Just as Chinese intervention turned the entire ground war around, the introduction of the MiG-15 completely changed the air war. The Soviet jet was vastly superior to the prop-powered American fighters and clearly superior to the F-80s. Only the experience level of the U.S. pilots and corresponding inexperience of the Soviet pilots kept this situation from becoming a wholesale slaughter. The USAF took rapid measures to correct the problem.
Prior to the appearance of the MiG, American airmen were quickly and easily able to win air superiority with the numbers and aircraft they had in the theater. There were concerns, however, over the air defense needs of Japan in the event of a Soviet air attack. With this in mind, Lt. Gen. George Stratemeyer, commander of Far East Air Forces (FEAF), requested replacements in early September 1950 for fighter units he had sent to Korea. Air Force Headquarters denied the request, explaining that there were other commitments for the F-80s, mechanical problems with the F-84, and logistical problems and stateside air defense priorities for the F-86.1 The initial American response to the appearance of the MiGs was mild. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, commented that the operations on 1 and 2 November indicated that “only token air forces [were] employed, conforming in general with [the] pattern [of the] ground forces.” He concluded that there was “no evidence as yet of [a] major air threat to UN forces in [the] Far East.”2 Vandenberg wrote that in the event there was a buildup of jet fighters by the Communists, he would send F-84s to the theater. Within a week, the chief of staff took just such action. On 8 November, Stratemeyer received a message from Vandenberg that began: “In view of the changed military situation, particularly the resurgency [sic] of hostile air and [the] appearance of jets, I propose to deploy to FEAF on temporary duty one each F-84E and F-86A wings.”3
The 27th Fighter Escort Wing was a Strategic Air Command unit that flew F-84Es. Despite its unit designation and the hopes of the Air Force, the F-84E (the Thunderjet) was no match for the MiG: during the course of the war its pilots claimed ten aerial victories while eighteen Thunderjets were lost to MiGs. As a result, the straight-winged Republic fighter went on to become the Air Force’s primary fighter-bomber in the conflict, flying more combat sorties and dropping more bombs than any other USAF fighter-bomber. The Air Force listed 335 F-84s lost in the theater, 153 to enemy action.4 Unloved but useful, the F-84 was one of the stalwarts of the air war. The star of the air war was, of course, the North American F-86 Sabre.
The USAF sent the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing to the Korean War. (The USAF wing organization consisted of an aircraft unit, in this case the 4th Fighter Group, composed of the 334th, 335th, and 336th Fighter Squadrons and the various base and support units.) Formed in the summer of 1942, the 4th became one of the most famous and successful American fighter units of the war. It was initially manned in World War II by former members of the famous Eagle Squadrons and went on to destroy over one thousand German aircraft, more than any other American unit. After World War II, it flew P-80s until March 1949, when it received F-86As. That January, the unit’s designation changed from “Fighter” to “Fighter Interceptor.” There is no indication why it was selected to go to Korea.5
The USAF alerted the 4th for its deployment to the war on 9 November, giving it forty-eight hours to prepare for the movement. Four other F-86 units traded sixty of their newer aircraft for those in the 4th, which began flying fighters to the West Coast on 11 November. Given the highest Air Force priority, by 15 November the unit had two hundred airmen and forty-nine Sabres of the 334th and 335th squadrons at Naval Air Station San Diego for embarkation on the escort carrier Cape Esperance. The remainder of the wing’s aircraft, twenty-six F-86s of the 336th, was carried as deck cargo aboard four tankers. The first tanker, carrying six F-86s, arrived in Japan the first week of December. Meanwhile, the carrier left the states on 29 November and arrived at Yokosuka on 13 December. The airmen ferried the fighters by barge from the port of entry to Kisarazu Air Base and then flew them to Johnson Air Base, located northwest of Tokyo, which became the 4th’s Japanese base. That same day, the unit’s group commander, Lt. Col. John Meyer, took an advanced detachment to Kimpo airfield outside of Seoul, known to the USAF as K-14.6
Although the unit got some F-86s quickly into action, the ocean voyage had not been flawless. To protect the fighters sent by tanker, the USAF “cocooned” the aircraft in a rubberized material. Unfortunately this was not done properly, resulting in salt corrosion to the magnesium trailing edges of the wings and control surfaces. This meant that many of the control surfaces and most of the wing trailing edges had to be replaced. The Sabres aboard the carrier were not “cocooned” but were periodically oiled and greased during the voyage. These aircraft also suffered corrosion damage, particularly those positioned on the forward part of the ship. Although most of this damage was minor, five fighters required replacement of part of their wing trailing edge. In addition, improper tie downs damaged the nose gear of some of the aircraft and later caused landing gear retraction problems. The dockworkers also dropped and damaged one fighter. These problems delayed the F-86’s introduction into combat.7
