3Systems of Norms and the Genesis of Meaning

THE HISTORICAL PROCESS of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, as we have seen, is internally conditioned by human capacities, but many forms of normative systems condition it as well. On the one hand, accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things concretely unfolds as a process of knowing and practicing, which involves different senses of normativity. On the other hand, the knowledge and wisdom formed through this process further constrain knowing and practicing by means of externalizing, transforming into universal systems of norms. Directed at knowing the world and the self and changing both the self and the world, norms not only involve questions like “what to do” and “how to do it” but “what to be” as well. In connection with purposiveness, norms encompass an axiological dimension, but insofar as they are based on both reality and what ought to be, norms also have their ontological ground. At the formal level, a norm is similar to a principle (li ) insofar as a norm is external and impersonal.1 However, the actual role of norms cannot be dissociated from inner consciousness or the affective mind (xin ). So, the relationship between norms, the individual, and his or her conscious activity concretely unfolds as the interaction between the affective mind and principle. As normative principles, which constrain the human process of being and the human mode of being, norms constitute the condition of possibility of humans being-with humans; here, norms grounding the possibility of living-in-common reflects the social universality and commonality of norms and reveals their concrete historicality as well.

Reality, Necessity, and What Ought to Be: the Origin of Norms

Why does human being even have the issue of norms? This is itself a question with original meaning. Logically, with regard to the way of being of humans, the question “Why are there norms?” first of all means “Why do human beings need norms?” One cognizes the world and oneself but also changes oneself and the world. This process not only forces human being to go beyond reality and face the question of what ought to be, it also invests norms with an originality intrinsic to the process of knowing and practicing.2 In viewing accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things as the very mode of being of humans in the ontological sense, and in tying axiological principles like observing ritual propriety (li ) and being-righteous (yi ) to it, Chinese philosophy has already noticed to some extent this relation between norms and the being of humans.

In a broad sense, norms could be understood as the universal standards according to which the human way of doing things and the human mode of being is prescribed and evaluated. The question “what to be” concerns the human form of being, and as I will demonstrate, norms have the meaning of guiding one in one’s concern with this question. Doing or acting refers to practicing in the broad sense, but in an extended sense, it also concerns conscious activity (like cognizing, thinking, and so on). Prior to acting as well as during the process of acting, norms regulate activity by guiding and restraining it; after an action occurs, norms furthermore constitute the standards according to which such activity is evaluated. Naturally, regulating is inseparable from evaluating. As far as moral norms are concerned, even when a motive has arisen in the mind of the individual prior to the occurrence of a corresponding action, the conscious individual will also evaluate this motive according to a certain norm or set thereof, and determine whether or not it is appropriate; similarly, the evaluation of an action that has already occurred also constrains and regulates future moral actions.

With regard to the way in which norms function, there is a diversity of modes. As a principle of what ought to be, a norm has “ought” and “should” as one of its meanings, which entails a demand concerning “what to do” and “how to do it.” In the form of “ought” or “should,” this demand has directive meaning: whereas “what to do” guides human being in terms of the aim and direction of action, “how to do it” guides human being in terms of the way it should be done. Opposed to and yet complementary to guiding is limiting and restricting. To guide is to tell people positively what “should” be done or how it “should” be done, while limiting and restricting stipulates negatively “what shouldn’t be done” or “how it shouldn’t be done.” Directing and limiting then constitute the two sides of the same principle, just as “tell the truth” (direction) and “don’t lie” (restriction) are two different expressions of the same principle concerning honesty.3

Directive norms also have a convincing quality. In the form of “should,” directive norms are not the same as external commands: in the face of a command, it does not matter if one is willing or not, one can only carry it out; the working of directive norms presupposes the agent’s acceptance and agreement, and accepting and agreeing involves convincing. Opposed to the convincing is the compulsory. Compulsory norms also entail a certain demand, but a demand that is not simply expressed in the form of a “should” or “ought;” but rather a “must.” However, it is essential to notice that the compulsory quality of norms cannot be equated with the restrictive nature of demands. Restrictive norms express a negative demand, but this kind of demand may either come in compulsory form or convincing form. As everyone knows, moral norms and legal norms both encompass restrictive aspects, but moral norms have a convincing quality, whereas legal norms have a compulsory quality.

Norms concern not only what should be done and how it should be done, but also what to be, which concerns the form of one’s being. In the moral realm, moral norms do not just restrict human action; they also play a guiding and determining role in relation to whatever form of being humans are aiming to attain. The core of Confucian axiological principles, being-humane (ren ), is not just a virtue; rather, it has normative meaning as well. Here, the Confucian call to “be humane” (wei ren ) demands that one abide by what is humane (ren ) as a norm in the process of acting, and implies sculpting the self according to what is humane as a principle. In a related sense, a general value ideal also has normative meaning: it serves as a goal that guides one toward such an ideal in the shaping of one’s character. Broadly speaking, the norms pertaining to the political, legal, and scientific domains also play this dual role. In the political and legal domains, norms not only prescribe people’s behavior, but also demand people to become beings with a political and legal consciousness and with a corresponding character and capacity. What Aristotle called a “political animal” and what we call today a “law-abiding citizen” express different senses of this core meaning. Similarly, scientific norms also restrict and prescribe behavior pertaining to the scientific domain, and furthermore, guide those engaged in such activities as to how to become qualified members of the scientific community.

“What to do” and “what to be” are inseparable. Shaping one’s personality and refining one’s mode of being is always linked to one’s way of doing things. As for being-humane (ren ), composing oneself according to the standard of what is humane (acquiring a humane character and being-humane) is always inseparably linked to acting in harmony with the norms of humanity (following the norms of humanity in the process of acting). Similarly, the forms of human character pertaining to the political, scientific, economic and legal domains are always consistent with the process of behaving under the constraint of the norms corresponding to those domains. On the other hand, character that has been refined under the guidance of certain norms also needs to gain embodiment and confirmation through concrete actions. So, harmonizing with a set of norms in one’s mode of being and way of acting concretely reveals the intrinsic link between being and doing, what to be and what to do.

Norms intrinsically entail purposiveness with the aim of guiding one’s actions and refining oneself. At the universal level, norms originate from the historical need of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, and their function lies in providing the conditions for knowing and reforming the world and the self. In effect, due to their original form, norms are infused with senses of value, and their meaning lies in attaining “the good” in the broad sense, which constitutes precisely their purposive determination. “The good” tied to the norms in the legal and moral domains first and foremost expresses the legitimacy and lawfulness of behavior, and in domains like that of reforming nature, this “good,” as purposive determination, simultaneously concerns the effectiveness of behavior. Some norms, at first glance, do not seem to share a direct link with any purpose. For instance, the respective purposes of the stipulations contained in customs, traditional habits, and game rules are often not very apparent. However, their purposive content can be discovered with closer analysis. Customs are in a sense twofold: insofar as they are phenomena of regularity arising spontaneously, they present traits akin to that of “natural” objects, and it is also precisely on these grounds that the study of customs is often developed in a descriptive manner similar to the way scientific research is conducted. However, customs also constitute the behavioral standards of certain ethnic groups, and are therefore prescriptive. One of the significances of customs, as norms, lies in bringing about community solidarity and cultural identity, which constitute the intrinsic aim of customs. Similarly, purposiveness may also be attributed to game rules. For different forms of competitive activity, rules are purposive insofar as they not only enable actions to make sense (as the conditions of possibility of this type of activity), but also ensure the justified order of activity (like justifiably determining a winner).

As a manifestation of the sense of values, the purposiveness of norms originally concerns human needs. Norms aim at attaining what is good (including the legitimacy and effectiveness of actions), which is itself based on human need. In the domain of moral practice, moral norms constitute the necessary ground of possibility of the integration of individuals, and hence, of social order itself, and the reason these grounds are necessary lies in connection with the production and reproduction of social life: the realization of the production and reproduction of social life would be impossible if the members of society were incapable of rationally managing and positioning their relationships to one another in accordance with basic ethical principles and norms like justice and humane treatment in the formation of a moral order. In the unfolding of life practices, universal ethical ideals, axiological principles, behavioral norms, and standards of evaluation are the intrinsic forces that consolidate the members of a society into a social membership: the members of a society are divided into different roles and positions, which give them each a different status and interest, so their only movement toward community life aside from mutual opposition, reciprocal discrimination, and open confrontation happens under the constraint and influence of the moral ideals and principles they hold in common. Here, the historical needs of social life undoubtedly constitute the intrinsic ground of moral norms. In the same way, the different norms pertaining respectively to the political, economic, legal, and scientific domains of practice are also in a similar sense formed out of the different needs of their corresponding practices.

