to either side, then came back to see if any oil surfaced. Without this preliminary attack to test out the German defences, the main attack on 23rd April may not have been so successful.
*
From E. E. Noyes: Harry Tate’s Navy
I don’t think we can be of much help for, although my father was full of reminiscences about Gallipoli, Zeebrugge, Jutland, etc., we ourselves have forgotten much that he told us.
He was at both Zeebrugge 23/4/18 and Ostend 10/5/18 and the only minor things we can call to mind are as follows:
The MLs bought from the USA and manned by the RNVR were scornfully referred to as Harry Tate’s Navy by the regular RN chaps but never the less the regulars had a hearty respect for their courage and tenacity in the face of dreadful odds.
The contingent of Australians from the flagship Australia and who sailed in the Vindictive and the blockships were the subject of much admiration for their gallantry and good humour despite their heavy losses.
The old ferry boat Daffodil came in for much barracking but I can’t remember the circumstances.
When the radio controlled ML with 500 tons of TNT hit the Erebus there were some crude comments but a great relief that somebody had thought of the idea of the side blisters.
I remember my father saying that one of his messmates who was somewhat of an artist – we still have some of his work in the form of an oil painting of HMS Erebus and some decorated German 2 inch HE shells – was swearing like hell that his so and so artistic work would be ruined and why the hell Jerry couldn’t have gone the other side and up the ward room.
Concerning the raid itself everyone seemed to have a terrific admiration for Keyes and the concept but considered that it was almost certain death for those on the Vindictive, the blockships and the relief vessels. There was great disappointment that the plan for the blockships was not 100% successful.
My father came in contact with several survivors from the Vindictive (or from the Iris) – some of them badly wounded – but they all gave credit to the fighting qualties of the Hun but also admiration for the tenacity and bravery of those involved in the landing with special reference to the Australian contingent.
Concerning the bombardment of the Belgian coast my father was what was then known as ‘Captain of the Gun’ – a title now extinct – in the 15 inch turret and he remarked that the rate of fire had exceeded by far anything previously attained in battle or practice and the chaps in the ammunition hoists were passing out with fatigue while the temperature in the turrets was higher than my father had experienced in the tropics.
The above is about all – it isn’t much but it is now difficult to recall the very many anecdotes of such a long career in the navy.
*
From C. W. Keel: after the battle
My elder brother George Ernest Keel was a Chief Engineer aboard what was then known as a CMB (coastal motor boat) whose duty it was (I believe) to lead in the old battleships to be sunk in a position to block the U-boats entrance.
The late Sir Roger Keyes was the Admiral in charge and I again believe was one of the plan originators. At the same time Ostend was to be attacked. Zeebrugge was a success but Ostend only partially so.
My brother survived Zeebrugge but I believe from my late mother, that volunteers from the survivors of both attempts were called for to attack Ostend for the second time. My brother wrote a letter to my mother (which I was not allowed to read) but which stated the heavy odds against returning. He was killed in action at Ostend on 10th May 1918. After the war was over I travelled by a coal boat to Le Havre France and from there made my way to Ostend and located my brother’s grave along with others in the British part of a French Cemetery. In this was a poorly kept plot with a kind of register of names in the little Church. I was then about 18 years of age with little money in a strange land but found great kindness at a British Mission to Seamen (I think) at Ostend which was in charge of, I think, a Reverend Grant and his wife.
They did everything to comfort me at the time with personal supervision to see that good food and bedroom, bath, etc., be provided. My late mother received a printed message from the late Sir Roger Keyes but he added his personal addition in his writing stating that my brother had died while gallantly doing his duty.
Being 16 at the time my mother felt that I should not be allowed to know all, but the above is what I recollect of Zeebrugge and Ostend 1918.
Before entering the Navy my brother was always connected with petrol engines and motor cycles and took one of the first twin-stretchered motor cycles to France bringing out the wounded. He became attracted to the petrol engined CMBs of the navy and was Chief Engineer in the attack on the submarine bases. His service medals I retain, being the only surviving male member of the family.
*
From M. Watts:
My late husband, Lieutenant Commander Arthur Watts DSO and Bar, RNVR took part in both the Zeebrugge and Ostend raids in April 1918. My husband was in command of ML 239, leader of a smoke screen unit. He was awarded the DSO for Zeebrugge and Ostend (see page 208 of Zeebrugge and Ostend Despatches of Sir Roger Keyes. Published by Oxford University Press 1919).
