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sincere supporters of perestroika, the tradition over many years of making everything a secret made itself felt. But it was precisely glasnost that awakened people from their social slumber, helped them overcome indifference and passivity and become aware ot the stake they had in change and of its important implications for their lives. Glasnost helped us to explain and promote awareness of the new realities and the essence of our new political course. In short, without glasnost'there would have been no perestroika.
The question of the relation between ends and means is one of the key aspects oj' politics and of political activity. If the means do not correspond to the ends, or, still worse, if the means contradict the ends, this will lead to setbacks and failure. The Soviet Union’s experience is convincing evidence of this. When we began perestroika as a process of democratic change, we had to ensure that the means used to carry out these changes were also democratic.
In essence, glasnost became the means for drawing people into political activity, for including them in the creation of a new life, and this, above all, corresponded to the essence of perestroika. Glasnost not only created conditions for implementing the intended reforms but also made it possible to overcome attempts to sabotage the policy of change.
We are indebted to glasnost for a profound psychological transformation in the public consciousness toward democracy, freedom, and the humanist values of civilization. Incidentally, this was one of the guarantees that the fundamental gains of this period would be irreversible.
Perestroika confirmed once again that the normal, democratic development of society rules out universal secrecy as a method of administration. Democratic development presupposes glasnost—that is, openness, freedom of information for all citizens and freedom of expression by them of their political, religious, and other views and convictions, freedom of criticism in the fullest sense of the word.
Why, then, did perestroika not succeed in achieving all its goals.^ The answer primarily involves the question of “harmonization” between political and economic change.
The dominant democratic aspect of perestroika meant that the accent was inevitably placed on political reform. The dialectic of our development during those years was such that serious changes in the economic sphere proved to be impossible without emancipating society politically, without ensuring freedom—that is, breaking the political structures of totalitarianism. And this was accomplished. But economic change lagged behind political change, and we did not succeed in developing economic change to the full extent.
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In recent years I have often had occasion to refute criticism to the effect that we should have begun with economic changes and held tightly to the political reins, as was done in China. There was no lack of understanding of economics on our part, still less scorn or disregard for it. To dispute that line of criticism it is sufficient to examine the chronology of events of perestroika. From the very beginning most plenary sessions of our Central Committee were devoted precisely to restructuring the economy. This aspect of the process occupied nearly three-quarters of my time and effort as general secretary, as well as the work of my colleagues and our government agencies. However, the state monopoly ownership that prevailed in our economy for decades, the administrative-command system that had left its mark on our economic personnel and party leaders, most of whom had been trained in economic management, indeed the very character of our economic system which had been functioning over such a prolonged period—all these factors contributed to incredibly powerful inertia^ which made the task of switching over onto new tracks, the tracks of a real market economy, tremendously difficult. Even if all our economic ideas and decisions during perestroika had been flawless (and I cannot say they were), that inertia would have been present.
Change had begun, but we were searching for an optimal way of making a peaceful transition from a totalitarian economy to a democratic one. The search was long and drawn out. Moods of disillusionment and disappointment, loss of faith in perestroika, dissatisfaction with the worsening material situation—all these forces began to rise among the people (although the material conditions at that time cannot be compared to those that resulted from the “shock therapy” of Gaidar and Yeltsin). Support for the reforms in our society grew distinctly weaker, and populist demagogues took advantage of this, promising to correct matters in the course of one year, which was sheer balderdash. But people wanted a quick change for the better. The society’s dissatisfaction over market conditions was thoroughly exploited by the opponents of reform inside the CPSU.
Another factor that threatened perestroika was the delay in solving the nationalities question, transforming the USSR from an actual unitary state to a truly multinational federation and thus, in the last analysis, bringing the situation into correspondence with the relevant clauses of the Soviet constitution. Nationalist elements and the ruling circles in the [non-Russian] republics, deciding that the moment had come to weaken control from the center, took advantage of this.
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The negative processes began to gain strength after Yeltsin’s group came to power in Russia and issued a declaration of sovereignty for the Russian Federation. The intention behind this was in fact to eliminate the union of republics (although nothing was said about that at the time). They were able to counter that destructive policy line with the line of preserving the union and reforming it fundamentally. By July 1991 the various republics had agreed on a new union treaty. The attempted coup by the opponents of reform thwarted the signing of that treaty. And although those opponents were defeated, the events of August 1991 gave a powerful impetus to the processes of disintegration, and the position of the central government of the Soviet Union was greatly undermined. The leadership of the Russian Republic took advantage of this. It had already been attempting constantly to assume the right to make decisions that would affect the entire union. Thus the process of estrangement and disunification among the republics was intensified, and all this resulted, in December 1991, in an agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to dissolve the USSR.
These are some of the lessons of perestroika. Of course I have only indicated the most important and fundamental ones. These lessons, it would seem, have a definite importance not only for historians. Today when the entire world is in flux, when the need for change has arisen in many countries as a result of the many new challenges of the approaching new century, any experience of change and reform takes on a significance that is not limited by national borders.
I can say this without fear of error: The experience of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy in my country, for all its uniqueness, contains much that may be of interest to democratic reformers in other countries. Especially if we keep in mind the intensified tendency toward decentralization and the rising new wave of nationalism. What about for Russia itself.^ What might be useful for its further development.^ The continuing crisis in Russia is explained in many respects by the fact that it departed from the evolutionary road of reforms and yielded to the influence of the proponents of “shock therapy.” It retreated from genuinely democratic standards in public life, scorned the social imperative, and failed to resolve the question of establishing proper federated relationships. We can be sure that the future of Russia as a democratic, peace-loving, humane country can be assured only if it continues to move along the path of genuinely democratic renewal, which was begun by perestroika—of course taking into account in the process all the new elements that have emerged.
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In concluding this chapter let us once again recall October. The revolution of 1917 was victorious under the banner of ultrademocratic slogans. These slogans were not merely demagogic, not just a means^of winning power. They expressed a profound basis for the transformation of our country, a country that used to be called the Russian empire. However, the Bolsheviks, and after them Stalin, demonstrated to their country and to the world in the most convincing way that democracy cannot be built on principles of hatred, hostility, or elimination of one part of society, or of the world, by another. Today in Russia, in the final analysis, we have come to understand democracy as a universal human value, and the task we face is not to end up once again in the position of serving as a “negative model.”
Thoughts about perestroika naturally encompass the entire complex of problems of the new thinking, including, in foreign policy, the international aspect. The road to a new foreign policy was a long one.
The first decree adopted after the October Revolution was the decree on peace. It proposed an immediate end to World War I on all fronts—but it did not call for a separate peace, as was sometimes claimed in later literature. The Entente countries rejected this appeal. Only then did Russia leave the war separately, concluding the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany. This was a humiliating treaty, a treaty of servitude. But it released our tortured and exhausted country from the worldwide slaughter. And at the same time it served as a stimulus toward ending the war as a whole. The effect of the peaceful signal Russia had given was felt everywhere in the world, by the masses of soldiers in combat and by the populations of the warring countries. Its impact was enormous, and for the Entente rulers this made Russia a more dangerous and hated enemy than even Germany itself. They were forced to draw other conclusions as well, however, from what had happened in Russia.
President Woodrow Wilson noted that the Bolsheviks had successfully influenced world public opinion by their use of a most effective weapon— a policy of peace. If the US. were to counter that influence successfully, it would have to seize that weapon from them. There soon appeared Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points—the American program for peace, which definitely reflected and took into account the peaceful challenge made by October and its impact on the world.
Soviet foreign policy after October was not irreproachable from the point of view of consistency in pursuing a peaceable line in the international
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arena. If nothing else, the attempts to implement the idea of world revolution, the activities of the Communist International, directed from Moscow, were sufficient to make the West distrust the peace initiatives of the USSR. But actually, from 1922 on, Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union were not inclined to initiate or engage in wars. Peaceful relations with the West, and mutually advantageous, businesslike economic ties [with the West], became a question of self-preservation fof'Russia.
The activities of Soviet diplomats in the 1930s, in the context of the overall democratic movement against fascism and war, are well known. This policy was dictated by the needs of the Soviet people, although the Kremlin had its own hidden agenda in this process. I believe that Stalin made a gross error in the rapprochement with Germany in 1939, an error that cost our country and the world dearly. However, the so-called Western democracies, which at the time were operating in the spirit of the Munich agreement, committed an error of no less significance.
It was natural for the USSR to join the anti-Hitler coalition with those who might have seemed to be its irreconcilable ideological opponents. This alliance was the determining factor for victory in a war that affected the destinies of all humanity. If this alliance had been maintained after the war, in a different form of course, the peace toward which we are now moving just at the end of the century could have been ours much earlier. But the former allies rushed headlong into the Cold War. Each side bears its share of responsibility for this. Which side bears the greater responsibility is a question that has not yet been answered by honest, objective historians in a sufficiently convincing way.
We cannot say that the Soviet Union’s entire postwar foreign policy brought only harm to our country and had nothing positive to offer to the outside world. It is enough to recall the ideas of the Twentieth Party Congress and some of Khrushchev’s specific actions, as well as the policy of detente under Brezhnev and the attempt to limit the nuclear arms race. The fiaw in Soviet foreign policy, however, consisted in the fact that all its energy came from an ideological source. A hard core of ideological constructs ultimately determined the behavior of the USSR on decisive questions of international relations and nourished an atmosphere of confrontation toward the West, which was of course also partly a response to the no less confrontational policy pursued by the West toward the Soviet Union. In thinking about these problems at length, 1 have come to the conclusion that the pol-
es
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icy pursued by both sides was dictated by mutual fear and was ideologically driven. As a result, by the mid-1980s the world was approaching a boundary line beyond which there loomed a universal nuclear catastrophe.
In beginning perestroika, we understood that if nothing was changed in our country’s foreign policy, we would get nowhere with the internal changes we had in mind. An analysis of the world situation and our country’s place in it had begun even before 1985. With the start of perestroika the work in this area moved forward energetically, and it was no longer kept secret but proceeded in full view of the broadest public. What was being discussed.^ We sought to define in a new way the true national interests of our country, the real parameters and imperatives for national security. We strove to examine soberly the condition of the world community and the main trends in world development. And on this basis, we tried to work out a well-considered program of specific actions in the main areas of foreign policy.
We understood of course that everything did not depend on us: Confrontational thinking and a combative political “culture” were characteristic phenomena on both sides of the Iron Curtain. But we realized that a great deal depended on us. During the years of discord with the West we in the USSR, with our nuclear arsenal and by some of our actions, had inspired distrust not only in official circles but among the broader public. Therefore it was necessary first to change our behavior in practical terms in our relations with other governments. The decisive element was to devise foreign policy conceptions that would be new in principle, to develop fresh criteria and principles for all Soviet policy in the international arena. As described above, the fruit of this effort was the new thinking—a philosophy and methodology of new approaches toward world affairs.
The new thinking was not developed all at once. It was enriched and refined as changes took place in our world outlook; it was checked and verified through our experiences in dealing and communicating with the outside world. All this, as well as the results of our changed policies, will be discussed in greater detail in part 3 of this book.
CHAPTER 7
Does Socialism Have a Future?
One OF today’s most fashionable cliches both in Russia and the West is to speak of the total collapse of the socialist idea. Socialism has been anathematized. All the misfortunes suffered by the Soviet people and others who pursued that same chimera, or on whom it was imposed—all their sufferings are attributed to socialism. This is a false conclusion. The socialism about which many great minds in the history of humanity have written and about which millions of people have dreamed never did exist—neither in the Soviet Union nor in Eastern Europe, Asia, or Cuba. And if that is true, then it simply flies in the face of history as well as logic to assert that socialism was defeated.
Nevertheless what happened in those countries that for a long time were called socialist, even “communist,” has given us greater knowledge about socialism than any theory could. We now know what is incompatible with socialism and what it cannot permit. We also know what requirements must be met by any policy aimed at making the socialist idea a reality. Let me emphasize, we know this both from the experience of the Soviet Union and from that of Western countries, where elements and processes of socialization of the productive forces have also developed to a considerable extent.
My own opinion is quite definite: The socialist idea has not lost its significance or Its historical relevance. This is so not only because the very idea of socialism, which includes such concepts as social justice, equality, freedom, and democracy, is one that can never be exhausted but also because the entire development of the world community confirms, with new urgency every day, that we need justice, equality, freedom, democracy, and solidarity. That need has not been extinguished but continues to grow. The popular movements that arise and develop in the most varied parts of our planet testify to this, do they not.^ What is it that Russia’s citizens are dissatisfied with today.^
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It is social injustice, namely, the deepening division of society into the poor (more than half the population) and the super rich (less than 2—3 percent of the population). Russians are dissatisfied with existing limitations on democratic freedoms, violations of human rights, and subordination of the mass media to the dictates of a handful of men with deep pockets.
