Special arrangements had been made to deal with the estaminet on the Warneton road which had proved so trouble-some to Devery's men on the 27th, and 2 sections under L.-Cpl. Leslie Wilton Andrew were detailed expressly for the destruction of its occupants. As they moved forward, pushing close behind the barrage, they threatened a machine gun post on the railway line to the north which was holding up our troops on the left. Diverging towards it they captured it, killing several Germans, and then dashing after the barrage picked it up afresh, pushed right into it for their proper objective, and ran towards the estaminet. In it a machine gun fired continuously. Its assailants made a detour round one side. Crouching and worming their way through a patch of thistles, they crept within striking distance of their prey. They flung a shower of bombs and rushed. Some of the Germans fled towards the river, in the wake of our barrage. The others were killed and the gun captured. While the rest of our party withdrew with the gun, Andrew himself and Pte. L. R. Ritchie undertook a reconnaissance towards Warneton as far as our standing barrage permitted. 300 yards along the road, on the very threshold of the village, was a wayside inn, In Der Rooster Cabaret: and in its cellars some of the hunted Germans sought refuge. A machine gun post was in an open trench beside it. The post was rushed, the cellars and adjoining dugouts were thoroughly bombed, and only then did the 2 men turn their faces towards our line. For his leadership and gallantry Andrew was awarded the Victoria Cross.

In the centre meanwhile the Ruahine company on Wellington's left front (Capt. M. Urquhart) had experienced bitter fighting. The general plan of the left machine gun group was on similar lines to that carried out in the former attack. Opening at 400 yards to the west of the Warneton Line, they lifted 100 yards every minute till they reached the trenches. After dwelling on them for a few minutes, 16 guns searched forward 100 yards per minute to the outskirts of Warneton to their extreme range. Here they were ordered to maintain a protective barrage till shortly after 4.30 a.m., when they would shorten their fire to unite with that of the remainder of their group on the trenches. 4 machine guns enfiladed down the Douve valley for 10 minutes and then lifted to the outskirts of Warneton.

The Ruahine company attacked with 2 platoons, Keeping a third in reserve. The fourth platoon was used to dig an advanced company headquarters. The task of the right party under Lt. H. R. Biss was to establish a post on the railway line. As they neared it they came under heavy fire from 2 machine guns in the embankment. Several of the party fell, and the remainder were forced to take cover in the shellholes. They worked their way forward from one shellhole to another as far as the edge of a glacis devoid of a vestige of cover. No further progress was possible, and fire was exchanged with the Germans on the railway. It was at this moment that L. Cpl. Andrew's men approached on their way towards the estaminet. Lt. Biss' party saw them, and the Germans saw them, and wavered. Biss observed them looking behind—a tell-tale sign. In an instant he shouted to his men strung out in the shellholes to follow, and the whole party rose to their feet and dashed at the embankment. Their determination was not to be in vain, and while Andrew's men dealt with the one gun, they captured the other, killing its crew. Biss, who had been wounded in the charge, stayed to see consolidation well under way and then reported the events of the morning to his company and battalion commanders before making his way to the dressing station.

The second platoon (2nd Lt. C. S. Brown) had the difficult task of clearing the hedgerows. After a 5 minutes' bombardment by the light trench mortars and under cover of close Lewis gun and machine gun fire from the flanks, the platoon left its trenches. It was divided into 3 parties. Two of these were practically annihilated by the Prussians' rifle fire from behind the hedge. Brown himself was wounded. The third party was led by Sergt. S. C. Foot, one of those splendid N.C.O.s that the type of manhood in the Division produced in inexhaustible profusion. It reached its objective but was fired at from the railway and on each flank and obliged to fall back. The Germans had just relieved the former garrison and had been in the position for only 3 hours. They were not less uneasy than the party that had confronted Biss, and the loss of the machine guns down the railway line decided them. They began to steal away. Foot was not the man to be content to let them go so lightly. He immediately sent one of his men, Pte. A. Stumbles, to work round one flank, and he himself ran to the other. Both were expert marksmen. They steadied their breath and fired coolly. In a few seconds 8 Germans pitched forward, each with a bullet in his head. The other 24 held up their hands and surrendered. One of the prisoners was an officer, and he vouchsafed the information that the company headquarters was in a concrete dugout not far away. Foot and his men hurried there to capture the company commander. They found, however, only his servant, a young lad of 18. The commander himself had found urgent business at battalion headquarters at the beginning of our bombardment. The rest of the hedge system was cleared without difficulty and a machine gun captured. The advanced posts were established and consolidated with the help of the support company.

