LIBERATION AND THE LEFT
January 20, 2022
Mustafa Barghouti is a prominent politician, campaigner, and physician with a long history of organizing and advocacy in Palestine. He is the leader of the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI), or al-Mubadara, a democratic movement that provides an alternative to Fatah and Hamas as dominant political parties. In 2005 Barghouti ran as the PNI’s candidate for the presidential election, coming in second to Mahmoud Abbas. In 2006 he was elected as a member of the Palestinian parliament, and he served as former minister of information under the 2007 National Unity Government. In 2010 Barghouti was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, in recognition of his social, political, human rights, and peace activism. He is one of the most active grassroots leaders in Palestine, campaigning for the development of Palestinian civil society and grassroots democracy while advocating for internal reform. Dr. Barghouti is an international spokesperson for the Palestinian cause, a leading figure in the nonviolent popular resistance against the occupation and apartheid, and an organizer of the international solidarity presence in Palestine. He is the founder and president of the Palestinian Medical Relief Society and writes extensively for local and international audiences on civil society and democracy issues and the political situation in Palestine, as well as on health development policy in Palestine. He recently published The Ploy of the Century: Dimensions and Confrontational Strategies (Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2020).
ILAN PAPPÉ: Dear Mustafa, let us start with some historical questions that are relevant to the present. Your personal biography and that of the Arab left are intertwined in many ways and lead me to think about your recent political house, the Palestinian National Initiative, and the situation of the Palestinian left in our times. You grew up surrounded by internationalist ideas, in a family committed to struggle against national and social injustices, which explains why in a certain moment in your life you were also a member of the Palestinian People’s Party (the former communist party of Palestine), as I was in its parallel sister party inside Israel.
In our institute and with colleagues from around the world, we have revisited the failures and achievements of the Arab left in the past, and wondered about the possible role the left, and in particular the Arab and Palestinian left, can play in our times in struggles— such as the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. I would like to ask if there is still a left and does it have a role in the liberation struggle?
A follow-up question is whether the Palestinian National Initiative, or al-Mubadara, which you established together with the late Edward Said, the late Haidar Abdel-Shaf’i, and others, is part of this new left? Does it create a new language for the left? Does it create a new kind of activism, which is different from the way organizations like this behaved in the past?
Does it have a special role to play? Particularly as we know how Israeli settler colonialism is intertwined with neoliberalism, as you warned us when writing about the ways that neocapitalist states deal with the question of refugees and immigrants in this century.
MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI: Let me start by talking about whether there is a role for the left. Of course—there is no doubt about that. Can there be a future role? Absolutely. That’s the short answer, but the question about failure must be addressed from three different angles: the global context, the regional context, and then the Palestinian internal context. Globally speaking, we know that capitalism has been hugely successful and actually morphed into new forms, including neoliberalism and what I call “global colonialism.” By that, I mean that class division is happening now, not only at the level of each country, but at the global level itself. To the extent that there are “exploiting” countries and “exploited” countries. That is a very important change and it has affected the ability of many left movements to be effective, including in Palestine and the Arab world.
The second context, which is very important now in the Arab region, is the regional one. We know that there are counter-democratic and counterrevolutionary forces that are against liberation and against democratization of the region. And I would say that these are movements, these are countries, and on top of them is Israel. In my opinion, the Zionist establishment is doing everything it can to prevent Arab countries from transforming into a democratic system. They are against democratization of the Palestinian infrastructure. Add to that the reactionary Arab regimes, the effect of the so-called petrodollar and its funding of counterrevolutions—this has definitely affected the possibility of democratic and left transformations in the region.
At the same time, one has to see a new question that the failures probably are creating new opportunities, creating new spaces. But the failure here is not related to the left only. It is also related to the failure of those reactionary groups that took over in solving the economic and social problems. That combination is creating space for change, globally and locally. We see interesting developments in Chile. We see the rise of Black Lives Matter in the United States. We see a serious movement against this horrible regime in Brazil. And here in the Arab world, I encourage everyone to keep following what’s happening today in Tunisia and Sudan, which sounds like the renovation of the Arab democratic revolutions. I think the left there is already playing a very important role.
What is different about the Palestinian National Initiative and about many other new movements is that they are more flexible and less dogmatic than the previous forms of the left. That gives them the ability to be more effective. But when we talk about the Palestinian context, and that’s the third aspect, one has to look at certain factors which have affected classical left parties in Palestine, weakening and marginalizing them to a large extent.