What are the citizens of the European Union demanding.^ They want unemployment brought under control. They want action to stop impoverishment and marginalization. They want the rights and powers of cities, towns, regions, and local government bodies increased and respected. They yearn for a political system that reflects the genuine interests and needs of the people, that protects their identity in the present context of globalization.
What about the countries that still lag behind the modern world.^ Don’t their recjuirements for a normal life, for economic development, for overcoming hunger and poverty, illiteracy, and a primitive existence come within the framework of the socialist idea.^ Let me stress that I am speaking of that idea outside any particular party context.
True, the criteria differ everywhere, as do the various approaches to specific questions. But there is a common denominator: a demand for social justice, equality, freedom, and democracy—in all things, from politics to economics to everyday life.
Therefore I am convinced, first, that the socialist idea is inextinguishable. It will continue to inspire people to take action in the name of everything contained in that idea, namely, natural human rights and freedoms. (The term natural is entirely appropriate here.) Second, I believe that the question of implementing the socialist idea must be approached in a modern way, that is, taking into account the actual current situation, the experience that has been accumulated, and the real challenges and requirements of the near future.
Let us consider the matter. A development of any kind is possible only given the existence of an inner diversity. Achieving an “ideal” through the victory of one of the existing trends in society and the elimination of all others inevitably results in the destruction of the system so created.
Thus, for example, the suppression of political pluralism in the USSR, the forcible elimination of all non-Communist parties, and then of all differing shades of opinion within the Communist Party itself—those actions essentially amounted to the first step toward the establishment of totalitarianism, and at the same time toward all the subsequent dramatic turns of events. In other words, those actions led the way toward the emasculation of
DOES SOCIALISM HAVE A FUTURE?
the socialist idea, toward a deformation of the principles of socialism to the point of their complete negation.
That is why it seems hardly correct or productive over the long term to pose the question of building a society in which socialist ideology would be completely dominant, a society with socialist features only, with socialist forces having exclusive sway.
Previous conceptions of socialism were constructed as antipodes to the model of capitalist society (and in many cases such concepts continue to ^xist today). But our times have demonstrated the relativity of all social structures. They are all historical, in flux, changeable, especially in our dynamic age. The very terms capitalism and socialism in their ordinary and accustomed interpretation no longer offer much in the way of describing and understanding reality. The contemporary world is not a dichotomy; it is a multiplicity. Capitalist society has everywhere been highly variegated, and future societies will likewise be anything but copies of one another.
I think that any attempt to “construct” a single universally applicable model” for implementing the socialist idea, relying on certain constants that would be identical in all cases—such an approach is fruitless. Isn’t a different approach required, one in which socialism will be regarded not as a closed social formation but as a set oj values, whose implementation would create the conditions for the free development of all people as a condition for the development of each individual.^
It seems to me that the cornerstone of the socialist idea, as understood at the present time, consists, above all, in the optimal solution to two problems. The first is efficiency of production, provision of the material bases for the fully rounded development of all people. The second is distribution of the social product in such a way that without undermining the efficiency of production all would be guaranteed a worthy and dignified level of existence, and that would include economically, socially, and ecologically disadvantaged groups.
The solution to these two problems would create the preconditions for implementing all the basic elements of the socialist idea. And of course it would create a reliable foundation for the free, democratic political and spiritual development of society. This kind of value-based approach would free us from the temptation to destroy the existing society “to its foundations” in order to build a society based on some intellectualized scheme starting from a clean slate. In adopting such an approach, our task would be different: It would be to investigate trends and possibilities that have already made
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themselves evident, possibilities for realizing the values of socialism at the present time and in the real social world. We would attempt to bring together those forces that are capable of receiving and accepting these values, to promote or contribute to their education and organization, and to select adequate means and conditions for action. In other words, there would be no maximalistic utopias but rather a consistent and purposeful realism.
Here of course another question arises: How should we act, what should we do, since neoliberal values are the ones that prevail m society today.^
Liberalism has denied and still denies socialist values. But what has it gained from this.^ Socialists and Communists deny and have denied liberal values, but what have they achieved in doing so.^ Such mutual negation is capable only of producing a dichotomy, a division of society and the world into two hostile camps. I do not think that is the road we want.
Historically both socialism and liberalism had a common source: the humanist ideas of the Enlightenment. The difference is that liberalism bases its values on the individual principle, while the socialist idea places the freedom of the individual and his or her development within the framework of a system of collectivist relations. There are grounds for each of these approaches. But are they really so irreconcilable.^
The contradictions of early capitalism revealed the limited character of the political equality toward which liberalism oriented. Socialist theory linked progress with the establishment of social equality. This had a fundamental effect on the development of capitalist society. There occurred a steady process in which the intensity of exploitation was reduced and the participation of working people in the management of the economy, in political life, and so on, expanded (although this occurred both through sharp clashes, class struggle, and other forms of social confrontation and through compromises, agreements, and improved legislation).
When the limited nature of authoritarian collectivism, with its complete subordination of the personal to the public, of the individual to the collective, and in fact to government structures and other institutions, became obvious, the success of liberalism in practice in creating conditions for individual freedom and political rights became a challenge to the Soviet experience. It became clear that neither egoistic individualism nor authoritarian collectivism could produce optimal results.
Thus a historic interaction occurred between what seemed to be two opposing lines, approaches, or principles. I think that this interaction, and in
70
DOES SOCIALISM HAVE A FUTURE?
a certain sense the competition between these two trends of historical action, can enrich each of them and help overcome one-sidedness in the social process.
What lies ahead for us.^ Time is introducing and bringing into circulation new value-based orientations. In our times these are becoming increas-ingly identified with the interests of humanity as a whole.
On the one hand, we are talking about the very survival of humanity. In the light of the existing dangers it is becoming more and more evident that all the traditional ideologies are vulnerable. Also evident is the one-sidedness oi any politics that pursues only some private interest—whether class, national, or other. Today the starting point for any rational policy must be the interests of all humanity, regardless of religious alignment or national, ethnic, and social status.
On the other hand, we are talking about the criteria and goals of progress. Its historically conditioned characteristic progress was that the necessary material conditions were lacking for putting in practical terms the following problem; Human beings must be the goal and meaning of progress, not merely instruments for achieving that progress.
Posing such a task, on the level of civilization as a whole, as a global phenomenon, requires a new value-based orientation.
Briefly, we are all in need of some new conceptual vision of the future. It can be defined dLS global humanism. I am not the first to use this term, but it seems to me a good definition of the “meta-ideology,” if you will, that will help us find a common language for the largest possible number of socially conscious people.
No one person and no one party or political tendency has a monopoly on solving the problems that face the human race today. These problems can hardly be solved in a definitive way, once and for all. The highest wisdom in politics is to move steadily in the desired direction, constantly searching for answers. And in this search there is room for all currents of modern democratic social thought.
The imperious necessity for such joint searching has been predetermined by the fact that civilization now finds itself at an impasse. It has exhausted its potential for positive development, or it is in the process of exhausting that potential. The external manifestations of this impasse are commonly known. There are the ecological spasms we all observe and the other global problems associated with them. There is the crisis in the contemporary forms of social existence, the accumulation of contradictions between the individual and society, between government and the individual.
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And there is the obviously unhealthy state of international relations: Having emerged from the Cold W^ar era, the international community to this day has not found the way to a new, genuinely peaceful world order. There is also the increasing complexity in the functioning of the world economy. And there is both a moral and an ideological crisis: None of the generally recognized schools ot thought has been able to explain what is happening or to point the way toward overcoming the present dilemma.
But now I would like to pose the question in a somewhat different manner. The crisis is obvious, but what are its deepest rootsf
I believe we have sufficient grounds for answering this question today. The roots of the present critical condition of civilization lie in a mistaken understanding of the relation between the human race and the rest of nature, a misunderstanding coming down to us from the time of the Renaissance. A basic postulate of the Renaissance has proven to be profoundly in error: the notion that “man is the king of creation,” a notion we followed for too long. Fixation on technologically centered factors of growth has
brought us to a global ecological crisis.
Unfortunately today, on the eve of a new century, prognoses are being made that to one degree or another link the future with further perfection or improvement of the technocentric model of development. The need to renounce technologically centered models of progress and make the transition to a new anthropocentric, humanist model is being ignored. This means we are risking not only the danger of not solving our current problems, which are already extreme, but we risk intensifying and multiplying those problems.
The deepest roots of civilization’s present crisis, on the other hand, are social in nature. From time immemorial the fruits of economic development have been used, and are still being used, in such a way as to preserve and in many cases intensify social differentiation.
Existing social relations are characterized not by a search for a balance among the interests of differing social and national groups, but in most cases in hostile confrontation or opposition of these groups to one another. Unfortunately, among the prognoses being made for the future that are so widespread today, these same models of social structure prevail, even though they have essentially exhausted themselves. These models can only give rise to sharpening contradictions and dangerous conflicts, not only nationally but globally as well.
DOES SOCIALISM HAVE A FUTURE?
Obviously a different approach is needed, another paradigm, one that would be based not on the perpetuation ot social antagonisms and national conflicts but on a consistent effort to avoid such clashes. Clearly we will never achieve complete social harmony. But what is most desirable, our optimal goal, is to bring harmony into social development as much as possible and free it from the vicious circle of the struggle of each against all.
The present crisis of civilization, in my opinion, is also deeply rooted in the sphere of international relations. In the twentieth century, international relations were imbued with the same confrontational approaches as permeated social relations. This resulted in the division ot humanity into warring camps, each side claiming to represent absolute truth in its social orientations and seeking to defeat, if not physically exterminate, the other.
As a result of intense efforts based on new approaches, we have succeeded in bringing a halt to international confrontation. But what do we see happening today.^ Politicians and ideologists, in thinking about the international relations they envisage for the twenty-first century, too often return to the old models, to seeking geopolitical gains, to the idea that the world must inevitably be redivided into spheres of influence or that a single power, the United States, can maintain global hegemony. But what can such an approach achieve.^ Nothing can be gained but a repetition of the tragedies of earlier and recent times.
To generalize on what has been presented thus far, although of course the subject has by no means been exhausted, it is not difficult to draw the following conclusion: The roots of the crisis of contemporary civilfation lie in a profound separation from the genuine interests of humanity. The motivating factor in contemporary civilization so far has not been the humanist approach but instead the instinct of self-preservation, of gaining advantages at the expense of others. If by force of inertia this situation continues, it can lead to new negative consequences.
Hence my conclusion: New approaches are needed, new orientations in both thought and action. We must make the transition to a new civilization. It is sometimes said that the time is not yet ripe for a new civilization. But the question cannot be posed as though a new civilization could start tomorrow, the way one might introduce new prices for energy sources.
We are talking of a transition toward a new civilization. No one knows what it will be like. What is important is to orient in that direction. The human race today is spending enormous resources to provide the means of
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existence, even the most basic ones. The quantity of resources being expended is growing, because human needs are constantly expanding and are even being artificially cultivated. This is occurring at the expense of resources that are increasingly necessary'to solve other vital tasks, tasks that are being posed with ever increasing urgency. This is an abnormal development. In principle, humanity today has already outgrown the framework of the struggle against nature and similar problems previously dictated by necessity.
The time has come for normal development, for what I call humanist progress. The very idea of progress, by the way, needs to “progress” in order for humanity to rise to the level at which it can realize the full meaning and purpose of its own history. This cannot take place any longer at the expense of irreparable injury to the human race itself and to the rest of nature, nor by humiliating and exploiting certain groups or entire nationalities with the irreversible moral and spiritual losses that entails. Progress is only possible under conditions of universal and equal cooperation stripped of any element of armed coercion, that is, under conditions of co-development, the simultaneous development of all.
On the broadest scale, this new civilization can be envisioned not as some kind of one-sided, totally unified entity but rather as a differentiated, pluralistic one. Only thus would it be able to adapt itself in the best possible way to the rapid tempo of change and the challenges of our times.
I am convinced that a new civilization will inevitably take on certain features that are characteristic of, or inherent in, the socialist ideal. However, over the course of centuries, in both politics and social consciousness, a great number of differing ideas have been churned out—conservative and radical, liberal and socialist, individualist and collectivist. This is the reality encountered everywhere. An attempt to synthesiie these views, trends, and phenomena, an attempt to achieve an optimal interaction among them based on strictly humanist criteria—that is what will ensure movement toward a new civilization.
I will not go into further detail. The effort to construct speculative blueprints for the future is not a productive task. The future grows out of the present, out of the challenges of tomorrow that we must answer today, out of the objectively determined developmental tendencies of the social organism.
The Gorbachev Foundation does not stand alone but works together with others in the world community who are ready to participate in the
DOES SOCIALISM HAVE A FUTURE?
search for a way to a better future. Today the Foundation has undertaken the task of studying the problems created by globali:^ation^ problems affecting the entire world. Research on global problems is of course a fundamental task, and our work is only just beginning.
