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Gaining Nondeceptive Knowledge

AS HUMAN BEINGS, we act to accomplish certain goals and purposes. In the area of spirituality and religion, our aim is to attain a state of enduring fulfillment and peace. To determine if full awakening is possible, to know what to practice and abandon in order to attain awakening, and to discern the ultimate nature of all phenomena, we need to be able to test various claims and determine if they are accurate and nondeceptive. In a meditation session, we want to be aware of what type of cognizer is knowing impermanence and emptiness, because a correct assumption of emptiness is very different from a nonconceptual realization of emptiness. The disciplines of logic and epistemology contain the tools for doing so. The objects that we seek to ascertain with reliable cognizers include the two truths and those spoken of in the four seals — impermanence, duḥkha, selflessness, and nirvāṇa. When speaking of cognizers and perceivers, we are referring to minds that know objects. They are agents that perform the function of knowing their objects.

This chapter contains terminology and ideas that will be new to some readers. It takes time and further study to understand everything completely. You will understand some points now and can return to this chapter later as a resource in your future studies.

Three Kinds of Objects and Their Cognizers

As we learn the Buddhadharma, we are exposed to new concepts that may challenge our view of the world and of reality. We may wonder how to go about verifying or disproving them. Śāntarakṣita’s Compendium on Reality (Tattvasaṃgraha) quotes the Buddha as recommending an analytical approach:

Do not accept my Dharma merely out of respect for me,

but analyze and check it

the way a goldsmith analyzes gold —

by burning, cutting, and rubbing it.

First a goldsmith checks for external impurities, which can be detected by burning the gold. Then he looks for internal impurities by cutting the gold. Finally he searches for very subtle impurities using a special technique of filing the gold. Similarly, we must test the teachings thoroughly, looking for three types of “impurities”: incorrect explanations regarding evident (abhimukhī) phenomena, slightly obscure (parokṣa) phenomena, and very obscure (atyantaparokṣa) phenomena. If there are none, we can accept the teachings with confidence. Each of the three types of phenomena is known by a specific kind of reliable cognizer.

Evident phenomena are those that ordinary beings can easily perceive. These include (1) external objects, such as colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects, which are known by direct reliable cognizers that correspond to our five physical senses, and (2) internal objects, such as feelings of happiness, pain, hopes, and desires, which are known by the mental consciousness.

Slightly obscure phenomena cannot initially be directly perceived. Ordinary beings must initially know them by factual inferential cognizers — inferential reliable cognizers based on valid factual reasons. Examples of slightly obscure phenomena are subtle impermanence — the momentary arising and ceasing of conditioned things — and selflessness. The fact that the apple arises in dependence on causes and conditions is part of the conventional nature of the apple. Through understanding that its existence is a result of causes and conditions, we can know that the apple is impermanent.

The sun setting in the west is coarse change that is evident to our visual sense. But to understand the sun’s subtle changeable nature, we must use reasoning. The sun rose in the east and in order to set in the west, it must move continuously, moment by moment, imperceptibly across the sky. This momentary change cannot be detected by our eyes; we need reasoning to know it.

To know a slightly obscure phenomenon such as selflessness — for example, the absence of a permanent, independent soul or self — we may use the reason of “dependence” and contemplate the syllogism Consider a person, she does not exist as a permanent, partless, under-its-own-power soul or self because she depends on her body and mind.

Very obscure phenomena are known by ordinary sentient beings by relying on inferential reliable cognizers by authoritative testimony, the attestation of someone who is authoritative in that field. We know our birthday by asking our mother, and we understand the subtle intricacies of karma by depending on the Buddha’s teachings. While atoms and subatomic particles are slightly obscure phenomena that can be known by inference, most of us rely on the testimony of scientists to know their existence and characteristics.

According to Sautrāntikas, from the viewpoint of direct perceivers, all functioning things are evident phenomena because under the right conditions they can be perceived by our direct perceivers. From the viewpoint of conceptual consciousnesses, all knowable objects — both impermanent and permanent — are obscure phenomena because they can be known by a conceptual consciousness thinking about them. Conceptual consciousnesses are obscured because they know things by means of a conceptual appearance, which obstructs them from seeing functioning things directly.

Prāsaṅgikas describe evident and obscure phenomena differently, saying that evident objects are those that can be known through our own experience, without depending on inference; for example, sense objects. Obscure objects must initially be known by depending on a reason. They are objects of inference — for example, the subtle impermanence of the body and the selflessness of the person.

These categories are described in relation to ordinary sentient beings, not āryas. For an ārya, subtle impermanence and selflessness are evident phenomena, whereas for us they are slightly obscure. There are no obscure objects for buddhas because they are omniscient. Even in terms of ordinary sentient beings, these categories can vary according to our situation. When we are at a campfire, the fire is evident to us; we see it with our eyes and feel the heat on our skin. To people on the other side of a clump of trees, the campfire is slightly obscure; they must infer, “In the area behind those trees, there is fire because there is smoke.” To our friends in another state, the campfire is very obscure. They know it because we call and tell them we are at a campfire.

Another example is devas — celestial beings such as the god Brahmā. For us human beings who live on Earth, Brahmā is very obscure; we know about him only through the testimony of a reliable authority. Our senses cannot see him and no amount of reasoning can prove his existence. To other living beings born in that realm, Brahmā is evident. Similarly, to people watching a spacecraft land on the moon, that event is evident, but to people who have no idea that such a thing is possible, it is very obscure. They must trust the testimony of those who witnessed it to know it happened.

An object becomes evident, slightly obscure, or very obscure in relation to an individual. For ordinary beings who haven’t entered a path, subtle impermanence and emptiness are slightly obscure, while for āryas they are evident phenomena, known by yogic direct perceivers.

To our mother, our birthday is an evident phenomenon, but for us it is a very obscure phenomenon. Owing to the extremely long distance, the details of various stars and planets in the universe are very obscure to us. But they are evident to whatever life forms inhabit those places.

Various aspects of one thing may be different types of objects. Our friend’s body is an evident phenomenon that we see with our eyes. His heart is a slightly obscure phenomenon that we infer because all human bodies have hearts. The karmic causes for our friend to be born into that body are very obscure phenomena known only by a buddha.

REFLECTION

1.Make examples of evident phenomena, slightly obscure phenomena, and very obscure phenomena that you already know. How did you come to understand them? Which type of reliable cognizer was involved?

2.Consider how we know things such as the existence of atoms, the Ice Age, or the qualities of other solar systems. Which of the three types of objects are they and how do we know them?

3.If you have never been to Antarctica, which of the three categories of phenomena is Antarctica in relation to you? Is it very obscure because you have to depend on another person’s testimony to know what it looks like? Is it slightly obscure because by seeing photographs or a 3D model you can infer what it looks like? Would it be evident because you could see it through live streaming on the Internet?

Seven Types of Awareness

Ancient Indian religious practitioners from many traditions discussed the topic of reliable cognizers at length. Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 CE) were the two foremost Buddhist sages in India involved in debating this topic with non-Buddhists and in establishing the systems of epistemology and logic studied by Tibetan Buddhists to this day. These topics of epistemology and logical reasoning are learned not for the sake of philosophical speculation or abstract theory, but for the purpose of actualizing human goals, in particular nirvāṇa. Dharmakīrti said in his Drop of Reasoning (Nyāyabindu), “Since correct [i.e., reliable] cognition is a prerequisite for achieving all human purposes, I shall explain it.”

