In pleasant summer weather the respite from the line speedily reinvigorated all ranks. A Divisional gymkhana, and athletic boxing and swimming competitions were interspersed with training in open warfare. On 4th July, in the Bailleul square, representatives of the Division were introduced to H.M. the King, and troops of the 2nd Infantry Brigade lining the Neuve Eglise road cheered him and the Prince of Wales as they drove past on a tour through the Corps area. It was during this period that the enemy's development of night bombing by aeroplanes first made itself appreciably felt. On the British side this feature of aggressive policy in the air had been long established and was a particularly prominent factor in the preparations for the Battle of Messines, but hitherto it had not been actively favoured by the Germans the night of 6th/7th July, however, nearly 100 bombs were dropped on Bailleul alone, inflicting many casualties, especially in the tents of a Casualty Clearing Station near the railway. Other. bombs fell elsewhere in the back areas, and of these 1 struck the 1st Wellington transport lines, causing the destruction of over 20 animals. The continued bombing and shelling of Bailleul forced Corps Headquarters to move to the less exposed village of Flégtre.
During this interval of “rest” an interesting experience was given to the Rifle Brigade. With the Pioneer Battalion, a company of Engineers, and a company of the Divisional Train, they were attached for over a. work to the First French Army in the north on the work of constructing gun positions and making roads. In fighting, other troops might with greater or smaller claims challenge the New Zealand record, but in the use of pick and shovel the “Diggers”{107} were incontestably unsurpassed. General Anthoine, who was later to give his satisfaction tangible expression in a number of decorations, wrote the following letter to Sir Douglas Haig:—“Now that the New Zealand troops are preparing to leave the First French Army, I wish to point out the fine attitude of these men whom you have put at my disposal. Infantry battalions, Pioneers, and Engineers have rivalled one another in hard work and fine behaviour. I thank you very heartily for the valuable help they have given to the First Army. I should be grateful if you would let them know my satisfaction.” On 12th July the 2nd Brigade completed its task of cable-burying in the forward area about Hill 63 and Messines, and rejoined the Division at the village of Doulieu, which had been one of their staging billets on their first march up to the Armentières trenches a year before.
Two or three days previously the 1st and 3rd Artillery Brigades had reoccupied their old positions about Ploegsteert.{108} On 18th July the infantry began to move forward to relieve the 4th Australian Division. The relief was completed by the 20th, when the 4th New Zealand Brigade, still garrisoning with 1 battalion the right subsector on the Lys, reverted to General Russell's tactical command. The centre was now occupied by the 2nd Brigade with 2nd Otago and 1st Canterbury, and the 1st Brigade took over the left sector on the Douve with 2nd Wellington and 1st Auckland. Each of these 2 brigades held a battalion in close support at Hill 63 and a reserve battalion in huts further in rear. Divisional Headquarters returned to Steenwerck. A few days later the 3rd Brigade replaced an Australian brigade as Divisional reserve.
By this time the storm clouds about Ypres had banked up solidly. The activity of aeroplanes and guns was already marked, and all the countless preparation for the continuance of the battle, to which Messines had been the overture, were approaching completion. A tremendous concentration of troops was gathering in the Ypres flats. South of Arras the Third Army (General Byng) had extended their front over the Fourth and Fifth, Armies' area, relieving them for the Flanders offensive. The Fifth Army (General Cough) held the northern part of the old Second Army sector. on its left General Anthoine's Army had relieved the Belgians, and still further north General Rawlinson's Fourth Army occupied the former French sector by the sea. The spear point of the Allied attack was to be the Fifth Army, whose thrust-would be covered on the north by an advance of the right wing of the French. At a later stage the Second Army and the Fourth Army were to be used on the flanks to exploit success.