The unit in Korea consisted mainly of personnel from the 336th Fighter Squadron that built up to squadron strength by 24 December. The Americans flew their first combat mission on 15 December. During the month, the unit put into the air one to four flights of Sabres (each flight consisting of four fighters flying in two elements in the tried and true “finger four” formation) which flew to the patrol area, about 220 miles from Kimpo, just below the contrail level, between twenty-seven thousand and thirty-five thousand feet. Initially, the Americans patrolled at relatively low air speeds to conserve fuel, but this put them at a disadvantage when they engaged the Russian fighters; therefore, they quickly increased their cruising speed. The average mission was about one and one-half hours in duration, about twenty to twenty-five minutes of which was spent in the patrol area. The Americans adopted a pattern by which four flights of four would arrive in the patrol area at five-minute intervals to extend the duration of the F-86 protection. The engagements usually began at high altitude and high speeds, exceeding the Sabre’s Mach .95 redline. If the fight continued beyond one pass, both the air speed and altitude decreased. The high speeds just about prohibited deflection shooting so that the overwhelming majority of engagements consisted of getting on an opponent’s tail and shooting up his tailpipe. As related above, on 17 December Lt. Col. Bruce Hinton earned a credit for downing a MiG, the first for the F-86s. On the morning of 22 December, eight or more MiGs bounced eight Sabres from out of the sun and “an enemy burst in the initial pass hit one friendly aircraft, which was last seen aflame and in a flat spin.”8 (Capt. Lawrence Bach, the only F-86 combat loss of the month, survived both the shoot down and captivity.) That afternoon, eight F-86s engaged fifteen or more MiGs and drew blood: six F-86 pilots each claimed one MiG destroyed. That is the USAF version. For their part, the Soviets claim they downed five F-86s and lost only one MiG that day (or three, according to another source), demonstrating the pattern of discrepancy between the American and Communist accounts that would continue throughout the war and frustrate students of the air war to this day. The F-86s were forced to move from K-14 on 2 January, due to the advancing Chinese ground offensive.9
The airmen encountered numerous problems in these initial operations. Starting the jet was difficult in the cold Korean weather. Maintenance personnel used new techniques that worked; however, these methods also damaged some of the engines. The airmen also found that the personal equipment, other than the flying helmet and “g” suit, were unsatisfactory. The bulky clothing made movement in the cockpit difficult and uncomfortable and rendered some of the switches hard to reach. Pilots reported that the “V” shaped windshield blocked out forward vision and caused distracting reflections on the canopy. On the other hand, they noted that the Sabre’s guns operated well, which was attributed to the continual use of gun heaters in flight. Understandably, the main interest of the Sabre pilots was how their aircraft compared with their opponent’s.10
It must be clearly recognized that comparisons in combat are very difficult and imprecise, and risk being inaccurate. Not only are such reports based on pilot perspectives but they also lump together a number of factors besides the technical qualities of the aircraft, such as pilot ability, training, doctrine, rules of engagement, and leadership, all of which impact on the performance of the aircraft in combat.
Nevertheless these assessments proved remarkably accurate, as confirmed shortly after the war when U.S. pilots systematically tested a MiG-15. These reports concluded that the two fighters were about equal in speed, with the F-86 having a slight edge at lower altitudes and the MiG at higher altitudes. The Russian fighter had the advantage of better climb and zoom performance at higher altitudes. The Sabre appeared to have the advantage in turning ability, at least up to thirty-seven thousand feet, the highest reported engagement altitude. The two fighters had about the same rate of roll. The USAF pilots noted three major problem areas. They desired longer range and endurance, although not at the cost of other flying performance. The Mark 18 gunsight was a sore point, having a number of inadequacies. The pilots also criticized the F-86’s armament as “not sufficiently destructive,” yet the Americans cited the armament and gunnery as a distinct advantage of the Sabre. In brief, the airmen attributed their success not to the superiority of their aircraft, but to better U.S. tactics, leadership, and pilot quality, along with the poor tactics and lack of aggressiveness of the MiG pilots.11
About six months later, the 4th again reported on its problems, confirming these views. This report again criticized the Sabre’s armament as inadequate and observed that the Mk 18 gunsight had been designed for use against slower aircraft. It pushed for the radar ranging gunsight that had just arrived in the theater. Finally it noted the problem with drop tanks, a failure rate of 5 to 10 percent, compounded by the policy requiring the Sabres to operate in pairs; one hung drop tank meant two aborting fighters.12