This connection between purposiveness and need manifests the sense of values; by originating from need, norms show that they are grounded in values. In effect, as what ought to be, norms are the prescriptions and standards pertaining to the axiological domain. However, at the same time, what ought to be in the axiological sense is inseparably linked to reality and necessity in the ontological sense. Chinese philosophy’s understanding of dao reflects this point. In Chinese philosophy, dao is understood to be both the laws of being and the ways of being. As the laws of being, dao expresses the objective determination of being, qualified as being in-itself. As the ways of being, Dao is interconnected with human being, encompassing the dimension of being for-humans: the ways of being do not only concern how objects exist, but also how human being exists. As the laws of being, dao means what necessarily is; as the ways of being in connection with human beings, dao means what ought to be. So, in Chinese philosophy, dao refers to both what necessarily is and what ought to be; the latter refers to normative systems in the form of ideals, rules, and procedures. So, Chinese philosophy’s inquiry into the world does not only aim at revealing the necessary laws of being, but also at discovering and grasping the human way of being. When Mencius stressed that “there is a dao to winning the world” and that “there is a dao to winning the people,”4 the dao spoken of here both concerns the laws of being of the social domain and also involves the way in which humans exist (the way of being of humans).

Wang Fuzhi once gave a concrete explanation of the relationship between what necessarily is and what ought to be at the metaphysical level. When concretely analyzing the meaning of dao, Wang Fuzhi pointed out:

qi transforming, that is, the transformation of qi. Yin and yang subsist in their interaction and fusion (yinyun ) in the state of extreme emptiness (taixu ): yin and yang succeed one another, moving and resting, resting and moving, contacting one another and influencing one another, displaying their function in accordance with their proper timing and location; the five phases (wuxing ) and all things, in melting and congealing, flowing and halting, flying and diving, the birds and fish, the animals and plants—each of them matures in accordance with their own laws without going awry. In this way, there is the dao of things for things, the dao of man for man, and the dao of spirits for spirits. If we know clearly and act properly, then we follow dao as the principle of what ought to be: it is in this sense that it is called dao.”5

The dao of the succession and flow of yin and yang initially appears as the necessary laws internal to things, which give the world a universal order (enabling things to follow their respective laws without going awry); and to illuminate the dao of necessity so as to grasp the rational way to conduct our actions (to know clearly and act properly) is to provide intrinsic norms for practices, and as the universal principles that prescribe actions, dao is simultaneously the principle of what ought to be. So, through the unity of the laws of being and the ways of being, what necessarily is simultaneously constitutes the ontological ground of what ought to be.

In the realm of concrete practice, the formation of norms is always based on actual beings (reality) and the laws that actual beings encompass (necessity); if a norm were to conflict with reality or necessity, then it would never be capable of becoming an actual norm with directive and constrictive significance. For example, traffic rules in modern living conditions regulate the relationship between different vehicles as well as that between vehicles and pedestrians, and the formation of specific rules in this domain requires a consideration of the horizontal and vertical connectivity of the different pathways, highways, and roads as well the density and speed of vehicles, the relationship of the latter to the roads, the characteristics of human behavior, and so on. Even though they are conventional principles of what ought to be (for instance, different countries and regions may have different conventions for driving on the left or right side of the road), their validity and rationality in the end is based on a precise grasp of the various conditions noted above (reality) and the determinate connections between these conditions (necessity). Systems of norms must be adjusted in correspondence with the changes that occur to the real form of being. For instance, as highways appeared, speed limits needed to be adjusted. Thus, with the purposive aim of having traffic circulate safely and fluidly, a normative system of traffic rules, as what ought to be, is simultaneously grounded in reality and necessity.

The connection between norms (what ought to be) and reality (what actually is) is also concretely demonstrated through the concept of “ought entails can.” Broadly speaking, “can” logically implies three meanings: first off, having the capacity to do, which mainly involves the agent or whether or not a specific individual has the capacity to complete an action; second, being able to do something involves “possibility,” which concerns the broader background and conditions of an action such as in the case of flying a plane, which aside from the capacity of the individual to pilot a plane also depends on other conditions mechanical and meteorological; third, being permitted to do something, which involves the relationship between actions and other normative systems (whether a system of norms with a broad constraining power permits certain actions or not). In the notion “ought entails can,” can bears upon the first meaning. In the case of choosing to do something, an “ought” (to do) that is prescribed by a norm presupposes that the individual concerned (the agent) can do what is prescribed, and “can” implies the ability to do something, which is itself a kind of fact (reality): a subject (or agent) having a corresponding ability is by no means based upon an arbitrary, subjective opinion; it is a real mode of being (reality). This connection between ought (norms) and can (capacity) thus reflects the connection between what ought to be and what actually is. Mencius once distinguished between “being unable” (buneng ) and “being unwilling” (buwei ):

When one who upon being asked to jump over the North Sea while holding Mount Tai in one’s arms, responds “I can’t do it” this is truly an expression of inability (shi cheng buneng ye ). When one who upon being asked to break a twig for one’s elders, responds “I can’t do it,” it is not that one is unable to do it (fei buneng ye ), but rather that one is unwilling to do it (shi buwei ye ).6

The reason that jumping over the North Sea while holding Mount Tai under one’s arms cannot become “what ought to be” (a norm one ought to carry out) is primarily because such an act is truly beyond one’s ability; the reason that “breaking a twig for one’s elders” “ought” to become a standard of behavior is because it lies within the scope of one’s real capacities; the latter is grounded in reality (it is within one’s capacity to do it), and it is this ground that is still wanting in the former case.

To elaborate further, norms both spring from the specific needs of concrete practical domains and also concern the specific actions or ways of acting corresponding to such domains; whether it is an actual need or a determinate kind of activity, both have real properties. A need, in contrast to a subjective desire, is the manifestation of an objective tendency determined by an actual relationship. Similarly, different activities respectively possess their own specific order and structure, which are also real. Norms can only effectively guide practical processes on the condition that they are grounded in orders and structures that are themselves real. From the activity of such domains as the economic and the political to legal to technical operations, the rationality and validity of norms always presupposes that they reflect and grasp the specific order, structure, and real needs of the activities of a given domain.

This connection between reality, necessity, and norms in the form of what ought to be has not been accounted for adequately. Some have addressed the issue of the ground of norms, but their accounts are strikingly abstract. The account given by C. M. Korsgaard seems to represent this tendency. In his work, The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard examines the sources of moral norms, and his main conclusion goes as follows: the sources of normativity should first be traced back to the human capacity of reflective scrutiny or the reflective structure of consciousness, which make human beings capable of forming the concept of self-identity, and further, of autonomous self-legislation, by virtue of which laws or norms that provide causes for action are constituted.7 The sources of normativity concern the foundation, origin, and hence ground of norms; to take the human capacity of reflective scrutiny or the reflective structure of consciousness to be the ultimate source of normativity implies searching for the ground of norms within human consciousness. Although Korsgaard’s account here touches upon the relationship between norms and internal consciousness, which I will discuss specifically later on, looking for the source of norms solely within the structure of consciousness is obviously an approach that fails to grasp the actual ground of norms (including moral norms). As for moral norms, investigating their origin first requires a look at the ethical relationships found within actual society. In terms of the ethical relationships found within the family, “taking care of children” and “respecting parents” became basic behavioral norms after humankind evolved up to a certain historical age. As far as humans as concrete individuals go, while it is true that the individual human being’s self-conscious understanding and acceptance of norms remains tied to a consciousness of reason, these norms themselves do not directly originate from human being’s rational reflection. At a certain stage of social development, when children come into the world, parents, as the life givers of their children, are simultaneously positioned within a certain relationship of responsibility (including the responsibility of nourishing their children); by the same token, as the other party in the relationship, children also have the duty to respect and care for their parents, which is not a simple payback, but rather a demand that is intrinsically entailed by this ethical relationship itself. Moral norms, which constrain family life, are grounded in such ethical relationships. In broader terms, as concrete members of society, humans always exist in multifaceted social relationships, which always determine corresponding duties. As soon as an individual becomes a member of a relationship, he or she simultaneously needs to take on the duties entailed by such a relationship, and follow the rules or norms, which correspond to such duties. The economic activities of the market have their specific market rules; academic groups have their own academic norms; mass media organizations have rules for their media activities; for public discussion, there is a general turn-taking procedure for speaking and responding, and so on. Such rules, norms, and procedures could be seen as the specific forms of expression of corresponding duties, which are themselves determined by the relationships binding the parties of a trade, the members of a group, mass, and media, and so on. Korsgaard overlooks just this fact in taking the reflectivity of consciousness to be the source of normativity.