I have quite a clear memory of some things he told me – I was a lot younger than he was – but I have a good memory still! Of course, it is a long time ago – he left nothing written – so my memories may be of no interest to you.
My husband, who was an artist who contributed to Punch, the Radio Times and many periodicals of the time in the 20’s, was killed in a civil flying crash in 1935.
Acting Lieutenant Commander Arthur Watts won special promotion at Zeebrugge; together with Lieutenant Commander Mieville, Lieutenant Dixon and Lieutenant Drummond, he was a leader of the smoke unit and by his skill and judgement contributed to the great success of the smoke screen in his section. His citation for the DSO at Ostend read: ‘This officer was in command of ML 239 and the leader of a smoke screen unit. He led his unit with skill and judgement in a very exposed position, and it was largely due to him that the screen was so extremely successful in his section.’
*
From H. E. Hampson: Smokescreens. Sir Roger Keyes’ thoroughness
I was, at the time engaged in the manufacture of smoke screen apparatus for that exploit; these were made on the premises of the firm for whom I worked as an oxy-acetylene welder and assembled in the submarine basin of the naval dockyard, they were then bolted on to lighters and towed across the Channel in order to cover the movements of the concrete filled Vindictive. Although somewhat Heath Robinson in design, they did by all accounts a very useful job and contributed in no small measure to the success of the operation.
The C in C Dover Patrol, Admiral Roger Keyes was often to be seen in the dockyard taking a keen interest in the assembly of these crude but effective pieces of equipment which also screened his flagship (HMS Warwick) on the crossing.
*
From J. F. Morris: his brother’s account
D. R. Morris, Midshipman RNR (HMS Conway – 15/1/1916 to Feb. 1918). Letter of 28th April 1918. HMS Arrogant, C/O G.P.O. London.
‘I am glad to say that I am quite safe, except for a wound in my left arm. However, it is not serious. We had a terrible fight but quite enjoyed it, and, of course, we won. No doubt you will see an account in the papers. I got a Lewis Gun bullet put into me, just as we got to Zeebrugge Mole, but managed to keep on firing until all was over. Of course, there were quite a lot wounded, but not many seriously. One of our middies had 14 wounds and is very bad. He is in hospital in Dunkirk. I never thought I should see Ostend and Zeebrugge so soon.’
In the local paper the above letter is repeated and also ‘When we arrived outside Zeebrugge 15 inch shells were flying about, and we got it pretty hot. We sighted the Vindictive and as she was getting badly hit, and no smoke screen to shield her, we decided to get our screens going. We then went between her and the Mole, which is 160 yards away. The result was that the enemy could not see the Vindictive and she was able to put her men ashore. In a few minutes we were all hit. We had 36 hours without sleep, and had hardly any food, so you can guess we were pretty exhausted.’*
He was gazetted on 8th March 1918 at the age of 16. He served in a ML at Zeebrugge. Later he was in Egypt and Palestine mainly on a converted yacht HMY Managem and operated off the Syrian Coast. This seems to have finished in 1919 and he went on the Konigin Luise to take troops back to Australia in June 1919. This went on until February 1921.
Up to the time of the depression he served with the various Ellerman Lines and died at sea, in the Persian Gulf in June 1944.
*
From A. Stobbs: the mystery of the MLs
I write to say that I recall hearing, as a very small child, my father recounting one or two particular strange tales of his Dover Patrol days.
He was Lieutenant F. Garnet Stobbs, RNVR, based in Felixstowe Dock and, during his service commanded four motor launches, as they were known; three of them on the Dover Patrol. Those were, HMMLs 14, 59, 3 and 2 in that order I believe.
He was posted in ML 59 to the Zeebrugge project but, at the last moment was medically down-graded to his annoyance, so was switched from ML 59 to 3 therefore.
I still have the group photograph of his intake at the RN College, Greenwich, their tutor – for whom he had a high regard – Montenarro was the name I believe.
One thing I recall is his saying it was a mystery how those craft held together in high seas. Apparently on top of a wave, the deck planks would open; he would put a half crown coin in an aperture and, at the bottom of the trough it was immovable!