In monastic universities, students are first introduced to the topic of reliable cognizers in the context of the seven types of awareness (T. blo rig bdun du dbye ba), which is taught from the Sautrāntika point of view. As we will see, some of these seven are reliable cognizers, others are not.

1.A direct perceiver (pratyakṣa) is an awareness that knows its object directly, without a conceptual appearance of its observed object (ālambana). Direct perceivers do not involve thinking, imagining, or remembering.

2.An inferential cognizer (anumāna) is an awareness that correctly understands its observed object through a conceptual appearance — a mental image of the object — and by means of an inference. An inference must be a correct argument; arguments using spurious logic are not considered inference.

3.A subsequent cognizer is an awareness that realizes an existent object that has already been realized. It is the second moment onward following a conceptual or nonconceptual reliable cognizer. “Moment” has different meanings according to the context. When speaking of cognizing objects, it refers to the period of time needed to ascertain the object; it does not refer to the smallest unit of time because to ascertain an object a series of smallest units of time is required. The second moment onward of a cognizer uninterruptedly follows the first moment; for example, the second moment onward of a sense direct reliable cognizer of blue or the second moment onward of an inferential reliable cognizer realizing the emptiness of the person.

4.A correct assumption is a conceptual awareness that correctly apprehends its object as a result of having read or heard an explanation of it, but does not fully or firmly grasp the meaning or conclusively ascertain its object. After learning a new topic, we have a correct general idea about it, but because we don’t ascertain the meaning, our understanding is not firm and we could change our mind later.

5.An inattentive awareness is a direct perceiver to which its apprehended object clearly appears but is not ascertained. For example, while engrossed in watching a movie, our auditory consciousness hears the voices of people near us, but later we cannot say with certainty that people were speaking or what they were discussing.

6.Deluded doubt is an awareness that vacillates between two or more options and is inclined toward the wrong conclusion.

7.A wrong awareness (viparyayajñāna) is either a conceptual or nonconceptual consciousness that incorrectly apprehends its observed object. A hallucination hearing voices where there are none is a wrong sensory awareness. Holding the view that impermanent things are permanent or that what is foul is actually delightful are wrong conceptual awarenesses.

Reliable Cognizers and Unreliable Awarenesses

Dharmakīrti, who wrote from the Sautrāntika and Cittamātrin perspective, and Candrakīrti (ca. 600–650 CE), who taught from the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamaka perspective, defined the Sanskrit term pramāṇa differently. According to Dharmakīrti, pramāṇa is a prime cognizer — a new and nondeceptive knower. “New” indicates that it is the first moment of a nondeceptive cognizer; the following moments in that continuity knowing the same object are subsequent cognizers and are not prime.

According to Candrakīrti, pramāṇa is a knower that is nondeceptive (avidaṃvādi) with regard to its principal or apprehended object (muṣṭibandhaviṣata). In his Commentary on “The Four Hundred,” he says, “Undeceived consciousness is seen in the world to be reliable cognizer (pramāṇa) itself.”4 “Nondeceptive” means incontrovertible; this knower is trustworthy and knows its object correctly. It does not have to be the first moment of a stream of moments of cognition. It is called a reliable cognizer because it can lead us to accomplish our purpose. Prāsaṅgikas say subsequent cognizers are reliable cognizers because they know the same apprehended object as the first moment that preceded it. Candrakīrti’s Clear Words (Prasannapadā) lists four types of reliable cognizers according to the objects to be comprehended:⁵

1.Direct reliable cognizers know their objects — evident phenomena — directly and nondeceptively, without depending on a reason or logical mark. With an unimpaired eye faculty, we see blue. This is a nonconceptual direct reliable cognizer. A subsequent cognizer can also be a direct reliable cognizer. A consciousness correctly remembering a conversation we had yesterday is a direct reliable cognizer even though it is a conceptual memory of the conversation. Similarly, many, but not all, scholars agree that the second moment onward of an inferential cognizer realizing impermanence is a direct reliable cognizer because unlike the first moment of that inferential cognizer, it does not depend on a reason. Although it is considered a direct reliable cognizer, it does not directly apprehend its object because it is a conceptual consciousness.

2.Inferential reliable cognizers know their objects — slightly obscure phenomena — nondeceptively purely in dependence on a reason (a logical mark). We know a car is impermanent because it is produced by causes.

3.Reliable cognizers based on an example are inferential cognizers that realize their object by understanding that it is similar to something else. Here an evident phenomenon such as an example, analogy, or model is used as the reason to understand the meaning, which is slightly obscure. For instance, the Potala is a slightly obscure phenomenon for people who have never been to Lhasa. But if someone shows them a model of the Potala and says, “It looks like this,” they will understand what the Potala is.

4.Reliable cognizers based on authoritative testimony are inferential cognizers knowing very obscure phenomena that cannot be established through direct perceivers or other inferential reliable cognizers, but only by depending on the authoritative testimony of a trustworthy source, such as a credible person or scripture. For example, we understand the subtle workings of karma by relying on a credible scripture taught by the Buddha, who is a reliable person.6

The number of reliable cognizers differs according to context. In the above classification, reliable cognizers based on authoritative testimony and based on an example are forms of inferential reliable cognizers. They are listed separately due to their specific functions. In this case, an inferential reliable cognizer is one based on factual inference, a specific type of inference. Here the general name “inferential reliable cognizer” is given to a specific instance.

However, when we say the comprehended objects (prameya) of reliable cognizers are of two types — evident phenomena and obscure phenomena — then reliable cognizers are also two: direct reliable perceivers and inferential reliable cognizers.⁷ In this case, reliable cognizers based on authoritative testimony and based on an example are included in inferential reliable cognizers, with that term now being used to refer to all inferential reliable cognizers. It is not uncommon that terms in a text have more than one meaning depending on their context, so we must take care not to get confused!

While reliable cognizers correctly ascertain their objects and give us reliable knowledge so we can accomplish our aims, other awarenesses — such as correct assumers, inattentive awarenesses, doubt, and wrong awarenesses — do not. These and other unreliable awarenesses cannot be trusted because we will not be able to achieve our purposes by relying on them. If we have bad eyesight and mistake an orange for a grapefruit, we will not purchase the fruit we want. Similarly, if we believe that the self is permanent or that phenomena exist as self-enclosed, independent entities, we will not be able to realize the emptiness of inherent existence or attain nirvāṇa.

Subsequent cognizers are minds that know what has already been known. The first moment of a visual consciousness knows red and the immediately subsequent moments of the visual consciousness also know red. Sautrāntikas say subsequent cognizers are not prime cognizers because, unlike prime cognizers that know the object by their own power, subsequent cognizers know the object by the force of the prime cognizer inducing them. Prāsaṅgikas say subsequent cognizers are direct reliable cognizers. In the case of an inferential cognizer, this is because the second moment onward of an inferential cognizer remembers the object inferred directly — it doesn’t rely on a reason or logical mark to know the object. It is a reliable cognizer because it incontrovertibly knows its object. For Sautrāntikas, “direct” in “direct perceiver” means without a conceptual appearance; for Prāsaṅgikas it means not relying on a reason.8 However, in another context, such as speaking about a direct realization of emptiness, Prāsaṅgikas take “direct” to mean nonconceptual.