Norms are rules that constrain the being and doing of humans, but the formation and application of norms remains tied to those practical activities that are repetitive and continuous: a certain rule always exercises directive and restrictive roles in relation to the different actions involved in similar types of practical activity. In the case of soccer competitions, the rules of soccer ought to be followed in every single soccer match. In effect, there are no rules or norms that only apply to isolated actions or activities that occur only once. Whereas being grounded in necessity determines the universal character of norms at the ontological level, that relationship between norms and human activity just mentioned invests norms with universal applicability at the level of social practice. However, on the other hand, norms are not for that matter eternally fixed and unchanging. As already shown, although norms are indeed grounded in reality and necessity, they are also tied to human aims and needs, which qualify them as conventional to some degree. As regards the formation of norms, the time and form in which a norm of a certain practical domain will emerge will always be a contingent phenomenon and not a matter of necessity. This quality of norms in a respect reflects the historical nature of norms. Norms change in response to transformations in the needs, aims, and contexts of the being of humans. In the case of civilian aircrafts, for example, prior to the appearance of wireless electronic devices like mobile phones, there were no stipulations prohibiting their use while riding on airplanes, but after these devices became popular, a norm prohibiting their use emerged as a response to the need of guaranteeing flight safety, that is, in order to avoid the disruption of aircraft traffic and communication signals. From a much broader perspective, the international community has rules that maintain the international economic and political order, and these international rules always need to be readjusted at different historical stages in order to adapt to the new world order. In brief, it is not just the formation of norms that is historical, since norms remain transformable even after they have formed. Here we can see that the universality, transformability, and historicality of norms constitute the properties of norms, which distinguish prescriptive rules from necessary laws.

Considered further, the working of norms always involves the human power to choose: human being can choose to follow a rule or choose to disobey or break it. By contrast, however, human being cannot choose to disobey a law (a natural law) as that which necessarily is. A particular social community may stipulate the rule that “one ought to turn on the heater when the temperature drops below zero,” but even with this stipulation, the members of such a community may still choose not to turn on the heater after the temperature drops below zero, and thus break the rule. However, “water transforms from liquid to solid when the temperature of the water drops below zero” is a law of nature, which is a necessary law and hence not something that human beings can disobey: in ordinary conditions, as soon as its temperature drops below zero, a volume of water necessarily transforms into a solid state (ice). This distinction between norms and laws demonstrates in another respect that norms are not equivalent to laws.

However, in the history of philosophy, due to affirming the connection between what ought to be and necessity, there were some philosophers who failed to notice this distinction. The Neo-Confucian philosophers following the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi manifest this tendency to some degree. The Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi saw the principle of Nature (tianli ) as the first principle, understanding it as both the ground of being and a universal ethical norm. As a universal norm, principle (li ) was often regarded as transcendent:

“Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety.”—This is precisely because of what the principle of Nature has donated to our two eyes. In other words, the principle of Nature has never told us to look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety. When we look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety, there is no principle of Nature [in it]. “Do not listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety.”—This is precisely because of what the principle of Nature has donated to our two ears. In other words, the principle of Nature has never told us to listen to something that violates the observance of ritual propriety. When we listen to something that violates the observance of ritual propriety, there is no principle of Nature [in it]. “Do not say anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety.”—This is precisely because of what the principle of Nature has donated to our mouths. In other words, the principle of Nature has never told us to say anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety. When we say something that violates the observance of ritual propriety, there is no principle of Nature [in it]. “Do not perform an action that violates the observance of ritual propriety.”—This is precisely because of what the principle of Nature has donated to our body and mind. In other words, the principle of Nature has never told us to perform any action that violates the observance of ritual propriety. When we perform an action that violates the observance of ritual propriety, there is no principle of Nature [in it].8

“What the principle of Nature has donated” is precisely the given of Nature itself, and when defining the norm of the humane way (rendao ), Zhu Xi more precisely pointed out what this means: “The humane way is the principle, which Nature gives me, and which I cannot but carry out.”9 A norm, as that which is given by Nature, is already no longer just a prescription of what ought to be, since it is simultaneously qualified as necessity: to say that one “cannot but do x” already entails that one “must do x.” In effect, Zhu Xi tried to transform the prescriptive “ought” into the necessary “must”; we cannot help but see this intention from his discussion of the following: “that which the self is intimately bound by, the constant binding duties—between ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elders and youth, and friends—all necessarily have their prescriptive principle, which the self cannot outstrip.”10 That the self cannot outstrip something means that the self cannot command itself according to its own volition, and the background of such a notion includes an affirmation of a force or tendency beyond one’s choice. In the form of an external command that the self cannot disobey, a principle of Nature transcends the self’s willing choice: “to fulfill the duty of filial piety is something that Nature commands me to do in such a way that I cannot but do otherwise.”11 For the individual to be unable to do otherwise means that there is no choice but to obey that which Nature mandates. As the objects that one “cannot but” follow, norms like the duty of filial piety are simultaneously invested with necessity: that one’s behavior must be like this and not otherwise stems from the necessary compulsion of norms. Logically speaking, understanding prescriptive principles as laws that “outstrip individual choice” and “cannot but be this way” always leads to taking what ought to be for necessity. In the realm of moral practice, taking what ought to be for necessity inevitably makes norms seem like they are forces beyond one’s will. From a much broader perspective, confusing the prescriptive with the necessary means weakening or even eliminating the role of human being’s autonomous choice in normative systems and thus leads to the other extreme pole of neglecting the objective basis of norms altogether.12

In summary, norms are not only grounded in reality and necessity and hence have their actual ground; norms are also infused with human aims and hence contain different senses of value. Simultaneously, as what ought to be, norms are also qualified as conventional and thus differ from natural laws. This property can always be seen in the different ways and forms in which norms emerge. For example, technical rules of procedure first concern the relationship between human being and object (how to effectively manipulate an object so as to make it suit one’s needs), and the aspect of norms that is grounded in reality and necessity is often displayed in a variety of ways; in such domains such as the aesthetic, moral, and cultural, norms mainly concern the human self and the relationships between humans (including the variety of activities found in each community), and hence, their purposive and conventional character is more salient. Furthermore, norms, whose object is the constraining of the human self and relations between humans, also have different stresses: compared to aesthetic norms, moral norms more directly display the sense of values, whereas the rules of game play for each community more openly display their conventional quality. But of course, these different stresses are relative: technical rules or procedures may embody an intimate relationship with reality and necessity, but insofar as they also aim at making objects conform to human ends and purposes, they obviously encompass values. Similarly, aesthetic taste and moral norms respectively concern natural forms and actual human ethical relationships, and hence are inseparable from necessity. Although game rules are indeed conventional, as that which ensures the effective unfolding of common activities, they are also infused with values. Considering norms as a whole, even though they have a diversity of expressive forms, they all share something in common insofar as they express the interfusion of what actually is, what necessarily is, and what ought to be as well as the unity of actuality, values, and conventionality.

The Affective Mind (xin ) and Principles (li ):
Norms and Internal Consciousness

Norms, as prescriptive principles, are impersonal and universal: they are by no means internal to or limited to a particular individual; rather, they are external to and transcendent to particular individuals. However, this does not imply that norms may exist in isolation from individuals and individual consciousness. Regardless of whether we are considering the actual effect of external norms or considering the process of internal conscious activity, we can see the reciprocal checking and balancing of the two. From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, norms could be seen as the concrete form of principles (li ), and human consciousness could be considered as belonging to the realm of the affective mind (xin ); thus, the interaction between norms and internal consciousness simultaneously involves the reciprocal interaction between the affective mind and principles.

Normative systems, their birth and their existence, are inseparable from humans, and their functioning is based on human being’s acceptance of them, identification with them, and choosing of them. In connection with this standpoint, one’s attitude and willingness, one’s acceptance of, identification with, and choice of norms intrinsically involves one’s conscious processes and mental activity or spiritual state. Accepting and identifying with a norm presupposes understanding it, which not only refers to understanding what it concretely stipulates and demands; it also includes a judgment concerning its necessity and legitimacy. Choice arises from the human will, and when a norm conflicts with one’s will, even if one adequately understands its meaning, one will not actually follow it in practice. Here, understanding, accepting, identifying with, and choosing all unfold simultaneously in the process of mental activity, which also includes the conscious activity of what Korsgaard called reflective rationality and rational scrutiny: viewing rational scrutiny as the source of norms is undoubtedly abstract, but this type of internal consciousness is indeed involved in the process of applying norms.