I would say that there are three factors here. The first factor is that some of these parties were too dependent on the Soviet Union— and when the Soviet Union collapsed, they were dramatically affected. The second factor was the lack of understanding in some of these parties of the value and importance of democracy and internal democracy. But also the inability to deal with the national question—sometimes mistakes were made, and that weakened the left parties. The inability to deal with religious societies and the question of how to approach religion in this context also had a great impact.
These factors have all affected and are related to weakening some of these groups. But the most important factor in the Palestinian context for me today, and maybe this is what distinguishes the Palestinian Initiative from other left parties, is that some parties were unable to be independent—independent in their vision, independent in their program, and independent in their practice. And some are too attached to one of the two main streams in Palestinian society: Fatah and Hamas.
In the Palestinian National Initiative, we believe that you cannot really be effective unless you create an independent program, an independent vision, and an independent practice from these two parties. In doing so, one can try to represent what I call “the silent majority” in Palestinian society. That’s what we saw, for instance, during the Palestinian presidential elections in 2005—a huge power is waiting and looking for an alternative. Some left parties only have the name of the left and they are unable to create that space of independence, which makes them vulnerable to being controlled by right-wing parties, conservative parties. And the question of alliances, with whom do they ally in elections, is a very interesting and indicative one.
Is al-Mubadara different from that? I believe so. It’s trying to be different, and here the name is not as important as the substance— you can call it a democratic left tendency or an independent one. But the most important distinguishing characteristics are, first, independence from the two major streams in the Palestinian society, as I said. Second, the initiative is in opposition to the system of nepotism and clientelism that sometimes dominates political life. Third, it concentrates not only on the issue of national struggle and liberation from Israeli occupation and the system of apartheid, but also it focuses on social justice: workers’ rights, poor people’s rights, marginalized groups, women’s rights. And it also relates to youth— around 85 percent of its membership are young people and women.
But one of the most important things is the issue of democracy. There is no compromise about freedom of speech, about the separation of powers, about fighting authoritarianism internally in Palestine. And the activism here is related to struggling for internal freedom as well. Finally, I would say that this movement has had three avant-garde positions or activities that made it different. One is its practical involvement in popular resistance. Second, its involvement in the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign. Third, its emphasis that we are not fighting only to end occupation, but to end the system of apartheid and discrimination in historic Palestine.
ILAN PAPPÉ: I would like to talk about the Palestinian political reality and the Palestinian national movement in a wider context, not just in the occupied territories. Like so many of us, you were impressed by the eleven days of resistance we witnessed throughout historic Palestine in May 2021.1 Can this unity on the ground be a factor encouraging unity from above, so to speak? Quite a few activists suggested even before those events that there is a need for fundamental change in the liberation movement as a whole. Some suggested either restructuring the PLO and making it a more representative body, or even creating together a new outfit that will integrate the various Palestinian movements and orientate the struggle in the future. Something that represents not only Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Palestinian society, wherever it exists. What is your response to these initiatives? Do you think they are relevant, important, or vital? Or is now not the time to consider such initiatives, and leave the political structures more or less as they are?
MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI: What happened in May was a turning point. In the sense of the unity among Palestinians, it was a really unifying moment—between Palestinians in the occupied territories, those who live in Israel, and those who live in the diaspora. I always say that the struggle against oppression unifies us, while the struggle for authority divides us. Unfortunately, the struggle for authority in Palestine is about an authority that is totally under Israeli military occupation. So, what happened in May had an impact and will continue to have an impact. But this unity on the ground, at the grassroots level, is not yet reflected at the level above. We see an objective need, an objective reality, that requires unity among Palestinians, but at the same time we see a different line being followed.
In reality, what we see is that the Oslo process and Oslo agreement have divided the Palestinians into those who are in the occupied territories, those who are in 1948 areas, and those who are in the diaspora and felt left out. Occupation transformed into apartheid or actually ethnic cleansing, which was very well described in the Human Rights Watch report, and the B’Tselem report, and previously the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) report that was never adopted by the United Nations. All these reports have shown that the system of oppression is unifying Palestinians, because it affects all three parts at the same time. And in my opinion, and the opinion of the Palestinian Initiative, the central goal of the Palestinian liberation movement needs to change.
It cannot continue to say that our goal is to end occupation only. It has to say that our goal is to end occupation and to bring down the system of oppressive, racist apartheid in all of Palestine. I don’t see a difference between what’s happening today in the Negev, in terms of the uprising there, and what’s happening among the Palestinians in Lod, or in Burqa or Beita in the West Bank, or Jerusalem or Hebron. It’s the same struggle against the same enemy, and the same form of oppression. And that’s why today we need a new form of unity. I don’t know what this form will take, but I know that there is an objective need for a system that unifies the struggle of Palestinians in all these areas.
