Soviet fighters in the 1920s and 1930s were comparable to any in the world. In the mid-1930s, the Russians attained qualitative fighter superiority when they introduced the stubby, all-metal Polikarpov I-16, a low wing monoplane that featured retractable landing gear. In the Spanish Civil War, the Russian fighter did well at first, outperforming Nationalist’s fighters, including the early models of the famous Bf 109B.1 However, during the early years of World War II, the Germans achieved air superiority against the Soviets with better aircraft and better trained, and certainly more experienced, pilots. Nevertheless, the Russians withstood the German onslaught, enduring horrendous losses but eventually producing more aircraft than the Germans, thus defeating them.2 To be clear, Russian air success in World War II was due more to superior numbers than to superior-quality aircraft or aircrew.
The advent of the jet age gave the Soviets a chance to reset the playing field. The Russians had both the incentive (a desire to challenge western superiority in aviation) and opportunity (occupying territory from which 85 percent of German aircraft were manufactured) to capitalize on this situation. They did this by shipping large quantities of German machinery, aircraft, and documents, as well as three thousand to six thousand aviation technicians to the Soviet Union. They tested a number of German aircraft, and considered putting the Me 262 into production but decided against that course of action in December 1945.3
The Soviets tinkered with jet and rocket propulsion during the war, but—unlike the Americans, British, and Germans—they did not fly a jet-propelled aircraft during the conflict. In February 1945, the Soviets issued an order for a single-place jet fighter. Four design bureaus responded. On the same day in April 1946, two of these aircraft made their first flight, both powered by German engines. The Yakovlev bureau’s Yak-15 was a modification of its successful piston-powered Yak-3 and was the first jet to enter service in the Red Air Force. The Yak-17 appeared in 1947. It differed from its predecessor mainly in employing tricycle landing gear, a slightly more powerful engine, and an enlarged tail fin. The Soviets built 280 Yak-15s and its trainer version (Yak-15U) and 430 Yak-17s.4
The second aircraft, the Mikoyan and Gurevich bureau’s MiG-9 was designed from the outset to be jet powered. With 3,520 pounds of thrust versus 1,980 pounds in the Yak, it had a higher top speed (560 mph versus 502 mph). The Soviets built 550 of these fighters. In late summer 1946, the twin engine Su-9 and La-150 made their first flights; however, they proved less successful.5
While Soviet airframes compared well with western fighters, their most significant deficiency was inferior engines. The Russians had worked on jet propulsion beginning in the 1920s, focusing on turboprop engines and testing one of these before World War II. The Soviets also went into turbojet area, reportedly developing a 1,104-pound thrust engine (RD-1) that was three-quarters complete when the war began. It was shelved in the early years of the war, along with a 4,410-pound thrust engine also under development. The Soviets did not resume work on turbojets until 1944. Because German engines were proven and outperformed Soviet ones, they were used in the first Soviet jets.6
Nevertheless, Soviet jet engines were inferior to those employed in the West. Therefore, it was a monumental coup in September 1946 when the British agreed to sell the Soviets their best jet engine, the Rolls Royce Nene. (This action supported the comment by Lenin that capitalists would sell the rope to their hangman.) The Soviets quickly reverse engineered the power plant and had it coming off the production line in August 1947 designated as RD-45. The Soviets went on to build thirty-nine thousand of these engines, and the Chinese another eight-five hundred.7 The Nene (RD-45F) could produce about five thousand pounds of thrust while its Soviet modification (VK-1A) was rated at six thousand pounds. These engines would power the best Soviet fighter, arguably the world’s best fighter of the day, the MiG-15.8
The design, development, and employment of the MiG-15 is a remarkable story because it illustrates how the Soviets, behind in aviation technology in the early 1940s, leaped to at least a position of equality, if not superiority, with the West by the end of that decade. Apparently impressed by the scenes of devastation caused by Anglo-American strategic bombing in areas it occupied, the Soviets sought an air defense fighter with which to combat U.S. long-range bombers. In March 1946, the Soviets established a specification for a high-altitude (over forty-six thousand feet), high-speed (over 620 mph) interceptor that would mount cannon armament, exhibit a high rate of climb, show good maneuverability above thirty-three thousand feet, and have an endurance of one hour. As with other Soviet equipment, the aircraft was to feature ease of maintenance. Three design bureaus (Lavochkin, Mikoyan, and Yakolev) submitted proposals.9
