One more letter, Sir, and you are rid of me. But in beginning it I find myself in a very bizarre situation; obliged to write it, and not knowing what to fill it with. Can you imagine that one had to justify oneself from a crime about which one is ignorant, and that one must defend oneself without knowing of what one is accused? Nevertheless that is what I have to do on the subject of Governments. I am, not accused, but judged, but stigmatized for having published two Works that are reckless, scandalous, impious, tending to destroy the Christian religion and all Governments. As to Religion we at least have some grip on finding what they wanted to say, and we have examined it. But as to Governments, nothing can furnish us the slightest indication. They have always avoided every sort of explanation on this point: they have never wanted to say in what place I undertook to destroy them this way, nor how, nor why, nor anything that can establish that the offense is not imaginary. It is as if one were judging someone for having killed a man without saying either where, or whom, or when; for an abstract murder. At the Inquisition indeed, they force the accused to guess what they are accusing him of, but they do not judge him without saying what.
With the same care the Author of the Letters Written from the Country avoids explaining himself on this pretended offense; he joins Religion and Governments equally in the same general accusation: then, entering into substance on Religion, he declares he wants to limit himself to it, and he keeps his word. How will we succeed in establishing the accusation that concerns Governments, if those who bring it refuse to state on what it bears?
Note even how this Author changes the state of the question with one stroke of the pen. The Council pronounces that my Books tend to destroy all Governments. The Author of the Letters says only that in them Governments are given over to the most audacious critique. That is very different. A critique, however audacious it might be, is not at all a conspiracy. To criticize or to blame some Laws is not to overturn all Laws. One might as well accuse someone of assassinating sick people when he shows the faults of Doctors.
Once again, how to respond to reasons they do not want to state: How to justify oneself against a judgment brought without grounds? That, without proof on one side or the other, these Gentlemen say that I want to overturn all Governments, and that I say, myself, that I do not want to overturn all Governments, in these assertions there is an exact parity, except that the prejudice is for me; for it is to be presumed that I know better than anyone what I want to do.
But where parity is lacking is in the effect of the assertion. Based on theirs my Book is burned, a warrant is issued for my person; and what I affirm restores nothing. Only, if I prove that the accusation is false and the judgment iniquitous, the affront they have given me turns back onto themselves. The warrant, the Executioner, everything ought to turn back onto them; since nothing destroys the Government so radically as the one who makes use of it directly contrary to the end for which it is instituted.
It is not enough for me to affirm, I must prove; and it is here that one sees how deplorable is the fate of a private individual subjected to unjust Magistrates, when they have nothing to fear from the Sovereign, and when they put themselves above the laws. Out of an affirmation without proof, they make a demonstration; behold the innocent person punished. Much more, they make another crime for him out of his very defense, and it depends only on them to punish him again for having proven that he was innocent.
How can I set about showing that they have not spoken truly; proving that I do not destroy Governments at all? Whatever place in my Writings I defend, they will say that it is not that one that they have condemned; although they have condemned everything, the good as well as the bad, without any distinction. In order not to leave them any way out, it would thus be necessary to take up everything, to follow everything from one end to the other, Book by Book, page by page, line by line, and finally almost word by word. It would be necessary further to examine all the Governments of the world, since they say that I destroy all of them. What an undertaking! How many years would have to be used for it? How many folio volumes would have to be written; and after that, who would read them?
Require what is feasible of me. Every sensible man ought to be satisfied with what I have to say to you: surely you do not want anything more.
Of my two Books burned at the same time under shared imputations, there is only one that treats political right and matters of Government. If the other does treat them, it is only in an abridgment of the former.41 Thus I assume that it is upon this one alone that the accusation falls. If this accusation bore on any particular passage, they doubtless would have cited it; they would at least have extracted some maxim, faithful or unfaithful, as they did on the points concerning Religion.
Thus it is the System established in the body of the work that destroys Governments; thus it is only a question of exposing this System or of making an analysis of the Book; and if we do not obviously see in this the destructive principles at issue, we will at least know where to find them in the book, by following the method of the Author.
But, Sir, if during this analysis, which will be short, you find some consequence to draw, please do not rush. Wait until we reason about it together. After that you will return to it if you wish.
What makes it so that the State is one? It is the union of its members. And from what is the union of its members born? From the obligation that ties them together. Up to this point all are in agreement.
But what is the foundation of this obligation? That is what Authors are divided upon. According to some, it is force, according to others, paternal authority; according to others, the will of God. Each establishes his principle and attacks that of the others: I have not done otherwise myself, and following the soundest portion of those who have discussed these matters, I posited as foundation of the body politic the convention of its members, I refuted the principles different from my own.
Independently of the truth of this principle, it prevails over all the others by the solidity of the foundation it establishes, for what more certain foundation can obligation among men have than the free engagement of the one who obliges himself? One can dispute every other principleR1; one cannot dispute that one.
