A n early hint that something had gone terribly awry came in the Associated Press dispatch from Panama at 6:30 p.m., September 14, 1964. It quoted “a Cuban exile source” as saying that antiCastro commandos had attacked a Cuban flag vessel the previous night in the Caribbean, then added ominously: “There was speculation . . . the commandos may have struck a Spanish freighter.” 1
Artime’s MRR raiders, aboard two power launches, had been lying in wait off Cuba’s northeast coast for the Sierra Maestra , one of Cuba’s largest merchant ships. Suddenly, the night of September 13, they opened fire, thinking they had it in their sights. Instead of the Sierra Maestra departing Cuba laden with sugar, they hit the Sierra Aranzazu, a 270-foot Spanish freighter bound for Havana with a cargo of cork, cognac, textiles, toys, and garlic. The attack set off a series of explosions and fires aboard the ship, killing the captain, first mate, and chief engineer. Eight crewmen were injured. 2 The Sierra Maestra had passed through the Panama Canal the previous week, bound for China with ten thousand bags of sugar. “It was a mistake, a big mistake,” said Rafael Quintero, Artime’s deputy. “I talked to the crew that did the operation. They all saw Sierra Maestra and actually the Sierra Maestra was supposed to be around that area. ... It was at night, and people were anxious to see what they wanted to see. They saw the people with the berets.” 3
The incident set off an even bigger diplomatic explosion in Washington, one that dragged on for months, forcing Artime to suspend activity until after the November presidential elections in the United States. By this time, too, Artime’s group was really the only force Washington had left in terms of serious covert action against Cuba. Ray’s operation had proven to be more illusory than real, and RECE was still struggling to find financing and other support. Even so, it was only a matter of time before Artime’s U.S. funding would be curtailed. The cutoff was delayed long enough, however, for Artime’s troops to be further tainted by the public
eruption of several scandals related to the Central American camps, and for the CIA secretly to establish contact between Rolando Cubela—a longtime, but temperamental, star “asset” inside Cuba—and Artime’s group. This was a busy and controversial six months.
In the midst of the frenzy, Oliva and Ernesto Freyre toured Central America in an ongoing effort to drum up support for RECE, the only other exile group still considered to have some sympathy and possible potential. An intelligence cable, with information attributed to a “Cuban exile who has high-level political contacts in Central America,” reported that the two RECE officials had visited Panama, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica in early October. In Panama they reportedly asked President Marco Robles for “airstrips for jet training,” but Robles put them off. In Nicaragua an interview was arranged with Luis Somoza but there was no indication that support was forthcoming. The cable advised that they had also met with Artime’s personal secretary but Artime himself was unavailable. And in Costa Rica “they saw no one with any authority.” 4
Washington had, in any event, bigger problems to confront. The attack on the Sierra Aranzazu immediately put the bureaucrats in damage control mode. Castro and, more importantly, the Spaniards were angry. Costa Rica and Nicaragua were nervous. The Soviets were annoyed. Even the Dominicans became entangled with the problem, as the Spaniards suspected the raid was launched from Dominican territory. Within hours after the attack became known, amid speculation that Cuban exiles were involved, White House aide Gordon Chase sent a memo to his boss, McGeorge Bundy, the president’s national security assistant. “It seems clear . . . Cuban exiles attacked the Spanish ship. . . . This is not a deep dark secret, although it will probably be tough for anybody to prove,” said Chase. He added that the State Department’s “press position will probably be a factual accounting indicating our helpfulness in the search and rescue operation and the fact that we really don’t know the full story on exactly who made the attack. Naturally we deplore this sort of attack on the high seas.” 5
Others quickly got into the act, among them Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits. The Secret Continental Anti-Communist Organization (OSAAA), a previously unknown exile group, surfaced for the first—and last—time to claim responsibility for the raid, promising that all ships trading with Cuba, no matter which flag they were under, would be subject to attack. Artime’s MRR said it was not involved and that accusations against it were an attempt to discredit the organization. Coman
dos L, another activist exile group that had attacked a British freighter in 1962 and a Russian freighter in 1963, said it “didn’t exclude the possibility” of carrying out similar actions in the future “for the cause of Cuban Liberation.” Manolo Ray suggested Castro might have engineered the attack to discredit his foes. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, responding to Spanish protests and Cuban accusations, said the “mystery” raiders did not come from the United States. Spain said it considered the United States morally responsible. Castro, not unexpectedly, charged that the attackers were Cuban counterrevolutionaries “equipped, paid and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency.” 6
Simultaneously with the Sierra Aranzazu incident, Gen. Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza, Nicaragua’s strongman as head of the country’s National Guard and sole military force, was scheduled to be at Baltimore’s Friendship Airport as part of a trip to the United States. His old friend, Col. J. C. King, still head of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, arranged to meet him at the airport. A two-page script regarding Artime was prepared for King’s conversation with Somoza. The script started with the admission “that we have reason to believe that Artime may have been involved in the shocking business of the Spanish ship.” It expressed concern that Artime’s involvement would become public and “a serious embarrassment” for Nicaragua, but the United States would understand if Somoza decided to close Artime’s bases there. It cautioned Somoza not to tell Artime about “our conversation” because his reaction “could be seriously disadvantageous to us and to Nicaragua.” If Somoza were to ask about further U.S. support for Artime, King’s reply would be “if we were giving support to Artime,” King would be “personally sure that we would seriously consider terminating it, if Artime’s involvement in the Spanish ship incident became public.” The suggested script concluded by saying “the above approach to Somoza and our own approach to Artime are based on three factors: 1) we want to do what we can to avoid public involvement of Artime with the Spanish ship incident; 2) we intend at an appropriate time to dissolve our relationship with Artime; but 3) we do not want to precipitate any messy situation with him in the next few weeks.” 7 Among other considerations, U.S. presidential elections were only weeks away.