Wittgenstein once examined the following of rules and especially affirmed their universality and publicity: “It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).”13 Rules thus, as behavioral norms, are not limited to particular individuals or specific situations, and in connection with customs, uses, and institutions, they have universality and publicity. For Wittgenstein, customs are always expressed through concrete actions: “And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.”14 From emphasizing the extra-individual and practical nature of rule-following, Wittgenstein proceeded to separate the following of rules from internal consciousness and mental processes. The distinction between following rules and “to think” that one is following rules in fact implies such a separation. As for the actual form of a rule, although “to think” one is obeying a rule is indeed different from obeying a rule, it is impossible to entirely exclude the individual’s self-awareness from the process of obeying rules. Yet, while affirming the former (“to think” one is obeying the rules is different from obeying the rules), Wittgenstein seems to have neglected the latter (the impossibility of disconnecting the individual’s self-awareness from the process of obeying rules); from the following statement, we cannot help but see this: “When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.”15 As I have already shown, choice is based on self-awareness and internal volition, but “blindly obeying rules” and “not choosing” is different from naturally according with principles without either needing to think or self-consciously exert oneself to do it: the latter involves transcending self-awareness through self-awareness (reaching a higher state of spontaneous awareness), whereas to blindly obey the rules and to not choose is a way of behaving that has never undergone such a process of self-aware willing, and hence, this means that it is to some degree disengaged from self-awareness and one’s willingness. As a whole, Wittgenstein actually tended to understand the following of rules as an external mode of behavior that has nothing to do with internal consciousness, which overemphasizes the public and practical nature of the process of employing norms and neglects the connection between norms and internal consciousness. Here, it is not hard to see some sort of behavioralist perspective in Wittgenstein.

As compared with Wittgenstein, Mencius expressed a different tendency of thought. According to the book Mencius, there is the following record of a dispute between Mencius and his contemporary Gaozi, which unfolded around the problem of being-humane (ren ) and being-righteous (yi ):

Gaozi states: “To eat, drink and copulate; such is human nature. Being-humane is internal and not external, whereas being-righteous is external and not internal.” Mencius asks: “Why do you say being-humane is internal and being-righteous external?” Gaozi responds, “Let’s say the other standing before me is an elder and so I respect him as an elder (wo zhang zhi ), this would have nothing to do with anything elderly in myself (fei you zhang yu wo ye ). Here it is as if there were an object standing before me that was white, and so I regarded it as white; this would be due to the white color of it being external, and so I say that being-righteous is external.” Mencius retorts: “Indeed there is no difference between regarding the white color of a white horse and the white color of a white man. But would recognizing the old age of an old horse be the same as respecting the elderly nature of an elderly man? And then would we say of the elderly man here that he is the one who is being-righteous? Or wouldn’t we rather say of the one who is respecting the elder that he is being-righteous?”16

Being-humane and being-righteous both have the broad sense of virtue and norm, and in the context of this dispute, being-righteous refers more to external norms, including showing respect for elders. Gaozi initially equates respect for an elder in the axiological sense (let’s say the other before me is an elder and I respect him as an elder) with a regard for white things as being white in the factual sense (let’s say the object before me is white and I regard it as white). The white color of the thing is an external factual property, and to regard the white color as white is grounded upon this external property. In the same way, for Gaozi, the old age of the elderly person is also external, and Gaozi deduces from this that respect for the elderly person is also external in nature: “let’s say the other before me is older and I respect him as an elder” is merely grounded upon the old age of an object, this external property. Opposed to this, Mencius distinguished between the recognition of facts and the recognition of norms, which pertain to values, through a comparison of humans and horses: one affirms that a horse is old on the grounds that it has aged many years, but one shows respect for an aged human being; the former is attributed to what is actual (fact), while the latter is attributed to what is righteous (what ought to be). Mencius opposes merely investing what is righteous with the attribute of externality on the grounds that the functioning of norms (the manifestation of what is righteous in such forms as respecting the elderly) is inseparable from internal consciousness. Mencius clearly expresses this through rebuttals like “Would we say of the elderly man here that he is the one who is being-righteous? Or wouldn’t we rather say of the one who is respecting the elder that he is being-righteous?” The old age of the elder is an objective property, but treating an elder as elderly is a way of behaving (respecting elders); as an attitude and way of treating elders, its distinctive feature lies in emerging from an internal sense of respect. For Mencius, only the latter can be a manifestation of “being-righteous.” When discussing filial conduct, Confucius once pointed out: “Those today who are filial are considered to be so because they are able to provide for their parents. But even dogs and horses are given that much care. If you do not respect your parents, what is the difference?”17 Filial piety embodies the moral norm of behavior between relatives, and “respect” here is the expression of internal consciousness, including sincere respect and care for parents. For Confucius, lacking this internal moral consciousness, even if one were to display different kinds of external expressivity like “providing for,” one’s behavior would still not qualify as following or according with the norm of filial conduct. The emphasis that Mencius placed on the internality of appropriate conduct could be seen as a further development of this train of thought in the Analects of Confucius. As opposed to Gaozi’s reduction of norms (what is righteous) to external properties, Mencius’s conception certainly reveals a much more profound grasp of the distinctive feature of actual norms.

Of course, to say the functioning of norms is linked to internal consciousness does not mean that following a norm could be simply expressed as intending to do something and then doing it. In the actual process of living, people do not first think of some norm or first make the decision that they ought to follow a norm and then act in accordance with it. Actions that accord with norms often unfold as habitual processes that do not involve thinking. Taking traffic rules as an example, for drivers in a modern society, to see a red light and then stop, and to see the light turn green and then go has become a series of almost instinctual reflexes. This habitual following of norms presupposes the internalization of norms. Here, the internalization of a norm refers to the process of undergoing a repetitive series of practical exercises over a long period of time, through which the agent gradually comes to understand, accept, and identify with a norm as it fuses gradually into the agent’s consciousness or structure of spirit, after which it becomes a kind of tacit consciousness and internal mental disposition. Thereby, as soon as a situation linked to a norm arises, one will act in accordance with this norm in a nearly spontaneous way. Here, the link between following norms and internal conscious processes has not changed in any fundamental way; what has changed is only the way in which consciousness functions: the conscious acceptance, identification with, and choosing of norms gradually transforms into the internal constraint of a tacit consciousness and fixed mental disposition.

This link between following norms and internal conscious activity reveals the influence of the affective mind upon principle. From a much broader perspective, as the affective mind acts upon principles (norms), the affective mind becomes constrained by principles in many ways. In the process of cognizing, one can see the different influences and regulative effects universal norms have upon perception and thought. The general principle pertaining to the realm of perception is the objectivity of observation, and although objectivity may be understood in different ways and observation may often involve theories, to grasp the external world as it is doubtless involves this general principle guiding the act of perception. Similarly, different norms also constrain thought. At the level of form, thinking presupposes the following of logical rules. Even though people do not in fact think of logical rules at every moment in the process of thinking and although just following logical rules will not ensure that one will arrive at a creative thought, to think according to logic undoubtedly constitutes one of the conditions of accurate knowledge of the world.

The influence and constraint of principles (norms) upon the affective mind likewise appears in the moral realm. An important mode of moral consciousness is moral sentiments. At first glance, moral norms seem primarily to be external social demands, while moral sentiments are internal to the individual’s consciousness, which seems to suggest that there is no intrinsic connection between them. However, further analysis will reveal that this is not actually the case. Moral norms directly or indirectly influence the formation and cultivation of moral sentiments, as concrete embodiments of moral consciousness. Engendering a sense of guilt, for example, involves the pervasive functioning of moral norms: guilt often follows a self-accusation of some kind, which springs from the inconsistency of one’s behavior with moral norms, and logically speaking, this includes both measuring behavior with moral norms as well as the emotional response that arises from this measuring. Similarly, dissatisfaction with immoral phenomena or immoral deeds is also linked to evaluations based on moral norms: immoral deeds incite discontent due to their disharmony with the moral norms the agent affirms and accepts.

