The line, especially on the right, was now considerably in advance of the flank units. In the Canterbury area an unexpected nest had been discovered still west of Beaudignies. In front of Otago also the enemy was in considerable strength on a sunken road eastwards and in isolated and inconsiderable "practice trenches" beyond an orchard just over the Ghissignies road. It was known that both flank Divisions were making an early attack. Patrols were pushed forward in the meantime, and the companies waited for the dawn.

With the first glimmer of light (24th October) the flank Divisions began to move forward into line. At 4.15 a.m. the covering barrage of the 3rd Division on the VI. Corps right overlapped our left and compelled 2nd Canterbury to withdraw temporarily some little distance to escape it. They were soon back, however, in the sunken road, and by 9 a.m. on the high ground north-east of Beaudignies. This movement, in combination with the Otago advance, compelled the surrender of an enemy force of about 80 who had held an orchard and now threw down their arms to Otago with the utmost alacrity. On the left, 2nd Canterbury were much assisted by the machine guns of the 3rd Division. These swept the wooded valley of the Rogneau stream, which falls north-west towards Ruesnes. Making the utmost use of outflanking movements against numerous enemy machine guns, 2nd Canterbury by nightfall had established outposts across the valley, with their left flank over the Le Quesnoy-Ruesnes road. During the day they captured an officer and 13 men, with 9 machine guns. To the north and north-east the high ground in their centre commanded a wide and diversified view over rich peaceful country. But it was not in that direction that the now exhausted men's eyes were turned. Only a mile eastwards, between intervening coppices, could be discerned the dense tree-tops which hid the ramparts of the ancient and famous fortress of Le Quesnoy.

On the right flank 1st Otago, reassured by the appearance of the 37th Division troops in the eastern outskirts of Ghissignies, advanced under cover of their Lewis guns on the strongly held "practice trenches" beyond the road. Skilful dispositions were made by Lt. H. R. Domigan, who commanded the assaulting company. Cpl. C. S. Moorhouse and Pte. E. A. Richardson crawled forward with a Lewis gun and covered the advance of the right platoon with enfilade fire. In its turn the platoon brought enfilade fire to bear, and the remainder of the company rushing forward carried the position. In addition to 7 machine guns, 3 officers and 75 men were captured, and many others were killed. On the next sunken road the right company was for some little time checked. Repeating the successful outflanking tactics of the previous day at the Chapelle des Six Chemins, the left company manoeuvred forward, worked down to the right and silenced the machine guns. Thereupon the companies without difficulty cleared the whole 1000 yards of road from the right Divisional boundary to the Le Quesnoy highway.

About 1000 yards from Beaudignies the Le Quesnoy road passes uphill through a thin wood in which the Rogneau has its source. The wood shelters 2 farms, 1 on each side of the road. On the left the Ferme du Fort Martin abuts on the road itself. South of the road the Ferme de Beart is secluded within the wood. A patrol of 1st Otago, under L.-Cpl. G. D. Tod, penetrated the wood, finding the De Beart farm occupied by 2 civilians, the Fort Martin farm unoccupied, and the wood evacuated. On the eastern edge of the wood, however, the enemy were located digging in. Fairly heavy fire was directed from the Cambrai railway embankment west of Le Quesnoy. Both flank Divisions were now abreast, and in close touch with them the 2nd Brigade line at nightfall ran from the Ruesnes road on the left to the north-eastern extremity of the de Beart Wood on the Le Quesnoy road and then through the trees. Outposts were established on the eastern edge of the wood. At the nearest point the line was only 1000 yards from the outer ramparts of Le Quesnoy. During the 2 days' operations 1st Otago lost 6 officers and 107 men, and captured close on 200 prisoners, with over 30 machine guns, a field gun, and 4 light mortars. 2nd Canterbury had lost 2 officers and 130 men. The enemy had given them little chance to get at close quarters, but they had taken over 60 prisoners and 17 machine guns, with 3 mortars.

