For all the gigantic preparations necessary there was, in view of the lateness of the season, little time to lose. Plans mere immediately drawn up for a grand attack at the earliest possible moment, which could not well be before the middle of September, with the aim of overwhelming the enemy at the outset and following up the advantage won with the utmost rapidity and vigour. Once the enemy was driven from his prepared positions into the open, it was hoped to abandon the snail-like progress of trench warfare and employ cavalry on a large scale. The other British Armies to the north were instructed to be prepared to assist in exploiting n decisive success. Preliminary attacks were made in the beginning of September to afford suitable assault positions or to deny observation. For the main operation, arrangements were put in hand for the employment of rested Divisions with their morale at its bloom. Among these it was the privilege of the New Zealand Division to be included.

The New Zealanders, meanwhile, were recuperating from their arduous work on the Lys amid the delectable wooded valleys of the lower Somme. Health improved rapidly, and at no time perhaps were more energy and keenness thrown into the training, which was itself based on the assumption of participation in a renewed offensive on the Somme. In the artillery work, therefore, it was natural that fire discipline should be a paramount feature, and that emphasis should be laid on the principles governing the close barrage. There was fortunately some fair manoeuvre ground, and the drivers, exercised in so-called "refresher" courses in field movements, speedily regained the proficiency which had been in some degree impaired by the prolonged conditions of trench warfare. Guns equipment and harness were minutely overhauled. The Engineers paid particular attention to the construction of Strong Points and to rapid wiring. Specialists in all branches intensified and widened their theoretical knowledge and practical skill. Above all, the infantry were familiarised with the new methods of assault, and great importance was attached to the thorough appreciation by every private soldier of the principles involved and the general scheme of each practice operation. The efficacy of these new methods had been proved over and over again, and it was vital to diffuse a complete comprehension of them. The lesson was hammered in, therefore, that infantry, trained to hug the protective curtain of shrapnel, which advanced in front of them and prevented the manning of the enemy's machine guns, would have all the odds in favour of success; that the risk of casualties caused by an occasional short burst must be faced, and that in any case these would be few compared with those to be expected on an unsuccessful attack, or in an attack driven home in the face of effective machine gun fire. So, too, stress was laid on the necessity of absolute punctuality. Experience had already shown that while an assault delivered immediately the artillery fire lifted from the objective was, humanly speaking, assured of victory, the delay of even a fraction of a minute might be fraught with disaster.

By night as well as day, all over the meadowlands and the stubble of the harvest fields, battalions in fighting kit incessantly practised the advance of assault waves in extended formation, the avoidance of crowding, the progress of small columns of supporting troops in rear, and the methods of communication with co-operating aeroplanes.{41} The different objectives were represented by different coloured flags, and the lifts of the creeping barrage by lines of men waving branches to indicate the fall of shrapnel, or by horsemen galloping forward in successive "bounds" in accordance with a prearranged timetable. The planning and execution of these operations constituted invaluable training.{42}

From these scenes of carefully staged rehearsal the first troops to move up to the front were the Engineers and the Pioneer Battalion. They left on 27th August, and partly on foot and partly by train proceeded to the neighbourhood of Fricourt. Here they were first employed under the Chief Engineer of the XV. Corps in consolidating the old German Second Line on the Bazentin Ridge and then, with a view to the forthcoming attack, in digging west of Delvone Wood the 2 communication trenches of Turk Lane and French Lane, which were to become such famous arteries of the battlefield. The next arm to follow was the artillery, who, marching by different routes through 29th and 30th August, concentrated at Bonnay. The same vile weather which was impeding the sappers in the reconstruction of the Carlton and Savoy trenches made the march a trying one for the gunners, harness and equipment being soaked in the torrential rain. From Bonnay on 5th September the artillery began to relieve the 33rd Divisional Artillery, which in. accordance with the artillery-policy of the time was not administered as a separate unit, but had been divided between the 7th and the 14th Divisional Artillery Groups. It thus came about that during the Battle of the Somme the C.R.A., New Zealand Division, had in that capacity no actual command.{43} The 1st and 2nd Brigades were attached to the 14th Divisional Artillery, covering the left Division of the XV. Corps, and the 3rd and 4th were joined in a group under Lt.-Col. I. T. Standish and attached to the 7th Divisional Artillery, covering the centre Division. Batteries were brought forward by sections each night to Caterpillar Valley and the reverse slopes by Montauban. They found the emplacements partly completed, in most cases with splinter-proof head-cover. The 8th Battery of the 4th Brigade remained for the moment in reserve. Relief was completed by 6 p.m. on 6th September. On that same day the gunners experienced a foretaste of the repeated bombardments to which they were to be exposed before they were done with "the Somme." Their positions were searched with 8-in. shells, and one lucky hit blew up an ammunition dump and destroyed a howitzer. Before the infantry came into the line, the artillery cooperated, besides carrying out daily routine fire, in several minor attacks, in the latter stages of the capture of Ginchy by the XIV. Corps on the 9th, and in the repulse of the German counter-attack.