I can also recall an early memory of attending a Sunday morning service on the deck of the old Ganges and to this day the scene flashes back whenever I hear this hymn ‘O God our help in ages past….’
*
From Wing Commander Mackie: the boom defence
My father was Anthony Charles Mackie DSC, Lt RNVR (Dover Patrol). Like a good sailor he was quite good at exaggeration, but I was brought up on yarns about this operation (I was born 7.7.14). I understood he assisted in the start of the operation by dismantling their huge boom defence warning bell at the end of the Mole. His ship was damaged but he picked up survivors and returned home.
Admiral Keyes was more than a hero.
He sailed his open day boat on the East Coast, near Maldon in Essex until he died some years ago.
Lieutenant Anthony Mackie received the DSC for his services at Ostend on 9th/10th May. He was mentioned in despatches for specially distinguished service, in his command of ML 279. He ‘pluckily carried on his smoke screen work under fire for one and a half hours after breaking the starboard shaft, retiring with the rest of the flotilla when operations were completed under one engine.’
*
From W. Marlow – ‘Shiner’ Wright
One of my great friends in life was J. C. Wright (Shiner) whom I believe was 2 i/c in Daffodil under Lieutenant Campbell DSO.
My first encounter with ‘Shiner’ Wright was when I joined London Division RNVR No 9 Coy in 1910. He was then C.P.O. His great love was training a field gun crew for competing with the terms of the Royal Navy. This he did most successfully in so much as our team ran in the final at Olympia against HMS Excellent.
After Zeebrugge the story amongst his contemporaries at the time (certainly not coming from him) was that a VC and a DSO were allotted for this exploit and that Campbell and Wright tossed a coin to decide which should receive which.
Lieutenant James Courtenay Wright was awarded the DSC at Zeebrugge; in fact he was second in command of HM Motor Launch 282 under Percy Dean, VC. He showed great courage and coolness in embarking the crews of Intrepid and Iphigenia. It was largely due to the magnificent manner in which he and others carried out their duties that so many officers and men were rescued from the blockships in the canal at Zeebrugge. He was dangerously wounded.
*
Account by Lieutenant S. D. Gowing, sent in by B. Muir (daughter): Synopsis for a book which was never written
Plan for heavy bombardment of Zeebrugge and Ostend by monitors, with smoke-screen made by MLs; impossible for unscreened ships to approach shore batteries. Captain McLean from Grand Fleet arrives to train MLs in concerted manoeuvring and smoke-screen work. Night passage to Belgian coast with thirty MLs and four monitors. Bombardment at dawn, three hours. Heavy fire. Smoke-screen successful. Destroyer action … Ostend and Zeebrugge docks destroyed … home over Goodwins.
MLs transferred to Dunkirk for smoke-screen and bombardment work. Daily actions. Intensive raids on Dunkirk nightly and bombardment by heavy German guns. Ostend railway depot destroyed by monitor fires. German destroyer raid on Dunkirk … Germans shoot up the town, pass through at full speed, torpedoing the monitor. Beached and sent home. The Erebus takes her place.
Decision to mine the Straits from shore to shore … 12,000 deep-laid mines … hush-hush job. Commander Metcalfe (Jackson) in charge. ML 21 (S. D. Gowing’s ship) detailed to accompany him. Ten week’s work in winter gales.
Metcalfe on last voyage shot himself with a rifle from the cabin rack Daffodil (armed trawler) brings him home.
Training and preparation … worked out to time-tables. Fine staff work. The fleet sails.
The two submarines part at midnight for their separate objectives. MLs ahead. S. D. Gowing in command of ML 551) take positions off harbour… Point blank range… German star shells… Hell let loose… Vindictive arrives with half her crew killed … storms the Mole but unable to silence the guns… Destroyer action… Pier work of Mole blown up by submarine charged with explosives that has rammed herself under the piles. German cyclist corps racing in to reinforce plunged into gap and is drowned wholesale. Blockships force the harbour, one knocked out, the two others sink themselves in canal mouth according to plan. MLs rescue the crews … all that remain alive. Complete success of operation. Vindictive sounds recall signal and retires, shot to pieces and all funnels blazing.
At Ostend the wind changes at the critical moment … smoke-screen blown off shore. The blockships sunk close under shore guns. Crews rescued by MLs … 551 runs ashore and screens the Hindenburg battery during retirement of the Flotilla. Return to Dunkirk.
