CHAPTER V — THE BATTLE OF MESSINES

From the first strategic developments of the war the British Cabinet had regarded as their particular charge the defences which protected the coast line and the approaches to the Channel. The German drive on Calais in the First Battle of Ypres and the second attack in 1915 had been providentially as it were, frustrated, but the menace of a further thrust was ever present. As it was, the enemy had secured nearly all the ground of tactical importance; and especially in the Ypres salient, commanded as it was by the low ridges to the east, where the German lines hung like an arrested wave ready to topple over and deluge the ruined city, the positions of the British were far from satisfactory. Costly to hold, the feasibility of their continued defence against a third German attack did not present itself as assured to sound military judgment.{75}

Early in 1916 the General Staff had weighed the difficulties involved in the capture of the Ypres ridges and decided that at that stage an attempt would be premature. In the vicinity of the Channel ports, moreover, failure might be attended by momentous consequences. Various preliminary measures, however, and in particular the construction of railways, were taken in hand with a view to the possibility of action at a later date. The development of the submarine campaign from Zeebrugge and Ostend and its crippling effect on the general British effort accentuated attention on the northern sector. A successful attack from this point would rob the enemy of these bases and might not only cut off his troops on the coast, but also compromise his whole position on his right flank. The new armies had been tested in the Somme Battle with satisfactory result, and the postponed operations appeared now feasible. In the Allied conference, therefore, held in November 1916, it was agreed that the main role of the British field forces in 1917 should be an offensive on a large scale in Flanders.

Previous to the main enterprise, however, it was proposed that an attack should be delivered against the salient south of Arras, in which the Germans were now confined by our advance on the Somme. From this earlier operation no great strategical results could be looked for without undue optimism, but besides wiping out the salient it promised useful attrition on the German forces. It might be expected also to preoccupy the enemy's attention ere he realised its conclusion and thus enable the initial blow of the main attack, the preparations for which could not be concealed, to be delivered before he anticipated it.

The Allies had with reason hoped that the combined offensive planned for all fronts in 1917, the British part in which has been indicated above, would yield decisive and final success. Fate willed, however, otherwise. On the Eastern front, any prospect of effective cooperation was dissipated by the Russian revolution and its aftermath, which were, as events proved, to strengthen the failing powers of the Central Empires and to exert an incalculable influence on the prolongation of the struggle. As the general Allied policy was thus upset, so too in the first months of the new year the British plans underwent considerable alterations. They were largely modified by the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg or Siegfried line, and they were vitally affected by a new plan of attack laid down for the French Army by General Nivelle and accepted by the Allied Governments. To his bold conception of a great break-through from the Aisne heights at the southern pivot of the Hindenburg line, with the capture of Laon as the first day's objective, all other proposals of operations on the Western front were subordinated. As a preparatory measure to it the British font was extended. General Haig's attack at Arras was to be proceeded with at an earlier date than at first contemplated, and with the additional object of attracting hostile forces from the French front nor was this all. The main offensive task of the British was altered from the original plans to the more subsidiary role of co-operation in exploiting the gains to be won by the French. Only in the event of these advantages failing to secure within a reasonable period would the original proposal of the attack in the north hold good. The work of preparation in Flanders was therefore somewhat restricted owing to the demands for the necessary labour in the south.

In pursuance of these plans the Battle of Arras was fought in the beginning of April by the Third and First British Armies, the former now commanded by the same General Horne under whom as Corps Commander the Division had won its first laurels on the Somme. Subsidiary operations: were conducted at the same time by the Fourth and Fifth Armies threatening the Hindenburg Line. In the vast preliminary underground operations at Arras substantial assistance was given by a detachment of the New Zealand Pioneers, who were despatched thither at the end of 1916, and by the New Zealand Tunnelling Company. This latter unit, formed in New Zealand in October 1915, went to the Arras neighbourhood on arrival in France in march 1916. The company was originally commanded by-major J. E. Duigan, N.Z.S.C., and later, on his accepting a Staff appointment, by Capt. (now Major) H. Vickerman. They: left an abiding mark of their work in the New Zealand place-names given to the subterranean caves and galleries which they opened up, such as "Nelson," "Blenheim," and "New Plymouth," and the following letters written prior to the Battle of arras indicate the appreciation with which their services were regarded:—

To Commander Third Army.

I wish to bring to the Army Commander's notice the excellent work done by the New Zealand Engineers Tunnelling Company during the past twelve months. First under Major Duigan and now under Captain Vickerman the work of the company has been excellent. Not only have the men worked extremely hard and well, but the: excellent relations that have been maintained with the various Divisions show a first-class organisation. I attach a copy of a report I have received from the G.O.C. 3rd Division which expresses clearly the opinion held by the Divisions in the line of the New Zealand Tunnelling Company.

