March

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All that the FBI knew about other presidents

March 1, 1973, 9:18 A.M.

Richard Nixon and John Dean

OVAL OFFICE

Patrick Gray’s confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee quickly developed into a curtain raiser for the Watergate Committee, which was due to convene in May. On February 28, even as the nominee for the FBI directorship sought to distance himself from the White House and its scandal, he was questioned about the investigative files that he’d sent to Dean. Gray tried to insist that the FBI under his aegis was “completely and absolutely nonpolitical,” but some on the committee were skeptical. In response, Gray offered to allow any senator the opportunity to see the Watergate files. On hearing that news, Nixon was incensed. In his view, the FBI was an arm of the Executive Branch and therefore of the president—not of the Congress. He made that point in a discussion with Dean the following day. As he did on a seemingly daily basis, he harkened back to his experience in 1948–49 in the Alger Hiss case, when the FBI flatly refused to cooperate with Congress. Nixon plotted with Dean to prove that all presidents had used surveillance and to break that news, he focused on Cartha “Deke” DeLoach, who had been a high-ranking FBI administrator until his retirement in 1970. DeLoach was then working for PepsiCo, under Nixon loyalist Don Kendall, the chief executive officer of the company.

…

DEAN: Good morning, Mr. President.

NIXON: Hi, how are you? Well, I was going to ask you about—got along—did you see Kleindienst yet?

DEAN: Yes, I talked with him yesterday and he is going to be very clear in any conversations with Ervin and Baker that first of all, he couldn’t begin to speak for the White House. That his own position would be that the White House has a very important principle to protect and that he would assume that basically White House staff would be unavailable and it would have to be a very exceptional set of circumstances before the president would—or he could even counsel the president, to consider—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: And he’s going to leave it hanging way out there. For any early conversations which I think will put them on notice that no one is going to be marching right up.

NIXON: Do you think he’s [unclear] proper shape?

DEAN: I think he is. He also—I don’t know if you’ve noted what Gray’s position was up there yesterday or not?

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Giving the little store away. Dick—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: I don’t know. I was very surprised by that.

NIXON: Well, what, you mean like saying—

DEAN: Saying that the FBI records, as far as he was concerned, were available to any senator in the United States Senate.

NIXON: For Christ’s sake! He must be out of his mind.

DEAN: Well, that was my reaction. He also said that if they’re not satisfied with any material that they’re provided, he’ll provide agents to come down and brief these people. So Dick Kleindienst last night—

NIXON: Oh, we’ve got to get to Gray because—

DEAN: He called Gray last night.

NIXON: Why doesn’t Kleindienst tell Gray about the Hiss case, for Christ’s sakes? That’s the standard thing. The FBI—good God! You’ll—the Congress will ruin him. The Congress’ll ruin him.

DEAN: I think Dick ought to be aware of the Hiss case in some detail as to the position that the government took on this.

NIXON: Well, this isn’t detail. It’s as simple as hell. The government—and Hoover always felt this—the government never—it wouldn’t allow Hoover even to talk to me. That was the Truman position—the truth. No agent of the committee, no counsel of the committee—strictly was not allowed to have any contact with the FBI. They gave no information. They were going to provide leads. They didn’t cooperate with—in fact, they were working with Truman, to try to kill the case.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: That’s the way it worked. Now goddamn it, that’s the line he’s got to realize. This is—what was his point, too, about [unclear]? The Republicans, it was rather—it was suggested—he, with reluctance, acceded to a White House request to see the FBI files on Watergate. What the hell’s he say? That he gives it to the congressmen for the White House?

DEAN: That’s kind of a curious position he’s put himself in yesterday.

NIXON: Yeah, but that’s what I would think that he would say of course. I did. They were conducting their own investigation.

DEAN: And that was exactly the time—

NIXON: Did he ever say that?

DEAN: He did. He ultimately came out with that. They were pursuing him on whether or not the White House had revealed the FBI reports to Segretti.

NIXON: Segretti.

DEAN: That did not happen, I can assure you—

NIXON: Oh, of course not.

DEAN: —without hesitation. It did not happen. No way.

NIXON: Have you told Ziegler what he’s to say today about it?

DEAN: I will—

NIXON: I take it Ziegler should say, very simply—he should say, “Why, of course the White House at the—was conducting its own investigation. The FBI cooperated—a lot of information.” Correct?

DEAN: That’s correct.

NIXON: But Jesus Christ, if he gets down there and says that any congressman—

DEAN: Well.

NIXON: Any congressman he said?

DEAN: Well, he said any member of the Senate.

NIXON: Of the Senate?

DEAN: Of the Senate.

NIXON: Well, then he goes for the House. He’s out of his goddamn mind. The House will insist on the same rights.

DEAN: That’s exactly right.

NIXON: You’ll have Bella Abzug asking for FBI stuff. What’s he going to say? What in the hell is he going to say?

DEAN: He’s put himself in a defenseless position. There’s no doubt about it. Kleindienst is going to pull him up short on it, say that you didn’t clear this position with the attorney general—“This is not my position.” As far as I’m willing to go is to give these people a summary of the investigation and if they contest the summary, they can send their counsel down to look at the 302 reports, which are the—

NIXON: Why wasn’t he prepared, John, in advance for this? Like a guy over this—Kleindienst should have—like a guy over this—

DEAN: Well, sir—

NIXON: —talked it over with Gray. Jesus Christ! He can’t be so—is he a little dumb?

DEAN: Little bullheaded.

NIXON: Yeah, but—what’s he trying to—is he trying to pander to these people too much? Is that it?

DEAN: I think that’s it. I think he’s frightened and a little bit bullheaded on this. I think he knows now that he’s made a—that this was a bad slip on his part. And—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —he knows it this morning, and he’s—if he goes back up today he’s going to have to say, “I didn’t have authority to say that.”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Now that’s what I—

NIXON: That’s what I should have said, that I was really talking to the committee. Well, anyway.

DEAN: I—

NIXON: Believe me, the FBI cannot make its—the—ask Kleindienst if he is aware of the fact the FBI can’t even be available to a committee. It really can’t. In fact, this is stretching the son of a bitch far more than we should, to give FBI raw data to a committee of the Congress of the United States. It’s not been done.