Preliminary conclusions have been reached, but they require further investigation. The first conclusions are as follows:
• The processes of globalization are not slowing down but are accelerating world development and making all its contradictions and problems more evident and more acute;
• Consequently, the crisis of the present-day civilization will not be easing; the tendency toward its intensification is becoming increasingly evident;
• Hence there is a quickly growing need to find new approaches and solutions aimed at overcoming the crisis, a need, at least as a start, to stop the crisis from deepening while taking into account the new conditions created by globalization;
• Obviously just as the future of civilization itself will prove to be global, so too will the path toward its formation and the solutions to its problems;
• Finally, all these factors, taken together, mean that the research on the problems that have accumulated, the efforts to work out proposals for solving them, and of course the implementation of these proposals—all must be the result of a joint effort on the part of both science and politics by the world community as a whole.
Unifying these efforts, while taking into account the current world situation, is by no means easy; the world community is not yet prepared for this.
In light of all this, a question arises: Is a movement toward a new civilization realistic.^ I think the lessons of history—above all, the history of the perestroika era, which was, if I may say so, a practical test of humanist approaches to the transformation of society—allow us to give a positive answer to this question.
What do these lessons of history embody.^
First, as perestroika demonstrated, the assertion of the ideas of humanism and democracy, even in a society burdened with the heritage of totalitarianism, is fully realistic. In the Soviet Union, in just over five years, enor-
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mous changes took place, as I have discussed above. How much more easily such changes could be made in countries where democratic traditions have long been established, however they may have been distorted in every- I
day practice. 1
Second, policy-making must play a decisive role in implementing change. But these must be policies that are linked with moral principles and serve the cause of humanism. Perestroika tells us that the elaboration of such policies and their implementation are possible even in a society bearing .
a painful legacy of the past. How much more possible they would be in countries without that heritage.
Third, these lessons confirm that genuinely progressive, democratic '
change is possible only if it does not remain the province of a small politi- ;
cal group in the top echelons of society, only if it becomes a genuine con- i
cern of the people as a whole and of public opinion in the broadest sense.
Taking heed of the lessons of the eighty years since October, as well as those of the recent past, and inspired by the ideas of humanism and universal human values, I believe we can look to the future with optimism.
CHAPTER 8
Summing Up
All that I have written above does not of course constitute a history of the October revolution or of the post-October period. These were simply reflections on that history, and if someone is displeased because certain events were not mentioned, there is no cause for complaint. This is especially true since much has been written elsewhere about the history of October and the years that followed. The key to the thoughts presented here, and my starting point, was to reflect on a many-faceted and contradictory past. Without giving way to the stereotyped thinking that has become ingrained in society and keeping my emotions in check (although that is difficult; after all a substantial part of post-October history took place before my eyes, and I played a direct role in it during the last few decades), I have tried to examine objectively the results of the path that has been taken.
I have shared my thoughts with readers. To summarize briefly, I believe that the October revolution undoubtedly left an ineradicable mark on the entire history of the twentieth century. This is simply a fact. In essence, the entire course of events since 1917 has absorbed all aspects—both positive and negative—of our great revolution and the decades that followed.
The revolution—despite the price that was paid—brought historical renewal to Russia, freed it from the heritage of the feudal and absolutist past, and allowed the modernization of our country to begin. And that was
accomplished through the mental and physical labor of our people a truly
heroic achievement. To forget this, to portray the decades of Soviet rule simply as a lost era, would be dishonest. It would be especially dishonest to the people, the individuals, the entire populations that lived and labored during those times. True, an excessively high price was paid—above all, because of the totalitarian system, the product and consequence of Stalinism. One of the most important lessons of those years is the need to reject
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
and condemn unconditionally the totalitarian system, a system that tramples on all that is human in human beings, that turns people into slaves.
Another aspect of this whole question is that Soviet history \ias shown once again that totalitarianism, which on the surface seems so solidly entrenched, so powerful, ultimately condemns a country to impotence. Alienating the people from government, property, politics, and culture and seeking to suppress the slightest manifestation of diversity, totalitarianism deprives society of any incentive toward self-development and thereby dooms itself. And conversely, one final conclusion may be drawn, a conclusion based on what we experienced: Only democracy can serve as the basis for society’s healthy and dynamic growth, for drawing out and utilizing all its possibilities.
All these assessments are not just lessons from the past. They are reminders for all of us today. The tendency toward authoritarianism, if not totalitarianism, has by no means disappeared in the world. By no means has democracy triumphed everywhere, and where it has triumphed, fundamental improvements are still needed if democracy is to adapt to new global challenges and to the needs of individual citizens.
All this is critical for today’s Russia. Entangled in a situation created by extreme radicalism [the extreme radicalism of a neoliberal school of thought], Russia has not yet found a reliable, democratic, and truly free road of development; it is still burdened with authoritarianism. It has not yet found a road that would enrich its citizens, not ruin them, a road that would ensure their political and social rights, rather than restrict or limit them.
I remain an optimist, not only because I wish my people well. I also believe in them. To be sure, much depends on what occurs in the current situation. Even two or three months can bring about great change. Perhaps an intention to change Russia’s present course will arise. To democratize the process of reform and strengthen its social orientation. Perhaps an entirely different course will be taken. As of the summer of 1998, I see no fundamental changes occurring, but I am hopeful. If we are to examine the root of our problems, however, we will see that it is a question of democracy. Only with democracy will everything proceed more smoothly and naturally.
Once when I was in Japan (I was still president of the USSR), a young woman, a student, asked me: “You are for democracy and free elections. But you yourself might not be chosen in an upcoming election; what would happen then.^” In reply I said that I would still believe I had won. I wanted people to have freedom of choice, and that is what I achieved.
SUMMING UP
One might aski But what about the October revolution? It remains one of the most important and unforgettable turning points in world history. It is my hope that its lessons, and those of the entire subsequent development of Russia, will serve the further cause of human progress. The lessons of October are highly instructive and should be absorbed and reflected upon for their genuine significance, not simply used to make a particular point. All who strive for the general good and wish peace and happiness for all humanity should reflect on those lessons and take them to heart.
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Part Two
THE UNIO'N COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
In the first part of this book I have written about what perestroika brought to the citizens of the USSR.
Perestroika was unable to give all it might have because of the difficulties encountered in the course of the reforms themselves. And of course, by December 1991, perestroika was scuttled and the Soviet Union was dissolved.
How was all this possible.^ How did it come about.^ In this part of the book I will try to answer these questions, which are of interest to many people.
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CHAPTER 9
A Tragic Turn of Events
Outside the Soviet Union, as both researchers and political leaders now acknowledge, no one foresaw the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And judging by all the evidence, no one other than rabid anti-Communists favored such an outcome. This dire turn of events shook the whole world.
How do I evaluate these events today.^ The same way I did six or seven years ago. It truly was a tragedy—a tragedy for the majority of Soviet citizens and for the republics that were part of the Soviet Union. Back then, I could not agree with the dismemberment of our country, the breaking apart of the Soviet state, and today I still consider this to have been a most flagrant error. The Union could have been preserved. A considerable number, and in some respects the overwhelming majority, of difficulties encountered by the peoples of the former Soviet Union, including the Russian people, are the result of the disintegration of the state we had in common, the destruction of a single economic, political, legal, scientific, informational, and military-strategic space that had been formed over centuries.
The dissolution of the Union radically changed the situation in Europe and the world, disrupted the geopolitical balance, and undermined the possibility of carrying further many positive processes that were under way in world politics by the end of 1991. I am convinced that the world today would be living more peacefully if the Soviet Union—of course in a renewed and reformed version—had continued to exist.
What was it that led to this deplorable finale.^ After all, the Soviet Union seemed to be such a giant block of stone, such a vast and powerful state, uniting people of more than a hundred different nationalities. Or did it perhaps only seem that way.^
No, it was not just a false appearance. The Soviet Union really was a strong and solid multinational state. Its dissolution was by no means
THE UNION COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
inevitable. At times the USSR has been called—and some still call it an empire. But it was not an empire in the generally accepted meaning of the
term.
The Soviet Union was a country tharwas formed historically over many centuries. In the course of its formation all sorts of events took place; for example, there were cases in which one or another territory or people voluntarily unified with Russia, and times when the tsarist government fought wars of concjuest. There was collaboration among different nationalities in pursuit of mutual advantage, and there were injustices and the use of force. History is like that. The result of all this was a state that was an organic ^hole—of course with a tremendous range of unique qualities among its various components. It traveled a long road—and naturally there were serious difficulties, stormy turns of events, even tragedies. Yet this state withstood the test of the Great Patriotic War. Even in that tragic hour it did not fall apart, but stood its ground.
Were there problems in the Soviet Union, including ethnic problems.^ Yes, there were political, economic, and social problems and problems between nationalities. These were not, however, problems of our country as a whole but of the system that had been established. This administrative-bureaucratic system, this totalitarian system, could not respond adequately to the problems that had built up. Not only did it fail to contribute to their solution; it deepened and intensified them. As a result, by the 1980s our country had entered a stage of severe crisis. It was in order to overcome this crisis that perestroika was begun.
Among the problems that existed in our country were those involving the various nationalities. I know this quite well from my own experience, because for many years I was in charge of one of the largest regions of the Soviet Union, the Stavropol region. I understood that relations among people of different nationalities and their common existence was an inseparable part of the real life of our society. I was aware of how important it was to adopt a cautious and sensitive attitude toward this delicate matter.
In the beginning, after the 1917 revolution, Lenin insisted on recognition of the principle that nations have the right of self-determination, up to and including secession, and he asserted the need to construct a federation of equal republics as a means of maintaining the integrity of the multinational state. It was on this basis that the USSR was founded in 1922, although events did not proceed without a certain use of force.
' A TRAGIC TURN OF EVENTS
Stalin, during the years of his rule, drastically departed from this course. The Soviet Union was turned into a supercentralized unitary state. Within this framework, the central government, the so-called Center—that is, essentially, the party did as it pleased. Borders were carved out arbitrarily, the rights of one or another nationality were flagrantly violated, and during and immediately after World War II many nationalities were subjected to wholesale repression. They were deported from their ancient homelands and resettled in remote parts of the country. Tens of thousands of these people perished m the process. Even under these conditions, however, closer ties and joint efforts among the various nationalities in the Soviet Union allowed all of them to accelerate their development sharply. National cultures flourished in all the republics, and each nationality developed its own working class and intelligentsia. The different nations and nationalities grew stronger, and each acquired an increasingly profound sense of its own identity.
In other words, contradictory processes were at work. These developments required attention and appropriate responses on the part of the Center. But that did not happen. Severe problems accumulated and were not resolved. Why did this happen.^ The'official conception was that relations among the nationalities in our country were in sufficiently good shape, that in general there were no serious problems. The mistakes made in the realm of relations among nationalities remained in the shadows, and discussion of them was unacceptable.
When perestroika began we could not avoid paying attention to this extremely important area in the life of our society. That is why, at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, which formulated a platform for the period ahead, one point was especially emphasized: “Our achievements should not give the impression that there is no problem regarding national processes. Contradictions are inherent in all processes of development, and they are inevitable in this sphere as well. What is important is to see all facets of these contradictions, which are constantly emerging, to search for reliable answers
to life s continuing questions, and to provide those answers in a timely way.”
The approach taken by this congress was correct and timely. Still, we suffered many setbacks in trying to resolve the national question. For one thing, we were late in dealing with this question; for another, we made some wrong decisions. No wonder. We were moving away from traditional attitudes and heading toward a policy aimed at transforming the bureaucratic unitary Soviet Union into a democratic federation of independent states.
THE UNION COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
Meanwhile, the course of events, life itself, made it clear that nationality problems had to be resolved. The first wake-up call came with clashes that occurred as early as March-April 1986 between groups of Russian youths and Yakut students at the state university in Yakutia. Then in December 1986 there were mass disturbances on the streets of Alma-Ata, related to a change of leadership in Kazakhstan, whose capital is Alma-Ata. A conflict had broken out among local clans. The tense situation had to be defused. And this could be done only by someone who was not linked with any of the local clans. So the proposal was made to replace D. Kunaev, the former first secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan and an ethnic Kazakh, with G. V. Kolbin, an ethnic Russian (who, incidentally, was nominated by Kunaev himself). Kolbin had experience working in the non-Russian republic of Georgia. It was thought that this would take the heat out of the conflict, especially since there were many Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and representatives of other nationalities living in Kazakhstan. It was a blunder. The appointment of Kolbin was taken as a sign of disrespect and distrust of the Kazakh people. Crowds protested on the streets of the capital and other cities of Kazakhstan.
