| CHAPTER ONE | MAHAN AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS |
1. Roosevelt, Letters, 1:221–22.
2. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History; Karsten, “The Nature of ‘Influence,’” 585–600.
3. Puleston, 145, 154–60.
4. Poultney Bigelow to Mahan, 12 April 1897, Mahan Papers.
5. Dingman, “Japan and Mahan,” 50.
6. Oriental Association to Mahan, 1 April 1897, Mahan Papers.
7. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 303.
8. In all, five of Mahan’s books and an anthology have been translated into Japanese.
9. The translation of The Interest of America in Sea Power is Minakami Umehiko, trans., Taiheiyō kaiken ron.
10. Seager, Mahan, 2–5.
11. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, xiv, 274.
12. Ibid., 198.
13. Mahan, Letters, 1:43–44.
14. Sir Rutherford Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon: Narratives of a Three Years’ Residence in Japan (New York: Harper, 1863).
15. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 243–47.
16. Ibid., 254.
17. Mahan, Letters, 1:140, 334–35, 337–38; Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 235–36.
18. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 129, 135, 236, 247, 335.
19. Seager, Mahan, 119; Puleston, 48.
20. The U.S. Navy played a role in the modernization of the Imperial Japanese Navy, having accepted seventeen Japanese students at Annapolis from 1869 to 1906. Ellicott, 303–7.
21. Mahan, Interest of America, 10; Vincent Davis, 110; Baer, 1.
22. Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 324.
23. Mahan, Influence, 29–89; Seager, Mahan, 7.
24. Weigley, American Way of War, 176, 178.
25. Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 3.
26. Ibid., v; Mahan, Influence, 287–88; Vincent Davis, 112.
27. Spector, Eagle, 43.
28. Baer, 16, 121; Crowl, 475.
29. Mahan, Influence, 28, 53.
30. Mahan, Interest of America, 6; Sumida, 27; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 226; Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 219.
31. LaFeber, New Empire, 88–93; LaFeber, “Note on the ‘Mercantilistc Imperialism.’”
32. Vincent Davis, 108.
33. Mahan, Interest of America, 7–8.
34. Ibid., 47, 49.
35. Seager, Mahan, 249.
36. Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 49–50.
37. Mahan, Interest of America, 31–32; Letters, 2:92–93; Love, History of the U.S. Navy, 1:386; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 53–56.
38. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909, 12.
39. Mahan, Letters, 2:506.
40. Puleston, 182; Turk, 119.
41. Mahan, Letters, 2:538.
42. Cited in Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 3; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 49–52; Livezey, 170.
43. Vlahos, “Naval War College,” 24; Mahan, Letters, 2:506–7.
44. Mahan, Interest of America, 243, 259.
45. Ibid., 162, 235, 237, 251–52.
46. Mahan, Letters, 2:569, 619.
47. Ibid., 579–80.
48. Ibid., 579–80; Livezey, 4.
49. Mahan, Letters, 2:582–83.
50. Puleston, 1; Livezey, 176; Mahan, Problem of Asia, 63–67; Mahan, Interest of America, 236; Mahan, Letters, 2:658.
51. Mahan, Problem of Asia, 87–90, 154, 165, 167.
52. Vlahos, “Naval War College,” 26, 63.
53. Mahan, Problem of Asia, 108.
54. Ibid., 101–2, 106–7, 110, 148–49, 151; Mahan, Letters, 2:707.
55. Mahan, Letters, 3:80.
56. Seager, Mahan, 472; Turk, 59, 89.
57. Mahan, “Some Reflections upon the Far Eastern War”; Mahan, “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia”; Mahan, Naval Strategy, 422–23.
58. Mahan, Letters, 3:221–22; Ōmae, “Kyū Nihon kaigun,” 13–14.
59. Vlahos, “Naval War College,” 28.
60. Quoted in Love, History of the U.S. Navy, 1:440.
61. Mahan, Letters, 3:226; Mahan to Roosevelt, 2 December 1911, Roosevelt Papers; Seager, Mahan, 479.
62. Report from the United States, No. 86, No. 89, Taniguchi to Tōgō, 29 April 1907 (No. 11, secret), Papers of Saitō Makoto.
63. Mahan, Letters, 3:277–78; Levy, 281.
64. Yamamoto Eisuke, Danshaku Ōsumi Mineo, 382.
65. Mahan, Letters, 3:355.
66. Hattendorf, Mahan on Naval Strategy, 175; Mahan, Letters, 3:495–99.
67. Mahan, Letters, 3:500; Tokutomi Sohō, Jimu ikkagen [My Opinions on Current Affairs], Tokyo: Min’yūsha, 1913, 471–73; Kodera Kenkichi, Dai-Ajia shugiron, 421–23.
68. See Asada, Ryō taisenkan, 296–304; Neumann, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” 713–19.
69. Turk, 93; Asada, “Jinshu to bunka,” 297–300.
70. Mahan, Letters, 3:355–56.
71. Ibid., 3:380–83; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 33–35.
72. Mahan, Letters, 3:380, 389–93, 439, 480–83; Seager, Mahan, 482–88; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 32–35; Spector, Professors of War, 105; Miller, War Plan Orange, 29.
73. Evaluations of Mahan’s proposal vary. William R. Braisted argues that Mahan’s proposal was “brilliantly conceived” (The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 34). Mahan’s biographer par excellence, Robert Seager, says Mahan’s proposal was “realistic and incisive” (Mahan, 482). On the other hand, Edward S. Miller calls Mahan’s proposal “sophomoric” (War Plan Orange, 334).
74. Mahan, Letters, 3:353.
75. Mahan, “The Open Door”; Letters, 3:353.
76. Neumann, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt”; Freidel, 46–47. After Roosevelt’s death, Mrs. Roosevelt was asked which books her husband considered most influential in his own thinking. In reply she said he had always talked of Mahan’s history as one of the books he found “most illuminating.” Neumann, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” 717, 719. Neumann, America Encounters Japan, 143.
77. Freidel, 1:234–35; Neumann, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” 716–17.
78. Miller, War Plan Orange, 111.
79. Puleston, 304; Turk, 171; Lyle Evans Mahan, 91.
80. Turk, 4.
| CHAPTER TWO | MAHAN’S INFLUENCE ON JAPANESE SEA POWER |
1. Mahan, Interest of America; Minakami Umehiko, trans., Taiheiyō kaiken ron, 8.
2. Quoted in Taylor, 115. What relevance does Mahan have in contemporary Japan? This question intrigued me when I edited and translated a Mahan anthology in 1977 as a volume in the Classics in American Culture series. I was pleasantly surprised that my Mahan volume sold more than most other titles in the series. It was used as one of the textbooks at the National Maritime Self-Defense Staff College, the Japanese counterpart of Newport. As of November 2004, the book has gone into its sixth printing, selling four thousand copies.
3. Ogasawara, Teikoku kaigun shiron, I, preface, 193–1; Nippon teikoku kaigun kaijō kenryokushi kōgi, 9, 79, 85, 168, 214.
4. Spector, Eagle, 43.
5. Baer, 16, 475.
6. Ogasawara, Teikoku kaigun shiron, 193–1; Ogasawara, Nippon teikoku kaijō kenryokushi kōgi, 9, 79, 85, 168, 214.
7. Ibid., 431, 447, 463.
8. Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, 99; Peattie, “Akiyama Saneyuki,” 61–69; Koyama, 253–56; Dingman, “Japan and Mahan,” 49–66; Yamanashi ihōroku, 23–24.
9. Shimada Kinji, Amerika ni okeru Akiyama, passim.
10. Ibid., 3.
11. Ibid., 498–500.
12. Dingman, “Japan and Mahan,” 58–59; Sakurai, 309; Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, 86–88; Kusumi, 352–58.
