The final German effort was nipped smartly in the bud. In the early morning of 28th July a 2nd 'Wellington listening post near the Lys heard stealthy and suspicious sounds about their wire. A flare revealed a party of 20 Germans some 30 yards away. Without hesitation they were attacked with bombs and driven off, leaving behind them much equipment. So far from obtaining identifications, they betrayed their own by losing one of their party, whose body with the tell-tale numerals on the tunic was brought into our lines.

Throughout this period the enemy's artillery endeavoured to keep pace with our own lavish expenditure of shell. Some days were marked by particular virulence. On 1st July, for example, possibly in retaliation for the bombing of Lille Railway Station by a number of aeroplanes on the previous evening, he shelled the great church of Notre Dame in Armentieres with a 5.9-in. naval high-velocity gun. It was new on this front and was surmised to be the one which had attained sinister notoriety at Ypres. It fired from a mounting in a railway loop beyond Perenchies. 58 rounds were fired from 7.30 a.m. to 10.6 a.m. and 18 rounds from 10.34 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. The first round was a hit, the thirty-sixth brought the spire down, and the fire was throughout extremely accurate. Our heavies retaliated, putting round for round into Comines. Two days later, in combination with the enemy raid on l'Epinette, after Houplines had been shelled during the daylight, Armentieres was heavily bombarded after dark with high-explosive up to 10-in. and with incendiary shells. The naval gun was again active. Many houses were set on fire, the streets damaged, and several casualties inflicted both among troops and civilians. The 1st and 2nd Artillery Brigade headquarters received several direct hits. The quartermaster stores of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters were burnt to the ground. The headquarters of the 1st Field Ambulance were demolished but the patients removed without casualties. The headquarters of the 4th Rifles were not so fortunate. An 8-in. shell scored a direct hit on the building, and Major A. E. Wolstenholme, the Battalion. Second-in-Command, and Capt. F. E. Guthrie, the Regimental Medical Officer, were killed. Every gun in the Division the Corps and the Army retaliated, the Army heavies putting round for round into the village of Lambersart, which lying beyond the ridge was occupied by the Headquarters of the Division opposed to us, and the bombardment on either side was the heaviest that the New Zealanders had yet witnessed. As the following days brought no abatement of the enemy's artillery fire, it was decided not to treat patients in the 2 Ambulances in the town. This step threw a greater amount of work on the Divisional Rest Station in rear and the remaining Ambulance which had charge of it.

In our artillery programme, apart from the unrehearsed revenge which a harassed battalion or company commander or on a larger scale an infantry brigadier could always summon, there were several definite prearranged and frequently varied systems of retaliation. The broad principles were that such retaliation should follow on the provocation as soon as possible, that it should be of greater volume, and delivered with bigger guns, and, if possible, be such as to connect itself in the enemy's mind with the fire which provoked it. This last principle was sometimes disputed on academic grounds, but certainly for the front line garrisons, when the foundations of their world shook under hostile bombardment, the moral tonic administered by the battering of their persecutor's own trenches was incomparably more effective than a shelling of his back areas. Thus as a rule forward areas suffered for forward areas, billets for billets, and so on. These retaliations culminated in the so called Retaliation X for the shelling of Armentières, when all artillery brigades were called on, and the “heavies,” if the bombardment were serious, would shell Lille.

Towards the middle of July this intense activity quietened down, on our side owing to the temporary shortage of ammunition, alluded to above, and on the German side through a similar shortage or a withdrawal of guns. The total ammunition expended by us during the last 10 days of the month did not exceed the average daily consumption of the first week.

By this time our patrols, which included Maori patrols, completely dominated No Man's Land, where their troubles were caused, not by active opposition, but by the searchlights which played along the enemy wire and by the rustling of the grass, which, though the Germans cut it with characteristic thoroughness near their own wire, lay thick in the middle of No Man's Land. Instead of sending out patrols himself, the enemy fired “pineapple” bombs at the points likely to be crossed by us and bombed his own wire. Generally his morale was surprisingly low, and on several occasions our sentries with mingled astonishment, and contempt saw a German put his rifle on the parapet and pull the trigger without taking aim, the bullet raising a spurt of dust in No Man's Land or passing high overhead. His machine guns were active and admirably handled as usual, and it was not often that they gave their position away, as by smoke from an overheated gun drifting in the moonlight against a dark background of bushes. Only now and again strong enemy patrols ventured out, and bombing fights ensued, almost invariably to our advantage. Various devices were employed to destroy or capture these hostile patrols, and on 26th July a familiar German booby-trap was utilised with apparent success. A patrol of the 3rd "Rifles laid out wires with bombs attached, and withdrew a little distance to await results. First 1 German appeared followed by 12, but their route did not take them in the way of the trap. The L/Cpl. in charge of our patrol therefore shot the leader. His men bombed the rest of the party, and only 3 were seen to escape. Alarmed by the noise, immediately afterwards another German party approached, and one of their number becoming entangled in the trip-wire exploded the bombs. This time not a man was seen to escape. The second explosion brought, down a gust of machine gun fire and shrapnel, and our patrol on its way to make investigation was compelled to withdraw. One man, Rflmn. Woods, was wounded and unable to drag himself in, his absence being discovered only when the patrol returned. He could not be found that night. On the following evening he was searched for by a patrol under Sergt. R. Simmers. The patrol itself was surprised and heavily bombed by the enemy who were lying in wait, 1 of our men being killed and 4 wounded. Simmers returned the bombing', drove off the enemy, and continued to advance with the 4 riflemen remaining. He located Woods, who was still alive, and returned with him and all his party and the body of the dead soldier to our trenches.