In a more universal sense, moral norms also constrain the cultivation of virtue. Virtue, as the unified structure of spirit, envelops universality insofar as it is inseparable from the self-conscious acceptance of norms. In effect, the formation of virtue is always tied to the process of molding oneself in accordance with norms; a normative system that occupies a dominant position for a definite period of time at once both constrains people’s behavior while also influencing the orientation of human character in terms of social values. In The Book of Rites (liji ), it is said: “Without observing ritual propriety, morality, humanity and righteousness does not mature [in human character].”18 In broad terms, there is a universal aspect to the humanity and righteousness of morality and an internal one as well. When opposed to “observing ritual propriety,” being moral, humane, and righteous appear as having more to do with the internal determination of human virtue and character. Here, ritual propriety (li ) refers to the institution and general normative system of the rites. This whole statement in The Book of Rites means that the growth and formation of inner character is inseparable from the constraint of the universal rules of ritual practice. Li Gou gave a more concrete affirmation of this, when he stated: “lead the people with learning, regulate the people with ritual propriety and human nature will mature.”19 Here, human nature (xing ) mainly refers to the second nature of virtue as opposed to the first nature of what is instinctual or innate, and to “lead the people with learning and regulate the people with ritual propriety” means to lead people to self-consciously accept and identify with universal norms and consequently constrain themselves with them: “human nature will mature” means that first nature will be raised through cultivation into the second nature of virtue. Zhang Zai also had a similar idea, emphasizing that “human nature that is still pending refinement depends on ritual propriety for support” and “moral right grows out of knowing ritual propriety in the refining of human nature.”20 Here, Zhang Zai confirms the unity of knowing ritual propriety (grasping a system of norms) and refining human nature (transforming first nature into the second nature of virtue). In broader terms, norms also guide the sculpting of spirit by influencing one’s virtue.

In connection with scientific knowledge and ethical virtue we find an aesthetic consciousness. The aesthetic sphere also has its own standards or norms, which influence many facets of aesthetic consciousness, including aesthetic taste. What distinguishes an aesthetic experience is its difference from a pure sensible pleasure. One of the fundamental differences between a feeling of beauty and a feeling of sensible pleasure lies in the connection between aesthetic standards or norms and the cultivation of aesthetic experiences. In The Analects, we find the following statement: “When at the kingdom of Qi, hearing the imperial music of Shao, Confucius didn’t even notice the taste of meat for three months. He stated, ‘I never imagined that music could have ever reached such perfection!’ ”21 To “not even notice the taste of meat for three months” due to “listening to the imperial music of Shao” means that enjoyment in the aesthetic sense enables human being to transcend the feeling of pleasure at the level of sensibility; such a raising of spirit is linked to the application of aesthetic norms. The Analects also records the comparison Confucius made between the music of Shao and that of Wu: “Confucius said of the music of Shao: ‘completely refined both in terms of beauty and in terms of good,’ and of the music of Wu: ‘completely refined in terms of beauty, but incompletely refined in terms of good.’ ”22 The aesthetic standard of perfection for Confucius is thus the unity of the beautiful and the good. The reason Confucius appreciated the music of Shao is due to its attainment of this standard of perfection.23 On the other hand, it is precisely with the music of Shun in mind as the standard of an aesthetic judgment of the unity of the good and the beautiful that Confucius weighs in favor of listening to the music of Shun while ignoring the taste of meat. Opposed to appreciation in the positive sense is repulsion in the negative sense. Confucius once insisted on “banishing the music of Zheng;”24 the reason it called for rejection is due to the discordance it evoked in relation to the aesthetic standards Confucius upheld—“I detest the sounds of Zheng for corrupting our classical court music.”25 Here, his “detest” includes a feeling of repulsion in him, which contrasted perfectly with that aesthetic enjoyment inspired in him by the music of Shao. In brief, the difference between the music of Shao and that of Zheng as well as the different emotional responses to which they give rise are all linked to the application and influence of aesthetic norms.

Evidently, norms emerge in a diversity of forms, which correspond to the diversity of human being’s practical activities and ways of being-in-the-world. Moreover, this diversity of norms also constrains human being’s conscious activity in many ways. Of course, by guiding and influencing, norms condition the rational and effective unfolding of conscious activity, but certainly without rejecting or limiting human creativity. In effect, norms always entail creative space. For instance, to play chess or some other competitive activity, following a defined set of rules is the basic precondition of joining the activity concerned, but to become the winner, just following the rules alone is obviously not enough; to win, the participants of the activity are simultaneously required to use norms creatively. A similar case could be made for the process of knowing. To follow logical rules while thinking is the necessary precondition of arriving at precise knowledge, but just following logical rules alone cannot ensure the attainment of any genuine, profound knowledge of the world. As norms guide and restrain thought in the process of thinking, they also provide creative thought with the vast world around us and thus present an openness. But, norms are unable to predict how a creative thought will concretely unfold.

In the domain of moral practice, we can likewise see the reciprocal interaction between universal norms and individual consciousness. Moral practices always unfold in specific circumstances. Analyzing concrete situations demands the application of norms and involves the flexible modification of principles. In Chinese philosophy, this issue emerged very early in debates concerning the distinction between jing () and quan ().26 Jing primarily refers to the universality and determinateness of rules, while quan refers to the flexible bending of rules. Chinese philosophers insisted on returning to the rules (fanjing ) but also opposed upholding rules inflexibly (wuquan ),27 which concerns the relationship between applying norms and considering concrete circumstances. But what is worth more attention is that in Chinese philosophy the interaction between jing and quan is always intertwined with the individual and inner consciousness. Here, the following quote from Wang Fuzhi is certainly representative of Chinese philosophy in this regard:

Only by knowing in advance the principles that connects things together consistently (xiangtong zhi li ) and by keeping those principles in mind will it be the case that a step here will not prevent a step there. When things change, one must keep in mind their consistent connections; when things are consistent, one needs to keep in mind their transformability—when the great functioning of such a practical actualization harmonizes with what one fully wills, this is called miraculous.”28

Wang Fuzhi here touches upon “the way of Nature” (tiandao ) and “the way of humans” (rendao ). According to the way of humans, those so-called “principles of consistency” include universal norms, and to know principles of consistency and to maintain them means transforming universal norms into an internal conceptual structure. The unity of consistency and change includes the interaction of jing (the constraint of universal rules) and quan (the bending of rules based upon an analysis of circumstances). As Wang Fuzhi sees it, this unity and interaction is rooted in an internal conceptual structure by harmonizing with what the whole affective mind maintains. This connection between the unity of the consistency and transformability of principles and what the whole affective mind maintains also reveals the role of the individual’s conscious activity in the process of applying universal norms and analyzing circumstances.

Norms work through the individual’s understanding, accepting, identifying with and choosing of norms, and the individual’s conscious activity is also constrained by norms in many ways; linked to this is the reciprocal interaction between according with norms and creative thought. In one respect, this relationship between norms and the individual’s internal consciousness concretely reveals the unity of the affective mind (xin ) and principles (li ).

Form, Procedure, and Norms: the Actual Conditions of a World of Meaning

The interaction of general norms with the individual’s conscious activity reveals the internal attribute of norms in terms of the relation between norms and the individual. But, as principles prescribing what ought to be, norms play a role that is by no means limited to the individual domain. In effect, norms are both universal and public in both reality and history. The concrete role of norms can be seen everywhere from the process of humans being-with humans to the founding of social institutions.

Human being is a social being who is incapable of living in isolation from others or a group. This being-with of human being with humans is at once a mode of being in the ontological sense and also a fact to which history attests. A correlated problem is: how is this being-with possible? Here, norms are indispensible. Considered historically, the tribes of prehistoric ages selected different animals or plants to serve as totems, which in a corresponding sense served as important signs that reciprocally differentiated tribes from one another and also constituted the ground of collective identity of the members of each tribe; the consolidation and group solidarity of a tribe was intrinsically tied to it. At the level of form, totems were a cultural sign; At the level of content, totems also contained norms, expressed in such forms as prohibitions (like the prohibitions against injuring or eating the animal or plant constituting the tribe’s totem). Here, the relationship between the formation of social groups and norms in the broad sense shows itself quite clearly: the influence and constraint that totems exercised upon the formation of social groups involved the functioning of norms.

In Chinese philosophy, the being-with of human being with humans was always understood “to be a group” as opposed to “being an individual.” According to Confucianism, the capacity “to group” is the fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from animals and enables them to transcend animals. When comparing humans and other beings, Xunzi once stated:

Water and fire have energy (qi ) but no life; plants and trees have life but no awareness (zhi ); beasts and birds have awareness but no sense of what is righteous (yi ); humans possess energy, life, awareness, and also a sense of what is righteous, and therefore rank of the highest nobility among beings in nature. Human strength does not compare to that of the bull; human mobility does not compare to that of the horse, but humans use the bull and horse as tools; how is this possible? The answer: humans can group, the others cannot. How is it that humans can group? The answer: differentiation. How is it that humans can carry out this differentiation? The answer: with a sense of what is righteous. Thus, with a sense of what is righteous humans can differentiate and then combine harmonically, to combine harmonically is to combine into a whole, to combine into a whole is to multiply strengths, to multiply strengths is to become powerful, to become powerful is to conquer other creatures; thus, a center of control can be attained and fixed. Thus, according to the order of the four seasons, all creatures are measured and conjoined to benefit the unified world; there is no other way through which or principle according to which the world could be unified other than through differentiation in accordance with what is righteous.29

The concepts of energy, life, awareness, and righteousness fall on the side of ontology and axiology, while the concept of “grouping” has sociological meaning; aside from having energy, life, and awareness, that humans also have a sense of what is righteous distinguishes humans from other beings at the ontological and axiological level. “The capacity to group” enables humans to transcend animals in terms of form of social organization. What is worth attention here is that Xunzi also advances from this point to raise the question “How is it that humans can group?” In Xunzi’s view, to group (qun ) presupposes differentiation (fen ). Differentiation here is the division of social roles into a hierarchical structure. In this way, the question concerning how grouping is possible concretely transforms into how it is that this “differentiation” can be carried out, and what is righteous (yi ) derives from this question.30 Etymologically, yi () is closely connected with its homonym yi () which broadly means “suitable, appropriate,” and by extension “what ought to be.” So, to differentiate according to what is righteous means to separately position the component members of society into a determinate social structure in harmony with a defined principle, and thereby establish a hierarchically ordered social organization (to group).

