Franklin arrived back in Philadelphia in 1785, and two years later he was elected to the convention meeting there to write a new Constitution to replace the weak Articles of Confederation. At 81, Franklin was the oldest member by 15 years and was exactly twice the average age of the rest of the members. His benign countenance and venerable grace as he took his seat every morning, and his preference for wry storytelling over argumentative oratory, added a calming presence.
The greatest issue facing the convention was whether America would remain 13 separate states, or become one nation, or some magical combination of both, as Franklin had first suggested in his Albany Plan of Union back in 1754. This issue was manifest in various specific ways: Would Congress be directly elected by the people or chosen by the state legislatures? Would representation be based on population or be equal for each state? Would the national government or the state governments be sovereign?
America was deeply split on this set of issues. Some people, Franklin initially among them, were in favor of creating a supreme national government and reducing the states to a subordinate role. On the other side were those fervently opposed to any surrender of state sovereignty, which had been enshrined in the Articles of Confederation.
The debate grew heated, threatening to break up the convention, and on June 11 Franklin decided it was time to try to restore a spirit of compromise. He had written his speech in advance, and because of his health he asked another delegate to read it aloud. Some of the suggestions that Franklin proposed seemed sensible, others rather odd. With his love of detail, he provided a lengthy set of calculations showing how smaller states could garner enough votes to match the power of larger ones. There were other remedies to be considered. Perhaps the larger states could give up some of their land to the smaller ones. If that was not feasible, he suggested an even more complex option: There could be equal tax contributions requisitioned from each state, and equal votes in Congress from each state on how to spend this money, then a supplemental requisition from larger states, with proportional votes in Congress on how to spend that fund.
Franklin’s speech was long, complex and at times baffling. Were these all serious suggestions or were some of them merely theoretical discourses? Members seemed not to know. He made no motion to vote on his suggestion for adjusting borders or creating separate treasury funds. More important than his specific ideas was his tone of moderation and conciliation. His speech, with its openness to new ideas and absence of one-sided advocacy, provided time for tempers to cool, and his call for creative compromises had an effect.
IN THE CONVENTION, JUNE 11, 1787
Mr. Chairman,
It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried on with great coolness and temper. If any thing of a contrary kind has on this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent hither to consult, not to contend, with each other; and declaration of a fixed opinion and of determined resolutions never to change it; neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and augment discord, and division, in a great concern, wherein harmony and union are extremely necessary, to give weight to our counsels, and render them effectual in promoting and securing the common good.
I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better if every member of Congress, or our national council, were to consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an agent for the interests of a particular state, in which case the proportion of members for each state would be of less consequence, and it would not be very material whether they voted by states or individually. But I find as this is not to be expected, I now think the number of representatives should bear some proportion to the number of the represented, and that the decisions should be by the majority of members, not by the majority of states. This is objected to, from an apprehension that the greater states would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater states could propose to themselves by swallowing the smaller and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this century, when the union was proposed of the two kingdoms, England and Scotland, the Scotch patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of representatives in Parliament they should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed however that the different proportions of importance in the union, of the two nations should be attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members in the house of commons, and only sixteen of their peers were to sit in the house of lords, a very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in the Parliament of great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever looks over the lists of public officers civil and military of that nation will find, I believe, that the north Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument.
But, sir, in the present mode of voting by states, it is equally in the power of the lesser states to swallow up the greater; and this is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose, for example, that 7 smaller states had each 3 members in the house, and the six larger to have one with another 6 members. And that upon a question, two members of each smaller state should be in the affirmative, and one in the negative, they will make:
Affirmatives 14—Negatives 7
and that all the larger states should be unanimously in the negative, they would make:
Negatives 36—In all, 43
It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the 41, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of assemblies in all countries and ages.
The greater states, sir, are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to leave theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleman has to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the states. It appears to me an equitable one, and I should for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a different constitution some with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to the borderers when their boundaries were contested, whether, by running the division lines they were placed on one side or the other. At present when such differences are done away, it is less material. The interest of a state is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the state is not injured. Small states are more easily well and happily governed than large ones. If therefore in such an equal division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to n. Jersey, and another to Delaware; but as there would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in some states and their more fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent occasion for new divisions; I beg leave to propose for the consideration of the committee another mode, which appears to me, to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature.
Let the weakest state say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the union.
Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish, even an equal proportion.
The whole of these joins supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of Congress.
The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of delegates from each state:
And their decisions to be by the majority of individual members voting.
If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions not be sufficient, let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more powerful states for farther aids, to be voluntarily afforded; leaving to each state the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found proper.
This mode is not new; it formerly was practiced with success by the British government, with respect to Ireland and the colonies. We sometimes gave even more than they expected or thought just to accept; and in the last war, carried on while we were united, they gave us back in 5 years a million sterling. We should probably have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions appeared to require them for the common good of the empire: it was not till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions, that we refused and resisted. Those contributions however were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a government in which we had no representative. I am therefore persuaded that they will not be refused to one in which the representation shall be equal.