It does not fall within the province of this book to describe the raising and dispatch of the original New Zealand Expeditionary Force, the formation of the New Zealand and Australian Division, which consisting predominantly of New Zealanders included an Australian infantry brigade and other Australian units, or the achievements of the composite Division in Egypt and Gallipoli.{3} The present narrative has for its subject the history of the New Zealand Division, whose inception dates from the early spring of 1916 with the transference of the Australian units of the old composite Division to Australian formations and the raising of fresh units to take their place and to complete the establishment of a purely New Zealand Division.
This reorganization followed after a short interval the inevitable abandonment of the Peninsula in December 1915 and January 1916. The policy of evacuation had made for a necessarily piecemeal arrival in Egypt, but by the end of the first week in January the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions (less mounted troops) were concentrated at Tel-el-Kebir, and the New Zealand and Australian Division (less mounted troops) at Moascar, near Ismailia, on the Suez Canal.{4} The latter neighbourhood was already familiar to the New Zealand infantry as the scene of their first experience of battle, for it was here that a year previously year had participated in the repulse of the Turkish attack on the Canal. Anzac Corps Headquarters moved from Cairo to Ismailia on 4th January. Subsequently to Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood's assuming temporary command of the Dardanelles Army, Major-General (now Lieut.-General) Sir A. J. Godley had been in November 1915 promoted from command of the New Zealand and Australian Division to temporary command of the Anzac Corps. He had been succeeded as Divisional commander by Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Sir A. H. Russell. While giving up command of the Division, General Godley retained control of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force as a whole.
Pending the development of the renewed Turkish threat at the Canal, the role of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was defined by the Chief of the Imperial Staff as being that of the strategical reserve of the Empire. With this function in view, the depleted ranks were immediately filled up from accumulated reinforcements, and the troops, who despite the rigours of the Gallipoli campaign and its tragic dénouement were in excellent health and fine morale, embarked without delay on a vigorous course of training. The main principles governing military policy in Egypt were two. On the one hand there was the possibility of an attack on the Canal, and on the other the probability that the various Corps quartered for the moment in the country would be required for operations in some other theatre of war in the spring. To meet the Turkish attack, extensive fortifications and engineering works were in process of construction east of the Canal. It was, however, the latter principle that was to affect the New Zealand and Australian Division for the first 2 months of the year. General Headquarters and Corps emphasised the urgency of intensive training. Thus, on 17th January, the Australasian Divisions received from Corps a memorandum whose nature is indicated by the following extract:—
“There is little enough time in which to fit ourselves to take the field against the Germans, which may be our next move, and every moment is precious. Each officer and man must make the fullest use of his opportunity for training. Except on one, or possibly two, days in the week,, at the discretion of Divisional commanders, lunch should now be taken in the field, and troops should be clear of camp by 7.30 am., and should not return before 4 p.m., at the earliest”.
A few days later G.H.Q. issued secret instructions impressing the necessity of taking every measure to ensure complete preparation for the field.
The New Zealand and Australian Division had all round its quarters a practically unlimited area, admirably suited alike for barrack-square drill, musketry, field firing and tactical operations. The broken surface of the desert, the tortuous wadis, the deep unexpected hollows, the glacis or sheer declivities of the yellow sand hills, the mud villages and the palm plantations lent themselves readily for all manner of schemes. In view, too, of the possibility of having to deliver a counter-attack through the front line defences, the Division was frequently exercised in moving over the desert on a broad front and in passing through “gaps” of a size similar to those left for the purpose of counter-attack in the defence system. Night operations were practiced twice a week, with the object of training the troops to carry out close formation marches and to execute attacks over the featureless desert in the dark with confidence and facility. Many courses of instruction were held. In addition to Divisional and brigade manoeuvres, a feature was made of “staff rides,” including a series for junior officers. A first acquaintance was made in the machine gun school at Ismailia with the recently invented Lewis gun, the far-reaching potentialities of which were to win speedy recognition.
Owing to shortage of equipment and to other reasons, the new artillery units, whose formation will be referred to presently, were confined to general or theoretical work; the other batteries fired practices with live shell, and occasionally in co-operation with aeroplane observers. Apart from their technical training and reorganisation, the Engineers were employed in pontoon-building on the Sweet Water Canal, near Ismailia, and on the Suez Canal at Ballah Serapeum and El Ferdan; in general camp improvements, such as pipelaying and the provision of water supply; the building of huts; the supervision of native labour in the construction of tramways and of light piers; and in the development of the field works at Abu Arak and other points in the Canal defences. On 16th January the Division was inspected by Sir Archibald Murray, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Force, who had relieved Sir C. C. Munro a week previously.