How did we react to this significant sign that all was not well in relations among the nationalities.^ I must confess that we reacted in the same old way, and if anyone reproaches me for lack of decisiveness, he should know that I regret the decisiveness that I showed during the Kazakh events of 1986. [We resolutely insisted on Kolbin replacing Kunaev.] Unfortunately this was not the only case. Only later did I understand that this was not the way to proceed, that we could not live by a double standard [calling for democracy, while imposing solutions “decisively.”]
The resolution the Politburo adopted at that time was aimed not so much at discovering the cause of what had happened or drawing lessons from the events as to teach a lesson to Kazakhstan as well as to others. We were guided by conceptions formed much earlier, the notion that everything was flowing smoothly in the channel of unity and friendship and that outbreaks
of nationalism represented the only danger.
Later, much later in fact, both the decision of our Central Committee’s Secretariat regarding Yakutia and the Politburo resolution on Kazakhstan were withdrawn. But ^hat had happened made me think seriously about the nationalities questions. At the January 1987 Plenum of our Central Committee I spoke about the conclusions I had reached as a result of my first reflections on the problem:
A TRAGIC TURN OF EVENTS
We are obliged to acknowledge the real situation and the real prospects for development in national relations. Today, when democracy and self-government are expanding, when there is a rapid growth in national self-consciousness among all nations and nationalities, when processes of internationalization are being intensified, the timely and just resolution of conflicts that arise acquires great importance—and there is only one possible basis for resolving these 6onflicts: The interests of each nation and nationality must be able to flourish, as must the interests of our society as a ^ whole. . . . The events in Alma-Ata, and all that preceded those events, require serious analysis and assessment on the basis of principle.
In mid-February 1987 I traveled to Latvia and Estonia. Once again I felt the great intensity of the national question. In the middle of that same year we encountered the problem of the Crimean Tatars, one of the nationalities that had been forcibly removed at the end of World War II to settlements that were run like concentration camps in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. Ever since the 1960s the Crimean Tatars had been demanding justice and the right to return to their homeland in Crimea. With the coming of perestroika they sensed it was possible to have their national dignity fully restored, in deeds and not just in words. In July 1987 the Crimean Tatar protests became intense. For three days they demonstrated without interruption by the walls of the Kremlin, shouting the slogan “Homeland or Death.” On July 9, 1987, the problem of the Crimean Tatars was discussed at a session of the Politburo. Rather than paraphrase the contents of the discussion, let me quote a section of the record:
GORBACHEV: Up to this time there has been a derogatory label circulating among us [referring to the Crimean Tatars]—traitors during the Great Patriotic War. But where were there not traitors.^ What about the Vlasovites [soldiers of Russian nationality who fought on Hitler’s side].^
LUKYANOV: There was a Tatar division in the Wehrmacht.
GORBACHEV: Well, there was a Kalmyk division also. They operated in the Stavropol region. But we still restored the Kalmyk autonomous republic. Was there something exceptional in the behavior of the Tatars.^ It is true that some of them collaborated with the Germans, but others fought the Germans, just as the rest of us did. Over a period of forty-four years, 250 volumes of signatures and statements have accumulated calling for justice to be restored. Today, according to the census, there are 132,000 Crimean Tatars,
THE UNION COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
but in fact there are 350,000. Can’t better arrangements be made for them in Uzbekistan.^ What is your opinion.^
>•
The question is addressed to CHEBRIKOV [head of state security].
CHEBRiKOv: (states that they have had to confront this problem for twenty years, then continues): It seems likely that it will be necessary to organize an autonomous district in the Crimea. Otherwise we will keep coming back to this question again and again. But Shcherbitsky [head ol the Ukrainian Republic, in which the Crimea is located] is opposed.
GORBACHEV: That is also democracy.
CHEBRIKOV: And how shall we deal with the question of the southern coast of the Crimea.^* The Tatars will return and say, “This is my house, give it back.” At the same time we have to solve the problem of the Germans. There are two million of them.** We can’t get away from having to solve this problem no matter how long we postpone it. These problems have come to a head.
SOLOMENTSEV: Yes, although the problem is not simple, it must be solved. And it must be solved at the same time that we solve the problem of the Volga Germans. We have acknowledged that their deportation was unjustified. And we returned the Ingush, the Kalmyks, and the Karachai [other nationalities deported during or just after World War II]... . Almost all [deported nationalities] have been returned to their homelands. But not the Volga Germans and not the Crimean Tatars. I am not in favor of an autonomous district, however. The national composition of the population in the Crimea has changed greatly. Before the war Ukrainians comprised 15 percent; now they account for 26 percent. Russians comprised 49 percent; now they account for 68 percent. ... An autonomous district would be a mongrel solution. Maybe I’m a maximalist, but we have a good decree signed by Lenin in his day. Since we are seeking to live according to Lenin, we could base our actions on his decree. It would be difficult for anyone to take offense against it. Neither Russians nor Ukrainians. The nationalities would learn to get used to living with one another.
*The Crimea’s southern coast is a beach and resort area, a highly prized location.—Trans.
** These are descendants of German colonists invited to settle mainly in the Volga region in the eighteenth century. During World War II they were deported from the autonomous area created for them after the Soviet revolution.—Trans.
A TRAGIC TURN OF EVENTS
GORBACHEV: In Other words, you think the Crimea should once again become part of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), as in Lenin’s decree? Don’t you remember that Podgorny insisted that Krasnodar and the Kuban be given back to Ukraine? Because, in his opinion, the Cossacks were Ukrainians. Most likely from the historical point of view it would be correct to return the Crimea to Russia. But Ukraine would rise up against that.
VOROTNIKOV: This question should be postponed. There is a risk of creating one more enormous Ukrainian problem? I am in favor of an autonomous district, but for the time being it is necessary to create [better] conditions [for the Crimean Tatars] in Uzbekistan. I am against trying to solve the Volga German problem at the same time.
SHEVARDNADZE: I am in favor of creating [better] conditions in Uzbekistan and gradually allowing all who so desire, and are able, to move back to the Crimea.
YAKOVLEV: Set a fifteen to twenty year transitional period, for example, for returning to the Crimea. And for the time being, [have them remain] in Uzbekistan.
DOLGIKH: I support this position.
GROMYKO: why are we being so hasty? No disaster has yet befallen us. So what if delegations are constantly traveling to visit the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and other institutions? Let them travel. The decision to deport them was justified by wartime conditions. Transfer [of the Crimea from Russia] to Ukraine was of course arbitrary. But how can we take that back now? I am in favor of leaving the problem to the judgment of history. And don’t create an autonomous district. Make arrangements for the Tatars in Uzbekistan. If this doesn’t provide a complete solution, at least it will ease the pressure for a Crimean variant of the solution. Once again, I propose that we think about it and not make a final decision.
LUKYANOV speaks in favor of an autonomous district in the Crimea.
GORBACHEV: We cannot succeed in avoiding a decision. We must think everything through thoroughly. The idea of restoring a Crimean autonomous area, as in Lenin’s decree, is unrealistic today. Over a period of forty-five years a great deal has changed in the Crimea. ... It is no longer possible to give the Crimea to the Tatars. . . . Returning the Crimea to the RSFSR
THE UNION COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
would create a fissure in a place where it would not at all suit our purposes now, that is, within the Slavic nucleus of the “socialist empire.” Before the revolution, the strongest support for independence of the country was the Russian nation. Now it is all the others, too. It is necessary to create conditions for a full and satisfactory life for the Tatars in Uzbekistan and to be concerned and take care of them. Those who have already turned up in the Crimea, let them live there. They, too, must be given assistance. But steps must be taken to restrain resettlement to the Crimea. People should be urged to base their actions on reality. '
A commission is created consisting of Gromyko^ Shcherbitsky, Vorotnikov^ Us-mankhodfiaev, Demichev, Chebrikov, Lukyanov, Raiumovsky, and Yakovlev.
GORBACHEV: For now we will not take up the Volga German problem. And if this commission shows its capabilities in resolving the Tatar question, we will assign it to the German question next. And let the commission go out to meet Tatar delegations and make statements for the press. In a word, we have to approach this process in a democratic spirit.
(Later, after the commission had worked for a while, a conclusion was reached jointly with the Ukrainian authorities: It was deemed possible to return some of the Tatars to their former places of residence. Thus a step was taken toward meeting the Tatars halfway, but the problem was not resolved. Later, in 1989, all the Crimean Tatars were given the right to return to the Crimea, but the commission reaffirmed the refusal to restore the Crimea to the status of an autonomous republic of the Crimean Tatars.)
I have cited the transcript of this Politburo discussion in order to show how we discussed such problems at that time. After mid-1987, the question of relations among the nationalities was practically always on the Politburo’s agenda.
In August 1987 signs of intensifying national ferment in the Baltic republics became evident. Such ferment had always existed there, but earlier it had remained beneath the surface. The main cause was discontent over the Russification of the region. But there was no plan for dealing with this matter. Discussion of the question went nowhere. Besides, the local authorities themselves were seeking investments for industrial construction for which workers and specialists were needed. And since they did not exist
A TRAGIC TURN OF EVENTS
locally, that meant more Russians would move to the area, and not only Russians. That’s the way things were in real life.
Suppression of the real history of how the Baltic region was unified with the USSR played a considerable role in this whole problem. Demands that the truth be established and the actual history revealed began in 1987. At first it was only a question of restoring historical truth, but later demands were made that the situation existing before 1939 be restored. At the time we did not realize the full import of the processes that were taking place. We ^were late in responding adequately to what was happening.
In October 1987 there began a movement to reunify the Karabakh region with Armenia. A wave of public meetings and rallies swept across the region, and this provoked the emigration of Azerbaijanis from Karabakh. In response, a protest campaign developed in Azerbaijan with the slogan, “Karabakh is an inseparable part of Azerbaijan.” In Karabakh, matters moved very quickly to the point of direct clashes between representatives of the two different national communities and a short while later to outright war between those communities and between the Armenian and Azerbaijan republics.
This forced the leadership of our country to view these national problems differently. At the February 1988 Central Committee Plenum the following statement was made: “We must examine the nationalities question at its present stage very thoroughly, both in theory and practice. This is a vital question of principle for our society.”
On February 26, 1988, I appealed directly to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia, urging the citizens of those republics to act only within a legal framework and within the boundaries of the democratic process, not to allow the question of their nations’ fate to fall into the hands of blind passion and elemental emotions. But I did not succeed in stopping the mounting animosity. By the end of February, bloody conflict broke out, culminating in the massacre at Sumgait.
I remember well the intensity with which these events were discussed at the Politburo session of March 3. Summarizing the discussion, I urged everyone to remain calm and maintain a principled approach: “Don’t make enemies out of people. . . . Function politically. Of course the government must be the government. Law must prevail.” I also said that there could be no victors in this conflict, but that agreement must be reached. It was necessary at this time to affirm a carefully balanced,approach to solving national problems.
Q I
THE UNION COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
«
Not only among ordinary citizens but in the Politburo as well, proposals were being made for the use of force. On July 4, 1987, Andrei Gromyko said: “Let the army appear in the streets, and immediately there will be order.” We did not agree with this point of view. But it reemerged from time to time. Old ways of approaching things, attitudes that had been entrenched for decades, continued to make themselves felt.
Did we realize at the time that what was at issue was not so much resolving our most acute problems as changing our way of approaching them, working out policies that would be new in principle regarding the national question.^
The answer is yes; by that time the idea that new policies were needed had matured in our thinking. At the February 1988 Central Committee Plenum I proposed that one of the next plenums be devoted entirely to problems of policy on the nationalities question.
Naturally the amount of attention we had to pay to national problems continued to mount. At the Nineteenth Party Conference I presented the Politburo’s position: “Despite all the difficulties encountered along our way ... the Soviet Union has withstood the test of time. It remains the decisive precondition for the further development of all the peoples of our country.”
But matters were not limited to that statement. A program of practical measures was essentially formulated. We considered it of paramount importance to develop and implement measures on a large scale in order to strengthen our Union. We prepared proposals defining the jurisdiction of the Union and that of the Union republics, transferring a number of administrative functions to the republics, determining optimal variants for the possible transition of the republics and regions into self-financing entities, and developing direct ties among the republics so as to clearly specify how each might contribute in carrying out programs on the level of the Union as a whole.
Life confronted us with the need to make changes in the legislation concerning Union republics and autonomous republics, as well as autonomous regions and districts, and to expand legal guarantees to ensure that the national-cultural needs of the various national groups living outside their own territories would be met. A Unionwide law was urgently needed regarding the full development and equal use of the languages of all the peoples of the USSR. Thus we viewed the national question within the framework of the policies of perestroika as a whole. The orientation we adopted was, on the one hand, to respect the rights of the different nations
A TRAGIC TURN OF EVENTS
and republics, ensuring them maximum satisfaction; on the other hand, we wished to strengthen the Union thoroughly and transform it into a genuine federation.
We had reached the next stage of political reform. And political methods for solving our persistent national problems had to be placed at the forefront.
