Essential terminology
A posteriori
A priori
Absolute
Absolutism
Autonomy
Categorical imperative
Copernican Revolution
Duty
Good will
Hypothetical
Imperative
Kingdom of ends
Law
Maxim
Summum bonum
Universalisability
Key scholars
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)
David Hume (1711–1776)
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
W.D. Ross (1877–1971)
R.M. Hare (1919–2002)
John Rawls (1921–2002)
Kantian ethics, including:
Learners should have the opportunity to discuss issues raised by Kant’s approach to ethics, including:
(From OCR AS Level Religious Studies Specification H173)
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
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Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg, Prussia, on 22 April 1724. He was educated at the Collegium Fredericianum and the University of Königsberg. He studied classics and, at university, physics and mathematics. He had to leave university to earn a living as a teacher when his father died. Later, he returned to university and studied for his doctorate. He taught at the university for 15 years, moving from science and mathematics to philosophy. He became a professor of logic and metaphysics in 1770. He held unorthodox religious beliefs based on rationalism rather than revelation, and in 1792 he was forbidden by the king from teaching or writing on religious subjects. When the king died in 1797, Kant resumed this teaching, and in 1798, the year after he retired, he published a summary of his religious views. He died on 12 February 1804.
Immanuel Kant believed in an objective right and wrong based on reason. We should do the right thing just because it is right and not because it fulfils our desires or is based on our feelings. We know what is right not by relying on our intuitions or facts about the world but by using our reason. To test a moral maxim, we need to ask whether we can always say that everyone should follow it and we must reject it if we cannot.
Kant opposed the view that all moral judgements are culturally relative or subjective so that there are no such things as moral absolutes. Kant’s approach to ethics was deontological, where the right takes precedence over the good, and basic rights and principles guide us to know which goods to follow.
Modern deontology avoids too close a link with Kant and rejects his absolutism and complete disregard for consequences; however, his moral theory has been and continues to be influential.
Kant’s main area of study was to investigate the formal structures of pure reasoning, causality, a priori knowledge (knowledge not based on experience) and the question of objectivity. He wrote these ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 2nd edn 1787). He then went on to demonstrate the formal structure of practical-moral reasoning in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and to study the conditions of the possibility of aesthetics and religion in the Critique of Judgement (1790).
Kant’s work was a reaction against the rationalists and empiricists, and he was concerned with the problem of objective knowledge: can I have any knowledge of the world that is not just ‘knowledge of the world as it seems to me’? He is asking, ‘How do we know what we know and what does it mean to know?’
The views of other philosophers about knowledge:
René Descartes (1596–1650)
René Descartes is often called the founder of modern philosophy. He was born in Touraine and was educated at a Jesuit school – La Flèche in Anjou. There he studied mathematics and scholasticism. He then studied law at Poitiers and later took up a military career. He went to Italy on pilgrimage in 1623–24 and then, until 1628, he studied philosophy in France. He moved to the Netherlands in 1628 and in 1637 published his first major work: Essais Philosophiques (Philosophical Essays). This book covered geometry, optics, meteors and philosophical method. He died from pneumonia in 1650.
Kant is closer to the rationalist views of Descartes and Leibniz and opposed to the empiricist views of Hume, which spurred him to explain his own view. Kant considers that our knowledge is not of the world as it is in itself but of the world as it appears to us. If our sense organs were different, our languages and thought patterns different, then our view of the world would be different. Kant is saying that humans can never know the world as it really is (the thing in itself) because as it is experienced it is changed by our minds – the world we now see is a phenomenon (like a reflection in a mirror). Kant argued that various structures or categories of thought (space, time and causality) were built into the structure of our minds – we have been preprogrammed. This means that all we can really know about scientifically are our own experiences and perceptions, which may or may not correspond to ultimate reality.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a German philosopher, mathematician and statesman. He was born in Leipzig and studied at the universities of Leipzig, Jena and Altdorf. In 1666 he began work for Johann Philipp von Schönborn, who was archbishop elector of Mainz. In 1673 Leibniz went to Paris. From 1676 until 1716 he was librarian and privy counsellor at the court of Hanover. His work comprised diplomacy, history, law, mathematics, philology, philosophy, physics, politics and theology.
Kant called this analysis the Copernican Revolution, as its implications for us are just as vital as the implications of believing that the solar system revolves around the sun. Science then can never give us any knowledge of objective reality, as it can never move beyond the view of the world given to us by the categories of our mind. However, Kant did think that these categories could be described as objective, as they are the objective laws of our mind – this is pure reason and tells you what is the case.