In October the Soviets expressed their concern. Llewellyn Thompson, the State Department’s ambassador-at-large, circulated a memo on October 6 advising that Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had come “to talk to me entirely on a personal basis about Cuba.” More specifically, he
wanted to talk about the raids and the “training of emigrant groups in Central America and elsewhere, and some rumors that some Central American countries might take some forceful action before the end of the year. In the course of the conversation, he mentioned the Artime group and another exile leader whose name he thought was Olivo [sic].” Thompson responded that the United States opposed hit-and-run raids and noted “how embarrassing it was to us that a Spanish ship had been attacked.” Thompson also said he “had not heard the rumor of a Central American supported action and did not think it to be true.” Dobrynin said he didn’t see how a Spanish ship could be attacked with all the air and sea power the United States had in the area. Thompson “pointed out that we could scarcely get into position of escorting ships to Cuba in view of our overall policy.” Dobrynin then said the Soviet Union had been “relatively quiet about the activities directed against Cuba” because it didn’t want to “inject the issue into the American political campaign.” 8
The Dominicans were the next to complain. A cable from U.S. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett in Santo Domingo said the country’s top officials had told him “they have recently had a very hard-nosed approach from the Spanish Ambassador, who gave it to them hot and heavy with respect Sept 13 attack on Spanish vessel ‘Sierra Aranzazu’ and possibility attackers may have been based on Dom territory.” Bennett said the Dominican government had asked for the most complete report possible on the incident to help them in replying to the Spaniards. In conclusion Bennett said he was in favor of providing them information “as Department believes appropriate. Aside from being cooperative with a friendly govt., it could be useful in opening Dominican eyes to type of problems they may run into through involvement in Cuban adventurism and might encourage them to take more sober attitude with respect activities Cuban exiles in Dom. territory.” 9
lohn Crimmins, the coordinator for Cuban affairs, was about to finish an “investigation” of the Sierra Aranzazu incident and said the Spaniards had asked for an evaluation of the various reports that had been furnished them. Gordon Chase, in a November 10 memo to Bundy, noted that the “general pitch he [Crimmins] will probably use is to take into account such facts as (a) that we want to give the Spanish the minimum necessary to keep them from thinking that we are trying to deceive them and (b) that the Spanish, themselves, probably evaluate Artime as the prime suspect.” Among the points Chase said Crimmins might make to the Spaniards were: it couldn’t be ruled out that the Cubans themselves did it, but
it was more probably the exiles; there are a number of exile groups that have the capability; the most likely suspect is Artime; and (if pressed) by a process of elimination, the attack seems to have come from the Dominican Republic. 10
On November 21 Crimmins circulated a memo on the investigation into the Sierra Aranzazu affair. “The weight of the evidence has inevitably (but not conclusively) fallen on Artime’s MRR,” Crimmins wrote, in the heavily censored declassified document. He cited six specific conclusions, which he recommended be passed on to the Spaniards in an informal, secret memorandum. They were:
1. Because conclusive proof is lacking, we cannot completely eliminate the hypothesis that the attack was made by the Cuban Government, either through error or as a provocation.
2. We are almost certain, however, that the attack was carried out by a Cuban exile group.
3. We estimate that several exile groups probably had, alone or in combination, a technical and organizational capability to carry out such an attack.
4. These include the Artime group (the MRR), the Menoyo group (SNFEAlpha 66-MRP), the Ray group (the JURE), and the student group (DRE).
5. Of these groups, we estimate that the most probable suspect is the MRR, but we have not been able to establish this firmly.
6. We are certain that US territory was in no way involved in the attack. 11
As his rationale for thinking the MRR was the most likely suspect, Crimmins said “the trend of the reporting [FBI and CIA] is certainly in that direction. So far as we can determine, the MRR has the best— although not the only—capability. The MRR had been more active than the other possibilities in recent months [Pilon, Cabo Cruz]. There were strong rumors immediately after the attack that the MRR was going to make an announcement, a sequence which was in the pattern of the Pilon and Cabo Cruz incidents.” 12
Two developments about this time provided a much welcome distraction from the Sierra Aranzazu, but created new problems of their own. For Artime the positive development, one that would give him a reprieve, was buried in a November 5 memorandum from the CIA to the 303 Committee on the future of his operation. The memo alerted the highlevel White House group that Artime had established a “potentially sig
nificant” contact the previous month with Rolando Cubela’s dissident group inside Cuba. As a result, the agency suggested a delay on any decision to cut off Artime’s support “until we have the opportunity to evaluate potential of the internal group.” 13
The more immediate, more negative, and much more visible problem for Artime was the rash of news stories beginning to appear about the same time, primarily in the Miami Herald , focusing on scandals in his Central America camps. “Exiles Target of Probe by Costa Rica,” proclaimed a November 21, 1964, page-one headline. Datelined San Jose, Costa Rica, the story reported: “President Francisco Orlich had confirmed authorities began an extensive probe after discovery of about $50,000 worth of contraband whisky [sic]. According to reports here and in neighboring Panama, Cuban exiles associated with the anti-Castro organization called Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR) are linked with the whisky and possibly other contraband shipments filtering into the country.” Artime, who had just returned to Miami from Costa Rica when the story appeared, issued a statement denying “any smuggling activities have been carried out by any member of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery. It is an attempt by the Communists to smear me.”