Being righteous (yi ) in the sense just mentioned is directly connected to the previously mentioned concept of observing ritual propriety (li ). Thus, to divide [roles] according to what is righteous is also to divide [roles] in harmony with ritual propriety and what is righteous. When discussing the origin of ritual propriety, Xunzi concretely elucidated this:

What is the origin of the rites? The answer: one is born and has desires; one desires, but when one does not attain [what one desires], one cannot help but seek it; so, one seeks it, but does not do so within the measure of boundaries, so one cannot help but conflict with others; they conflict, so there is disorder, and due to this disorder, poverty. Past kings were disgusted with this chaos, so they instituted a code of rites determining what is appropriate and just so as to measure boundaries and divide them, that is, in order to cultivate their desires and give them what they seek; by making desires such that they do not come up poor over material things, and by making things such that they do not suffer under the reign of desires, so that both things and desires raise each other and grow; this is the very origin of the rites.”31

As I have already shown, the rites refer to both an ethical-political institution and a corresponding system of social norms. Here in the same way Xunzi analyzed the origin and function of the rites from the perspective of how to establish and protect “the group.” For Xunzi, the distinctive feature of the rites lies in prescribing specific “rights” and “duties” for each member of society, which simultaneously establishes the limits or boundaries of the activity of each member; within the measured boundaries distributed to each, the behavior of each member is reasonable and permitted (including their striving for their own benefit), but if any such boundary is overstepped, one’s activity will be checked. This so-called measuring of boundaries effectively implies a conception of order; it is precisely the different limits placed on their rights and activity that enable the members of a society to harmoniously co-exist in “group” fashion, thereby preventing internal strife and disputes. We can see that the rites (li ) and what is righteous (yi ) as universal norms are understood as protecting the possibility of ordered co-existence (grouping).32

Being-with or the co-existence of humans involves multiple factors. In actuality, human being is always first a being in some relationship; from everyday life to economic and political practices, the being-with of humans essentially unfolds in relationships. A relationship is in some sense transcendent to the individual self; from the static perspective, the individual’s being constitutes the background of the other’s being, and vise versa; from the dynamic perspective, a relationship leads to inter-subjective communication. As the background and form of being-with, the relationships in which one lives come in different forms, but harmony and conflict are the basic forms. Harmony is grounded in identity and unity, while conflict stems from difference. Considered in its actual form, there is both unity and multiple senses of difference between humans, and how one leads from unity to harmony in the positive sense and how one prevents difference from developing into conflict in the negative sense constitute the preconditions of being-with, and the formation of this condition is inseparably bound to social norms. As the principles of what ought to be, universal norms make the members of a society communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with one another in life practices by guiding and demanding in the positive sense, while preventing the members of society from overstepping their own rights and duties by means of limiting them in the negative sense, thereby preventing the movement from difference to conflict or from conflict to disorder. As Xunzi recognized, these two functions of norms make them become the conditions of possibility of humans being-with humans.

In the social or public sphere, norms have a regulative function, but also a constitutive one as well. A social structure does not just emerge directly through the relationships between humans, for institutions are needed as well. The formation of an institution involves different conditions and preconditions, and an important facet among them is universal value principles. Value principles involve general ideals, present normative meaning, and pervade a particular social institution in different ways. The system of the rites in the Shang and Zhou dynasties, for instance, suited the historical needs of the Shang and Zhou societies, and also embodied the value principles and value ideals based on the blood ties and kinship relations of that age. As a concretization of value principles and value ideals, the formation of the rites system was founded on those value principles and value ideals. Similarly, modern political institutions embody the value principles and value ideals of the enlightenment age, such as democracy, equality, and freedom. The latter (modern value principles and value ideals) constrain and guide the construction of modern political institutions. Broadly speaking, certain norms participate in the constituting of certain social organizations and communities: norms for scientific research drive the formation of the scientific community. Different industrial norms construct corresponding business organizations; while involving a specific form of activity, various game rules motivate the establishment of different groups and organizations such as baseball teams and chess associations. Of course, while catalyzing the formation of different institutions and groups, norms themselves are also constrained by institutions. After a particular organization or institution is formed, the institution will demand that a system of norms suit it, and thereby adjust whatever norms were originally in place. In this way, norms create institutions, and institutions demand those norms to undergo adjustments in harmony with their own form. So, norms and institutions interact and fuse together. In the course of social evolution, norms and institutions are not strictly separable. As has been repeatedly mentioned, the rites of ancient China are a typical expression of this: they are at once a politico-ethical institution and also universal principles and norms; the rites (li ) as an institution was intrinsically based on ritual propriety (li ) as principles and norms, but the latter also had to adapt to the former.

As the conditions of possibility of social life, norms are characterized by universality. If the norms of a specific community of a given age are effectively valid, they always have a constraining or regulative effect upon all the different individuals within that community. Wittgenstein’s rejection of the possibility of private language on the basis of following rules simultaneously entails an affirmation of the public nature of norms or rules. However, some philosophers fail to give an adequate account of this universality of norms. The philosopher J. Raz is an example worth mentioning. When considering the different forms of norms, Raz made a distinction between a personal rule and a social rule.33 The presupposition of this distinction is accepting the existence of personal rules. In fact, these so-called rules, which are merely valid for a specific individual, can be nothing but individual self-determination, like demanding oneself “to wake up everyday at 6 o’clock” and “to go for a half-hour walk every morning.” Although these types of demands have some sort of normative relation to the individual’s own activity, they are neither public nor universal, since they only have validity in the sphere of the self; thus, they can only be seen as personal plans or a self-determination as regards working and resting hours, and do not belong to the list of norms.

Individual plans and demands in the aforementioned sense also differ from what Kant called self-legislation. In the moral domain, Kant saw the good will or practical reason of human being as the legislator of moral laws, but those laws which practical reason issues are not solely valid for the self; rather, they must be valid for all individuals. One of the basic moral laws Kant affirms is: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”34 According to Kant, “the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality.”35 In brief, self-legislation differs entirely from individualistic demands; the precondition of moral self-legislation lies precisely in a confirmation of the universality of moral laws. Even though Kant’s view here shows a tendency to mistake what ought to be for necessity, he does notice the universality of norms from the perspective of moral practice.

The universality of norms also intrinsically influences human practice. As explained previously, norms guide and constrain human activity through demands such as “ought” and “ought not,” and it is just such demands that constitute the ground or cause of action in different senses: “ought” implies that there is a reason to do something, while “ought not” provides the basis for inhibiting some action. These grounds or reasons that norms contain are not only founded on reality and necessity; they are also the consolidation of the historical experience of the species, which have come to express social demands that relieve the individual not only of the need to discover anew before each action whether or not it ought to be executed but also of the need to repeatedly examine how it should be concretely done after the action is chosen. Similar to general propositions in epistemology, the universality of norms transcends both the individual and the particular, and covers different aspects of the practical sphere. When based on norms, the individual’s choice of action and way of acting is awarded legitimacy, and at the same time unnecessary repetitions are avoided. In some sense, then, norms embody an economic principle of action.

Directed at practices, norms are also systematic. The norms of the different practical spheres do not appear in singular isolated form, but rather, as a systematic set. From moral and legal norms to rules of game play, this characteristic is present in each case. To take chess-like games as an example, there are systematic sets of rules for how to move the pieces and how to strike the opponent. With regard to the social realm as a whole, there are differences in authoritativeness between different systems of norms. Generally speaking, norms of law have a much higher authoritative status: if other norms in society clash with legal norms, they will not be awarded legitimacy. Of course, there are cases of mutual toleration between different systems of norms. Under the condition that they do not conflict with legal norms, it may be the case that other norms such as moral norms and trading or industrial norms are tolerated by norms of law. The systematicity of norms and the relationship between norms reveal their publicity and universal sociality.