13. Quoted in Tomioka, Kaisen, 160–62.
14. Mizuno; Evans and Peattie, 73.
15. Yasui, 137; Sakurai, 307–9; Shimada Kinji, Roshia sensō zen’ya, 2:714, 722, 764.
16. Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:125–29, 135–42.
17. Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, 309.
18. Quoted in Evans and Peattie, 84; Yamanashi ihōroku, 23; Sakurai, 236–37, 388.
19. Akiyama, Kaigun ōyō senjutsu (secret), JDA; Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, 300; Shimada Kinji, Roshia sensō zen’ya, 2:893–95.
20. Kusumi, 354–56.
21. Higuchi, Nihon kaigun kara mita Nitchū, 17, 23–27, 37–38.
22. Higuchi, “Nihon kaigun no tairiku seisaku,” 63–91; Sakurai, 254–56; Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, 256–62.
23. Higuchi, Nihon kaigun kara mita Nitchū, 23–26; Hirama, 174.
24. Murakami Teiichi, 287–88, 293–98.
25. Rivera, 97–98.
26. Tsunoda, Manshū mondai, 648–50.
27. Shinohara, 451.
28. Satō, Teikoku kokubō shiron, 78–79, 337, 456, 758, 831, 870, 877–78. See also Satō, Teikoku kokubō shironshō, passim; Yamanashi ihōroku, 23.
29. Evans and Peattie, 137.
30. Satō, Teikoku kokubō shiron, 70–71, 160, 718, 752, 758.
31. Ibid., 50, 752, 756–59.
32. Ibid., 160.
33. Mahan, Interest of America, 180.
34. Satō, Teikoku kokubō shiron, 748, 760.
35. Ibid., 28, 760, 814–15 (emphasis Satō’s).
36. Satō, “Kokubō sakugi,” 4; Satō, Teikoku kokubō shironshō, 509, 512–13; “Kokubō sūgi” [Commentaries on National Defense], 1914? in Saitō Papers, 37; Satō, “Kokubō sakugi,” 21–24.
37. Satō, “Kokubō sakugi,” 21–24. In January 1909, Navy Vice Minister Takarabe Takeshi wrote in his diary, “The American proposal concerning the Manchurian question is an extremely grave matter.” Takarabe, 39.
38. Satō Tetsutarō et al., Kokubō mondai no kenkyū [A Study of the National Defense Problem] (1913), JDA; Satō, “Kokubō sakugi,” 21; Saitō Seiji, “Kokubō hōshin daiichiji kaitei no haikei,” 31–32; Kobayashi Michihiko, “Teikoku kokubō hōshin no dōyō,” 60–61.
Another interesting theme that appeared in this booklet was southward expansion: “The South Sea region is an area which Japan must regard most important from political, commercial, and colonial viewpoints. The Dutch East Indies is one of the areas which our Empire must regard as most important for our national expansion.”
The theme of a strong fleet to prevail in “trade conflict,” the centerpiece of neo-Mahanian doctrine, was accepted and even improved on by the Japanese navy. Throughout the period treated in this study, American trade with China was insignificant in comparison with Japanese-American trade. It may be that navalists, both in the United States and Japan, perpetuated the myth of trade rivalry as a lever for fleet expansion.
39. Satō Tetsutarō, Teikoku kokubō shironshō, 509; Satō, “Kokubō sakugi,” 25–26, 34.
40. Satō Tetsutarō, Teikoku kokubō shiron, 160, 338; Satō, Teikoku kokubō shi ronshō, 440.
41. Gensui Katō Tomosaburō den, 259; Asada, “Japanese Admirals,” 145.
42. Ishikawa Yasushi, 337–39.
43. Ibid., 356, 358.
44. Satō Tetsutarō, Teikoku kokubō shiron, 144.
45. Katō Kanji taishō den, 233–47, 825–2.
46. Ibid., 521–23.
47. Ibid., 577–78.
48. Ibid., 823–34, 831; Katō Kanji’s memo, “Gunshuki shoken” [My Views on Arms Limitation], January 1930, JDA; NGS memo, “American Armaments since the Washington Conference,” 14 December 1929, submitted by Katō to Saitō Makoto, Saitō Papers.
49. Ibid.
50. Memo prepared for the 1935 conference of naval limitation, No. 1, Navy Ministry, JDA.
51. Mahan, Beikoku kaigun senryaku, 1–2.
52. Ibid.
53. Weigley, American Way of War, 286, 293, 311, 334.
54. W. H. Gardiner to William S. Sims, 17 July 1921, 27 September 1921, Gardiner Papers.
55. U.S. naval attache, Tokyo, “Some Observations on the Navy of Japan,” received 25 February 1920, U.S. Navy Department Policies, “The Navy of Japan,” RG 45, NA.
56. Louis Hacker, “The Incendiary Mahan: A Biography,” Scribner’s Magazine 64 (April 1934).
57. Nakahara Diary, 3, 29 December 1939, 15 January 1940, June 1940, JDA; Nakahara, “Dainiji sekai taisen,” Vol. 1.
58. Inoue Shigeyoshi-S, 295.
59. John L. Gaddis, Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 224.
| CHAPTER THREE | FROM ENMITY TO DÉTENTE |
1. The text of the Imperial National Defense Policy appears in Shimanuki, “Nichi-Ro sensō ikō ni okeru kokubō hōshin,” 2–11. Drafted and decided on by the high command, it provided for defense policy in the narrow military sense of the word, not a comprehensive defense plan.
2. Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:225–26.
3. Itō Masanori, Kasō tekkoku [Hypothetical Enemy] (Tokyo: Sasaki Shuppanbu, 1926) is the best Japanese analysis of the idea of a hypothetical enemy. 1:246–48.
4. Nomura Minoru, “Tai-Bei-Ei kaisen,” 26–27; Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai,: 156–59; Nomura Minoru, Taiheiyō sensō, 287–89; Kobayashi Seizō, Kaigun taishō Kobayashi Seizō oboegaki, 2–22 (hereafter cited as Kobayashi Seizō oboegaki).
5. Quoted in Sprout and Sprout, Toward a New Order, 23.
6. Miller, War Plan Orange, 32; Itō Masanori, Gunshuku, 242–74; Pelz, 89–91.
7. Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:246–48.
8. The text of the General Plan for Strategy is printed in Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai, 1:119–120.
9. Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:246–48.
10. Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai, 1:132–35; Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:145–46; Senshishitsu, Daihon’ei rikugunbu, 1:223; Evans and Peattie, 189.
11. Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai, 1:132–35; Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:145–46.
12. Miller, War Plan Orange, 24–25; Love, History of the U.S. Navy, 1:448.
13. Tsunoda, Manshū mondai, 721–22; quoted in Nihon kaigunshi, 2:314.
14. Miller, War Plan Orange, 111.
15. File XSTP, 1895–1916, Old Naval War College Archives, record lot No. 1, Naval Historical Collection, NWC; ONI to CNO, General Board, 5 August 1918, GR 45, NA.
16. Portfolio No. 2, Asiatic Station, General Considerations and Data (confidential), February 1916, War Plans Division, Naval History Division; ONI to the General Board, Reg. 6347 c-10-a, WA 5, GR 45, NA; Hagan, This People’s Navy, 254.
17. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 207–08.
18. Ibid, 208.
19. Takeshita Isamu, Kaigun no gaikōkan, 48 (italics added).
20. Naval General Staff Report No. 38, 1916, Saitō Papers.
21. Naval Staff College, Dai-6 hen kimitsu hoshō [Confidential Supplement, Vol. 6, to The Naval War History of World War I], n.d., JDA.
22. Kaigun Daijin Kanbō, Kaigun gunbi enkaku, 3–4.
23. Itō Masanori, Dai kaigun, 313.
24. Kobayashi Tatsuo, ed., Suiusō nikki, 299, 303.
25. Nomura Minoru, Rekishi no naka no Nihon kaigun, 35.
26. Takagi, Shikan, 64–66; Takagi, Jidenteki Nihon kaigun, 49.I could not find in the U.S. naval record a paper exactly corresponding to this document, but it does not differ in essential ways from Admiral Robert E. Coontz (CNO) to Secretary of State, 27 February 19, P.D. 198-2, RG 80, NA.
27. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 206–08.
28. Senshibu, Rengō Kantai, 1:168.
29. Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 472, 474–75.
30. Asada, “Japanese Admirals.”
31. TSM-S, 3–7; Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:146; Saitō Seiji, “Kaigun ni okeru daiichiji sensō kenkyū,” 16–32.
32. Katō Kanji taishō den, 756–57; Katō Kanji, “Gunshuku shoken,” Saitō Papers; Kurono, 6.
33. Niimi, 216–17; Hirama, 276–77.
34. Yamanashi calculated that the maintenance cost alone of the eight-eight fleet, once it was completed, would be 600,000,000 yen. The government budget at that time was about 1,500,000,000 yen. Yamanashi ihōroku, 66; Yamanashi, Katō Tomosaburō gensui, 8.
35. Proceedings of the budget committee of the House of Councilors, 5 February 1919, 27.
36. Yamanashi, Rekishi to meishō, 151–52.
37. Yamanashi ihōroku, 66–67.
38. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 539–40.
39. Shidehara, Gaikō 50-nen, 59.
40. Sprout and Sprout, Toward a New Order, 102; Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, Shidehara Kijūrō, 2.
41. Kennedy, 31.
42. Quoted in Love, History of the U.S. Navy, 1:526.
43. Albert P. Niblack to the General Board, 24 February 19, RG 45, WA-5, NA; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 546.
44. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. to Mrs. Roosevelt, 14 July 1921, Papers of Theodore Roosevelt Jr.
45. Report of the General Board on Limitation of Armament, memos for the use of the American delegation, No. 1 (GPO, 1921), 8–16, 24, copy in the Hughes Papers; Folder 139, Op-29, Folder No. 4, War Portfolio No. 2, Asiatic Station, January 1919; Folder 141, Op-29, Folder No. 6, War Portfolio No. 3, General Board No. 425, Strategic Survey of the Pacific, 26 April 1923; General Board and the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 2:147; Director of War Plans C. S. Williams to chief of naval operations, 28 October 1921, 500.A41a/145; Report of the General Board, 8, 11, 14–16, 24; 500.A41a/121, NA; Wheeler, “The United States Navy and the Japanese ‘Enemy,’” 63.
46. Frederick McCormick, The Menace of Japan (Boston: Little, Brown, 1917); Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy (New York: Scribner, 1919); Sidney Osborne, The New Japanese Peril (New York: Macmillan, 1921); Walter Pitkin, Must We Fight Japan? (New York: Century, 1921).
47. Baer, 121.
48. Katō Kanji, “Gunshuku shoken.”
49. Kaigun Kokusai Renmei Kankei Jikō Kenkyūkai [Navy Ministry’s Committee to Investigate League of Nations Matters], “Kafu kaigi gunbi seigen mondai ni kansuru kenkyū” [Studies on the Arms Limitation Question at the Washington Conference], 21 July 1921, Enomoto Papers.
50. Kaigun Kokusai Renmei Kankei Jikō Kenkyūkai, “Taiheiyō shotō no gunjiteki shisetsu teppai moshikuwa seigen ni kansuru kenkyū” [Study on Dismantlement or Restriction of Military Installations on Pacific Islands], JDA.
51. Hori, memo on the Washington Conference (secret), February 1946. Draft request for Navy Minister Katō’s approval, August 1921 (never sanctioned), Hori Papers, NMSDC; instructions from Navy Minister Katō to Vice Admiral Katō Kanji, “Memo on Treatment of Naval Matters at the Washington Conference,” 28 September 1921, Enomoto Papers.
52. The government’s instructions appear in JMFA, NGB: Washinton kaigi, 1:181–87.
53. Shidehara, Gaiko 50-nen, 2.
54. Bull, 349–57; Goldman, passim.
55. Ian Nish observes that in the hasty preparations and hurried give-and-takes at the conference, the participating powers could not devise a “master plan,” nor did they have much awareness that they were “devising a carefully balanced structure,” Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London: Routledge, 1977), 141–42. But Japan and the United States shared the view that as a result of the Washington Conference, there emerged a new international order of regional cooperation in the Pacific and East Asia encompassing both naval and diplomatic issues. With regard to Britain, it is important to note that the British delegate Arthur Balfour stressed to Prime Minister Lloyd George, “If satisfactory and durable results are to be achieved in regard to naval disarmament ... an agreement must also be reached in regard to certain political problems which have arisen in China and the Pacific.” Quoted in Goldman, 244.
56. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 4, 6.
57. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 13 July 1921; Ishii Itarō, Gaikōkan, 81–82.
58. Memo on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japanese-American cooperation, 6 July 1921, JMFA.
59. JMFA, NGB: Washinton kaigi, 1:34–37.
60. Shidehara to Uchida, 14 August 1921 (No. 510); 23 July 1921 (No. 416); 14 August 1921 (No. 510); 29 September 1921.
61. Edwin L. Neville’s memo, “Japan in the Far East,” 1921 (in U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs Prepared for the American Delegation to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament); Neville’s memo for Hughes, October 1921; Neville’s memo on “Japan in the Far East” for the American delegation, 1921, 500.A41a/67, NA.
62. Chandler P. Anderson Diary, 28 October 1921, Anderson Papers; Roosevelt to Taft, 22 December 1910, cited in Griswold, 131–32.
63. FRUS, 1922, 1:1–2
64. Hoover, Memoirs, 3:180.
65. Anderson Diary, 26 November, 27 December 1921; Jessup, 2:447–48, 457–59.
66. J. Reuben Clark, “Some Basic Reflections of the Far Eastern Problems,” 28 September 1921; “Preliminary Suggestions,” n.d., 500.4la/58, NA.
67. Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation, 7 December 1921, Papers of the American Delegation to the Washington Conference, 500.A41/12, NA.
68. TSM-S, 3.
69. Hanihara to Uchida, 5 December 1921 (Conference No. 128, urgent and confidential), JMFA.
70. For a detailed account, see Asada, “Japan’s ‘Special Interests’” and “Between the Old Diplomacy and the New” 224–25; Hanihara to Uchida, 5 December 1921; Anderson Diary, 26, 27 November 1921; Washburn to Root, 30 October, 26 November 1921; Washburn’s memo to Root, “Japanese Situation,” 26 November 1921, Washburn Papers; Jessup, 2:457–59 (italics added).
71. Anderson Diary, 18, 19 November, 27 December 1921; Jessup, 2:562; Delegates to Uchida (italics added); 26 January 1922 (Conference No. 496), JMFA (italics added).
72. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Diary, 13 January 1922; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 652.
73. Beerits’s memo on Far Eastern Question, Hughes Papers.
74. Shidehara to Uchida, 24 July 1921 (No. 4229); 20 December 1921 (No. 255); 9 January 1922 (No. 307) Ujita, 70.
75. Hanihara to Uchida, 25 December 1921 (No. 128, urgent and confidential) JMFA.
76. Delegates to Uchida, 29 January 1922 (Conference No. 548), JMFA.
77. Anderson Diary, 22 November 1921; 10, 21 December 1922; Delegates to Uchida, December 1921 (Conference No. 255), 9 January 1922 (Conference No. 307); Uchida to delegates, 24 December 1921 (Conference No. 237), 28 December 1921 (Conference No. 241), JMFA.
78. Shidehara to Uchida, 26 January 1922 (Conference No. 5), 28 January 1922, JMFA.
79. Katō Tomosaburō to navy vice minister, 16 January 1922, JDA.
80. Hughes, Pathway of Peace, 2–40; Hughes, “Foreign Policy of the United States,” 575–83er 1921 (Conference No. 124), JMFA.
81. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 13 March. Delegates to Uchida, 5 December 1921 (Conference No. 1279).