Unfortunately for Artime, the Herald article was only the beginning. Continuing news coverage not only focused on alleged scandals but also tore away the thin veneer of secrecy that still surrounded the training camps in Costa Rica. Another story reported, “no other exile organization is so well financed and so well equipped as Artime’s. His forces, sporting a four-ship navy and free movement in Central America, have had commando capability for approximately one year. Their score: destruction of one sugar warehouse containing 70,000 sacks of sugar May 13 and an attack, extent of damage unconfirmed, on a radar station August 30.” 14 That was followed by a headline proclaiming “MRR Says Exile Shot at Camp,” over a story which said Artime’s MRR acknowledged that a “missing Cuban refugee father of two was shot to death” in one of its Central American training camps. “The strange death of Roberto Trujillo Rodriguez, kept secret four months, is being investigated to determine whether the shooting was an accident or a criminal act, MRR officials said.” 15
The almost daily drumbeat of doom kept up for the rest of December. “Costa Rican Boots Anti-Fidel Camps,” declared a December 5 headline. The story began: “President Francisco J. Orlich has ordered the elimination of military training camps—including any manned by Cuban
exiles—in the northeastern area of Costa Rica. The order did not specify Cuban exile camps, but was a blanket instruction to dismantle all such camps discovered by security police.” 16 The order appeared to be more bark than bite, a move responding to the politically embarrassing contraband scandal that erupted a few weeks earlier. It was clear that the camps were being used as a cover for smuggling, but no solid evidence ever emerged linking the MRR to the contraband. And the airstrip the Artime organization used was on property owned by President Orlich’s brother. “We were both using the same strip,” said Quintero. “We were using it for our program and he was using it for his own program.” 17 Nor did the camps shut down following Orlich’s order. They did not close for another three months, and then only because of a cutoff of U.S. financing. Still, the stories continued. A five-part series written by A1 Burt of the Miami Herald in mid-December contained great detail about the camps’ origins and operations. Most of the information was close to the mark, although off on some specific details, such as Bobby Kennedy’s key role. 18 Coupled with the sinking of the Sierra Aranzazu , the negative publicity generated by the Artime operation at the end of 1964 most likely would have prompted Washington to suspend funding much earlier than it finally did had it not been for AMLASH, the CIA’s code name for the Cubela caper.
The Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE) of which Cubela was the second-ranking leader, and Castro’s 26th of luly Movement had been rivals in the guerrilla campaign against Batista. Cubela had become close to Castro since the triumph of the revolution and at the time of the Artime contact he was the only serious prospect the CIA had to ignite a coup attempt. The agency made its first contact with the temperamental Cubela when he visited Mexico City in March 1961 for a leftist-sponsored Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. A longtime friend of Cubela’s had arranged a meeting for him with an officer in the Mexico City CIA station to sound out his views on the situation in Cuba. The meeting was inconclusive but led to other meetings out of which grew operation AMLASH. Intermittent contact was maintained from early 1961 until September 1963, with little of substance emerging other than talk of Cubela’s defection. Several meetings were held in Helsinki during midsummer 1962 as Cubela attended a conference in Finland. There “the original objective of defecting Cubela was quickly changed to recruiting him in place.” An agent’s report of the first meeting in Helsinki read, “Cubela stated many times during the course of this and subsequent meetings that he was only interested in involving
himself in a plan of significant action, and which was truly designed to achieve rapidly his desire to help Cuba.” 19
Nestor Sanchez became Cubela’s CIA case officer in 1963, just as Artime’s autonomous operation was getting organized. According to Sanchez, Desmond FitzGerald, in charge of the agency’s Special Affairs Staff, had divided Cuba responsibility between “internal” and “external” operations. Sanchez was put in charge of the internal, which meant developing activities inside Cuba, “essentially Cubela.” Henry Heckscher had the external side, “essentially Artime.” The agency, said Sanchez, was not allowed to make any “tactical decisions,” only provide financing. “Bobby Kennedy was running everybody he could get his hands on,” remembered Sanchez. “It was damned messy. The Kennedys didn’t trust anybody, especially the CIA and the Pentagon. The Kennedys thought anything the agency was associated with smelled.” 20
By the time Sanchez became Cubela’s case officer AMLASH was getting more attention. Using an assumed name, Sanchez first met Cubela in September 1963 at the Pan American Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Another meeting took place the next month in Paris. Cubela insisted upon “meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of U.S. moral support for any activity Cubela undertook in Cuba.” FitzGerald had a planned October 29 visit to Paris for other business and agreed to meet with Cubela “as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy,” although nobody told Kennedy about the meeting. 21
Helms, FitzGerald’s boss as the head of clandestine services, speculated before the Church Committee that the reason they had not consulted the attorney general was because “this was so central to the whole theme of what we had been trying to do .. . [find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to replace Castro]. This is obviously what we had been pushing, what everybody had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is in that context that I would have made some remark like this.” Helms said he told FitzGerald to “go ahead and say that from the standpoint of political support, the United States government will be behind you if you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings. This had only to do with the political action part of it.” 22
FitzGerald, using an alias, met with Cubela in Paris on October 29. Sanchez acted as interpreter. In a memorandum for the record of the meeting, FitzGerald said he told Cubela that the United States would help “any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and assumes sufficient control” to request U.S.