To achieve that, I believe four preconditions are required quickly. The first is that the Palestinian leadership must adopt an alternative program of struggle, an alternative to the Oslo approach, an alternative to this myth of the possibility of compromise. Second, there must be acceptance of the idea of participatory democracy, or unity that is based on the democratic participation of people. Third, there must be the right of Palestinians to elect their representatives. We have been denied this right. We haven’t had any elections since 2006. And the people have the right to choose their leaders, specifically for the Palestinian National Council, which is the parliament or the governing body of the PLO. We need to find forms to unify the struggle of Palestinians in a more effective way.
About the PLO: I totally support the need for a democratic restructuring of the PLO, which is the only way to bring back its very vital role. The PLO has been co-opted by the Palestinian Authority (PA). It is crippled. It has lost the ability to be influential, and that is a big challenge facing the Palestinians. But at the same time, we must balance between two things: true democratic representation of the Palestinian people in their leadership structure and sustaining the right of Palestinians to represent themselves. That’s why the PLO is important—because it is recognized as a representative of the Palestinian people internationally and at the level of the Arab world.
We all know that one of the goals of “the deal of the century” by President Trump—which was written by Netanyahu rather than Trump, in my opinion—was eliminating the right of the Palestinian people to represent themselves. And that’s what this Israeli government is trying to do. They want to discuss our issues with those countries that are normalizing relations with the Israeli occupation. And that’s why, while maintaining our right to represent ourselves by sustaining the role of the PLO is an important goal, the PLO itself must change and be democratically restructured. There are many new initiatives in Palestine. The PNI are the only movement that joined the PLO, was allowed into the PLO, or managed to enter the PLO after waiting for ten years. But there are many new movements in Palestine, and these people should be given the chance to be represented through democratic elections.
ILAN PAPPÉ: Yes, let’s move to the international arena. Because even if we know that efforts for unity and more democratic representation are successful, a lot of what happens in Palestine, and will occur in Palestine, also depends on the international community. In her excellent book, A History of False Hope, Lori Allen describes various junctures in which the international community pretended to investigate the violations of Palestinian rights, without any real intention or willingness to confront Israel and its exceptional immunity in the international community. She mentions the term “democratic listeners.” For those of us who might think that the problem was only Trump, all prior American administrations followed a very similar line. Democratic listening is a futile act of sympathy with the Palestinians by people such as the former president Barack Obama. Unfortunately, I think this will be true of Joe Biden as well.
And I thought of something you commented on when Barack Obama came to the occupied territories and stated that he came “to listen.” You reacted by saying, “We Palestinians have been listening for too long. This passivity on Obama’s part is unacceptable and dangerous.”
This leads me to the question of Israel’s exceptionalism. Have we become better in dealing with Israel’s exceptional immunity from international intervention and rebuke? And is this something you think that academic communities can contribute to in this regard? Because this exceptionalism is the shield of immunity that prevents governments in the West, and beyond, from taking any action in support and solidarity with the Palestinians.
MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI: The short answer to your question is, not yet. We haven’t yet become better. And before I explain, I would like to remind everyone that what you said is that really what we need is a new understanding of the relationship between settler colonialism and the system of apartheid with global neocapitalism. Academics have the duty of trying to explain why all the right-wingers, the extreme fascists, and the reactionaries in so many countries support Israeli policy. What is the connection? Why is Bolsonaro such a supporter of Israel? Why is Trump such a supporter of this Israeli government and its policies? Why are the racists in Hungary and Austria doing the same? Why is Israel creating alliances, even security and military alliances, with the most reactionary Arab regimes?
It’s very clear that there is a real connection with settler colonialism, which sees itself as an extension of other settler colonialisms in other places. That’s why I believe that the entry point to explaining the Palestinian problem, and to building solidarity with Palestine, should be the criticism of apartheid and an explanation of what apartheid means in Palestine—and why the system is much worse than the apartheid that prevailed in South Africa. We must identify the challenges facing us, why we cannot yet overcome this system of impunity that Israel enjoys.