Decision to go back to Ostend immediately with Vindictive. The second attack. The Germans ready for us. More mines and yet more guns. The run in-shore. MLs shot up. The screen succeeds. Vindictive makes the piers before the guns get her. Sinks herself across the harbour. Raked by machine guns and heavies. Survivors of crews taken off by MLs. Transferred to Commodore’s flagship outside, which is mined during the retirement but reaches port. Zeebrugge and Ostend bases destroyed. No U-boats able to enter. 17 corked up inside.
[The account of ‘my father’s war’ ends as follows:]
The last push. … Squadrons of heavy-gun monitors with MLs drive along Belgian coast engaging the shore batteries … the Army advances. German army fighting rearguard action in retirement from Belgium.
Night falls … last of German troops retreating from Ostend. MLs 281 and 551 reach the harbour and land the King and Queen of Belgium. Their reception by a liberated people.
(My father received the Croix de Guerre and was also mentioned in despatches.)
*
From A. A. Croft: presence of mind (!)
My late brother-in-law, Dudley Babb, took part in the Zeebrugge Raid on 2 3rd April 1918 as a sub-lieutenant.
He distinguished himself by his presence of mind – or backside – by sitting on a flare which German machine-gun bullets, splashing up around the Carley float on which he was, had ignited. He was subsequently offered a decoration or promotion; he chose the latter – more money in it – and became, I believe, the youngest two-ringer in the Service.
Sub-Lieutenant Babb received special promotion. He was navigating officer of Intrepid and by his bravery and cheerfulness throughout the action he set a fine example to his men.
*
From H. E. Thompson: diagram of the smoke screen
I have delved back through the mist of time and managed to recall the shape and approximate measurements of the apparatus used to make smoke during the attack on Zeebrugge long, long ago. In this matter I have been assisted by my wife who worked at the same establishment as myself and who also did her bit in the making of the same; between us we have managed to agree the design.
Account by Sir Ion Hamilton Benn: the Ostend operations
(Sent in by J. Cumin-Scott)
None of the books that I have seen about Zeebrugge and Ostend operations gives an account of what happened at Ostend on the night of the 11th April 1918, which resulted in the buoys being shifted by the Germans before St George’s Day, causing the failure of the blocking operations on that night.
Orders for operation Z.O. – April, 1918.
Ships coming from Thames, Dover and
Dunkirk to rendezvous 5 miles off
Zeebrugge Mole and 5 miles off Ostend –
Stroombank Buoy No 7 respectively.
The 20 MLs to make the smoke screen came up from Dunkirk, leaving there at 9.30 p.m., arriving at the rendezvous five miles from Ostend in good time. In ML 532 I took station close to Commodore Lyne’s destroyer. The plan was that ML 532 should go into Ostend with the blockships and rescue the crew of the Brilliant after she had been sunk between the piers, and that Lieutenant Commander Robin Hoare in ML 283 should do the same for the crew of the Sirius. Lieutenant Roland Bourke in ML 276 was to follow us in case ML 532 or ML 283 was knocked out. The other MLs were to take station on the best line for the smoke screen according to the wind, anchoring about 250 yards from the harbour entrance.
At zero hour the Commodore hailed me saying, ‘Zero hour, no word from the Admiral, proceed in execution of orders, wind if any NNE.’ I thereupon instructed Eric Welman, RN, to go ahead; he commanded the CMBs which were to light the entrance to the harbour with flares, a very dangerous mission. These ‘skimming dishes’ had a speed of over 30 knots, but the smoke they made was rather poor. The MLs followed at a speed of 15 knots, our instructions being to make a smoke screen between the Stroombank Buoy No 7 and the Bell Buoy at the Harbour entrance to cover the two blockships Brilliant and Sirius from the shore batteries, and especially from a battery with big guns, a little to the east of Ostend.
After running 14 minutes I saw the Stroombank buoy No 7 right ahead. The MLs were placed as arranged, but there was practically no wind. Meantime, the Germans having heard our approach put up every kind of star shell, flaming onions, rockets, etc., and fired a lot of two-pound tracer shells in strings of 13, like coveys of partridges, but the biggest guns did not fire. Our smoke went straight up in pillars, expanding as it went up like inverted pyramids. I was reminded of the scene I once saw in the caves of Staffa lit up by torches of the guides, great stalactites coming down from the roof. This was no good for the block-ships so I at once ordered all MLs to get under way and move slowly round from Buoy No 7 to the Bell Buoy; this spread the smoke and made good cover, except for the last couple of hundred yards.