DEAN: The only situation that I can recall where there’s been cooperation between the FBI and a committee was [Senator John] McClellan’s [D-AR] investigative committee [the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management]. The FBI—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: The FBI from time to time on organized crime has been of assistance but it’s not been overt—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: It’s been more covert assistance—

NIXON: Yeah, exactly.

DEAN: —to preserve the principle.

NIXON: But in the case of the Hiss case [unclear]. That was a major confrontation and the—Truman said hell, no. The Justice Department said hell, no. That was [Attorney General Thomas Campbell] Clark at that point. No, sir. And Hoover, who was a friend of ours, who was all for what the committee was doing, said no and there was no cooperation whatever. None. Absolutely none. And anyone else says to me are you in this country?

DEAN: That’s correct.

NIXON: [unclear] against a party. Now I think that’s a hell of a good column for somebody to write or something.

DEAN: I think that’s—

NIXON: Let me ask you to do this—write me a memorandum, and for my eyes only, with regard to everything you know about Johnson’s use of the FBI for espionage. And then go back—I was reading last night, you know, what Kennedy did on the FBI in this field as you may remember that as a really—

DEAN: No, I don’t.

NIXON: You remember when he busted—when [U.S. Steel chairman] Roger Blough tried to raise prices—

DEAN: That’s correct. I remember that.

NIXON: And Kennedy sent FBI agents and Bobby Kennedy did it at five o’clock in the morning.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Got newsmen out of bed, et cetera.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Has Ziegler anything—are they aware of that? I mean they talk about harassing newsmen. Have we ever done that? Have we ever had FBI agents go to a newsman to see what happened to their sources?

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Where’d they get that story from?

DEAN: The only thing that ever got distorted in that regard was the [White House request for an FBI investigation of journalist] Dan Schorr incident where he alleged that a full field investigation was put on him and the like.

NIXON: Oh, for Christ’s sake!

DEAN: It’s all explainable, too.

NIXON: Yeah, well, as a matter of fact that was only—our—of course, as you know, our [unclear] what was happening there. We were trying to get some very—from the FBI on a colder basis, a very—just some background on Schorr. And particularly to see what his connections were with Hanoi.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: It was again part of the—part of that part—don’t you see what I mean? The guys don’t know anything. They go on a full field investigation on the idea we’re going to hire him. That’s ridiculous. Even though we hadn’t said it—I mean, even though the boys said that was what we were doing. I guess that was their cover. But the idea that they didn’t go—they didn’t go back for Schorr, though.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Your FBI agents—

DEAN: Well, they—

NIXON: —in the Kennedy case, they got the—the eight—they got three reporters the hell out of bed and said we want to know where—what is the source of your—it is—you can get it in a little book called [John F.] Kennedy’s Thirteen [Great] Mistakes by Malcolm Smith Jr.—and the chapter on this—on this policy. It’s a fascinating little story. Don’t you forget it. But I want, you see, everything Johnson and everything else that you have to sit down some time and dictate what you were telling me the other day—

DEAN: I’ll do that.

NIXON: —in terms of what Johnson did. You know, and who—how the reverse of the coin thing and how that came in but how Johnson used it and so forth and so on. I just want to know what the hell we did. Now—and let me see what we can do with it.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I mean think now. I’ll let you know.

DEAN: All right.

NIXON: I think the—this FBI thing, though, it’s—we have not used it, frankly, at all. I mean that’s the damnedest—

DEAN: I spoke to Kleindienst yesterday.

NIXON: I hope Kleindienst is appalled. It’s just unbelievable.

DEAN: It’s true. It is, as opposed—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —to what past administrations have done and we have been so kind and so good as far as asking the FBI—in fact, in some instances I thought we should have asked them to do things that—

NIXON: I know, I know.

DEAN: —they are quite capable of doing. Kleindienst also mentioned to me on this ’68 bugging of the—

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

DEAN: That he’d had lunch with DeLoach yesterday—

NIXON: Who lied.

DEAN: —and DeLoach said that—said to Dick—he said that there was no bugging of the president’s plane per se, contrary to anything Hoover might have said. And I said, “Well, Dick, how do you read that?” And he said, “Well, one of two things.” One, DeLoach knows that he’d be in serious trouble for a potential felony himself if he confessed it. Or two, it didn’t happen.

NIXON: Bullshit.

DEAN: So that’s—and I said, “Well, how do you read it?” I said I would read it—the man would be—very doubtful if he would confess himself into a felony—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: So it’s going to be tough to prove. Because DeLoach is the one who probably knows unless we can find through some of the other sources—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —some of the agents who were involved.

NIXON: Well, you know the point. I think what you’ve got to do, John, is what I told Gray to do and he hasn’t done—is to get right down to the—you’ve got to get at the little boys who did it.

DEAN: That’s right. That’s exactly right.

NIXON: I told Gray—I said give them all lie detector tests. He hasn’t done that yet. But I said I want—well, you know who does the bugging. Now just go back and see who the hell’s done it and put them—and make them all take a lie detector test. That’ll shake that bureau right to its roots. That’s what I’d do.

DEAN: Well, I think that the timing on that of course would be the—

NIXON: Right after the hearings.

DEAN: Right after the hearings—right after he’s sworn in, just go in and start breaking things wide open.

NIXON: That’s right. That’s right. And I think it will shake loose.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Just sort of—just bring him in and say, “All right, Deke, we’re all taking one. How about you?”

DEAN: Well, Don Kendall could be persuasive in that.

NIXON: Don Kendall can say if he doesn’t take one, he gets canned.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Let’s find out. I’d like you to tell—you might give Deke—Kendall a call. “You better have a heart-to-heart talk with DeLoach.” That “we now have other evidence to corroborate it. We don’t want DeLoach to be in a position of having perjured himself because it’s going to be investigated.” Just get that word out.

DEAN: Mm-hmm. That’ll bring him up. Get him a little concerned.

NIXON: [unclear] You could say, “I just don’t like it when there’s now evidence that he lied to the attorney general.” Just put it that way, and “under those circumstances, that there’s—there was a case, and if a full field investigation is going to be made shortly”—and that we just want him, just for—because we know he’s a friend of DeLoach’s—tell DeLoach he’d better tell the truth or we’ll get a perjury rap on him. Fair enough?