Copernican Revolution
Belief that the solar system revolves around the sun.
Practical reason looks at evidence and argument and tells you what ought to be done. This sense of the moral ‘ought’ is something which cannot simply depend on external facts of what the world is like, or the expected consequences of our actions. Kant saw that people are aware of the moral law at work within them – not as a vague feeling but a direct and powerful experience. ‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me’ (Critique of Practical Reason). Kant’s moral theory is explained in the ‘Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals’ (1785) and tries to show the objectivity of moral judgement and the universal character of moral laws and attempts to base morality on reason as opposed to feelings, inclinations, consequences or religion. He roots his view of morality in reason to the exclusion of everything else, and rejects especially Hume’s idea that morality is rooted in desires or feelings. He does not reject desires and feelings, but says that they have nothing to do with morality. Only reason is universal. Kant approached morality in the same way as he approached knowledge (looking at the a priori categories through which we make sense of the world) – he looked for the categories we use: what makes a moral precept moral? Kant declared that these were rooted in rationality, were unconditional or categorical and completely unchanging and presupposed freedom.
For Kant, if I am to act morally then I must be capable of exercising freedom or autonomy of the will. The opposite of this is heteronomy – that something is right because it satisfies some desire, emotion, goal or obligation. Our reason must not be subservient to something else even if this is the happiness of the majority.
Autonomy
Self-directed freedom, arriving at moral judgement through reason.
A posteriori
A statement which is knowable after experience.
A priori
A statement which is knowable without reference to any experience.
Absolute
A principle that is universally binding.
Absolutism
There is only one correct answer to every moral problem.
Good will
Making a moral choice expresses good will.
Duty
A motive for acting in a certain way which shows moral quality.
The idea of a ‘good will’ is Kant’s starting point for his morality.
It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement and any other talents of the mind we care to name, or courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose, as qualities of temperament, are without doubt good and desirable in many respects; but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good expresses good will. which has to make use of these gifts … Good will, then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add to nor take away anything from this value.
(‘Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals’)
It is only the ‘good will’ which counts and which is the starting point for ethics. Abilities, talents and even virtues count for nothing, as do consequences. Only the will is within our control and so only the will can be unconditionally good and can exercise pure practical reason. This will means the total effort involved in making a conscious moral choice. The good will is when someone acts rationally and ignores inclinations, desires and emotions when making an ethical decision. This requires freedom, as a moral agent needs the ability to choose to act with the right intention.
David Hume (1711–1776)
David Hume was born in Edinburgh on 7 May 1711. He was a historian and philosopher. He influenced the development of scepticism and empiricism. He worked in an office in Bristol for a short time and then moved to France. A Treatise of Human Nature was published in three volumes between 1739 and 1740. Hume went back to his family home in Berwickshire and worked on Essays Moral and Political, published in 1741 to 1742. Hume moved to Edinburgh in 1751 and became librarian of the Advocates’ Library. Hume was a friend of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and brought him to Britain, but the friendship collapsed due to Rousseau’s mental condition. Hume died on 25 August 1776.
This is the opposite of Hume’s argument that morality is based only on making people happy and fulfilling their desires – it is just a servant of the passions, and morality is founded on our feelings of sympathy for others and depends on our human nature.
Duty is what makes the good will good. It is important that duty be done for its own sake, and it does not matter whether you or others benefit from your action – our motives need to be pure. Doing duty for any other reason – inclination, self-interest, affection – does not count. The good will chooses duty for duty’s sake.
Richard Warburton/Alamy
Acting according to good will is doing one’s duty and is acting without any personal motive or from any hope of gain, such as personal pleasure. Kant does not rule out pleasure in doing one’s duty, but pleasure will not help us to know what duty is or the morality of our actions. According to Kant, there is no moral worth in the feeling of satisfaction we get from doing our duty – if giving to charity out of love for others gives you that warm glow of having helped others, it is not necessarily moral. If I give to charity because duty commands it, then I am moral. So, even though the act of giving to charity has the same result, according to Kant one way is moral and the other is not. We are not moral for the sake of love but for duty’s sake only. He is arguing against Hume that duty and reason can help us guide our emotions so that we are not dominated and ruled by them.
Kant was looking for some sort of objective basis for morality – a way of knowing our duty. Practical reason, therefore, must give the will commands or imperatives. He makes the distinction between two kinds of imperatives – non-moral (hypothetical) and moral (categorical).
