The V. Corps on the right were now also over the Canal du Nord, and the VI. Corps on the left had reached its western bank about the great spoil-heap near Hermies. Here the deep trough of the canal might prove a serious obstacle, but it was not yet certain that the enemy would contest it. Corps Commanders were instructed to continue to adhere to the principle of pressing the enemy with advanced guards, with the object of driving in his rear guards and outposts and ascertaining his dispositions. Troops were to be rested as much as possible, resources conserved and communications improved with a view to a vigorous resumption of the offensive in the near future. As many Divisions and artillery brigades as possible were to be withdrawn into reserve for rest and training.

In accordance with this policy, the Corps front was on the night 5th/6th September reconstituted on a 2-Divisional basis. The 37th took over the northern sector of the New Zealand line, which extended southwards to include that of the 42nd Division. This increase of frontage necessitated the employment by the leading brigade of 3 battalions in the line. The remaining battalion would be in support. A battalion of the support brigade was allotted as reserves. 2nd Canterbury's line down to Matheson Road was handed over to the 37th Division, and it side-stepped southwards. Similarly 1st Otago extended their right to take over part of the 42nd Division's position east of Neuville-Bourgonval. The remaining 1000 yards were given to 1st Canterbury who came in on the right. 2nd Wellington was placed at General Young's disposal as a mobile reserve.

The 3 field artillery brigades covering the 42nd Division's front passed under General Napier Johnston's command. The second of the 2 British (Army) brigades hitherto attached to the Division was handed over to the 37th Division. A battery of 9.2-in. howitzers and a brigade of R.G.A., consisting of 3 batteries of 6-in. howitzers, was affiliated to the Division. The 2nd (Army) Brigade, 1 of the British field artillery brigades, and the 3rd Brigade covered the front, while the remaining 3 brigades remained in Divisional reserve but were maintained in action for S.O.S. On the following day, in conformity with Army instructions, 1 of the 42nd Divisional Artillery brigades was withdrawn, and the remaining 2 brigades with the 1st N.Z.F.A. Brigade were superimposed over the whole front.

While these various readjustments were in progress, the 2nd Canterbury area and Ruyaulcourt were heavily gassed, and the infantry reliefs were considerably hampered and delayed. This artillery activity covered a further enemy withdrawal south of Havrincourt Wood. The shelling eased off towards morning, and patrols early reported signs of evacuation.

While making a personal reconnaissance at 10 a.m. of a Strong Point in the trenches east of Neuville-Bourgonval, Major Hargest, his intelligence officer, and a sergeant ran unexpectedly into and took prisoners a party of 5 Germans with a machine gun. Shortly afterwards in the same vicinity another small Otago party under 2nd Lt. A. E. Byrne captured 21 Germans. These, however, were the final rearguards. Infantry patrols and a section of Otago Mounted Rifles, now attached from the XXII. Corps Mounted Regiment as Divisional cavalry, were pushed forward as a screen, and the other troops followed. The advance continued throughout the day, 6th September, with little opposition.

Under a blue sky and scorching sun 1st Otago moved with remarkable rapidity. They were supported most effectively by a section of the 9th Battery (2nd Lt. A. F. Downer) which over open sights engaged enemy infantry and two 77-mm. guns in Metz. Here the battalion was for a time checked, but by the late afternoon had succeeded in enveloping the village. Metz had been captured by the British in the first week of April 1917, in the last stages of the German withdrawal on the Hindenburg Line, and had been fortified by them with 2 lines of inner and outer defences. Otago carried the inner defences shortly after 6 p.m. Enemy resistance, however, was appreciably stiffening, and a section of Otago Mounted Rifles, attempting to reconnoitre Gouzeaucourt, came under heavy machine gun fire. Towards evening the German guns bombarded Metz, where a large mine crater was blown at the cross-roads, with marked vindictiveness. The outer defences were part of the long line of old British trenches which had been set as a distant objective for the advance on 4th September. It extended southwards over the Fins and Revelon Ridges and northwards along the eastern edge of Havrincourt Wood. Despite the increasing fire, however, both right and centre battalions pushed on these trenches, and by nightfall 1st Canterbury held the Quivering and Quotient sectors cast and south-east of Metz, 1st Otago the Quack and Quality positions to the east and north-east.