On arrival in Egypt from Gallipoli, administration had been hampered by more than the usual difficulties attendant on the redistribution of large forces. The baggage sent from Anzac had not arrived, and owing to insufficiency of camp equipment the troops were at first obliged to bivouac in the open. There was also a shortage of supplies due to the enormous congestion on the railways, so that for the first few days less than half the bread ration and no jam or bacon were procurable. The provision of an adequate water system presented grave difficulties. The Supply Units had only temporary structures formed of biscuit-boxes covered with tarpaulins to protect their most perishable commodities from the sun's rays. They surmounted all obstacles, however, just as rapidly as they circumvented the craftiness of the native dealers, who increased the weight of their bales of green feed by a judicious use of the roadside watering pipes and inserted stones in every crutch or cavity of their consignments of wood. Brick sheds with wooden roofs and Venetian ventilators were erected, and the services of native carpenters were engaged to expedite the construction of tables and benches for offices canteens and mess-rooms. Tents and marquees rose gradually in orderly formations, followed by baths canteens and cinema halls. With such amenities, with plenty of food, with undisturbed sleep and freedom from anxiety, with the unrivalled winter air of the desert, even the very strenuous training was an extraordinary relaxation after the hardships of Gallipoli. Ismailia, in addition, though less cosmopolitan than Cairo, provided diverse opportunities for amusement. The deep clear waters of Lake Timsah, reflecting the blue sky and the bare yellow hills, afforded scope for bathing and swimming. Football and athletic competitions gave relief from training and reorganisation, and mounted steeplechases were held over the sand-dunes and the network of little canals. All around were the habiliments of war—guns horses aeroplanes warships—but the trials and horrors of battle and of the trenches seemed remote and unreal.
Shortly after. Sir Archibald Murray had assumed command, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in Egypt, augmented by the large forces returned from the Peninsula, was reconstituted and located, from the southern extremity of the defences northwards, as follows. The IX. Corps (Lieut.-General Hon. Sir J. Byng) with headquarters at Suez and comprising the 29th 46th and 10th (Indian) Divisions, was responsible for the area from Suez to Kabrit inclusive. The intermediate section from Kabrit to El Ferdan, both exclusive, was in charge of the Anzac Corps. Northwards from El Ferdan to Port Said extended the XV. Corps (Lieut.-General H. S. Horne), with the 11th 13th and 31st Divisions. In general reserve at Tel-el-Kebir was the VIII. Corps, consisting of the 42nd and 52nd divisions under Lieut.-General Sir F. J. Davies.
To the defensive front allotted to the Anzac Corps the 2 Australian Divisions began to move from Tel-el-Kebir on 24th January. The New Zealand and Australian Division remained in Corps reserve at Moascar. At the same time the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade under Brigadier-General E. W. C. Chaytor, who had succeeded General Russell, began a wearisome trek from Zeitoun to the Corps area. They bivouacked alongside the infantry at Moasear on the night of 28th/29th January, whence they reached their destination at Serapeum on the following day The Light Horse Brigades followed by rail.
The fact that the New Zealand and Australian Division was thus left in reserve facilitated the complex task of reorganisation. By the beginning of 1916 there had been a remarkable expansion of the Australasian forces in Egypt owing to the piling up of sick and wounded, and particularly to the steady flow of reinforcements from the Dominions. These had been temporarily drafted into makeshift formations, training brigades, and the like but their numbers demanded some radical reorganisation. The problem now pressed for solution. It was earnestly considered at Corps Headquarters during the latter part of January and was reviewed, from all aspects. On 21st January Sir Archibald Murray wired in code to the Chief of the Imperial Staff:—
“I find there is now a very large accumulation of Australian and New Zealand reinforcements here which cannot be absorbed in existing organisations. It is essential that these should be formed into definite units, with the least possible delay, both for reasons of training and discipline. I have consulted General Birdwood, and we are of the opinion that it is possible to form immediately four new Australian brigades, four Australian Pioneer battalions, and another New Zealand brigade. The New Zealand Division{5} at present contains the 4th Australian Brigade and two dismounted Light Horse and Mounted Rifles brigades. The dismounted brigades are being replaced by the New Zealand Rifles Brigade; and the, formations, if additional to New Zealand brigade, from reinforcements in Egypt will enable a complete New Zealand Division to be formed and will release the 4th Australian Brigade.” (The proposed Australian formations of 2 fresh Divisions to be raised in Egypt in addition to the Division to be raised in Australia are then discussed.) “I understand that General Birdwood has the confidence of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, and if these proposals are agreed to, I propose to organise at once, and it will simplify and hasten matters if General Birdwood is permitted to arrange all details in direct communication with the relative Defence Ministers.”
On reference to the Dominions the War Office was notified by Australia that she agreed to the proposals. The New Zealand Government, however, having already sent the Rifle Brigade in excess of the numbers originally contemplated, desired further information in view of the necessity that would arise of maintaining 3 infantry brigades with reinforcements arranged for only 2, and with no increase on the scale in force possible before the autumn. General Murray was therefore instructed by the War Office on 5th February to notify General Birdwood that he must await instructions with regard to the proposed New Zealand Division. On the 8th the Commander-in-Chief replied to the War Office that while quite understanding the situation as regards New Zealand, he trusted that he might be permitted to form a third infantry brigade at once, as there were sufficient men available for it in excess of the establishment of the 2 existing brigades.
“The formation of such a brigade is necessary in any case for the purpose of training and discipline. In addition to the surplus of infantry reinforcements who are available for the formation of a third infantry brigade, there is a large number of surplus Mounted Rifles who are available and willing to come forward either for artillery or infantry brigade. Reinforcements are coming in every month at the rate of 20% in excess of establishment, and there seems little chance in the near future of absorbing this surplus in existing units. It therefore seems practically certain that we could keep up the proposed New Zealand Division to approximate strength until New Zealand can increase the present scale of reinforcements.”