assistance. Added comment in the CIA inspector general’s report on assassination plots and attributed to those involved, but not part of the written record, said Cubela “spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon,” specifically a “high-powered rifle with a telescopic sight . . . that could be used to kill Castro from a distance.” FitzGerald responded that the “U.S. simply does not do such things.” Cubela persisted, through intermediaries, in his demand for the high-powered rifle, but finally said he would settle for some other “technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life.” That’s when the poison pen device was concocted, using Black Leaf 40, a nicotine sulphate, a “deadly poison that can be administered orally, by injection or by absorption through the skin.” Sanchez returned to Paris on November 22 to deliver the pen/syringe device to Cubela and tell him how it worked. 23 In testimony before the Church Committee, Sanchez said Cubela “did not think much of the device,” but Sanchez could not remember whether he took it with him or threw it away. There was conflicting testimony on whether the device was to be used in an assassination attempt against Castro or for Cubela’s own protection. 24 Sanchez also described for the committee the context in which Cubela raised the topic of assassination: “You also must recognize that AM/LASH was a rather temperamental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said something like this [assassination] in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath.” 25
In March and June 1964 the JMWAVE station in Miami dispatched two separate arms caches to Cuba for Cubela as part of the ongoing AMTRUNK operation, which was targeted at military officials. In May Cubela let it be known he wanted a silencer for a Belgian FAT submachine gun as soon as possible. But it first had to be modified and there wasn’t time to do it for the June cache. Cubela was subsequently notified that it was not feasible to make a silencer for a FAL. By late 1964 Cubela was increasingly insistent that assassination was a necessary first step in a coup. In a memorandum, Sanchez suggested Cubela be put in touch with Artime. The memo said: “AM/LASH was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the ‘first step’ of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-l [Artime] could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request.” 26
The CIA’s seven-page November 5 memo to the 303 Committee is essentially a review of the Artime operation until that time and the agency recommendations for the operation, concluding with the recommendation to continue it in conjunction with Cubela. Following the Sierra Aranzazu incident, Artime suspended operations until after President Johnson’s victory in the November presidential election. Despite news reports to the contrary, the agency said Artime had “maintained close contact and good relations” with top officials in both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, “where he continues to receive their complete cooperation and support.” Enrique Peralta, Guatemala’s military president, had invited him to a meeting. “President Robles of Panama has promised Artime his full cooperation and any support he may need,” and “President Reid of the Dominican Republic provided Artime a forward operating base in his country. Artime is in the process of surveying the base site.” The memo then got to the crux of the matter.
“As a result of the publicity Artime received over the past year for his anti-Castro activity and the fact that at present he is considered the strongest of the active Cuban exile groups, an internal dissident group established contact with him and proposed joining forces,” the CIA reported. “An emissary from the internal dissident group met with one of Artime’s representatives in Europe in early October 1964 and proposed a ‘summit’ meeting between Artime and their ‘top guy’ as soon as the latter can travel to Europe, probably between 15 and 30 November 1964.”
The CIA memo reported that Artime and his aides had come to the conclusion that the internal dissidents included at least a half-dozen prominent revolutionary figures, among them Efigenio Ameijeiras, Juan Almeida, and Faustino Perez, all of whom were with Castro aboard the Granma when it sailed from Mexico to Cuba in late 1956 to begin the guerrilla campaign against Batista. “Reports from independent sources confirm the discontent of this particular group,” the memo reported. “In late 1963 an Agency representative had several meetings with a Cuban officer [Cubela] closely associated with this group who reported their anti-regime feelings and plans for a coup against Castro with the support of this group. It is known that the emissary who established contact with Artime’s representative is a confidant of this officer.” 27
In urging continued support for Artime in light of the Cubela connection, the CIA argued:
Whereas the incident of the Sierra Aranzazu raised serious doubts about
the desirability of continued support to Artime, the contact of Artime by a
potentially significant internal dissident group introduces an entirely new dimension to the problem. It is believed that within sixty to ninety days a reasonable evaluation of the potential and plans of the internal group can be made. Therefore, it appears desirable to defer any final decision on support (if any) to Artime until we have the opportunity to evaluate the potential of the internal group. It is assumed that the internal group established contact with Artime because of their belief that his paramilitary capability is based on close relations with the United States. Hence, if Artime is to maintain his attractiveness and continue developing this contact, it is necessary for Artime to maintain a good facade in terms of his paramilitary capability. While we feel it is desirable to give Artime every opportunity to develop an operation with the internal group, we believe the groundwork should be laid for a phase out of support to the paramilitary aspect of the program. Artime will be unhappy with any decision to terminate support regardless of how such a decision is implemented, but we believe a negotiated phase out dovetailed with support to develop the internal operation will reduce the number of problems and best protect the deniability of United States complicity in the operation, provided Artime cooperates.
It recommended:
a. Artime concentrate on developing the internal operation, maintaining his paramilitary posture to the degree necessary to preserve his attractiveness to the internal group.
b. Support to Artime at approximately the present level be continued for the next sixty to ninety days in order to give Artime an opportunity to develop an operation with the dissident internal group which has sought him out.
c. Should it be considered vital in order to maintain his attractiveness to the internal group and hold his own group together, permit Artime to conduct one raid and plan but not execute at least one more during this period.