The Mikoyan designers considered a number of configurations before settling on their final design. The Soviets dropped a twin-engine version because of the shortage of engines. They also considered a twin-boom version, similar to the British Vampire, and a variable sweep design. The Russian design team had access to World War II German work, as did the Anglo-Americans; but, contrary to what some believe, the fighter was not a direct development of Kurt Tank’s similarly configured World War II concept, the Ta 183. The Soviets also had information on American development, not only because of the openness of American society, but also as a result of their espionage. Secrecy characterized the police state to such an extent that there was no cooperation or interchange between the various Russian design bureaus, who knew more about Western designs than competing Soviet ones.10
The Mikoyan team built their design, originally known as I-310, around the Nene engine. The nose intake followed the pattern of earlier Soviet jets and, for that matter, American fighters (P-84 and P-86) under development at this time. The origin of the swept wing is unclear but probably can be attributed, as with the American development, to a combination of indigenous aerodynamic design and captured German research. In any case, the designers mounted a wing with a 35-degree sweep and two wing fences midway on the wing.11
The wings presented a problem. The lack of stiffness caused wing drop, which could make the fighter uncontrollable at high speeds. This was due to the structure of the wing and to poor quality control in manufacture that resulted in asymmetric wings and, consequently, unequal lift. Therefore, while the fighter’s initial red line was Mach .92, it was restricted to Mach .88. To combat the problem, the manufacturer instituted tighter quality control and added individually fitted tabs (“knives”) on the wings. According to one secondary source, the Soviets began efforts to cure this deficiency in September 1950. If so, this was a belated reaction to a major issue. In any event, the solution was hardly elegant but did help fix the problem.12
The designers also encountered difficulties with the jet exhaust. They therefore shortened the size of the exhaust nozzle and the fuselage length, enhancing the fighter’s stubby appearance. The vertical tail appeared oversized in profile relative to the lines of the fuselage. The horizontal tail was affixed midway on the vertical tail as with other Soviet fighters of that period. The fighter’s main landing gear extended outward from the fuselage and retracted into the wing. The designers equipped the machine with the standards of the day for jet fighters: an ejection seat and pressurized cabin. The Soviets added hydraulic speed brakes beginning with the third prototype.13
The original MiG-15 used mechanical controls, as had World War II propeller-driven aircraft. However, the higher speeds increased the loads on the control surfaces, forcing the designers to incorporate hydraulic-boosted ailerons on the twentieth fighter. Above Mach .86, aileron efficiency was poor; in addition, the rudder control reversed (depressing the right rudder moved the nose to the left). As a result, the fighter had poor roll control and relatively slow transition from one maneuver to another.14 Clearly, the aircraft exhibited difficult characteristics at high speeds.
The MiG-15 was heavily armed to fulfill its air defense role. The designers considered a number of options before establishing the aircraft’s armament. Installation of a 45 mm cannon was downsized to a 37 mm that was to be mounted in the inlet splitter in the nose. It would be complemented by other guns, initially two 12.7 mm, then one 23 mm, and finally two 23 mm cannons below it, the same configuration as in the MiG-9. Firing tests on the MiG-9 demonstrated that the engine ingested gun gases and occasionally flamed out. Therefore, the designers moved the 37 mm to the right side of the fuselage and the 23 mms to the left. All three cannon were mounted on a tray that could be easily accessed by hoist for quick service and rearming.15
This armament proved inadequate over Korea. It suffered from poor accuracy, due to the inadequate rigidity of the mounts and limited duration of fire; the 37 mm had a firing duration of 6 seconds and the 23 mm, 5.3 seconds. Combat in Korea demonstrated that this armament was successful in its intended task (anti-bomber engagements) but less so in fighter-versus-fighter combat.16
The MiG first flew in December 1947, only months after the F-86’s maiden flight. The flight was planned for 1948, but the test pilot, Ramenskoye Yuganov, was short of money and took off on his own, despite the poor weather and lack of authorization, in order to earn the ten thousand ruble bonus for the initial flight. He flew two circuits around the field and landed. Because of his initiative in advancing the timing of the test, no important personages witnessed the event.17
The Soviets built three prototypes, which they began testing in May 1948; by the end of the year, they designated the fighter MiG-15. The testers noted that the aircraft had some handling problems. In a tight, high-speed turn it could quickly flick into a stall and spin. The fighter demonstrated poor spin characteristics due to its swept wing and high horizontal tail, easily going into a flat spin from which it was difficult to recover. The second prototype was destroyed and the test pilot killed in a spin.18 This was a harbinger of later problems.
