Veterans of World War I dominated the general officer corps of both the French and German armies. However, each group drew different lessons from their wartime experiences. Most French generals were deeply rooted in past doctrines and practices, while the German generals included many innovators looking for new ways to conduct war.
The strongest fortifications of the Maginot Line were under the command of Gén. Prételat, commander of Groupe d’armées 2. By the time of the major German offensives against the Maginot Line in the Sarre and Rhine regions most of Groupe d’armées 2 had withdrawn, leaving the defence of the frontier to the fortress troops. (NARA)
The French chain of command was overly complicated and cumbersome. French forces had two commanders – Général d’armée Maurice Gamelin and Général d’armée Alphonse Georges. As Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, Gamelin retained all authority, but delegated the responsibility for operations of the field army to Georges. The result was two competing headquarters with overlapping roles. Aggravating the situation was Gamelin’s and Georges’ dislike for each other, a lack of radio communications between both headquarters and the field forces, and each commander’s habit of commanding far from the front.
Général Gamelin was responsible for the planning, organization and readiness of the entire French Army. As the army’s chief since 1935, he oversaw completion of the Maginot Line defences, the modernization programme and the development of France’s military strategy. Surprisingly, even though he was a brigade and divisional commander during World War I and a corps commander in the 1920s, Gamelin was more of a staff officer than a commander. Cautious, reserved and uncomfortable around troops, he secluded himself at his headquarters in the Château de Vincennes near Paris, far away from current events that might disturb him.
Général Georges was a completely opposite personality to Gamelin. Outgoing and candid, Georges was a no-nonsense soldier and leader. He was expected by many to become head of the French Army in 1935. However, Gamelin was selected instead because either (depending on the source) Prime Minister Edouard Daladier thought Georges was too right wing in his political views, or Georges’ health was too precarious, having never fully recovered from wounds received during an assassination attempt against the king of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934.
Under Georges were three army group commanders – Générals d’armée Gaston Billotte (Groupe d’armées 1 located along the Belgian border), André-Gaston Prételat (Groupe d’armées 2 in Alsace and Lorraine), and Antoine Besson (Groupe d’armées 3 in southern Alsace and along the Swiss border). Général Billotte was similar in demeanour to Gén. Georges. At the start of the war, Gamelin selected him to command Groupe d’armées 1 because he was the army’s most offensive-minded field general officer and a primary proponent of French armoured divisions. Therefore, placing Billotte in command over France’s primary mechanized force made sense. When Billotte was injured in a car accident on 21 May 1940 (dying two days later), he was replaced by Général d’armée Georges Blanchard.
Most forces in Alsace and Lorraine, including the main fortresses of the Maginot Line, were under the command of Gén. Prételat. At 55 years old, he was young by French general officer standards. He was also very experienced at higher-level command, having commanded Groupe d’armées 2 well before the start of the war and during the Saar offensive in September 1939. By May 1940, Prételat’s command included three field armies and most of the Maginot Line fortress troops.
Général Besson was also an experienced field commander, having commanded a regiment during World War I, and a brigade, division and army in the 1920s and 1930s. In October 1939, he took command of Groupe d’armées 3 on the extreme right flank of the north-east front in the Colmar and Mulhouse region of the Upper Rhine. There, he played a minor role in the battle for France.
The chain of command for the campaign in the west was Adolf Hitler, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Commander-in-Chief of the Army), then the three army group commanders who commanded the operational forces – Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Heeresgruppe A), Generaloberst Fedor von Bock (Heeresgruppe B), and Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (Heeresgruppe C). Based on their World War I experience, these generals and many of their subordinates doubted a quick war could be won against France. They thought Fall Gelb could be defeated easily by either a stout defence by French forces entrenched along the border or a counteroffensive by forces behind the Maginot Line.
The commander of Heeresgruppe A, Gen.Obst. von Rundstedt was the Wehrmacht’s senior officer in terms of length of service. He was brought out of retirement in April 1939 to plan the invasion of Poland and command Heeresgruppe Süd. Afterwards, he and his staff moved west to plan the French campaign and lead the main attack. Rundstedt’s subordinate commanders were Generaloberst Gunther von Kluge (AOK 4) and Generaloberst Wilhelm List (AOK 12), General der Infanterie Ernst Busch (AOK 16), and General der Kavallerie Ewald von Kleist (Panzergruppe Kleist), all with combat experience from the Polish campaign. Assigned to Heeresgruppe A were two energetic and innovative officers who would ultimately embody the blitzkrieg concept – General der Panzertruppe Heinz Guderian, the Wehrmacht’s Panzer expert and XIX AK (mot.) commander, and Generalmajor Erwin Rommel, commander of the 7. Panzer-Division. Heeresgruppe A also had many exceptional division commanders and staff officers who became group commanders later in the war. All except Busch were well suited to mobile operations as envisioned by the German invasion plan.
An authority on defensive warfare, Gen.Obst. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb was the ideal officer to defend Germany’s western frontier during the invasion of Poland and then direct two major offensives against the Maginot Line during the invasion of France. (M. Romanych)
General Busch was an ardent supporter of the Nazi Party who achieved rapid promotion once Hitler came to power. Although his performance in Poland as a corps commander was undistinguished, Busch’s political stance gained him command of the newly formed AOK 16 in October 1940. Fortuitously for Busch, his chief of staff was Generalleutnant Walter Model, a tactically competent dynamo who became the driving force behind AOK 16 operations.
The senior commanders of Heeresgruppe C – Gen.Obst. von Leeb and his two subordinate army commanders, Generaloberst Erwin von Witzleben (AOK 1 stationed opposite the strongest parts of the Maginot Line), and Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann (AOK 7 located along the Rhine River) – were in direct contrast to the commanders of Heeresgruppe A. As a group, they were neither among Hitler’s favourites nor part of the developing Panzer general elite. All three sat out the invasion of Poland, assigned to defend Germany’s western front from French attack. As a result they lacked recent combat experience and first-hand knowledge of modern mechanized forces. They were though, assigned responsibility for two planned major offensives against the Maginot Line.
A capable leader, Gen.Obst. von Leeb was out of favour with Hitler because of his anti-Nazi attitude and religious convictions. Among the army group commanders, Leeb was the only strong objector to the invasion in the west, but for moral rather than operational grounds. Retired in 1938 when commanders considered hostile to the Nazis were removed, Leeb was reactivated in July of the same year and given command of AOK 12 during the occupation of the Sudetenland. Afterwards, he retired again from active duty, only to be called back a second time in the summer of 1939 to command Heeresgruppe C.
Generaloberst von Witzleben was anti-Nazi. In the mid-1930s, Witzleben became an active opponent of Adolf Hitler. On 1 September 1939, he took command of AOK 1, which was defending the frontier opposite the Maginot Line. With minimal forces, Witzleben stopped France’s abortive Saar offensive and then conducted a counterattack that took back most of the French territorial gains. During the Phoney War, he remained an active member of the anti-Hitler resistance.
Generaloberst Dollmann was an undistinguished leader with no higher-level command experience. He served without special distinction in World War I and never had a field command at division or corps level. Good at sensing and adapting to political currents, Dollmann was promoted because of his relations with Nazi party officials rather than on his military ability. On 25 August 1939, Gen.Obst. Dollmann took command of AOK 7, which was manning the West Wall along the Rhine River.