Tbilisi. . . Baku . . . Vilnius
\
Were we successful in keeping the course of events within this framework? After all, the events in Tbilisi and Baku, and then in Lithuania, did happen. I will go into each of those cases in some detail because a lot of nonsense has been stated and many false accusations made about these events.
First, Tbilisi. Beginning on April 4, 1989, several informal groups [groups not officially recognized] held unauthorized demonstrations for many days in front of the main government building with such slogans as “Independence for Georgia” and “Down with the Russian Empire.” The local leaders, who considered political methods and direct discussion with the people to be manifestations of weakness (a typical attitude of many officials of the old school), preferred to rely on force. On April 7 they proposed that a state of emergency be declared in Tbilisi. On that same day, a meeting at the Central Committee of the CPSU (involving Ligachev, Chebrikov, and others), decided that troops would be sent there. They were not supposed to be used; it was felt that, by itself, the appearance of soldiers would return the situation to normal.
On April 7 I was in London. Returning to Moscow late in the evening, I received information at the airport about what had happened. Taking into account all the facts that were known at the time, I immediately assigned Shevardnadze and Razumovsky, a secretary of the Central Committee, to go immediately to Georgia. On the morning of April 8 the Georgian leadership informed us that there was no need for representatives from Moscow to come immediately, that the situation had returned to normal. I think Dzhumber Patiashvili did not want Shevardnadze to come there, because his relations with Shevardnadze had been completely soured. On the night of April 9, troops were used to “clear” demonstrators from the central square. In the process sixteen people were killed and many were wounded.
TBILISI . . . BAKU . . . VILNIUS
But who gave the order to use force? This remains a mystery, which neither the Congress of People’s Deputies nor numerous commissions investigating events in Tbilisi have been able to solve. I believe that the local military command in Georgia, entirely unsuspecting, was the victim of political intrigues. Apparently even at the time military operations were being influenced by those who later, in August 1991, set into motion the events that became known as the August coup. Recently General Rodionov [who was in charge of the troops that attacked the demonstrators in Tbilisi], Jn reply to a question from a journalist, said he was authorized to take action by Marshall Yazov, who was then the minister of defense. This confirms our suspicions. Rodionov assumed that Yazov’s orders had the approval of the top leadership of the Soviet Union.
This was a cruel stab in the back. Speaking on radio and television immediately after the events, I stated:
What happened in Tbilisi undeniably is harmful to the interests of perestroika, democratization, and the renewal of our country. Decisions and actions by irresponsible persons have resulted in increased tensions in the Georgian republic. Anti-Soviet slogans are being heard, along with demands that socialist Georgia be broken away from the fraternal family of Soviet peoples. False orientations have led some people astray. Disturbances have broken out. People have been killed and innocent blood has been shed. The grief of the mothers and family members is immense, and the grief we feel is very deep.
A few days later, after Shevardnadze actually visited Georgia, a meeting of the Politburo sharply condemned the military action. By way of illustration, I will quote the words of Nikolai Ryzhkov, prime minister at the time, spoken at the Politburo meeting:
We were in Moscow during those days, so what did we know? I am the head of the government, but what did I know? I read in Pravda about the death of people in Tbilisi. The secretaries of the Central Committee knew, but we, the members of the Politburo and the Cabinet, knew nothing . . . We must have timely and accurate information. What’s the good of all this? What is going on here? The commander of the military district takes action, but we in Moscow know nothing about it. He could arrest all the Politburo members [of the Communist Party] of Georgia, and we again would learn about it in
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the newspapers. Even Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev did not know. So, then, what is going on among us.^ The army is used and the general secretary only finds out about it the next day. How are we going to appear to the Soviet public and in the eyes of world opinion.^ Everywhere you look in our country, actions are being taken without the Politburo’s knowledge. That is even worse than the Politburo itself making a wrong decision.
Ryzhkov was right.
At this same Politburo meeting I was obliged, in rather sharp form, to raise the question of accuracy and truthfulness of information and to point out that the agencies providing information must approach the question with full responsibility. Of course I also raised the question of the army’s role. I said to Defense Minister Yazov: From then on, the army was not to take part in such matters without the permission of the country’s top leadership.
After the events in Tbilisi, the Politburo authorized army action only once—to avoid mass disturbances and bloodletting in Baku. This was related to a further worsening of relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in early 1990, resulting in pogroms against Armenians in Baku and to an “exodus” of Armenians from that city. The local authorities sought to restore order. But internal quarreling and divisions paralyzed their ability to act and to maintain control of the situation. Disturbances spread to a large part of the Azerbaijani republic, and destructive elements encouraged people to destroy the boundary lines [along the Azerbaijani border] over a distance of several hundred kilometers.
Representatives of the top Soviet leadership were sent to Baku— Yevgeny Primakov, a member of the President’s Council, and A. Girenko, a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They reported that the situation was critical. On January 19 two documents were published simultaneously—an appeal to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia from the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers; also published was a decree announcing a state of emergency in Baku, issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Late in the night of January 19 and the early hours of January 20 troops from the Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet Army entered Baku. All possible forms of provocation and obstacles were placed in their path as these troops moved forward. Gunmen of the Azerbaijani National Front opened fire on our military personnel, and our military units were obliged to respond in kind. As a result, on January 19-20, eighty-three people were
TBILISI . . . BAKU . . . VILNIUS
killed in Baku, including fourteen military personnel and members of their families.
On January 20 I appeared on central television to give an assessment of the situation and to explain the actions of the leadership. I said that the leadership hoped that the measures taken would be understood and supported by all the nations and nationalities of our country.
But those events and the measures taken were interpreted in varying ways (and that is still true today). Some said that once again we were late in ^taking action and that a state of emergency should have been imposed sooner. However, the authorities of the Soviet Union could not, according to the Constitution of the USSR, take action over the heads of the leaders of the Azerbaijani republic. The central government intervened directly only when it became clear that the authorities on the republic level were paralyzed and unable to act.
Others have simply reproached or denounced us for imposing a state of emergency. There is only one answer to such accusations: If measures had not been taken, events might have followed a totally unpredictable course. I regret that blood was spilled, but the purpose was to stop further bloodshed at all costs.
I have long reflected on what happened. The lesson I have drawn from this whole tragic history is that the authorities cannot get by without using force in extreme situations. But such actions must be justified by absolute necessity and must be kept within very carefully weighed limits. Only political measures can provide a genuine solution to such problems.
Finally there was Vilnius, in Lithuania. This time it was 1991, and again it was January. I have said that the situation in the Baltic region, above all, in Lithuania, began to worsen from mid-1987 on. But in mid-1989 matters began to deteriorate with particular speed after the Sajudis organization in fact came to power in the Lithuanian republic. Let me remind readers that at first Sajudis was an organization that supported perestroika and defended it against conservative elements. Later it gradually became a stronghold for those forces that favored secession from the USSR. I personally, and many of my colleagues, put a great deal of effort into trying to defuse the sentiment in favor of separation, but our efforts were unsuccessful.
What arguments did the advocates of secession advance.^ On the one hand, they sounded the alarm about alleged domination by the Russian part of the population. This was an obvious exaggeration. The Russians accounted for only one-fifth of the population in Lithuania. But warnings
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that Lithuanians could ultimately become a minority within their own republic had an effect on many people.
Another argument was more practical in nature. Those favoring separation claimed that Lithuania, because of its excellent agricultural production, was supplying much of the food for Moscow and Leningrad. Yet the Lithuanian republic itself was suffering shortages of meat. This was true—or, more exactly, partly true. Nothing was said about the enormous quantity of goods supplied to Lithuania from other Soviet republics, primarily Russia, including grain, oil, metals, industrial goods, and consumer goods—or else the significance of those supplies was minimized. Nothing was said about the preferential treatment of Lithuania and all the Baltic republics out of political considerations. Owing to this preferential treatment (and of course to the higher productivity of labor there) the standard of living in Lithuania was higher than the average standard in the Soviet Union, but no one seemed to think about that. These half-truths had their effect: Not only Lithuanians but people of other nationalities began to think, “If we separate from Moscow, our lives will become better.”
In any case, the situation gradually became hotter and hotter. On May II, 1989, the Politburo discussed the situation in the three Baltic republics. The leaders of the Communist parties of those three republics took part in the meeting. During the discussion, especially after the secretaries of the Baltic Communist parties had left, different views were heard concerning what should be done. It was obvious that some participants at the meeting were not averse to applying pressure. In my concluding remarks, I said:
Let us take as our starting point the idea that all is not lost. We also must be cautious in our assessments so as not to reach a point of desperation or of breaking off relations. ... We cannot dismiss as extremists the various national fronts, which have the support of 90 percent of the people in those
republics. We must be able to talk with them We must have confidence
in the people’s good sense We must not be afraid of experiments allow-
ing republics to become fully self-financing entities. . . . We must not be afraid of differentiation among republics in terms of the level at which they exercise their sovereignty. ... In general, we must think, and think hard, about how in fact to transform our federation. Otherwise everything will indeed fall apart. . . . The use of force is excluded. It has been ruled out in
foreign policy and is absolutely inadmissible against our own people Let
us take our analysis of what is going on to a higher level. . . . And we must
TBILISI . . . BAKU . , . VILNIUS
be more cautious than ever with any final qualifications or use of labels. After all, this is the national question.
At the First Congress of People’s Deputies (May 25-June 9, 1989) the full range of national problems in the Soviet Union was posed for discussion and consideration in the broadest sense. The report I presented to the congress defined key aspects of nationalities policy under perestroika:
In a federated state, that which falls within the competence of the Union as a whole and that which is the sovereign right of the republic or autonomous entity should be clearly defined. Legal mechanisms need to be worked out for resolving conflicts that may arise in the relations between the Union and its component parts.
In the economic field, relations between the Union and the republics must be harmonized on the basis of an organic combination of economic independence and active participation in the Unionwide division of labor. From this standpoint, it follows that we need a restructuring of the way the unified economic complex of the country is regulated, by allowing republics, regions, and provinces to make the transition to a self-governing and selffinancing basis as an organic part of the overall process of renewing the Soviet economy.
.. .In the spiritual realm, we take as our starting point a recognition of the multiplicity and diversity of national cultures as a great social and historical value and a unique advantage belonging to our Union as a whole. We do not have the right to underestimate, still less to entirely lose, any one of these cultures, because each is irreplaceable.
We are in favor of the full and rounded development of each nationality, national language, and culture and for equal rights and friendly relations among all nations, nationalities, and national groups.
The congress supported what I proposed as a basis for action. During 1989 and 1990 a great deal was done to put into practice the policy line I had projected. Several laws were adopted, for example, one on general principles of local self-government and the local economy in the USSR, which expanded the rights and powers of union republics and autonomous republics; a second on the languages of the peoples of the USSR, which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization; a third demarcating the respective powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the component parts of the federation; as well as others.
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As for the Baltic republics, they were granted broad rights in the economic realm by a special law passed by the second session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, rights that were extended to Byelorussia and Sverdlovsk Province as well.
In September 1989 a plenum of the Central Committee adopted, as the official position of the CPSU, a document entitled “The Nationalities Policy of the Party in Present-Day Conditions.” This document formulated the main tasks we faced, and these are summarized as follows:
• transforming the Soviet federation into a genuine political and economic entity;
• enlarging the rights and powers of autonomous national entities of all forms and types;
• ensuring equal rights to every nationality;
• creating conditions for free development of national cultures and languages;
• strengthening guarantees that would rule out any restriction on the rights of citizens for reasons of nationality.
Thus, although belatedly, we formulated a principled political platform on the national question. This platform made it possible to resolve the accumulated problems. In the Baltic region, however, those who had made up their mind in favor of secession from the Soviet Union intensified their activity. Members of our party’s leadership, including myself, met many times with representatives of the three republics, separately and together. I emphasized that the right to self-determination, up to and including separation, is an inseparable sovereign right embodied in the then operative Soviet Constitution. But I tried to convince people that secession would contradict the real needs of the nationalities of our Union. Decentralization, autonomy, a redistribution of powers—yes—but with the maintenance of cooperation and coordination. It made no sense to criticize the idea of a federation. We had never had such a system. We had lived in a unitary state. Let us first try living under a genuinely federated arrangement, I argued, and then decide what to do. The positive experience of federated states in other parts of the world was there for us to see.
On January 29, 1990, the Politburo considered several draft laws and amendments to the Soviet Constitution having to do with the national question.
TBILISI . . . BAKU . . . VILNIUS
On April 3,1990, a law on secession from the Union was adopted. However, on the eve of its adoption the new leadership in Lithuania demonstratively declared that republic s independence. On March 22, during a discussion in the Politburo about the situation that had thus arisen, General Varennikov proposed that a state of emergency be proclaimed, that presidential rule be imposed, that troops be sent in, that the leaders of the Lithuanian republic be isolated, and that all this be carried out under the pretext of an appeal from patriotic forces.” Naturally the Politburo refused to con-^sider this proposal. But the very fact that he made it was symptomatic of the mood in certain Soviet military circles, and not only in the military.