The purpose of these preparations could not be hid from the Germans, whose Press indeed discussed the forthcoming attack at length. Nevertheless it was possible for Haig to take various measures with the object of dissipating the enemy's reserves and artillery and to feint elsewhere, especially in accordance with time-worn British strategy in the direction of Lille, already menaced from the north by our new positions east of Messines. For this reason local attacks were continued, occasionally on a considerable scale, by the Third and First Armies throughout June in the Lens area, and orders were issued for the Second Army to co-operate directly in the Flanders attack by a limited advance on the right flank. The movement, in itself of comparatively little tactical importance, would nevertheless have the effect of stimulating German anxiety for Lille and their communications and of diverting part of the enemy's guns from the troops storming the Ypres ridges northwards. A demonstration would be made threatening a further offensive on the Warneton Line, and a passage of the river Lys would be feinted as a northern counterpart to the converging movement on Lille from the south. The remainder of the Second Army, including the 3rd Australian Division in the left of the II. Anzac line, would advance simultaneously with General Gough's main attack. The New Zealanders, however, on the extreme right flank of the Second Army, would move one or two days previously in order to carry out this feint and incidentally seize ground about Basseville which would secure the Australians' right flank.
During the month II. Anzac had lost to the Fourth and Fifth Armies the bulk of its siege batteries and other heavy pieces, but there was still a formidable weight of artillery to support the proposed operations. In addition to six brigades of 18-pounders and thirty-six light howitzers, it marshalled twelve 60-pounders, one 15-in., four 12-in., six 8-in., and thirty-two 6-in. howitzers. Wire-cutting, counter-battery work and trench bombardment were begun in the middle of July, and from the 20th onwards the artillery programme was accentuated. Night firing was especially intensified. While a quarter of the ammunition allotted for harassing fire was used in daylight, three-quarters were expended in the hours of darkness. One or other of the rear towns or villages, Comines Deulemont or Quesnoy, was daily subjected to a devastating bombardment. With a view to "drilling" the enemy, practice bombardments and barrages were carried out nightly at an hour previous to and also at the exact hour fixed for the attack. The enemy guns retaliated with heavy shelling both on our forward trench system and on Ploegsteert and the back areas. The 4th (Howitzer) and the 11th and 12th Batteries were punished severely, several of their guns being destroyed. Extensive use was made by the enemy of his newly-introduced "mustard" gas.
During the interval that the Division was in reserve, the enemy had again established himself in the shellholes and ditches in front of the railway line north-east of Basseville from which he had been evicted at the end of June. He had heavily wired the hedges. The strength of his position was definitely established by a 2nd Wellington patrol which had a severe bombing fight over his wire on the evening of 21st July, and it was manifest that an attack in this quarter would now retaliate substantial artillery assistance. While this was arranged for, the other necessary preliminaries were expedited. Assembly trenches were dug, posts pushed forward and dumps prepared.
A certain reorganisation of the troops, too, was necessary in connection with the general redistribution of the forces for the Ypres attack, and with the consequent extension of the Division's front northwards which was to follow later.{109} The initial stage was effected on the night 23rd/24th July, when the 4th Brigade took over the right battalion sector of the 2nd Brigade area. Here 3rd Canterbury relieved 2nd Otago. The Divisional front was now held by 3 brigades, those on the flanks with 2 battalions and the centre with 1 battalion in the line. On the following night 3rd Otago relieved 3rd Wellington on the Lys.
Owing to the German withdrawal across the Lys, there now existed between the river and our posts on the railway a wide No Man's Land which, low-lying and exposed to German fire, it was not in our interests to occupy. In the course of the active patrolling carried out over this extensive area by 3rd Otago, one party had a midnight encounter on the river somewhat out of the ordinary. They were in the rushes above the towpath when they observed 4 Germans warily enter a boat on the opposite side of the river. The boat began to push of furtively. Our patrol loosened the pins of its bombs and flung them, and as a direct result of their action or owing to panic-stricken movements of the crew, the boat overturned and sank. Not all the Germans had been killed, for the silence that followed the explosion of the bombs was broken by the sound of frantic splashes of an inexpert swimmer. The patrol could not see him, but they whipped the water with rifle fire, and the splashings ceased.