Meantime on the 2nd Canterbury front energetic reconnaissances by O'Grady and others established that the enemy still held Havrincourt Wood strongly as late as 3 p.m. It was no part of our purpose to force a passage at a costly price if the Wood could be enveloped. Shortly afterwards, however, signals were given by an aeroplane that the enemy was moving. At 5 p.m. our posts were on the western edge with fighting patrols among the trees. In combination with the troops on the left, 2 companies began to work through the forest. By 10 p.m. after an arduous and perplexing passage they had penetrated to within 50 yards of their objective in the important Quaff Trench which continued Quality northwards on the eastern edge of the Wood. Here the German rearguards proved too strong to be pushed without proper reconnaissance. Two Canterbury platoons had gone astray in the dense bush, and touch had been lost with the 37th Division. The line was consolidated for the night with a defensive flank formed by the support companies. Throughout the remainder of the night officers' patrols fruitlessly scoured the Wood in search of the lost platoons and the 37th Division troops on the left.

Losses throughout had been slight. 1st Otago captured 70 prisoners with 26 machine guns and a 59 in. howitzer. 1st Canterbury similarly secured numerous machine guns and two 77-mm. guns. Even 2nd Canterbury in the fastnesses of the Wood had contrived to capture a few prisoners. Nowhere till the close of the day had opposition been severe, and the line had been advanced over 2 miles. No more illuminating evidence of the aggressiveness vigour and dash of the New Zealand battalions could be cited than the reiterated admonitions addressed to them by the Divisional staff against undue impetuosity. The infantry were most efficiently backed by artillery and machine guns, and the very rate of progress saved casualties, for on repeated occasions the Germans put down barrages on ground over which the advance had already passed, thus providing object lessons to the gunner of the futility of map-shelling and the essential importance of observation of fire.

During the night, 6th/7th September, 1st Canterbury had been unable to secure touch with the enemy, but 1st Otago patrols penetrating the fringe of Gouzeaucourt Wood and working north of it were much hampered by fire. Just before dawn, 7th September, the active machine guns in Quaff ceased, and 2nd Canterbury carried it with slight resistance and pushed on to the eastern edge of the Wood. In the daylight they regained touch with the 37th Division. The lost platoons returned at 7 a.m. All 3 battalions were now confronted by the Trescault Ridge, and our advance had nearly reached its limits. Along this important height machine guns were in great force, and field guns in Trescault village on the north sniped over open sights down the valley at our patrols. Our 18-pounders “pasted” the trenches, and howitzers bombarded the enemy field guns. These latter were silenced, but machine guns and well-posted snipers made progress infinitely difficult. By noon, however, posts were established in front of Havrincourt Wood. The right and centre of our line pushed well into the valley and into the subsidiary southern corridor which held the greater part of Gouzeaucourt Wood, a long segment of thick bush straggling eastwards up the ridge. The enemy appeared to reinforce his already numerous machine guns, but we succeeded in establishing posts inside the edge and round the southern fringe of Gouzeaucourt Wood. The Rifle Brigade, however, were to relieve in the evening. In view of the difficulty of handing over these advanced posts about Gouzeaucourt Wood, it was decided to withdraw them on to the Quotient Quack Quality and Quaff trenches on the near side of the valley. The weather had turned colder, and much rain fell during the day.

While the infantry and artillery had been straining hard after the retreating enemy, the vast and complex machine of the administrative services had worked at intense pressure and with gratifying smoothness. Field ambulances followed close in rear. Engineers reconnoitred dugouts, searched for booby traps, constructed defensive posts, and repaired roads. Not the least of their responsibilities was the supervision of the water supply. They cleared wells, tested the water, and put up notice-boards giving the results. They erected power-pumping plant and hand-pumps, and installed storage-troughs and water-cart filling-points. The whole rear area indeed seethed with the active movement that attends an advancing army. The effect on the German prisoners is happily illustrated by the remarks of an intelligent Guards N.C.O. captured a few days later in the neighbourhood:

“Passing back under escort I saw things that I could scarcely believe—such transport, such horses, such men and these masses of artillery! I compare them with our wretched iron-wheeled transport, skidding all over the place and blocking the roads in wet weather, our scanty and badly-fed horses, and those boys pretending to be Guards.