Here it seems we may distinguish between norms and normativity. In contrast to norms, normativity is broader in meaning. To take language as an example, to understand the connotations of a word means that one can accurately use the given word; in this case then, the meaning or connotation of a word entails “how” (how to use a word). Thus, to grasp the meaning of a word implies that one has grasped its normativity. In a similar sense, in the process of organizing empirical data, categories and concepts also present normativity. Kant expressed this point clearly when he said: “A concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule.”36 Aside from this, commands, permissions, promises, demands, prescriptions, and threats (of the type “if not, then I’ll . . .”) all contain different degrees of normativity. Of course, normativity cannot be simply equated with norms. Generally speaking, norms have a universal character. However, although the commands, permissions, promises, demands, and prescriptions found in particular contexts have normativity, insofar as they concern specific people and singular affairs, they lack universality. At the same time, norms are characterized by systematicity, and therefore, although commands, permissions, promises, demands, and prescriptions have a normative form of expressivity, they unfold as singular mutually distinct demands and thus differ quite clearly from the systematic nature of norms.

At the level of form, a norm involves the relationship between a categorical judgment and a hypothetical judgment. Kant made a distinction between the two from the perspective of moral practice, emphasizing that a moral law is categorical rather than hypothetical. Hypothetical judgments include in logical terms a relationship of conditional implication (if x, then y), whereas categorical judgments are not constrained by conditions, and thus appear in the form of unconditional commands. For Kant, hypothetical judgments involve ends of utility. So, the actions they concern are based entirely on some external aim. The distinctive feature of moral actions on the other hand consists entirely in having duty as their basis. So, they do not involve either a concrete end result or concern any notion of utility. Thus, moral laws can only be given in the form of categorical judgments. On this basis, Kant distinguishes between moral actions and actions based on utility and rejects the empiricist and utilitarian understanding of moral action. This distinction is undoubtedly significant. But whether or not moral laws can be seen as unconditional categorical judgments or absolute commands remains an open question.

Moral laws concern both action and agent. As a concrete being, the agent always finds himself embedded in a set of actual social relationships, so it is evident that moral laws cannot just be understood as categorical judgments. In actuality, moral laws take the following form: if you find yourself in this or that type of social relationship, then you ought to fulfill the duty that such a relationship prescribes and follow the norm that corresponds to it. Here, moral maxims also present a hypothetical dimension. In effect, it is precisely this hypothetical form of judgment (if-then) that at the logical level enables substantial social relationships to communicate with formalized (universalized) moral laws; and it is this logical relationship that reflects the actual connection between the two.37

In broader terms, the role of norms outside of the moral realm similarly involves actual relationships and a specific background, and thereby entails some sort of hypothetical nature. In everyday life situations where the maxim “when in Rome do as the Romans do” applies, the Chinese use the proverb “follow the customs of the village you enter.” The term “customs” here points to behavioral norms in reference to how to do something and whether or not it can be done; the term “village” here could be seen as a certain state of being or setting of being; “to follow the customs of that village” means following the behavioral norms that such a set of customs entails. And this following of norms presupposes being embedded in a certain social situation whose logical form could be expressed as follows: if you arrive at or exist in a certain social situation, then you ought to follow the behavioral norms that such a situation demands. A similar case could be made for other activities where norms reign, like following traffic laws and the operational procedures of a production process or abiding by academic standards. Here, the functioning of a norm is always premised by a certain background setting of actual relationships, which issues a demand expressed in the following forms: if you drive or walk in some state then you ought to follow the local traffic laws; if you work on a particular assembly line then you ought to follow the corresponding operational procedures; if you engage in research in some academic community, then you ought to abide by the academic standards of that community. Here, behind each (if-then) logical form we see the substantial meaning of an actual social relation and a certain background setting of being. That which the hypothetical form of norms reflects, therefore, is the sociality of the being of humans and the historicality and concreteness of norms themselves.

Norms at the formal level not only involve logical relations; they also have different ways of expressing themselves. Firstly, there is the linguistic way. Generally speaking, norms that are fabricated in a self-conscious way like laws, regulations, prescriptions of different forms, and technological procedures (like instructions for how to operate machinery) more straightforwardly express themselves in linguistic form; in fact, the norms expressed in the form of prescriptions could also be seen as speech acts. But, norms may also be expressed in the form of rituals and other ways of behaving. In the course of the historical evolution of society, the norms that took shape spontaneously like customs exist mainly in non-linguistic form, and they function more through the setting of examples and the imitating of those examples. There are still other norms, whose manner of being and manner of expression show even more complex characteristics. Character appraisals and written criticisms of certain social figures played a normative role in traditional Chinese society; their content consisted in evaluations of certain political affairs and the political figures involved at some specified period of time. These criticisms played an extremely important role in influencing and constraining the words and deeds of the political officials and those occupying prestigious positions in the social group at the time. Although these criticisms concerned concrete affairs and particular persons, they also entailed some kind of universal principle of values; and in the process of evaluating these characters and affairs, the principles entailed were certainly expressed through language, but not in the form of a clear and distinct judgment or concept. To a large extent, such principles existed in the form of beliefs that were held in common by the community, and were expressed in a narrative style quite distinct from the form of a logical deduction. While language expresses the universality of norms at the level of form, common beliefs embody the sociality of norms at the level of substance.

Human Capacities and Universal Norms

Directed at accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, the function of norms is inseparable from the capacities of human nature. In effect, the interconnection between human capacities and systems of norms is shown through the interaction of the affective mind (xin ) or internal consciousness with principles (li ) or external norms. The process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is grounded in human capacities and is constrained by systems of norms. Human capacities intertwine with systems of norms, constituting at different levels the actual conditions of the genesis of a world of meaning.

Tied to the genesis of meaning, accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things concretely unfolds as the historical process of knowing and practicing. With the substantial content of knowing oneself and refining oneself and of knowing the world and reforming the world, the process of knowing and practicing opens up being and transforms both oneself and the world, while continuously driving the development and formation of knowledge and wisdom. Human capacities and systems of norms constitute the conditions of possibility of cognition and practice, whose unfolding in turn influences and constrains human capacities and systems of norms by developing wisdom and knowledge. Concretely speaking, presupposing the multifaceted unfolding of the individual’s understanding, comprehension, recognition, and practical action, the knowledge and wisdom that takes shape in the process of knowing and practicing gradually integrates into the individual’s perspective, thinking tendencies, and inner virtue, and are thereby gradually internalized as human capacities. On the other hand, knowledge and wisdom also take shape as universal systems of ideas and systems of norms through the historical unfolding of practices, and thereby take on a social and public form. By integrating into the process of human cognition and practice and by guiding and influencing human activity both at the level of ideas and at the level of practice, universal knowledge and systems of wisdom acquire normative meaning and externalize as normative systems of different forms.

With the wisdom and knowledge formed through knowing and practicing as their common source, human capacities and systems of norms present their intrinsic unity at their origin. As the internalized form of knowledge and wisdom, human capacities constitute the internal conditions of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, whereas by contrast, systems of norms, as the externalization of knowledge and wisdom constitute the external conditions of the same process. As mentioned, the genesis of a world of meaning is the content of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, and by correspondence, human capacities and systems of norms constrain the process of generating a world of meaning in different ways.

As the internal conditions of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, human capacities endow this process with creativity. With respect to accomplishing oneself (refining oneself), the individual’s character is by no means simply designed according to a fixed procedure: the formation of virtue is not a proceduralized process. Developing free character always involves the individual interacting with society. In this process, it is not the case that the individual passively accepts the external mold of society; rather, always and everywhere the individual is expressing autonomous choice, concrete flexibility, a diversity of responses and the like. It is this choice, flexibility, and capacity to respond that reveals the creativity characterizing the process of accomplishing oneself. Similarly, the process of accomplishing things, whose aim is reforming the world, is not entirely the unfolding of a predictable procedure. Whether it is transforming things in-themselves into humanized beings or constructing a world that harmonizes with human nature in the social sphere, the inner creativity of human beings is always at play. Objects in-themselves will not by themselves suit human needs, so transforming things in-themselves into humanized beings is also a process of overcoming the being in-itself of objects by making them become things for-us. Social reality likewise unfolds as a continuous process of moving toward an ideal form, but meanwhile this reforming, as well as the resulting gains and losses made, always involve the creative activity of human being. This creativity of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things undoubtedly involves multiple facets, among which human capacities constitute one, as the internal conditions of this creativity: as stated previously, the degree to which human being has refined itself and reformed the world marks the depth and breadth to which human being’s knowing and practicing has reached, which in turn corresponds to the degree of development of human capacities.