It was not ton 2nd September that the infantry began to move up from their peaceful billets towards the realities of war. On that date the 1st Brigade marched to Airaines, the 2nd to Cavonon, and the 3rd to Le Quesnoy. In beautiful autumn weather, the march continued on the following day, when the 1st Brigade reached Yzeux, the 2nd Picquigny, and the 3rd Vaux-en-Amienois. In this area, well in rear of the surge of battle, the brigades remained for 4 days, and engaged in manoeuvres over the country-side. The whole district, and particularly the 2nd Brigade area with its splendid remains of the Roman legions, left an abiding impression of picturesque charm and historical interest. The march was resumed on the 7th by side roads to the mean and crowded villages of the Allonvone area, and that day, as the battalions breasted slopes on the tree-shaded roads, the distant throb of the guns, now sinking, now swelling, became audible. The following afternoon they passed through the old British rear defences, the 3rd Brigade to Dernancourt, the 1st and 2nd into the butted camps about Lavievone of the XV. Corps (Lt.-General H. S. Horne). It was on this day (8th September.) that the German Guards and other picked troops hurled themselves against the whole are of the allied line. All day long heavy artillery action was distinctly heard. In the evening the unbroken ring of gun flashes round the horizon flickered red like continuous sheet lightning, and the menacing rumble of the opposing artilleries exactly resembled thunder. On the battlefield itself the number of guns heard is more circumscribed the ear more attuned to the German batteries, and the dangers, faced and known lose their frightfulness. The Lavievone bivouacs were at just that distance when the sounds of the massed and opposing artilleries blend in indistinguishable unison, and are invested with a mysterious and awful impressiveness.{44}

While the 1st and 2nd Brigades remained for a day here, visited by General Godley at training or on parade, and bathing in the deep willow-fringed waters of the swift-running Ancre, the 3rd Brigade set out on 9th September, marching past the varied scenes of astounding activity along the main road to the Moulin du Vivier and thence by the dry-weather track to Fricourt. On all the slopes tens of thousands of British troops were bivouacked under the eyes of the German balloons. The twinkling of their camp fires at night was like the lights of a great, city, and in the morning the smoke from a thousand cookhouses rose up and spread a haze over the hillsides.

On the following day and night the Rifles relieved a brigade of the 55th Division towards Delvone Wood and a portion of the 1st Division on the left nearer High Wood. The 1st{45} and 4th Battalions went into the advanced trenches, and the 2nd and 3rd{46} into the old German Second Line (Carlton and Savoy) in rear, where the dugouts were still full of German dead. Brigade Headquarters occupied a cellar in Bazentin-le-Grand.

These rear positions commanded an extensive view of the German trenches on the crest. To the right lies Longueval village and Delvone Wood, now at length wholly in British hands. In front, just beyond Carlton trench, the road runs from Longueval to Bazentin, and across the valley to the north the scarred and pock-marked slopes rise up gently to the enemy's positions in the Crest Trench, on the ridge by High Wood. Just over that ridge is the formidable Switch Trench, connecting the German Third and Second Systems, and about three-quarters up is our own front line. Breaking the skyline further to the left are the stark trees of High Wood, from which rises ever slid again the black smoke of bursting explosive. This grimly contested wood was now a charnel house, full of sinister memories to the British, and inspiring not less horror in the mind of the German infantryman. “We are actually fighting on the Somme with the English,“ wrote a Bavarian in September. “You can no longer call it war; it is mere murder. We are at the focal point of the present battle in Foureaux{47} (High) Wood. All my previous experience in this war, the slaughter at Ypres, and the battle in the gravel pit at Hulluch, are the merest child's play compared with this massacre, and that is much too mild a description. I hardly think they won bring us into the fight again now, for me are in a very bad way”—the last pium desiderium is a distinctly human touch.

Pending the day of attack, the Rifle Brigade improved their trenches and dug a new line through the shellholes in front, first constructing a chain of posts 100 yards apart and each 20 yards long, with flank trenches of 5 yards, then connecting these posts together and the whole with the original line.

On the 10th (Sunday), after a joint service by the 2 sister battalions of each regiment, the 1st and 2nd Brigades marched up to the rear of the battle area. The 1st Brigade went to Fricourt, the 2nd to Fricourt Wood and Mametz Wood, where they lay in bivouac among the trees ton the morning of the 12th. On the 11th, at 9 a.m., the command of the sector passed to the New Zealand Division.

Long ere now the Fourth Army plans had been crystallized. While the French would continue their pressure on the south, the Reserve Army would attack on the north in conjunction. An attempt would be made to seize Morval, Les Bœufs, Flers and Gueudecourt, through which lay the nearest avenue to the open country beyond. On their capture, the cavalry, supported by the XIV. and XV. Corps, who would follow up at once in rear, would be pushed through the outposts. With a flank guard of all arms established on the general line Morval-Le Transloy, the cavalry would seize the high ground east of the Péronne road, and establish a line in country later to become familiar to the New Zealanders, from Rocquigny through Voners-au-Flos and Riencourt-les-Bapanme to Bapaume itself. They would moreover assist in rolling up the enemy's lines to the north-west by operating against his flank and rear in conjunction with the attack which would be continued against his front. The cavalry would not enter the villages, so fire would be maintained on them. Corps and Divisional Commanders, with whom it lies to feel the pulse of a battle and turn favourable opportunities to account, were admonished of the need of boldness and determination.

The XV. Corps was now composed of fresh Divisions with their fighting spirit at its zenith. All 3 Divisions were to be put in the line, each on a frontage of about 1000 yards. This formation was preferable to keeping 1 Division in rear, as facilitating the more rapid advance of reserve troops with a view to paralysing the enemy defences and producing panic. On the right was the 14th, in the centre the 41st, and on the left the New Zealand Division. On its left again on the right flank of the NI. Corps, the 1st Division had been relieved by the Londoners of the 47th.

In the forthcoming battle the Corps objectives were 4 in number, marked in accordance with custom in different tints on the maps and referred to by these colours; firstly the seizure of the Switch Trench with the intermediate defences on the crest (the Green Line); secondly the establishment of a Brown Line in German trenches on the far slopes; thirdly the passage of the Flers System, the capture of Flers village and the consolidation of a Blue Line in front of it; and lastly the carrying of Gueudecourt and establishment of a protective Red Line beyond it, bending back to the north-west to the junction with the VI. Corps, whose advance would still leave the XV. Corps in a marked salient. Flers fell within the zone of the 41st Division, in the centre of the Corps, and Gueudecourt within that of the 14th Division, on the right. In addition to minor trench elements the advance would involve the capture of 3 formidable trench systems the Switch, the Flers Line, and the Gird Line that protected Gueudecourt. Opposite the New Zealand sector the German positions were held by Bavarians.