Our knowledge about an object may gradually evolve via these various cognizers. For example, a new science student hears about bacteria from his teacher and gains a rough idea of what they are; this is a correct assumption. His knowledge also involves inference by authoritative testimony, for he trusts his science teacher’s knowledge even though he cannot yet verify the information for himself. He learns about the structure of bacteria by seeing a model or diagram, which is inference based on an example. If he then looks under a microscope and sees some bacteria, those bacteria become evident phenomena that he knows with a direct reliable cognizer. Through executing various experiments and gaining reliable data, he will be able to have an inferential reliable cognizer of other properties of bacteria that are slightly obscure phenomena.

However, he may be able to verify that his conclusion is an inferential reliable cognizer only later on. First he needs to make sure that the research data are valid and can be duplicated by others. Even if his data are reliable, they may not be complete, thus skewing a conclusion based on them. New data about other properties of bacteria may cause him to rethink his initial conclusions. For this reason, many scientists consider the initial knowledge from their research to be a correct assumption or even doubt.

In many areas of scientific research, human knowledge rests on assumptions. Even though scientists have supportive reasons for drawing certain conclusions, those conclusions are by no means hard and fast. They will be verified, denied, or revised later on as more data are collected. It may take a while for correct conclusions to be known by inference. Those of us who learn of new discoveries by listening to experts or reading scientific journals will have either a correct assumption or an inferential cognizer by authoritative testimony, depending on how well we understood the explanation.

REFLECTION

1.Consider why having reliable cognizers is important in your daily life and in your spiritual life.

2.Make examples of times when you have had an inattentive awareness or deluded doubt. How did they inhibit your full knowledge?

3.Make examples of wrong awarenesses, such as seeing things incorrectly or misunderstanding the meaning of what someone said. Have you ever had a wrong awareness but not known it was incorrect until sometime later?

4.Make an example of how your understanding of a topic began as a wrong consciousness or doubt and slowly evolved to a correct assumption and then to an inferential cognizer or direct perceiver.

CHART: RELIABLE COGNIZERS AND UNRELIABLE AWARENESSES ACCORDING TO CANDRAKĪRTI

RELIABLE COGNIZERS	UNRELIABLE AWARENESSES
1. Direct reliable cognizers9 a. Sense direct reliable cognizers b. Mental direct reliable cognizers c. Yogic direct reliable cognizers	1. Wrong awareness
2. Inferential reliable cognizers	2. Deluded doubt
3. Reliable cognizers based on an example	3. Inattentive awareness
4. Reliable cognizers based on authoritative testimony	4. Correct assumption

Direct Reliable Cognizers

Reliable cognizers have specific characteristics, and not all our cognitions meet those standards. Learning the descriptions of the various types of reliable cognizers helps us to identify them in our own experience, and that lets us know whether to trust what we’re seeing and thinking. Wrong awarenesses and correct assumptions are not reliable cognizers, even when we mistakenly think they are. Direct reliable cognizers are of three types: sense, mental, and yogic direct reliable cognizers.

Sense direct reliable cognizers know their objects — sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible objects — directly by depending on a physical cognitive faculty. These reliable cognizers enable us to know our surroundings and the things within them.

Mental direct reliable cognizers correctly know their objects by depending on a mental cognitive faculty — that is, on another consciousness that induces it. Mental direct reliable cognizers include clairvoyance and consciousnesses that know our own feelings of happiness and pain. They also include conceptual subsequent cognizers induced by inferential valid cognizers, such as the second moment onward of an inferential cognizer of impermanence, and memory consciousnesses, such as the consciousness remembering a person we met last week.

Yogic direct reliable cognizers are mental consciousnesses that know their objects — the sixteen attributes of the four truths and subtle and gross selflessness — by depending on a union of serenity and insight. These direct perceivers are essential to overcome defilements.

An evident phenomenon, such as the sound of leaves rustling in the breeze, is known by a sense direct perceiver, in this case an auditory consciousness. By means of mental direct perceivers we know that we feel happy from hearing that sound, and we can remember the sound of rustling leaves the next day. A highly evolved consciousness, a yogic direct perceiver, realizes the subtle impermanence of both the sound of the leaves and the happy feeling.

Inferential Reliable Cognizers

To be able to benefit sentient beings most effectively, we must gain the direct, nonconceptual cognizers of a buddha so that we will clearly perceive all phenomena, both ultimate truths and conventional truths. Unlike buddhas, at present we ordinary beings are not capable of directly knowing slightly obscure and very obscure phenomena, but must rely on an inferential cognizer, a mind that nondeceptively realizes an obscure object in dependence on a reason.

Inferential cognizers must trace back to direct experiences and shared direct perceptions. Although our initial access to an object may be through reasoning, in time an inferential cognizer can lead to direct experience. We initially know emptiness through an inferential cognizer, but by continuously familiarizing our minds with it in meditation that is a union of serenity and insight, we will be able to dissolve the conceptual appearance and realize emptiness with a yogic direct reliable cognizer. An inferential cognizer not only depends on direct experience but also leads to it.

We use inferential cognizers often in our daily lives and at our jobs. According to classical Indian logic, an inference is generated by means of a syllogism (prayoga), a statement with four parts — a subject (dharmin), predicate (sādhya dharma), reason (liṅga), and example. To teach the parts of a syllogism, Buddhist monastics often use the syllogism Consider sound, it is impermanent because it is produced by causes; for example, like the last moment of a flame. Although this syllogism may not stir us, it was extremely important for Buddhists in ancient India. This is the argument they used to refute the assertion of brahmins who believed that the sound of the Vedas was permanent and unchanging.

In this syllogism, “sound” is the subject (A) about which something is to be proven. “Is impermanent” is the predicate (B), the attribute we want to establish about sound. “Because it is produced by causes” is the reason (C) we use to prove the thesis. “For example, like the last moment of a flame” is the example. The thesis (pratijñā) is what is to be proven — the combination of the subject and the predicate — in this case, “sound is impermanent.”

To understand this, the person who hears the syllogism needs to understand three criteria of a correct inference: (1) The reason applies to the subject (pakṣadharma) corresponds to the major premise. This is the relationship between the subject and the reason, specifically that the reason is a property of the subject. Being produced by causes is a quality of sound. (2) The pervasion or entailment (anvayavyāpti) corresponds to the minor premise. This is the relationship between the reason and the predicate: If something is the reason, it is necessarily the predicate. If something is produced by causes, it is necessarily impermanent. (3) The counterpervasion (vyatirekavyāpti) corresponds to the contrapositive of the minor premise. This is the relationship between the opposite of the predicate and the opposite of the reason: If something is not the predicate, it is necessarily not the reason. If something is not impermanent (i.e., if it is permanent), it is definitely not produced by causes.

The reason is the key to establish the three criteria. We must understand that the reason applies to the subject, is present in the predicate, and is not present in the opposite of the predicate. In simplified form:

C applies to A. The reason is a property of the subject.