This energetic patrolling, not only towards the Lys and the 1 remaining bridge opposite Frélinghien but over the whole New Zealand front, in itself heralded the approach of the Division's more aggressive role. This embraced 3 tasks. In the first place, to make the feint against Lille they would establish one or two forward posts commanding the river and dig on its banks isolated trenches intended, not for occupation, but to convey the impression of being designed to cover the construction of bridges and the crossing of the river. Secondly, they aimed at the capture and occupation of Basseville. Lastly, they proposed to raid the enemy's posts north-east of the village among the hedgerows and to advance their line in this neighbourhood. The Allied attack in the north, originally fixed for 25th July, was for various reasons postponed to the 28th. The preliminary operations of the New Zealanders were so timed that their first and second tasks should be carried out on the night 26th/27th and the third operation on the following night. The construction of the posts was assigned to the 4th and 2nd Brigades on the right and in the centre of the line; the capture of Basseville and the clearance of the hedgerows to the 1st Brigade on the left.
The 26th was a warm sunny day. The evening was unusually clear. After dusk, however, without attracting attention, 3rd Otago on the extreme right dug 4 short trenches on the river bank opposite Frélinghien and northwards to Pont Rouge, and laid, as if for the purpose of directing a night attack, white and noticeable tapes across No Man's Land down to the Frélinghien bridge and the water's edge. On their left, one of the three 3rd Canterbury parties carrying out similar work was equally undisturbed, but the other 2 were to have adventures. One party downstream from Pont Rouge was absorbed in its work when the sentry became aware of a hostile patrol approaching in single file from the direction of Basseville. When the Germans were within 15 yards, 2 flares happened to go up across the river and revealed our working party. The leading German challenged. The Canterbury sergeant at once fired a bullet, and the German fell. The rest of our party opened fire with rifles and grenades, and the enemy ran, some silently, others calling out “Mercy, English.” Another large group of Germans blundered right into the third Canterbury party still further downstream, but were dispersed with casualties. In addition to the construction of these dummy trenches and the laying of the tapes, 2 posts were established by 3rd Canterbury in Pont Rouge. In the centre sector similar short trenches were dug and lengths of tape extended by 1st Canterbury. A forward post was also established near La Grande Haie Farm to cover the right flank of the 1st Brigade after their capture of Basseville and to prevent the Germans from crossing the river and taking them in rear. These operations on the right and centre of the front were carried out without artillery, and no casualties were incurred by any of our parties.
For the main operation, the attack on Basseville, on the 1st Brigade front, the commander of 2nd Wellington had selected the Hawkes Bay company ( Capt. W. H. McLean). It had been sent out for 10 days' training and had come into the support line on the evening of 25th July. During the 26th its trenches were heavily shelled, and the company lost 4 men killed and 11 wounded. After darkness it completed final arrangements and moved into its assembly positions for the assault at 2 a.m. For nights past, as has been noted, the enemy had been drilled by a preliminary bombardment and by a practice bombardment and barrage at the actual time selected for the attack. The first bombardment took place as usual, and with the second and the barrage Wellington left their trenches. Their left flank would be exposed to enemy fire from beyond the Douve and their right to fire from beyond the Lys, and in front, beyond their objective, the Warneton Line bristled with machine guns. To cover the Wellington advance, therefore, it had been arranged that Australian shrapnel should sweep down the Douve, and that in addition to the support of the New Zealand artillery the machine guns should provide a creeping barrage up to the Warneton Line, in front of Warneton, and sweep the Uncut Trench System that faced Basseville south of the Lys. When this machine gun barrage should reach the Warneton Line, the fire of the bulk of the guns would remain there, but a few would search forward to catch fugitives or supports before rejoining the others in their fire on the trench itself.