A. Haldane,

Lieut.-General, Commanding VI. Corps.

To VI. Corps.

I wish to bring to the notice of the Corps Commander the excellent work and willing help of the N.Z.E. Tunnelling Company in all their undertakings with the 3rd Division. All work has been punctually and thoroughly carried out to my entire satisfaction without a hitch or difficulty of any kind.

C. J. Deverel,

Major-General, Commanding 3rd Division.

The fruits of the first phase of the Arras operations were substantial, and Sir Douglas Haig would probably have been well content to have stopped the offensive at that point. But it was part of the general policy to maintain the pressure while Nivelle's grand attack by 4 French Armies burst out on the Aisne. The French struck on 16th April. Their dream of a break-through was shattered by the Germen machine guns. It became speedily apparent that the day of rapid and extensive operations in open country was not yet. On 5th May with the capture of the long plateau north of the Aisne traversed by the Chemin des Dames, the French effort was brought to a conclusion. The Fabian policy of the limited offensive pursued by methodical progress was again endorsed, and Petain succeeded Nivelle.{76}

The French attack failing in its main objects, Haig's armies were thus released for the originally planned and now delayed attack in the northern theatre. for the purpose of diversion minor operations were continued by the British southern Armies.

Before the principal blow could be delivered in Flanders, it was essential to capture the strongly fortified, if not impregnable, ridge which leaving the southern tip of the Ypres salient stretched south-east past Wytschaete and Messines to the Douve valley. From it the enemy commanded unique observation over the whole, of the British lines about Ypres, and from it they were in a position to strike at the flank of any attack originating within the salient, further north. It was with the object of removing at once this observation and this menace to the right flank of the main operation that the Battle of Messines was fought. It is not, merely connected with but is an integral part of the tremendous Third Battle of Ypres.

While some of the assaulting Divisions were faced by outliers and subsidiary ridges, the New Zealanders lay directly against the main bastion, separated from it only by the shallow valley down which the Steenebeek streamlet ran sluggishly to join the Douve. The Steenebeek was half choked in places by debris or shattered culverts, and had formed small swamps. It was, however, narrow and shallow, measuring from bank to bank some 5 feet. Its bed was soft and muddy, and torn coils of wire had been strung along it by earlier garrisons. Constant reconnaissance had proved that while it might prove an obstacle to tanks it would not stop assaulting infantry. At the foot of the ridge and again on the crest the 2 front system of German defences were clearly visible. On the top of the ridge, along which the Armentières-Ypres road ran through Messines towards Wytschaete, the skyline was broken by the roofs of the village of Messines and the medieval masonry of its church. Information obtained from civilian records, refugees, and the survivors of the 1914 fighting was circulated concerning the deep cellars under the institution Royale{77} and other features of military importance in the village. From Hill 63 partial observation was obtained of the tree-bordered ]road known as Huns' Walk, that ran from Messines eastwards towards the hamlet of Gapaard and the town of Comines, the base of all German traffic in the area immediately north of the Ly's. Two miles to the east on the reverse slopes of the ridge this road crossed the first of the enemy 2 trench systems that ran from the Lys across the base of the Messines-Wytschaete salient towards his lines at Ypres. This first system, which lay just beyond Gapaard and the village of Oosttaverne, further to the north opposite Wytschaete, was called the Oosttaverne Line a mile further back was the Warneton line. For The moment the Oosttaverne Line was to be the limit of our objective.

In addition to the German earthworks on the ridge, concrete abounded everywhere—machine gun emplacement, observation posts and dugouts, and in particular the defence relied on a number of very substantial Strong Points, small fortresses of heavily reinforced concrete, each of which contained 2 or 3 machine guns and a garrison-varying from 15 to 40 soldiers. Half-way-up the hill in front of the New Zealanders were the cellared ruins of an old inn, “Au Bon Fermier Cabaret,” at the point where the country road from Le Rossignol and Stinking Farm in our lines meets the main Armentières-Ypres road from Plogsteert village and Hyde Park Corner. Further to the north at the left flank of the Division the road from Wulverghem, bordered by shell-stricken; tree-stumps, ran straight up the hill to the northern end of the village, and half-way up the slopes it also was joined by a sunken road which led from Birthday Farm on the left. At this junction stood the shattered remains of a mill, the Moulin de l'Hospice, set on a high knoll and surrounded by a trench, Birthday Farm was just included within the left boundary of the Division's area. The inn, the mill, and the farm, no less than the La Petite Douve Ferme defences, might be expected to form centres of resistance, and specially detailed troops would be required to deal with each.