Alas, the blockships did not show up. After two hours, when the tide had fallen too low to admit of entering Ostend, I gave instructions to withdraw.
At Dunkirk I learned that ten minutes after zero hour the Commodore received a message from the Admiral to say the operations were abandoned for lack of wind, but there was no means of letting me know; being miles away followed by a string of noisy launches no signals could be seen or heard.
Several of the MLs were damaged by gun fire, but none was sunk; on the other hand, two of the CMBs were lost and it was reported that one at least had been salved by the Germans.
Consequently, when it was decided that a further attempt was to be made on the night of 22nd/23rd April I asked the Commodore whether the buoys (especially Stroombank Buoy No 7) were in the charted position, and learned that Lieutenant Welman had on the 18th/19th fixed the position of No 7 and found it correct. The Commodore also sent an aeroplane over on 21st April and was told that No 7 was in its correct position. However, on the night of 22nd/23rd, having got the zero signal from the Commodore, we ran 14 minutes on the same course as before and saw no No 7 where we expected it to be, but saw a twinkle about 1,500 yards away to the norrard, and proceeding there found it marked Stroombank Buoy No 7. I therefore concluded that the Commodore’s destroyer had not been in exactly the same position as on the 11th. On both occasions the position had been fixed by dead reckoning, and the speed of the tides and currents varies from day to day owing to the direction of the winds in the North Sea, etc. Subsequent events proved that the position was right and that No 7 had been moved by the Germans.
That night there was a moderate on shore breeze, and a nice smoke screen was laid, until later the wind shifted and spoilt it.
As the blockships did not show up at the time expected, I went out a short distance looking for them; then a few minutes later I saw through the smoke two large vessels which appeared to be coming out from Ostend. My first thought was that they were German destroyers and that we were in for a very bad time, but getting another glimpse realised they were the blockships (they had first gone to the right position for Buoy No 7 and had subsequently found it where we had).
They turned on the buoy in the direction believed to be the harbour entrance. ML 532 then went ahead making as much smoke as possible. By this time the shore batteries and big guns had opened up hot fire. ML 532 carried on until we saw dunes right ahead and knew that we were to the eastward of the harbour. Turning at full speed we went back to warn the Brilliant but as we came alongside she struck a sandbank and sheered across the channel. At the same time a shell struck ML 532 carrying away the bows from the keel to the deck with anchor, winch and chain. We were all knocked down – I fell against the binnacle and was somewhat damaged. When we picked ourselves up we saw the Sirius was on fire and also aground close to the Brilliant. Seeing ML 532 was out of action Lieutenant Commander Robin Hoare in ML 283 went alongside the Brilliant and took off Captain Godsal and the crew. It was fortunate that Lieutenant Bourke in ML 276 was following us as he took off Lieutenant Commander Hardy and the crew of the Sirius; then both the MLs made for Dunkirk very heavily laden with the crews of these two ships. Meantime, ML 532 had drifted away in the smoke, both engines had been shifted on their beds by the shock, breaking the exhaust pipes, consequently both engineers were badly gassed. Getting no response to my signals to stop engines, Lieutenant Kirkwood, a young New Zealander, jumped down and stopped them, returning on deck in a rather dazed state he told me both engineers were on the floor, whereupon our Cook, F. Bowles, went down and carried them both on deck, where they recovered after an hour or two.
Before the operation on the 10th I had given orders that each ML should have a small red bulb fixed to the top of her mast so that they might be easily distinguishable at night. As it turned out this saved us in the ML 532 from a German prison. We were about 600 yards from Ostend completely broken down, kept afloat by a bulkhead of less than an eighth of an inch thick. I had just said to the helmsman, ‘It looks like breakfast on Sauerkraut’ when I caught sight of a tiny red light far away to seaward and I turned on the searchlight and signalled ‘SOS, SOS, SOS,’ fortunately some of the rescued crew of the Sirius were sitting in the stern of ML 276 facing aft. They saw the signal and passed word to Lieutenant Bourke who immediately came back to us. There was some difficulty in getting in tow, as one rope after another broke, but this was accomplished and we were towed slowly about halfway back to Dunkirk. By this time the engineers had managed to patch up an exhaust pipe and had got one engine going so I told ML 276 to cast off and take the rescued men, some of whom were wounded, to Dunkirk as quickly as possible. ML 532 carried on slowly and arrived there about mid-day on the 23rd.
