By their ultimate failure in the Second Battle of the Marne the Germans had been definitely thrown back on the defensive. Instead of crushing the Allies, their utmost hope was now to secure a stalemate, in which they might find compensation in the East. Their immediate task was to rebuild shattered Divisions, accumulate fresh reserves to replace those expended in the spring, and shorten their line by the elimination of awkward salients. The High Command accordingly had begun to contemplate an orderly evacuation of the salients on the Lys and at Amiens. The Allies on their side had now left behind them that critical period between March and August when their efforts were confined mainly to the holding of the offensive and to the construction of railways and defences. The initiative had been once more restored to them. By the end of July the British Armies had again been welded into an effective striking weapon, and the arrival of reinforcements and the expansion of the American Armies enabled Foch in his turn to pass from the small local and isolated offensive actions of the summer to larger, though still limited, attacks, as a stage towards comprehensive and co-ordinated strategical operations on a grand scale.
On 23rd July, when the success of his counter-offensive on the Marne was assured, Foch convoked a conference of the French British and American Commanders. He asked them to prepare plans for local limited offensives on their respective fronts, with the general aim of freeing rail communications. Should the first semi-independent attacks prove successful, it was hoped that subsequently the French and Americans might converge on the Meuse railways, and the British move towards the St. Quentin-Cambrai line which protected the Maubeuge railway system, thus threatening directly the enemy's communications in Champagne and indirectly his communications in Flanders.
In selecting the stage for the British preliminary operation, Haig, after considering the possibility of action in the Lys salient, decided to strike east of Amiens with the object of freeing the Paris railway. The British Fourth and the French First Armies attacked on 8th August, and with the co-operation of the French Third Army on the 9th not merely effected the liberation of the Amiens-Paris railway, hut also deprived the Germans of the use of the Roye-Péronne railway. In addition, the French on the Oise captured the Lassigny massif, which, if the Germans proposed to fall back on Bapaume, was the obvious southern pivot of their shortened line. In view of the unexpected ease with which these successes were achieved, the Allied Command definitely made up their minds to increase the pressure. Ludendorff's and Hindenburg's memoirs well reflect the consternation inspired in the minds of the German Staff by the issue of the Battle of Amiens.
As a result of this operation, the first stage of our offensive, the enemy was faced with the possibility of having to seek a line of resistance further east than Bapaume. He was also urgently and instantly compelled to expedite his withdrawal from his positions about Serre, where, as a result of Rawlinson's advance south of the Somme, he was being confined into a dangerous salient. He no doubt meditated an orderly movement as in the early months of 1917. Foch and Haig did not, however, mean to let him go so lightly, but to force on him a disorganised retreat. Moreover, in the Amiens area his troops had by this time been heavily reinforced, and there the wire and trenches of the old Somme battlefield would make a continuance of our attack costly. For these reasons, therefore, Haig broke off the battle on the Fourth Army front and transferred it to the Bapaume sector north of the river, with the object of turning the line of the old Somme defences from the north and of preventing the enemy's destruction of road and rail communications in his withdrawal on Bapaume.
Several circumstances promised success to a rapid and vigorous attack, and in particular here again, as at Amiens, conditions favoured the tactical factor of surprise and the mechanical factor of the tank, two basic principles in the evolved science of the offensive. The enemy appeared to have no premonition of an. attack here on a large scale. The ground, which he had yielded in 1917, was only to a small degree shell-torn and could be traversed by tanks without difficulty. Moreover, holding the high plateau about Bucquoy and Gommecourt we now possessed not only commanding observation but a position of deployment from which an outflanking attack could be delivered to the southeast in place of the frontal assault of 1916.
The initial stage of the Third Army attack was fixed for 21st August. The objective aimed at for that day was the Albert-Arras railway. The 22nd would see the Fourth Army conform on the right by the capture of Albert and by the passage of the lower valley of the Ancre, while the Third Army brought forward troops and guns into position for the main blow. This would be delivered on 23rd August by the Third Army and by the left wing of the Fourth north of the Somme, while the remainder of the Fourth south of the river would advance to establish a protecting flank. Should success crown these operations, the whole of both Armies would press forward to exploit it. For this purpose, the 1st Cavalry Division was placed at General Byng's disposal. If all went well and the enemy were driven eastwards on the shelter of the Hindenburg Line, the First Army would at a later stage attack on the north with a view to turning it and compelling a further retreat.