“We still have a certain amount of artillery, but you must have five guns to our one, and we are not well off for shells, whilst you seem to have an endless supply.

“No! Germany is defeated, and the sooner we recognize it the better, but you will admit we have put up a good fight. No nation could have done more.”

The infantry relief was carried out in pitch darkness, and the South Island battalions withdrew to the position of support brigade. The Rifle Brigade took over the line with the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th{232} Battalions, in that order, from south to north. The 1st Artillery Brigade batteries were now on the western edge of Havrincourt Wood, the 2nd between the Wood and Metz, 1 of the 2 attached 42nd Divisional brigades south of Metz, with the other attached brigade and the 3rd Brigade superimposed further in rear.

The morning of the 8th broke very cold with a high wind from the south. Whatever hopes the Rifles had of emulating the rapid progress of the 2nd Brigade were doomed to disappointment. There was no abatement of the enemy's fire, and our posts on the forward slopes under Havrincourt Wood were aggressively sniped and machine-gunned from the high ridge over the valley. It became increasingly manifest that we were at length approaching the main line of resistance.

The enemy was now indeed only 3 miles from the Hindenburg Line itself. The Trescault Ridge,{233} in conjunction with similar positions southward about Epehy and with the obstacle of the Canal du Nord northwards beyond Havrincourt village, presented itself as a strong forward defence line which might be calculated on to withstand even prepared attacks, and act as a buffer to the main line of resistance behind. Eastwards the Trescault Ridge fell towards the Couillet Valley, through which ran the Péronne-Cambrai railway. Its general conformation was like an elongated right hand, with a long forefinger (Trescault Spur) pointing due north towards the village of that name, and the bent knuckles of the middle and fourth fingers projecting north-eastwards in the Beaucamp and Borderer Ridges towards Beaucamp village and Villers-Plouich respectively. West of Gouzeaucourt village, which lay in the upper Couillet Valley, the wrist joined a wide tableland.

The ridge, along whose crest ran the road from Gouzeaucourt to Trescault, was fortified by old British trenches. On its eastern brow was the strong and important African Trench running north and south along the ridge and overlooking Gouzeaucourt village. African Support on the western slopes above Gouzeaucourt Wood commanded the top of the ridge. Further north Lincoln Reserve and other trenches continued African Trench along the knuckles of Borderer and Beaucamp Ridges. There also on our side of the main spur, some 200 yards under the crest, ran a chord line connected in its turn with the African system southwards, and known as Snap Trench. Further down the slope lay Snap Reserve. A multitude of saps ran up from Snap Reserve to Snap Trench, and the German position on this western slope was further strengthened by many deep-sunken roads whose banks afforded admirable vantage points from which to rake our advance with grazing machine gun fire. Of these roads, 2 ran towards Gouzeaucourt, 1 eastwards from Metz and 1 south-eastwards from Havrincourt Wood. These were cut at right angles by an old British "corduroy" road traced along the hillside and parallel to our own positions and to African Support and Snap Reserve which lay just above it. At the junctions of this old road, with the Metz Road at Queen's Cross, and the Wood Road at Dead Man's Corner, the Germans had by digging into the steep banks improvised redoubts which they held in force.

The first effort on the high ground was planned for 9th September when the V. Corps on the right proposed to carry the part of the tableland west and south-west of Gouzeaucourt, including African Trench as far north as the Metz Road. The New Zealanders were instructed to protect the V. Corps' left flank by capturing and holding African for another 1000 yards northwards, thence refusing their left along a convenient communication sap down to Dead Man's Corner, and thereafter down the Wood Road back to the south-east edge of Havrincourt Wood. With this object in view the 8th was spent for the most part in necessary preparations. Patrols from the 2nd Rifles, however, penetrated Gouzeaucourt Wood, and a small party under Rflmn. J. C. Dibble surprised and dispersed with Lewis gun fire an enemy attack on an isolated British post to the south. Later these patrols were forced back by superior numbers of the enemy working round their right flank. In the evening they again penetrated part of the wood, and it was only after dark, when they were withdrawn in conformity with barrage plans, that the enemy reoccupied it in strength.