Robin Hoare had already got a DSC, he was awarded a DSO at the first Ostend operation; a Bar to the DSO for the second Ostend operation, and also in July 1918, the Albert Medal for another Special Act of Gallantry.
Roland Bourke was awarded the DSO. He and Lieutenant Drummond both got VC’s on 10th May, when HMS Vindictive was put into Ostend Harbour, but that is another story.
W. Wigg – Leading Seaman in ML 532 and F. Bowles, the Cook, were both awarded the DCM.
Wigg had been with me for 16 years in various yachts and held a Master’s ticket. Bowles, part owner of a Tollesbury fishing smack, was cook in the Kaiser’s Schooner Meteor. When the war broke out he was given a pass home, but no wages, £60 due – he joined me in HMY Greta in September 1914.
THE 9th MAY, 1918
The Zeebrugge Bruges Canal was the depot for German submarines and destroyers operating in the Channel, and Bruges was also connected with Ostend by canal.
As we had failed to block Ostend on 23rd April, Admiral Keyes decided to have another try using the Vindictive under Captain Godsal and the old depot ship Sappho under Captain Hardy, the two officers who had commanded the Brilliant and the Sirius.
He sent me back to Dunkirk to discuss plans with Commodore Lynes and make arrangements for the smoke screen and rescue MLs.
When I told the Commodore that I intended to lead the MLs he looked at me and said, ‘Do you think it is quite the thing for an elderly man and an MP to be going to Ostend three times inside a month?’
I replied, ‘I am a member of the Ostend Yacht Club and on my last visit I left two of my front teeth behind!’
The failure of 23rd April was due to the Germans moving the Stroombank Buoy to another and smaller channel to the NE, and also to the wind shifting at the turn of the tide from an on shore to off shore breeze which blew back our smoke screen and exposed the Brilliant and Sirius to the full blast of the big guns of the shore batteries. It was decided that this time the blockships should ignore all buoys and go in at the top of high water from a point fixed about ten miles from the harbour; that MLs should station in a straight line about half a mile off shore, and as it was uncertain where the blockships would pass through this line the two nearest MLs would follow to rescue the crews.
The Sappho broke down on her way up from Dunkirk and the Vindictive went on alone; a thick sea fog developed which made it difficult to find the entrance between the piers. She eventually succeeded with the help of a million candle power buoy which was lighted at the entrance by one of Captain Welman’s gallant little CMBs, but this, of course, exposed the Vindictive to the fire of all the harbour batteries.
After passing the entrance between the piers Captain Godsal went outside the conning tower to get a better view and gave the order ‘Hard a starboard’ to bring the Vindictive square across the channel. At that moment a bit shell hit the conning tower and Godsal was never seen again. The second-in-command, Lieutenant Sir John Alleyne, was knocked out by the concussion, but Lieutenant Crutchley, though badly shaken, gave the order ‘full speed astern’ on the port engine to help the vessel swing, but it was too late and she took the ground at an angle of about 25 degrees.
My ML 532 was in dockyard hands so I went with Lieutenant Commander Watson in ML 105. We took up the position in the centre of the line believing it was the place where the Vindictive would pass, but we did not see her at all until the CMB lighted up the entrance. ML 254 was the nearest to her and ML 276 was not far away. Lieutenant Drummond in ML 254 followed her inside the piers. While doing so he was badly wounded in two places and his second-in-command Lieutenant Gordon Ross was killed. The seaman at the wheel was also wounded but they managed to get the ML alongside the Vindictive and take off two officers and 37 men. ML 254 then backed out. Half an hour later she was picked up in a sinking condition by the destroyer Warwick with Admiral Keyes on board.
Meantime Lieutenant Bourke in ML 276, after raking the piers with the Lewis gun, went into the harbour to see if anyone was left alive in the Vindictive. Finding no one he backed out; on passing the stern he thought he heard a cry and so went alongside again without result. As he backed out for the second time he was sure he heard a shout and therefore went in again, this time on the other side of the ship, where he found two men in the water being held up by a petty officer in a half sunken rowing boat. Sub-Lieutenant Petrie managed somehow to get these men on board; one of them proved to be Sir John Alleyne.