There are several challenges. One is the fact that Israel continues to use and abuse the relationship of the Holocaust with Israel. Second, Israel also uses the fact that it is a base for global colonialism today. This is the reason for the role it plays vis-à-vis the Gulf, other countries in the region, and the strategic balance in the Middle East. Third, we are facing one of the most developed and the most organized lobbies in the world. Finally, it is important to emphasize that Israel is using what I call “intellectual terrorism” or “mental terrorism”—a strategy of frightening people. Anyone who struggles against Israeli occupation is described as a terrorist. If you use the most nonviolent form of resistance, you are called a violent person. If you resist occupation by speaking against it, you are described as a provocateur. And if you are supporting Palestinians, they describe you as antisemitic. And people like you, Ilan, will be described as self-hating Jews. There is a whole system that attempts to frighten people and prevent them from expressing their opinions.
Recently we have witnessed a very sharp increase in these attacks. First, the attack on BDS, which you can see in Britain, France, and the United States. There are even laws against BDS. There are also the three most dangerous instruments that are used against solidarity with Palestinians and Palestinian society: NGO Monitor, UK lawyers, and UN Watch. These three instruments are mobilized specifically to attack Palestinian civil society.
And why are they attacking the most developed civil society in the Arab world? Because they want to deprive Palestinians of the role that civil society organizations play in supporting the steadfastness of the Palestinian people. Second, to prevent their role in exposing the human rights violations that Israel commits. And third, to prevent civil society organizations from playing a very important role in trying to introduce democracy in Palestine. In that sense, what we witness here is a very dangerous effort to dehumanize the Palestinian struggle.
Of course, there are successes—I admire actions by people like Susan Sarandon and Emma Watson, who broke the wall of fear. And the role you play, Ilan, along with Noam Chomsky, Daniel Barenboim, and others. We also see a change in the Democratic Party in the United States, especially among young people. I do believe that academics have a role to play here.
But there are two very important conditions if we want to succeed. The first is not to be defensive, to take the initiative. If we are defensive, we will always lose the fight. And second, to organize. The more we can organize to counter these lobbies, the more we can succeed in bringing down Israel’s impunity.
ILAN PAPPÉ: You mentioned what’s going on today in the Negev. I don’t think many people outside historic Palestine know about it, because I haven’t seen any reports in Western media about how the Palestinians of the south have taken action against an insidious Israeli plan to plant European pine tree forests in the desert. For some reason, Israelis feel intimidated by the desert and they want to turn it into a European forest. But of course, the main objective of that forestation project is to try to squeeze the Palestinians in the south into an enclave that would prevent them from developing their economy, social cohesion, and national aspiration.
This brings me to the question of decolonization that you’ve already touched upon. One of the important networks supporting this series is the Exeter Decolonizing Network, which indeed sees colonization as prevailing in many parts in the world, including the West. We have moved quite far with our deliberations on the question of decolonization in our times. It is clear that decolonization is a relevant process for our century and for all our societies, and particularly for Palestine. What I really like about your work, Mustafa, is its clarity; you unpack clearly what decolonization means when talking about the liberation of Palestine. Before talking about the possible endgame of this process, namely how we should imagine a decolonized historic Palestine, I would like to go back to the modes of Palestinian resistance. Some of them you mentioned, like BDS and steadfastness, or sumud—but there is also popular resistance on the ground.
We saw it in the Great March of Return in Gaza and we see it now in the Naqab, which succeeded at least temporarily in stopping the forestation project.2 And we see it in East Jerusalem where we were less successful against the ethnic cleansing that is taking place. Is something missing in this resistance on the ground that people should know and understand? Because the Israelis also like to convey the message of Palestinians’ passivity, of acceptance or resignation, and therefore claim there’s no need for any dramatic change in the status quo. But those of us who are on the ground know that the resistance of individuals and collectives is still happening. Can you see something like a third uprising, a third intifada, being part of that resistance in the future?
MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI: I do see that, yes. I don’t know when and I don’t know exactly which form it will take, but since 2015 we’ve been moving in that direction. Specifically, since the people of Palestine are almost 100 percent convinced that the Oslo path has failed, that the Palestinian Authority has failed, that this reliance on the compromise with Israel is not working, they are seeking ways to struggle back. And I believe that many of the new forms have been used before. This popular resistance is the new form of struggle in Palestine, which does not negate the right of Palestinians to use all other forms of resistance, as long as they respect international law.
Palestinians in Gaza frequently use military struggle to defend themselves, to deter Israeli aggression. That is well known. But the most popular and effective form of resistance is what we’ve been advocating: popular resistance. As we invent and use new forms, we are in a dynamic process—because the establishment constantly tries to co-opt and neutralize these forms, to make them an official ministry or a governmental body. But it is not working. I want people to understand that this is a dynamic process—it’s not just a new form that you discover and use. You first struggle on the ground to promote these forms.