If it’s C, it must be B. There is pervasion.

If it’s not B, it cannot be C. There is counterpervasion.

To gain an inferential cognizer, we must establish these three criteria in the syllogism. In general, the first criterion is something obvious; it can be established by means of a direct perceiver. We know that sound is produced by causes; we hear the sound after the bell is struck. Then through reasoning we try to establish something that is not obvious — that sound is impermanent and momentary.

If a syllogism is not formed correctly, it will not prove its thesis. That may mean that the thesis is wrong or that the person constructing the syllogism did not think well about the topic. Consider sound, it is impermanent because it exists is not a correct syllogism. Although the reason is established (sound exists), the pervasion doesn’t hold (if something exists, it is not necessarily impermanent; permanent phenomena also exist).

In the syllogism Consider this person, he will die because he was born, “this person” is the subject, “will die” is the predicate, and “because he was born” is the reason. The reason applies to the subject because that person was born. The pervasion holds true because if someone is born, he will die. The counterpervasion is established: if there is no death, it is because birth did not precede it. When the full force of this syllogism dawns in our mind, it becomes a powerful motivator for us to practice the Dharma in order to cease the causes of rebirth in cyclic existence and thereby to cease death as well.

We do not necessarily realize the thesis of a correct syllogism immediately after hearing it. To realize the three criteria of a correct syllogism, we must have a certain level of knowledge and be mentally receptive. Three preliminary reliable cognizers are needed in order to ascertain the second criterion, the pervasion. In the syllogism Consider sound, it is impermanent because it is produced by causes, these are:

1.A reliable cognizer ascertaining the reason. “Being produced by causes” is a reason that can establish that sound is impermanent. It is suitable to be used as a reason in this syllogism.

2.A reliable cognizer ascertaining that in the opposite of the predicate, the reason does not exist. The opposite of the predicate is devoid of the reason. Among permanent phenomena, no products exist. Permanent phenomena are devoid of products.

3.A reliable cognizer ascertaining that the predicate and its opposite are mutually exclusive. Impermanent and permanent are mutually exclusive.

Sometimes ascertaining the three criteria requires a considerable amount of time and effort: a person may have to learn the meaning of terms or understand other syllogisms first. Many texts contain debates in which a syllogism is presented, followed by other syllogisms that help us understand important points so that we will be able to comprehend the first syllogism. When we encounter difficult topics, we must persevere and continue to contemplate the material. As with most other subjects, it may be difficult at the beginning, but through familiarization it becomes easier.

After presenting a syllogism to a person, three kinds of wisdom arise progressively over time: the wisdom arising from hearing or studying the Dharma; the wisdom arising from contemplating, thinking, and reflecting on it; and the wisdom arising from meditating. When we first learn about subtle impermanence by hearing a teaching or reading a Dharma book, our understanding is the wisdom arising from hearing. At best this is a correct assumption that is a general idea about subtle impermanence. It is not the incontrovertible knowledge of an inferential reliable cognizer. While correct assumptions and factual inferential cognizers both focus on subtle impermanence, the depth and stability of their understandings differ. A correct assumption can easily become vague if we don’t repeatedly familiarize ourselves with the topic. Also, if we are presented with the opposite view, a correct assumption may degenerate into doubt.

By continuing to analyze, our correct assumption will become an inferential reliable cognizer that realizes subtle impermanence by means of a conceptual appearance. This is the wisdom arising from contemplation. This inferential understanding will not degenerate unless we allow the intensity of this cognition to deteriorate by ceasing to contemplate the topic. The deterioration of inferential reliable cognizers occurs because the seeds of wrong views haven’t been eliminated completely from our mental continua and our familiarity with the correct view is not strong. For this reason, we must make effort to maintain the correct understandings we gain through repeatedly bringing them to mind.

To deepen our understanding, we continue to cultivate concentration and analytical wisdom so that we can attain the union of serenity and insight on subtle impermanence. This is the wisdom arising from meditation. Initially this wisdom is conceptual because the veil of the conceptual appearance of impermanence is present. With continuous meditation over time, that veil becomes thinner and thinner and will eventually disappear, and we will realize subtle impermanence directly and nonconceptually. This yogic direct perceiver of subtle impermanence is also the wisdom arising from meditation.

From the very beginning of their training in philosophy, when they are still young children, Tibetan monastics are taught that whatever is produced by causes necessarily has the quality of subtle impermanence. At the same time, their teachers caution them, “You have a highly learned mouth (you know all the words), but actual understanding will come through constant reflection after you have passed your geshe exam. Only then will there be the possibility of the actual realization dawning in your mind. Be realistic and patient and continue to work hard.”

There is debate on whether a syllogism needs to be stated for someone to gain an inferential reliable cognizer. Prāsaṅgikas claim it is not necessary; they accept an inferential cognizer through example as a reliable cognizer. They also say that merely stating a consequence (prasaṅga) — that is, pointing out the internal contradictions in someone’s argument — is sufficient for sharp-faculty people to gain an inferential reliable cognizer. For example, someone understands that the person is a dependent arising but also believes the person truly exists. By pointing out to him the unwanted consequence of his view by saying, “Consider the person, he isn’t a dependent arising because of being truly existent,” a sharp-faculty disciple will understand that the person is not truly existent. It isn’t necessary to subsequently state the syllogism Consider a person, she is not truly existent because of being a dependent arising. For a person of more modest faculties, a follow-up syllogism is needed for him to understand.

To the contrary, the lower schools hold that an inferential reliable cognizer must come about through the power of reasoning, implying that it is always necessary to state a syllogism. In addition, they adhere to autonomous syllogisms in which the subject, predicate, and reason all truly exist, whereas Prāsaṅgikas establish the parts of a syllogism and all phenomena by convention.

REFLECTION

1.Identify the parts of the syllogism and the three criteria in the syllogism Consider smoking, it is a health risk because it is directly responsible for approximately 80 to 90 percent of lung cancers.

2.Behind our emotions we often find “syllogisms.” Identify the parts of the following syllogisms and test them with the three criteria to see if they are correct.

•Consider me, I am an unlovable person because my friend is mad at me.

•Consider my friend, he is untrustworthy because he didn’t do what I wanted him to do.

•Consider my ideas, they are always good because they are the ideas of a smart person.

Reliable Cognizers Based on an Example

We often use analogies, models, and examples when learning something new. These evident phenomena — a map, picture, model, and so forth — illustrate a meaning that is obscure because the two have some similar characteristics.

In ancient India, a king was given a painting of the wheel of life, which illustrates the three realms (tridhātu) and six classes of saṃsāric beings (ṣaṣgati) and the process by which ordinary beings take rebirth. By contemplating the picture, the king understood the causal chain leading to rebirth in cyclic existence. This understanding of dependent arising, in turn, later led him to realize that there is no inherent existence.

A face in a mirror is an evident phenomenon, whereas emptiness is a slightly obscure phenomenon. When an intelligent disciple whose mindstream is fully ripened is told that just as a face in a mirror lacks true existence, so does the person, by the power of this example she will understand the selflessness of persons.