The Wellington company was divided into 3 parties. One platoon (2nd Lt. J. S. Hanna) made across the swamps for the ruined Sugar Refinery that stood somewhat detached at the south edge of the village. At the outset of the bombardment its garrison of 40 Bavarians had taken refuge in the cellar, and it was captured with ease. Into the cellar incendiary bombs were thrown, causing an explosion of ammunition and effectively destroying the garrison, not one of whom emerged. A post was then dug beyond the Refinery. When day came, it would be in touch with the new 1st Canterbury post on its right.
The second platoon was commanded by a fine fighting N.C.O., Sergt. C. N. Devery. His mission was to clear the village itself. He divided his men into groups of bombers and riflemen on one side and systematically gunners and rifle grenadiers on the other, and systematically dealt with house after house in the straggling main street. A considerable amount of resistance was offered, but in the end the village was cleared by sheer fighting power, and 2 posts proceeded to dig in east of it, in a position to command the river crossings at the partially wrecked wooden bridges used by the Germans. On the cobbled street or about the buildings mere counted 30 German dead.
On the northern extremity of the village, but detached from it, as the Refinery at its other end, was a second factory on the road towards Warneton. Here the third platoon (2nd Lt. W. G. Gibbs) had a brief and hot encounter, and killed 10 Germans in the open. The others fled towards Warneton, pursued by Lewis gun fire. A post here completed the ring round the captured village, and the whole chain was linked up by an intermediate post with our front line to the north. By dawn the posts were dug 4½ feet deep. A section was left in each. To avoid shelling in the daylight, the remainder of the company was withdrawn to the front line. It was most unlikely that the enemy would attack during the day, and at dusk the posts would be doubly manned to meet any counter-stroke in the night.
The expectation of a quiet day proved optimistic. Two hours after the attack, the enemy barrage fell heavily round Basseville and grew in intensity, cutting off the approach of supports. Sergt. Devery's 2 posts in the centre were twice attacked by small bodies approaching down the river bank from Warneton. These were driven off by the men's rifles and Lewis guns. Shortly after daylight, however, a resolute attack was launched by a force then estimated at 250 strong, and later identified as a whole support battalion of the 16th Division. A large detached party moved down the railway on the Wellington left and worked round the northernmost post. They had almost. surrounded it. The post moved out to meet them, but the enemy's pressure was overpowering, and to avoid capture our men were forced to withdraw towards the railway. Their retirement was covered by a Lewis gunner, Pte. M. Vestey, who remained alone in the sap. A German platoon from straight opposite tried to rush him, but he dispersed them with casualties. He then turned his attention to the more dangerous party working down the railway from the north along the ditch under the embankment. He forced them to take cover. Seizing the opportunity offered by their check, he ran to the railway line with his gun here in a shallow shellhole on the permanent way he once again brought his gun into action. The enemy by this time were advancing in force, and rifles and machine guns blazed at the lonely and intrepid figure on the railway. But only when his last magazine of ammunition was expended did Vestey withdraw. As he dashed for the shelter of the embankment a great gust of fire swept the railway, but he escaped unscathed. “By his coolness and gallantry,” says the official record, “he undoubtedly saved the lives of his comrades besides holding up the counter-attack most effectively for some time, and inflicting many casualties on the enemy.”
Through this withdrawal of the post on the left Sergt. Devery's posts, already harassed by machine guns from a 2-storied estaminet 100 yards north of the factory on the Warneton road, were now in turn exposed to intense enfilade fire They were obliged to give ground and move nearer the village. They were determined to die rather than be driven further. Presently an unlooked-for misfortune was added to their trials. Conceivably the occupants of some overlooked cellar, seeing the turn of fortune, resolved to make a bid for freedom. More probably a party of Germans, creeping along the river bank, whose steep declivity had not been fully recognised by us and was not commanded by our posts, succeeded in entering Basseville undetected.{110} At any rate, the posts facing the attacking enemy from Warneton became now exposed also to sniping and machine gun fire which was directed with deadly effect from the roofs and windows of the village in their rear. The posts kept their vow and fought to the last. In the end every man was killed or grievously wounded except Devery himself, who had been the spirit of resistance throughout, and 1 private. By careful stalking they succeeded in making their way through the outskirts of the village and through the hostile barrage luck to our line. The southernmost post, now completely in the air, was also compelled to withdraw. By 6 a.m. Basseville was again in the enemy's hands. His signal flares of triumph shot up, and his barrage ceased.