The first 3 objectives set before the New Zealand Division, the Green, Brown, and Blue Lines, lay square to its front, but its section of the Red line, forming as it did the Corps' north-western flank ran across its front diagonally. The left of the Red Line thus coincided with the left of the Blue in the Abbey road which ran from Flers to Eaucourt l'Abbaye, and the area to be secured in the final advance was roughly triangular. For the actual Red Line, which would mark the limit of advance and cover the exposed left flank of the Corps, there was conveniently situated a strip of high ground which extended back towards a sugar factory halfway between Flers and Ligny Thonoy. Along this high ground lay the important trench called Grove Alley which connected the Flers and Gird systems, and just beyond it was a shallow valley down which the North Road led to the Factory. The ridge on the other side of the depression similarly had a communication trench along its crest called Goose Alley. Both Alleys were to be scenes of epic fighting, but for the present attack the high ground about Grove Alley was selected as the final objective.

For these operations General Russell decided to employ the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, and hold the 1st Brigade in reserve. Two battalions of the 2nd Brigade, who would during the interval relieve the Rifle Brigade and be in the line, would seize the Switch. Passing through them, the Rifle; Brigade would capture the remaining objectives. 1 battalion would leave the Green Line for the Brown an hour after zero, 2 battalions the Brown for the Blue Line 2 hours after zero, and 1 battalion the Blue for the attenuated Red Line 4½ hours after zero. Should the fourth objective be reached without undue difficulty, it was intended to exploit success in a northerly direction, with the cooperation of tanks. The Rifle Brigade were accordingly instructed to push out strong offensive patrols and the 2nd Brigade to be prepared to support them.

Stupendous weight of artillery was behind the infantry to neutralise the advantages given by modern warfare to the defence. In addition to overwhelming heavy artillery a field gun was available for every 12 yards of enemy front opposite the New Zealanders. German newspaper critics might growl fiercely in terms like these: "Anyone would think that the object of the French and the English was simply to kill so many Germans every week or every month. They have no tactical ideas; they are simply butchering us. "Their soldiers knew, however, that no other alternative was feasible. The experience of Neuve Chapelle, Loos, and Verdun had established firmly the principle of demolishing trenches saps had machine gun emplacements, cutting communications, and in a word destroying the enemy's physical and moral powers of defence by a heavy bombardment preliminary to the operation and continued during the attack up to the time of the arrival of the infantry at each objective. The actual advance of the infantry was covered by stationary and rolling barrage of field guns. Normally the rolling barrage commencing in No Man's Land would move back steadily and evenly at a rate calculated by the infantry advance, lifting, say, 50 yards at a time and halting on certain defined lines for definite periods to enable the infantry to reorganise. The stationary barrage on the other hand remained in the position to be assaulted ton joined by the rolling barrage when it lifted at one bound to the next objective. While the heavy guns did counter-battery work, the field howitzers co-operated with the siege howitzers in bombarding objectives in advance of the stationary barrage.

The front held by the Division was, as we have seen, covered by the 14th Divisional Artillery and the 1st aid 2nd New Zealand Field Artillery Brigades, the other half of the Divisional artillery assisting the Division on the right. The New Zealand batteries were disposed on the northern slopes of the valley running from Caterpillar Wood to Bernaifay Wood as close to the front as could possibly be arranged. Forward positions in the event of success were selected. The initial bombardment commenced on 12th September. Sunken roads and road junctions, headquarters and villages as well as trenches and battery positions were subjected to a steady fire. Particular attention was given to the Switch line and above all to its extensive wire entanglements on the smashing of which the success of the operation largely depended.

On the same day (12th September) the Rifles were relieved by the 2nd Brigade and marched back for a short period of rest to Fricourt and Mametz Woods. 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago took over the front line, 2nd Canterbury went into support, and 2nd Wellington into reserve. Brigade headquarters was established in a tunnelled dugout built by the Pioneers in Turk Lane, just, south of Carlton Trench. The assembly trenches initiated by the Rifle Brigade were extended and further ones constructed. All other preparations were being pushed on with vigour both in front and in rear.

The 14th was a squally day of rain which cleared off towards evening. Throughout the day the enemy shelled the areas of Caterpillar and Marlborough Woods and Bazentin-le-Grand but refrained from harrassing our front trenches. During the daylight the German outposts appeared to have been withdrawn over the crest, and our infantry to their equal astonishment and gratification were able to work openly in No Man's Land, and to complete their jumping-off line and assembly trenches unmolested. The 1st Brigade moved up to Fricourt and Mametz Woods, and after dusk the Rifle Brigade marched up from their bivouacs there to the assembly area in front of the 2 rear battalions of the 2nd Brigade. In accordance with the sound principle already laid down by the General Staff, all battalions sent to the Reserve Camp, as so-called "B Teams," the proportion of officers non-commissioned officers and specialists, who would in the event of heavy casualties serve as a framework on which the renewed unit could be built. Parties were told off for all the heterogeneous duties of the battlefield, to police the trenches, to bury the dead, to salvage abandoned equipment, to act as ammunition carriers for trench mortar sections or machine gunners, to assist the Engineers, to carry up stores from prearranged advanced dumps-ammunition bombs water and tools, in that order of importance.

After darkness the tanks, male and female, crawled forward to their assembly area by Delvone Wood. They were still in the first stage of development. Their pace was not more than on an average 33 yards per minute, or 15 yards per minute over badly shelled ground. They carried a crate of pigeons for communication with Headquarters and different coloured flags to denote to the infantry that they were out of action or had arrived at their objective. Their mission was, roughly, to move in front of the infantry, attack certain positions at which particular resistance war expected, and assist the infantry in clearing difficult places if called on. There had been, however, little opportunity of practising co-operation, and it was to be expected that they would act largely as freelances of the battlefield. The tactical experience of the officers in command was naturally not at this time equal to their gallantry. Of the 4 allotted to the Division, 1 broke down in Longueval.