On the infantry gaining the high ground beyond Beaudignies, the 2nd (Army) Brigade batteries, which had been ordered to rendezvous at 6 a.m. on the main road through Pont-à-Pierres, were rushed forward over the newly constructed bridge to the east bank of the St. Georges river. At the storm-centre of Pont-à-Pierres the 6th Battery was caught in a sharp bombardment and lost 3 men and several horses killed. By 9 a.m. the bulk of the artillery was in the St. Georges valley. The line of the river continued to be heavily shelled. All teams were sent to the rear with the exception of those of the 8th Battery, which now moved still further forward to the northern outskirts of Beaudignies in order to be in close touch with the infantry.

In the evening (24th October), the South Island battalions and their affiliated units were relieved by the Rifle Brigade Group. The 3rd Battalion was placed on the right and the 4th on the left. The squadron of the 3rd Hussars and the troop of Otago Mounted Rifles passed under General Hart's orders. Following on the relief, the 3rd Artillery Brigade, with one of the 42nd Divisional brigades, both under Lt.-Col. McQuarrie, became advanced guard artillery, and on the same day the 1st Artillery Brigade went into reserve. Its casualties had been heavy, on the 24th the 1st Battery alone losing 1 man and 37 horses killed and 10 men wounded. There was a renewed violent bombardment on the Pont-â-Pierres crossings from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m., and the 2nd Rifles in the vicinity were much inconvenienced by gas. The rest of the night was marked by sporadic shelling, but was quieter. In the early morning (25th October) the fire became again intense-along the line of the river.

By this time the Army objectives had been achieved generally all along the front. The line now ran from the western edge of the Mormal Forest past the western outskirts of Le Quesnoy and thence along the lower Rhonelle towards the Scheldt west of Valenciennes. On the New Zealanders' front the enemy was found to be established in strength along the Cambrai and Valenciennes railways. But northwards the 3rd Division had occupied Ruesnes and found indications in the forenoon of a further withdrawal. Immediately in front of Le Quesnoy the 3rd Rifles, apart from effecting local improvement in their position, could do little, but an advance might be effected round the town on the north. Orders were issued, therefore, for the 4th Battalion on the left to make good by the evening the line of the Valenciennes railway north-west of Le Quesnoy, after which the 2nd Battalion would pass through for exploitation.

Near the point where the Beaudignies road makes a sharp eastward turn before entering Le Quesnoy, the Cambrai railway, which faced the 3rd Rifles, splits into 2 branches. One, carrying the traffic for Le Quesnoy, bends in a semicircle round the town's north-western outskirts till the rails, turning south-eastward, reach the permanent way from Valenciennes. The second branch serves the northern traffic and continues north, meeting the trunk line about 1000 yards above the junction of the Le Quesnoy loop. Just above this northern junction the sunken road from Beaudignies to Orsinval, after crossing successively the Rogneau and the Precheltes, goes over the railway at a level crossing. Another 1000 yards further up the line towards Valenciennes the railway passes on its right La Croisette Wood. Of one or two small houses about the level crossing on the Orsinval Road we must notice a brick house on the far side of the line, occupied in peace time by an old couple who look after the gates at the crossing. The Orsinval Road, like most of the roads in the neighbourhood, is for the most part sunken, but just beyond the railway it is for some 20 yards on a level with the fields. Thereafter, again becoming deeply sunken, it leads down gently towards a well-defined mossy bank and hedge, with a belt of trees beyond. This hedge bank is almost continuous, but on the right of the road and at some distance from it is a gap of about 80 yards, below which the bank and hedge again continue south, merging eventually into plantations on the outskirts of Be Quesnoy. In the open field on the left of the road is a small square wood, some 300 yards east of the railway. On this level crossing and its vicinity the Division's efforts were to centre during the final movements of the battle itself and during the brief period of quiescence that followed.

In the afternoon and evening, 25th October, the 3rd Rifles advanced their line beyond the de Beart "Wood and swung their right parallel with the Cambrai railway. In a small farm building at the eastern fringe of the wood they found 17 French civilians, men women and boys. The main building in the Ferme de Beart was, during the afternoon, fired and razed to the ground by German shells. By the evening the 4th Rifles succeeded in making the Precheltes stream north of the Orsinval Road, but machine guns on the embankment towards La Croisette Wood held them back from the railway. On the other side of the road, towards Le Quesnoy, the Germans were also in force in the whole triangle formed by the 2 railways, but the Rifles pushed well up the road itself towards the Level Crossing. The advance, though falling short of the objective, enabled the supporting artillery to move east of Beaudignies.

