Franklin arrived in Paris at the end of 1776 as America’s envoy attempting to enlist the support of the French in the revolution. His diplomacy was an adroit mix of realism and idealism. After meeting with the French foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, Franklin wrote a memo on behalf of the three American commissioners explaining why it was in France’s national interest to side with the Americans and reap the balance of power benefits (including islands in the West Indies) that would come from such a successful alliance.
TO THE COMTE DE VERGENNES, JANUARY 5, 1777
To his Excellency the Comte de Vergennes, one of his most Christian Majesty’s principal Secretaries of State, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The Congress, the better to defend their coasts, protect the trade, and drive off the enemy, have instructed us to apply to France for 8 ships of the line, completely manned, the expense of which they will undertake to pay. As other princes of Europe are lending or hiring their troops to Britain against America, it is apprehended that France may, if she thinks fit, afford our independent states the same kind of aid, without giving England just cause of complaint: but if England should on that account declare war we conceive that by the united force of France, Spain and America, she will lose all her possessions in the West Indies, much the greatest part of that commerce that has rendered her so opulent, and be reduced to that state of weakness and humiliation, she has by her perfidy, her insolence, and her cruelty both in the east and west, so justly merited.
We are also instructed to solicit the court of France for an immediate supply of twenty or thirty thousand muskets and bayonets, and a large quantity of ammunition and brass field pieces, to be sent under convoy. The united states engage for the payment of the arms, artillery and ammunition, and to defray the expense of the convoy. This application is now become the more necessary, as the private purchase made by Mr. Deane of those articles, is rendered ineffectual by an order forbidding their exportation.
We also beg it may be particularly considered, while the English are masters of the American seas and can, without fear of interruption, transport with such ease their army from one part of our extensive coast to another, and we can only meet them by land-marches, we may possibly, unless some powerful aid is given us, or some strong diversion made in our favor be so harassed, and put to such immense expense, as that finally our people will find themselves reduced to the necessity of ending the war by an accommodation.
The courts of France and Spain may rely with the fullest confidence, that whatever stipulations are made by us in case of granting such aid, will be ratified and punctually fulfilled by the Congress, who are determined to found their future character, with regard to justice and fidelity, on a full and perfect performance of all their present engagements.
North America now offers to France and Spain her amity and commerce. She is also ready to guarantee in the firmest manner to those nations all their present possessions in the West Indies, as well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that may be consequential of such assistance as she requests. The interest of the three nations is the same. The opportunity of cementing them, and of securing all the advantages of that commerce, which in time will be immense, now presents itself. If neglected, it may never again return. We cannot help suggesting that a considerable delay may be attended with fatal consequences.