The hour of attack had been fixed for 6.20 a.m. on the 15th. Before midnight the troops were all in position. Each man was in light fighting order. Two gas helmets were slung over his shoulders. Over 200 rounds of ammunition were contained in his pouches and bandoliers. In his pocket he carried 2 bombs, and behind on his belt were tied the precious sandbags for consolidation. His greatcoat was left with his pack in the regimental dump, but he retained his waterproof sheet with cardigan jacket rolled inside His waterbottle was filled, and in his haversack was a day's rations and "iron" ration. Fastened down the centre of every other man's back was a shovel or pick. Each platoon carried so many smoke bombs for rendering enemy dugouts untenable and so many flares for signalling to our contact aeroplanes that, marked by white streamers and at black band under the left plane, would hover over them at prearranged hours on the following day and after dawn on the 16th.

German aeroplanes had noted the tanks and reported them as heavily armoured cars; and on our left a German officer wrote in wrath and despair an unheeded report on the suspicious massing in the British trenches and the inactivity of the German artillery. If the enemy anticipated an attack, he took no counter-measure. Opposite the New Zealand sector he proceeded with the relief of the 3rd and 4th Bavarian Divisions by the stout 6th Bavarian Division from the Argonne and the fibreless 50th from his Grenier. His mood appears to have been one of confidence, inspired by the repeated repulses of the British attacks on High Wood. A captured Brigade Order, dated 10th September and relating to the defence of High Wood and its vicinity, stated categorically that the German positions in Crest and Switch Trenches were so strong that they might be relied on to resist the fiercest attack.

In the New Zealand trenches the infantry, trained to the last degree of physical fitness and with the fine edge of morale undulled by exposure to artillery fire, snatched a little sleep. The sentries on duty, without either excitement or the boyish insouciance of the English soldier, but in stern and serene elation of spirit, waited for the coming of the dawn and whatsoever fortune might bring them.

By 6 a.m. they had breakfasted, and drunk their rum. A ghostly pallor was now creeping into the sky, and the Otago left could just faintly discern the silhouettes of the gaunt trees in High Wood, whose silence was unbroken by German shells. The watch hand crept slowly and as it were reluctantly toward the appointed time. The weather held out every hope of a fine day.

To the second our guns broke out into thunderous uproar, and to the second the leading infantry waves of Auckland and Otago, with bayonets fixed and rifles sloped, clambered out of their assembly trenches and advanced straight up over the hummocks and between the shellholes. The 8 companies moved abreast in 4 waves about 50 yards behind each other. Each wave was made up of 8 platoons in single rank, some 3 yards separating man from man. The advance was marked by admirable direction pace and alignment. To those watching in the Carlton System the long line of sombre figures was visible for a few moments ton obscured by thick clouds of smoke and dust. Trudging up the hill, the men hugged the barrage which lifted 50 yards a minute. They twice knelt down in the shellholes to let it precede, firing as they knelt at the machine guns in Crest Trench. An advanced outpost line called Coffee Trench, which lay in front of the Aucklanders, was crowed in their stride. On reaching Crest Trench more Germans were found than had been expected. On the left in front of Otago some 200 turned and ran over the open for the Switch. Many of them never reached it, for our Lewis Gun teams, waiting for the barrage to lift, raked the fugitives with fire.

One machine gun on the Otago sector was, however, most troublesome Sergt. Donald Forrester Brown with another non-commissioned officer, J. Rodgers, crawled forward at the utmost risk to their lives to within 30 yards of the position and then rushed it, killing the crew aid capturing the gun. Otherwise little resistance was met with all along Crest, Trench. Sections from rear waves were detailed to “mop” it up, and the leading troops, with their zest for killing whetted, swept on without delay to the Switch 250 yards in front.

Just before the Switch, the leading waves of Auckland in their eagerness overstepped the barrage and suffered casualties. The troops on the right were advancing in line, but on the left the Londoners had been delayed, after a premature start, by the peculiarly bad going in High Wood and by heavy machine gun fire. Hence there was a gap beyond the left of Otago, and the enemy machine guns and rifles enfilading down from the corner of High Wood tore some holes in the khaki line. The tanks, for which predetermined lines had been left in the barrage, so that they could reach the Switch 5 minutes before the infantry, had been delayed by the broken ground and had not yet arrived. As the storming lines lay under the final halt of the barrage on their objective, the 2 leading waves and the individuals who had pressed on in the avenues left for the tanks all wedged into 1 solid wave, which the instant the barrage lifted—almost before it had lifted—poured through the smashed entanglements towards the trench. Again Sergt Brown and his comrade rushed a gun and killed the crew. The Switch had been terribly battered and wrecked, but many of the garrison were still alive. There were also several machine guns, but such was the speed of the assault that the enemy was generally unable to use them, and those on the flank and in rear were masked by his own troops in the Switch.