82. From Watson, naval attaché, to ONI, 4 April 1922, Register No. 14746, NWC.
| CHAPTER FOUR | THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE |
1. Hara Kei nikki, 5:435; Arai, 53–54, 169; Yamanashi ihōroku, 68; Aoki, second foreign ministership, Part 4, 87–91, 96–98.
2. Yamanashi, Katō Tomosaburō, 2, 10; Itō Masanori, Kafu kaigi to sonogo, 351–52; Katō Gensui Denki Hensan Iin, 264—65.
3. Sagishiro Gakujin, “Kafu kaigi to Katō kaishō” [The Washington Conference and Navy Minister Katō], Nihon oyobi Nipponjin (1 October 1921).
4. Itō Masanori, Kafu kaigi to sonogo, 351–52.
5. Attaché (Tokyo) reports, 10 October 1921, GR 45, QY-Japanese; CNI’s memo for CNO, 11 October 1921, RG 45, NA.
6. Attaché report from Tokyo, 23 September; 10, 21 October 1921 (Nos. 764, 769, 807), RG 45; memo for CNO, 11 October 1921, RG 45, NA. The British held an equally positive view of Katō Tomosaburoō. The British ambassador to Japan, Charles Eliot, cabled the Foreign Office, “Baron Kato is reserved and silent, but has a high reputation for broad vision, calm judgment and great determination.” Eliot to Arthur Balfour, 17 July 1921 (No. 412, confidential), F2693/2693/23, Foreign Office Archives, PRO.
7. Willam Pratt, “Autobiography.”
8. ONI, “Memorandum for CNO,” 11 October 1921 (confidential), NA.
9. Yamanashi, Rekishi to meishō, 156.
10. “Katō zenken dengon” [The Message of Chief Delegate Katō], full text at JDA.
11. Hughes’s memo of an interview with Shidehara, 18 August 1921, 793.94/119 1/2, NA.
12. Warren to Hughes, 14 October 1921, FRUS, 1921.
13. Shidehara Kijūrō, Gaikō 50-nen, 64.
14. Attaché report, Tokyo to ONI, File No. 105–100, W-764 of 23 September 1921, and W-745 of 9 September 1921, RG 45, NA.
15. Sprout and Sprout, Toward the New Order, 150.
16. Yamanashi, Rekishi to meishō, 156.
17. Nomura to navy vice minister, 5 November 1921 (telegram No. 3), JDA.
18. The full text of the Hughes proposal appears in U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 42–76. President Harding’s and Hughes’s case for presenting a drastic proposal—“a very large and liberal offer”—at the outset of the conference is described in Henry Cabot Lodge’s “Journal of Washington Conference,” 12, 24, 31 October 1921.
19. Ichihashi, 34; Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Diary, 14 December 1921.
20. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Diary, 12 November 1921.
21. TSM-S, 3:23; Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 216; Shidehara Kijūrō, Gaikō 50-nen, 216. 24; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 598.
22. TSM-S, 3.
23. Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 216.
24. Itō Masanori, Rengō kantai, 259; Itō Masanori, Gunshuku?, 50.
25. Katō to Ide, 12 November 1921 (Conference No. 4), JDA; Katō to Uchida, received 14 November 1921 (Conference No. 18), JMFA.
26. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 77; Nomura Kichisaburō to Ide, 15 November 1921 (No. 6), JDA.
27. Delegates to Uchida, 16 November 1921 (Conference No. 22), JMFA; 30. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 15 November 1921.
28. Delegates to Uchida, 14 November 1921 (Conference No. 18), JMFA; Nomura Kichisaburō, “Kaiko to tenbō,” 11, JDA.
29. U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 106; NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 82–83.
30. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 80–81; Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 106.
31. The Mutsu began its trial run after 9 October 1921, was hastily completed on 24 October before the Washington Conference, and was officially delivered to the navy on 22 November.
32. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 78, 79–81; Uchida to delegates, 22 November 1921 (Conference No. 44, strictly confidential and urgent), JMFA; NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 79.
33. Interview with Enomoto, July 1972.
34. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 90.
35. Theodore Roosevelt Jr.: Diary, 15, 17, 30 November, 1921. Slightly different figures are given in Katō Kanji’s telegram to the vice minister and vice chief, sent on November 1921, JDA. A succinct summary of the ratio question from the American viewpoint appears in William Howard Gardiner, “Memorandum of Naval Matters Connected with the Washington Conference of the Limitation of Armament, 1921–1922,” Papers of William Howard Gardiner. See also William Pratt, “Autobiography,” passim.
36. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 1, 36.
37. Ibid., 90.
38. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Diary, 15, 17, 30 November 1921.
39. Ibid., 24 October 1921; 17, 19, 21, 30 November 1921.
40. Delegates to Uchida, arrived 19 November, 3 December 1921 (Conference No. 127), JMFA.
41. FRUS, 1922, 1:12.
42. Sprout and Sprout, Toward a New Order, 157; Hughes to Warren, 19, 27 November 1921; FRUS, 1922,: 64–65, 67–68.
43. Quoted in Kiba, 85, 268.
44. Anderson Diary, 18, 30 November 1921.
45. Ide to Katō, 7 December 1921 (special telegram, urgent), JDA; Uchida to delegates, 22 November 1921 (Conference No. 44), JMFA.
46. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Diary, 30 November 1921.
47. In his recent biography of Yardley, David Kahn documents that the Japanese telegram of 28 November, revealing that Japan would abandon the 10:7 ratio and accept 10:6, was available to the American delegation by 2 December. It stiffened Hughes’s attitude. Kahn, 76–81.
48. Delegates to Uchida, 23 November 1921 (Conference No. 74), JMFA; interview with Enomoto, July 1975; Delegates to Uchida, arrived 26 November 1921; Hori’s memo on the Washington Conference, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
49. Interview with Enomoto Jaji, July 1975.
50. “Kaigun iken” [Naval Opinion], n.d., Enomoto Papers. According to the procedures established before the conference, Katō was to direct his navy vice minister, Ide Kenji, who would explain the matter to top navy leaders. At the same time he was to keep in close touch with Katō on domestic opinion by reporting debates in the cabinet and on the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations. “Procedures of the Arms Limitation Conference,” senior aide, Navy Ministry, n.d., Enomoto Papers.
51. Ide to Katō, 28 November 1921 (special telegram No. 16, urgent), JDA.
52. Rear Admiral Ichikizaka Keiichi, “Gensui Tōgō Heihachirō Kō ni kansuru hiwa” [Confidential Stories about Fleet Admiral Tōgō Heihachiro], JDA; Kiba, 227; Nomura’s memo on “procedures for the naval conference,” n.d., JDA; Hori’s memo on the Washington Conference, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
53. Uchida to delegates, 28 November 1921 (Conference No. 73, strictly confidential and urgent), JMFA.
54. Ide to Katō, received 1, 4 December 1921 (special telegram, confidential and urgent), JDA.
55. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 122–23; Delegates to Uchida, sent 1 December 1921 (Conference No. 127, strictly confidential), JMFA.
56. NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 232; Katō to Uchida, arrived 5 December 1921 (Conference No. 131), JDA.
57. Delegates to Uchida, 2 December 1921 (No. 131, strictly confidential and urgent), JMFA.
58. FRUS, 1922, 1:407–11; NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 128; NGB: Washinton kaigi, 1:297–300. Katō failed to immediately report to Tokyo Hughes’s agreement at this meeting to the status quo of the Philippines and Guam. Tokyo learned of this from Ambassador Charles B. Warren on 9 December. This caused some confusion between the delegates and Tokyo.
59. Katō to Uchida, 5 December 1921 (No. 127, strictly confidential), JMFA; Katō to Ide, 4 December 1921 (No. 12), JDA.
60. Katō to Ide, 4 December 1921, JDA.
61. Navy minister to vice minister, 4 December 1921, JDA; Delegates to Uchida, 5 December 1921 (No. 142, strictly confidential and urgent), JMFA.