General Byng's plans may be summarised as follows. The opening assault of the Third Army on 21st August would be made on a front of about 9 miles by the IV. and VI. Corps in the centre and on the left of his line, their right flank being covered by the left division of the V. Corps which held the right sector. The principal attack to be delivered on the 23rd in co-operation with the Fourth Army would be carried out by all 3 Corps.
The IV. Corps had at its disposal 6 brigades of heavy and 15 brigades of field artillery. The front was now held from right to left by the 42nd, the New Zealand, and the 37th Divisions. The 5th and the 63rd (Royal Naval) Divisions were in reserve. The IV. Corps plans for the 21st laid down 2 stages of the attack. First, the left Division, the 37th, would assault and capture the slopes east of Bucquoy and Ablainzeville. Thereafter, the reserve Divisions, the 5th Division on the right and the 63rd Division on the left, with a battalion of tanks, would pass through the 37th and push forward to the line Irles-Bihucourt beyond the Albert-Arras railway. In the day's programme the 42nd and New Zealand Divisions in the right and centre of the Corps line would co-operate by swinging forward the right flank. In the first stage, they would support the main attack by artillery and machine gun fire, and by advancing in conformity with the 37th Division to a "Blue" Line on the eastern outskirts of Puisieux and the high ground southwards beyond Serre overlooking the Ancre. In the nest stage, as the 5th and 63rd Divisions advanced on the railway, it was their task to conform by refusing the Corps flank north and northwest of Miraumont. In this second stage the New Zealand advance would be in a valley overlooked on both sides by high ground. On the north the slopes were to be carried frontally by the 5th Division. The southern spur, on whose crest was the Beauregard Dovecot,{202} a long a ranging mark for our artillery, was to be carried obliquely by the 42nd Division. The New Zealand frontage would be gradually squeezed out by the south-eastern trend of the general movement towards Bapaume. General Bussell was warned therefore that his troops would probably be called upon to exploit the successes hoped for in the attack of the 23rd. The New Zealand officers accordingly lost no time in studying the map of the country east of the railway and north of Bapaume.
The inestimably valuable asset of surprise, which, generally impossible of achievement in siege operations, had been reintroduced by the British at Cambrai, November 1917, and developed by the Germans, had contributed in no small degree to Rawlinson's success on 8th August.{203} The utmost efforts were now made to achieve secrecy. The ostensible reason assigned for the concentration of troops in the Third Army area was the provision against a possible riposte in the Arras neighbourhood made with a view to easing the pressure south of Amiens. A much greater measure of reticence than usual was observed in giving information to subordinate commanders and the troops. The issue of bombs, the calling-in of packs and greatcoats, and other preparations were sufficient evidence of an impending "stunt," but it was not till the morning of the 21st when the roar of artillery, somewhat muffled by the fog, broke out in the east, that the men of the reserve brigades knew definitely that the battle in which they were to be engaged had commenced.
Similarly every possible precaution was taken to deceive the enemy. Operations were continued by Rawlinson south of the Somme, and on 18th August the Tenth French Army struck on the Aisne, securing results of tactical importance in themselves and attracting a further quota of Ludendorff's rapidly waning reserves. Our reinforcing batteries were carefully concealed in woods and villages till the last possible moment, and were forbidden to fire a single round from their new positions. No increase of work on roads, no fresh hospital signs were permitted. Movement by the concentrated battalions was restricted during daylight to a minimum. Every advantage was taken of cover from observation from the air. Undue fire activity, however, against hostile aeroplanes was forbidden, as being likely to suggest the presence of an unusual number of troops in our intermediate and back areas.