For the forthcoming attack the 4th Rifles on the left in front of Havrincourt Wood were not affected. The 2nd Rifles on the right would carry African System and the communication trench to Dead Man's Corner and clear that Strong Point. The 3rd Rifles{234} in the centre would form a 1200 yards' defensive flank from the cross-roads to Havrincourt Wood. Arrangements had been made for heavy artillery to bombard trenches and roads on the eastern slopes of the ridge, the Couillet Valley, and the outskirts of Gouzeaucourt. A creeping barrage would support the main New Zealand attack on the 2nd Rifles' front. A standing barrage would be placed on Snap Reserve in front of the left battalion. Protective curtains of machine gun fire were also provided.

The night was again intensely dark, and the assaulting companies had no little difficulty in reaching their assembly positions amid the wire and shellholes on the western edge of Gouzeaucourt Wood. Each section, however, was in its place some 20 minutes before zero. The attack was delivered at 4 a.m. During the previous day enemy aeroplanes had seen much movement of troops tanks and transport behind our lines, and our assault was expected. Determined to retain Trescault Ridge, the Germans did not commit its defence to the 44th and 225th Divisions that had the last few days opposed us and were exhausted by the pressure of hard rearguard actions and by lack of food. They had brought up fresh from refitting and rest the 113th and the Jäger Division, 2 of their strongest corps d'élite at this time. The latter especially was a magnificent body of men, fully equal to the Guards and reserved for the most vigorous work. On these troops the retiring rearguards of the 44th and 225th Divisions now fell back and passed into reserve. Large numbers of machine guns also were sent up to strengthen the all-important positions on the ridge, and the new garrison of tried and confident veterans were ordered to hold their ground at all costs. When our guns opened, the enemy's answering barrage fell immediately. It was directed, however, rather on Metz and Havrincourt Wood in rear than on the lower slopes of the ridge where our troops were assembled, and though inflicting casualties among the storming riflemen it was not of undue intensity. Bat the fire of the enemy's massed machine guns leapt at once into a tremendous concentration which in daylight must have blotted out any-assault. As it was, the darkness which the assembling troops had cursed so bitterly as they stumbled about the old entanglements now proved their salvation. It was lit only by the German flares and the bursts of howitzer shells on the hillside in front and valley behind. Much of the enemy's machine gun fire was consequently high and passed over their heads.

The 2nd Rifles employed 2 companies, using a support company to mop up Gouzeaucourt Wood and assist the leading companies in an emergency. The right company was commanded by an extremely gallant and capable officer, Lt. D. Kennedy, M.C., who prior to the attack had made a fine personal reconnaissance of the position. Faced by the impenetrable dark thickets of Gouzeaucourt Wood, his company boldly pressed in 2 columns up the Metz Road towards Gouzeaucourt and along another smaller track through the trees. The garrison at Queen's Cross was killed or captured in a brief struggle, and African Support was won after stubborn fighting. It was still dark, and the company, which had crossed several trenches on the way, believed and reported that they were in African Trench itself. Some 70 prisoners were captured, consisting mostly of Jägers, but including some men of the 6th (Dismounted) Cavalry Division. There was no sign of the troops on either flank. The V. Corps' assault had been unable to make progress, and the 2nd Rifles' left company, skirting the north edge of the wood and coming under intense machine gun fire from Dead Man's Corner, had been forced into the cover of shellholes round its north-eastern edge. When dawn came, Kennedy realised that he was not in his final objective, but with the company already isolated and with African Trench in front stoutly held, no attempt at further progress could for the moment be contemplated. It would be no mean achievement to hold the ground already won, for both flanks were in the air, and in his rear there was a strong German garrison in the southern part of Gouzeaucourt Wood, which the support company had not thoroughly cleared. The support company, indeed, had suffered somewhat heavily, and the company commander was the only officer left.

Part of this company, however, were to strengthen Kennedy's left. For, about 7 a.m., seeing the left company checked Sergt.-Major G. P. Webster and Sergt. T. R. Kennerley rushed forward with the right half of the company to occupy their place in African Support, They were covered by Kennedy's fire and carried the position. Each of the 2 leaders captured 2 machine guns and killed their crews. An attempt was at once made to help the left company by bombing up African Support towards Dead Man's Corner. Led by a fearless N.C.O., Cpl. G. Fruin, a little party reached this point. They captured 2 machine guns and 16 prisoners, and killed many of the retreating enemy. This deadly Strong Point cleared, 2 platoons of the left company also were able to reach African Support, and led by 2nd Lt. E. G. Bates, D.C.M., bombed past Dead Man's Corner northwards up the trench itself for 200 yards beyond. Their bombs were already running short, so here they established a block.