The 1st Auckland{112} raiders by the Douve were drawn from the 15th (North Auckland) company ( Capt. J. G. Coates), which had its own revenge to seek for its trials of a few nights previously. They had since been taken out of the line for a night's rest. They attacked in 4 parties, and were followed as a second wave by a party of 2nd Auckland, who were made responsible for the construction and garrisoning of the new posts. The Germans had strongly organised their shellholes, roofed them with timber and matting and on top spread a 6-in. layer of earth to provide some protection from splinters. Over the earth thistles and grasses had been strewn, and in the long grass the positions proved most difficult to locate. A small hole gave entrance to each at the rear, and loopholes commanded the approach. In these shellholes the right party had a brief encounter on its objective, but the bulk of the garrison ran, and those who remained and fought were killed. One was taken prisoner. The second party's experience was similar. They killed nearly 50 and captured a prisoner and a machine gun. The third party was also successful in inflicting casualties. The platoon on the left, faced by intense fire from 3 machine guns and by a heavy mortar bombardment, were unable to make much progress. This check prevented the 2 parties in the centre from reaching the embankment, but the raid had achieved its purpose. Some 80 Germans were killed, 12 were taken prisoners, and 2 machine guns captured.

Under cover of these operations a forward series of posts, about 500 yards in front of our main position, was consolidated by parties of the 2nd Auckland garrison on a line with the new 2nd Wellington posts on their right. These last were now in process of being cut forward at intervals from a long drain which lay in front of Basseville across the Warneton road. The 2 Taranaki platoons were digging in near the Refinery as immediate supports and as wardens of the Lys crossings. The post safeguarding the right flank, which 1st Canterbury had put out on the 27th, was now re-established by 1st Otago. At 5.30 a.m. our contact aeroplanes looked clown on a line of flares along the whole length of the allotted objective.

The Germans lost no time in directing intense shelling on Basseville and our new line to the east and north of it. Machine guns from the In Der Rooster Cabaret and from positions south of the river swept and enfiladed the advanced posts and the approaches from our old front line to Basseville. Under cover of continuous bombardment 3 efforts were made at the recapture of the village, one in the early morning, one in the afternoon, and one in the evening. All were repulsed.

Shortly after dawn the first counter-attack was delivered at the centre of our line by local reserves from Warneton approaching between the river and road. They were observed concentrating at the In Der Rooster Cabaret. The mistake of the 27th was not repeated on this occasion. The S.O.S. green Verey lights, and rifle grenade signals, bursting into 2 red and 2 white balls, were at once fired and taken up by the rocket-post sentries in rear, whose gold and silver rain rockets had scarce died away when shrapnel and machine gun fire lashed the attackers. A few came on with great tenacity but fell to the Lewis guns and rifles of the posts.

The afternoon attack aimed at the post on the right. All our officers here had been killed or wounded, but the command of the post was in very competent hands. The light trench mortar officer, Lt. R. K. Nichol, who had covered the attack on the hedgerows, had moved his guns to Basseville to assist in its defence. Shortly afterwards his mortars had been put out of action by shell-fire, and Nichol readily obtained the company commander's permission to take command of the infantry post. About 50 Germans assembled in the dead ground under the river bank, and sneaked along it, endeavouring to come in behind our front line. Nichol collected about 10 men and was reinforced by a small 1st Wellington party under Sergt. W. A. Wasley. Biding his opportunity he charged the enemy. With a cheer and a volley of bombs the little party demoralised the surprised Germans. 13 were bayoneted and 20 shot, and the rest fled.

