The courses of the large rivers Sambre and Scheldt are so directed that between them is left a broad avenue where no great natural obstacle bars an invasion of France from the north-east. Here, on high ground between the smaller rivers of the Ecaillon and Rhonelle, stands the fortress-town of Le Quesnoy. Founded before the XL century, it was a place of considerable importance in the ancient French Hainault. It was surrounded in the middle of the XII. century by extensive ramparts, which did not prevent its capture by several of the great captains in mediaeval and modern history. It had fallen, for example, to Louis XI. (1447), Henry II. of France (1552), the Spaniards (1568), Turenne (1654), Eugene (1712). In 1793 it had been captured by the Austrians, and with its recovery in the following year is connected one of the earliest recorded uses of telegraphy. Before it the English soldier had, in the year of Crecy (1336), been for the first time exposed to the fire of cannon.{266} The fortifications had been maintained and improved, notably by Vauban, who remodelled them in the light of developing military science, but already before the war were rightly considered obsolete. The town contained an arsenal, barracks, military and civil hospitals, and a municipal college. Its population of barely 5000 was mostly employed in the manufacture of iron ware, cotton thread, sugar, and leather. It is entered by 3 roads, 1 from the east, 1 from Orsinval and the north through the Valenciennes Gate, and 1 from the south-east passing between 2 lakes and entering by the Landrecies Gate.
The rolling countryside round the town, beautified at this season of the year with the brown and golden tints of the foliage, is generally well timbered, and some 3 miles to the south-east lie the western extremities of the great Forêt de Mormal, which eastward falls to the Sambre. Through the Forest, on 26th August 1914, the German cavalry and guns, followed by Jägers on motor lorries, had pressed hard on the British columns retreating from Mons. It is traversed by a first-class road from Le Quesnoy to Avesnes and by several second-class roads. In 1914 these roads had offered the only practicable passage for troops. Since then the Germans had felled large areas, but even in these thick undergrowth had risen, hardly less impenetrable than the virgin forest, and almost the whole of its 20,000 acres, with its bush marshes and streams, formed a most serious obstacle to military movement. Maubeuge, 15 miles due east from Le Quesnoy, is only 6 miles distant, as the crow flies, from the Avesnes-Bavai road which bounds the most easterly part of the Forest. Some 8 miles to the south-east of Le Quesnoy the Valenciennes railway and the Le Quesnoy-Avesnes road, after passing through the Forest and crossing the river Sambre, reach the Aulnoye junction, already under our artillery tire.
The enemy's position at the end of October cannot be defined more lucidly or briefly than in the words of the official despatch:—
“By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by the British forces had had a cumulative effect, both moral and material, upon the German Armies. The difficulty of replacing the enemy's enormous losses in guns, machine guns and ammunition had increased with every fresh attack, and his reserves of men were exhausted…..
“The capitulation of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent collapse of Austria—consequent upon Allied successes which the desperate position of her own armies on the western front had rendered her powerless to prevent—had made Germany's military situation ultimately impossible. If her armies were allowed to withdraw undisturbed to shorter lines, the struggle might still be protracted over the winter. The British Armies, however, were now in a position to prevent this by a direct attack upon a vital centre, which should anticipate the enemy's withdrawal and force an immediate conclusion.”
The general plan laid down for the British Armies was to continue their advance on the Aulnoye junction and other centres of communication about Maubeuge vital to the enemy, and, if possible, to cut the main avenue of escape for the German forces opposite the French and Americans. It was essential to strike with the least loss of time. A preliminary operation, begun on 1st November, brought up the left flank of the Third Army across the Rhonelle and gave the Canadians Valenciennes. South of Valenciennes the enemy made, on 3rd November, a limited withdrawal which did not extend so far as Le Quesnoy and did not affect the New Zealanders. "There were indications," writes the Commander-in-Chief, "that a further withdrawal was contemplated both in the Tournai salient, where the line of the Scheldt was turned by our progress on the battle front, and also in the area to the south of us, where the enemy's positions were equally threatened by our advance. Our principal attack was ready."
It was to be delivered the following morning (4th November) along the front of the Fourth Third and First Armies for a distance of about 30 miles from the Sambre, north of Oisy, to Valenciennes, with the co-operation of the French First Army southwards. The Sambre itself on the right of the attack, the Mormal Forest, the thickset nature of the country generally, and the successive river lines falling to the Scheldt across the direction of the advance, threatened to prove difficult obstacles. It was the Allies' intention, however, now to secure that complete victory which had just eluded their grasp in October and which would hurl the Germans back on the Mouse. Nor were their hopes to be disappointed or deferred. It should, moreover, be noted that while the French and Americans were exercising great and increasing pressure towards the Meuse, it was the decisive operation now undertaken by the British Armies which definitely crushed the enemy's resistance, forced retreats in front and on either flank, and compelled him to sue for an armistice. Rich in dramatic values, the pursuit of the broken forces of the invaders brought the Armies of the Empire back to Mons and over the Belgian frontier. These final operations are called the Battle of the Sambre (1st-11th November).
In the lull before the storm the Rifle Brigade continued to hold the New Zealand line west and north-west of Le Quesnoy. During the last days of October. the enemy's artillery was consistently active with explosive and gas. General Russell accordingly ordered the evacuation of the civilians from the Ferme de Beart and other houses east of Beaudignies. From their positions across the railway the enemy's machine guns were now less aggressive against our posts but harassed our low-flying aeroplanes. In retaliation a combined shoot was arranged for 29th October by artillery and machine guns. Aeroplanes flew over the positions to attract fire. The numerous German machine guns about the Square Wood and the belt of trees by the Orsinval Road refused to be drawn. In the railway triangle, however, several, bolder or less sophisticated, opened fire, and locating these the aeroplanes dropped light-signals and sent wireless messages to the batteries, which swept the hostile positions with destructive salvoes.