However, even though accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is not limited to external procedures, aspects of form are still involved. One of the meanings of human being refining itself is moving toward the ideal form of human character, which concerns both the goal of character development (what to become) and the way in which it is be accomplished (how to become it). From establishing the goal to seeking out a way to realize that goal, there is no way to ignore aspects of form and procedure. While advocating that one must accomplish oneself, Confucianism repeatedly demanded that one ought to “take one’s stand in ritual propriety” (li yu li ).38 Here, the aim of taking one’s stand is to accomplish oneself, but not without ritual propriety, which refers to formal prescriptions and demands. The connection between accomplishing oneself (taking one’s stand) and ritual propriety shows the relation between form, procedure, and the process of accomplishing oneself. As opposed to establishing oneself, the process of accomplishing things unfolds as a practical activity, but the rationality and effectiveness of practical action is also inseparably bound to formal prescriptions and procedure. In the case of reforming nature, there are always technical procedures involved, from working and producing to undertaking scientific research. Similarly, activities in the social domain—political, legal, and moral—also need to accord with different forms of procedure. Modern society tends to use the rule of law to overcome the rule of man, and the rule of law is immersed in procedural demands. This procedural dimension of the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is first of all tied to systems of norms: it is precisely different forms of norms or rules that qualify the process of knowing and practicing as procedural. Although human capacities internally ground the creativity of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, if they, as the intrinsic properties of the individual, were unbounded from the constraint of norms, the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things would never cease to harbor the possibility of becoming subjective and whimsical. Accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things demands that the creative tendencies of human capacities overcome the restrictions placed upon them by formalization and routinization, but also demands that one conquer the arbitrariness and subjectivity that human capacities may harbor with the guidance and direction of norms. So, from a broader perspective, the mutual constraining of human capacities and systems of norms undoubtedly protects the possibility of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things.

Now, creativity is inseparable from individuality. Whether it is the goal or the concrete process one has in mind, in both cases the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is characterized as a process of individualization and diversification. What human development aspires to accomplish is by no means a world of uniformity where everyone has the same personality, and similarly, there is no single model for the humanization of Nature into social reality. As human capacities make accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things a creative process, they also condition the unfolding of the individualization of knowledge and practice. On the other hand, however, there is also a universal dimension to the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things in connection with procedural serialization. The common aim of ideal human character is the movement toward the realm of freedom, and so the goal of humanized reality is bringing nature into harmony with human need and into a shape that befits human nature. Even though the implications of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things maybe quite particular in correspondence with different stages of social development, from the perspective of the historical direction of social evolution, this ideal goal is unquestionably present in all the different forms of accomplishment and thereby constitutes the universal tendency of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things. This universal dimension of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is obviously linked to the universality of systems of norms in an intrinsic way. In the historical process of cognitive and practical development, norms that embody universal ideals always involve a rather constant viewpoint upon the being of the world and the being of humans; such a viewpoint is linked to a universal principle of values and a universal orientation of values, and so as a whole determines the goal and direction of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things. At the same time, norms are also general rules for action, rules that guide in a stable way the actions correlated with each situation; such stability in guidance protects the universality of cognitive and practical norms. Whereas human capacities give individuality and diversity to the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things so that the tendency toward uniformity may be overcome, systems of norms give this process universal guidance through a supply of value-oriented ideals and principles, along with behavioral rules, thereby helping it to ward off the degenerating whim of randomness and relativity.

Accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, whose agent is human being, is directed at human being and the human world. As the internal properties of human being, human capacities also constitute the real efficient cause behind the unfolding of the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things. If the process of refining oneself were to be divorced from the actual employment of human capacities, it would stop at the ideal level; similarly, the world only unfolds as an actual process of reform when it enters the actual sphere of employment of human capacities. Furthermore, prior to integrating with human capacities, systems of norms remain abstract, that is, the only possible way for norms to come into possession of actual life is through the actual employment of human capacities. From this perspective, human capacities are precisely what make the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things real and actual. On the other hand, however, the efficient cause can never be entirely separated from the formal cause. Therefore, human capacities are indeed the real efficient cause of the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, but their actualization is always constrained by systems of norms, whose guidance over cognition and practice constrains the manner of employment of human capacities on the formal level. In brief, divorced from human capacities, systems of norms degrade into abstractions, and likewise, unconstrained by systems of norms, human capacities run the risk of going blind. So, human capacities give the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things actual properties from the inside, while systems of norms give it self-awareness from the outside.

To reiterate the argument of this book, accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is the generative process of producing meaning, which first concerns the realm of ideas. In the world of ideas, the genesis of meaning is rooted in human capacities and is tied to a variety of systems of norms. The formation of knowledge, for instance, is based on the interaction between human being and object, whose concrete unfolding is inseparable from human capacities and systems of norms. From perceiving to thinking, from imagining to experiencing, and from intuiting to deducing, human capacities can be seen at work in each phase of the genesis of knowledge. On the other hand, for knowledge to be a meaningful system, it must be constrained by different norms. A perception needs to abide by the principle of the objectivity of observation, a thought may not disobey the rules of logic, and so on. Though imagination should not stick to what is fixed and settled, it must still stay grounded in the determination of possible worlds (it cannot involve logical contradictions). Moreover, as Jin Yuelin demonstrated, the concepts and categories connected to systems of knowledge also have the dual function of being both descriptive and prescriptive, and the so-called prescriptive function of concepts involves guiding and restraining cognition. While human capacities make the formation of knowledge creative and actual, the systems of norms constituted out of logic and concepts ground the universal validity of such formations of meaning.

The reciprocal interaction between human capacities and systems of norms can likewise be seen in a world of meaning infused with senses of value. When considering the process of accomplishing oneself, what must first be taken into account is the meaning that emerges in the form of a spiritual world. As discussed later, in the process of cognizing, the world first emerges as an understandable world-picture; through evaluating, the world shows human being what significances of value are there for human being. Proceeding from the being of the world to one’s own being, questioning the meaning of objects leads one further into a concern for the meaning of one’s own being, connected to which are different worlds of spirit or states of mind. As a manifestation of the refinement of one’s own being at the level of ideas, a state of mind not only springs internally from the creative employment of human capacities, it is also inseparably bound to the guidance and constraint of systems of norms such as ideals and principles of evaluation. Whether human being is transforming facts into significances of value or forming a consciousness of an ideal and becoming conscious of a mission, human being remains rooted in human capacities and dependent on universal principles of evaluation.

Turning from meaning in the form of ideas toward the actualized form of meaning involves humanizing reality in the broad sense. Presupposing that human beings transform things in-themselves into things for-us, a world of meaning in actualized form is linked more directly to the process of accomplishing things (refining the world). The movement from being in-itself toward humanized being involves multiple facets, including grasping reality, necessity, and actual possibilities; the forming of ends and ideals; the making of plans and blueprints, and so on. Furthermore, the genesis of a world of meaning at this level is always inseparably bound to practice: transforming things in-themselves into humanized beings presupposes the historical unfolding of practice. This process of generating a world of meaning involves the reciprocal interaction of human capacities with systems of norms from the very beginning. Grasping reality, necessity, and actual possibilities involves knowing, which is internally conditioned by human capacities, but which can never come about without the constraint of cognitive and logical norms; on the foundation of first having a grasp of reality, necessity, and actual possibilities, one integrates the ends that one values into a whole and thereby forms the blueprint of an ideal, which also involves the creative employment of human capacities and the guidance of principles; the unfolding of practice must therefore be rooted in practical wisdom that expresses human capacities, but must also follow concrete rules and procedures for action. This interaction of human capacities with systems of norms also develops in the process of generating social reality. As the actual form of a world of meaning, the formation of social reality (including various kinds of institutions) is likewise conditioned by human capacities and universal norms. From social institutions to a system of civilization, the emergence and development of social reality is always immersed in the actualization of human capacities and the functioning of universal norms.

Aiming at the genesis of a world of meaning, the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things is at once internally grounded in human capacities and also rooted externally in universal norms. As the conditions of possibility of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, human capacities and universal norms are intrinsically interconnected. Severed from human capacities, systems of norms are doomed to abstraction and formalization and drained of actual vitality; unguided by systems of norms, human capacity as a whole would be doomed to the whim of arbitrariness and random chance, and would quite possibly due to this lose consciousness of itself. It is precisely through the interaction of human capacities with systems of norms that the process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things brings about the union of creativity, individuality, actuality, procedurality, universality, and self-consciousness, the union of which concretely ensures the genesis of a world of meaning.