Before fresh supplies of bombs could reach them, the enemy fell on them from the northern end of the trench in overpowering strength and with inexhaustible quantities of bombs, and the mingled personnel of the left and support companies were driven back down African Support southwards. The hold on Dead Man's Corner was lost, Very hard fighting ensued about 1 p.m. Pressing his advantage, the enemy forced the posts established towards Dead Man's Corner to fall back nearer Gouzeaucourt Wood. All his efforts to recover the southern portion of African Support were in vain. On the contrary, repeated sorties led by Fruin{235} and by N.C.O.s of the right company made desperate attempts to clear the communication trenches leading up to African. Their pressure was not adequate, however, to dislodge the enemy from his strong position, though they forced him to invoke artillery protection.

While the left of the 2nd Rifles' line in African Support fought with great tenacity, the chief honour of the day undoubtedly belongs to the right company. Inspired by their commander's personality, Kennedy's men held their ground without losing an inch. They killed many of the enemy on their right and repulsed repeated counter-attacks from in front and from the flanks. Mention should be made of an act by C.S.M. P. A. Scully, who commanded a platoon in our support line. With 1 man he was returning from the front line after taking up a load of bombs, when he observed a machine gun firing from the flank. He at once rushed it, and bombing, the crew killed them and captured the gun. In the evening the V. Corps troops came up as far as Queen's Cross, and to thern the 40 Germans, who had all day been contained by the right company in the southern portion of Gouzeaucourt Wood, now surrendered. Whole droves of our heavy shells passed overhead towards Couillet Valley, but on the ridge the enemy's defence was not shaken. His contact aeroplanes flew low over our positions. The valley and Queen's Cross were bombarded heavily with gas and high-explosive. About 7 p.m. he made a final effort to drive us back.

Under cover of a heavy bombardment he attacked our whole front from African Support to Dead Man's Corner, pressing down the saps with great vigour. Everywhere he was completely repulsed, except before Dead Man's Corner, where he temporarily compelled 1 post to withdraw. At dusk the riflemen recovered it. During the day the 2nd Rifles lost an officer and 14 men killed, 68 men wounded and 2 missing. Of the 150 prisoners captured by the brigade nearly all were taken by the 2nd Battalion.

While this fiercely-contested battle raged on the 2nd Rifles' front, the 3rd Battalion on the left was very much less successful. The right company, held up by the 1917 British entanglements and coming under heavy fire from Dead Man's Corner, not yet contained, managed to approach the objective. The left company suffered severely from machine guns on the crest and in Snap Reserve and advanced positions which the barrage chanced to miss. Only a handful reached their goal. Reinforcements were at once hurried up, but these also lost heavily. Almost immediately the enemy counter-attacked, and the left company was forced back to the starting line. Several wounded men lay still out in the open, 200 yards in advance of our line. Desperate efforts to rescue these resulted only in additions to the casualty roll. Sergt. J. Keatley had gone back with despatches to battalion headquarters. He was already wounded in the face, but returned to the line. He now went out himself, under a hail of bullets, and rescued first 1 and then another wounded man. On reaching a third he found him already dead.

This check in turn exposed the right company's posts. They withdrew towards the eastern edge of Gouzeaucourt Wood and took up a position about a hedgerow some 300 yards in front of their original line. Touch was maintained with the 2nd Battalion, and a defensive flank on the north was put round the wood. Here they were heavily bombarded and subjected to salvoes of small bombs of combined gas and explosive which burnt the grass and earth black and caused considerable casualties. Four prisoners were taken. The 3rd Battalion lost an officer and 25 other ranks killed, and 4 officers and 66 other ranks wounded.