DEAN: Mm-hmm. It’ll smoke him out if there’s something there.

NIXON: It may. It may or may not but at least let him worry.

DEAN: Let him worry.

NIXON: Let people worry a little, you know? That’s the thing, you know? Kendall’s a blustery kind of a guy. I’d say now—it would just, as if we want you to know as a friend. Don’t want to hurt anybody but that—tell him that the boys in the woodwork are talking. The little boys down in the woodwork. Not going to tell you who but it’s [unclear], but right after Gray is confirmed that there’s a very, very, very big story here. Newsweek with a couple of newspaper—oh, hot newspaper reporters on it and DeLoach had better be told he better not continue to lie—hurting himself about that bugging.

DEAN: And there is a hot newspaper reporter. Kevin Phillips is all over this and trying to get it out. I don’t know how—

NIXON: See, DeLoach told Mitchell that. Well, he was ordered to do it and then didn’t do it. That’s what his story to Mitchell was. But that he did do some tapping of telephones—maybe Agnew’s phone.

DEAN: Yeah, he’s already—he’s said—what he told Kleindienst yesterday again. He said that he did trace telephone calls made from Agnew’s airplane. We got the toll records of those—

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

DEAN: —and tracked those down as to where they were going.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: [unclear]

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: No doubt about it.

NIXON: That’s our problem, isn’t it?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Well, just say that there are people in the woodwork—

DEAN: Well, that’s—

NIXON: —calling, you know? He won’t know whether it’s normal bureau channels or not. That there’s—they’re hot on it. We just want to warn—just warn DeLoach that what he said to the attorney general was not true. That we have—that there’s—just say, I guess put it bluntly that what he said to the attorney general was not true and that he better get his story straight with the attorney general, or he’ll have some problems. Why not? What do you think?

DEAN: I think it’s an excellent idea to let the man worry a little bit.

NIXON: Good God, yes! And he’ll worry all those little pipsqueaks’ll start talking.

DEAN: Because he might also worry himself into telling us a few more things that would be helpful to us on the other side of the coin.

NIXON: That’s right. That’s right. Now Kendall is our friend. He’s not going to go lurking around. He’s going to say that, “Look here, this is only for your own information. This call’s never been made [unclear].”

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: But, “I think it’s important for you to know that this thing’s cracking around and he said that he—that if it was not done and he said that the investigation’s going forward—the newspapers, they’re hot on it. There’s some boys down in the woodwork that are cracking and that he’d [DeLoach] better get back.”

DEAN: I think it’s best to let DeLoach worry a little bit now. He’s friendly to Kleindienst. He and Kleindienst have become great friends.

NIXON: Oh, sure.

DEAN: I wouldn’t—

NIXON: —trust him.

DEAN: I wouldn’t trust him at all. I’ve always—

NIXON: I never have trusted DeLoach.

DEAN: No?

NIXON: He’s a politician.

DEAN: Absolutely. He’s out for DeLoach first. He was playing to whoever—

NIXON: He was playing to Johnson, for Christ’s sakes—for years.

DEAN: Whoever occupies this office and he thought—

NIXON: Yeah, he probably never thought I was going to win.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: He just played the wrong horse. [unclear] I know. He’s basically more a Democrat than a Republican, too, because he’s in the Legion. I have known him for years, not well, but I’ve never had any trust for him. No, the only man we could ever rely on in the FBI was Hoover. The only other guy that really may know was Tolson. What’s the matter with Tolson? He’s sick.

DEAN: That’s right. I understand he isn’t well and I’ve been trying to find out what link we might have to Tolson. Of course, Tolson’s brother is with the White House Historical Society. What his relationship with his brother is I don’t know, but I just—I’ve always—

NIXON: I have only—I could talk to him directly but I shouldn’t. I may sometime, but no, you never know about a Tolson, whether he’s bitter—this or that—he might go out yakking but—

DEAN: Well, at some point, a call on his general health—

NIXON: That’s easy.

DEAN: —might not hurt.

NIXON: Me?

DEAN: Yes. If it’s—you know, we could check that out first and say that, you know, the surgery—

NIXON: Yeah. Why don’t you get a check on him—how he’s feeling and so forth?

DEAN: Somebody’s got to be seeing him.

NIXON: Check also when his birthday is—that’d be another thing.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: Knew he’d been under the weather—wanted to wish him well. He’s a spunky old bastard.

DEAN: He just might come forward with something. You never know.

NIXON: He knows—you know, Hoover was so—in a—you know, that’s the only man Hoover could talk to. They’d go home at night. They always had dinner together. I’m sure Hoover told Tolson every goddamn thing he did because Hoover blabbed a lot. That’s where we got that Johnson thing, is that bureau—the way Bobby—the way we have Gray, Jesus Christ! He’s done a hell of a bad wicket thing.

DEAN: Tough wicket.

NIXON: Well, the bureau cannot survive, John. It cannot survive. Christ, if Truman was right. That’s right.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: You’re not turning it over to the committee, God almighty. Yet the bureau, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, makes its files available to the members of Congress. What the hell! Some of those congressmen are damn near under Communist discipline. That’s the reason Hoover would never do it.

DEAN: Some of them are from the Mafia. No doubt they’re backed by the Mafia.

NIXON: Jesus Christ! You could say “only under the strictest regulations of a committee hearing—must be a committee authorized by the Congress of the United States.” Individual congressmen, of course, cannot get information. I mean that is not allowed. It must be authorized by the House and Senate investigating committee for a legitimate legislative purpose and all that bullshit. And then under—and then we will furnish a summary and you know that sort of thing, but golly, all these raw files are the most unbelievably crappy things I ever saw.

DEAN: Oh, I know they are. The most spectacular thing is his even saying, “I will make agents who did the investigation, who were on top of this, available.” Now these people are full of impressions, innuendo—their own feelings about the case.

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

DEAN: Whether they were getting cooperation from a witness, whether they weren’t—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: There was a considerable amount of bitching, for example, that I sat in on everybody at the White House’s interview. Now, I thought that there’d be no other course.

NIXON: Why, of course. Counsel for them, aren’t you?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Well, if they want an outside counsel, Jesus, the White House better—they’re entitled to counsel.