62. Katō to Ide, 4 December 1921 (confidential, urgent), JDA; NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 137.
63. TSM-S, 6–6; interview with Enomoto, July 1975.
64. “Katō zenken dengon,” TSM-S, 3–8, Ide to Katō, 10 December, 1921 (special dispatch, No. 30, JDA).
65. NGB: Washington Kaigi, 1:314–16. Quoted in Gensui Katō Tomosaburō den, 114.
66. TSM-S, 3–8.
67. Quoted in Gensui Katō Tomosaburō den, 114. 8.
68. Quoted in Katō Kanji taisho den, 1008.
69. Asada, “Japanese Admirals,” 142–45.
70. Katō Kanji to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, February 1918; navy vice minister to Katō Kanji, 30 March 1918; Katō Tomosaburō to Katō Kanji, 5 April 1918; Nihon kaigunshi, 2:371–91.
71. Nagai Kansei, November 1997.
72. Harada-Saionji, 1:33.
73. Katō Kanji taishō den, 746–19, 752–59; Katō Kanji to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 24 November 1921 (No. 40), JDA; Itō Kinjirō, 191–92, 197; Katō Kanji, “Rondon kaigun jōyaku hiroku” [Secret Record of the London Naval Treaty], JDA.
74. Katō Kanji to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 16, 24, 27 November; 4 December 1921 (Nos. 52, 53, strictly confidential), JDA. In his recent biography of Kaōo Kanji, Ian Gow fails to use Katō Kanji’s crucial telegrams to the naval authorities in Tokyo. Instead, he relies exclusively on the stenographic record provided by his son, Katō Hirokazu, of the lecture Katō delivered at the Naval Staff College in “May or June 1922.” Such a postconference statement, presenting ex post facto rationalizations, is worse than useless. For that matter, Gow’s book does not use any Japanese archives, naval or otherwise, although he claims to have made “an extensive search of archival materials.”
75. Katō Kanji to navy vice minister and chief of NGS, 4 December 1921 (No. 52, strictly confidential), JDA.
76. Katō Kanji to navy vice minister and chief of NGS, 4 December 1921 (No. 53, strictly confidential), JDA.
77. According to the regular procedure for handling telegrams at the conference, Katō Kanji, as chief naval adviser, was to show Katō Tomosaburō without delay any telegrams that he might send to the naval authorities in Tokyo. Disregarding this procedure, Katō Kanji ordered the telegraphic officer to send his dispatch directly to Tokyo. Hori’s memo on the Washington Conference, NMSDC.
78. Navy minister to navy vice minister, 16 January 1922, JDA; TSM-S, 7.
79. Itō Masanori, Rengō kantai no saigo, 259; Arai, 64–65; Gensui Katō Tomosaburō den, 117–27; Yamanashi ihōroku, 78–79; Yamanashi, Rekishi to meishō, 160.
80. Arai, 67.
81. Asada, “Japanese Admirals,” 161.
82. Katō Kanji nikki, 53, 55.
83. NGB, Washinton kaigi, 1:318.
84. TSM-S, 3–8.
85. Ibid., 7.
86. FRUS, 1922, 75–78; Delegates to Uchida, received 8 December 1921 (Conference No. 143), JMFA; Yamanashi, Rekisho to meishō, 162.
87. General Board, No. 438, series 1088c, 26 October 1921, NA.
88. George H. Blakeslee’s memo, “The Existing Strategic Situation in the Pacific in Relation to Limitation of Armament,” file of Henry Cabot Lodge, Papers of the American Delegation, NA; Hughes, Beerits’s memo on Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 31–32. Mahan once wrote, “Guam held securely, with a navy superior to that of Japan, threatens every Japanese interest from Dalny and Korea to Nagasaki and Yokohama.” Quoted in Buckley, 90–91.
89. Delegates to Uchida, 12 January 1922; Uchida to delegates, 12 January 1922. JMFA Relevant documents appear in NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 239–79.
90. Quoted in Kashima, Nichi-Bei gaikōshi, 191–93.
91. Uchida to delegates, 14 January 1922 (Conference No. 321); Delegates to Uchida, received 12 January 1922 (Conference No. 393), JMFA; Navy Minister Katō to vice minister, 16 January 1922 (urgent and strictly confidential); Delegates to Uchida, sent 19 January 1922, JDA.
92. Vice minister to navy minister, 21 January 1922 (strictly confidential), JDA; Delegates to Uchida, 12 January 1922; Uchida to delegates, 12 January 1922; Uchida to Katō, 14 January 1922 (Conference No. 417), JMFA; Ichihashi, 90; Katō to Ide, 16 January 1922 (No. 305–6); Ide to Katō, 21 January 1922 (strictly confidential), JDA; Katō to Uchida, 27 January (No. 540), JMFA.
93. For the text of Article XIX, see NGB: Washinton kaigi: gunbi seigen, 278.
94. For a theoretical analysis of Katō Tomosaburō’s decision making, see Asada, “Washinton kaigi o meguru Nichi-Bei no seisaku kettei,” 74–81.
95. Quoted in Gensui Katō Tomosaburō den, 117; Itō Masanori, Rengō kantai no saigo, 259.
96. Mori, 50.
97. Katō Kanji nikki, 49–51.
98. TSM-S, 7.
99. A representative interpretation along this line is Tsunoda, “Nihon kaigun sandai,” 90–125. See also Kobayashi Tatsuo, “The London Naval Treaty, 1930,” in Morley, Japan’s Road to the Pacific War: Japan Erupts, 3–117.1 avail myself of this opportunity to revise my older interpretation that appeared in “Japanese Navy and the United States,” in Borg and Okamoto, 228.
100. Baer, 103.
101. Huntington, 398.
102. Levy, 3, 90; Mahan, “Preparedness for War, 1906,” in Naval Administration and Warfare, 193.
103. Kaufman, 15.
104. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 592, 670–71.
105. Joint Board, memo for CNO, 7 July 1923, J.B. No. 325, RG 80, NA.
106. Braisted, “On the United States Navy’s Operational Outlook in the Pacific.”
107. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922, 687.
108. Memorandum from Director of War Plans to Director of Naval Intelligence “Japanese War Plans,” February 17, 1923; (RG) 80; Office of the Chief of Operations, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, “Strategic Survey Pacific,” 10 May 1923, (RG) 80, CNO-PD File 198-26, NA.
| CHAPTER FIVE | REVOLT AGAINST THE WASHINGTON TREAT |
1. Ichikizaki Keiichi, memo on secret stories about Fleet Admiral Tōgō, Ichikizaki’s additional materials No. 5, JDA.
2. Takahashi, 74–75.
3. Inoue Shigeyoshi, 103–4.
4. Captain R. M. Colvin’s report, No. 22, 1 November 1922, enclosed in Ambassador Charles Eliot’s report, 9 November 1922, F 3795/25/3; Captain Marriott’s report on “Administration of the Imperial Japanese Navy,” enclosed in Eliot’s report, British Foreign Office Archives, PRO.
5. In 1915 Rear Admiral Satō Tetsutarō, then Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, had plotted for a similar plan and incurred the wrath of Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō, who immediately demoted him. Katō Kanji remembered this episode. Kato Kanji taishō den, 769–72; Commander Takagi Sōkichi’s record of his interview with Vice Admiral Takahashi Sankichi, “Circumstances Surrounding the Revision of the Naval General Staff Regulations,” January 1934, JDA; Takahashi, 74, 85; Harada-Saionji, 3:116.
6. Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai, 1:196, 164–66.
7. The document is quoted in full in Shimanuki, “Daiichiji sekai taisen igo no kokubō hōshin,” 65–74.
8. Katō Kanji taishō den, 767–72; Yamaji, 245–46.
9. Ōmae, 35, 37. For General Plan for Strategy, see Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai, 1:200–2.