The 3rd Division, further distant from Le Quesnoy, had encountered less resistance. By 4.30 p.m., crossing the railway beyond Ruesnes, they occupied La Croisette village and were moving on the high ground east of the wood to outflank the enemy opposite their right at its southern edge. On the following day, 26th October, they proposed to advance on Orsinval and Villers Pol. The 4th Rifles were accordingly ordered to make a fresh bid after dusk, 25th October, for the Level Crossing, upon the seizure of which the 2nd Battalion would pass through them towards the Le Quesnoy-Orsinval road. The latter battalion was directed to push its left to the southern boundary of Orsinval, and at the same time to operate with patrols against the north and north-west of Le Quesnoy. A section of the Otago Mounted Rifles was placed at its disposal. It was hoped that, in view of the reported withdrawal on the left, the advance might be effected by methods of peaceful penetration.

Under cover of darkness, accordingly, the 4th Rifles renewed their movement against the Level Crossing. They rushed it, L.-Sergt. H. Moscroft heading the charge. Several enemy were killed without loss to the attack. A counterthrust made about 2 a.m., after a heavy bombardment, was repulsed, German prisoners being left in our hands. The railway on each flank, however, was very strongly held, and the attack elsewhere being checked by intense machine gun and rifle fire, and at close quarters by bombs, the post at the Level Crossing had eventually to withdraw.

Meantime the 2nd Rifles had, shortly before midnight, come forward to follow through the 4th Battalion, exploit to the north of Le Quesnoy, and endeavour to penetrate the town from that direction. The enemy's guns were active. Gas was being sent over in salvoes, especially about Beaudignies, and the 2nd Rifles had to dodge storms of 8-in. shells on the road junctions. Their plans were that one company should move towards Orsinval along the sunken road, with a second following it to secure its left flank, and that a third should then exploit towards Le Quesnoy. At 3 a.m., 26th October, the leading companies moved to their assembly areas. Machine gun fire aimed at the 4th Battalion posts swept the approaches, and several men were hit. All companies, however, deployed in good time, and the telephone was run well forward along the Orsinval Road on our side of the Level Crossing. On finding that the post at the Crossing had been lost, that we were not in touch on the left, and that there were no posts on the railway, the 2nd Rifles rapidly adjusted their plans to meet this unexpected situation. Two light trench mortars in the road were ordered to cover the advance by bombarding the railway and the high ground beyond it on the north of Le Quesnoy. The machine gun section attached to the battalion took up positions for a similar purpose. The first duty of the leading company was obviously to secure the Crossing and the railway junction just south of it, where the northern branch of the Cambrai line links with the main Valenciennes railway.

The 2nd Rifles' attack was launched at 5.15 a.m. The morning was very foggy, but as soon as ever the leading troops moved on the railway, heavy machine gun fire was opened at them from the Cambrai line embankment in their right rear. Our machine and Lewis guns, rifles and mortars replied from the Orsinval Road but were not able to dominate the enemy fire. The right platoon was practically annihilated and the centre held up. By 5.50 a.m., however, posts were established on the main railway line close to the junction. Resistance on the left was also heavy, but the line was cleared as far as La Croisette Wood. Outposts were thrown across the railway, and touch was secured with the VI. Corps. By 6.30 a.m. posts were held in the Square Wood and beyond it, and along the hedgerow from the sunken road as far as the gap in the hedge and bank.

Further progress, however, down the road proved impossible, and the passage of the gap, swept as it was by particularly heavy fire, appeared equally impracticable. None the less, another platoon (2nd. Lt, R. J. Richards) was sent forward at 7 a.m. Under all the covering fire which the platoon on their left could give, Richards' men made a very gallant effort to rush the gap to the belt of trees eastward. The enemy machine guns inflicted grievous losses. Some of the riflemen reached the edge of the belt of trees, where a slight hollow, carpeted with autumn leaves, gave shelter from the fire in front. The Germans, however, moved a machine gun down a dry ditch round their right flank, and against its enfilade fire our men had practically no protection. A scout from the platoon on the road endeavoured to reach them but could not. He reported that he could see only dead and wounded. He did not greatly exaggerate the actual situation. The Lewis gun was early knocked out of action, the Nos. 1 and 2 of the team hit, and Richards himself wounded in the jaw and neck. The party could neither advance nor withdraw. Two men volunteered to take back a message. One was killed; the other, although wounded, crawled back to the bank. Unless there was a marked turn of fortune, Richards and the few wounded survivors must fall into German hands.