The 5th Division was partly accommodated in the New Zealanders' area, and the 2nd Infantry Brigade, in reserve, moved further back to make room for them. Concentration proceeded smoothly under the cover of darkness. During the nights 18th/19th and 19th/20th August the 3rd Artillery Brigade moved north to cover the 37th Division, leaving the New Zealand front supported by the 1st and 2nd (Army) Brigades. At midnight 20th/21st August General Russell established advanced headquarters in the outskirts of Fonquevillers.
For the limited task which the Division was called upon to discharge at the outset in the valley east of Puisieux, the employment of 1 infantry brigade would be adequate, thus preserving the other 2 intact for exploitation after the attack on the 23rd. The Rifle Brigade, therefore, which had on 18th August relieved the 2nd Brigade in the right subsector, now after nightfall on the 19th took over in addition the 1st Brigade area north of Puisieux. On the evening of 20th August they held the whole Divisional line, on a frontage of some 2800 yards, with 3 companies of the 3rd Battalion south of Puisieux and behind the southern part of the village, and with 2 companies of the 4th Battalion northwards to the junction of the old railway siding with the Puisieux-Bucquoy road north-cast of Fork Wood. These 2 battalions were ordered to carry out the attack. The 2nd Battalion was in support and the 1st in reserve. Battalions were compulsorily reduced to a strength of 640. In addition to the artillery, 6 medium trench mortars and the greater part of 2 machine gun companies were placed at General Hart's disposal.
The task of the Rifle Brigade was throughout closely co-ordinated with that of the 42nd Division, and with it dependent on the progress of the main blow on the left. At zero, 4.55 a.m. on 21st August, in conformity with the 37th Division on their loft the Rifle Battalions would attack Puisieux and press eastwards to their sector of the Blue Line. As soon as the 5th Division secured an intermediate position (the Brown Line), which they were timed to reach shortly after 7.30 a.m., and from which they would launch their attack on Achiet-le-Petit, the Rifles were to advance about 1000 yards down the valley, refusing their right flank in conformity with the 42nd Division. At a still later stage, shortly before 9 a.m., when it was estimated that the 5th Division would have effected the capture of Achiet-le-Petit, the 42nd Division would attack the Dovecot crest, and the Rifles' patrols make a further advance down the valley north of the Dovecot, for the purpose of establishing liaison and clearing the ground as far as the Ancre. In this third movement, beginning at 9 a.m., the Rifles' work would have dwindled to filling a comparatively narrow gap, and the fire of the 2 New Zealand artillery brigades, as well as of the supporting machine guns, would be employed almost exclusively to assist the 42nd Division in carrying the high ground about the Dovecot.
General Hart's plans were that both his front line battalions should effect the first task, namely the capture of the Blue Line immediately east of Puisieux, and that, as his left battalion was squeezed out by the southward movement of the troops on the left, the 2 further steps necessary to clear the remaining triangular area should be carried out by the right battalion only. 1 section of light mortars was given to the left battalion and 2 to the right. Anxiety was felt on the score of water. There was a scarcity of wells in the forward area, and water was still being carried from Sailly Hébuterne and Fonquevillers. The right battalion parties, therefore, detailed for the more distant objectives, were provided with an extra water bottle. All ranks carried 24 hours' rations in addition to the iron ration.
The night was unusually quiet, and the men had their hot meal and rum at 3 a.m. in comfort. By the hour of attack the sun had risen, but, as on 21st March and 8th August, there was a heavy blanket of fog which prevented observation beyond 100 yards and completely blinded aeroplanes. The barrage on the Rifles' front provided by the 1st and 2nd (Army) Artillery Brigades came down at zero on an opening line in advance of our trenches, but stayed there 10 minutes in order to allow the barrage for the 37th Division, who had a longer distance to cover, to come abreast. It then advanced by lifts of 100 yards every 4 minutes. Half the ammunition was the deadly 106 non-delay fuse, and extensive use was made of smoke. The barrage fell with greater intensity on the trench elements east of Puisieux, and here especially the Newton mortars co-operated. Five minutes after it opened, the assaulting troops crept up to its edge and advanced on both sides of Puisieux and just inside the outskirts.