10. Kurono, 126–37.
11. Ōmae, 35, 37.
12. William V. Pratt to Robert Dunn, 25 September 1921, Pratt Papers.
13. Telegram from Eliot to Foreign Office (No. 154, confidential), 12 June 1922, F43/23, British Foreign Office Archives, PRO.
14. Pratt to Rear Admiral Nomura, 25 August 1923; telegram from Eliot to Foreign Office 12 June 1922, No. 154, confidential, F 43/426/23, British Foreign Office Archives, PRO.
15. William Pratt, “Autobiography,” chap. 17.
16. Cotton Diary, 25 August 1923.
17. Quoted in Yoshida, Rengō kantai, 247.
18. Interview with Enomoto, July 1975.
19. Yamanashi ihōroku, 98–99.
20. Takagi, Jidenteki, 50; interview with Enomoto, August 1975; Koike, “Washinton kaigi zengo,” 36–37, 160.
21. U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 248.
22. TSM-S, 7.
23. Sir J. Tilley to Austen Chamberlain, received 13 April 1927, F 3611/3611/23, British Foreign Office Archives, PRO.
24. Gunbi Seigen Kenkyū Iinkai [Investigatory Committee on Naval Limitation], “A Study on a Second Arms Limitation Conference,” 18 February 1925, JDA.
25. Ibid.
26. Hori, “Explanation of ratios in auxiliary vessels,” n.d. (strictly confidential), Hori Papers, NMSDC; “A Study on a Second Arms Limitation Conference”; Koike, “Taishō kōki no kaigun,” 48–9; NGB, Junēvu kaigun gunbi seigen kaigi, 88.
27. Wheeler, Prelude, 80.
28. Nagai Sumitaka, “Kokubō hōshin to kaigun yōhei shisō,” May 1962, Part 13, 3318–27, 3335–38, JDA; “Kōjutsu oboegaki” [Memo for an Oral Presentation], 1930, prepared by Katō Kanji, JDA.
29. Katō Kanji taishō den, 746–60; Satō Tetsutarō, “Daini gunshuku ni kansuru shiken” [A Private View on the Second Naval Limitation Conference], 18 February 1925, Enomoto Papers.
30. Senshishitsu, Rengō kantai, 1:213–15; Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:148–51; Senshishitsu, Sensuikanshi, 27–33.
31. Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:148–49; Katō Kanji, “Kōjutsu oboegaki.”
32. NHK, 40–44; Miller, War Plan Orange, 79, 97–99, 115–21.
33. Katō Kanji, “Kōjutsu oboegaki”; Katō Kanji, “Gunshuki shoken”; Naval General Staff memo, “American Naval Armaments since the Washington Conference,” n.d. (1930?); Saitō Papers; Nagai, “Kokubō hōshin,” 13:3329–31, JDA; Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:150–51.
34. Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:150–52.
35. Miller, War Plan Orange, 115–26; Katō Kanji, “Kōjutsu oboegaki”; Katō Kanji, “Gunshuku shoken” [My Views on Naval Limitation]; Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:150–51.
36. Katō Kanji, “Gunshuku shoken”; Ōmae, 376.
37. Takagi, Shikan, 19; Nagai, “Kokubō hōshin,” 13:3328.
38. Katō Kanji taishō den, 846–57, 918–19; Takahashi, 32, 77; NHK, 130–34; “Katō Kanji hiroku” [The Secret Record of Katō Kanji Concerning the London Conference], JDA (hereafter cited as “Katō Kanji hiroku”); Katō Kanji to Makino Nobuaki, 29 January 1930, Makino Papers.
39. Braisted, “Evolution of the United States Navy’s Strategic Assessments,” 113; Braisted, “On the United States Navy’s Operational Outlook.”
40. NGS secret report quoted in NHK, 119–20; Katō Kanji, “Gunshuku shoken”; Kaigunshō Gunbi Seigen Iinkai [Navy Ministry Committee on Naval Limitation], Report C-l, 1928, JDA; Braisted, “On the United States Navy’s Operational Outlook”; NHK, 116–20.
41. Kido Kōichi kankei bunsho, 1:263–66.
42. Tanaka, “Shōwa 7-nen zengo,” 11.
43. Kobayashi Seizō oboegaki, 12; FRUS, 1927, 3–14.
44. Wheeler, “The United States Navy and the Japanese ‘Enemy,’” 65; Wheeler, Pratt, 260; Hagan, 272.
45. Ishii, Gaikō yoroku, 234.
46. Quoted in Nakamura Kikuo, 33–34.
47. Unno, Nihon gaikōshi, Vol. 16: Kaigun gunshuku kōshō is based only on Foreign Ministry archives. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 1:498–516; Wheeler, Prelude, 131–57.
48. Yamamoto Eisuke, Danshaku Ōsumi Mineo, 760.
49. Itō Masanori, “Kobayashi Seizō ron,” 1–3.
50. Satō Ichirō, Kaisōroku, 24–25.
51. Ibid., 25–26.
52. Ibid., 27.
53. Ibid., 28–30.
54. Instructions to the chief delegate to the Geneva Conference, cabinet decision, 15 April 1927, JMFA; navy minister’s instructions to chief naval adviser, 19 April 1927, JDA.
55. Saitō Shishaku Kinenkai, 3:78–79, 90–91; Takarabe to Saitō, 25 February, 17 March 1927; Saitō to Yamanashi, 2 March 1927, Saitō Papers; Aritake, 73; Yamanashi ihōroku, 118–19.
56. Takarabe to Saitō, 25 February, March 17, 1827; Saitō to Yamanashi, 2 March, 1927.
57. Katō Kanji to Saitō, 23 March 1927, Saitō Papers.
58. “Saitō’s Conversations upon His Return,” Saitō Papers; Aritake, 107–9; Saitō Shishaku Kinenkai, 3:78–79, 90–91; Satō Ichirō, 39.
59. Yamanashi ihōroku, 119; Kobayashi Seizō, “Report on the Geneva Conference on Naval Limitation,” submitted to the navy minister and chief of NGS (1927), 191–92 (hereafter cited as “Kobayashi report”), JDA; Epstein, “Naval Disarmament,” 219; Saitō Shishaku Kinenkai, 3:71–73.
60. For Kobayashi, see Itō Masanayi, “Kobayashi Seizōron.”
61. Danshaku Ōsumi Mireoden, 378, 493, 506, 760.
62. Trimble, 3.
63. Kobayashi to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 23 June and 18 July (Nos. 14, 39), JDA; Delegates to Foreign Minister Tanaka (concurrently prime minister), 24 July 1927 (No. 643, strictly confidential), JMFA; Kobayashi report, 101, 117–18, 134–35, 138, JDA; Satō Ichirō, 65.
64. Delegates to Foreign Minister (Prime Minister) Tanaka Giichi, 24, 25 June 1927 (Nos. 13/2 and 14/2, strictly confidential), JMFA.
65. Satō Ichirō, 43, 67.
66. Delegates to foreign minister, 25 June; 7, 16 July 1927 (Nos. 14, 28, 56), JMFA; Kobayashi report, 127, JDA.
67. Kobayashi to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 15 July 1927 (No. 36, confidential); Kobayashi report, 92–93, JDA.
68. Satō Ichirō, 79, 81.
69. Navy vice minister to Kobayashi, 6 July 1927 (No. 14, confidential); Kobayashi to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 18 July 1927 (Nos. 39, 41); Kobayashi report, 101–3, 115, 128–32, JDA; Itō Masanori, “Kobayashi Seizō ron,” 3. Kobayashi also felt that the middle figure between Japan’s demand of 70 percent and America’s claim to 60 percent would be acceptable.
70. Kobayashi to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 18 July 1927 (Nos. 39, 41, confidential); delegates to foreign minister, 25 June 1927; 7 July 1927 (No. 28); 18 July 1927 (No. 56); Kobayashi report, 101–3, 115, 128–32, JDA.