Along the whole of the right flank the pressure from the direction of Le Quesnoy now grew overwhelming. Heavy and sustained fire from both railway lines forced the outnumbered and enfiladed post at the junction to fall back. The enemy began to move in behind the platoon on the Orsinval Road, and their position in turn became untenable. To prevent envelopment they withdrew under cover of its high banks towards the railway line just in time. The intense machine gun fire now directed over their heads across the sunken road did not matter, but the fire sweeping the open space at the Level Crossing, which they must pass, mattered very much. Every weapon available was turned on the enemy machine guns. They were silenced for a moment, and in that moment the platoon dashed safely across the line.

It was now 10 a.m. On our side of the railway line the sunken road was being severely bombarded by German light howitzers, field guns and mortars, and receiving in addition unwelcome and resented attention from some of our own 18-pounders. The enemy presently worked up the Orsinval Road on the other side of the line. His fire became increasingly violent, and it was evident that an attack was imminent on our own positions on this side of the railway. The 2nd Rifles strengthened their flanks by fresh posts of Lewis guns and prepared to meet it. About 10.30 a.m. a company or more of German infantry poured up the main railway from the direction of Le Quesnoy. About the junction the enemy swarmed over the embankment and reached some 50 yards further. There he was definitely held. At the Level Crossing he had won the brick house by 10.50 a.m. and was endeavouring, under cover of stick bombs, to cross to our side. An officer succeeded, but was instantly killed.

The watchful and active hostile machine guns on the Cambrai railway prevented a counter-attack over the open. The 3rd Artillery Brigade and the English batteries, however, which were now in action east of the Beaudignies-Ruesnes road, answered the S.O.S. signals by an effective barrage, and the enemy was in addition bombarded by the light mortars and by rifle grenades. Shortly after 11 a.m. his effort was broken, and his party at the junction withdrew, suffering several casualties as they recrossed the embankment. The junction was at once reconnoitred and found vacated, but a post here would be too exposed, and it was decided not to garrison it for the moment. The Level Crossing, however, was reoccupied and a strong post installed there so as. to command the Valenciennes railway towards Le Quesnoy.

The enemy shelling had ceased as soon as his infantry came into action. It now reopened vindictively on the Crossing and our positions in the Orsinval Road, and continued intermittently during the afternoon. A further strong hostile attack was made after midday. It was for the most part shattered by the 2nd and 4th Battalions' fire. A handful of Germans reoccupied the brick house, but were driven out from it almost immediately. A third attack, shortly after 5 p.m., was repulsed with less difficulty. Two Lewis gunners. of the 4th Rifles, A. G. Feat and F. Prince, had done particularly good service in moving their gun to a flank and enfilading the enemy's advancing troops. The check to our advance and the subsequent necessary withdrawal from the Orsinval Road across the railway left the posts in the Square Wood and beyond hopelessly isolated, and they must have been not a little uneasy about their position. There was no alternative for them but to retire. If the absence of cover made this impossible for them in daylight, it also prevented offensive movement against the wood by the enemy. At dusk they were successfully withdrawn through our posts in front of the railway between the Level Crossing and La Croisette Wood.

In the evening an overdue reorganisation was made. The 4th Battalion troops still in the sunken road at the Level Crossing were relieved, and the whole position was taken over by the 2nd Battalion. In the day's fighting 12 men of the 2nd Battalion had been killed, and an officer and 22 men wounded. Richards and half a dozen men, all wounded, were taken prisoners.

On 27th October the 2nd Battalion's left flank beyond the railway was improved and posts established to within 200 yards of the VI. Corps right, whose advance had been similarly arrested. The 3rd Battalion's posts now lay along the Precheltes and about 500 yards short of the Cambrai railway. No further enemy attack followed on the Level Crossing, but snipers in the excellent cover afforded by the railway embankments towards Le Quesnoy were markedly aggressive till overcome in the afternoon. The German machine guns and artillery remained abnormally active.