The Soviets judged the MiG against its rivals, the La-15 and Yak-30. The Lavochkin and Mikoyan fighters were similar in appearance, except for the La-15’s high-mounted wing and the main landing gear that was housed in the fuselage. The Lavochkin was faster and more stable at speeds approaching Mach 1 than the MiG. However, the short wheel track of its main landing gear made cross-wind landing more difficult, and it was judged to be more complicated to build and maintain than its rival. The La-15 was built in small numbers (about five hundred) and served briefly as a ground support aircraft.19 Less is known about the Yakovlev. Apparently, it was more agile than the MiG but slower and not as well armed. Thus the MiG became the Soviet’s fighter of choice.20
The Soviets introduced the MiG-15 to the world at the July 1948 Tushino air show. The first aircraft went into service with Ivan Kozhedub’s unit in February 1949. (Kozhedub was the top Soviet ace of World War II with sixty-two credits.) When the Korean War began, Soviet air defense forces had about 2,000 jet fighters; many, if not most, were MiG-15s. By comparison only 560 F-86s were delivered to the USAF by the end of that year.21
The Soviets pushed to improve the MiG-15. In 1949, they fitted the airframe with an upgraded Nene engine, designated VK-1, that produced approximately 20 percent more thrust than the RD-45F.22 Therefore, although the fighter’s weight increased marginally by 524 pounds, performance improved. The fighter, known as the MiG-15bis, increased top speed at low altitude from 651 mph to 667 mph, rate of climb at sea level from 8,285 fpm to 9,060 fpm, and service ceiling from 49,856 feet to 50,840 feet. The only diminution in performance was a 9 percent increase in landing roll.23
The new engine was the most significant change although the Soviets tried several other improvements. In September 1950, orders were signed to substitute two flexible 23 mm guns for the standard armament. Developed by B. Shpitlny OKB, the guns could elevate upward 11 degrees and downward 7 degrees, allowing the pilot to draw more lead on a maneuvering target. The Soviets tested the system in sixty-three flights in the summer of 1951. Although these tests demonstrated that the system improved tactical performance, the device was not fitted on production fighters for unstated reasons.24
The Soviets made a number of attempts to improve the fighter’s poor rearward visibility. One effort was a periscope, tested in June 1952, but it proved unsuitable.25 Three other changes did improve rearward vision. In September 1951, the Russians tested a new canopy that had less framing in the rear, thus providing the pilot with superior visibility. It went into production in 1952. The Soviets went further. In October 1952, the Russians fitted fifteen fighters engaged in the Korean War with rearward-looking radar, known as the Sirena radar homing and warning system. This worked well, encouraging the Soviets to equip all their MiGs with the device.26 There is no indication it was ever used in the action. A third effort to alert MiG pilots to rearward attacks was to mount a radar detection device, a “fuzz buster,” in the tail. It had a range of four to five miles and gave an audible “howl” when it picked up pulses from American radar-ranging radar. The Soviets tested ten units in May 1952 and, despite its occasional false warnings, installed it as standard equipment on Red fighters.27
The Soviets made other changes as well. In November 1952, they fitted an improved gunsight into the MiG that increased accuracy and was more suitable in highly maneuvering dogfights.28 Another change that improved the MiG’s tactical capability was to increase the size of the fighter’s speed brakes. The MiG’s original speed brakes had a triangular shape with an area of 5.2 square feet. This was not altogether adequate and gave the aircraft a pitch up tendency when employed. In 1952 the Soviets enlarged the speed brakes to 8.6 square feet. This change entered production in September 1952 and was retrofitted into fighters engaged in the Korean War.29
The MiG-15 would prove itself in combat over Korea. It completely outclassed the UN’s prop and straight-winged jets and would outperform the F-86 almost to the end of the war. However, the MiG force was unable to wrest air superiority from the UN: that is the crux of this story and the stuff from which history and legends are made.