Thomas Pierret
One of the most common arguments against Western involvement in the Syrian conflict is that Islamists dominate the armed opposition. From this point of view, the Assad regime is seen as a secular bulwark that should be preserved until a political agreement is reached or, more cynically, until the two sides achieve mutual destruction. This approach relies on the assumption that no credible alternative to the radical Islamists exists among the rebels and that any kind of intervention would therefore empower forces that are inimical to both democratic values and Western interests.
As for the beleaguered but resilient Assad we know today, he is certainly no bulwark against Islamists; in fact his brutal and sectarian war on the opposition has played into the hands of the most militant Salafi factions, which have thrived across the country over the last year. In other words, “better Assad than the Islamists” actually means “both Assad and the (radical) Islamists.”
Opposing foreign intervention because of the strength of Islamists is wrong for at least two other reasons. First, because the lack of foreign intervention in support for the Syrian opposition is precisely what has favored the spectacular rise of radical Islamists during the second year of the uprising. Secondly, evidence exists that it is actually possible to bolster more moderate alternatives by providing them carefully managed logistical support. As I will explain below in more detail, non-Salafi groups have been the main beneficiaries of the significant influx of Croatian weapons that was engineered in late 2012 by the Arab and Western allies of the opposition.
But there was nothing inevitable in the rise of the al-Qaeda-related al-Nusra front and other Salafi groups like Ahrar al-Sham. The first armed groups that were established by military defectors in the summer of 2011 were not “secular” in the strict sense, as several of them were given religious names, but their discourse was moderate and did not include any distinctly Islamist agenda. They were widely popular though, as no strong demand for a more radical orientation existed at that time.
The first half of 2012 marked a watershed in the process of Islamization of the revolution. This radicalization was a direct by-product of the Assad regime’s decision to use its full military might against rebellious cities (heavy artillery was first used in Homs in February 2012, and the first airstrikes were carried out on Aleppo in July). Furthermore, sectarian massacres targeting Sunni civilians enhanced the process of radicalization. Sectarian polarization and a widespread sense of abandonment by an impotent West combined to create a fertile ground for radical Islamist ideas. Foreign fighters began to flow into Syria for the same reasons: although seasoned itinerant jihadis would certainly have joined the struggle whatever happened, the escalation of the conflict and the corollary atrocities against civilians convinced large numbers of hitherto not-so-radical foreign volunteers to take up arms in support of their Syrian brethren.
The second factor behind the rise of radical Islamists is the issue of funding. Common wisdom has it that the Islamization of the insurgency has been favored by the support of conservative Gulf monarchies, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The reality is very different, however. Despite Qatar’s partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter’s military arm in Syria, the Committee of the Shields of the Revolution, apparently suffers from a dire need of financial means. Apart from that, the Brothers have “shares” in powerful insurgent groups such as the Tawhid Brigade in Aleppo and the Faruq Battalions, but they do not own them. As for Saudi Arabia, it has constantly backed the establishment of coordination structures run by relatively secular defector officers such as Mustafa al-Sheikh’s Military Council, Hussein al-Hajj Ali’s Syrian National Army, Mahir al-Nu‘aymi’s Joint Command of the Military Councils, and Salim Idris’ Joint Command of the Free Syrian Army. In the province of Idlib, Riyadh’s chief client is none of the three local Salafi heavyweights (Ahrar al-Sham, Suqur al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra), but their more secular rivals of Shuhada’ Suriyya.
In fact, Islamization has not resulted from funding by Gulf states, but from the lack of it. Although arms paid for by Saudi Arabia and Qatar started to make their way into Syria in the spring of 2012, insufficient quantities, sudden disruptions of deliveries and poor management of their distribution plagued the opposition’s military effort throughout the rest of the year.56 In such circumstances, Gulf-based private networks of funding have played a prominent role in the bankrolling of the insurgency, and groups with privileged access to these networks have frequently outgunned less connected ones. Gulf benefactors, being generally of a Salafi persuasion, have logically favored like-minded outfits and encouraged others to “Salafize” their outlook.57
Only in late 2012 did Gulf states significantly step up their support for the Syrian rebels, an effort that quickly translated into the empowerment of non-Salafi battalions. Croatian antitank weapons purchased with Saudi money were channeled to selected insurgent groups, primarily in the southern province of Deraa (through Jordanian intelligence), but also, from Turkey, in the center and north of the country. Results were especially spectacular in Deraa, as rebels achieved significant gains in a region which until then had remained under the firm grip of loyalist forces.58
Remarkably, insurgent successes in the south were predominantly achieved by groups that claim to be part of the Free Syrian Army and raise Syrian flags (Shuhada al-Yarmuk Brigade, Fajr al-Islam Brigade, al-Omari Brigade), two features that clearly distinguish them from Salafi organisations. A similar pattern was replicated in other parts of the country in April, as FSA-related groups seized the airport of al-Dab‘a (Homs) and captured parts of the bases of Abu al-Dhuhur (Idlib) and Kweyris (Aleppo). This upsurge in the military activities of non-Salafi insurgents was all the more remarkable in that in previous months, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham had been chiefly responsible for most major insurgent victories in the North (airports of Taftanaz and al-Jirah, city of al-Raqqa).
Such developments show that fears of military help falling in the “wrong hands” are not necessarily more justified than the claim that the Afghan precedent will necessarily repeat itself in Syria. It was not US support that favored the rise of the most radical elements among the Afghan Mujahidin in the 1980s, but the fact that this support was mediated by Pakistani intelligence, a quite unreliable partner in that respect. Things can turn out to be different provided one chooses intermediaries that are determined to contain radical Islamism, as is obviously the case with Jordanian intelligence.
Western-Arab support for FSA-related battalions has sometimes been derided as a replication of the Awakening Councils established by the U.S. in Iraq.59 The comparison is misguided, however. Syrian groups were not “created” as a counterweight to Salafi organizations; rather, they were the early mainstream of the insurgency, only waiting for someone to help them. Of course, these battalions are not necessarily “secular” by Western standards, but their stance on issues such as democracy and foreign policy are undeniably more flexible than those of their Salafi counterparts.
To be sure, supporting them is no guarantee that Islamists will not prevail in a post-Assad Syria. However, this should not prevent the West from hastening Assad’s fall by all necessary means. First, because it is a fantasy to think that any political arrangement in an Arab country could achieve stability by excluding moderate Islamists. Second, because the real choice is not between Assad’s doomed “panzer-secularism” (secularism imposed by tanks) and Islamism; it is rather between a pluralistic (even if predominantly religious-conservative) Syrian society that can still be preserved by acting quickly, and extreme versions of Salafi Islam that will continue to flourish if Syria remains abandoned by the outside world to its current apocalyptic fate.