DEAN: They said that the standard policy of the FBI was that no one was present when they interviewed somebody or they didn’t interview them. I said, well, if you want to interview these people, you’re going to do it while I’m sitting here, because I think I’m entitled to know, for my own purposes, whether they’re—

NIXON: You’re conducting your investigation for the president.

DEAN: That’s right. That’s right.

NIXON: Right?

DEAN: That’s correct.

NIXON: That’s the line that Gray should take. You’re conducting an investigation. You didn’t—well, anyway, it’s one of those things that’s going to go on and on and on and on. I think Gray has demonstrated in his first day’s hearing, he’s got a—well, you’ve got to admit it’s a weakness of him and the reason I was very hesitant about appointing him. There’s too much bravado there. He’s a big, strong navy guy, you know? “Everything’s great. Boy, let’s go. Yeah, yeah, yeah.” A guy that has that much outward self-confidence doesn’t have much inward self-confidence. That’s what I [unclear].

DEAN: Interesting observation.

NIXON: It’s like a poker player. You know—the guy that’s got the cards. A good poker player, you never know either way—he’s got the cards, or whether he doesn’t. Christ, you’ll never know—never know. But he doesn’t have them, he’s a little loud—a little loud. He said, “Well, you know, he talks too much,” but the good poker player, he’s got the cards.

DEAN: I think Gray’ll be all right once we get him through these hearings. We—

NIXON: Yeah, he is loyal.

DEAN: No doubt about that.

NIXON: He’s a decent man. He’ll try but we’re going to shake that goddamn FBI up just like Schlesinger’s shaking up the other [CIA]. Now the other thing, too, is this that we’ve got to remember, if—Gray does pander to the Senate too much. We may have to face the fact sometime that he’ll have to go. You know what I mean? I have no—

DEAN: Sure.

NIXON: I have no compunctions about that. After all, he’s frightened and all that but that would be—that would indicate that we were at least going to put him on—that the FBI was not being adequately managed. You see my point?

DEAN: That’s right. It would have to be that way. Otherwise, you’re jeopardizing one of the institutions of government that—but I don’t see that. I don’t see Gray—

NIXON: No.

DEAN: —being in that position, and I think that he wants to be confirmed very badly. He wants to appear—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —that he has nothing to hide about the Watergate.

NIXON: Right. That’s good, too. It’s good for him to not want to hide anything because I don’t want him to be in a position—

DEAN: He’s proud of his Watergate investigation. [laughs]

NIXON: Mm-hmm?

DEAN: I said he’s proud of his investigation, and despite the fact he caused us some kind of incredible grief.

NIXON: Yup. I only talked to Gray once since he was confirmed—I mean since we sent his name down there. I called him up on a hijacking case to congratulate the FBI. As I used to call Hoover on such things. Then he raised the point on Watergate with me. I didn’t want to have anything about it—well, the White House people were—this was right at the very beginning where—[unclear] recognize the seriousness of—

DEAN: I remember the sequence then. I remember Gray telling me that [unclear].

NIXON: I got ahold of Ehrlichman. I said, “What the hell is this all about?” Ehrlichman, though [unclear].

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: And I said, “Well, you talk to Gray.”

DEAN: And, well, what had happened is we had been leaning on Gray to stay on top of the investigation. And Pat was out making a lot of speeches and we kept telling him, “Pat, you ought to sit on top of this investigation and keep an eye on it.”

NIXON: Yup.

DEAN: But he was new in the chair over there and those were, you know, that was a strange office to him. We felt—

NIXON: Yeah, yeah. Interesting, interesting. Well, we should—nobody’s perfect. You know, Hoover was the guy, and even at the later times, I mean, sure, there was senility and everything—the little stuff. Say, he did talk too much. He wasn’t perfect. Damn it, but he ran a tight ship. Goddamn it! That’s the way and the FBI did not leak and it cannot leak. I mean, frankly, I admire that it didn’t leak on Johnson and Bobby Kennedy. They shouldn’t.

DEAN: That’s right. Well, when he said—you know, he said, “Jump,” everybody jumped. They might not have liked jumping but they sure did jump.

NIXON: Yes, that’s good. You can—

DEAN: I think Pat will—

NIXON: I just want to be sure that Gray was aware of—that those two things—that his testimony is cleared up—that that business about the—

DEAN: I’ll get them both straightened out today and I’ll get you a—

NIXON: Well, you—let’s see. You know, this stuff goes to the private staff. Go over to the bedroom and there’s a book in the—on that desk over there—a little book about so thick. You bring it over here to me and [unclear] find this in that book. I’ll get that section over to you. Read the Hiss case, the first chapter of Six Crises. I think you’ll find it very, very interesting.

DEAN: The attorney general just tried to call you. I have no idea what the subject—the subject’s unknown. I’ll get ahold of Dick and find out what it is.

NIXON: Oh, I’ve got it on the subject. Tell him I’m in a meeting—

DEAN: I will.

NIXON: —with Golda Meir at the moment and I’d have to step out. If he’d just give us an idea what the subject is, if it’s urgent, I can come out.

DEAN: Okay.

NIXON: Put it that way, otherwise I [unclear].

DEAN: All right.

NIXON: Just that, but tell him if it is—

DEAN: I would suspect it’s on the Segretti thing—if he’s pulled him up short and wants you to know it.

NIXON: All right. Just tell him that I will call him. But if it’s urgent, tell him I’ll have to step out of a meeting. But I will call him.

DEAN: Good.

NIXON: I will return the call.

DEAN: Good.

NIXON: That I’m in a meeting with Mrs. Meir—just say that.

DEAN: Shall be done.

NIXON: And then let me know.

 

Tense hours in Washington for Golda Meir

March 1, 1973, 10:05 A.M.

Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin

OVAL OFFICE

Golda Meir, Israel’s fourth prime minister, arrived in Washington late in February to solidify U.S. cooperation, especially in the supply of advanced warplanes. She spent February 28 meeting with administration cabinet members who were so uniformly discouraging that her ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, reported that she spoke of packing her bags and skipping her planned meeting with President Nixon the next day. Instead, she and Rabin prepared revised expectations for military and diplomatic aid, an outline that was sent to Kissinger. By the following morning, Rabin had made repeated calls to the White House, but Kissinger was not available. Finally, using the phone in the Oval Office, Kissinger let Rabin know that the outline was acceptable. “After twenty-four hours of undiluted tension,” Rabin wrote, “I saw Golda smile again.” The summit meeting went off as scheduled, with Kissinger’s invisible hand behind every stage.^*

…

RABIN: Hello?