Unlike the lower schools, Prāsaṅgikas accept inference by example as a means to generate a reliable cognizer. Whether someone generates an understanding through this means or through factual inference depends on the mindset and faculties of the individual. Although a few ripened disciples may be able to realize emptiness through inference by example, most people need to rely on factual inference.

Reliable Cognizers Based on Authoritative Testimony

A reliable cognizer based on authoritative testimony is used to gain knowledge about very obscure phenomena that we are unable to know through direct perceivers or other types of inferential cognizers. A reliable cognizer based on authoritative testimony uses as the reason to accept a statement as true the word of someone we have examined and determined to be a reliable authority on the subject. The validity of this inference hinges on the reliability of the person whose testimony we trust. Such a person should know the information, have no cognitive disability, and speak truthfully. For example, someone who wants to enroll in a school trusts the application instructions given by people working at the administrative office. Still it is our responsibility to examine their qualifications and not to believe things blindly.

In spiritual practice, this form of inference is also called “inference by belief” or “by scriptural authority.” Important for spiritual progress, it involves accepting reliable scriptural passages in order to understand very obscure points that cannot be otherwise known. Such topics include the subtle workings of karma and its effects, the twelve sets of qualities bodhisattvas gain on the ten grounds, the causes of the Buddha’s thirty-two signs, the inexpressible qualities of the resultant state of awakening, and the life spans of beings in realms imperceptible by our senses.

To correctly infer that a scriptural passage is accurate and free from fault, we must test it by means of a threefold analysis:

1.There is no reason to reject this statement or scripture in terms of its presentation of evident phenomena. To assess this, we examine if its presentation of evident phenomena can be refuted by direct perception.

2.There is no reason to reject this statement or scripture in terms of its presentation of slightly obscure phenomena. To assess this, we examine if its presentation of slightly obscure phenomena can be refuted by inference.

3.There is no reason to reject this scripture in terms of its presentation of very obscure phenomena. To assess this, we examine two factors: (a) The scripture’s explicit and implicit meanings about very obscure phenomena are free from contradiction. The explicit meaning is the evident theme of the scripture; the implicit meaning is other topics that are the basis. The explicit meaning of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras is the doctrine of emptiness and the implicit meaning is the progressive stages of the paths that realize emptiness. (b) The former and latter passages of its presentation of very obscure phenomena are free from contradiction. What the scripture says in one place does not contradict what it says in another.

There is not a recommended number of pages to read in order to determine that a scripture is free from faults by the threefold analysis. Each person must read enough to be satisfied that his or her analysis is thorough. If a scripture meets these three criteria, accepting its statements as true gives us access to knowledge that is useful for our Dharma practice.

Dharmakīrti says that a scripture may also be considered trustworthy if its author is a reliable or credible person. A reliable person is one who is able to fulfill the desires of disciples in a nondeceptive manner. The Buddha is a reliable being because he has freed his mind from all defilements, developed all excellent qualities, and knows all phenomena directly with his omniscient mind. Motivated by compassion, he has the genuine wish to lead all sentient beings from duḥkha to the joy of liberation, and he has no reason to lie. Furthermore, what the Buddha said about the most essential aspects of the path — the four truths and emptiness based on dependent arising — can be validated by an inferential reliable cognizer. As we become convinced regarding these subjects, we begin to appreciate the possibility of attaining awakening and respect the Buddha as the one who taught such a wonderful path. Since the Buddha explained the essential aspects in a nondeceptive manner, we can infer that his statements on auxiliary topics that are very obscure phenomena are also trustworthy.10 Āryadeva says (CŚ 280):

Whoever doubts what the Buddha said

about that which is very obscure

should rely on emptiness

and gain conviction in him alone.

Dharmakīrti makes a similar point (PV 1.217):

Alternatively, since the true nature (tattva) of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be done along with the methods for doing so are well established, the statements of the credible person in question [the Buddha] are nondeceptive with regard to the most important issues [the four truths]. Hence, he is a source of inferential knowledge with regard to other objects.¹¹

Tsongkhapa agrees that investigating one teaching of the Buddha — in this case dependent arising — and seeing its veracity gives us confidence in his other teachings. Tsongkhapa says (PDA 30):

Through this very path of dependent arising,

the rationale for your speech being peerless,

convictions arise in me

that your other words are valid too.

Inference by authoritative testimony is not the first choice for gaining knowledge. It cannot be used to prove evident phenomena that can be known by direct perceivers or to prove slightly obscure phenomena that must initially be known through inference. During debates, participants must use inference as much as possible. The quality of a debate deteriorates if students mistakenly believe that quoting a well-respected master is sufficient to prove a point that actually needs to be realized through inference. It is unsuitable to abandon our investigative abilities and blindly quote scripture to prove a point. However, scriptural statements on these topics are useful because they inspire our practice, reinforce our understanding, and suggest new perspectives.

An example of gaining knowledge about the subtle workings of karma by using scriptural inference is the syllogism Consider the statement “Through generosity comes wealth; through ethical conduct comes upper rebirth.” It is nondeceptive in its subject matter because it is a statement that is free from faults by the threefold analysis. This statement is from Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland (RA 438), a text written by a great master; its content cannot be invalidated by the threefold analysis.

The sūtras of both the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions contain accounts of the Buddha and his disciples encountering living beings in very peculiar situations. The Buddha would often describe the karma that person had created in a previous life that brought about that situation. The Connected Discourses with Lakkhaṇa (Lakkhaṇasaṃyutta, SN 19) is dedicated to such accounts. It is helpful to read and think about these and use them as guidelines for our behavior. The Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish (Damamūrkha Sūtra) also describes the subtle workings of karma and gives us much food for thought.

We ordinary people must use inference by authoritative testimony to understand the subtlest clear light mind. According to Nyingma and Kagyu presentations, the clear light mind is not only the subtlest mind that manifests after the dissolution of grosser conceptual levels of mind, but also the clear light mind that is present and pervades all mental states even when the grosser levels of mind are manifest. However, the Guhyasamāja Tantra says the clear light mind manifests only after the grosser winds and minds have dissolved. Highly realized practitioners with direct experience of this clear light do not need to prove its existence by inference because for them it is an evident phenomenon. For those of us who have not had this experience, it is very obscure, and neither direct perceivers nor factual inferential cognizers can prove its existence.

The minds of white appearance, red increase, and black near attainment that appear during the dissolution process are probably very obscure phenomena for us as well. We may get some inkling of these increasingly subtle states of mind culminating in the clear light by considering that the eighty indicative conceptions are classified into three levels according to their subtlety. Thus the combination of wind and mind that are their underlying foundation — the vivid white appearance, red increase, and black near attainment — should also be increasingly subtle and culminate in the clear light. For example, we may see three clouds moving at different speeds in the sky — one fast, another slower, and a third barely moving at all. Although we cannot see the winds moving the clouds, we can infer that those winds are moving at three different speeds.