The November 5 memo gave no indication how contact between Artime and Cubela might have been contrived to put them together “in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been made by the CIA.” There also is a discrepancy as to when the initial contact with the Artime group was made. The Church Committee report said “documents in the AM/LASH file establish that in early 1965, the CIA put AM/ LASH in contact with B-l [Artime], the leader of an anti-Castro group.”
The November 5 memo said the contact was made in October 1964. A chronology in the CIA inspector general’s 1967 report on assassination plots, said that Artime “received information through Madrid” on August 30, 1964, “that a group of dissident members of the Castro regime desired to establish direct contact” with him. On October 7, 1964, “an Artime associate [Quintero] went to France for a meeting with an intermediary from the dissident group.”
Then, on November 13, the CIA chronology cites a contact report of a meeting in Washington with Artime: “Artime agreed to talk to AMLASH1 [Cubela] if it turns out that he is the contact man for the dissident group. Artime thinks that if AMLASH-1 is the chief of the dissident group we can all forget about the operation.” Three weeks later, on December 4, a request was prepared “for $6,500 as an extraordinary budget expenditure for the travel of Artime for maintaining contact with the internal dissident group’s representative in Europe during November and December 1964. There is no direct indication in the file that the request was approved, but indirect evidence indicates that it was. Artime did travel to Europe and maintained the contacts.”
Sanchez, the CIA’s AMLASH case officer, met Cubela again in Paris on December 6-7. On December 10 he reported in a memo: “Artime does not know and we do not plan to tell him that we are in direct contact with Cubela [one and one-half lines censored; presumably referring to assassination/coup plot]. . . . Cubela was told and fully understands that U.S. Government cannot become involved to any degree in the ‘first step’ of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where Artime could fit in nicely in giving any support Cubela would request.” A parenthetical note follows with comment from the investigators, which says: “Sanchez explained to us that what had happened was that SAS [CIA’s Special Affairs Staff] contrived to put Artime and Cubela together in such a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was that Artime needed a man inside and Cubela wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, Artime might get his man inside and Cubela might get his silenced weapon—from Artime. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for Artime, and did not do so.” 28
Washington obviously considered an internal coup the last-best hope it had of unseating Castro; so much so that by year’s end representatives of the CIA, Defense, and State had prepared “A Contingency Plan for a
Coup in Cuba” and what the U.S. response would be. They sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A December 30, 1964, cover letter signed by Cyrus Vance noted, “Bundy has been advised . . . and requested to inform the President of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion.” As foreseen in the plan, the U.S. response would vary depending on whether it had “up to forty-eight hours” advance notice of the coup. If so, it would then send in a “special team” to make a decision on whether to provide support; otherwise “a longer time would be required.” The plan laid out the criteria that had to be met for U.S. support:
(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.
(2) Be prepared to establish a provisional government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for covert U.S. action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).
(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
(4) Seize and hold significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the United States plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the provisional government.
The contingency plan emphasized, “The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the reintroduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation which could be used as a pretext for such action.” 29
ft
Quintero, the MRR representative who made the initial contact with the internal dissidents and was the first to meet with Cubela, said the link began with Alberto Blanco, one of the dissidents on the Cuban embassy staff in Madrid. Quintero said he went to Mallorca to talk with a ship captain about hijacking a passenger liner as Portuguese rebels had done three years earlier with the Santa Maria off the coast of Brazil. When he got back to Madrid from Mallorca, “Cuco” Leon, a former Cuban legislator who was friendly with Somoza, told him “there’s a bigger thing here than that... a big comandante in Cuba, they’re planning a plot against Cuba.” The hijacking plan was canceled “in order not to get any kind of publicity that could hurt the operation with Cubela.” The August 30 meeting with Blanco was arranged for Paris, beginning the MRR relationship with the Cubela dissidents.
Quintero said he had a second meeting in December in Rome with Cubela himself to “finalize the military plan.” Artime held his first meeting with Cubela in Madrid on December 27, 1964. Cubela and Artime met a second time in Madrid on December 30, 1964. That, said Quintero, is “when everything was set up. All this was told to our CIA contacts in our monthly meeting; all that we were doing, because even if we didn’t have to get approval, we were supposed to tell them what we were doing because we were spending money and they wanted to know what we were doing with it.” One reason they decided to go ahead with Cubela, said Quintero, was that the MRR objective was the overthrow of Castro “and we knew at a given moment that the commando operations, infiltration and maritime operations were not going to overthrow the government. So we have to go for the king, and basically the king here was the elimination of Castro. That’s when we came up with the Cubela operation.” 30
The CIA chronology records both December meetings between Artime and Cubela. At the second meeting “Cubela told Artime that he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. Artime agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer. If Artime obtained a silencer for a FAL, Cubela would personally carry it back to Cuba with him. If Artime had to settle for some other type of silenced rifle, he would cache it in Cuba for Cubela.” 31 Quintero said the MRR provided the silencer by making it themselves and then sending it to Europe for Cubela to retrieve. 32
According to Quintero, the plot finally agreed on was a combined assassination-coup attempt at Varadero, the beach resort on Cuba’s north coast, where the annual 26th of July ceremonies were scheduled in 1965. “All the Cabinet was going to be there, and Fidel. That’s how the idea came up. Fidel was going to make his speech. At the time he was giving his speech, Cubela was supposed to kill him with the rifle.” Artime and several dozen of his commandos would land simultaneously, cutting off the road and taking the Cabinet ministers hostage. “We were supposed to take over Varadero and the whole thing would start there and then the people from the Central Army Command could rise up against the government,” said Quintero. Artime even had an inventor friend in Miami “building some small helicopters that were to be used in the operation,” according to Quintero.