I presented my position publicly in a discussion with delegates to the Twenty-first Congress of the Young Communist League (the Komsomol);
To be sure there is the constitutional right to self-determination. A law has now been adopted on the procedure for solving problems associated with the secession of a republic from the USSR, so let us begin the ‘process of divorce,’ but for them, that is, the Lithuanians, to adopt a decision overnight without consulting the people, without any referendum—that is an adventure.
As the saying goes, you can’t force someone to like you. Granted there is a desire to leave—but we must first tell the Lithuanian people what the consequences will be—these will be territorial, economic, defense-related, and will impact the arrangements for those who do not wish to remain in a separate state. That is one option. Here is another: If the republic remains in
the Soviet Union, [we need to specify] what rights and powers it will have
political, economic, cultural-technical, and so forth, and what freedom and autonomy it will enjoy. In that case, the Lithuanian people, who are a wise people, will figure out for themselves that what Lithuania needs is autonomy within the framework of ongoing vital links with all the other republics.
I wish to remind readers that all these events were unfolding at a time when political reform was deepening in our country. The Congress of People’s Deputies had been operating for a year by then, as had the Supreme Soviet elected by that congress. Free elections had also been held for government bodies in the Union republics and bodies of local self-government. A political struggle was mounting—a so-called radical wing had taken shape among the democrats and, in opposition to it, a no less radical wing of
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so-called patriots had been formed. Events in the Baltic region provoked strong reactions on both sides. The entire country was seized by a sense of alarm.
When I was in the city of Sverdlovsk at that time, I had occasion to answer numerous questions on this matter. The following is just one of my replies;
We are encountering increasing strain in relations among nationalities, greater conflicts. Some say. Let this “empire fall apart; others say. What are Gorbachev and the other leaders thinking about.^ They should have restored order and put everyone back in their place long ago. Neither of these two approaches is consistent with serious politics. As a Russian, as a Soviet citizen, and as a political leader, I cannot accept such extreme ways of approaching these questions. . . . Let us reorganize our federation and think about renewing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Everything that contributes to carrying out the idea of renewal corresponds to the interests of Russians and of all other nationalities in our country. That we must take as our starting point.
In late April 1990 signals began to come from the Lithuanian leadership indicating a willingness to enter into a dialogue with representatives of the central government, suggesting that the decisions made by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania could be considered a subject for discussion. Lithuania would not object to an interpretation of its declaration of independence as a document in which the status of the republic could be considered as “an associated member of a renewed, reorganized Soviet Union.” The implementation of this kind of approach would have to be the result of a step-by-step process involving consultation and coordination with the central government of the Union. This was a basis on which to search for a practical solution.
This little-known fact tells us that at the time there was indeed a possibility for a political solution that would not have undermined the idea of renewing the Soviet Union. What prevented us, then, from reaching an accord.^ A new situation arose that radically changed the entire atmosphere—above all, in matters having to do with nationalities.
On June 12, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Russia adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of the RFSFR. In the wake of that action similar declarations were adopted by other republics, not only Union republics but
TBILISI . . . BAKU . . . VILNIUS
also autonomous republics. The “parade of sovereignties” began. The search for ways of coming to an agreement with Lithuania was consequently frustrated and made impossible.
The declaration of sovereignty by Russia, as is well known, had even more far-reaching consequences. Not only was agreement with Lithuania undermined. Essentially the events of the summer of 1990, with the Russian declaration of sovereignty as the fuse, ignited a process that eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. That, if you will, was the prime ^cause of its dissolution. I will return to this point below.
At the end of 1990 the authorities in Vilnius continued to function according to the letter and spirit of their declaration of independence, and this led to a significant internal struggle within that republic. Those opposed to secession from the Soviet Union created their own organizations. The Communist Party of Lithuania broke apart at that time, and its fragments scattered in different directions. One element supported independence^ another opposed it and acted, moreover, in an extremely radical way, sometimes in violation of the law. This segment of the former Communist Party of Lithuania began systematically to request that the central government impose a state of emergency, place Lithuania under rule by presidential decree, and so on. These demands, in fact, were met with sympathy and support on the part of certain forces in Moscow, forces exerting similar pressures (for example, as mentioned above. General Varennikov’s statement in the Politburo meeting). In December 1990 and January 1991 these forces in Vilnius and Moscow were in fact coordinating their actions.
Even so, I felt, as before, that I did not have the right to take extreme measures. On January 10, 1991, I appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian republic and called for full and immediate restoration of the Soviet Constitution since the situation was becoming explosive. The Lithuanian authorities did not respond. As a result, those who demanded that Lithuania remain within the framework of the USSR sharply increased their activities and created a Committee for National Salvation. Anticonstitutional activities by some had called forth anticonstitutional activities by others. The struggle had passed from the channel of constitutional procedures and was flowing into the path of direct confrontation.
Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pugo [ministers of defense, state security, and the interior, respectively] reported to me that they had taken measures in case the situation grew out of control and direct clashes began between supporters of Sajudis and the Communists, necessitating rule by presidential
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decree. That was the only factor considered, nothing else—just the need to act in the event ot bloodshed. After arriving in Vilnius, General Varennikov reported that the situation was dangerous, and he again proposed imposing rule by presidential decree.
Under these conditions, one more attempt was made at a political solution. On January 12 the Council of the Federation discussed the situation in Lithuania. I stated that we were one step away from bloodshed and proposed that representatives of the Council of the Federation be sent to Vilnius immediately to investigate on the spot and suggest possible action. But before the delegation even arrived in Vilnius, the tragedy occurred. I demanded explanations from Kryuchkov, Pugo, and Yazov: How could this have happened, and who gave the order for the use of troops.^ All three denied any involvement in these events.
To this day all the details of what happened in Vilnius (and then in Riga) are not known, but as time passes, more and more facts are being disclosed. After I had ceased to function as president of the USSR I received information lifting the curtain a bit on the events of January 13, 1990, in the capital of Lithuania. Ultimately, without question, we will know exactly who gave the order for the troops to act, who led the entire “operation,” and how they went about it.
In a speech on January 22, 1990, I said the following: “The events that occurred in Vilnius are in no way an expression of the policy line of the president; it was not for this that presidential power was established. I therefore emphatically reject all speculation, all suspicions, and all insinuations in this regard.” The declaration stated firmly that any social organizations, committees, and fronts can aspire to come to power only by constitutional means and without the use of force. All attempts to resort to armed force in political struggle are unacceptable. Arbitrary actions on the part of the armed forces are equally unacceptable.
It is evident from the above discussion that these three crises—in Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius—were quite different in character. Only in Baku was the use of troops the result of a decision by the central government. The actions in the other two cases were totally opposed to the policy line of our country’s leadership, which was oriented toward a peaceful, political resolution of the situations that had developed.
CHAPTER I I
Toward a New Union Treaty
The question of drafting and signing a new Union treaty arose in the course of preparations for a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the nationalities question, although the problem of the renewal of our federation, as I have said, had come up earlier. Indeed the time was ripe to begin work on establishing a legal basis for the reformation of the Union, that is, the drafting of a new Union treaty. For our part, having formulated this idea in September 1989, we had actually begun practical consultations on such a treaty much earlier.
The platform of the CPSU Central Committee, drafted for the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, entitled “Toward a Humane and Democratic Socialism,” which was approved by the February 1990 Central Committee plenum, stated: “The CPSU considers further development of the treaty principle in restructuring the Soviet Union to be necessary. . . . The Union republics, while voluntarily transferring strictly defined functions to the competence of the Union [in a Union treaty], will reinforce their status as sovereign states, assuring them constitutional guarantees.”
This general position had not yet been “fleshed out” with an appropriately detailed elaboration. Discussions continued on what the actual content of the Union treaty should be. The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the Politburo meeting of March i, 1990:
GORBACHEV: We have to examine and truly understand the conception of a federation. We cannot limit ourselves to expressing condemnation and feeling offended. Some people even suggest expulsion from the USSR. Public opinion has shifted in attitude from emotional reactions to arguments like the following: Why do we need such a huge Union.^ Russia and Ukraine together already have 200 million people. Then add Kazakhstan, where half
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the people are Russian. Well, maybe tack on Uzbekistan, too. But as for the rest of them, let them leave the Soviet Union.
That is why we must keep the initiative in our own hands. I repeat, we need a clear conception. And that conception is the renewal of the Union on the basis of a treaty. From discussions with representatives from the Baltic region, from Georgia, and from other republics, I see that they are all thinking about a new conception of the Union in their republics. Yet we keep insisting on the old formula. We need to draft a Union treaty and publish it, and it must be thoroughly discussed, without haste, in the press and in society—everywhere. Particularly so that everyone will see what the various nations would risk if they withdraw from the Union. Of course we cannot fall into the old [tsarist] slogan “One and Indivisible.” [The old slogan of tsarist Russia had been “Russia, One and Indivisible. ] But the (Question must be posed in such a way as to neutralize the desire to leave the Union. It is possible to have a federation with the different republics having different status^ consecjuently different relations will result between the republics and the Center. After all, even in the Russian empire the status of different parts of the empire varied. There was the Grand Duchy of Finland, the Kingdom of Poland, the Khanate of Bukhara, and so on.
RYZHKOV supports the idea of a discussion of a draft treaty with the aim of and within the framework of drafting a new constitution. LIGACHEV sharply asserts that internationalism is being forgotten.
GORBACHEV (continues): If we do not examine and come to understand the idea of a federation, turmoil will continue. All that we are doing will be affected. We can’t just “keep them in check.” We must act very carefully to establish a procedure; otherwise we could end up defending ourselves against our own most ardent supporters, those who are in favor of a federation i ,000 percent.
How can we build a bridge.^ The starting point is the idea of the federation. Despite what the variations or various steps may be, going in one or another direction, still the pivotal point is the idea of a federation.
Two weeks later, at the Third Congress of People’s Deputies, I was elected president of the USSR. In my first speech in this new position I immediately placed the accent on the problem of a Union treaty:
The fate of perestroika to a large degree will be determined by how successful we are in carrying out the transformation to a new federation. As
TOWARD A NEW UNION TREATY
president, I reaffirm my commitment to maintaining our country’s integrity. At the same time I proceed from the idea that it must be an object of special concern by the president s office to take measures to strengthen the sover-^he Union republics, their economic and political autonomy, and to raise the status of the autonomous republics and other national-territorial entities.
While I share the opinions stated here on these questions, I consider it vitally urgent that a new Union treaty be drafted, one that will correspond ^ to the new realities and requirements in the development of our federation and of each Soviet nation. In this process we should provide for differentiation in the various forms of federative relationships, taking into account the unique conditions and potential of each republic.
In other words, a very definite course was publicly presented for consideration by our country’s highest governing authority. In that same speech, taking into account the situation in the Caucasus (the continuing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan), as well that in the Baltic region, and the spread of separatism and anti-Soviet sentiments in other regions of various republics, I found it necessary to focus on certain specific problems. The drafting and signing of a new Union treaty would contribute to overcoming those difficulties.
And I continued my address:
Emergency measures are needed to resolve the especially painful problems arising from quarrels or feuding among nationalities, above all, the problem of refugees. In this regard, measures must be taken by the governments of the appropriate Union republics and, when necessary, by the Union government itself.
In general, we have the right today to propose the following: The Union republics, while strengthening their sovereignty and acquiring broad autonomy, must also take full responsibility for ensuring civil rights for people of all nationalities on their territory—in accordance with both Soviet and international norms. This is a political, legal, and material responsibility.
In recent times the danger of the spread of nationalist, chauvinist, and even racist slogans has arisen. We must fight relentlessly against this, using the full force of the constitution and the laws of the land.
On June 12, 1990, a session of the Council of the Federation was held. This was a new body established (along with the President’s Council) at the
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same time that the office of the president of the USSR was initiated. The leaders of all the Union republics belonged to this Council of the Federation. The June 12 session was devoted to problems concerning the structures of national governments and the Union treaty. The agreement was that we should establish a working group consisting of representatives of all the republics. The Council of the Federation expressed itself in favor of establishing a Union of sovereign states^ with the possible combination of elements of a federation, a confederation, and a commonwealth.
Explaining the motivation for this decision to the delegates at the Twenty-eighth CPSU Congress, I said the following:
Everything we have lived through and become aware of in the recent past has led us to understand that the transformation of the Union cannot be limited simply to an expansion, however significant, of the rights of the republics and autonomous entities. A genuine Union of sovereign states is necessary. We are talking essentially about the establishment of a national-governmental structure for our country of a kind that would allow various knots of contradictions to be untied, for cooperation among Soviet nations and nationalities to be raised to a new level, and for the totality of our united political strength and economic and spiritual potential to be multiplied in the interests of all who have joined this great Union of states. By the same token, our country’s security will be reliably ensured and its international prestige heightened.