A letter written by a soldier, who took part in the storming of the Switch, to his relatives in New Zealand affords an interesting record of detailed adventure and emotional experience:—

“On the 15th September our platoon went over in the second wave, and I could see the Germans' heads above the trench firing at us when we got about half way across. Even when we joined the first wave I could see that our ranks were pretty thin. We lay down and watched for the third and fourth wave to join us before rushing them. The four waves combined made up about as many as one of the original waves. While we were lying down waiting for the rush, Fritz was rattling away with his machine gun for all he was worth, and for a few seconds he ripped up the ground about a yard in front of me. It gave me a bit of a fright, and I wasted no time in wriggling back a few yards. I also yelled out to the man on my left to get back, but when I looked at his face I saw that he was dead. When we stood up and started to run, their fire slackened off a lot, and soon stopped altogether. Half of them put their hands up and ran towards us; some of them took to their heels, and a few of the fools kept firing at us. We all wanted to get at them with the bayonet, but some of us were faster than others, and those behind were so anxious to do something that they started firing at the Huns, at the risk of hitting their own men in front. I jumped into the Hun trench and found that it was so deep that I could not climb out at the other side, so I pulled a dead Hun into a sitting position at the side of the trench, stood on his shoulders, and managed to climb out. When I think of it now, it seemed a horrible thing to do, and I am not quite sure whether he was dead or not, but I did not notice it in the excitement of the moment. I was chasing one fellow and almost had him, but I soon found I was not too safe, as the fellows behind were firing, so I lay down, took steady aim, and shot him. Another poor beggar came stumbling towards me with a shower of bullets flying all round him. I knew that if I let him come too near me I would stand a good chance of getting hit by one of our own bullets, as he was drawing a lot of fire, so I gave him a bullet in the chest when he was about 15 yards from me. They are the only two Huns I can claim to have put out of action, although I may have killed or wounded more that I did not see.”

While some of the occupants made a poor fight, others stouter-hearted, threw bombs and fired rifles till our lines were atop of them, and then oil the greater part of the front, throwing down their weapons, they held up their hands, and with calculated presumption called for mercy. Mercy, how- ever, was shown only to the Red Cross men and the wounded. Where further resistance was made, the enemy in the trench itself were disposed of after a little point-blank shooting and a short struggle with bombs. The dugouts were cleared similarly. On the right, where the enemy were thicker, the Aucklanders used their bayonets freely. With this weapon Pte. A. R. Johnson showed magnificent courage and agility, killing one after another of the enemy who were throwing bombs at his comrades. It was here that 2nd Lt. A. C. Cooper, already wounded, continued to fire his revolver with great effect at the German bombers. Otago found a Headquarters dugout some 100 yards down the forward slope, and its 6 occupants were bombed. By 6.50 a.m. the Switch was completely in our hands, and its captors looked down on the new country where the greenish-brown fields seemed unscarred and the villages unshattered.

Below them, immediately on their right, lay the houses and kitchen gardens of Flers, and in a straight line, 1000 yards beyond, one got glimpses of Gueudecourt. On their left, about a mile and a quarter to the north-west of Flers, Eaucourt l'Abbaye could be distinguished with the picturesque ruins of the old monastery and the 2 orchard-surrounded farms built of its masonry—all enclosed by a high wall. It lay in the III. Corps front, and from it stretched a road to Ligny Thilloy, on which glasses defected the limbers of German transport. Between these villages in the middle distance lay the solitary group of buildings of the sugar refinery at Factory Corner, close to which the Rifle Brigade would thrust the line, if all went well, later in the day. In the background, the eye travelled over gentle wooded slopes on which the roofs of Ligny Thilloy and Le Barque stood out among the trees.

Close on the heels of the 2nd Brigade battalions came the leading battalion, the 4th, of the Rifle Brigade. It was extended over the whole Divisional sector with 2 companies in front, each occupying 400 yards and each in 4 waves. At the rear of each leading company followed 2 sections detailed to clear any intermediate trenches encountered before reaching the Brown Line. The support companies followed 60 yards in rear. At 7.5 a.m. the leading lines passed through the Switch, singing{48} and in high spirits, and lay down as close as possible to the curtain of fire some 300 yards beyond. There was still no sign of the tanks. When the barrage lifted and commenced to roll forward, now at a slower rate in view of possible difficulties on this reverse slope, the riflemen followed it for their half-mile journey without experiencing any particular difficulty. By the scheduled hour of 7.50 a.m. they had captured the Brown Line. The Battalion Headquarters moved forward to a sunken road some 150 yards behind, but here came presently under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The artillery liaison officer was killed, and several of the officers and men killed and wounded. Lt.-Col. Melvill and his staff therefore moved forward into the Brown Line itself. Consolidation and organisation for defence were at once taken on hand. Two machine guns were posted, one in the Brown Line, where it did particularly useful work against the German counter-attack launched during the afternoon, and one in a Strong Point on the left, from which it decimated a party of retreating enemy. Unfortunately, later in the morning, a tank was damaged about the centre of the line and drew heavy fire on the trench. The 4th Battalions casualties during the day were 13 officers and 254 other ranks.

All this time the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Rifle Brigade had been advancing immediately behind the 4th Battalion. Till they reached the crest, each section wound its way in Indian file up over the shellholes, each platoon group being separated about 100 yards from its neighbour to minimise the dangers of artillery fire. The 2 battalions were each in depth on a 1-company frontage of 400 yards. One company of the right battalion for a time got in front of the 4th Battalion, but this was remedied without confusion. German heavy artillery laid a barrage in High Wood and along the crest, but the shells kept falling in much the same spots, and a passage through was not difficult for seasoned soldiers.{49} The German field guns presumably were moving back, for there was little or no shrapnel, but with characteristic tenacity an overlooked machine gun in the Switch blazed into activity for a few thrilling moments and caused some casualties before the crew were destroyed. The battalions reached their assembly position in rear of the Brown Line well up to time.

Just after 8 a.m. the barrage moved forward again, though the tanks it was to cover were not up, and 20 minutes later, in accordance with the programme, the 2 Rifle Battalions started forward, unaccompanied by a barrage, to fulfil their allotted part in the battle. Their task was first to capture the sector of the great Flers Trench System on the Divisional front, then to carry Fort Trench, which lay towards Flers village, clear the north-west corner of Flers and the line of dugouts in the Abbey Road, and lastly to dig themselves a position front the tip of the village along the rising ground beyond the Abbey Road to the North Road valley and the III. Corps boundary.