Also, tantric texts that discuss the various levels of mind describe many things that we can verify through direct perceivers — we have experiences of the awake state, dream state, and state of deep sleep, which are increasingly subtle states of mind. This gives us confidence in the accuracy of other topics presented in these texts. Furthermore, we do not know of any evidence that contradicts the existence of the clear light mind. Therefore, based on the authoritative testimony of the Buddha and those meditators who have direct experience of the subtlest clear light mind, there seems to be more grounds for accepting its existence than disproving it

For us ordinary beings, the level of realizations of those who are more highly realized than we are is very obscure. In his commentary on the Ornament entitled Golden Rosary (Legs bshad gser phreng), Tsongkhapa said that no matter how many reasons ordinary beings apply or how much logic they use, they cannot infer the level of realizations of highly realized practitioners. However, for those with higher realizations, the level of realizations of people inferior to them are evident phenomena.

If we are speaking with our teacher in the classroom, and he says that there is a text on the table in another room, we can accept that as true by believing his words. While in general the book is an evident phenomenon, to us at that moment it is very obscure. We cannot see it with our eyes or know it by inference. At that time, the only way we have to know the book is by relying on the testimony of someone who does.

However, simply citing our teacher or a scripture that says, “All phenomena are empty because they are dependent” will not help us to understand emptiness initially. What is the difference between trusting our teacher’s words to know the book and to understand emptiness? In general, a book is an evident phenomenon. We know what it is and have an image of a table with a book and a table without one. His words clarify for us which one it is. However, initially we do not have an idea of what emptiness is — or if we do, it’s the emptiness of our stomach, which is not the kind of emptiness we’re trying to realize! Quoting our spiritual mentor that phenomena are empty does not enhance our understanding of emptiness, even if we have tremendous devotion to our teacher. However, our trust in our teacher will inspire us to contemplate and meditate on emptiness according to the teachings, and through that we will understand the three criteria of the syllogism and in time will gain an inferential reliable cognizer of emptiness.

REFLECTION

1.Who do you trust as an authority and in what areas do you take them as authoritative? To what extent is that person fully reliable in terms of knowledge of that topic?

2.Those of us who are not scientists know the existence of atoms, the healthy range for human blood pressure, and so forth through accepting the word of scientists. Do we investigate their qualifications as authorities on the subject or do we blindly accept their word?

3.When politicians make various statements, to what extent do we check the reliability of their information and the reliability of their words before believing their statements?

4.In what other areas of life do you rely on the testimony of others to know something? Do you check the credibility of the person first or do you tend to believe something simply because someone said it or you read it somewhere?

Applying the Threefold Analysis

If direct reliable cognizers, inferential reliable cognizers, or other reliable scriptures contradict a particular scriptural passage, or if scientists can irrefutably prove that a scriptural statement is incorrect, we should not accept it. Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa) describes the structure of the universe as a flat world with Mount Meru at the center, four surrounding continents, heavenly realms above, and hellish states below. The sun and moon are said to be the same distance from the Earth, and the sun is only slightly larger than the moon. I do not believe that we should accept this description as accurate. My reasons for this are based on the guidelines the Buddhist scriptures have set out for evaluating the veracity of a teaching.

In Vasubandhu’s time the structure of our solar system was a very obscure phenomenon. Now, due to scientific advancement, some parts of its structure are evident while other parts can be known through factual inference. This new information affects our understanding of Vasubandhu’s description. We must apply the threefold analysis necessary for inference by scriptural authority to determine whether to accept his statements regarding our solar system.

The first criterion, that the statement is not contradicted by direct perception of evident phenomena, is not fulfilled. One way of proving the nonexistence of something is to prove the existence of its opposite. Vasubandhu describes the sun and moon as being almost the same size — 51 yojanas (20,400 km) and 50 yojanas (20,000 km) in diameter, respectively.12 However, reliable scientific instruments have measured the sun’s diameter as 1,392,000 km and the moon’s diameter as 3,480 km. It is clear that the sizes of the sun and moon as written in the Treasury of Knowledge are inaccurate.

Furthermore, this treatise says that the sun and the moon are the same height above the ocean — 40,000 yojanas (16,000,000 km) — and that they circle Mount Meru. Reliable scientific measurements have calculated that the sun is 150,000,000 km and the moon is 384,400 km from the Earth’s oceans. Here too we see that the measurements in the Treasury of Knowledge are inaccurate. In addition, there is scientific evidence showing that the sun does not orbit the Earth.

Another criterion for inference by scriptural authority is that the scripture lacks internal contradictions. As a learned practitioner from Nālandā Monastery, Vasubandhu would have based what he wrote on material in Buddhist scriptures. We find various measurements and structures of the solar system presented in Buddhist scriptures. The presentation of the shapes of the worlds in the Flower Ornament Sūtra (Avataṃsaka Sūtra) differs from that in Vasubandhu’s treatise. Because there are inconsistencies among Buddhist scriptures, a literal reading of their presentation of the world’s structure is not reliable.

I consider myself a student of Vasubandhu and have full respect for his great learning and spiritual attainments. At the same time, the Buddha advised us not to accept teachings merely out of respect, but to investigate them. Having followed the Buddha’s instructions and made a thorough investigation, I believe that if Vasubandhu were alive today, he would rewrite chapter 3 of the Treasury of Knowledge in light of current scientific knowledge.

The description of the world found in the Kālacakra Tantra and the scientific description also differ in several ways. It is possible that the description in the Kālacakra Tantra is designed to point out parallels between the external world and our internal human physiology, not as a description for space travel. In that case, it is valuable to use in meditation practice, although I find it difficult to accept literally.

Reflections on Scriptural Inference

Some people grow up in an environment where questioning a scripture’s authority is unacceptable and disbelievers are shunned or threatened. These experiences may cause us to mistrust religious authority. In Buddhism no one asks us to have blind belief. Instead we are encouraged and even required to scrutinize a scripture’s reliability by means of the threefold analysis and by examining the qualities of its author.

It is easier for serious, learned practitioners to examine a scripture’s reliability. Such practitioners have studied Buddhist scriptures for a period of time and have gained an understanding of the four truths and emptiness based on dependent arising, which facilitates their ability to examine scriptural authority.

How do people who are new to Buddhism approach the issue of the reliability of Buddhist scriptures and of the Buddha as a teacher? When you hear a teaching that tallies with what you have experienced — a teaching that touches you deeply and that in your heart you know is true — you will naturally think, “The Buddha accurately described my experience in one area in a way that no one else has. He may have some special knowledge or spiritual realizations.” In addition, when you put a teaching into practice and experience beneficial results, you will easily think, “I followed the Buddha’s instructions on how to deal with this disturbing emotion and it worked. Other teachings he has given may be equally valuable.” Like the Kālāmas, your trust in the Buddha and his teachings will increase due to your own experiences, as will your receptivity and interest.13 In this case, it makes sense to continue learning and practicing the Dharma, using your intelligence to examine the teachings. If you don’t find a particular point illogical or contradictory, you can accept it; this is not blind belief. The Buddha does not pressure anyone to follow his teachings and gives us full liberty to examine them. But if you don’t fully understand a topic and doubts about it remain, leave it for the time being and focus on the parts that help you. You can come back to these more challenging topics later.

Dharmakīrti instructed that inference by authoritative testimony should be applied only to topics that are important to know in order to make spiritual progress. In general, cosmology, political issues, history, gender traits and roles, and so forth are not included. As Buddhist practitioners, we must scrutinize scriptural passages about such topics, weigh them against contemporary ideas of human rights, scientific knowledge, and historical analysis, and come to our own conclusions.