But by this condition of liberty, which includes others, not all sorts of engagements are valid, even before human Tribunals. Thus in order to determine this one, one ought to explain its nature, one ought to find its use and end, one ought to prove that it is suitable to men, and that it has nothing contrary to natural Laws: for it is no more permitted to infringe natural Laws by the Social Contract than it is permitted to infringe positive Laws by the Contracts of private individuals, and it is only by these Laws themselves that the liberty that gives force to the engagement exists.
As a result of this examination, I have it that the establishment of the Social Contract is a pact of a particular sort, by which each engages himself toward all, from which follows the reciprocal engagement of all toward each, which is the immediate object of the union.
I say that this engagement is of a particular sort in that by being absolute, without condition, without reserve, it, nevertheless, cannot be unjust or susceptible of abuse; since it is not possible that the body would want to hurt itself, as long as the whole wills only for all.
It is also of a particular sort in that it binds the contracting people together without subjecting them to anyone, and that by giving them their will alone as rule it leaves them as free as before.
The will of all is thus the order, the supreme rule, and that general and personified rule is what I call the Sovereign.
It follows from that that the Sovereign is indivisible, inalienable, and that it resides essentially in all the members of the body.
But how does this abstract and collective being act? It acts by means of Laws, and it cannot act otherwise.
And what is a Law? It is a public and solemn declaration of the general will, on an object of common interest.
I say, on an object of common interest; because the Law would lose its force and would cease to be legitimate if the object did not matter to all.
By its nature Law cannot have a particular and individual object: but the application of the Law falls on particular and individual objects.
The Legislative power that is the Sovereign thus needs another power that executes, that is to say, that reduces the Law into particular actions. This second power ought to be established in a manner so that it always executes the Law and it never executes anything but the Law. Here comes the institution of the Government.
What is the Government? It is an intermediate body established between the subjects and the Sovereign for their mutual communication and charged with the execution of the Laws and the maintenance of civil as well as political Liberty.42
As an integral part of the body politic the Government participates in the general will that constitutes it; as a body itself, it has its own will. These two will sometimes agree with and sometimes combat each other. From the combined effect of this agreement and of this conflict results the action of the whole machine.
The principle that constitutes the various forms of Government consists in the number of members that compose it. The smaller this number is, the more force the Government has; the larger the number is, the weaker the Government is; and since sovereignty always tends toward relaxation, the Government always tends to become stronger. Thus the executive Body ought in the long run to prevail over the legislative body, and when the Law is finally subjected to men, only slaves and masters remain; the State is destroyed.
Before this destruction, the Government ought by its natural progress to change form and pass by degrees from the greater number to the smaller.
The diverse forms of which the Government is susceptible are reduced to three principal ones. After having compared them by their advantages and their inconveniences, I give the preference to the one that is intermediate between the two extremes and that bears the name of Aristocracy. Here one ought to remember that the constitution of the State and that of the Government are two very distinct things, and that I have not mixed them up. The best of Governments is the aristocratic; the worst of sovereignties is the aristocratic.
These discussions lead to others on the manner by which the Government degenerates, and on the means of slowing down the destruction of the body politic.
Finally in the last Book I examine by means of comparison with the best Government that has existed, namely that of Rome, the public order most favorable to the good constitution of the State; then I conclude this Book and the entire Work with researches on the manner in which Religion can and ought to enter as a constitutive part into the composition of the body politic.
What do you think, Sir, upon reading this short and faithful analysis of my Book? I guess it. You are saying to yourself; there is the History of the Government of Geneva. That is what all those who are acquainted with your Constitution say upon reading the same Work.
And in fact, that primitive Contract, that essence of Sovereignty, that empire of the Laws, that institution of Government, that manner of confining it in various degrees in order to balance authority with force, that tendency to usurpation, those periodic assemblies, that skill in getting rid of them, finally that imminent destruction that menaces you and that I wished to prevent; isn’t this stroke for stroke the image of your Republic, since its birth up to this day?
Thus I took your Constitution, which I found to be beautiful, as the model of political institutions, and proposing you as an example to Europe, far from seeking to destroy you I set out the means of preserving you. This Constitution, completely good as it is, is not faultless; one could have prevented the alterations it has suffered, protected it from the danger it is running today. I foresaw this danger, I caused it to be understood, I indicated preservatives. Was showing what had to be done to maintain it to want to destroy it? It was out of my attachment for it that I would have wanted nothing to be able to alter it. There is my whole crime; I was wrong, perhaps; but if love of the fatherland blinded me on this point, was it up to it to punish me for this?
How could I tend toward overthrowing all Governments, by positing as principles all of yours? This fact alone destroys the accusation. Since there was a Government existing upon my model, I thus did not tend toward destroying all those that existed. What! Sir; if I had only made a System, you can be sure that they would have said nothing. They would have been content to relegate the Social Contract along with the Republic of Plato, Utopia, and Severambes43 into the land of the chimeras. But I depicted an existing object, and they wanted to change that object’s face. My Book bore witness against the attack they were going to make. That is what they did not pardon me for.