ML 276 was subsequently picked up outside by one of our monitors and towed into Dunkirk. I examined her next morning and found the mast had been shot away about 7 foot from the deck and there were 55 holes in her between wind and water. Before these operations on the Belgian Coast I had given strict instructions that no petrol tank should be more than half full, so that the petrol would be below the water line. But for this precaution both these MLs would have certainly been lost with all on board.
The holes in ML 276 were plugged up temporarily and I escorted her to Dover and from there she was escorted to Chatham Dockyard for repairs, she went under her own power in both passages. A month later she came back to Dover all spick and span. On arrival I told Lieutenant Bourke that as we were very short of MLs he should fill up the petrol, be on hand, and be ready to go to sea if necessary. An hour later he came to me and said, ‘It is no use, Sir, the petrol tanks are leaking badly.’ I sent for the Dockyard Superintendent. He confirmed that the main tank was leaking badly and part of the deck would have to be taken off in order to get the tank out. This was done and I found that on one side there was a hole inwards about 2 inch in diameter and on the other side there were 13 small holes going outwards shewing that a shell had entered and broken into pieces inside; one would suppose that there must have been an explosion, but the tank was not distorted in shape. The tank was put on a lorry with instructions to the driver to stop in front of the Admiral’s office, and I went and told the Admiral. He, as I expected, looked at me and said, ‘Why, that is quite impossible’. I replied that I fully expected he would say that, the tank was outside the front door for him to see for himself. It is said that there cannot be an explosion if there is no air, so I think it likely that the missile was one of the 2 inch tracer shells, a great number of them were fired by the Germans that night and that having pierced the tank it flew into pieces.
It transpired subsequently that there was no need to block Ostend as the Canal from Bruges was too shallow for the large German U-boats and destroyers which were confined there until the end of the war by the blocking of Zeebrugge.
Both Drummond and Bourke were awarded the Victoria Cross.
Commander Ion Hamilton Benn DSO MP received special promotion for 23rd April. By his energy and fine spirit he inspired the officers and men of the motor launches with devotion to duty and readiness to self sacrifice. During the engagement he was in ML 582, in one of the most inshore berths, and went alongside Brilliant under very heavy fire, after she had ground. He was awarded the Croix de Guerre. For his services on 9th/10th May, he was made a CB. His mention in despatches for specially distinguished service read: ‘This officer led the motor launches in ML 105 with conspicuous ability and success. This is the third occasion Captain Benn has led the inshore motor launch division off Ostend under a very heavy fire. Captain Benn has set a very fine example of bravery and devotion to duty to the officers and men of the motor launches of the Dover patrol, which he has commanded for nearly three years and has thus contributed greatly to the success which has attended the gallant efforts of these small raft in carrying out the dangerous duties assigned to them during these operations off the Belgian coast.’
Lieutenant Robin Hoare was awarded the DSO at the first Ostend operation for taking off 50 of the crew of the sinking Sirius; he then proceeded to Brilliant and took off 16, then back to Sirius for the remainder of the officers and crew. He received a bar to the DSO at the second Ostend operation. He was ordered to follow astern and assist two other motor launches detailed for rescue work. He remained at the Stroom Bank Buoy position until Vindictive had passed, and then followed her, patrolling east and west within a quarter of a mile of the shore under heavy fire, searching for survivors until 3.20 a.m. when all hope of finding anyone still alive had passed.
Lieutenant Eric Welman DSC, was specially promoted and awarded the DSO at the first Ostend operation for handling the units of the coastal motor boat flotilla under his command in a masterly manner, rendering the great service in screening and rescue work. He was always in the most exposed positions across the harbour entrance covering Vindictive, Iris II and Daffodil by smoke screen. He received a Bar to the DSO at Ostend for organising and leading the coastal motor boats in a most spirited manner. He encountered an enemy torpedo boat near the entrance to Ostend, which switched on searchlights and opened fire. He at once closed with her, and engaged her with Lewis guns to such good effect that she withdrew and left the channel clear for the approach of the blockships. He also received the Croix de Guerre.