A month after this report, Lieutenant Colonel Hinton wrote a follow-up to his January report that compared the F-86A with the MiG based on the 4th’s operations between December 1950 and mid-July 1951. During that 160-day period the F-86 pilots were involved in over four hundred separate engagements and claimed forty-five MiGs destroyed, seven probably destroyed, and seventy-five damaged.13 The Sabre showed a slight edge in turning ability whereas the MiG demonstrated superior climbing and zoom ability above twenty-five thousand feet as well as better acceleration. Hinton wrote that the Soviet fighter had better deceleration using only the throttle than the F-86, but the latter slowed quicker using speed brakes. The report observed that except for the most recent forty-five days, the MiG was hampered by its fire control system. It went on to note the great difference in the pilot skills of the MiG drivers, a matter often commented on by the American airmen. While about half the MiG pilots “performed with skill, precision and good judgment . . . [the remainder were] either unable to properly handle the MiG-15 or [were unable to] combine headwork with his skill to obtain the best performance in evading or attacking the F-86.”14 There seems to be general agreement on these views although other observations in the report are in dispute or in error. Hinton wrote that initially the MiG could outdive the Sabre, but when the fighters reached lower altitudes, the F-86 could slowly overtake the Red fighter. The American erroneously believed that the MiG could exceed Mach 1 in a dive. The airmen credited the MiG with equal control response at high speed and equal rate of roll with the F-86. The MiG appeared to have better spin recovery characteristics, being able to pull out at lower altitudes than the Sabre.15
The pullout of the 4th from K-14 in early 1951 ended Sabre operations over MiG Alley for the moment. The F-86s were out of action for two weeks, and then on 17 January they began flying primarily close air support and armed reconnaissance missions out of an airfield at Taegu (K-2). In comparison to 229 effective sorties flown in December and 207 in January, the unit flew but 1 effective sortie in February. It wasn’t until 6 March that the 4th, using Suwon as a staging base, resumed operations over MiG Alley. After claiming seven MiGs in December, the Sabre pilots did not down another until 31 March when Flight Lt. J. A. O. Levesque (RCAF, attached to the 334FS) claimed a MiG. Suwon had little more than a concrete runway—no taxiways but lots of mud. Nevertheless, after the addition of some parking space and tents, the 334th moved into the base on 10 March. At the same time, the 336th moved to Taegu and staged out of Suwon for its combat missions. April was a better month for the Sabre pilots, during which they claimed fifteen MiGs destroyed without a combat loss. On 20 April Capt. James Jabara claimed his fifth and sixth victories, making him the first American ace of the war.16
Operations in March and April confirmed the view that only the Sabres could deal with the MiGs. FEAF notified Fifth Air Force on 26 February that as it was again able to escort B-29s in northwestern Korea, the bombers would resume their attacks on interdiction targets. On 1 March the USAF launched eighteen Superforts against these targets; but unforecast winds forced twenty-two F-80s to break off their escort early. Thus, when the bombers reached their target unescorted, they were easy game for nine MiG-15s. The Superfort gunners claimed one fighter destroyed and two others damaged, but ten of the Boeing bombers were damaged, three so severely that they had to make emergency landings in Korea. (The Soviets claimed three B-29s and one F-80 destroyed without any MiG losses on that day.) While other bomber attacks in the month were less costly, it was primarily due to the unwillingness of the MiGs to attack. On 12 April forty-eight F-84s provided close escort for thirty-nine B-29s attacking the Yalu River bridges, with the F-86s flying high cover. The bombers broke up into three formations that spread out the Thunderjet escort. The Communists took advantage of the situation with at least fifty MiGs attacking the bombers. In the resulting battle the B-29s claimed to have destroyed ten MiGs (later credited with seven); the F-86s, four; and the F-84s, three probably destroyed. Three B-29s were lost and seven others were damaged in contrast to Soviet claims of ten Superforts and four Thunderjets destroyed. Nevertheless, the 8 percent bomber loss rate was too high to bear, forcing General Stratemeyer to withdraw the B-29s from daylight operations in northwestern Korea. The United States had lost air superiority over MiG Alley. While some might dispute this, since UN fighters and fighter-bombers could still operate there, those aircraft did not rival the bomb carrying capacity of the B-29s.17
The air leaders were apprehensive that the Communists might launch an air offensive in early 1951. The UN expected a Communist land offensive and the fluid ground battle might be affected by the reduction of UN air support, and certainly by Communist air attacks on UN ground forces. The Red fighter pilots were demonstrating increased proficiency. More ominous, since February aerial reconnaissance revealed the Communists were repairing their airfields in North Korea, and in early April the Reds appeared ready to move aircraft into these facilities. To counter such a move, Brig. Gen. James Briggs, commander of FEAF Bomber Command, came up with a plan to use small numbers of B-29s to neutralize the airfields just as they became operable and then continue with small attacks to harass and delay reconstruction. B-29 operations in small numbers close to the Yalu River might very well trigger a massive battle for control of the skies.18
As April began, the 4th had two of its three squadrons in Korea, stationed at Suwon and Taegu. This was less than optimal for the already outnumbered Sabre pilots. American engineers upgraded the facilities at Suwon allowing the third squadron to move in by 22 April.
