The 42nd Division moved shortly before 6 a.m. and 2nd Auckland with them. It was now broad daylight with no protecting mist. Raked by fire from the village of Beaulencourt further down the Péronne Road, which had resisted the V. Corps' attack, the 42nd Division was unable to take Riencourt, and this check in turn exposed the right of Auckland. Intense machine gun fire raged from the village itself and the coppices round it, and though artillery support was obtained it failed to neutralise the machine guns. For the moment it was out of the question for Auckland's right flank to attempt to advance over the open slopes north of Riencourt, and consequently a defensive flank was formed well up the ridge pending the fall of the village. Even the establishment of this foothold on the high ground was a creditable performance. The left company advanced rapidly, clearing Bancourt by 8 a.m. and gaining touch with 1st Wellington. In mopping up, Auckland was helped by 2 companies of the 2nd Rifles who came forward and secured 34 prisoners. In this strenuous day Auckland lost an officer and 17 men killed and 8 officers and 112 men wounded. One wounded man was missing. The places of the officers were taken effectively by Sergt. L. Thomas, M.M., Sergt. H. M. Morris, Cpl. L. G. North, L/Cpl. G. C. Ford, and others.

The general advance effected by the 3 battalions amounted to a mile and a quarter. Parties of the enemy digging in east of Bancourt during the morning were heavily shelled by our artillery. Others could be seen moving back towards Villers-au-Flos at noon, but till Riencourt fell the New Zealanders could make no further move. On the left too the 5th Division had cleared the old British trenches west of Beugny but had been unable to capture the village, and as a result the 1st Rifles' position was not satisfactory. Sustained rifle and machine gun tire from Beugny caused casualties, and the line was thin. Soon after midday the enemy counter-attacked. He succeeded in driving the 1st Rifles' right flank and a post on the left off the crest. In the afternoon no improvement took place on the flanks, and both the Rifle companies were obliged to withdraw their remaining posts. They established themselves in a trench line about 300 yards below the crest. Here they were sufficiently clear of the enemy edge of Fremicourt, and a hostile bombardment on the village at 4.30 p.m. passed idly over their heads. The remaining 3 platoons of the reserve company and a section of Vickers guns were sent up the Cambrai Road towards Beugny to strengthen the left flank, and a company of the 3rd Rifles was attached in reserve.

Meanwhile on the right flank the 42nd Division planned a further attack shortly after 7 p.m. on Riencourt. To destroy the machine gun nests the 3rd New Zealand Battery ran a gun in the afternoon up the Péronne Road within 900 yards of Riencourt, and engaged them over open sights. The attack was preceded by a 2 hours' bombardment. As the 42nd Division advanced, the 1st Brigade's right flank swung forward in conformity. No machine gun fire was directed at them now from Riencourt, and the enemy appeared to be shelling it. 2nd Auckland had no difficulty in moving up another 500 yards. But though Riencourt was clear, a tremendous volume of machine gun fire from Beaulencourt swept the 42nd Division's flank, and they failed to enter the village. A further attempt after darkness proved successful. During the night 30th/31st August{223} and early next morning the New Zealand batteries moved to the valleys north-east of Bapaume, and constant harassing fire was maintained on German approaches. At about 5 a.m. on the 31st the enemy heavily barraged our front line, and following on a reconnaissance by three or four of his tanks{224} he made a strong counter-attack half an hour later. S.O.S. signals were fired, but were at first masked by poor visibility. Later the light cleared, and the enemy infantry were engaged not merely by rifle and machine gun fire, lout also over open sights by the forward sections of the 1st Artillery Brigade batteries. One or two posts in the centre of the line before the 7th Battery (Major H. G. Wilding, D.S.O.) were driven in about 300 yards, but Wilding held his ground and continued a devastating fire, under which the Germans recoiled. By the cemetery the support company of the 1st Rifles stood fast and strengthened their flank with additional Lewis guns at the southern end of the village. The enemy tanks came forward towards the cemetery, but though heavily fired on made no attack and turned in the direction of Haplincourt Wood, which was forthwith shelled by the Corps heavies. As they withdrew, the enemy machine gunners, who had not been warned about the tanks' reconnaissance, mistook them for British tanks, and hotly engaged them with armour-piercing ammunition. Under this fire some of the tank personnel appear to have lost their heads, and 2 tanks ran into a bank and became ditched. These fell into our hands later on 2nd September. They bore ample evidence of the effect of German armour-piercing ammunition.