Hypothetical imperatives are not moral commands to the will, as they do not apply to everyone. You need to obey them only if you want to achieve a certain goal – that is why a hypothetical imperative always begins with the word ‘if’.
For example: if I want to lose weight I ought to go on a diet and exercise more. A hypothetical imperative depends on the results and aims at personal well-being.
Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, are moral commands and do not begin with an ‘if’, as they tell everyone what to do and do not depend on anything, especially desires or goals. According to Kant these categorical imperatives apply to everyone (like the categories of pure reason, which apply to everyone) because they are based on an objective a priori law of reason, which Kant calls the categorical imperative. This is a test to judge whether an action is in accordance with pure practical reason.
There are a number of different forms of this, but they are variations on three basic ones:
Hypothetical imperative
An action that achieves some goal or end.
Categorical imperative
A command to perform actions that are absolute moral obligations without reference to other ends.
Kant calls this the formula of the law of nature. This first formulation of the categorical imperative asks everyone to universalise their principles or maxims without contradiction. In other words, before you act ask yourself whether you would like everyone in the same situation to act in the same way. If not, then you are involved in a contradiction and what you are thinking of doing is wrong because it is against reason.
Kant always wants to universalise rules, as he wants everyone to be free and rational, and if rules are not universalisable then others will not have the same freedom to act on the same moral principles as I use. However, Kant does not claim that everyone should be able to do the same thing as I choose to do in order for it to be moral – but rather everyone should be prepared to act on the same maxim.
Kant uses promise-keeping as an example. I cannot consistently will that promise-breaking for my own self-interest should be a universal law. If I try to make a universal law of the maxim ‘I may always break my promises when it is for my benefit,’ the result will be that there is no point in anyone making promises – this is inconsistent and so cannot be a moral imperative.
To make his argument as clear as possible Kant uses four examples, including the one of promise-keeping:
Law
Objective principle, a maxim that can be universalised.
Maxim
A general rule in accordance with which we intend to act.
(‘Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals’)
Kant’s followers disagree about how to apply this universal law test. R.M. Hare suggests an alternative approach to test a proposed moral maxim:
The challenge then is to distinguish right maxims from wrong ones. This is the role of reason in choosing only maxims that can be universalised.
Kant calls this the formula of end in itself. He means that we should not exploit others or treat them as things to achieve an end, as they are as rational as we are. To treat another person as a means is to deny that person the right to be a rational and independent judge of his or her own actions. It is to make oneself in some way superior and different. To be consistent we need to value everyone equally.
Kant saw the first two formulations as two expressions of the same idea. He summed this up as follows: ‘Principles of action are prohibited morally if they could not be universalised without contradiction, or they could not be willed as universal laws’ (‘Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals’). The third formulation follows from the other two.
Kingdom of ends
A world in which people do not treat others as means but only as ends.
This he calls the formula of a kingdom of ends. Everyone should act as if every other person was an ‘end’ – a free, autonomous agent. Kant believed that each person is autonomous, and moral judgements should not be based on any empirical consideration about human nature, human flourishing or human destiny. However, this idea of the autonomy of the individual does not mean that everyone can just decide their own morality, but rather that each individual has the ability to understand the principles of pure practical reason and follow them. Pure practical reason must be impartial and so its principles must apply equally to everyone. Kant’s kingdom of ends is an ideal community in which all members are both the authors and subjects of all laws. In this community the only possible laws are those which could apply to all rational beings. This means that the categorical imperative demands that we follow only those principles that could be laws in the kingdom of ends. Thus the kingdom of ends can be achieved only if each individual follows the categorical imperative unfailingly; so helping to achieve the kingdom of ends is a duty, and people must hold each other accountable for helping achieve it.
In more modern times a good application of Kant’s thoughts on the kingdom of ends can be found in Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971). Rawls’ approach is that the correct rules of justice are those that are conducive to harmony in society. This means that our fundamental obligation is to act only on principles that would be accepted by a community of fully rational autonomous agents who all share in legislating these principles for their community. This adds a social dimension to Kantian ethics.
Apart from making the individual the sole authority for moral judgement, Kant’s theory of ethics seems to grant freedom to do anything that can be consistently universalised. This morality sets limits but does not give direct guidance; therefore, in order for it to make sense Kant has to postulate the existence of God, freedom and immortality.