KISSINGER: Mr. Ambassador.

RABIN: Yes.

KISSINGER: I am with the president, and I’ve dispatched the matter we dis—our conversations. If the prime minister raises the issue of the interim agreement, the president will then raise the other one and we can proceed in the sense that we discussed. On the planes, I think the prime minister should explain what your request is—

RABIN: Yeah.

KISSINGER: —and my impression is that the president will then be prepared to indicate on the production a figure of a hundred, and a sympathetic consideration of the others—of the other figures to be worked out by experts including F-4s and A-4s.

RABIN: All right, and [unclear] after that would work out how to deliver that.

KISSINGER: Right, and I have had a word with Joseph Sisco on that this morning so he is generally—so we can then put it into proper channels.

RABIN: Fine. All right then, see you later.

KISSINGER: Good. See you later.

RABIN: Fine.

 

Possibly the president’s best friend: Bebe Rebozo

March 2, 1973, 8:06 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Bebe Rebozo

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

On March 1 in Khartoum, Sudan, America’s newly arrived ambassador, Cleo Noel, and the chargé d’affaires, George C. Moore, were dining at the home of the Saudi ambassador with others from the diplomatic community. Gunmen burst in, kidnapping the two Americans along with eight others. The attackers were from a terrorist arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organization called Black September. Bebe Rebozo, one of Nixon’s closest friends, started a conversation on March 2 by joking with the president about the incident. Nixon found nothing amusing about it, however. Rebozo, a businessman from Florida, readily agreed to join the president the following evening at the White House for an evening of entertainment starring Sammy Davis Jr.

…

NIXON: Hello?

REBOZO: Mr. President.

NIXON: Bebe, where are you tonight?

REBOZO: Oh, I am at my sister’s house down the street. How are you feeling?

NIXON: Just fine. Just fine.

REBOZO: I hope you didn’t call to offer me that post at Khartoum.

NIXON: Oh, boy, isn’t that too bad. You heard then?

REBOZO: Horrible.

NIXON: Yeah, well—

REBOZO: That is unreal.

NIXON: Of course we couldn’t give in to the blackmail.

REBOZO: No way. No.

NIXON: So, I had indicated earlier that we wouldn’t.

REBOZO: That all you’d have to do. Just one thing—

NIXON: Well, if we gave in once then they’d kill a—they’d do it everywhere around the world.

REBOZO: Yeah, everybody would be doing it. That’s horrendous.

NIXON: Yeah, I was thinking if you’ve got time why don’t you come up tomorrow and come to the Sammy Davis party and then go to Camp David with me for a day?

REBOZO: Sure.

NIXON: Okay.

REBOZO: That would be great.

NIXON: Get on up here and then you could stay at the White House. There is plenty of room. And then I would go to Camp David about Sunday around noon.

REBOZO: Okay.

NIXON: Okay?

REBOZO: Okay.

NIXON: Fine.

REBOZO: What—is the party black tie?

NIXON: Yeah, bring your black tie. You know, otherwise they will think you look like a slob. You know?

REBOZO: [laughs] As an honored guest—black tie?

NIXON: Black tie, and don’t bring any mustard.

REBOZO: [laughs] Okay. How are you feeling? All right?

NIXON: Oh, fine. Fine.

REBOZO: You wouldn’t believe—I hate to even tell you this but you wouldn’t believe the weather we have had all week.

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

REBOZO: You wouldn’t believe it. It’s just been gorgeous.

NIXON: Well, that is the way it is. Yeah.

REBOZO: Okay, well—

NIXON: Well, actually you know the—since we are talking, a lot of good things have happened though. The way these POWs have handled themselves.

REBOZO: [unclear]

NIXON: We put it to those bastards and made them come through on that anyway.

REBOZO: You know, I had talked to Walter Annenberg yesterday, and he is just so proud. He is just so proud of that POW return and the way you handled that. He is just bursting at the seams.

NIXON: That’s good. That’s good.

REBOZO: He really is and properly so.

NIXON: Right.

REBOZO: Well, wonderful.

NIXON: Well, anyway, you can come up and have yourself a good time, you know. Okay.

REBOZO: All right, sir. Bye.

 

An early instance of Islamic extremist terrorism against the United States

March 2, 1973, 8:28 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

Hours after Nixon refused to accede to the ransom demands, Noel and Moore were executed by the gunmen. A Belgian diplomat received the same fate. The other hostages, representing Arab countries, were eventually freed.

…

KISSINGER: Mr. President?

NIXON: Yeah, Henry.

KISSINGER: Information is just very fragmentary. The major who—the Sudanese major who brought out the information now admits that he didn’t see any bodies and now he admits that he—now he claims that the Belgian was alive.

NIXON: But he thinks—he says the Americans are dead.

KISSINGER: Well, that is what he says. But now that—it is even possible, Mr. President, that nobody was killed.

NIXON: Really?

KISSINGER: Well, I wouldn’t want to hold that out, but I would have thought that if these Arabs wanted to establish their credibility then why would they kill the Americans, in order to—?

NIXON: That is what I wondered. Why would they kill us and not the Belgian?

KISSINGER: No, they would do it to increase their credibility—

NIXON: And want us to squeeze the others.

KISSINGER: —towards the remaining hostages.

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: To do that it would be better for them to exhibit a body.

NIXON: Yes, and also to keep them alive in order to keep squeezing us.

KISSINGER: Well, if they keep them alive people might think they might—would not kill anybody. I can imagine that they would kill somebody just to show that they can do—to show they are determined. But then it would be, one would think, in their interest to produce the body.

NIXON: In any event, I guess we have got to go ahead. We have already put our statement out and lowered the flags and all the rest and we just let that go, huh?

KISSINGER: I think we should let that go, but I am holding up on the cables a few hours, Mr. President.

NIXON: I see. Yeah, because the cables you mean to—

KISSINGER: To the families.

NIXON: Yes, yes. Yes, my God, we have already ordered the lowering of the flag. Is that a good idea?