Between 16 and 23 April, the USAF launched about a dozen Superforts a day against about nine airfields, postholing the airstrips with delayed action bombs. Light bombers attacked during both day and night to disrupt repair work. On one occasion Sabres returning from MiG Alley swooped down to strafe repair efforts. The MiGs did little to interfere with these operations. There was only one major air battle during this week when, on 22 April, three dozen MiGs flew across the Yalu to engage a dozen F-86s. The Sabres claimed four MiGs destroyed and another four damaged without a friendly loss. By the end of the month American photo interpreters concluded that all Communist airfields in North Korean were unserviceable. Thus the Chinese ground offensive that kicked off on the night of 22 April did so in the face of UN air superiority over the front as well as over almost all of North Korea.19
The USAF did note the buildup of air power at the North Korean airfield at Sinuiju, just across the Yalu River from one of the main Chinese airfields and Communist MiG bases at Antung. Reconnaissance spotted 38 prop powered fighters and attack bombers in revetments along with support facilities. The UN launched 312 USAF and Marine aircraft against the airfield on the afternoon of 9 May. The attack employed both Sabres and Panthers as top cover, Shooting Stars to suppress AA, and Corsairs and Mustangs to pummel the airfield area with bombs, rockets, and napalm. Although 50 MiGs took off, only 18 made halfhearted passes. Therefore there was no major aerial battle with only two claims of damaged MiGs, one by an F-84 and another by an F-86 pilot, and one Thunderjet damaged. The attack was a rousing success.20
The Communists did not give up their efforts to contest UN air superiority. One innovative effort was to demolish buildings along a section of road within Pyongyang, the North Korean capital that yielded a runway 7,000 feet long and 375 feet wide. While the UN air forces could hit and put these large airfields out of commission, the smaller dirt strips for smaller aircraft were much more difficult to detect and attack. Although these airfields could only support small numbers of the lighter aircraft, it was from these airstrips that the Communists launched their nighttime heckling raids. When the weather cleared, the airmen struck the Red airfields with everything they had: B-29s, B-26s, and fighter-bombers during the day, and B-26s at night. The campaign began in mid-June and continued for a month. It came to an end after reconnaissance noted on 12 July that the Communists had stopped trying to repair their airfields.21
Although the air superiority effort was the Air Force’s top priority, as it played out, the bulk of USAF effort in the Korean War was directed against Communist supply lines. During the Korean War, the USAF flew 48 percent of its sorties on interdiction missions, compared with 20 percent in close support, and 19 percent in counter air. The interdiction effort was at its height between 1 December 1950 and 1 April 1952, with an overall average of 58 percent of the sorties. The interdiction missions were the USAF’s mostly costly, accounting for 51 percent of operational losses (749 in number) and 55 percent of losses to enemy action (415).22
The USAF did not have the tools to effectively wage an interdiction campaign, especially at night. Its principal aircraft for this mission was the World War II Douglas B-26 (formerly A-26) Invader that lacked maneuverability and navigational equipment for low-level operations in the mountainous North Korean terrain. The interdiction crews had neither the equipment to detect enemy targets at night nor munitions any more accurate than the bombs and bullets that had been used in World War I. The airmen tried a variety of innovative technologies to pierce the night and to accurately hit enemy targets. B-29s dropped two types of guided bombs, the 1,000 pound Razon and 12,000 pound Tarzon, with mixed technical and limited tactical results. The Air Force also experimented with infrared detection devices on B-26s and dropped both roofing tacks and tetrahedrons from the venerable C-47 to puncture the truck tires, but with little success. The C-47s and other aircraft also dropped flares to allow attacks on night logistical traffic. Despite these efforts the airmen were unable to come up with effective tactics or technology to seriously impede Communist supply efforts.23
Probably more important to the eventual failure of the interdiction effort than American shortcomings were the actions taken by the Communists. The Communists had minimal supply requirements unless involved in full-scale combat operations. A Chinese division required only fifty tons of supplies a day, one-fifth of that of a comparable sized American formation, a tonnage that could be carried by two and a half railroad cars or twenty-five trucks. Unless the UN ground forces took the offensive, the Communist could control both their casualties and supply requirements. Poor weather and rugged terrain made night operations hazardous even without enemy opposition. As the Communists had abundant manpower to repair damage and build more bridges and bypasses, the interdiction campaign pitted Communist engineers and laborers against the UN airmen. The Communists took more active measures as well, increasing the number of antiaircraft guns by a factor of four during 1951, stringing cables across valleys, using deceptive lights to decoy the night bombers, and setting up flak traps. These not only knocked down UN aircraft but also forced them to fly higher and make only one pass, thus lessening accuracy. Ground defenses also diverted aircraft from strike to flak suppression; in October 1951, 20 percent of the fighter-bomber effort was so engaged.