Varadero was the key location for two reasons: It had only one road to and from the mainland that could be taken over by a few people and
Calixto Garcia, commander of Cuba’s Central Army, which included Varadero, was said to be a member of the internal dissident group. “Calixto Garcia was for us the most important guy in this whole group because he had command of troops,” said Quintero. “And that’s when the idea of the Varadero operation came up because he was in Matanzas and in charge of Varadero, so he could support us in this coup d’etat or whatever you want to call it.” An element of the plot involved the infiltration of Quintero into Cuba before it was executed. “He [Cubela] was going to kill Castro but the condition he made was that somebody from outside had to be with him. Artime said I was going to be the person. Then we got him the silencer.” Tentative details of the plot and the composition of a provisional government were worked out at the December 30 meeting in Madrid between Artime and Cubela. “As a matter of fact, when they had this meeting all the names came up to the table. They talked about making some kind of government and there were three persons. Along with Cubela, the other ones were going to be Artime and the other person would have to come from one of the names on the table,” said Quintero. 33
A January 6, 1965, CIA memorandum to the 303 Committee, recorded the following account of the December 30 meeting between Artime and Cubela:
During a six-hour meeting, Cubela stated that three groups are involved in a coup against Fidel Castro and plan to use troops to seize power. The three groups are: One from the Directorio Revolutionario (DR), led by Cubela himself; one from the 26 July Movement led by Efigenio Ameijeiras Delgado, Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces for Special Affairs; and another separate 26 th of July Movement group headed by Cmdte. Guillermo Garcia Frias, Commander of the Western Army. (The Western Army, whose area includes Havana, has approximately half the active strength of the entire Cuban Army.) The loyalty of this army to Garcia is not presently known. . . .
Artime and Cubela reached tentative agreement on cooperation in the execution of a coup against the top leadership of the Castro regime and the creation of a junta to replace Fidel Castro. Cubela stated he would not oppose Artime as president of the junta. In addition, Artime’s group . . . would be allowed two other representatives in the junta, provided Artime’s selections were made from prisoners presently interned on the Isle of Pines. The dissident group would be given representation in the junta equal to Artime’s. The major role to be allotted to the MRR in the junta is due to the dissidents’ belief that Artime and the MRR are favorably
regarded by the United States; by according them a major role the dissidents, even though tarnished by collaboration with Castro, hope to gain United States support. . . .
One of the points emphasized by Cubela was the need for more frequent commando raids in order to raise the morale and spirit of resistance of the people inside Cuba. He expressed the view that these raids reassure the people inside Cuba that active resistance to Castro continues. . . . Artime and Cubela made arrangements to meet once again at the end of January, before Cubela returns to Havana, in order to work out final details, including timing. . . .
Despite the rather optimistic view of the above reported discussions, we cannot forecast the chances of success since the operation is primarily dependent upon the resoluteness of a few key officers and the loyalty of their officers and men at the critical time.
The January 6 CIA memo again argued for continued support of Artime, citing as reasons:
While the operation has been relatively secure as long as our subsidies allowed Artime to keep full control of his group, it is doubtful the same degree of security can be maintained once subsidies are terminated. All agencies should be prepared, therefore, for a number of security breaches involving press stories regarding covert United States support to the MRR_
The internal dissidents appear to count heavily on Artime’s involvement with them as a guarantee of United States benevolence once they seize power. If publicity is given to the discontinuance of our covert relationship with Artime, it is possible that the dissidents will drop, or at least delay, their plans to upset the Castro regime. . . .
There are a number of technical problems involved in terminating the Artime relationship. Many of these have to do with contractual obligations which will continue after the termination and which CIA will have to continue to meet for a limited period of time. Sufficient funds are available to handle these problems.
The memo concluded by recommending that Artime’s funding be continued until the end of February 1965, nearly two more months. 34
The CIA’s relationship with Artime remained a rocky one, however. The memo had begun by citing his “reluctantly acquiescing” to a request to cancel a commando raid in early December. Later in the month, while
Artime was in Europe “Quintero was strongly admonished not to attempt such a raid.” He was told, however, there was “no objection to carrying out the intelligence infiltration operation which Artime told his men was of primary importance.” Quintero continued to hedge on the commando raid, saying he had “firm orders from Artime to carry it out,” even though they both were “well aware that failure to heed our admonition would wholly jeopardize their support by the United States Government.” Artime returned from Europe on December 31, 1964, apparently ordering the raid to go ahead, but first told the mother ship and two Swift boats to put into the Dominican Republic for repairs. An intercepted message indicated the repairs had been carried out at sea and the raid against Casilda, on Cuba’s south coast near Trinidad, would be carried out the night of January 5, 1965. 35
Two memos from Chase to Bundy on January 5 indicate White House displeasure with Artime. The terse first message read, “The Artime raid scheduled for tonight has been called off because of weather.” Bundy had scrawled at the bottom: “Bet 5-1 it never goes, McB.” Chase’s handwritten response said, “You’re on, and John Crimmins says he wants a piece of the action. (The next attempt, by the way, is scheduled for tonight.)” 36 The second memo reported “the weather was bad on New Year’s Eve, Artime had mechanical difficulties, and raid scheduled for that night did not materialize. However, Artime intends to pull off his attack tonight despite our strong expressions of disapproval.” It added that Artime “apparently feels that an attack is mandatory to maintain the morale of his people and to maintain the confidence of a dissident group inside Cuba.” 37