After recommending that the Kālāmas examine the various teachings they heard, the Buddha asked them a series of questions about what they observed to be the results of attachment, anger, and confusion. They replied that the results were consistently unpleasant. When questioned about the results of the absence of attachment, anger, and confusion, the Kālāmas replied that they were pleasant. After having them examine evident phenomena by means of their own experience, the Buddha taught them the meditation on the four immeasurables, and they practiced cultivating love, compassion, joy, and equanimity for all sentient beings. Again the Kālāmas experienced for themselves the beneficial results of following the Buddha’s instructions. Having ascertained the reliability of some of the Buddha’s teachings through their own experience, they came to trust the Buddha and his teachings and took refuge in the Three Jewels. Their confidence in the Buddha, in turn, made them more open to hear more complex teachings on topics that could be ascertained by factual inference and inference through authoritative testimony.

The Prāsaṅgikas’ Unique View of Reliable Cognizers

The Prāsaṅgikas’ presentation of reliable cognizers has several distinctive features that differentiate it from the presentations of the Svātantrikas and other lower tenet schools. These principally center on the Prāsaṅgikas’ rejection of inherent or true existence. The lower tenet schools say that reliable cognizers and their comprehended objects exist inherently, whereas Prāsaṅgikas assert that they are established in dependence on each other. Candrakīrti states in Clear Words:

When in that way it is posited that the aims of the world are realized by the four reliable cognizers, those also are established in mutual dependence. When reliable cognizers exist, there are comprehended objects, and when comprehended objects exist, there are reliable cognizers. The two — reliable cognizers and comprehended objects that are inherently established — do not exist.

The existence of reliable cognizers and reliable objects is established in dependence on each other. There are no objects out there, existing in their own right, waiting to be comprehended. Nor are there reliable cognizers existing from their own side without perceiving a comprehended object.

A second distinctive feature is the Prāsaṅgikas’ assertion that a reliable cognizer can be mistaken. Veiled truths appear inherently existent to all consciousnesses of sentient beings except āryas’ meditative equipoise on emptiness. When a sentient being looks at a table, that table appears to her eye consciousness as inherently existent even though it isn’t. This consciousness is mistaken with respect to the appearance of the table. Still it is reliable with respect to the main object it cognizes — the table. It gives the person the information she needs to put her cup down. That visual consciousness is a reliable cognizer that is nondeceptive with respect to its apprehended object — its main object, in this case the table. At the same time, it is mistaken with respect to its appearing object (T. snang yul) — a table that appears to exist inherently although it does not.

Contrary to Sautrāntikas, Prāsaṅgikas assert that a yogic direct perceiver does not necessarily exist only in the mindstreams of āryas. Ordinary beings can have them as well, for example, the yogic direct perceiver apprehending subtle impermanence. This reliable cognizer is mistaken in that subtle impermanence appears truly existent to it, but nevertheless it correctly knows subtle impermanence.

Some people question whether Prāsaṅgikas can accept factual inference at all, saying that the Tibetan word for “fact,” dngos po, implies inherent existence. Prāsaṅgikas do not agree that dngos po implies inherent existence in this context. They assert that phenomena do not have some “fact” or independent essence that inheres in them. They refute inherent existence on all phenomena and assert that everything exists by being merely designated, dependent on conventions.

Svātantrikas and below say that direct reliable cognizers must be nonconceptual and must be the first moment of knowing the object. Prāsaṅgikas define a reliable cognizer as a nondeceptive consciousness; it need not be the first moment of that cognizer. Glossing direct as meaning not dependent on a reason, they accept both conceptual and nonconceptual direct reliable cognizers. An example of a conceptual direct reliable cognizer is the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing selflessness. This consciousness is conceptual and correct; it nondeceptively apprehends its main object selflessness that was ascertained in the first moment of that inferential cognizer. However, unlike the first moment, it apprehends selflessness without depending on a reason. Hence it is a conceptual consciousness that is a direct reliable cognizer. Another example of a conceptual direct reliable cognizer is a consciousness remembering the table after our visual consciousness saw it. It directly remembers the table that was seen without depending on a reason. For Prāsaṅgikas, subsequent cognizers are necessarily direct reliable cognizers.

Unlike Sautrāntikas, Prāsaṅgikas say that all consciousnesses, even erroneous ones, are direct reliable cognizers with respect to their appearing objects. For example, the erroneous conception of a turtle’s moustache is a reliable cognizer with respect to its appearing object, the appearance of a turtle’s moustache, because it knows the conceptual appearance of a turtle’s moustache and can induce memory of it. However, it is not a direct reliable cognizer in general because it is erroneous; a turtle’s moustache does not exist.

Knowing When We Have a Correct Reason and a Reliable Cognizer

We do not necessarily know that a particular reason is correct at the time we state it. This could happen for more than one reason. For example, weather forecasting involves factual inference. When a weatherperson predicts that it will be sunny in three days, he is doing so based on the data available to him at that moment. Since the causes and conditions influencing the weather can change quickly, it is unsure whether his conclusion will be correct and, even if it is, if his current reason will be the correct reason later on.

A similar process may occur with a Buddhist practitioner trying to realize emptiness. She may state many reasons to prove emptiness and reach a certain ascertainment or conclusion. But she is not totally confident in the validity of her reasons. Only later, when she has a profound realization, is she confident that her reasons were correct. This is not because the reasons were unsound, but because the initial understanding in her mind was not deep. It was a correct assumption because she did not incontrovertibly ascertain her conclusion at that time. With continued reflection, a correct assumption can become an inferential cognizer.

Although both of these examples involve factual inference in which the person may not be able to ascertain that the reason is correct when stating it, there is a difference between them. The reasons the weatherperson uses — barometric readings and so forth — could easily change as circumstances change. But the reason the Buddhist practitioner contemplates remains constant; it’s just that at her current level she’s not able to completely ascertain the reason as correct.

Knowing when we have a reliable cognizer is important. For example, when you drive a car and see an animal out of the corner of your eye, you need to find out if that is a direct reliable perception. If it is, you must brake to avoid hitting the animal. When medical researchers conduct trials for a new medication, they need to know that their interpretation of the data is a correct inference, because many people’s lives depend on it. We may have certain experiences in our meditation practice, and we need to know if these are reliable cognizers or wrong awarenesses because that will determine whether we reinforce these minds or counteract them.

Tsongkhapa lays out three criteria for existent phenomena (LC 3:178): (1) The object is known to a conventional consciousness. (2) The existence of that object is not invalidated by another conventional reliable cognizer — another reliable cognizer that accurately knows conventional truths. (3) It is not invalidated by a mind analyzing suchness (emptiness).

While a consciousness is cognizing an object, it is unable to know if it knows the object correctly. For this reason, the second criterion is important: another reliable cognizer — which may be another person’s reliable cognizer or a later reliable cognizer in our own mental continuum — does not disprove it. We may apprehend something protruding from a field and think it is a person. However, another person comes along and ascertains that it is a scarecrow. Third, a mind analyzing emptiness cannot disprove it. We may believe that inherently existent social castes exist, but a probing awareness analyzing emptiness can negate that.