The surprise so studiously aimed at was completely realised. The enemy's artillery was particularly inactive, and after the development of the attack the fog masked his machine guns. On reaching the eastern side of the village the inner flank companies of the 2 Rifle battalions extended to meet each other, and specially detailed parties cleared it up, taking over 80 prisoners. The left company of the 4th Rifles had some fighting on the eastern outskirts, where a Lewis gun section under Cpl. N. C. Neilson captured 2 machine gun positions with guns and a dozen gunners. In and about the village the 4th Rifles with insignificant losses{204} captured in all over 100 prisoners with 12 machine guns and 3 mortars.
On their right the 3rd Rifles moved some few minutes later, as the 42nd Division's plans necessitated, with a platoon specially earmarked for assistance in carrying a 140-metre contour hill on the southern slope. In the open valley south of Puisieux the right company encountered light machine gun fire when approaching the shell-damaged road that here formed the Blue Line, but covered by the fog was able to rush the guns before they could be effectively used. They captured 4 guns, killing the crews. From immediately in front, however, beyond the objective there came now fairly heavy fire which it was essential to silence without delay. On this point of resistance they pushed forward. They found it to lie in another damaged sunken road a further 100 yards ahead, and here about 6 a.m. they captured a fifth gun, the bulk of its crew succeeding in withdrawing under the fog. Patrols were sent out 150 yards and connected up their positions in the shellholes. The centre company captured 3 light machine guns and 15 prisoners. The majority of the prisoners fell to Rflmn. C. W. Batty and J. Lowe. These 2 men, with a third companion who was killed, noticing that a strong machine gun post was holding up a portion of the advance, dashed forward to rush it. Bombing the post, they followed up their bombs and captured the machine guns and the garrison of an officer and 10 other ranks. Thus by 6 a.m. Puisieux was taken, and the 2 battalions were established on and beyond the first objective. A section of our machine guns at once came forward to the vicinity of the Blue Line to open fire on the southern spurs of the valley, which from now on were also harassed by field artillery. At 7.30 a.m. our artillery fire on the New Zealand front was stopped in order to give free scope to the Rifles' patrols.
Before this time, however, the remaining company of the 3rd Battalion had crossed the Blue Line to establish touch with the 5th-Division, whose right, was known to have passed through the 4th Battalion, but whose Verey signals on the Brown Line it would be impossible to see in the fog. 500 yards eastwards of the first objective a temporary line was formed. Patrols were sent forward and gained touch about 8 a.m. with the 5th Division. The advance was then resumed. 6 machine guns and 33 prisoners were captured from machine gun nests. Owing to the fog, which also impeded operations elsewhere, there appears to have been a certain amount of natural confusion in the valley. Rflmn A. Dalzell, who was detailed to establish liaison with a flank, found that the area between his unit and the next was still in enemy possession. Single-handed he bombed a number of dugouts and captured 5 prisoners. He also located a machine gun in action, and taking 3 men with him he rushed the post and captured the gun. An artillery forward observation officer, 2nd Lt. R. M. Blackwell, M.M., took 15 lost German prisoners. Another, 2nd Lt. W. N. Sievers, with his telephonist, captured 7 prisoners, and with a handful of infantry appears actually to have passed behind the German outposts and reached the vicinity of the Dovecot. Sievers located a large enemy force massing for attack and without delay brought artillery fire to bear on them, which dispersed them. In the fog the left platoons of the Rifles overran the second objective. About 10.30 a.m. the fog cleared, and the riflemen found that they were ahead of the flank troops and on a bare spur immediately overlooking the railway. The position offered no cover from the intense fire of the machine guns about the Ancre. They therefore fell back and occupied a line nearly a mile beyond Puisieux, but somewhat in rear of their objective, where they prolonged and refused the 5th Division's flank. The right platoons, who in the fog had moved somewhat independently, had made less rapid progress in conformity with the 42nd Division's advance along the spur to the south. By noon they were connected with the 2 left platoons, whose line they continued across the valley.