Who won this competition? On the last day of May 1951 the airmen began an interdiction campaign they codenamed “Strangle.” While initially the operation seemed to have positive results, by mid-June the front settled down and the Communists adapted to the attacks. FEAF concluded: “Operation Strangle was not successful due . . . to the flexibility of the Communist logistic system.”24 In late December, Fifth Air Force intelligence conceded that the Communist repair and building troops had “broken our railroad blockade of Pyongyang and [won] the use of all key rail arteries.”25 Clearly, the Communist troops suffered from the constant day and night attacks on their supply lines that extended over two hundred miles from the Chinese sanctuary to the front lines. In the end, the Communists were able to launch large ground offensives and make air operations over North Korea expensive. One measure of the failure of the air effort was that while in July 1951 the Chinese fired about 8,000 rounds of artillery, in May 1952 they were able to fire 102,000 rounds. The air war against Red supply lines continued, but despite considerable effort, constant losses, optimistic claims, and high hopes, it was never able to decisively affect the ground war.26
In mid-1951 both sides pushed the air superiority war. On the American side, the field commanders wanted more F-86s to meet the threat. In June, U.S. intelligence estimated the Communists had 445 MiG-15s in the theater compared with a total of 89 F-86s, with only two of three Sabre squadrons deployed in Korea. Air Force Chief Vandenberg was reluctant to send any more Sabres to the war because of the demands of homeland defense and probably because of the low North American production along with the needs of the European forces.27 On 20 September he made clear to Gen. Otto Weyland, commander of FEAF, that there would be no additional F-86s for the war. A few months earlier in July, however, the Air Force ordered that the new F-86E be sent to Korea to replace the “A” model, and in August the new aircraft began to arrive, albeit in small numbers. (By October the F-86E was flying 40 percent of the 4th’s combat sorties.)28
Although MiGs were seen as far south as Pyongyang in June, air-to-air action had been sparse for the Sabres, with nine credits in June, six in July, four in August, and seven in September. The Communists made their move in September, sending more MiGs across the Yalu and demonstrating better formations and tactics. When reconnaissance spotted construction of three jet fighter airfields in late September, it was clear the Communists were again attempting to contest air superiority. In response, the USAF dispatched B-29s to neutralize these installations. The first attack on 18 October caught the Reds by surprise, and they offered no aerial opposition. But when the B-29s attacked again on 21 October, the Communists downed one Superfort, and two days later downed three more along with an F-84. B-29 attacks on bridge targets later in the month also met fierce MiG resistance. As a result the Air Force suspended daylight attacks by B-29s at the end of the month. October 1951 was the worst month of the war for the USAF in the air-to-air battle when it lost fourteen aircraft to the MiGs, the highest number of losses in one month in the entire war, while claiming thirty-five MiGs (twenty-five by F-86s). The last quarter of 1951 saw three of the five highest monthly air-to-air losses of the war.29
The increased air battles and construction in North Korea were not the only signs of the Communist intent to contest air superiority. Intelligence noted the movement of both jet and prop-powered aircraft across the Yalu; the introduction of a new version of the MiG (MiGbis) with an upgraded engine and better performance; and, in early December, MiGs flying south of Seoul. Therefore the Air Force escalated its plan to convert an F-80 wing to F-86s scheduled for spring 1952. Vandenberg directed Air Defense Command to send seventy-five F-86s along with air and ground crews to Korea. The field commanders, however, had a different idea: Fifth Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Frank Everest proposed to send just the F-86s to the 51st Fighter Interceptor, which was then flying F-80s. Vandenberg met with Weyland in Tokyo and approved the conversion plan.30
To meet the Red bid and realizing that the 51st would not be in action for weeks, if not months, FEAF sent the 4th’s third squadron from Japan to join its two sister squadrons in Korea. The 335th deployed to Kimpo on 2 November. During this month the MiGs had superior numbers and the initiative north of Pyongyang. Nevertheless the Sabres had another good month, claiming twenty-five kills for the loss of two F-86s in air-to-air combat. (A dozen of these victories were scored on 30 November when the Communist airmen made one of their few offensive actions of the war.) The Sabres destroyed another four MiGs on the ground at a North Korean airfield.31
In December 1951 the 4th’s Sabres were joined by those of the 51st. This unit had been formed a year before the United States entered World War II and had served in the China-Burma-India theater where it downed seventy-one Japanese aircraft. In February 1950 it was redesignated “Fighter Interceptor” and deployed to Japan in September. It flew over 17,500 sorties in F-80s, claiming two aerial victories while losing seventy-three aircraft, thirty to enemy action. Its last F-80 mission was on 19 November 1951. At the time of its transition to Sabres, it consisted of two squadrons, the 16th and 25th. A number of pilots who were flying with the 4th transferred to the new Sabre unit, including the 51st’s wing and group commanders, Francis Gabreski and George Jones.32
The 51st initiated F-86 operations on 1 December and claimed five MiGs in that month. (1st Lt. Paul Roach got the first 51st victory on 2 December and added one more on 28 December. A transfer from the 334th Fighter Squadron, Roach had earned a half credit on 25 September.) In January 1952 the unit hit its stride as it notched twenty-seven victories while the veteran 4th had a mere five. Some of this success could be attributed to the fact that the 51st was flying the newer F-86Es while the 4th was flying a mixture of the older, well-used F-86As along with the E model. In May the USAF attached a third squadron to the unit. (The 39th had been flying F-51s in the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.) In June the new squadron was the first to receive the new F-86F. The next month the 51st adopted its checkerboard tail markings, with the 16th’s painted blue; the 25th’s, red; and the 39th’s, yellow. Initially the Sabres had three black stripes separated by two white stripes painted on their wing tips and tail. Early in 1952 this scheme was changed to wide yellow bands on the wing tips and fuselage. Apparently the 4th also painted the yellow band on the vertical tail, a practice not followed by the 51st.33