Kant’s ethical theory could, in fact, be said to be a religious morality without God but he seems to take for granted God as lawgiver and he argues that there must be a God and an afterlife, as there has to be some sort of reward.
Kant has already explained that happiness is not the foundation or reason for acting morally, but he claims that it is its reward. Kant’s ideas seem to be really twisted with regard to happiness. In the ‘Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals’ he writes,
The principle of personal happiness is the most objectionable not merely because it is false and because its pretence that well-being always adjusts itself to well-doing is contradicted by experience; not merely because it contributes nothing to morality (since making a man happy is quite different from making him good) but because it bases morality on sensuous motives.
However, he also says that we have a duty to make ourselves happy, not because we want to be happy but because it is necessary for us to do our other duties. Kant seems to put duty in a sort of vacuum, totally separate from our everyday lives.
To solve this dilemma Kant looks at the postulates of God and immortality: after death, in the next world, there is no conflict between ‘duty’ and ‘happiness’, as ‘duty’ is part of the natural harmony of purposes created by God. Kant thought that our aim in acting morally is not to be happy but to be worthy of being happy. The summum bonum or highest good is a state where happiness and virtue are united – but for Kant it is the virtuous person who has a ‘good will’ which is vital for morality; happiness is not guaranteed. The summum bonum, however, cannot be achieved in this life, and so there must be life after death where we can achieve it – thus for Kant, morality leads to God.
Summum bonum
The supreme good that we pursue through moral acts.
Universalisability
If an act is right or wrong for one person in a situation, then it is right or wrong for anyone in that situation.
These problems with Kant’s theory of ethics led W.D. Ross to make certain changes.
Ross said that there were two kinds of duties:
Ross argued that exceptions should be allowed to Kant’s duties – he called these prima facie duties (first sight duties). These duties are conditional and can be outweighed by a more compelling duty (e.g. ‘Never take a life’ could be outweighed by ‘Never take a life except in self-defence’).
I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. Whether an act is a duty proper or actual duty depends on all the morally significant kinds it is an instance of.
(The Right and the Good, pp. 19–20)
Ross lists seven prima facie duties:
These stress the personal character of duty. The first three duties look to the past and the last four to the future, but they do not need to be considered in any particular order, but rather as to how they fit the particular situation. For example who should I save from drowning: my father or a famous doctor? A utilitarian would save the doctor because he could help more people. Ross says we have a special duty of gratitude to our parents which outweighs any duty to a stranger. Ross shows that there are possible exceptions to any rule and these exceptions depend on the situation in which I do my duty, the possible consequences of doing my duty and the personal relationships involved.
However, calling these ‘duties’ may be a bit misleading, as they are not so much duties as ‘features that give us genuine (not merely apparent) moral reason to do certain actions’. Ross later described prima facie duties as ‘responsibilities to ourselves and to others’ and he went on to say that our actual duty is determined by the balance of these responsibilities.
Every act therefore, viewed in some aspects, will be prima facie right, and viewed in others, prima facie wrong, and right acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those respects in which they are prima facie wrong … For the estimation of the comparative stringency of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I can see, be laid down.
(The Right and the Good, p. 41)
This is the duty people are left with after they have weighed up all the conflicting prima facie duties that apply in a particular case.
Problems with Ross’ theory:
Ross says that we simply know which acts are right by consulting our deepest moral convictions, but is this an adequate response? Can we be sure that Ross’ list of duties is correct? How can we compare and rank them in order to arrive at a balance which will guide us to our actual duty?
Ross thought that people could solve problems by relying on their intuitions.
Look back over the chapter and check that you can answer the following questions:
Try to explain the following terms without looking at your books and notes:
Examination questions practice |
It is a good idea always to use examples to explain the categorical imperative. Do not use phrases like ‘a priori’ if you cannot remember what they mean.
To help you improve your answers look at the AS Levels of Response.
Critically assess the claim that Kant’s theory of universalisability provides a sound basis for ethical decision making.
AO1 (15 marks)
AO2 (15 marks)
Kant, I. 2005. ‘Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals’, in The Moral Law, Paton, H.J. (trans.), London: Routledge.
MacIntyre, A. 1968. A Short History of Ethics. London: Routledge.
Norman, R. 1998. The Moral Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, O. 2013. ‘Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems’, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Pojman, L.P. 2002. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. Toronto: Wadsworth.
Ross, W.D. 1930, 2002. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scruton, R. 1982. Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ward, K. 1972. The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.