But here is what will appear bizarre to you. My Book attacks all Governments, and it is not proscribed in any!44 It established a single one, it proposes it as an example, and that is the one it is burned in! Isn’t it peculiar that the Governments attacked are silent, and the Government respected deals severely? What! The body of Magistrates of Geneva makes itself the protector of other Governments against its very own! It punishes its own Citizen for having preferred the Laws of his country to all others! Is that conceivable, and would you believe it if you had not seen it? In all the rest of Europe has anyone taken it into his head to stigmatize the work? No; not even the State in which it was printed.R2 Not even France where the Magistrates are so severe about it. Did they forbid the Book? Nothing like it; at first they did not allow the edition of Holland to enter, but it was counterfeited in France, and the work circulated there without difficulty. Thus it was an affair of commerce and not of public order: they preferred the profit of the Bookseller of France to that of the foreign Bookseller. That is all.
The Social Contract was not burned anywhere except at Geneva where it was not printed; only the Magistrate of Geneva found principles destructive of all Governments in it. In truth, this Magistrate did not say at all what these principles were; in that I believe he acted extremely prudently.
The effect of indiscreet prohibitions is not to be observed and to enervate the force of authority. My Book is in the hands of everyone at Geneva, and would that it were equally in everyone’s heart! Read it, Sir, this Book that is so decried, but so necessary; throughout you will see the Law put above men; throughout you will see liberty laid claim to, but always under the authority of the laws, without which liberty cannot exist, and under which one is always free, in whatever manner one might be governed. From that I do not, they say, pay my court to the powers: so much the worse for them; for I know their true interests, if they knew how to see them and follow them. But passions blind men about their own good. Those who subject Laws to human passions are the true destroyers of Governments: there are the people who should be punished.
The foundations of the State are the same in all Governments, and these foundations are better set down in my Book than in any other. When it is a question afterward of comparing the various forms of Government, one cannot avoid weighing separately the advantages and inconveniences of each: that is what I believe I did with impartiality. Everything weighed, I gave the preference to the Government of my country. That was natural and reasonable; they would have blamed me if I had not done so. But I did not exclude other Governments; on the contrary: I showed that each had its reason which could render it preferable to all others, in accordance with men, times, and places. Thus far from destroying all Governments, I have established all of them.
In speaking about Monarchic Government in particular, I insisted very much upon its advantage, and I did not disguise its defects either. That is, I think, within the right of a man who reasons; and if I had refused to permit it, which I assuredly did not do, would it follow that they ought to punish me in Geneva? Was a warrant issued for Hobbes’s arrest in some Monarchy because his principles are destructive of every republican Government, and do Kings put on trial Authors who reject and belittle Republics? Isn’t the right reciprocal, and aren’t Republicans Sovereigns in their country as Kings are in theirs. As for me, I have rejected no Government, I have not scorned any of them. In examining them, in comparing them, I have held the scale and I have calculated the weight: I have done nothing more.
One ought not to punish reason anywhere, nor even reasoning; that punishment would prove too much against those who would impose it. The Remonstrators have very well established that my Book, in which I do not depart from the general thesis, not attacking the Government of Geneva at all and printed out of its territory, can only be considered to be among the number of those that treat of natural and political right, over which the Laws do not give the Council any power, and which are always sold publicly in the Town, whatever principle is advanced in them and whatever sentiment is supported in them. I am not the only one who, discussing questions of politics by abstraction, might have treated them with some boldness; not everyone has done it, but every man has the right to do it; several make use of this right, and I am the only one who is punished for having made use of it. The unfortunate Sydnei thought as I did, but he acted; it is for his deed and not for his Book that he had the honor of shedding his blood.45 In Germany Althusius drew enemies down on him, but they did not take it into their heads to prosecute him criminally.46 Locke, Montesquieu, the Abbé de Saint Pierre47 treated the same matters, and often with at least the same liberty. Locke in particular treated them exactly in the same principles as I did.48 All three were born under Kings, lived tranquilly and died honored in their country. You know how I have been treated in mine.
Also rest assured that far from blushing at these stigmas I glorify myself for them, because they serve only to put into evidence the motive that drew them down on me, and that this motive is only to have deserved well from my country. The conduct of the Council toward me afflicts me, without a doubt, by breaking the bonds that were so dear to me; but can it debase me? No, it raises me up, it puts me in the rank of those who have suffered for liberty. My Books, whatever might be done, will always bear witness for themselves, and the treatment they have received will do nothing but save from opprobrium those that will have the honor of being burned after them.
END OF THE FIRST PART
Notes
R1 Even the one of the will of God, at least as to its application. For although it might be clear that man ought to want what God wants, it is not clear that God wants one to prefer such Government to such a different one, nor that one obey James rather than William. Now this is what is at issue.
R2 At the height of the earliest clamors caused by the proceedings of Paris and Geneva, the surprised Magistrate forbade the two Books: but based on his own examination this wise Magistrate changed his sentiment, above all with regard to the Social Contract.