There is little indication of any activity by Artime’s group during the rest of January, although the capture of Menoyo in Cuba raised concerns in the White House. “John Crimmins commented that this is a bad thing,” said Chase in a memo to Bundy. “It will be a big blow to antiCastro morale in Cuba.... It shows how efficient the Cuban Government is. Menoyo is an old experienced guerrilla fighter who, in the past, has impressed John with his intelligence, security and carefulness.” 38 On February 2 a cable arrived in CIA headquarters from Paris. Although the name is blacked out, it presumably came from Sanchez, Cubela’s case officer, and reported that “Cubela and [name blacked out] returned Paris January 31. Met 1 February. Cubela states full agreement reached with Artime and he well satisfied with arrangements which he outlined for our information (along same lines as reported by Artime).... Artime provid
ing package in Madrid which Cubela plans carry back in personal luggage.” The package apparently referred to the silencer sent to Cubela. Another message on February 11, said “Cubela is to receive one pistol with silencer and one Belgian FAL with silencer from Artime’s secretary. Both weapons come from U.S. and now in Madrid.” And this on February 12: “Artime reported on final meeting with Cubela: Artime had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to Cubela in Madrid. Cubela seemed satisfied.” 39
Washington became even more irritated with the Artime operation in early February. A Chase-to-Bundy memo reported the MRR, with Artime in Europe, had called off a plan to go into Cuba, seize a couple of hostages, and hold them as an exchange for Menoyo. But the group went ahead with an effort to bring out some of its own people, which ended in disaster. “The exfiltration effort failed,” Chase reported. Two agents were captured and the boats involved “were sighted and chased vigorously by Cuban air and sea forces. Only an inordinate amount of luck allowed the boats to escape to Nicaragua.” Chase suggested the likely implications of the episode. “First, the two captured agents will undoubtedly spill their guts. Needless to say, we will, of course, deny any implication. Second, the conduct of the operation may have been conducted from a Miami radio station in spite of our policy statements to the effect that no U.S. territories would be used in the conduct of such raids. We are still checking this one out. Third, State has just about had it with the Artime group and seems to be leaning in favor of an immediate cut-off of ties with Artime. Of possible bearing on this decision will be the outcome of the Artime/internal dissident talks which took place recently.” 40
State had indeed “had it” with Artime and his operation. And with Lyndon Johnson in the White House there was no longer need to worry about whether Bobby Kennedy disagreed. In a stiff February 23 memo to the “Members of the 303 Committee,” the department “strongly” recommended a three-point course of action:
1. Artime will be notified without delay that, in conformity with previous statements made to him, US support for his group will be terminated as of February 28, with phasing out of US assistance to be carried out as quickly as possible.
2. Artime will be notified immediately, with respect to his dealings with Cubela concerning the “internal operation,” that (a) it is our firm estimate that under present circumstances such an operation is impractical,
unrealistic and almost certain to fail; (b) we cannot be certain that the participation by internal Cuban elements is not a provocation and a trap; and (c) in any case, we want it clearly understood that we cannot and will not make any commitments in advance concerning US support for such an operation.
3. Through both diplomatic and Agency channels, the Nicaragua, Costa Rican and Dominican Governments will be informed discreetly, but clearly, that (a) we are in no way supporting Artime; (b) he is on his own; (c) any arrangements made with, or facilities provided to, Artime by the Governments concerned are strictly between them and him; and (d) we would understand and would have no objection if the Governments concerned were to refuse assistance to him or withdraw present assistance from him. 41
Much as a pesky gnat that won’t go away, the question of how to deal with the RECE exile group popped up again during the increasingly intense debate over the future of the Artime operation. Whether to provide U.S. funding for RECE had been a subject of ongoing discussion. John Crimmins, the coordinator of Cuban affairs, had requested input from his colleagues, among them Gordon Chase. Chase responded that, “basically, I do not think that the Cuban exiles have much to offer the U.S. by way of significantly helping us to solve our Cuban problems. This factor,” said Chase, “coupled with the long history of highly troublesome, relatively unfruitful U.S./exile relations, leads me to the conclusion that the burden of proof rests, in very great measure, on those who argue in favor of starting a program of support (large or small) for RECE.” Starting a program for RECE, observed Chase, “at a minimum will cost us some money and time and which, at a maximum, will cause us a Pandora’s Box-full of typical exile problems.” He concluded by noting “there are questions regarding the desirability of using RECE even if things hot up and even if we want to step up the pressure on Cuba: What will RECE be able to do in the crunch that we will not be able to do better? Can they make better propaganda? Conduct more effective covert operations?” 42
From here, the record of events becomes murkier. What is clear, however, is that abrupt termination of the Artime operation called for by the State Department was not approved as recommended. Most, if not all, U.S. funding was cut off, but apparently not as of February 28. Newspaper accounts, reinforced by Quintero’s recollections that they received a onemonth notice, indicate the camps began to shut down by mid-March.
The Artime-Cubela operation continued for several more months with the MRR’s cash on hand, said Quintero. The one declassified record available dealing with the subject is a heavily censored March 4, 1965, memo from Chase to Bundy in advance of that day’s Special Group meeting. Regarding the Artime operation, Chase noted, “State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely because of his irresponsible activity. [About two lines blocked out.] . . . Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. [About two lines blocked out, presumably Vance’s proposal.] . . . The advantage of this would be twofold—First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.” There is no clue to what Vance might have proposed, but it could have been a more gradual phase-out of support and a continuation of the Cubela plot. 43
The recurring question of support for RECE again was anticipated to be on the agenda. “One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE,” wrote Chase. “While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. . . . State does not want to compromise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop aid to Artime?) State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. . . . Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among exiles (we don’t want them to look bad because they are ‘good guys’), and (c) part of RECE’s problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give them as prompt an answer as they would have liked. I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.” 44 A record of the meeting itself was not found.