On the right the 2nd Battalion did not find much difficulty in Flers Trench, where they captured over 80 prisoners, but as soon they began to move out of it, a machine gun from the hedges at the corner of the village in front caused several casualties, among whom fell Major A. J. Childs. By short rushes, however, the platoons pushed their way to Flers Support, which was found empty. From there to the Abbey Road the support companies, who now took up the struggle, met stiff fighting. Hidden in the plantations, the road had a sheer 20-feet drop, undetected by our aeroplanes and full of dugouts, and there the Germans resisted stubbornly. Part of the 1st Battalion, which followed in rear, joined in the conflict, and a platoon of the 4th which had been in battalion reserve was sent forward to assist. About 9.30 a.m. the road and plantations on the western half of the village were cleared of the enemy, and the 4th Battalion platoon returned to the Brown Line.

Partly to fill a gap on their right and partly drawn by the magnetism of the village, the 2nd Battalion had swung somewhat into the area of the 41st Division on their right, to whom all Flers, except this north-western corner, had been assigned. These English troops had had less distance to cover in the initial stages of the battle, and for them the Brown Line had coincided with the Flers System where it was contiguous with the village. Thus they were among the houses and saw the Germans retiring in disorder towards Gueudecourt, while the New Zealanders, according to programme were still mastering Flers and Fort Trenches. At 8.40 a.m. an aeroplane saw a crowd of them following a tank up the main street. Ere the Germans retired, however, they released pigeons with a report of their disaster, and the congested troops of the 41st Division in the village were soon heavily shelled and lost most of their officers. Only a handful penetrated to the Blue Line beyond, till the Brigade Major{50} of their left brigade, a fine fighting soldier, personally collected parties and brought them round to the north-eastern side. Owing to these casualties it was fortunate that the 2nd Rifles was in a position to give substantial assistance in filling up the gap on its right and so securing our hold on Flers. By 10 a.m. it was on the Blue Line in its own area on the New Zealand front and had its right thrown well over into the 41st Division's sector, and covering the village.

On the left, with the 3rd Battalion, progress was much less marked. As no barrage accompanied this stage of the attack, it was most desirable that the wire in front of the Flers System should be found well broken. It was a matter, therefore, of grave anxiety to the 3rd Battalion troops to find themselves confronted by a practically intact barrier of rusty entanglements. Machine guns and rifles chattered from the trench beyond, and it was obvious that their hope of surmounting the barrier of Flers Trench without trouble was doomed to disappointment. No tanks were yet visible. Bombing sections, led by 2nd Lt, R. A. Bennett and others, worked up the communication trenches which ran forward from the Brown Line, and succeeded in putting one machine gun out of action, but all their effort were unable to force an entry. Other parties, utilising the dead ground on the left, made some progress under cover of supporting machine guns. The 1st Battalion coming up joined in the fighting here as they had joined in the fighting in the village, but the barrier remained unbroken. Attempts at a frontal rush to reach the wire and break it with wire-cutters were effectively checked by the stream of lead pumped from the trench.

But the new British weapon was thus early to prove its value. About 10.30 a.m. the men lying in sullen discomfiture in the shellholes, with their rifles trained on any movement in the Flers Line, became aware of 2 tanks, one of which rolled over to the left boundary by the North Road, while the other smashed the wire and stamped out the machine guns. In their wake followed a party of 10 riflemen and bombers of the 4th Battalion, who had pushed forward to add impetus to the 3rd Battalion's attack. This little party, commanded by Major Pow, coming on top of the dismay inspired by the tank actually captured 100 prisoners. The 3rd Battalion then pushed up through Flers Support to Abbey Road to join the 2nd.

There now remained the final task of capturing Grove Alley. This objective had been allotted to the 1st Battalion, which till now had constituted the brigade reserve. The fighting in the village and before Flers Trench, in which parties of this battalion had become involved, made reorganisation necessary. When the leading companies therefore reached Abbey Road, they paused for a time under cover of the 2nd Battalion and part of the 3rd, now on or close in rear of the Blue Line, to straighten out their units. It was about 11 a.m. Owing to the delay at the Flers System the progress of operations now lagged behind the timetable, but as there was no covering barrage this mattered little. Advantage was taken of the halt to arrange with a small party of English troops in Flers that these should establish a Strong Point in an isolated German system known as Box and Cox, 300 yards north of the village, so as to furnish a defensive flank.

At about 11.30 a.m. the 2 assaulting companies moved off. On their appearance, 200 of the German troops garrisoning Grove Alley turned and fled north-eastwards towards Gueudecourt. Our advance was covered by the fire of the machine guns attached to the 2nd Battalion, which had taken up prearranged positions in Strong Points in the vicinity of the Blue Line. This checked opposition in front, but severe machine guns fire, admirably directed from the Goose Alley ridge beyond the North Road on the left, caused several casualties. Somewhat reduced in numbers by this fire, the 1st Battalion pushed steadily forward and captured the centre of the position without overmuch trouble. Particularly, fine qualities of leadership were shown by Coy.-Sergt.-Major G. H. Boles, who, when all the officers and most of the N.C.O.s of his company had been put out of action and the men began to falter under the fire, took command, organised the remnants, and led them forward to the objective. Two guns of a German field battery, one of which was in action, were assaulted by 2nd Lt. J. R. Bongard with a party of 7 men, and the crews bayoneted.

Thus the final objective of the Division, except for a portion on each flank, was in our hands. It was now, however, after midday. The tanks had gone over to the right or had been destroyed. No troops were visible in the 41st Division's Red Line, and even at Box and Cox in the right rear, the party that had undertaken to form the Strong Point had been prevented from carrying out the arrangement. The left or south end of Grove Alley, which the depleted companies were not strong enough to cover in their assault, was still occupied by the enemy. This force was hemmed in by the 1st Battalion and the 3rd, and no doubt could have been trapped. A more pressing danger, however, lay on the 1st Battalion's unguarded right flank, where large numbers of the enemy were beginning to advance from the north-east, and threatening to cut off the thin line of our troops, stretching out here "into the air." The officer in command in the front line had to make up his mind rapidly. He decided to withdraw steadily to Box and Cox and the Blue Line. Bongard's party destroyed at least one of the field guns.

