A Syrian Case for Humanitarian Intervention

Radwan Ziadeh

Since the struggle for freedom and democracy in Syria began in March 2011, Syrian security forces and the Syrian army have killed at least 80,000 people and laid complete waste to the country. More than 1.5 million refugees have fled to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, and 5 million Syrians have been forced to abandon their homes due to the violence. According to reports issued by the United Nations and international human rights organizations, Syrian government forces have routinely bombarded densely populated civilian areas with artillery, deployed snipers and helicopters in urban areas, and tortured detained protestors and human rights activists. All of these acts are considered Crimes Against Humanity as defined by the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002.

After similar war crimes and crimes against humanity took place in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the General Assembly of the United Nations established the “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P in 2005. R2P argues that a state surrenders its sovereignty when it commits acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity on its territory. As a member of the United Nations, Syria is committed to this duty to protect its citizens from these crimes. When the Syrian government launches constant indiscriminate attacks against unarmed civilians, it is clearly failing to comply with this principle, thereby transferring the responsibility to protect unarmed Syrian citizens directly to the international community.

In a United Nations report published in 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon characterized the three pillars underpinning the R2P principle: First, each state has a permanent responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and all that incites those crimes. Second, it is the responsibility of the international community to provide assistance to states to comply with the obligations contained in the first point. Third, if the state has clearly failed to protect its people, the international community must respond to the situation decisively and in a timely manner, based on Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the U.N. Charter, and to take appropriate measures, peaceful or otherwise. In addition, in emergency situations, international alliances can be established to stop gross violations of international law, even without prior approval of the Security Council.

Despite the fact that Syria is a clear-cut candidate for the application of R2P, the international community has essentially abandoned Syrians to die at the hands of their government. The United States, which called for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad in 2011, has thus far utterly failed at following up its words with decisive action. And, for more than a year, the U.N. Security Council has proven itself incapable of adopting a resolution regarding Syria, not even to condemn the atrocities perpetrated by the Syrian regime, thanks to Russian veto power.

The Friends of Syria group, which was established specifically for the sake of creating a venue outside of the United Nations in which an international coalition could begin considering actions that would protect the lives of Syrian civilians, has offered only words of sympathy and empty promises to the Syrian people. Syrians have learned not to expect much from the international community after many conferences concluded without adopting any meaningful decisions. They consider these gatherings, like Friends of Syria meetings, as nothing more than opportunities for giving sympathetic speeches.

The United States should work with E.U. allies to achieve the main goals for which the Friends of Syria group was initially established: to conduct an international humanitarian intervention to protect Syrian civilians.

In ideal circumstances, a humanitarian intervention—the use of force for humanitarian means—would be instituted via the U.N. Security Council. Unfortunately, Russian veto power stands in the way of this option. Russia remains unwilling to grant Western powers additional abilities to check the power of regimes, no matter how evil, in its backyard. But precedent for conducting a humanitarian intervention outside the auspices of the Security Council already exists—Western allies have previously enforced no-fly zones over Iraq without the explicit approval of the Security Council. Some form of intervention could absolutely be instituted either under the umbrella of the Friends of Syria group or some other international coalition.

But what would such an intervention look like? A number of options remain available to the international community, including: targeted airstrikes, a no-fly zone, a buffer zone, a humanitarian zone, the training of opposition forces, and the arming of opposition forces. Both Western powers and regional allies are already engaging in the latter two options. Media reports clearly show that the United States has approved training programs for Free Syrian Army soldiers in Jordan and given the green light for the distribution of Croatian arms (paid for and transported by Gulf partners) to rebel battalions operating under the command structure of the Supreme Military Council. Unfortunately these steps are being implemented in such a limited fashion that they have yet to yield particularly tangible results inside Syria itself. In fact, without greater commitment to intervention, it seems likely that current activities will only serve to prolong the violence, which, with hundreds killed every day, is already at unacceptable levels.

A humanitarian zone, or humanitarian corridor, could be implemented along the Turkish and Jordanian borders. The purpose of such a zone would be explicitly to protect Syrian civilians from the imminent and constant threat that the Syrian army and air force pose to them. Such a zone is difficult to establish without a large number of ground troops, however. 13,000 soldiers were needed to create a 10,000 square kilometer safe zone in Iraq in 1991. And, in reality, neither the Syrian opposition nor the international community are particularly enthused by the idea of “boots on the ground” in Syria.

The option of creating a buffer zone presents similar difficulties. Buffer zones, which are used to separate two warring parties, require peacekeeping forces and the consent of both sides of a conflict. Though a buffer zone would certainly have the effect of protecting civilians over a limited territory, the intervention would be limited in its scope and results and require soldiers provided by other countries, a scenario both unlikely and unwanted by the international community and most members of the Syrian opposition.

The creation of a no-fly zone, on the other hand, would not require the occupation of Syria by foreign soldiers. It would, however, require a significant investment of military hardware by the implementing nation or coalition. A no-fly zone would directly aid in civilian protection by preventing the aerial bombardment of civilian populations. But, it would require the active patrol of Syrian airspace. Thus far, members of the international community have been unwilling to make the investment required to enforce such a no-fly zone. This is why some have suggested the creation of a de facto no-fly zone through the arming of opposition forces with man portable air defense systems (MANPADS). The opposition has in fact obtained a small number of these weapons, and they have been somewhat effective, but many more weapons systems would be needed before making a tangible effect on the levels of violence propagated by the regime against Syrian civilians. And, in reaction to the opposition’s procurement of MANPADS, the Syrian government quickly changed its tactics. Syria now uses long-range ballistic missiles to indiscriminately attack areas in which it can no longer utilize its air power.

Targeted air strikes remain the option most likely to erode the Syrian government’s ability to commit crimes against humanity. Strategic strikes would eliminate crucial military targets such as regime military, air, and missile assets and could be accomplished with stand-off weaponry—not a single foreign soldier would enter Syrian territory. Such strikes could also hasten the downfall of the regime, but not without risks. There remains a small chance that such overt action would elicit a retaliatory response from Syrian allies.

It is clear that Syria has now reached such a state of violence that some form of international intervention is necessary to bring a swift end to the conflict. With Syrian regime forces committing crimes against humanity daily against Syrian civilians, according to the R2P doctrine, it is the explicit responsibility of the international community to act to prevent these crimes. Although a humanitarian intervention can take many forms, in the case of Syria, an ideal intervention would involve the empowerment of the Syrian opposition alongside targeted airstrikes against Syrian regime assets and the enforcement of a no-fly zone to prevent the mass murder of the Syrian people. This comprehensive approach would minimize the amount of international investment required while maximizing immediate and tangible results for protecting innocent Syrians.