TIMELINE

1943

2 February      

Final surrender of all German forces in Stalingrad.

8 February

Soviet forces recapture Kursk

18 February-18 March    

German counter -offensive recaptures much territory lost to Red Army. Kharkov retaken with heavy German losses. Manstein closes down all counter-offensive operations.

13 March

Field Marshal von Manstein receives copy of Operational Order No: 5 identifying Kursk Salient as focus of early limited German offensive by forces of Army Groups Centre and South.

25 March

Ninth Army performs completes abandonment of Rzhev Salient. It is earmarked as key offensive formation for Army Group Centre.

8-12 April

Deputy Supreme Commander Marshal Zhukov recommends to Stalin that Red Army embrace a strategic defence in the Kursk salient to defeat German offensive. Stalin concurs on 12 with adoption of a two stage defensive/counter offensive strategy. Orders construction of massive defensive fortifications in and to rear of the salient.

15 April

Operational Order No: 6 supersedes earlier directive naming destruction of the Kursk salient by code name ‘Operation Zitadelle, to begin 3 May.

5/6 May

Intelligence repudiates German assumptions about Russian intentions in the salient. Red Army now drawn up for a massive defensive. Hitler decides to persist with operation but orders first of many delays to permit addition of far larger numbers of tanks to the operation. Within days all Axis forces in North Africa surrender to western Allies.

1 July

Hitler tells his generals that as all now seems quiet in the Mediterranean, he has decided to launch Zitadelle on 5 July.

Operation Zitadelle

1943

5 -6 July

Ninth Army/Central Front

Following the onset of the German offensive, General Rokossovsky attempts to discern the primary axis of the enemy assault. By days end this is seen to be directed to the west of the Orel/Kursk railway line. However, Model did not see fit to use his panzer divisions en masse from the outset but choose to feed them in over a number of days. Initial assaults by infantry supported by Tigers, Ferdinands and Assault Guns fails to achieve a rapid breakthrough.

On 6 July, Rokossovsky launches his 2nd Tank Army at the main German thrust line. Subsidiary German thrusts on either flank are held by the Soviets.

The Germans find themselves enmeshed amid minefields, massive fortifications and strong-points and make little headway.

Rokossovsky begins to draw off units from formations on either side of the German flanks to bolster his defences.

5-7th July

4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf

Unlike Model, Hoth unleashes all of his armoured and formations at the very outset. On the left, 48th Panzer Korps makes slow headway through the Soviet defences over the first two days. On the right, II SS Panzer Korps has greater success, managing to breach the Soviet first line of defence within hours of the opening of the offensive. Although anticipating a rapid advance with Prokhorovka the Korps objective,by the end of day 2 the advance is slowing because of the immense minefields and defences.

Unnerved by the unexpected German progress through their defences, Stalin orders that the 6th Guards Tank Army, initially earmarked for counter offensive operations, be committed to prevent a German breakthough across the river Psel. 6 GD TA begin its long journey to the Kursk battlefield where it is expected to arrive within five days to prevent a breakthrough by the Germans.

However, the inability of III Pz Kps to fully cross the Donets on Day 1 and its failure to break out of the massive Soviet defensive system by the end of Day 2, means that it is unable to fulfill its task of flank defence for the SS Pz Kps. This poses a major threat to the German timetable in the south.

7 - 10 July

Ninth Army /Central Front

Model continues to feed in his panzer divisions on a daily basis to secure a breakthrough. By the 10 July, his main thrust has advanced as far as lower slopes of the Olkhovatka heights but it is clear his offensive is running out of steam.

Rokossovsky has continually drawn on other formations of his Central Front not involved in coping with the German offensive and added more and more artillery, katyusha and infantry units to continually augment his defensive field.

The German units, even though supported by extra Luftwaffe units sent north from the south of the salient, cannot achieve the breakthrough and dash themselves against the Soviet defences.

By day’s end on the 10 July Model realises that he does not have the strength to effect the breakthrough and orders his units to engage ‘in a rolling battle of attrition’. Stalin and Zhukov have already agreed on the lauch date for Operation Kutuzov - the first counter offensive to be launched once they had sensed that the German offensive tide in the north was ebbing - and directed into the rear of Ninth Army to begin on the 13 July.

Zitadelle has already failed in the north.

On 10 July the Allies invade Sicily.

8-17 July

48th Pz Kps continues its advance on the Psel crossings, but its main offensive asset - the Grossdeutschland Pz Gren Div - now begins to find itself side-tracked into having to shore up other German formations protecting its western flank by Soviet forces that are continually attacking it. By the 10 July, this ongoing problem will see it continually invovled in this fashion through to the close down of Zitadelle.

The Russian employ the same tactics on the SS Pz Kps eastern flank which is still devoid of its designated protection from III Pz Kps which is still immured amid the Soviet defensive system.

Nonetheless, by 9 July the SS Pz Kps is approaching the river Psel when late on that evening it begins to regroup and change its axis of advance. On the following day the Kps strikes out toward Prokhorovka.

By this date, 6th Guards TA is within striking distance of Prokhorovka and the first of its units arrive there on the following day. Also due to arrive is 5th Guards Army. German hope of a rapid advance and capture of Prokhorovka is thwarted.

On the 12 July, Totenkopf is engaged on the northern bank of the Psel, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division is in the centre between the river and the Kursk/Orel railway line and Das Reich is operating to its south. Having regrouped his armoured units overnight, the Soviet commander of 5th Guards TA launches his forces at the Germans early on the 12 July. What has become known since as the ‘Tank Battle at Prokhorovka’ carries on throughout the day. Although Soviet tank losses are extremely heavy, they prevent the Germans taking Prokhorovka.

While III Pz Kps finally achieves its breakthrough to the south, it is not on hand to assist the SS Panzer Corps counter 5th GTA as the original planning had envisaged.

13-17 July

Hitler tells von Manstein and von Kluge that he is terminating Zitadelle forthwith. The latter is pleased because he is having to deal with beginnings of a massive Soviet counter offensive against the Orel salient and is already drawing on units from Ninth Army in the salient to contest it. Manstein manages to argue for five days grace from Hitler to enable his forces to continue the destruction of Soviet armour around Prokhorovka. However, on the 17 July Zitadelle is terminated as an offensive operation.

3 August            

The Red Army launches the second of its planned counteroffensives following on from its defeat of the German attack on the Kursk salient. Its launch marks the irrefutable and irrevocable final transfer of the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front to the Red Army.