Generally, in such circumstances, it is the duty of troops that reach an advanced position to hold their ground and facilitate the advance of their comrades on the flanks, but sometimes situations arise which are frankly impossible, and to stay then means useless waste of lives. On this occasion, as a matter of fact, the neighbouring troops were not in a position to effect further progress without an interval of at least some hours, and the tactical correctness of the decision to withdraw, however reluctantly made, was confirmed by the orders received shortly afterwards from Corps, that no advance beyond the Blue Line would be made that day. It was now about 2.30 p.m. The 1st Battalion troops set to work at once to consolidate their line. Of the 2 light trench mortars at their disposal 1 was destroyed by a direct hit. The other took up a defensive position. The right flank round the north-east corner of Flers was drawn further back to protect the village from this direction, and to connect up with the handful of English troops on the right. 2nd Lt. N. L. Macky, who was in command of the 1st Rifles' reserve of 2 platoons, moved forward, engaged the enemy with fire and arrested his advance. Thus, though it was impossible to maintain a hold on that last objective, the Rifle Brigade achieved further progress than the troops on either flank. In the course of the day's operations they had captured over 400 prisoners, 6 machine guns and a mitrailleuse.

To meet the threatened counter-attack on the forward position, the 2nd Brigade was ordered to send up a battalion in support of the Rifle Brigade. General Braithwaite accordingly gave instructions to this effect over the telephone to his reserve battalion, 2nd Wellington, which, previously warned for such action, moved off at once with 5 machine guns. They met a considerable barrage on the Switch and heavy shelling between there and Flers, but advancing in splendid order suffered few casualties. Passing through the western part of the village, the 2 leading companies found that the enemy's attack had been finally smashed by artillery fire and had not developed into a serious danger.{51} After reconnaissance of the Rifles' position they filled up a gap north of the village, where, owing to the necessary overflow into the right Division's front, the line was distinctly thin. As the infantry dug in, they were covered by the tank “H.M.S. Diehard,” commanded by a gallant young officer of the Highland Light Infantry. It had already done strenuous service, though none of its adventures so impressed its cheerful crew as the sight of passing Bavarians hurriedly adjusting their respirators, under the impression that the smoke from the exhaust pipe was some novel kind of lethal gas. It now moved forward along the road towards Factory Corner, protecting the digging parties with its broadsides and at the same time firing up the road with its forward gun.

At 3.30 p.m., enemy reaction seemed to swing against the left flank, where a previous attempt had been crushed by our machine guns. Reports reached Divisional Headquarters of skirmishing lines of enemy north of High Wood and west of Flers. The 2nd Rifles moved a composite party of a company strength across from right to left to meet this new threat, and a third 2nd Wellington company was also rushed up, but this attack, too, failed to materialise.

At about the same time the English troops on the right came up to a level with the New Zealanders in Box and Cox by occupying trenches further to the east, but in accordance with Corps orders and as their right flank was in the air, they withdrew again on the evening to the Blue Line. After their experience in Grove Alley, the riflemen were resolutely determined not to relinquish their grasp on Box and Cox. On the left they were now more or less linked through to the New Zealand hector of the Blue Line. If only troops were brought up to swing the right flank back further, they were confident of maintaining their advanced position. For this purpose, the last 2nd Wellington company was sent up in the evening, and after its arrival units were largely reorganised, the forward troops of the 2nd Rifles being pulled back to support. In the protection and consolidation of this awkward right flank, conspicuously good work was done by Capt. L. M. Inglis, of the 1st Rifles, and Capt. H. E. McKinnon, of 2nd Wellington.

The position in the evening was that the north-east approaches to the village were barred by the 41st Division troops on the Blue Line, and the north and north-west of the village secured by the 1st Rifles, with the three 2nd Wellington companies, 200 yards in front of the Blue Line and connected back with the 3rd Rifles and the other 2nd Wellington company, who were consolidating the Blue Line on the left of the sector. On their left, again, in the III. Corps area, the 47th Division had been very severely engaged in High Wood and been unable to take their objective in the Flers System. The 3rd Rifles, therefore, who had themselves lost nearly half of their effectives in the fight for Flers Trench, placed machine and Lewis guns to command the North Road valley. A further section of machine guns was sent forward in the evening. Blocks and bombing posts were established in Flers Trench and Flers Support, and a defensive flank was manned in a convenient sap which ran from Abbey Road to Flers Support.{52}

About the Abbey Road, during the afternoon, conspicuous gallantry was shown by Rflmn. J. R. Walter, of the 3rd Battalion, who under direct machine gun fire and heavy shell-fire went into No Man's Land, where he dressed the wounds of 8 men and carried them into shelter.

In the village of Flers itself a systematic search was made during the course of the afternoon. Many cellars and dugouts still contained Germans. Seven prisoners had been taken when a machine gun party, after surrendering, fired point-blank into the clearing party, of whom 3 were killed and 4 wounded. Thenceforward no prisoners were taken. Two machine guns were captured with a vast amount of equipment. As in the Switch and other lines, the dugouts were full of cigars, chocolate, mineral waters and food, with which the victors assuaged their hardships. No civilians were found. Previous to the battle the 400 inhabitants, who had remained in Flers under German control, had been withdrawn eastwards. The big brewery had been some time before stripped of its machinery and converted into Baths. The church had been used as a hospital, and the schools for operations. In the evening the 41st Division was instructed by Corps to appoint an officer specially charged with the defence of the village.