71. NGB: Junēve kaigun gunbi seigen kaigi, 186–87; navy vice minister to Kobayashi, 17 July 1927 (No. 21, confidential), 22 July 1927 (Nos. 21, 23, confidential), JDA (italics added).
72. Kobayashi Seizō oboegaki, 62; Terashima Ken den, 224.
73. Satō Ichirō, 88–90.
74. Ibid.
75. FRUS, 1927, 1:113–14, 130–34.
76. Delegates to foreign minister, 24 July 1927 (No. 64, strictly confidential), JMFA.
77. Navy vice minister to Kobayashi, 28 July 1927 (No. 27, confidential), JDA; Tanaka (prime minister) to the delegates, 27 July 1927, JMFA.
78. FRUS, 1927, 1:113–14; DBFP, Series IA, 3:686–87, 691–93.
79. Unno, 60.
80. Horikawa, 195.
81. Yamanashi to Saitō, 29 August 1927, Saitoō Papers.
82. Summary minutes of the Privy Council, 1 October 1930.
83. Interview with Enomoto, August 1975.
84. Navy Ministry, Gunbi Seigen Kenkyū Iinkai [Investigatory Committee on Naval Limitation], “Reports on Policy Regarding Naval Limitation,” prepared in August 1928, JDA (hereafter cited as “Reports”); Senshishitsu, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1:350–67.
85. Reports, Part B: 11–12.
86. Reports, Part B: 133–34, 169–71.
87. Reports, Part A (1): 1; Part B (1): 17.
88. Reports, Part B: 1–2, 4, 7, 12–13; Part C (1): 49–50, 132; Studies, Part B: 7.
89. Reports, Part A (1): 4–5; Part A (2): 39; Part B (1): 65–66, 99, 206–7.
90. Reports, Part A-2, 15–16, 36, 38; Part B-l, 7, 41–42.
91. “Katō Kanji hiroku.”
92. Operations Division of the NGS, memo on the power of 10,000-ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers, 1 December 1929; JDA.
93. Operations Division NGS, “The formidable power of the 10,000-ton, eight-inch-gun cruiser and the need to secure 70 percent strength vis-à-vis the U.S.,” 1 December 1929. A similar document is found in Saitō Papers.
94. Katō Kanji, “Gunshuku shoken”; Studies, Part A (1): 65–66.
| CHAPTER SIX | THE DENOUEMENT: THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE |
1. Itō Masanori, Dai kaigun, 365.
2. Cabinet decision on policy regarding naval limitation, 28 June 1929, JMFA; Katō Kanji, “Kōjutsu oboegaki” [Memo for oral presentation], Katō Kanji Papers.
3. Telegrams to naval attachés in Washington and London, 25 July 1929 (No. 95, secret), “Main Points for the Imperial Navy’s Study,” JDA.
4. Captain Koga Min’eichi Diary, 8 October 1929, Hori Papers, NMSDC; Tanaka, “Shōwa 7-nen zengo,” Part 1, 12.
5. Katō Kanji, “Rondon jōyaku hiroku” [Secret record of the London naval treaty], Katō Kanji Papers [hereafter cited as “Katō Kanji hiroku”].
6. Matsudaira to Shidehara, 30 August 1929 (No. 1, strictly confidential); Shidehara to Matsudaira, 16 September 1929 (No. 243, confidential), JMFA.
7. Memo of conversation between Stimson and Debuchi, 12 November 1929, in “1930-nen Rondon kaigun kaigi zenshi” [Preliminary to the 1930 London Naval Conference], JDA; Stimson’s memo of conversation with Debuchi, 12 November 1929, FRUS, 1929, 1:274–75.
8. FRUS, 1929, 1:307–13; Debuchi to Shidehara, 18 December 1929 (strictly confidential and urgent), JMFA.
9. Wakatsuki (London) to Shidehara, 14 January 1930 (No. 33), JMFA.
10. Matsudaira to Shidehara, 12 August 1929 (No. 309, strictly confidential), JMFA; Matsudaira to Shidehara, 11 December 1929, NGB, 1:325.
11. Shidehara to Matsudaira, 23 December 1929 (No. 329, strictly confidential and urgent), JMFA.
12. “Katō Kanji hiroku”; Katō Kanji to Makino, 29 January 1930, Makino Papers; Hori Teikichi’s memo on the conference and the supreme command question, 11 July 1946, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
13. Katō Kanji to Makino, 29 January 1930, Makino Papers; “Katō Kanji hiroku.”
14. Hata Shunroku nisshi, 4.
15. “Katō Kanji hiroku.”
16. Yamamoto Eisuke’s memo, May 1930, Makino Papers.
17. Katō Kanji to Makino, 29 January 1930, Makino Papers.
18. NGS, “Kafu kaigi go ni okeru Beikoku no gunbi” [U.S. Naval Armaments since the Washington Conference], 14 December 1929, presented by Katō Kanji to Saitō Makoto, Saitō Papers.
19. Ibid.
20. Ikeda, “Rondon kaigun jōyaku gunreibu shiryoō,” 105.
21. NGS, “Kafu kaigi go ni okeru Beikoku no senbi,” 1930.
22. Katō Kanji, “Kōjutsu oboegaki.”
23. Katō Kanji to Makino, 29 January 1930, Makino Papers; Katō Kanji, “Kōjutsu oboegaki.”
24. Katō Kanji taishō den, 890–92.
25. Ibid., 890.
26. Katō Kanji to Kaneko Kentarō, 13 December 1929 (strictly confidential), Papers of Kaneko Kentarō, DL; Ikeda, “Rondon kaigun jōyaku gunreibu shiryō,” 105.
27. Katō Kanji taishō den, 891–92; Morley, Japan Erupts, 29.
28. Wakatsuki, 262–63, 334–35; Yamanashi ihōroku, 122; Harada-Saionji, 1:19.
29. Wakatsuki, 262–63.
30. Arima, 10:5–6, and interview with Enomoto, August 1975.
31. Cosmopolitan minded Admiral Saitō and Shidehara, regarding the naval conference as a diplomatic gathering, had advised Takarabe to take his wife with him.
32. Koga Mineichi Diary, 27 September 1929, Hori Papers, NMSDC; interview with Enomoto, August 1975.
33. Okada, Kaikoroku, 44.
34. Katō Kanji taishō den, 887.
35. Stimson to the American Embassy (Tokyo), 24 October 1929, 500/713; American Embassy (Tokyo) to Stimson, 9 November 1929, 500/713/844, Papers of Henry L. Stimson, Yale University Library (microfilm).
36. Stimson to the American Embassy (Tokyo), 24 October 1929, 500/713; U.S. Embassy (Tokyo) to Stimson, 1929, 500/713/844, Stimson Papers; Stimson, On Active Service, 166.
37. Ferrell, 87–88; O’Connor, 63; Stimson, 166.
38. Kaufman, 124.
39. Stimson to Hoover, 17 February 1930, Stimson Papers.
40. Yamanashi ihōroku, 129; Wakatsuki, 365.
41. Other moderate leaders included Admiral Taniguchi Naomi (Commander, Kure Naval District), Vice Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō (soon to succeed Taniguchi), and Vice Admiral Kobayashi Seizō (head of the Naval Construction Department). They held that there was nothing absolute about the 70 percent ratio and that Japan’s position at the conference must not be governed by narrow considerations of ratios and tonnages alone. Makino nikki, 396; Ko-Matsudaira Tsuiokukai, 530–32.
42. Hori, “Rondon kaigi to tōsuiken mondai” [The London Conference and the Question of the Right of Supreme Command], Hori Papers, NMSDC.