As to be expected from the highly competitive fighter pilots, there was a keen rivalry between the two units. Certainly this was fanned by the unit’s flamboyant wing commander, Gabby Gabreski. But the rivalry was also fueled by those in the unit, according to the wing’s historian, who believed that the fighter school at Nellis was funneling its best graduates to the 4th. In any case, the 51st believed, as recorded in its history, that while the 4th claimed 10 percent more kills, it had twice the losses of the 51st. This is not borne out by the documents. Comparing the two units beginning with the 51st’s first claim on 2 December 1951 indicates 392 credits for the 4th versus 306 for the 51st or 28 percent more credits. During this same time period the 4th lost a total of seventy-nine aircraft (forty-four in air-to-air) compared with its rival’s losses of sixty-nine (thirty-four in air-to-air) or a difference of 14.5 percent. However, if we compare air-to-air claims and air-to-air losses, the 4th had 28 percent higher credits and losses. In the period 1 January through 30 June 1953, the 4th flew more hours (12 percent) than the other Sabre outfit and had 15 major accidents compared with 21 for the 51st, which yielded a lower accident rate (67 major accidents per one hundred thousand flying hours) than for the 51st (105).34 The 4th ended the war as the top scoring USAF fighter (56 percent of the total Air Force 893 claims) and the bulk of the aces. On its part, the 51st had the highest scoring ace, Joseph McConnell, and two pilots who would go on to greater fame, astronauts John Glenn and Edwin Aldrin.35
The fight for control of the skies heated up in late 1951. In addition to the slaughter of eleven prop-powered aircraft and one MiG on 30 November (without a loss), the Sabres scored thirteen other victories in the month. December was also a good month for the F-86s, as they downed thirty Red aircraft. They got fourteen of these in one day (13 December), all but one by the guns of the 4th. This was the highest one-day toll the F-86s would enact during the war, although it was later tied. In exchange, the USAF lost two F-86s on the 13 December and a dozen Sabres during November and December, eight in air-to-air combat.
At the same time the F-86s were running up this score, the units had to deal with a lowering of pilot quality. Most of the original highly experienced pilots were rotating out of the war, having flown the required one hundred missions. In their place, the units received a mixture of brand-new pilots out of flight school and others whose flying experience was in multiengine aircraft.36 The 4th complained that it was an “almost impossible task to take a pilot who flew transport or heavy bombers in World War II, who got out of the service and grew old mentally and fat physically for several years, recall that pilot, and expect him to fly a quick course in F-80s and become a replacement pilot for F-86 flying.” Only a very few rare and unusual individuals could accomplish this feat, for “air to air fighter flying calls for a pilot with an aggressive, competitive mental attitude. He must be young mentally. Age, as measured in years, is not the criteria for selecting fighter pilots. As long as a pilot’s reflexes and vision hold up and his physical machinery will continue to stand the pace, he can continue active fighter flying providing he started out in fighters.”37 This position contradicted Air Force policy that held that any Air Force pilot could fly any Air Force aircraft, a policy carried through the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the Sabre pilots were able to post impressive victory totals and to increase the victory-to-loss ratio in the last months of the war.
The F-86E was introduced in late 1951. It was about six hundred pounds heavier than the “A” model but with the same engine, therefore losing some performance. It was an overall improvement, however, because its hydraulically powered control system and all-flying tail (the entire horizontal stabilizer moved, not just the elevators) gave it superior handling abilities, especially at high speeds and when pulling “g”s. So, while there is a dispute as to whether the Sabre or MiG had the faster rate of roll, the F-86 could transition more quickly from one direction to the other. The Sabre was considered a more stable gun platform than the MiG. The downside, the pilots noted, was that the aircraft’s hydraulic systems were vulnerable because the main and emergency lines were located too close together in the tail.38
All accounts agreed that the MiG had superior rate of climb and ceiling (about five thousand feet) compared to the Sabre. The Americans believed that the F-86 was faster below twenty thousand feet while the MiG held that advantage above that altitude. The Russian fighter had superior acceleration, which gave it an initial advantage in dives, although the Sabre could (slowly) overhaul the MiG in sustained, high-speed (Mach .95 or higher) dives. At lower speeds the two were equivalent in dives. The American fighter had superior dive recovery while the Communist fighter had the advantage in a zoom climb. Prior to March 1952 the Americans believed that the Sabre could slightly out-turn the MiG below thirty thousand feet as well at high speeds (Mach .85 or higher), except at very high altitudes, while the MiG held an advantage in turning above thirty thousand feet. After that date, the MiG was judged to be equal, if not superior, to the F-86 in turning. The Sabre could decelerate faster than the MiG as its speed brakes were more effective, although slower to extend. After March 1952, the Americans believed the MiG was definitely superior to the F-86 above thirty-five thousand feet, marginally better between that altitude and twenty-five thousand feet, and equivalent below twenty thousand feet.