For some reason the Wellington posts were without S.O.S rockets, and it was some time before it was realised that an attack accompanied the bombardment. By the time the call for a protective barrage reached the artillery, it was too late. One of the machine gun groups, too, considering its task completed, had already withdrawn. As soon, however, as word came of his men's straits, McLean led a counter-attack of 2 platoons up to the railway through the barrage; but it was clear that the moment for their action had passed, and he showed good judgment in not persevering further in a forlorn hope.
The company had lost 4 men killed, 25 wounded, and 9 missing. Despite the ultimate failure, the performance was an extraordinarily gallant feat. It had been believed that the Basseville garrison did not total more than 2 platoons, but, as was corroborated by prisoners' statements, the village was actually held by 2 companies, whose combined effectives numbered at least 200 rifles. This garrison had been completely disposed of by the 130 attackers. They had killed half of them, captured 12, as well as 2 machine guns, and routed the remainder. Even when outflanked, the 44 men in the posts had put up a magnificent fight against over-heavy odds. McLean was awarded the M.C., and Devery and Vestey the D.C.M. As it was, however, the bitter fact remained that Basseville, if taken, had been lost.
But it was not intended to leave the enemy in enjoyment of his success, and plans were at once formed for a fresh enterprise. In the meantime the final stage in the operation, the clearing up of the shellholes to the north, was of necessity postponed; and the 1st Canterbury post on the right, which had remained in an exposed position during the 27th, was withdrawn in the evening.
The extent to which the enemy was alarmed by these activities and the feint of crossing the river is not yet known, but the desired symptoms of nervousness were immediately forthcoming. On the following day (28th July) flights of his. aeroplanes carried out a prolonged reconnaissance, and our whole area was shelled furiously throughout the afternoon and evening. Just before dusk hostile artillery undertook a violent bombardment of Armentières. At about 9.40 p.m. the shelling on the New Zealand trenches concentrated with special intensity on the left sector of the 1st Brigade held by 1st Auckland. In the right sector at the moment 2nd Wellington was being relieved by 1st Wellington, and the communication trenches were crowded, but fortunately the fire passed just beyond them, falling on the forward posts by the Douve. Telephone lines were at once cut, but our S.O.S. was answered promptly by the batteries and the machine guns. The so-called “normal” rate laid down for machine gun fire at this time was 3000 rounds per gun per hour, but on a S.O.S. call each gun fired 250 rounds a minute for 10 minutes, followed by 20 minutes' “normal” fire. Through this stream of lead and shrapnel 60 German raiders, under cover of their own barrage, made a valiant effort to reach the Auckland posts, garrisoned by the 15th (North Auckland) company. They were successful in driving 1 advanced section back with flammenwerfer. Another moved to its flank to escape the bombardment. The third held firm.
The withdrawal of 1 post was, as often happens in war, magnified into a disaster. The reserve company, which had stood to arms on the first alarm, was sent forward to re-establish the situation. They remained up in front, till shortly after midnight, when the posts were all back in position, and then returned to the support line. Auckland, suffering some 60 casualties, got off lightly, considering the violence of the shelling, which continued intermittently till 5.30 a.m. A few men were found to be missing. The Germans left 9 dead and a wounded prisoner in our hands.
At about the same hour retribution was being exacted on the other flank of the Division. There a 3rd Canterbury patrol was lying in wait at a moated farm in front of their lines for one of the German patrols whose tracks in the long grass showed clearly in our aeroplane photographs. They were not to wait in vain. A party of 15 approached them. They opened fire and killed 8, all well-built, soldierly-looking Bavarians.