KISSINGER: Well, we were given official information from the Sudanese government, Mr. President.

NIXON: Right. So we will go ahead and lower the flag and—

KISSINGER: We were told by the vice president of the Sudan—

…

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

KISSINGER: But this has happened, and he [the vice president of the Sudan] in turn—it now turns out that he was told by a major—

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: —who had been negotiating.

NIXON: Well, I just pray it isn’t true.

KISSINGER: Well, I think the probability is that—

NIXON: They’re dead.

KISSINGER: That they are dead, but there is this slight glimmer.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: And we will keep you informed, of course.

NIXON: Well, in any event, we are doing exactly the right thing in taking a hard line on it, Henry. We can’t give an inch on this.

KISSINGER: Absolutely not, Mr. President.

NIXON: We can’t do it. We can’t do it. Nobody can.

KISSINGER: There is no—you had—I mean first of all, there wasn’t anything—

NIXON: We could do. I know, there was nothing we could do to their ransom demands.

KISSINGER: You would have done—you wouldn’t have yielded anyway, but this wasn’t a case where you had any choice.

NIXON: Well, they didn’t say, “Give us a hundred thousand dollars,” they said, “Give us [the assassin of Robert Kennedy, Sirhan] Sirhan,” or whatever the hell his name was.

KISSINGER: Sirhan was just one of many requests that—

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: Specific requests just to get those terrorists out.

NIXON: That’s right, and we have no control over that.

KISSINGER: And we have absolutely no—

NIXON: Let’s be damn sure though that we get that—all that out in the crap that’s being written—said about this. Okay?

KISSINGER: Absolutely. Absolutely, Mr. President.

NIXON: Yep. Okay. Well, incidentally, give some thought to—and put your staff to work on this as to what we may have to do with regard to some sort of insurance policy, or something with regard to ambassadors in critical posts like this. What do you think?

KISSINGER: Well, let me look into this.

NIXON: See what I mean? I just wonder if you can just—we can just, frankly, expect these poor bastards to be over there and just—

KISSINGER: Yeah.

NIXON: Not that that pays for their lives. At least let’s show that we are caring about it. And that we are—and, of course, when a man goes there he’s got to know he takes the risk.

KISSINGER: Of course, the Sudan itself was a fairly quiet place. This is a bunch of Arabs—

NIXON: Yeah, but—

KISSINGER: If it had happened in Libya—

NIXON: That kind—that part of the world is always dangerous. Of course, on the other hand, it happened to the Israelis down in Southeast Asia.

KISSINGER: Yeah, in Bangkok, but they got out.

NIXON: I know, but it happened.

KISSINGER: Yeah. The Thais said that the Arabs had been in Thailand too long. They got soft.

NIXON: [laughs] Isn’t that something?

KISSINGER: I asked, “How long is that?” They said five days.

NIXON: Yeah, that is the Thai reaction as you might expect.

KISSINGER: Yeah.

NIXON: Well, anyway—

KISSINGER: I’ll keep you posted.

NIXON: If there’s a—you know, you follow up, and if there’s anything I need to know, let me know. If not, we just ride it through—

KISSINGER: Right.

NIXON: —and—but we are going to stand firm. We are not going to give an inch on this business of paying something for them. No way.

KISSINGER: No, we can’t.

NIXON: No way. Okay.

KISSINGER: Right.

 

A route home for American POWs

March 4, 1973, 11:22 A.M.

Richard Nixon and William Rogers

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

In Paris on March 1, Secretary of State Rogers oversaw the completion of a twelve-nation agreement on the return of prisoners of war, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War peace accords. The day before, Nixon had instructed Rogers to refrain from further negotiations on the agreement, unless the North Vietnamese provided the names of POWs who were to be returned, along with a release date. It was a hard line, but it worked, and the “satisfaction” Rogers expressed at the signing was underscored by the list of 106 Americans and one Thai soldier submitted hours before by the North Vietnamese. Within days the POWs were released, representing one contingent of the 591 who would come home between February and April that year.

The terrorist attack in Khartoum continued to trouble Nixon, who discussed it with Rogers, as they speculated on the punishment that would be meted out to the killers. They were far off the mark. After the attack, the gunmen turned themselves over to Sudanese authorities, who eventually sent them to the PLO for light prison sentences.^*

…

NIXON: Hello?

ROGERS: Hello, Mr. President.

NIXON: Well, you had a busy week.

ROGERS: Yes, we did. It worked out very well, though. I thought the way you handled that POW thing was excellent.

NIXON: Well, we—it got us in a position, too, Bill, where you see we stood firm, and the like, and your statement over there was the public way. Around here, you know, the—when we pulled the [May 1972] mining [of Haiphong] off, and the rest, the Defense people said they wanted to announce it, and I said, “No, sir.” I wouldn’t let them say a word. You know, but we just did it.

ROGERS: Sure. Everybody knew it.

NIXON: And everybody knew it, but—I know, but I meant if we had done it and said I am doing this or that, then it was a matter of face for them.

ROGERS: Exactly.

NIXON: It’s like the bombing thing.

ROGERS: Exactly.

NIXON: And I went over it all, with Henry and everybody else, and of course he was reflecting the Defense Department point of view, but he completely bought it. I said let’s let Bill make the statement over there and we’ll state it here, and that will be it. Tell me, Bill, while we are on the subject, how did the congressmen—did they handle themselves all right?

ROGERS: Oh, great.

NIXON: Do you think it will help a little on getting them supporting—well, the fellows over there do support us, don’t they, on the aid thing?

ROGERS: Yeah, but well, they are all [unclear]. [Congressman John] McFall [D-CA] of course is the [majority] whip over there [in the U.S. House of Representatives].

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: And oh, I thought it was a great thing.

NIXON: But it will help get them lined up for it later.

ROGERS: That’s right.

NIXON: I’d address myself to it again, in my little press conf—I didn’t have a night thing, but I did a press conference Thursday and I hit it again.

ROGERS: Yeah.

NIXON: I think we can sell it in the end.

ROGERS: Bill Timmons was there, and he was very favorably [unclear] to the thing. I think we can sell it too. My, you know, I have never had any doubt about it.

NIXON: Really?