At the same time there remains the requirement to give priority to human rights over any interests of national sovereignty or autonomy. This condition should be firmly embodied in the constitutional structure of the Union and of each republic. We cannot retreat a single step from this principle, by which we are also guided on the international level.
I have made these references to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, to the Council of the Federation, and to the Twenty-eighth Party Congress especially to show that in the leadership of the CPSU there had developed an understanding not only of the necessity for reforming the Union but also a conception of how to carry out this task.
After that, the practical work began. On June 20 there took place the first meeting of working groups of representatives of the Union republics and the working group of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Council of Ministers. This meeting was devoted to a discussion of approaches in drafting a
TOWARD A NEW UNION TREATY
new Union treaty. Later, additional meetings of working groups of the republics and a working group of the USSR Supreme Soviet were held. There were twelve such meetings from August 3 to August 28,1990, the first
between the working groups of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and those of the RFSFR.
There was a special reason for beginning conversations with Russia: Boris Yeltsin, who had been elected to the post of chairman of the RFSFR Supreme Soviet, in his very first speeches at the Congress of People’s JDeputies, had called for a declaration of Russia’s sovereignty. His understanding of Russia s sovereignty was quite unique: **The most important primary sovereignty in Russia is man and the rights of man. Then comes the enterprise, the collective farm, the state farm, and any other organization that is where the primary and most powerful sovereignty should be.
And of course the sovereignty of the district Soviet, just as with any other Soviet.”
At this same Congress of People’s Deputies, while supporting the desire to strengthen the sovereignty of each republic within the framework of a renewed Union, I noted: “Boris Nikolaevich [Yeltsin] asserts that sovereignty belongs to the individual and to the enterprise and the district Soviet. But I must tell you: This thesis has not been worked out either theoretically or politically. It is a highly dubious thesis, and he is carrying the question of sovereignty to the point of absurdity.” Even then I understood that all these actions of our new Russian government would encourage separatism within the Russian Federation itself and would cause the nationalities of that republic to clash.
But Yeltsin did not limit himself to what he said in Moscow. On a trip around the country he continued to “deepen” these ideas. In Tatarstan he said: ‘Whatever kind of autonomy Tataria chooses for itself—no matter what it is—we will welcome it.” In Bashkiria he said: “Take whatever share of power you are able to swallow.” Sure enough, later, when the Chechen republic demanded the sovereignty it had decided on and declared its independence, a war began.
But it was not just a matter of how sovereignty should be understood within Russia, although that was quite a dangerous question, as has now become quite clear. The problem was how Yeltsin understood the sover-eignty of Russia within the Soviet Union. Immediately after his election as chairman of the RFSFR Supreme Soviet, he stated: “Based on the declaration of sovereignty that will be adopted and on the necessary laws, Russia
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t
will be autonomous in all things and its decisions must be higher than those of the Union.” This statement was as irresponsible as it was illiterate. In practice it meant that Russia would pay no attention to the Union or to the Union government and was not about'to carry out decisions made on the basis of the federation as a whole.
Russia’s actions resulted in an avalanche of sovereignty declarations by all the Union republics and by many autonomous republics—the so-called parade of sovereignties—and prevented a constructive dialogue with Lithuania. In fact those actions laid the basis for the dissblution of the Soviet Union.
Thus all the arguments claiming that the national conflicts in the Baltic region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia triggered the dissolution of the Soviet Union are nothing but attempts to justify, after the fact, Yeltsin’s irresponsible actions, and those of the organization Democratic Russia, in causing the disintegration of the USSR. Neither then nor now has anyone been able to make convincing arguments as to why Russia needed independence from the USSR. The question is a simple one: From whom was Russia supposed to become independent.^ From itself.^ This question completely disarms and stumps those who have tried both at the time and now to argue that the actions of the Russian government were necessary. I remember sitting with Yeltsin at one point after the law on Russia’s sovereignty had been adopted, and saying to him: “Boris Nikolaevich, our country, the USSR, consists of two hoops: the Union and the Russian Federation. If one of them falls apart, then everything will dissolve.”
Looking back now at everything that happened, it is evident to me that the main orientation of Yeltsin and his entourage was to pursue a course aimed at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, at taking control of Russia, so as to seize power for themselves. Of course at that time, and even afterward, right up until the coup attempt in 1991, he could not act openly. He would not have had support even from the majority of his own supporters at that
time. But secretly that was what was going on.
There is one more point of no small importance. It is now quite obvious that the line taken by the Russian leadership, aimed at the disintegration of the Soviet Union, intersected with the struggle against the leadership of the USSR which was being conducted by the fundamentalist forces, the old school of the nomenklatura inside the CPSU. Their stronghold was the Communist Party of the RFSFR, which had been founded that same year, in 1990, and was headed by Ivan Polozkov and others, including Gennady
TOWARD A NEW UNION TREATY
Both camps, those around Yeltsin and the leaders of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, despite their seemingly opposite ideological positions,were encouraging, provoking, and instigating each other toward removing Gorbachev and undermining and destroying the
process of renewal and reform of the Union government. That process did not suit their purposes.
But let us return to the process then under way—the drafting of a Union treaty.
^ On August 30-31, 199^5 consultations with twelve Soviet republics (the three Baltic republics were not included, although meetings were also held with delegations from those republics), a joint session of the President s Council and the Council of the Federation took place. R. Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, acquainted the participants with the results of the consultations. He noted a complete coincidence of views on the need for a radical renewal of the Union but stressed at the same time that the most varied opinions had been expressed on the form the future unified state would take—ranging from a federation to a confederation. The decision was made to form a preparatory committee to draft a new Union treaty; it would consist of authorized delegations from the republics headed by those in the top government positions and with the participation of the president of the USSR, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. This committee was to begin work in mid-September 1990.
At the end of September, the USSR Supreme Soviet joined in the discussion on the question of the Union treaty. Keeping in mind that during the course of these preceding discussions and consultations, it was sometimes expressed that the renewed federation would not be a single country but a weakly linked and not very viable conglomerate of republics, it was necessary that I affirm once again the majority position: “I am for a Union of sovereign states, a renewed Union, in which everyone would feel comfortable, all the nationalities, and each and every nation would realize its intellectual potential and everything else lodged within that nation. Each nation and nationality is great and unique in its own way. And I regard the Union of sovereign states as a united multinational state.''
After this session of the Supreme Soviet, work continued. In writing the new Union treaty, seven drafts were used. These had been prepared by Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kirgizia, Turkmenia, and Tadzhikistan. Also used were two drafts that originated at the Soviet Acad-
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emy of Science’s Institute of Government and Law, three drafts that had been awarded prizes by a jury of the Interregional Deputies Group, and one draft presented by a group of political parties. Problems having to do with the renewal of the Soviet Union were discussed three times at the Council of the Federation and twice by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The interim result of all this activity was presented to the Fourth Congress of People’s Deputies (held December 17-27, 1990). The discussion there was very intense and sometimes quite strained. Rather than attempt to paraphrase it, I will cite an excerpt from remarks by G. Tar^zevich, representing Byelorussia, chairman of the commission of the Council of Nationalities on nationality policy and on relations among nationalities:
If we analyze the various political views on the principles for a renewal of our Union, two opposing patterns reveal themselves.
The first proposes to destroy the existing Union. (Sometimes this is stated openly, sometimes in a veiled fashion.) In other words, those supporting this proposal are talking about eliminating the government structures and governing bodies of the Soviet Union and making the Union constitution no longer operative. At the same time the republics (so it is suggested) would begin a process of making treaties with one another, and on this basis a new Union would be established.
The second plan is based not on destruction but on reform. This one proposes to stop the decomposition of existing internal links binding the Union together. By agreement with the republics, the administrative and government bodies of the Union would be radically reformed. The republics, jointly with the president and the leadership of the top Unionwide government bodies, would conduct a process to arrive at an agreement on a new Union.
A bitter struggle, a contest for power, has essentially broken out between proponents of these two plans. The first plan is actually not that difficult to implement, since a consistently negative attitude on the part of the public has been formed in relation to the former central government and the existing one. In many respects this attitude is justified. But the truth is that in criticizing the Center and heaping all the blame on it, we fail to recognize that many of our present troubles are connected with a rather unwise destruction of this much-reviled Center.
But let us return to the question of implementing the first plan. As we have said, public opinion is generally against the Center. It is sufficient now
TOWARD A NEW UNION TREATY
for the leaders of several republics, especially if Russia is included, to have their parliaments make such ideas official in order to pull the rug out, so to speak, from under the Union’s governing bodies. In my opinion, this process has already begun. Isn’t that why we have not yet been able to consider a plan and a budget for the Union as a whole for the coming year.^ With events developing in this way, some political forces and their leaders will of course win out, but will our society and the people of our Union gain from this.^ I am convinced they will not. On the contrary, the destruction of the
^ Union will bring new disasters to the people of that Union
Destruction of the Soviet Union in the present historical circumstances will inevitably lead to catastrophic consequences for our society. The politicians who are influencing processes in this direction in one way or another should understand their responsibility to the people and to history, y^sfaras the idea of a renewal of the Soviet Union is concerned, in my opinion the conception of the president [Gorbachev] should be supported because it provides not for the destruction but for the reformation of the central government.
On December 24, 1990, the congress passed a resolution entitled “On the General Conception of a New Union Treaty and the Procedure for Concluding Such a Treaty.” Having expressed itself in favor of a transformation of the existing Union into a “voluntary, equal Union of sovereign republics—a democratic and federated state,” the congress noted:
A renewed Union based on the expressed will of the various peoples and based on principles set forth in the declarations by the republics and autonomous entities on state sovereignty—such a renewed Union is called upon to ensure the following: the equality of all citizens of the country regardless of nationality or place of residence; equality of all nationalities, no matter the size of the population, and their inalienable right to self-determination and free democratic development, as well as the right of the components of the federation to territorial integrity; guarantees of the rights of all national minorities; and a strengthening of the authority of the Union as a guarantee of peace and international security.
It was prescribed that further work on the draft treaty and the development of procedures for the signing of this treaty should be organized and earned out by a preparatory committee consisting of the top officials of the federation’s components—the republics and autonomous entities, the pres-
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idem of the USSR, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the USSR Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet. In preparing a draft of a Union treaty the committee was to base its work “on the general conception presented to the congress as well as the conceptions held by the component bodies of the federation, while taking into account the proposals and comments expressed by the People’s Deputies of the USSR and by public opinion.”
A special point in the congress’s resolution stated the tollowing:
The congress emphasizes that the chief condition for arriving at an agreement is for all government bodies, up until the signing of a new Union treaty, to abide by the existing constitution of the USSR and Unionwide laws and not to permit the adoption of resolutions that would restrict the sovereign rights and legal interests of the component entities of the federation.
This clause was absolutely necessary because, by the beginning of i 99 U cases of violations against the constitution of the USSR were multiplying rapidly. It was not just a question of the Baltic region but involved a number of other republics as well. In this respect, Russia also set a bad example
more than once.
At the very beginning of 1991, work on the draft of the new Union treaty began to pick up speed. But it was proceeding in extremely complicated circumstances: Both the radical democrats and the conservative opponents of renewal of the federation intensified their activities, seeking to pre-vent the implementation of plans that had been outlined and approved by the Congress of People’s Deputies.
The radical democrats proved to be the most energetic. They tried to take advantage of the events in Vilnius and Riga, portraying them as a “conspiracy by the conservatives in the Kremlin. They interpreted any action by the central government authorities in that spirit.
At that point Yeltsin made a trip to Latvia and Estonia. Speaking at a press conference after the trip, he declared: “It apparently would not be possible” to defend Russia’s sovereignty without a Russian army. Thus a Russian army was supposed to defend the sovereignty of Russia against a Union army, which was 80 percent Russian. How absurd! What is more, this was a gross violation of the constitution of the USSR. I had occasion to say this directly from the speaker’s platform at the USSR Supreme Soviet.
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Yeltsin s statements at this same press conference, which I quote from the news report in Iivestia^ were as follows:
Yeltsin spoke of the fact that the leaders of the four largest republics
Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan—had decided, without waiting for a Union treaty, to conclude a four-sided agreement among themselves on all questions and, forthis purpose, to meet in the near future in the city of Minsk. No exact date had been set.
Yeltsin stated, “It seems to us that such an action will be a good stabilizing factor for all of society. Our agreement can be adhered to later, if they wish, by the other republics and the central government.”
This idea was not carried out at that time. What was actually involved, however, was an open attempt not only to undermine the Union treaty but to call the existing government into question.
By no means was it accidental that during that period, in early 1991, Yeltsin began an intense campaign against me as president of the USSR. On February 19, in an interview for central television, he stated that he was differentiating himself from the policies of the president of the USSR and was demanding that the president resign. The USSR Supreme Soviet interpreted this statement by Yeltsin as contradicting the constitution and creating an extraordinary situation.