The stubbornness of the opposition and the number of counter-attacks attested the enemy's anxiety to maintain intact a deep outpost zone in front of his main line of resistance. Intercepted wireless messages in themselves indicated more and more clearly that the disorganisation of the German Command and troops, resulting from the last fortnight's operations, had been rectified, and that systematic opposition must be expected. In these comparatively local operations of the 9th the Division's role had been dissociated from the IV. Corps and co-ordinated with the action of the V. Corps on its right. Plans were already, however, completed for a resumption of the general advance of the Army with a view to carrying this outpost zone, including the Trescault Ridge, as a first step to the breach of the whole Hindenburg Line. These operations were to be followed some days later by a Fourth Army advance from Gouzeaucourt southwards beyond Epehy with a similar object.

The Third Army blow was to be delivered by the IV. and VI. Corps. The right flank was to be protected by the capture of the Trescault Ridge. For this purpose the 37th Division, on the left of the IV. Corps, and troops of the VI. Corps thence northwards would carry out preliminary operations with the object of securing favourable attack positions. The main attack would take place on 12th September. Then, at one and the same hour, the 62nd Division of the VI. Corps would assault Havrincourt village, and in a movement from the south-west, so as to turn the village of Trescault, the New Zealand and 37th Divisions would storm the Trescault Ridge. The right flank of the New Zealanders would be protected by an advance of a company of the 38th Division on the left wing of the V. Corps south of Gouzeaucourt Wood. The V. Corps also agreed to prolong the barrage on our right flank and to maintain a standing barrage for 2 hours after zero on African Trench, south of the portion to be attacked by them, and on Gouzeaucourt village and the approaches from it to the ridge. All brigades of heavy and field artillery now out of the line for rest or training were instructed to be in action on the night 10th/11th September, and certain batteries were ordered to move forward to advanced positions. Several of these were overlooked from high ground to the south, and hence a proportion of our guns would be compelled to remain silent till the moment of attack.

The 37th Division already on 9th September had by peaceful penetration reached the north-eastern edge of Havrincourt Wood, and by the evening of the 11th both it and the VI. Corps were in position. The New Zealanders were already as far forward as possible, and the intervening days were spent in effecting local improvements. The 3rd Battalion quietly effected considerable progress towards the objective of the 9th north of Gouzeaucourt Wood The 2nd Rifles consolidated their position in African Support, placing light mortars on their right flank and to deal with Dead Man's Corner on their left. One of their patrols, under Cpl. N. G. Stone, had won and occupied this Strong Point on 10th September. But on the evening of the 10th the enemy made a final costly effort to recover African Support. In captured British helmets his infantry rushed Dead Man's Corner and regained it. Then they bombed fiercely from it and from African Trench towards the Support line, but were repulsed with Lewis gun fire and chased back to Dead Man's Corner and their trenches with grenades. By nightfall on the 11th the V. Corps left had joined up with Kennedy in African Support. Renewed attempts to cross the crest and penetrate African Trench in front were foiled.

As compared with the operation of the 9th, the task now set the Rifle Brigade was at once larger and differently orientated. Instead of forming the left protective flank to an attack southwards, they formed part of the right protective flank to an attack on a more considerable scale northwards. Instead of using 2 battalions, all 3 were now to advance and carry the ridge in conjunction with the 37th Division on the left. The 2nd Battalion on the right holding African Support had a single and straightforward objective in the capture of African Trench. North of Gouzeaucourt Wood, in the centre of the line where the 1st Battalion{236} would pass through the 3rd, and on the left, where the 4th would cross the valley under Havrincourt Wood, our troops would be required to carry 2 objectives. The 1st Battalion after clearing Dead Man's Corner had its first objective in Snap Reserve, and its second in Snap Trench. On the extreme left, the first objective of the 4th Battalion was also Snap Reserve, but its final objective lay beyond Snap Trench, here bending inconveniently far westwards, and was fixed in the crest road, some 300 yards east of it, which led from Gouzeaucourt to Trescault. The road junction known as Charing Cross, where this road intersected the track from Havrincourt Wood to Beaucamp, marked the boundary in the final objective between the New Zealanders and the 37th Division. Heavy and field artillery and machine guns would co-operate. 3 brigades of field artillery and 3 batteries of heavy artillery were placed under the C.R.A., in addition to the 3 New Zealand brigades. A section of machine guns was put at the disposal of each attacking battalion to assist them in holding the objectives during and after consolidation. A company of the 3rd Battalion garrisoning the centre of the present line was allotted to each of the 2nd and 1st Battalions as reserves.