The enemy were known to be constructing a system of trenches on the line Mons-Maubeuge and were believed to contemplate also another as a temporary position west of Bavai. Till these were completed it was apparently his intention to stand on his present line. The increase of hostile fire and an extensive employment of mortars all along the front indicated that the tide of the battle had reached its limit. The attackers had no reason to feel dissatisfied. 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns had been captured. The objectives of the Armies had been attained and in places, as on the New Zealanders' front, exceeded. Haig marks 25th October as the final day of the Battle of the Selle.

The Rifle Brigade's effort was thus made when the action had already virtually reached its close. The Division, however, had been fully represented in the Corps' operations. The artillery and Engineers had borne an active share from the outset. The infantry's participation did not extend to the opening move of the 20th, and except for the Rifles' attack on the enemy's reorganised line was confined to the 2nd Brigade's advance on the 23rd and 24th. Its performance had, nevertheless, fully reached the level of the Division's best achievements up to this time. All objectives had been seized or passed with exemplary speed and precision. 524 prisoners and 8 guns, in addition to a vast array of machine guns and other trophies had been captured. 2nd Otago's skilful and resolute work at the St. Georges river, and 1st Canterbury's dashing and energetic seizure of the Ecaillon bridgeheads were exploits as gallant and successful as any in the long and honourable records of these battalions. Less dramatic but not less instinct with the soldierly spirit were the bold handling of the artillery, indefatigably eager and supremely competent to take advantage of fleeting targets and assist the line of bayonets; the staunch determination, true to death, of the Engineers at Pont-à-Pierres; and the impetuosity of the machine gunners, content only with a place in the foremost line. Nor did the administrative personnel escape dangers and fatigues or fail to overcome them. A single illustration must suffice. Rflmn. E. H. Nailer, a driver in the 3rd Rifles' transport, was engaged on 25th October in bringing up rations to the front line companies, when he came under heavy shell-fire at a cutting. Here he passed a water cart which had been cut adrift by a fellow driver to save the horses. With consummate coolness and gallantry Nailer negotiated the cutting successfully and delivered the rations. Learning then that the fighting troops were short of water, he returned, hitched his team to the cart and went forward with it in turn. Shelling, though less heavy, had not ceased, and Nailer was wounded. None the less, he persevered with his errand, delivered the water, and brought his team back again to safety.

Pending the resumption of the advance the Division was organised in depth, and the front line was reconstituted on a 2-battalion basis. All necessary readjustments from a moving to a stationary warfare ensued. The consolidation of defences was taken in hand. Trenches were dug, not in continuous lines, but in section posts, arranged chequerwise. They were camouflaged to harmonise with their surroundings, and the excavations of shelters were covered to prevent toll-tale shadows in aeroplane photographs. Batteries of medium and light mortars were installed in or near the front line for offensive purposes. Forward sections of artillery, frequently changing their positions, were retained near the line for harassing fire, but the remainder of the 3 field artillery brigades, now covering the outpost line, withdrew into defensive positions. Of these 1 was superimposed for S.O.S. calls, the remaining 2 being placed in reserve positions to cover the second line.{265} The Engineer companies hitherto forming part of the infantry brigade groups reverted to the command of the C.R.E. Similarly the machine gun companies were restored to Lt.-Col. Blair's command, to whom with the change fell the responsibility of the machine gun defences. One company was detailed for the forward and one for the second line, the remainder passing into reserve. All possible precautions were taken to prevent casualties among men and animals. Thus the Engineers put in hand the construction of "elephant" shelters in the forward area and gas-proof protection east of the St. Georges river. Wagon lines also were withdrawn westwards.

The enemy's artillery meanwhile remained consistently active, particularly about Pont-à-Pierres. There was a very violent bombardment on the afternoon of the 27th, in which 8-in. shells and a heavy concentration of gas were included. A considerable number of artillery horses were killed. Troops of 2nd Canterbury then in the vicinity of Pont-à-Pierres were forced to seek new bivouacs. The 2nd (Army) Brigade headquarters were also in the area affected. Lt.-Col. Falla was on the point of going to the N.Z.F.A. Depot in England in due rotation to relieve Lt.-Col. Symon, and Major Richmond had just taken command of the brigade. In the bombardment, together with other casualties, Major Richmond, gallant gentleman and exceptionally able gunner, was killed.