The Sabre’s armament and gunsight were considered better than the MiG’s for jet fighter-versus-fighter combat as they were superior at ranges below fifteen hundred feet and in the fast moving aerial combat that often required “snap shots.” Nevertheless, an operations analyst summed up the situation in his April 1952 report with this chilling warning:
In general, the F-86-E is a sound, “honest” airplane, well liked by its pilots, and whose record in Korea speaks for itself. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that it is fighting a specialized aircraft on its own ground and that the relative superiority of the present F-86-E pilot-plane-weapon “team” is not likely to continue forever. In point of fact, it is the considered opinion of most pilots that, given the present MiG-15 advantages of combat location, the rising proficiency of the MiG-15 “team” will eventually void our present superiority.39
The F-86s were engaged in two specific projects of note during the first half of 1952. The first was an attempt to extend the use of the F-86 from strictly an air superiority role to a ground support role. The fighter’s gunsight enabled the pilot to fire bullets and rockets as well as to drop bombs, and each Sabre could deliver either sixteen rockets or two bombs.40 The pressing requirements of air superiority, the limited number of Sabres, and the light bomb loads that the F-86s could deliver (it had only two pylons) restricted initial efforts to combat experiments. In January 1951 Sabres fired 162 rockets, 24 in February 1952, and then 60 rockets in December. In April 1952 the F-86s dropped six tons of napalm and the next month thirteen tons of bombs. This was not a very efficient use of the scarce Sabres and their pilots. That picture changed with the introduction of more F-86s—specifically, the conversion of two fighter-bomber units to the F-86s in early 1953—that gave the airmen essentially twice as many fighters as they had for the first two years of the war. Whereas the number of F-86s the USAF had in the field (“committed units”) did not exceed 100 until December 1951 and did not exceed 160 until October 1952, the numbers rapidly rose to 297 in July 1953. In addition, the new F-86F-25 with four pylon positions permitted the Sabre to carry more stores.41
A second major USAF effort was directed against the North Korean hydroelectric industry. As truce negotiations dragged on, FEAF sought a way to use air power to pressure the Communists. In April 1952 the FEAF staff submitted a plan to attack high value targets in North Korea. Although such targets were few in number, the one target set that stood out was hydroelectric power. The Americans were aware of this target from the start of the war, although it was not on the original lists of eighteen strategic targets in North Korea because of economic (reconstruction), diplomatic (the Chinese used electricity generated there), and military (the difficulty of taking out the facilities) factors. The premier generator site was at Sui-ho, the largest generating facility in the Orient and the fourth largest in the world that supplied 90 percent of the power for North Korea and 10 percent of the power used in Manchuria. The May 1952 change of command with Gen. Mark Clark replacing Gen. Matthew Ridgway as commander of UN forces was more than a mere exchange of generals. Clark was less reluctant than Ridgway to attack these targets and in mid-June ordered the Air Force and Navy to attack all of the power targets except Sui-ho, which required permission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the chiefs added Sui-ho to the target list after getting the specific approval of President Truman. The American airmen would attack Sui-ho, located on the Yalu River within thirty miles of two of the main MiG airfields, and three other generating sites on the east coast. The largest of these attacks was a joint Air Force–Navy attack on Sui-ho, the first Navy attacks in MiG Alley since 1950.
In the early afternoon of 23 June under the cover of eighty-four F-86s and thirty-five F9Fs, thirty-five Navy Skyraiders from three carriers unloaded 85 tons of bombs on the generating facilities at the Sui-ho. Later in the afternoon seventy-nine F-84s and forty-five F-80s attacked with another 145 tons of bombs. The Communists met the air attacks with flak but not with fighters. In fact, the American air attacks flushed the MiGs that, instead of rising to defend Sui-ho facility, flew (or perhaps more accurately, fled) west into China. The massive American assault may have appeared as an attack on the Chinese airfields. As a result, only two attacking aircraft suffered minor damage. There were Air Force and Marine attacks on three other power targets as well. The four-day operation of 968 USAF and 546 Navy sorties, which cost two Navy aircraft whose pilots were rescued, rendered eleven of the thirteen plants unserviceable and knocked out over 90 percent of the potential North Korean power production. North Korea was blacked out for over two weeks, before it was able to restore perhaps 10 percent of its former electrical capacity.42
The Americans followed up these attacks on Communist power production with naval and B-29 strikes in July and a night B-29 attack on Sui-ho on 12 September 1952. For the latter attack, four B-29s with electronic counter-measures orbited to jam Communist radar while B-26s and Navy aircraft attacked searchlight and antiaircraft gun positions to aid the twenty-five four-engine bombers. Red fighters downed one Superfort, and AA damaged others. Months later, on 15 February, the USAF sent low-flying F-84s covered by F-86s against the target. These attacks caused political problems for the U.S. government. At home, congressmen were eager to know why these targets had not been hit sooner. Meanwhile, the Labor party in Britain called the attacks “provocative.”43
The year 1952 proved to be a better year than 1951 for victory credits. Whereas the Sabres had claimed 122 MiGs, of a total of 175 USAF claims in 1951, the next year the F-86s score was 375 MiGs of USAF’s 383 total claims. Further data dramatically underscore the improvement: while in 1951 there were only two months in which the Sabre claims exceeded 19 MiGs, in 1952 there were only two months of fewer than 20 kills.