During the first week in August the 18th Division came into the centre sector of the Corps front between the 5th Australian Division on the right and the New Zealanders on the left. The Rifle Brigade was relieved by troops of the new Division, and the New Zealand front was therefore contracted to its original length. In connection with this re-organisation the 4th Artillery Brigade recovered its 8th 10th and 14th batteries from the respective groups. Various British units were now coming up from the Somme fighting, and several valuable lectures were given on the terrain, the tactical methods of the opposing armies, questions of supply, and experience generally in the battle. Towards the end of the week orders were received that the Division would be relieved by the 51st (Highland Territorial) Division, from the Somme, in order to release it for a period of preparatory training for battle. The relief commenced on 13th August, and was completed on the 18th, when the command of the sector passed to the Highlanders, and the Division marched out after a continuous stay of 3 months in the line.

During this period they had sustained 2500 casualties. 25 officers and 350 other ranks had been killed. 70 officers and 2000 men had been wounded, and 30 men were missing. Some of these last were in enemy hands, others had been blown to pieces by explosive or buried irretrievably in trench cataclysms. On the 14th, 2 battalions of the Rifle Brigade, marching back with the newly issued Lewis gun handcarts to the railhead at Steenwerck, were inspected informally by H.M. the King. The infantry entrained there for the concentration area at Blaringhem. They were followed by the batteries who trekked the 27-mile march with their guns via Estaires, Vieux Berquin and La Motte.

On the 20th the entrainment of the Division was commenced at Arques and St. Omer for a training area east of Abbeville where it was to pass under the command of the X. Corps of the Fourth Army. The concentration in this new area was completed by 22nd August. Headquarters was at Hallencourt, the artillery in billets about Longpre, the 3 infantry brigade areas being Yonville Airaines and Limercourt respectively.

Meanwhile the Divisional Cyclist Company{38} had reached France in July. In accordance with the Army policy, which transferred this unit with the mounted squadron from the control of Divisions to that of Corps, the company was taken on the strength of II. Anzac Corps Headquarters. In the Mounted Regiment, there was 1 New Zealand and 2 Australian squadrons. In the Cyclist Battalion the balance was to be reversed, and reinforcements were drawn on to make 2 New Zealand companies. The command of the battalion was given to Major (later Lt.-Col.) C. H. S. Evans who had organised and trained the New Zealand company from its formation. At the end of August 1 platoon of the battalion was attached to the Division to be used as runners and orderlies in the forthcoming operations.

The Division followed with keen interest the passing into law in New Zealand of the Military Service Act on 1st August, This measure of far-reaching political and historical importance was brought to the notice of all ranks in the following Divisional Routine Order of 13th August: “The New Zealand Government wishes the men of the New Zealand Division to feel that the Military Service Bill just passed by both Houses of Parliament represents the assurance of New Zealand both to the Motherland and to her troops in the field that the obligation to keep the ranks full will be carried out as long as men are available.”

During the period under review certain changes in appointments were made which it is convenient here to summarise. On 22nd July Lt.-Col. Pinwill vacated the appointment of G.S.O.1 to take command of a battalion in his old regiment. He was succeeded by Lt.-Col. R. O'H. Livesay, D.S.O., Queen's R.W. Surrey Regiment. About the same date Major Chesney, Brigade Major, 1st Brigade, was invalided and succeeded by Capt. M. H. Jackson (29th Lancers), whose appointment as D.A.Q.M.G. was filled by Lt.-Col. Hamilton, hitherto commanding the Divisional Train. Command of the Train was assumed by Lt.-Col. J. Atkinson A.S.C. Lt.-Col. H. A. Reid succeeded Lt.-Col. A. R. Young as A.D.V.S., the latter returning sick to New Zealand. Various changes took place in the 2nd Infantry Brigade. Major Puttick relinquished his appointment as Staff Captain to become Second-in-Command of the 4th Rifles{39} His place was taken by Capt, T. M. Wilkes, N.Z.S.C., who subsequently, on Major Lampen's becoming sick, was promoted Brigade Major. In the appointment of Staff Captain he was succeeded by Capt. Richardson, who transferred from the same appointment in the 1st Brigade, where the vacant position was filled by Capt. A. S. Falconer. In the battalions Lt.-Col. C. H. J. Brown had taken over the command of 2nd Auckland from Lt.-Col. Alderman on 6th July, and on arrival in the training area in August, Lt.-Col. Moore, commanding 2nd Otago, was transferred to the British Army and was succeeded by Major (now Lt.-Col.) G. S. Smith, D.S.O.