ROGERS: No, I have never had any doubt about it.

NIXON: Great. Incidentally we had Sammy Davis here last night, and he was just great.

ROGERS: Was he?

NIXON: Absolutely great.

ROGERS: I am sorry I missed it.

NIXON: And he spent the night.

ROGERS: Oh, did he?

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah. Oh, incidentally, I didn’t know it, because I thought with the Kennedys and the Rat Packers—this is the first time he had ever performed at the White House, and the first time an American black has ever stayed overnight at the White House.

ROGERS: Is that a fact?

NIXON: So it is sort of like Booker T. Washington, you know.

ROGERS: Isn’t that great?

NIXON: I didn’t announce it, of course. I didn’t say it. I said, “Sammy, I think you,” I said, “if you”—he said, “yes, I know.” I said, “I don’t want to exploit it.” He said, “I know.” [laughs]

ROGERS: That is very good.

NIXON: But isn’t that nice, though?

ROGERS: He is a pretty clever fellow, isn’t he?

NIXON: Oh, God, what a performer! He was great. We did it mainly for congressmen. Last night, we had, God, we had about a hundred of them—senators, too. You know, all sorts. I wanted to ask you about one thing. As you know, I am—we are all just—everybody’s terribly disturbed about this—what has happened in the Sudan.

ROGERS: Yeah.

NIXON: And, just symbolically, I lowered the White House flag, too, because obviously he is an ambassador from the president as well as the State Department, and so I got it. But anyway, I was wondering what do we provide for the way of compensation in cases of this sort? I mean, is there anything that we do? We are now in a situation where ambassadors, and people around in that part of the world particularly, are in a very hazardous position. You—

ROGERS: I don’t know the answer to that. I will find out. I don’t—I think of course we have some provision, but I don’t think we can get anything special for this kind of—

NIXON: Well, it would seem to me, that for families and so forth, of course that they—it’s more than the usual—you know, death on the job, and so forth. But when somebody—here’s the point: we have got to tell all our ambassadors, and I don’t know quite how to do it, maybe you’ll do it or something, I was even thinking that maybe I would sit down with you and the top people in the department and we just talk about it. I think all of them have got to be informed that, in the Foreign Service, that the policy of the United States has to be one of not paying ransom.

ROGERS: Yeah.

NIXON: Mainly because if we ever change that policy we will have a rash of it all over the world. It’s bad enough, but on the other hand that nobody has to go. You know what I mean? It is a risky business. That they are—

ROGERS: Well, Mr. President, I don’t know if you followed it, but I had a survey made among our Foreign Service people sometime back anticipating this kind of trouble, and they all decided themselves that we should not pay ransom.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: And we have announced that.

NIXON: Would there be anything worthwhile? You can just think about it. If I were maybe to come over to State maybe on Tuesday or something and just sit down with the group and just say, “Fellows, we just appreciate what you are doing,” and all that sort of thing.

ROGERS: I think it would be very good. Very good.

NIXON: And what I was thinking was saying, “I know this is it, and I appreciate the fact that this survey has shown it and we can’t begin this but we will want you to know that we will back you up,” et cetera. And you could get them together in a large group, or a small group. Would it be something to pay a tribute to the people who had died, and so forth?

ROGERS: It would be a tremendous idea, and I’ll be glad to set it up. Did you hear also that the wives have asked that their husbands be buried in Arlington [National] Cemetery? Now, they were both veterans.

NIXON: No problem.

ROGERS: And so were their wives. Interestingly enough, all four, both the two men, and the two women, were veterans.

NIXON: Of course they should be buried there. Of course.

ROGERS: So, what you could do—you could announce that at that day, I think.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: You could announce—

NIXON: Sure. Sure.

ROGERS: Well, I think—

NIXON: The plane is going to stay there to bring them back I understand.

ROGERS: Yes.

NIXON: [unclear] with the plane. I was going to send the presidential plane, but they said that one was already there so that would be overdoing it.

ROGERS: Yes. I think this is fine.

NIXON: But—

ROGERS: The other thing we were thinking about, you know, the Belgian was killed, too—

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: —and the assessment was made that we stop on the way back and deliver the Belgian—the body—

NIXON: Excellent.

ROGERS: —back to Belgium, to show the international character of this problem.

NIXON: Yeah. Now we don’t know about—they are still holding a couple, aren’t they? Or—

ROGERS: No, that’s all—they have given up now. The assassins have given up, and they are in the hands of the Sudanese government. And the others have been—the Arabs have been released.

NIXON: Now what are the Sudanese government going to do?

ROGERS: Well, that is the problem. I was hoping they would kill them.

NIXON: I wish they—I think they should kill them the minute they see them. That is what they should do.

ROGERS: That’s right.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: But, the Sudanese government handled themselves pretty well. You know, one thing that occurred to me, I have been thinking about it a lot, I think maybe one of the things to do on these things is to cut off all communication with the terrorists. One of the things—

NIXON: Do we communicate with them?

ROGERS: Well, every year, what I am saying is no—cut off the telephone service—cut off—don’t—if they drop any notes don’t pick them up—

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: Just let them sit there.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: They have a feeling that they can bargain with the world.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: And we all get worried about how—

NIXON: Yep.

ROGERS: —how can we bargain with them?

NIXON: You can’t bargain with them. Because, like—their suggestion to us was so silly—

ROGERS: That’s right.

NIXON: —that like—that’s what—you know—when [journalist] Tom Jarriel asked me the question what about [releasing] Sirhan Sirhan, I said, “Well, that is ridiculous.” I said, “Of course we can’t do that.” It’s not our business. I agree. Why don’t we do that?

ROGERS: Well, we—

NIXON: Why don’t we develop—why don’t you start developing within the department—you can say that we talked about it, and you are working on it—frankly, a plan to deal with these goddamn things, because we are going to have more. I—

ROGERS: We have—you asked me sometime back, and we have set up a very good task force including a lot of people—

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: —in the government that report regularly, and they have done a pretty good job.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: But these things happen in such unexpected ways in foreign countries—

NIXON: And you don’t know. I see. But you could have certain policies know—well, who would have thought we could go to the Saudi Arabian embassy?

ROGERS: And who would have thought that you would have a fedayeen go to the Saudi Arabian embassy and capture Arabs as well as Americans?