While these events were happening in the front of the battle, in rear there was incessant activity on all branches of the service, above and below ground and in the air. As an instance of the work of Staffs and Signallers, it is interesting to note that for the first 24 hours of the action Divisional Headquarters dealt with 700, and the 2nd Brigade Headquarters with 400 telegrams. The formation of forward dumps, the carrying forward of munitions and food the supply of water, the extension of roads and approach trenches, the evacuation of wounded, The movement of troops and guns, the development of signal communication, all necessitated urgent and considered effort. The rear battalions of the 2nd Brigade moved up to close support as soon as the Rifle Brigade crossed the Switch. Soon after midday the 1st Brigade also marched up nearer the battle. 1st Canterbury and 1st Wellington occupied the old German Second Line in Carlton and Savoy Trenches, and the remaining battalions went forward from Fricourt Wood to Mametz Wood. Batteries were hauled up over the shellholes to new positions under the Switch, between High and Delville Woods, and to Devil's valley, some 500 yards north-east of the latter mood.

In the Switch itself, 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago, with the Engineers' assistance, had, immediately after capture, begun to consolidate a new trench some 70 yards in front, with Strong Points on either flank. They had seen enough of war to realise that the lost Switch would certainly prove a ranging mark for German guns. This assumption proved correct, for an hour and a half after capture a heavy and accurate bombardment was opened on it, which continued throughout the day and night. It was not till the afternoon that the German observers noted the new trench, which thereafter came in for its share. Men were continually being buried, and portions of the trench had to be redug. But by evening it was complete. On account of the shelling, the Switch itself was left severely alone, except for exploration in search of souvenirs. For 2 days after, dazed and ghastly pale Germans, whose pockets were being rifled on the assumption that they were dead, would suddenly come to life in its dugouts. From if the battalions brought for- ward 4 undamaged German machine guns to the new line. The capture of the Switch had cost Auckland nearly 300 and Otago 400 casualties. The left Otago Company had lost all its officers and had been reduced to 34 men. L.-Sergt. H. Bellamy and Cpl. V. W. Shirley handled these with conspicuous ability.

In their new positions Otago were harassed not only by artillery fire but also by considerable enfilade machine gun fire and sniping, which came from their left, where the troops of the 47th Division, heavily engaged and, it appears, indifferently handed, had failed to reach their objective. These snipers were dealt with by the redoubtable Pte. R. C. Travis, whose exploits on the Lys have already been mentioned, and who now went out voluntarily on to the open and silenced them. Every effort was made to consolidate and strengthen the position, but the uncertainty of the situation in front of High Wood and the fact that our left was seriously exposed gave grounds for anxiety. A company of 2nd Canterbury was therefore moved early, before the Germans had been cleared out of High Wood, to fill the dangerous gap on the left. Later in the day also this flank was strengthened by 10 machine guns, and in the evening 1st Canterbury was brought up from Carlton Trench into close support. During the night and the following morning 2nd Canterbury took over the Switch.

It was some days before apprehensions about this exposed flank towards High Wood were finally relieved. Prisoners captured on the 16th from different Regiments stated that a strong German counter-attack was to drive in from the north-west on High Wood before dawn on the 17th. Further Strong Points and machine gun emplacements were therefore established and manned, and the 2 supporting battalions of the 2nd Brigade were moved to assembly trenches in rear the threatened attack did not actually materialise, and after the position was secured on the left, the garrison of the Switch, in order to minimise casualties from shell-fire, was reduced to a nucleus of 50 men, with numerous machine guns.{53}

The night of 15th/16th September was comparatively quiet. Patrols were sent out well ahead towards Grove Alley and the north Road up to the line of our own protective barrage, which was maintained along the whole front. On the 41st Division's sector it had been hoped that an afternoon bombardment of Gueudecourt and the Gird System might induce the Germans to vacate trenches and village and thus lead to peaceful penetration, but reconnaissance by patrols made it clear that the enemy was not to relinquish his hold so lightly.

A resumption of the general attack by the Fourth Army had been planned for the morrow (16th September), and orders had been received on the evening by the Division from Corps for co-operation with the troops oil either flank with a view to the completion of the objectives of the 15th. At midnight further instructions were issued that in the event of success the advantages won on the XV. Corps front should, in accordance with the general tactical scheme, be exploited in a northerly direction. In that case, the 41st Division would make a distinct change of direction, swinging north-west to capture the Gird System as far as Goose Alley, and the New Zealand Division similarly inclining to the left would seize Goose Alley from the Gird to the Flers System. This second movement, however, was conditional and would not take place before 1 p.m.

On receipt of the Corps orders the 1st Brigade, which had remained ready to move at 15 minutes' notice, was immediately warned for the capture of the Red Line in Grove Alley and for the possible exploitation. The 2 battalions back in Mametz Wood were set in motion at once for the area in rear of the Switch as a half-way resting place the completion of the fourth objective was given to 1st Wellington; 1st Auckland and 1st Canterbury were selected for the subsequent conditional operation, with 1st Otago in reserve. Wellington moved off at midnight and reached their assembly position west of Flers before dawn, after a most creditable march in the darkness, made difficult by lack of guides and absence of previous reconnaissance. The other 3 battalions of the brigade moved forward in the forenoon of the 16th, through a heavy barrage of high-explosive. 1st Canterbury and 1st Auckland, as assaulting troops for the second objective, assembled to the west of Flers, and Otago, less 1 company detailed for ration-carrying, dug a new trench for themselves just in rear of the Brown Line. General Earl Johnston, with characteristic disregard of danger, established his headquarters on the forward slope of the ridge in the new Switch, but was later forced by interference from hostile artillery to seek a less exposed position. As on the 15th, the weather was warm and bright. The artillery, which had through the night been engaged in wire-cutting, commenced the preparatory bombardment at dawn. Just prior to the 1st Wellington attack, an attempt by 2 enemy companies against our right flank was crushed by rifle fire and that of the 4 machine guns allotted to Wellington, together with the help of a tank which was on its way to co-operate with the troops on the right.