I would add to popular resistance the issue of steadfastness. In the ’70s and ’80s, this was the main goal: how to help people remain steadfast against occupation. This is becoming even more important today. Because it is the main instrument to prevent ethnic cleansing in many areas, especially in Area C, which represents 62 percent of the West Bank. So many communities like Sheikh Jarrah, Khan al-Ahmar, and the Negev in the south of historic Palestine are being subjected to ethnic cleansing. BDS is another very important form of resistance. It translates solidarity with Palestinians into material power—into an economic effect that impacts occupation. It also provides Palestinians in the diaspora with an effective form of participating in the struggle of their people.
Popular resistance, or nonviolent resistance, is not passive resistance. On the contrary, it will become the most important form of struggle against apartheid. Our goal in the struggle is to change the balance of power, to fix the severe disparity between Palestinians and the Israeli establishment. We speak about six pillars of struggle as a strategy: popular resistance; BDS; steadfastness; integrating the struggle between Palestinians in the occupied territories, in 1948 areas, and in the diaspora; and the creation of a unified democratic leadership. We need that desperately as a way to achieve national unity. Finally, the sixth pillar is the penetration of the circles of our opponents and working with different groups to mobilize solidarity with the Palestinian cause.
ILAN PAPPÉ: You defined your and the PNI’s vision for the future as including, among other aspirations, the following: “Bringing an end to the system of apartheid in all parts of historic Palestine.” Does this mean the establishment of a single democratic state? Is such a project plausible? More generally, how do you imagine a decolonized Palestine, if all the struggles you describe would be successful, if we succeed in galvanizing the international community, and if we can change the balance of power? Is this something that is part of your vision or are you strategically focusing on a very near future, rather than a more distant one?
MUSTAFA BARGHOUTI: This is a very good question. I believe that bringing down the system of apartheid in all parts of historic Palestine could mean one democratic state, yes. Theoretically, there is no problem with that. Practically, we need to be careful about not engaging on this level at this time and creating a new division between Palestinians—between those who want an independent Palestinian state and those who favor one democratic state. So while I say that one democratic state, which was the original Palestinian goal, would be the right concept, our new program concentrates on ending the system of apartheid in all of Palestine, including ethnic cleansing and occupation. But also exercising the right of Palestinians of self-determination. The right of self-determination means that I am not the one who will decide the form that Palestinians will choose, but it’s all of us as Palestinians.
Let me also say here that, logically speaking, one democratic state is the right approach. But there will never be one democratic state, or an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, without bringing down apartheid. We often hear counterarguments from people who say that Israel will never accept a one-state solution. My response to them is usually: Does Israel accept a two-state solution anyhow? Of course not. They do not accept a two-state solution or a one-state solution. We need to understand the reality that we live in today. And the reality is that we already live in one state, but with a system of apartheid. That’s what I wish every diplomat in this world would understand, especially diplomats in Europe. We already live in one apartheid state. That is the reality of today.
And that is why bringing down apartheid is the most important issue. It is one apartheid state with a process of gradual, continuous annexation of the West Bank, piece by piece. We want to break down apartheid, and I don’t care if this Israeli establishment accepts or does not accept that. I would ask the question, when did liberation movements decide their goal based on what their colonizers would accept? Is that what Algeria did when it struggled for independence? Is that what South Africans did when they struggled against apartheid? Is that what Vietnam did when it struggled for its freedom? No. And in my opinion, the sin of the PLO leadership at the time was accepting to make its goal a negotiated agreement.
A negotiated solution meant that the international community gave Israel the right to veto the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and ending the occupation. Otherwise, why would all these European countries that speak about a two-state solution still abstain from recognizing the Palestinian state while they recognize Israel?
I would also warn against one specific thing, which is that we need to be very careful with those who say that there is no possibility for a two-state solution without saying, “What is the alternative?” These people are practically supporters of the Israeli establishment and the status quo—of keeping the system of apartheid. We need to differentiate this camp from the camp that you represent, or the camp that I represent, in struggling against apartheid. It is our duty to explain to our friends that the status quo cannot be maintained. I listen to diplomats who support two-state solutions, but they keep saying that we need to stabilize the situation. Their goal as diplomats is to stabilize the status quo. My goal is to destabilize the status quo, and it should be our goal to destabilize the status quo and change it. Because that’s the only way to get to freedom and to decolonize this horrible system.