On March 14, the Miami Herald ran a page-one story under the headline: “Exile Camps Closed; Move Is Called Tactical Shift.” It read, in part:
“The Cuban exile organization, Revolutionary Recovery Movement, has lost a major portion of its financial support and been forced to close commando camps in Central America. MRR commandos have been returning to Miami for the past week. In Miami, MRR spokesmen claimed the closing of the camps in Nicaragua and Costa Rica represented only a change in tactics. They said it simply meant they would concen
trate on subversion. Returning commandos told a different story. They said ‘operational assistance’ had been lost a few weeks ago, and that this week they were told there would be no more ‘salary’ checks ($175 and up per month).”
The story cited the contraband scandal, the attack on the Sierra Aranzazu , the capture of two MRR infiltrators and their subsequent confessions on Cuban television, disorganization, and the unexplained death of one commando as reasons for the shutdown. Lending credence to the belief that support for the Cubela operation continued, the story said,
MRR spokesmen in Miami contended the commando camps were only suspended while the organization concentrated on activities inside Cuba.” 45
Quintero, while not recalling the exact dates, remembered the final days. “We knew it was coming,” said Quintero. “We more or less had the feeling that it was coming.” He and Artime got the word at a meeting with Heckscher, their CIA case officer, at a “safe house” in Alexandria, Virginia. Telling the commandos in the camps was the difficult part, said Quintero. “We expect that people will say, ‘Well, let’s do the last one and let s go to Cuba.’ But Artime was able to convince the people that we were going to keep everything. You know that Artime was a very good talker, and he was able to convince the guys that he was going to keep the boats and keep the people together. . . . Even if the Americans can’t help us, we’re going to go on our own. He was able to relieve most of the people. He kept people believing they were really going to stay.” In fact, said Quintero, “he left some people in El Bluff [Nicaragua], and he built a house, supposedly for Somoza. And we put a waterproof basement in that house, and put about half the weapons we had taken to Nicaragua in there. We only turned back to the CIA about half of them and the other half we kept. It didn t really make a big difference. Those weapons weren’t going to last that long . . . anyway we did it... it was permissible.”
In Nicaragua, said Quintero, Gen. Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza, head of the country s National Guard, told us to think about trying to keep it [the operation] going. But Artime knew he wasn’t going to be able to because of the problems between the Costa Ricans and the Nicaraguans. We had all the weapons in a barge there in the middle of the river in Costa Rica, and we really didn’t want to take that over to Nicaragua. We had taken some of the weapons from there to Nicaragua, but the big stuff, the main stuff, was still in the barge. We just took a few we were using and the ones we were using for training to Nicaragua.” The two Swift boats
LAST HURRAH
belonging to the MRR were brought back to Naples, Florida, and, under Quintero’s supervision, sent off to the Cuban exiles fighting in the Congo. 46
On June 23, 1965, CIA “headquarters sent a cable to stations concerned, directing termination of contact with members of the Cubela group.” It read, in part:
“Convincing proof that entire AMLASH group insecure and that further contact with key members of group constitute menace to CIA operations against Cuba as well as to the security of CIA staff personnel in Western Europe.
“Under the circumstances headquarters desires that contact with key members of the group be eliminated as rapidly as possible, and that assets who may be in contact with individual members of the group or peripherally involved in AMLASH conspiracy be warned of danger implicit in these associations and directed to eliminate contacts ASAP.” 4/
According to author Thomas Powers, the CIA apparently learned from listening devices that Cubela had been talking too much about his plotting during visits to Europe. Even a CIA officer in Rome picked up talk of Cubela’s boasting from Cuban contacts he maintained on his own. The CIA ordered all contact broken and warned Artime that Cubela was not to be trusted. 48
Curiously, it wasn’t until March 1, 1966, eight months later, that Cuba announced that security police had arrested “two military officers for alleged counterrevolutionary activities involving the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. They were identified as Maj. Rolando Cubela and Maj. Ramon Guin.” Cubela was found guilty and sentenced to thirty years in prison, after Castro asked for leniency. 49 Cubela was released after serving less than half his sentence. He now lives in Spain and is said to visit Miami occasionally.
The CIA belatedly prepared a report in 1976 on the AMLASH Operation for the Church Committee, relating to any possible link to President Kennedy’s assassination. It noted that transcripts of Cubela’s 1966 trial “contain no references to his activities prior to 1964, i.e., before President Kennedy’s assassination. The transcripts suggest that, to the Cubans’ knowledge, AMLASH/1 was not in touch with the CIA before November 1964. Nor did the book which Castro provided Senator McGovern in 1975, which purported to be an inventory of all known plots against Castro’s life, contain any allegation of AMLASH/1 anti-Castro activity prior
to late 1964. The book mentions travel by AMLASH/1 to Madrid ‘where he was recruited by CIA agents.’ This travel occurred in November 1964. The above two instances strongly suggest that Castro was not aware that AMLASH/1 had any contact with CIA prior to November 1964; i.e, one year after President Kennedy’s death.” 50
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