Although the air war over MiG Alley is best remembered for the glory of fighter pilots engaged in the first jet-versus-jet aerial combat, there was far more to their exploits. Regardless of the widespread discrepancies between U.S. and Communist accounts regarding victory credits, it is clear that the F-86 pilots won an important victory: Red aircraft did not venture far south of the Yalu River. Some may claim that this stemmed from the Communist prohibition against such flights, prompted by their desire not to expose Soviet airmen to capture, possibly widening the conflict. But if the Russians restricted their operations for political purposes, the newly formed North Korean and Chinese air forces may have done so for practical ones: their airmen were less trained and experienced and would have been badly defeated by the Americans. An alternative explanation is that the Communists knew that the American advantage increased the farther south the air battle was waged; as it was, they were defeated over their airfields in China.
Whether the Reds conceded air superiority or the Americans won it, the clear fact is that UN forces essentially had air superiority over all of Korea during the war.
Air superiority was important from the outset and throughout the war. It was especially significant in the initial weeks of the conflict. Airlift got American forces quickly into action, albeit in a piecemeal fashion. These American air and ground units could not stop but did delay and batter the North Korean advance. The elimination of the North Korean air force had a psychological impact, but, more importantly, it allowed air power to operate and gave the UN defenders added reach and firepower. The Communists came close to winning the war in that first month of the conflict, and air power provided what may very well have been the decisive edge to UN forces.
Throughout the war, the UN maintained air superiority over the immediate battle zone, UN rear areas, and arguably over all of North Korea. UN air superiority was there for the long haul. Consequently, with the exception of nighttime nuisance raids, UN ground forces and installations were free from air attack, as were UN movements and supply efforts. This was not so for their foes. Air power pummeled Communist ground forces, restricted most Red operations, and confined most enemy movements to the night. Air superiority also allowed widespread interdiction operations that hindered Communist resupply efforts. While air power could not defeat the massive, dug-in, tough Communist ground forces, it could greatly hinder their operations, as well as make them more costly. Surely air power increased the burden on the Communist ground soldier and lessened the burden on their UN counterparts. As in World War II, the Korean War demonstrated that conventional forces would be hard pressed to fight under unfriendly skies. Certainly such operations would be expensive.
The Communists challenged UN air power with the introduction of the MiG-15. The United States countered with the Sabre, which won and maintained air superiority. The F-86 defeated the MiG, although it is true that the Soviet fighter proved an unpleasant surprise for the West and a worthy opponent for the Sabre. In fact, the MiG initially had a number of performance advantages over the American fighter. However, North American upgraded its fighter so that by the end of the war the F-86 was essentially the equivalent of the MiG. The American pilots also had the advantages of a better gunsight and of “g” suits that permitted them to endure more stressful maneuvers than their opponents without blacking out. The F-86’s .50s proved superior to the MiG’s mixed cannon armament in the close-in highly maneuvering air battles. Another factor was that the MiG was a more dangerous aircraft to fly than the Sabre and was infamous for its tendency to get into uncontrollable spins. Considering all these factors, the F-86 was a superior fighting machine.
Ironically, American airmen, who have always pushed superior technology, won this fight without it. Just as American airmen in World War II began the conflict with fighters inferior to the enemy, American airmen in the Korean War found themselves in the same predicament in late 1950. But while the United States was able in the “Big War” to produce a greater number of superior piston-powered fighters, the USAF fought the battle in Korea with inferior numbers of an—at best—equivalent aircraft. In both wars, the key to winning air superiority was a better-trained pilot.
If the Sabre was at best equal to the MiG, the same cannot be said of the opposing pilots. Certainly there were good Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet pilots, but overall the Americans had a decisive edge in pilot quality. The USAF put into action numbers of experienced fighter pilots with high flying time, some of whom were World War II combat veterans. In addition, newly trained U.S. pilots proved to be more skillful than newly trained Communist pilots. Although Russian pilots were of a higher quality than their Chinese and North Korean allies, they were less able than the Americans. Most of all, the Sabre pilots were much more aggressive than their foes, a key to success in air-to-air combat.
In World War II, Allied air forces won the air campaign by destroying enemy air forces in the air, on their airfields, and in their factories. In contrast, the battle for air superiority over Korea was limited. Specifically, neither Soviet aircraft factories nor Communist aircraft on the ground in China were hit. The air war was fought and won in the skies over North Korea and China.
A small number of Sabre pilots won and maintained air superiority. On the order of 1,000 to 1,200 pilots flew the F-86 in combat in the Korean War. It was a long battle, a clear American victory, and important to the outcome of the war. The ’86s claimed 810 enemy aircraft destroyed in aerial combat, all but 18 of which were MiG-15s. Yet this was not without losses. The official USAF records list a total of 224 Sabres lost to all causes. A further breakdown of the data indicates that approximately 100 F-86s fell in air-to-air combat, and seventy-one pilots died; forty-two were rescued from behind enemy lines or out of the sea, while another twenty-eight survived captivity. The Korean War remains the largest jet fighter action to date, despite the longer duration, greater number of sorties, and heavier tonnage of bombs dropped during the Vietnam War. Thus, the North American F-86 Sabre remains the most successful air-to-air jet fighter of all time.
Victory in the battle for air superiority was important to the overall action and helps explain the war’s outcome. Air superiority was one of the few advantages the UN had in the war, and it allowed the UN to apply air power to make the war much more costly for the enemy. The Sabre and its pilots were key to UN air superiority. The F-86 looked good and performed well, but most of all, it was a superlative air-to-air fighter. The Sabre’s outstanding success in Korea won it and its pilots a well-deserved place in the history of the Korean War and the annals of aviation history.