Lieutenant Malcolm Kirkwood received the DSC for his work at the first Ostend operation. After his ship was damaged alongside Brilliant and the engineers gassed, he went down to the engine room which was full of fumes, and started the starboard engines, thereby saving the ship from either being sunk or captured. Shortly afterwards he lost consciousness and was only rescued with difficulty.
Commander William Watson was mentioned in despatches and promoted for the first operation. He was mentioned for specially distinguished service at the second operation; he was in command of ML 105, and was of great assistance to Captain Benn in arranging and supervising the smoke screen. This involved going from end to end of the line and taking his vessel close inshore several times, when he came under heavy fire. He showed great courage and coolness throughout the operation.
Captain Lynes had been appointed by Keyes to direct the early attempt to block Ostend, and Keyes entrusted the second operation to him also. He directed it in a most able manner, proceeding himself in HMS Faulknor, and supporting the Vindictive from an inshore position. He was made a Commander of the Legion of Honour.
Lieutenant Sir John Alleyne DSC was awarded the DSO for the second Ostend operation. He had volunteered from a monitor of the Dover patrol for service in the Vindictive. He refitted the navionational arrangements destroyed in Vindictive on 23rd April and on 9th/10th May was invaluable because of his local knowledge. He showed great coolness under fire, and skilfully navigated the Vindictive to the entrance in Ostend Harbour. He was severely wounded when his captain was killed.
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Account by N. Rogers
Rear Admiral Roger Keyes was in charge of the Dover Base. The Zeebrugge raid was despatched from the dockyard at the Eastern Harbour at Dover where the Coastal Motor Base was situated. I was one of the crew on CMB 28A under the command of Lieutenant Hill, RN. The crew consisted of five with Sub-Lieutenant Fogg Elliott, two ERA’s and a wireless telegraphist of which I was the latter. The W/T operator was also signaller with semaphore flags and hoists.
The boat was 55 feet long built by Messrs J. I. Thornycroft Ltd. at Hampton, Middlesex, and had two 12 cylinder engines (FIAT). The armament was two 18 inch torpedoes fired from the stern above propellers, two Lewis Machine Guns, and two depth charges. The maximum speed was 40 knots. A wireless cabin was situated at the rear of the cockpit with an aircraft with a range of about twenty miles.
As the hull of the boat was of wood to prevent barnacles forming on the hull the CMB’s were lifted out of the water by slings and chains and placed on chocks on trucks. It was not considered wise to go to sea in rough weather. The task was two months at Dover patrolling the Straits of Dover and one month at Dunkirk submarine hunting in the Belgian coast.
The wireless operators were not permitted to actually take part in the operation to minimize casualties.
HMS Vindictive and the flotilla of motor launches and CMB’s left Dover on the eve of St George’s Day 1918 to meet up with other vessels from Harwich and other ports. The CMB’s were under the command of Lieutenant Eric C. Welman, CMB 28A took its position in the line, but unfortunately developed engine trouble and had to return to base. The ERAs discovered the defect, repaired it, and the boat was able to follow the flotilla and take its place as originally planned. One of the skippers of another CMB was Lieutenant Reed, DSO and bar, who took part in both Zeebrugge and Ostend raids. He later was in the Russian raids against the Bolsheviks, but unfortunately was shot in the head whilst raiding.
The Mole was breached by using an old submarine filled with explosives and rammed into the Mole, and was a counter attack to attack German defensive action whilst channel was blocked. This was effected by Lieutenant R. D. Sandford, RN, who was picked up by a Motor Launch after the explosion. On his death some time later, he was buried in Eston Cemetery, near Middlesbrough, Cleveland, where a monument was erected.
The return of Vindictive to Dover after the operation was a most inspiring sight, and miraculous that she was able to make port. The official photographs published in the press could not possibly shew the damage which she had received.
I visited the scene at Zeebrugge in the summer of 1920, and the Thetis, Iphigenia and Invincible were still in the position in which they were sunk, and it was possible to go aboard at low tide.
Lieutenant Hill was mentioned in despatches.
Lieutenant Dayrell-Reed DSO received a bar to his DSO at the second Ostend operation; in command of a coastal motor boat he carried out a successful attack on the pier ends, afterwards laying and maintaining good smoke screens close inshore throughout the remainder of the operation under heavy fire.
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