Inferential Reliable Cognizers and Meditation

All Buddhist traditions share two forms of meditation: serenity, which is principally stabilizing meditation, and insight, which is principally analytical meditation. It is helpful to understand how inferential cognizers relate to these two types of meditation lest we mistakenly believe that inference is mere intellectualization unrelated to experience-based insight. In fact, factual inference can have a profound effect on our mind and totally change our outlook.

For us ordinary beings, deep states of concentration such as serenity are not evident phenomena that we have experienced, nor can we know their existence through factual inference. Rather, we depend on the authoritative testimony of the Buddha, arhats, and practitioners who have realized serenity to know that it exists. Based on their authoritative testimony, we develop faith in serenity, which leads us to aspire to actualize it. This, in turn, inspires us to listen to the instructions on the method to develop it and to apply effort to practice accordingly. Serenity is attained primarily through stabilizing meditation that trains the mind to focus on one object; doing this does not involve factual inference.

Factual inference is crucial for analytical meditation and the development of insight. By contemplating the reason of a syllogism, we come to understand it and to determine that it applies to the subject and is present in the predicate. This process occurs even when we do not consciously state a syllogism. When we establish mindfulness on the body, we do not necessarily verbally state the syllogism at the outset of a meditation session: “The body is unattractive because it is composed of unappealing parts.” Rather, by examining the body and its components with strong mindfulness, we naturally come to see that it is unattractive because it is composed of bones, muscles, blood, internal organs, eyeballs, hair, tissue, and so forth. Such an inferential understanding has a strong effect on how we relate to our own and others’ bodies and stimulates our determination to be free from cyclic existence.

We may not begin a meditation on mindfulness of feelings with the syllogism Consider feelings, they are duḥkha (unsatisfactory) in nature because they are under the control of afflictions and karma. However, this is the understanding we reach by mindfully exploring our pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings. This, in turn, leads us to understand that there is no purpose in clinging to saṃsāric feelings of pleasure. Such knowledge is very freeing and profoundly affects our lives. Here again we see that deep meditation naturally leads us to understand the thesis of a syllogism, even though we do not consciously state a syllogism at the beginning of our meditation. A similar process occurs when establishing mindfulness on the mind, which brings the understanding that the mind is impermanent because it is produced by causes, and when establishing mindfulness on phenomena, through which we understand that all the various mental states are not I or mine because they are neither identical with nor totally unrelated to the I. In short, although we may not be aware that we are using reasoning to cultivate a correct assumption and then an inferential reliable cognizer, this is in fact what is happening.

It is also interesting to apply our knowledge of the three types of phenomena and the reliable cognizers that know them to the stages of the path. Some examples are helpful.

A human life is an evident phenomenon, but our precious human life is slightly obscure. We need to use the reason that we have the eight freedoms and ten fortunes to infer that we have such a wonderful life with all the conducive circumstances for practicing the path. We need to employ inference of authoritative testimony to know that our precious human life is a product of specific karmic causes.

In general, death and coarse impermanence are evident phenomena; we witness people dying and things breaking. But the fact that those of us who are presently alive will die is slightly obscure. We infer it by thinking that we will die because we were born. The exact time and circumstances of our death, however, are very obscure.

Regarding the meditation on unfortunate rebirths, animals are evident to us. Hell beings and hungry ghosts are very obscure; we know them through inference by authoritative testimony. Even if we have a correct assumption of the existence of these states, we may wonder, “How is it possible for a human being to take such a rebirth?” Here it is helpful to think about the continuity of mind that goes from one life to the next. Rebirth itself can be known through factual inference, but it may take us a while to gain the understandings preliminary to this. Sometimes contemplating passages in the sūtras where the Buddha directly speaks about rebirth boosts our understanding. For example, discussing the attainment of a vision of the truth, the Buddha says (DN 28.7):

He understands a human’s unbroken stream of mind that is established in both this world and the next.

The Buddha also refers to a future life that follows death (SN 4.9):

This life span of human beings is short. One has to go on to the future life. One should do what is wholesome and lead the holy life; for one who has taken birth, there is no avoiding death.

To wholeheartedly take refuge in the Three Jewels, we must first establish their existence. The best way to do this is to transform our mind into the Dharma Jewel, which depends on having a yogic direct, nonconceptual perceiver of subtle selflessness. This is gained from first having an inferential reliable cognizer of selflessness, which is a slightly obscure phenomenon. In his Commentary on Reliable Cognition, Dharmakīrti set out the reasoning proving that it is possible to have a yogic direct perceiver of selflessness. The process begins by having a correct assumption, an understanding derived from hearing. This is deepened by means of the wisdom of reflecting — an inferential cognizer realizing selflessness — which is further enhanced by the wisdom of meditation until it becomes a yogic direct perceiver of selflessness. This wisdom, which is a true path, is then used to progressively eradicate the afflictions from the mindstream and attain true cessations. The true paths and true cessations are the Dharma Jewel. From these we infer the existence of the Saṅgha Jewel, those beings who have attained these realizations. Following this, we can infer the existence of the Buddha Jewel, someone who has eradicated all obscurations.

At the present moment, our understanding of selflessness and of the process of actualizing true paths and true cessations may be a correct assumption. This is sufficient for us to understand that the Three Jewels have the ability to guide us from the dangers of cyclic existence in general and from unfortunate rebirths in particular. Understanding this has the power to impel us to turn to the Three Jewels for spiritual guidance, which is the purpose of the teaching on refuge.

Regarding the teaching on karma and its results, some of the results of our actions are evident, while others are slightly obscure or very obscure. An evident result is the reciprocal kindness we receive after treating someone else with care. A slightly obscure karmic result is a person’s being compassionate from a young age. We can infer that this is due to her having cultivated compassion in previous lives. Barring any inhibiting factors, familiarity with compassion in previous lives will cause compassion to arise easily again in future lives.

A very obscure karmic result is the specific rebirth that is the maturation result of a complete karma we did today. Only an omniscient one, a buddha, can know this. Once an old man asked Śāriputra to ordain him as a monk. Even with his great clairvoyance, Śāriputra could not determine if this man had created the virtuous causes in the past to be able to ordain. It was only after he consulted the Buddha, who saw with his omniscience that indeed this man had created the virtuous karma, that he was able to become a monastic. Even for Śāriputra, the Buddha’s disciple most renowned for his wisdom, the exact details of karma and its effects were very obscure.

The measure of understanding the meditation on karma is gaining an understanding of karma and its effects that is sufficient to make us increasingly conscientious of our physical, verbal, and mental actions so that we avoid engaging in harmful actions and are eager to create constructive ones. This is gained by understanding the causes of our experiences and results of our actions through direct perception, factual inference, and inference by authoritative testimony, as described above.

As we’ve seen in this chapter, reliable cognizers apply to many aspects of our lives and our Dharma practice. By learning about them, we will lay a foundation for the critical thinking necessary to correctly understand ever more profound subjects.

REFLECTION

1.What kind of reliable cognizers know the duḥkha of cyclic existence?

2.When you reflect on the kindness of others, what kind of reliable cognizers are at play?