The Sabres had three big days in 1952. On 1 April they claimed ten MiGs for the loss of one F-86. The airmen also did well on 4 July, covering an attack on the North Korean Military Academy. Here they claimed thirteen MiGs at the cost of two Sabres. A week later UN airmen launched a massive operation against the North Korean capital. American and British naval aviators joined Marine and Air Force airmen to put more than 1,200 aircraft over Pyongyang in the largest daily effort made to this point in the war. Losses were light: two Navy and one Air Force (F-84) aircraft. On 29 August UN airmen put 1,400 sorties over Pyongyang with good results. The Sabres posted another thirteen victories on 4 September, although this time four F-86s went down. In September the F-86s downed sixty-three MiGs, the highest monthly total to that time, at the cost of nine Sabres downed by MiGs.44
One boost to the American advantage came with the introduction of the F-86F into combat. With a more powerful engine and soon retrofitted with a higher performing wing (fixed leading edge, 6-3), this Sabre clearly lessened, if not eliminated, most of the MiG’s flying advantages. The first “F” models went to the 51st’s 39th Fighter Squadron in August 1952 and then to the 4th’s 335th Fighter Squadron in October. (There is no mention of why these units were chosen.) The other four squadrons continued to fly the “A”s and “E”s until October, when all of the “A” models were taken out of action.
The 39th had just converted to Sabres in June but in short order became the highest scoring squadron in the 51st. The 335th, already the top-scoring unit in its group, maintained that position, ending the war as the highest scoring Sabre squadron. In the six months in which the 39th was the only squadron in the 51st that flew the F-86F, it claimed 46 percent of the unit’s victories, while in the four months in which the 335th held a similar advantage in 4th, it accounted for 53 percent of the unit’s victories. In the last five months of the war, all but one (the 39th) of the 4th’s and 51st’s six squadrons increased their victory-to-loss ratio. How much of this success was due to the F-86F is open to speculation, but surely it helped. Since the 335th claimed 42 percent of the 4th’s victory credits in the four months prior to receiving the “F” and 54 percent after, the advantage may have been approximately 10 percent.45
In March 1953 the USAF distributed the “F” models to all six squadrons. The ever-increasing numbers of these aircraft along with complaints (and lowered morale) from the pilots in the excluded squadrons pushed this redistribution. Another aspect that rubbed salt into the wounds, at least in the 51st, was that because the F-86F could fly higher than the “A” and “E” models, the pilots of the 39th were put on a special diet to minimize gas and reduce discomfort at higher altitudes. They got better food—in the words of one of these pilots, “we ate like kings.” So the 39th squadron got the best birds and the best chow—great for them, but not conducive to good morale for the rest of the unit.46
The F-86s did even better in 1953. The Sabres claimed 294 of the 298 USAF victories and scored 25 or more victories in each of last seven months of 1953. In May, they had three days in which they scored 10 or more victories and experienced no losses. The 57 claims and 1 loss in May gave the Sabres their best claims to loss ratio of the war. In June the Sabres scored the most victories in one month: 77 MiGs at the cost of 5 fighters lost to MiGs and 1 to friendly fire. On 30 May, they scored 14 victories without a loss to equal the record for victories in one day set on 13 December 1951. The ratio of F-86 claims of MiG-15s downed to F-86s lost in air-to-air combat skyrocketed in 1953: for the entire war, the ratio was 8.2 to 1; in 1953 that ratio was more than 13 to 1.47
Why did the Americans finish with such a flourish, not only increasing the number of kills, but also increasing the ratio of claims to losses? The introduction of the F-86F with the solid leading edge was certainly a factor. Another factor was that the Soviets phased out of the war, leaving the less-trained and inexperienced Chinese and North Korean pilots to face the Sabres. Finally, I believe the American pilots became bolder, realizing that the war was ending and that this would be their last shot at the glory of downing enemy aircraft.
One of the most effective air actions of the war was connected with the effort to pressure the Communists to come to terms at Panmunjom. Just as talks reached a break-off point in mid-May, General Clark proposed a number of measures, including hitting twenty previously untouched irrigation dams on the west coast of Korea, and he even mentioned air operations against targets in Manchuria and North China. President Eisenhower was willing to threaten the Communists with an expansion of the war, and in late May, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told visiting Indian Prime Minister Nehru that the United States had decided to attack Communist bases in Manchuria if an honorable peace was not agreed to at Panmunjom. Some believe President Eisenhower implied he would consider using nuclear weapons.
On 13 May, F-84s hit the dam at Toksan, twenty miles north of Pyongyang. The resulting flooding took out five square miles of rice fields and seven hundred buildings, inundating an airfield and miles of railroads and highways. Later attacks by fighter-bombers and B-29s did further damage and forced the North Koreans to lower the level of their reservoirs, thereby reducing rice production. In June, the Communists agreed to the peace terms; in late July, the war ended.48
The last major air effort of the war was to deny the Communists the use of airfields in North Korea that could accommodate MiG-15s, that is, those with runways over three thousand feet long. (The armistice terms called for a freeze on the introduction of replacement aircraft after the truce went into effect.) The airmen attacked irrigation dams to flood some of these airstrips, but the Communists countered by lowering the level of the reservoirs. Standard attacks did the job, and by late June all but one airfield had been neutralized. It again became a race between the Red engineers and laborers and the airmen. The airmen won, evidenced in pictures taken on 27 July, which indicated that all North Korean airfields were unsuitable for jet operations.49