Rain fell heavily the next day (29th July). An even gentle wind blew over the German lines, and a very large concentration of gas bombs was projected after dark on Frélinghien under highly favourable conditions which allowed the fumes to hang for a considerable time about the billets and dugouts. In the evening 2nd Auckland relieved 1st Auckland by the Douve, and 1st Otago moved into the 1st Canterbury position in the centre of the line.
All the while preparations were being pushed on for the renewed attempt at Basseville. The main attack in the north had again been postponed owing to "a succession of days of low visibility combined with the difficulties experienced by our Allies in getting their guns into position."{111} The new date was to be 31st July. As the German anxiety about an advance in the Lys valley was already manifest, and as any local attack now would meet strong resistance and prove costly, General Plumer himself decided that the New Zealanders' co-operation on the extreme right flank of the Second Army's subsidiary attack should not predate the general advance but be simultaneous with it. The feint of crossing the Lys had already been carried out, but the role now allotted to the Division was again, as on the 27th, three-fold: the capture and holding of Basseville, the clearance of the hedge system 500 yards to the north of the village combined with an advance of our posts, and the raiding of the enemy's position between our front and the railway on the extreme left towards the Douve.
The 1st Brigade area, from which the attack would debouch, was now held on the right opposite Basseville by 1st Wellington and on the left up to the Douve by 2nd Auckland, in touch with the Australians. It was arranged, however, that the greater part of the attack should be carried out by the other 2 battalions, who had completed their plans and were more conversant with the terrain. 2nd Wellington, therefore, would complete the enterprise undertaken on the 27th, and capture and hold Basseville. The second operation, the clearing of the hedge system in the centre of the line, was also entrusted to 2nd Wellington. The raid in the northern area was allotted to 1st Auckland. The captured positions would be consolidated by the battalions garrisoning the line. During the day there had been rain, and in the greasy trenches it was no light matter to carry up barbed wire and tools for consolidation, ammunition, mortar bombs, rations and water. The assembly of the incoming troops was similarly laborious. The night, however, was comparatively quiet.
At 3.50 am., 31st July, a roar of artillery fire along the whole 15 miles of the Allied front inaugurated the effort to win the coast, with the Passchendaele ridge as the first main objective. The field artillery, directly assisting the New Zealanders was divided into 2 groups. The right group supported the attack on Basseville by a barrage delivered by a gun to every 47 yards of front. Judged by the usual standard this was somewhat thin, but its deadly effect was to be testified to by the prisoners. On the open ground northwards to the Douve the left group had a gun available for every 23 yards. Howitzers bombarded the Strong Points and machine emplacements south of the Douve and in the Warneton Line. Barrages were also provided by machine guns, organised like the artillery into 2 groups. The right, supporting the attack on the village, searched the southern bank of the Lys and its trenches, and the treacherous dead ground on the northern bank. The left, protecting the assault on the hedges and the railway, swept the Warneton Line, the open ground to the east, mid the Douve valley. Admirably planned, these artillery and machine gun barrages were to prove of invaluable assistance.
The renewed 2nd Wellington attack on Basseville was carried out by the Wellington West Coast company (Capt. McKinnon), assisted by 2 platoons of the Taranaki company, and a handful of Hawkes Bay men who had penetrated the village 4 mornings previously and now volunteered to act as guides. Officers and men were equally eager to avenge their misfortune. In the meantime the German defence had not been idle. Round the west edge of the village they had fortified a series of shellholes, and here stubborn resistance was offered by fresh troops who had just come into the line. The leading Wellington platoon seized the Refinery. Two platoons followed it and worked up the village, one on each side of the main street. The fourth platoon made for the northern factory. The south part of the village and the 2 factories fell easily. The houses of the main street were cleared by bombs and bayonets in half an hour. The dugouts were left full of dead. Beyond the town a few snipers lurked in ditches or behind hedges, but these were killed or fled along the river bank in the direction of Warneton into these grey running figures rifles and Lewis guns poured their lead, and many fell to run no further. In an hour's time the whole vicinity was cleared and consolidation already in progress.