The attack in the evening was a repetition of the morning one, delivered with larger effectives and pushed home with a determination to which our men paid generous tribute. Rain had set in, and in the heavy drizzle the observation posts saw the Germans again massing at the Cabaret. Throughout the operations Wellington had used their rifles with masterly confidence and effect. They were now to give a final exhibition of their skill. Decimated by the barrage, groups of Germans pressed on to within 100 yards of our posts, where Lewis guns and rifles vied with one another in picking them off. The attack dwindled away, and we remained in complete possession of our objectives. In the late evening the posts were taken over by 1st Wellington in pouring rain which had already reduced trenches and posts to muddy ditches and greatly impeded work and movement.

In these operations 1st Auckland lost only 2 men killed and some 20 other casualties. The 2nd Wellington losses were inevitably heavier. An officer and 26 other ranks were killed or died of wounds, and 4 officers and 100 other ranks wounded. They had, however, the satisfaction of triumphing over their previous ill-fortune by an operation abounding, as the former one did also, in incidents of courage and self-sacrifice, but crowned with success. It was indeed one of the most brilliant minor operations which the Division executed. While all ranks insisted on laying stress on the magnificent co-operation of the artillery and machine guns, 2nd Wellington had full reason to be proud of their own courage skill and success. One further instance of devotion to duty may be quoted in the conduct of Pte. J. E. Ryan, a company runner. The other runners in the company were killed or wounded, and Ryan was for 20 hours incessantly engaged in making his way under fire from his company commander back to battalion headquarters or forward to the posts east of Basseville. Dangers and exertions alike he accepted with coolness and cheerfulness, and not yet satisfied with his arduous duty, when in the evening the relieving company wanted guides, Ryan was the first man to volunteer.

In their captured material 2nd Wellington included 5 machine guns and 2 trench mortars, and took an officer, a warrant officer and 40 men prisoners. Capt. McKinnon was awarded a bar to his M.C., Capt. Urquhart a M.C., and Ryan and Foot D.C.Ms. The regimental doctor, Capt. H. M. Goldstein, and Urquhart's sergeant-major. W. McKean, received for conspicuously fine work a M.C. and a D.C.M respectively.

Immediately across the Douve the 3rd Australians had been equally successful in capturing the enemy's line of posts along the road from Warneton to Gapaard. In the north, the left wing of the Second Army had pushed astride the Ypres-Comines canal, and Hollebeke and Klein Zillebeke were after 3 years' interval once more in British hands. Still farther north the grand offensive of the Fifth Army was falling short of expectations.

After the failure of his counter-attacks on the New Zealand front the enemy resigned himself to the loss of Basseville and confined his activities to heavy shelling, under which the 1st Wellington posts suffered severely.{113} No infantry attack developed, however, and no opportunity was given to test our strong machine gun protective barrage covering the approaches from Warneton. On the evening of 1st August, as a further{114} step to the approaching prolongation of the Division's front northwards, the 2nd Brigade took over from the 1st Brigade their right battalion front, including Basseville. In the following evening the trenches on the south bank of the Douve were handed over by the 1st Brigade to the Rifle Brigade, and during the night 3rd/4th the Rifle Brigade relieved a battalion of the 3rd Australian Division north of the Douve. In the interval which had elapsed since their last visit to the trenches the Rifle Brigade had lost General Fulton, who had gone to Sling for his period of duty. General Earl Johnston, whom he relieved there, took over on rejoining the Division, the command not of his old 1st Brigade, now commanded by General Melvill,{115} but of the Rifle Brigade. These changes of areas prepared the way for an extension of the Corps front a mile northwards on 8th August, when the 4th Australians relieved the remainder of the 3rd and took over the southern extremity of the IX. Corps line.

The Divisional front was now held by 3 brigades, the 4th on the Lys, the 2nd round Basseville, and the 3rd astride the Douve. Each brigade had 2 battalions in the line. The 1st Brigade was in Divisional reserve. Strenuous efforts were at once made to strengthen the defences and organisation of the whole area.{116} Wire was the first essential, for it was an established principle that the heaviest counter-attack is likely to fail if the defence is well-wired, whereas the feeblest counter-attack has a chance if wire is poor or non-existent. The posts in front of Basseville, the front line, and the support line were swathed with entanglements. Much of the wire was erected by the Pioneers, who under intensely disagreeable conditions showed all their wonted cheerfulness and unsurpassed ability at work of this nature. In one night, for example, they put up 800 yards of “double-apron” wire north-east of Basseville.