On the left of the Rifles, in view of the gap towards the 5th Division, all possible measures had been taken during the night to strengthen the thin line. Daylight revealed that the precautions adopted were more than justified. Two strong enemy parties had infiltrated through behind our line, possibly working down the railway through the railway yard and the dumps, and were now in our rear. Both parties were about 50 strong. The first was taken prisoner by vigorous enterprise on the part of Sergt. A. J. Cunningham, M.M., who, while reconnoitring the front, was surprised by the sight of the Germans. He at once went to a neighbouring platoon and asked for a section. Dividing them into 2 parties, he charged the enemy and captured 46 prisoners, with very few casualties. The other was wiped out by our machine gun and infantry fire, in which the 5th Division co-operated, only half a dozen prisoners remaining. By 7 a.m. the Rifles' posts on the right were restored to the position on the slopes lost at daybreak, and the 1st Brigade also pushed forward again shortly afterwards and were now able to swing their refused right to join the 42nd Division east of Riencourt.

It was obviously desirable to retake the portion of the actual crest lost on the 30th, and also, now that the 42nd Division held Riencourt and protected the right flank, to extend our footing on the high ground for the purpose of securing wider observation. Preparations were pressed forward to that end. The 5th Division on the left were to cooperate. Reconnaissance, however, established that the crest line was held too strongly to be taken without artillery. A conference was held at advanced Divisional headquarters, now at Grévillers. The operation, in which both brigades would take part, was fixed for the following morning (1st September), under an artillery barrage. In accordance with these plans, the 1st Rifles' reserve and support companies passed at 4.55 a.m. through the outpost line. By 5.30 a.m. they had carried their objective, and their centre was beyond it. They secured 70 prisoners of the 23rd (Saxon) Division, together with the usual haul of mortars and machine guns. Later in the morning the right of the 5th Division, which had been unable to attack at zero, pushed forward as far as was possible in the day time, and in the evening, under cover of darkness, it dribbled up into line. At the close of the day the Rifles' casualties were 84, of whom the greater number were lightly wounded cases.

The 1st Brigade, who were faced by the 44th (Reserve) Division, were not to gain their objective with the same uneventful smoothness. In close touch with the Rifles on its left, 1st Wellington attacked with 3 companies in line. In command of one of the platoons was a Sergt. John Gilroy Grant, who throughout the 2 days' previous fighting had displayed coolness determination and valour of the highest order. On nearing the crest his company threatened to be hung up by a line of 5 enemy machine guns. Under point-blank fire, however, it rushed forward. When some 20 yards from the guns Grant, closely followed by L.-Cpl. C. T. Hill, dashed ahead of his platoon at the centre post. No one but the panic-stricken German at the gun could tell how the fire missed him. He leapt into the post, demoralising the gunners. His men were close on his heels. The instant they were on the parapet he rushed the post on the left in the same manner, and cleared first it and then the next one, and the company quickly occupied the remainder. Grant was awarded the V.C. and Hill the D.C.M. The other companies did not encounter very determined resistance. One platoon was taken by surprise by a hostile machine gun at close range. L.-Cpl. W. E. Ball immediately engaged the machine gun, and by skilful manoeuvring beat down its fire and forced it out of its position. The platoon then moved forward successfully. The whole position was gained and established well up to time. It had been intended to push patrols forward towards the Haplincourt Road, but intense machine gun fire from that direction made all movement impossible. Small sections of trenches were dug in touch with one another along the crest.

This fire from the Haplincourt Road and from huts on the roadside had seriously inconvenienced the advance of the 3 companies of 2nd Auckland who incurred more casualties from it than in clearing their objective. No touch was yet obtained with the 42nd Division. A foreshadowed German counter-attack was stifled by our artillery action. The enemy gun-fire slackened considerably. The snipers in the Haplincourt Road huts were temporarily dislodged by one of the 2 tanks put at Auckland's disposal{225}, and the battalion proceeded to consolidate their position. During the day the 1st Brigade captured 100 prisoners and 7 machine guns.