At the end of February I traveled to Byelorussia. In my speeches there I gave the following assessment of everything that was happening, without of course falling into the kind of tone and accents used by my opponents. I feel obliged to quote extensively from my speech at that meeting on February 26 with the scientific and creative intelligentsia of Byelorussia:
Today the peoples’ right to self-determination and self-government is recognized by law. We have entered the phase of transforming the Soviet Union into a federation of sovereign republics.
It is necessary to state, however, that, given our democracy’s current fragile and unconsolidated condition, certain political groups have been attempting to carry out their plans not within the constitutional framework nor through existing laws but in direct opposition to them. All the drama of the present situation and the root source of the difficulties we are experiencing essentially stems from this. .. .
The “war of laws” [in which the Russian Federation was adopting laws that contradicted Unionwide laws], which has been waged in accordance
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«
with a certain ideology, has in many respects paralyzed the government, torn the market apart, and disorganized vital ties that had taken shape over decades. Attacks have intensified against the Congress of People s Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the president. A paradoxical situation has arisen in which people are accusing the central government of supposedly putting an end to reform and preparing a dictatorship when they themselves are departing quite far from the line of perestroika and are seeking in fact to change its goals and orientation. In reality a struggle for power is under way, and it is destabilizing society and threatening to diveVt us from the path of reform to that of confrontation. Until we can eliminate this situation, which is intolerable from the point of view of our society s and our government s viability, the crisis will deepen, threatening to develop into a civil war and seriously weaken the country, if not set it back for decades....
The general conclusion of authoritative scholars and scientists from many countries comes down to this: It is impossible to carry out a successful transition to the market under conditions of chaos and disorganization. We want to reach these new forms of life and ensure a different dynamic for the development of our country precisely by reforming property relations, moving toward a market economy, and transforming the Union. Without cohesiveness, without a united majority of the people, we will not be able to shoulder these tasks. That is the essence of this entire complicated and dramatic situation. . . .
The political groups that are demonstrating under the flag of democracy are a mixed bunch, but the positions of their leaders have been made fairly clear. Where do they want to lead us, to what end do they offer their services, these newfangled “friends of the people”.^ The first point in their program is defederalization, by which they mean the disintegration of our great multinational state. One of the ideologists among the democrats, the chairman of the Moscow Soviet, Gavriil Popov, speaks candidly, without emotion, about the possibility of separating the Soviet Union into forty or fifty new states, resettling entire populations, and carving new borders among various republics. This plan that is both anti-Union and anti-people is put forward as the central core of democracy, and political actions follow in the wake of these programmatic orientations. I have in mind the frenzied attacks on the central government, that is, the attempt to cast suspicion on our Union and on the referendum regarding the future of our multinational state....
And not only to cast suspicion but to try to distort our goals. Look at what attacks the referendum has been subjected to at certain forums. It is no
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surprise that the so-called democrats entered into a political alliance with separatist nationalist groups. They have a common purpose: to weaken and, if possible, destroy the Union. And for the democrats it is not a problem that the reputation of the extremists from Sajudis or [the Ukrainian nationalist movement] Rukh is not above reproach. They are able to forgive these allies for such sins as the organization of moral terror, and, in some cases, armed terror, against people wfio think differently or who speak a different language, the destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers, and the promo-^ tion of profascist views. . . .
The opposition does not find it to their advantage when the reforms are carried out by someone other than themselves. That is why they try not only to discredit the policies of the central government but, insofar as they are able, to torpedo measures taken by the central government. All this is having a major effect on the economy in spite of the feverish efforts we all have taken. The activity of many republic-level government bodies has been affected, as has the search for proper and good relations between the central government and the republics. We can see where the processes of disintegration are leading. And if we do not stop them and if we do not maintain the economic ties that to a considerable extent have already been disrupted, we will face a decline in production with all the consequences, above all, social consequences, that will flow from that. And from the social consequences, political consequences will follow, because the people will not tolerate this situation any longer. . . .
So then, questions must be resolved within the framework of continuing perestroika—otherwise the disintegration and decomposition of economic ties and the disruption of production will end up requiring that harsh measures be taken. We do not want to permit this: chaos can only give rise to dictatorial methods and forms of rule.
I considered it necessary at that time to call things by their real names, to point to the danger of the challenges being posed by the radical democrats, to the importunity they displayed. But attacks were also coming from the forces opposing reform, those who attempted at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in December 1990 to remove the president from his post. And although the supporters of these two different radical extremist currents hated each other, their interests objectively converged around the common aim of undermining a reformist central government.
CHAPTER I 2
Referendum on the Union
I UNDERSTOOD QUITE well that the political struggle would develop mainly over the fate of the Union—whether it would continue to exist at all and, if so, in what form. (The fate of the reforms—economic, political, and
legal also depended on the answer to this question.) Understanding all
this, I held the view that all these questions affecting the fate of the people could not be decided without their participation. I was convinced that if a referendum were held, the overwhelming majority of the citizens of our country would express themselves in favor of preserving the Union in its
reformed aspect.
I submitted this question to the Congress of People s Deputies. On December 24,1990, the congress passed a resolution to hold a referendum on the fate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And on January 16 the USSR Supreme Soviet decreed that a referendum would be held throughout the territory of the Soviet Union on March 17,199^ • T"he question to be taken up in the referendum was formulated as follows: “Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal, sovereign states—republics in which the rights and freedoms of persons of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed.^
The separatists in all the republics waged an intensive campaign calling on voters to answer this question in the negative. I will cite an example. At the end of January 1991 the founding conference of the so-called Democratic Congress Bloc was held in Kharkov. This bloc consisted of Democratic Russia and a number of other parties akin to it from various republics. The conference expressed itself in opposition to preserving the USSR, and the consultative council established by that congress called for mass actions under the slogans “No on the Union referendum question” and “Support Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
I I 8
REFERENDUM ON THE UNION
In this way the leader of Russia was counterposed to the idea of preserving the Union. Moreover, he did not conceal his views. I have already referred to his speech of February 19 in which he called for the resignation of the president of the USSR. Three weeks later he spoke even more fiercely, calling on his supporters to “declare war on the leadership of the country because it is leading us into a morass” and claiming that “Gorbachev is deceiving the people and democracy.”
In early February the three Baltic republics, along with Armenia, Moldavia, and Georgia, announced that they would not participate in the March 17 referendum. But citizens in those republics who wished to take part were provided with the opportunity to do so.
On the eve of the referendum, opposition to it reached the highest intensity. On March 9 Yeltsin declared, “We do not need a central government like this—huge and bureaucratic... We must get rid of it.” Here, as the say-ing goes, he was rushing through an open door. After all, the issue under discussion was to renew the union not in order to have a huge, bureaucratic central government but rather to create a genuinely democratic federation of sovereign states; that, however, was of no concern to Yeltsin.
It was quite obvious from the first draft of the Union treaty, which had been approved by the Council of the Federation on March 6 (with the participation of representatives of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet) and published on March 9, that Yeltsin knew what the real issue was. He did not want this draft to win approval. Trying to reinforce his point of view, he hastily declared that the signatures of the two representatives from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the draft of the treaty did not obligate him or the RSFSR m any way. On the eye of the referendum, speaking on Radio Rossiya, he added: “The referendum is being held in order to win support for the current policies of the leadership of the country. Its aim is to preserve the imperial unitary essence of the Union and the system.”
I, too, spoke on television on the eve of the voting, and said:
We are on the threshold of a Unionwide referendum. This is the first time in our country’s history that such an event is taking place. When we participate in the referendum, each of us must have the full realization that he or she is helping to decide the main question concerning the present and the future of our multinational state. At issue is the fate of our country, the fate of our homeland, our common home, the question of how we and our children and our grandchildren are to live with one another.
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t
This is a question of such great dimension and significance that it stands above the interests of particular parties, social groups, or political and social movements. Only the people themselves have the right to resolve this question. I call on all of you, my dear fellow citizens, to take part in the Unionwide referendum and to answer yes on the question before you.
Our yes will preserve the integrity of the state which is a thousand years old and was created by the labor, the intelligence, and the countless sacrifices of many generations—a state in which the destinies of many peoples have been inseparably interwoven, the fates of millions of people, your fate and ours.
Our yes is an expression of respect for the governmental power that has more than once demonstrated its ability to defend the independence and
security of the peoples united within it.
Our yes is a guarantee that the flames of war will never again sear our
country, to whose lot many ordeals have befallen.
Our yes does not mean preservation of the old order with domination by the central government and a lack of rights for the republics. The positive results of the referendum will open the road to radical renewal of the Union government, its transformation into a federation of sovereign republics where the rights and freedoms of citizens of all nationalities will be reliably
guaranteed.
Our yes in the referendum and the conclusion of a Union treaty will make it possible to put an end to the destructive processes going on m our society and to make a decisive return to restoring normal conditions of life
and labor. . . .
It will be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the questions facing us without harmony and cooperation in society. Therefore it is necessary, while it is not too late, to stop the growing intolerance and bitterness and m some instances hostility. We can also do this jointly, all together—as one village, as the saying goes. A positive result from the referendum would lay the
basis for the consolidation of society.
It is my firm conviction that if a profound split occurs in society, there
will be no victors. Everyone will lose. All of us, both you and I, will be the losers. It is hard even to imagine how many misfortunes the disintegration of the country would bring in its wake, with the various peoples and nationalities being set against one another. And it would be a misfortune not only for you and me. The collapse of a power that today is one of the bulwarks of peace in the world would be fraught with the danger of a general upheaval, one of unprecedented proportions.. ..
REFERENDUM ON THE UNION
Each of us now faces a historic choice. . . .
I appeal to you all, my dear fellow countrymen and women—say yes to the referendum regarding our great state, our Union, preserve it for ourselves and for our descendants.
The number of citizens taking part in the March 17,1991, referendum was i48,574,6o6,or8opercentof regi^ered voters. Of these, 113,512,812, or 76.4 percent, voted yes. Those voting no numbered 32,303,977, or 21.7 percent. The number of spoiled or invalid ballots was 2,757,857, or i .9 percent. These results spoke for themselves: The majority of citizens (a very substantial majority!) was in favor of preserving the Union as a renewed federation.
I cannot leave unexamined the conservatives’ position on the question of preserving the Union. To the inexperienced it might seem that they were ardent defenders of the Union. Outwardly they spoke in its defense, and their group in the parliament was even called Soyuz (Union). But what kind of Union did they advocate.^ They spoke in favor of preserving the old Union and did not wish to see it reformed in any way. They represented forces interested in preserving the old order from the days before perestroika.
I have already indicated that the radical democrats began their offensive against the president right after the New Year in 1991. The conservative forces also stepped up their activities at that time. The founding of the Movement for a Great and Unitary Russia was announced. The leading figures in this organization were the future conspirator [participant in the August 1991 coup] Vasily Starodubstev, the writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, and Ivan Polozkov, head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
Shortly after the referendum, one of the leaders of the Union group in the parliament, V. Alksnis, gave an interview to the British weekly New Statesman in which he essentially made public the program of the conservative groupings. He rejected the idea of the Union treaty, favored the use of force to preserve the Union, and advocated the formation of a Committee of National Salvation, to which all the power in the country would be transferred.
On April 9 a regular session of the Council of the Federation was held.
I took the floor and spoke about the existing situation:
Our position is such that we must recognize the great danger that hangs over our country. It is a danger to our state system, the Soviet federation, for whose preservation the majority of the population has spoken; a danger of
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economic disintegration, with all the consequences which that would have tor the interests of the people and for the welfare of our country s defense capability; a danger of the destruction of our institutions of government, jurisprudence, and law. ...
It is now necessary that we act—moreover, that we act without delay and not in isolation, but in unity with all the healthy forces of society, setting aside feuds and quarrels. We must act so as not to let our country slide into disaster.
At the same time I proposed specific measures that would incorporate in legislation the people’s will, as expressed in the referendum, for the preservation of the Union, namely, to restore the vertical co-subordination of all government bodies, to halt decisively the escalation of conflicts among nationalities, and to conduct negotiations in search of mutually acceptable solutions.
The subsequent development of events confirmed that I had taken the correct approach on the question. The problem was that after the referendum, which had opened the door toward the signing of a new Union treaty, the conservative forces inside the CPSU greatly intensified their activity, undertaking a determined offensive. At a conference in Smolensk, a number of party leaders from Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia openly called for emergency measures. And at meetings of smaller groups, they urged that Gorbachev be confronted with tough demands, that an emergency congress of the CPSU be called, and that the leadership of the party be changed. Similar moves were made at plenums of the party organization in Moscow and at the Leningrad provincial party committee. The slogan was “Let the general secretary resign!” I recall that, at the very same time. Democratic Russia raised the slogan that the president should resign.