43. Itō Takashi, Shōwa shoki keijishi kenkyū, 141; Harada-Saionji, 1:62; Arima, 5, 6, JDA.
44. Yamanashi, Rekishi to meishō, 172; Nakamura Kikuo, 34; Harada-Saionji, 1:19.
45. FRUS, 1930, 1:24.
46. Matsudaira to Shidehara, 22 March 1930 (specially ciphered), JMFA; Sakonji’s statement in Arima, “Takarabe denki shiryō,” 10:5, 10–78; FRUS, 1930, 1:24.
47. Sakonji, “The Report on the 1930 London Naval Conference” (hereafter cited as “Sakonji report”), JDA. This revealing report was a day-to-day record of the Japanese naval delegation, which was drafted by Enomoto and approved by Yamamoto Isoroku. Although the report was considerably toned down by Vice Admiral Sakonji Seizō, it was never formally submitted to the higher naval authorities in Tokyo for fear of aggravating “domestic political unrest and complications within the navy.” This alluded to the controversy over the right of supreme command.
48. Sakonji report, 1, 22, 41–42, 53; Matsudaira to Foreign Minister Shidehara, 20 February 1930 (strictly confidential and specially ciphered, with a note “Destroy upon reading”), JMFA; Takarabe Diary, 25 January 1930, Takarabo Papers, DL.
49. Matsudaira to Shidehara, 20 February 1930; Shidehara to Matsudaira, 21 February 1930, JMFA.
50. Matsudaira to Shidehara, 22 March 1930 (specially ciphered), JMFA; 4 March; Koga Diary, 6, 15 March 1930, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
51. Wakatsuki to Shidehara, 18 February 1930 (No. 149), JMFA.
52. Matsudaira and Wakatsuki to Shidehara and Hamaguchi, 20 February 1930 (strictly confidential, destroy upon reading), JMFA.
53. Shidehara to Matsudaira, 21 February 1930 (confidential, to be handled by the chief of the mission), JMFA (italics added).
54. Abo to Katō Kanji, 6 March 1930; Katō Kanji nikki, 609.
55. “Kaigi taisaku shiken” [My Private View of Conference Strategy], 10 March 1939, Hori Papers, NMSDC; Arima, 10:5–7; Andō, 2:267; NGB.
56. NGB: 1930-nen Rondon kaigun kaigi, 2:88; FRUS, 1930, 56; NGB: 1930-nen Rondon kaigun kaigi, 1:414.
57. NGB: Rondon kaigun kaigi keika gaiyō, 277. The record of the Reed-Matsudaira talk appears on 277–56.
58. Hori to Sakonji, 10 March 1930, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
59. For the American side, see O’Connor, 77–81.
60. For the Reed-Matsudaira compromise, see Table 2 and TSM, 1.
61. Wakatsuki, 352–53.
62. Ibid., 355–56.
63. TSM, 1:64, 71; Sakonji report, 46–47, 63–65, 73, 78, 93; Captain Nakamura Kamesaburō, “Seikun ni itarishi jijō oyobi jigo no keika ni kansuru hōkoku” [Report on Circumstances Leading to the Request for the Final Instructions from the Government and the Developments That Followed], April 1930 (a day-to-day report of the activities of middle-echelon naval officers), entries of 13, 14, 15 March 1930, Hori Papers (hereafter cited as “Nakamura report”).
64. Takarabe Diary, 13, 14 March 1930, DL; Nakamura report, 13 March 1930; Wakatsuki, 356.
65. Satō Naotake, 245–50.
66. TSM-S, 9–10, 11–12.
67. TSM, 1:71–72.
68. Sakonji to navy vice minister and vice chief of NGS, 16 March 1930, TSM-S, 15.
69. Wakatsuki, 355–57.
70. Yamamoto to Hori, 17 March 1930, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
71. Captain Nakamura’s memo, “My Views on the London Naval Conference”; Sakonji report, 15, 16; Nakamura report, 16 March 1930, JDA; Nomura Minoru, Yamamoto, 179.
72. TSM-S, 15; Nakamura report, 13–16 March 1930; Yamamoto to Hori, 17 March 1930, NMSDC.
73. Sakonji report, 76, 93; Nakamura report, 15, 16 March 1930; TSM-S, 15, 17.
74. Abo to Katō Kanji, 15, 19 March 1930 (special, confidential, and personal telegram No. 3), JDA.
75. NGS, “Rondon kaigi kōshō keika gaiyō narabini Beikoku teian no naiyō kentō” [Summary of the Negotiations at the London Naval Conference and an Analysis of the Contents of the American Proposal] (strictly confidential), in Ikeda, “Rondon kaigun jōyaku”; Koga Mine’ichi, “Koga fukukan shuki” [Senior Aide Koga’s Notes], 24 March 1930, JDA; Katō Kanji, “Memo on Various Questions on the Request for Government Instructions,” Hori Papers, NMSDC; Nomura Minoru, “Tai-Bei-Ei sakusen keikaku,” 223–24.
76. NGS to Takarabe, 17 March; TSM-S, 16–17.
77. Okada, Kaikoroku, 44.
78. TSM, 1:79.
79. Ibid., 80–82; TSM-S, 20, 22.
80. TSM-S, 22–24; TSM, 1:80–81.
81. Okada, Kaikoroku, 40–44.
82. Ibid., 43.
83. Ibid., 47.
84. Harada-Saionji, 1:63.
85. Yamanashi to Takarabe, 22 March 1939; Yamanashi to Abo, 21 March 1930, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
86. TSM, 1:74.
87. TSM-S, 27–28.
88. Hamaguchi nikki, 318, 444–45; Harada-Saionji, 1:32; “Heika no okotoba” [The Emperor’s Words], contained in Hori Papers, No. 30, NMSDC.
89. Harada-Saionji, 1:18.
90. Ibid., 1:32–33.
91. Kobayashi Seizō oboegaki, 55.
92. FRUS, 1930, 1:71; NGB: 1930 Rondon kaigun kaigi, 2:151.
93. Okada, Kaikoroku, 48–49.
94. Hamaguchi nikki, 445–46; Hatano Masaru, “Hamaguchike shozō,” 100–102.
95. Okada, Kaikoroku, 49–50, 174; Okada Keisuke, 81.
96. TSM-S, 36–37.
97. Ibid., 49; Takarabe Diary, 31 March 1930.
98. Nakamura report, 2 April 1930; Sakonji report, 114; Yamamoto’s oral presentation to Takarabe, 2, 9 April 1930, Hori Papers, NMSDC; Sorimachi, 301–2; Nakamura Takafusa, et al., 3:51.
99. Yamamoto’s oral presentation to Takarabe, 2, 9 April 1930, Hori Papers, NMSDC.
100. Katō Kanji nikki, 93 (entries of 30 March 1930).
101. Quoted in Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 260; Love, History of the United States Navy, 1:561.
102. NHK, 164.
103. Love, History of the United States Navy, 1:559–61; see also TSM, 1:95.
104. Crowley, 65.
105. Castle to acting secretary of state, 25 January, FRUS, 1930, 10; Symonds, 76–77, 126.
106. Cited in LaFeber, Clash, 58; NGB: 1930-nen Rondon kaigun kaigi, 2:87–88.
107. Stimson to Hoover, 17 February 1930, Stimson Papers.
108. Quoted in Wheeler, Pratt, 341.
109. Stimson, 168.
110. Wakatsuki, 358–59.
111. For the background, see Morley, Japan Erupts, 59–106.
112. Ibid., 84.
113. Sakai, 190; Harada-Saionji, 1:70.
114. Okada Keisuke, 161; Harada-Saionji, 1:113–14.
115. Suetsugu, “Shimatsusho” [Apologies] to Katō Kanji, 10 April 1930, JDA.
116. Takahashi, 82.
117. “Heika no non hito Kotoba” [His Majesty’s Word], Hori Papers, No. 30, NMSDC.
118. Suetsugu to Katō, 17 September 1930, Katō Kanji Papers; Harada-Saionji, 1:40.
119. Harada-Saionji, 3:147.