The tank having fulfilled its mission departed, and ere long the German snipers and machine guns returned to the huts. 2nd Auckland, though toiling manfully, were not yet under cover, and from the huts machine gun fire became very heavy on their centre. Mortars in a sunken road in front pounded destructively on the same sector. Anti-tank gun fire from the direction of Villers-au-Flos also raked these exposed forward slopes. Movement and consolidation became alike impossible, and after suffering severely the survivors, too weak to attack the enemy, even if attack were feasible, were forced to withdraw behind the crest. On this misfortune being reported, orders were issued for an immediate re-establishment of the line before the 2nd Brigade, relieving the front, line troops in the evening, took over the position. The assistance of a 2nd Wellington company was put at Auckland's disposal. The project was, however, eventually abandoned, and General Young expressed himself as satisfied with the position as it was. During the day Auckland had lost 3 officers and 31 men. killed, and 104 men wounded. 1 man had been taken prisoner.

While this minor action was being effected on the IV. Corps front, operations of greater importance were in progress elsewhere in the final phases of the Battle of Bapaume. By 27th August the enemy, threatened by the progress of the Third Army, had fallen back on the whole of his front in the south between the Oise and the Somme. Roye Nesle and Noyon had been recaptured. In brilliant operations begun on 30th/31st August the Australians had stormed Mont St. Quentin, and on 1st September captured Péronne. On the left of the Third Army we were in possession of Vaulx-Vraucourt-Longatte-Bullecourt and Heudecourt. The second stage of the British offensive was now closed.

The battle had been no facile triumph. The enemy had indeed been retiring, but his movements had up till this time been conducted in a great measure deliberately, with marked skill and in good order. His rearguards had offered fight on positions carefully selected to give the greatest scope to well-placed machine guns supported by field artillery. The successive lines occupied were independently organised and sufficiently far behind one another to prevent troops who had carried the first from overrunning the second with their initial impetus. The villages and broken commanding ground chosen as centres of resistance were in themselves formidable. The machine gun positions were sited up to 1500 yards, and in such spots as afforded no covered approach either from the front or flanks. Unoccupied intervals were left merely as traps. Moreover, each centre of resistance was sited for all-round defence. The destruction or capitulation of one did not materially facilitate the task of our units on either side, for, while neighbouring centres held out, further progress into the gap was, in daylight at least, extremely arduous. Against these machine gun nests the most gallant efforts to advance with infantry weapons not supported by artillery had proved unsuccessful. The German rearguards had displayed resolution and had repeatedly sacrificed themselves, Fighting for time, the enemy had in many cases forced from us more of that priceless asset than we were disposed to yield, and he had maintained unbroken a screen behind which he had withdrawn his guns and main force.

Under these conditions the attacking troops were called upon for strenuous and incessant labour. Nor had the cost been light. The Corps casualties amounted to over 600 officers and nearly 11,000 men. Of the 3 New Zealand infantry brigades, the 1st had lost 10 officers killed and 36 wounded, and 110 other ranks killed and over 500 wounded. The 2nd Brigade had 7 officers killed and 28 wounded, 150 men killed and 650 wounded. In the 3rd Brigade, 14 officers and 120 men had given their lives, and 34 officers and close on 600 men had been wounded. The Division had lost some 2 dozen prisoners.

But despite German science and stubbornness there could be no doubt as to the satisfactory results of the battle. "The troops of the Third and Fourth Armies, comprising 23 British Divisions, by skilful leading, hard fighting, and relentless and unremitting pursuit, had driven 35 German Divisions from one side of the old Somme battlefield to the other, thereby turning the line of the River Somme. In so doing they had inflicted upon the enemy the heaviest losses in killed and wounded, and had taken from him over 34,000 prisoners and 270 guns."{226} The IV. Corps alone had captured nearly 8000 prisoners. Of these the New Zealanders' share amounted to 47 officers and just over 1600 men.

In the battle the Division had experienced its share of checks and disappointments, but these were outweighed by its repeated successes. In common with the other troops engaged it had found that the transition from trench warfare to a battle of movement involved certain novel and at the outset somewhat bewildering features. Above all, the speed necessary to secure surprise and exploit success had allowed no place for elaborate deliberations and had rendered it in many instances impossible for battalions or even brigades to give other than verbal orders. It was thus inevitable that the men should get little previous information. This involved obvious disadvantages. But all difficulties incident to the change were surmounted with remarkable and admirable rapidity. Competent observers noted the facility with which subordinate commanders grasped hurriedly-sketched operations, and with which units of all arms, after one or two days of open warfare, achieved a high degree of mobility. The mass of comprehensive detailed and precise reports forwarded by artillery and infantry officers and by Intelligence personnel on our own and the enemy's positions and movements constitutes a striking testimony to the adaptability of officers and men to novel circumstances.