NIXON: And also of all the people to kill, why the Americans?

ROGERS: Well—

NIXON: They want us to squeeze the Jordanians?

ROGERS: That’s right, and they were trying also to get some of the fedayeen out of the Jordanian jails. Jordan has got a fedayeen that they were going to execute. Somebody, I think, that was going to try to assassinate the king and they delayed the execution, and one of the things these fellows wanted was the release of this prisoner. It is really unfortunate that Jordan hadn’t executed him. The thing to do it seems to me—just be tough.

NIXON: Well, that is right.

ROGERS: You can’t dilly-dally with these fellows.

NIXON: And of course there is nothing we can do about being tough on them, except to back up the governments that are tough on them and not back those that aren’t.

ROGERS: Sudan is pretty good about it.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: Pretty good about it.

NIXON: Yeah, well, listen, next it will be them if they don’t watch out.

ROGERS: That’s right.

NIXON: These people are nuts.

ROGERS: Well, Mr. President, I think that is a great idea, and I will—

NIXON: Well, I was thinking, frankly, the better day for me is Tuesday—rather, Monday. See, I am going to Camp David to do some writing this afternoon, and I could perhaps get back and do it Monday. That might be better, might it not?

ROGERS: It might be.

NIXON: Four o’clock?

ROGERS: It might be, depending on when the bodies get back.

NIXON: Should we wait till they get back? No.

ROGERS: Well, I don’t know, it might be better to do it before they get back.

NIXON: I think we should do it, yeah. I tell you what, you get the dope for me and give me a call. I will be leaving here in about fifteen minutes and give me a call as to where the—

ROGERS: All right.

NIXON: As to when they get back.

ROGERS: What I can do, I’ll—

NIXON: And then I could come back, or just tell Pete—[White House military aide] Jack Brennan up there, and I could arrange to come back, and come back a little earlier. I could be back around three or four o’clock. But what I had in mind was that, you see, I went over to the Defense Department on the POW thing, and I was trying to think of something to do at State. Of course, God knows, we didn’t want this, but I thought I could just go over and talk to the people and say look, I know how you have worked and I know the this and that, and this points it up and we want to thank you and tell you that we back you up, et cetera.

ROGERS: What about, well, let me give some thought to it, and I’ll suggest several things and then you can make a choice. For example, we could have a meeting of the Foreign Service Association. We have a lot of them. You could have a talk. We could—what you could do is have a preliminary meeting with some of the top people and then talk to the whole Foreign Service group.

NIXON: Yeah, and then they—remember you could even get them in the—how many would that be in the hall there?

ROGERS: Well, yeah, you could get them in the hall, or you could get them in that eighth-floor room.

NIXON: Right.

ROGERS: You could get four or five hundred of them in there.

NIXON: Yeah. I think hitting four or five hundred is worth doing so that all of them have a feeling that we care.

ROGERS: I do, too.

NIXON: But then hit, so it doesn’t just feel like a gimmick we ought to meet with your people first.

ROGERS: That’s right. Or we could meet with [Ambassador] Armin Meyer’s group [tasked with studying international terrorism] and some of the top, they are the ones that have been working on this problem.

NIXON: Yeah.

ROGERS: They really have been doing a good job, seriously, and they have got the FBI and everybody else, and they have thought of everything in this country you can possibly think of, and they have set up special task forces. They really have done a damn good job, but this was so unexpected. And the one in Haiti [following the death of President François Duvalier in 1971], the same way. How the hell can you guard against that? You know you can—

NIXON: Now wait, we didn’t—what did we—

ROGERS: The Haiti one, I ran it—

NIXON: Was that an ambassador?

ROGERS: Yes.

NIXON: Did he get killed?

ROGERS: No, we got him out.

NIXON: Oh, yeah. Now the one before was a U.S., I mean an AID guy. Wasn’t that in Brazil or someplace? You remember?

ROGERS: Well, that was Guatemala, wasn’t it?

NIXON: No, remember about two years ago, I remember seeing the wife later. You remember?

ROGERS: Oh, yes. Yes. I went out to Ohio to the funeral.

NIXON: Ohio, yes. David [Eisenhower] went out for me. Remember?

ROGERS: That’s right. That’s right.

NIXON: Now who was that? Wasn’t that AID? Or it was Foreign Service?

ROGERS: No, that was AID.

NIXON: AID, but you know it’s the same thing.

ROGERS: That’s right.

NIXON: But what I mean is, that we—we naturally of course—we have now indicated total backing for our military POWs, which are basically—were hostages.

ROGERS: That’s right.

NIXON: I think it is a nice touch to indicate total backing for our others, you know. In a curious kind of way.

ROGERS: Very good. Well, I tell you, I will set it up, and I will give you some choices and you can—

NIXON: Yeah, well, you give me not only choices but a recommendation, too, of what you think. And in the meantime we will—I have some thoughts for some remarks, and that it might be that when I do the full group you’d even let the press cover it.

ROGERS: Oh, sure.

NIXON: You know—

ROGERS: No, I think we should.

NIXON: —so that they—and then I could make a few—what I would do, Bill, is to use it as a basis for saying some good things about the Foreign Service generally. See?

ROGERS: Right.

NIXON: Make about a fifteen-minute talk. That is what I had in mind.

ROGERS: You may have been thinking about how to do this—you know, you and I have talked about this before.

NIXON: And then I could do that, and then I could say I want to talk about the Foreign Service and so forth and so on. That we have been through a great historic year, and now we have got other business, and this, that, and the other thing, and you are going to play a very important part and we want you to da-da-da and then say that I want to talk about this tragedy. This wack—

ROGERS: Well, let me ask one other question. What do you think about it at a meal? A lunch? Would it be better not to, I guess, don’t you think?

NIXON: I have no objection. That might mean more.

 

“This currency thing is working out beautifully.”

March 4, 1973, 11:50 A.M.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

By no coincidence, Kissinger called Nixon immediately after the president finished talking to the secretary of state. Kissinger was effectively the nation’s top diplomat, a role he guarded carefully. He and Nixon went over the previous conversation, critiquing Rogers together in a more civil tone than they sometimes used for the ostracized secretary of state. They went on to discuss the revolution then under way in the field of currency valuation. Nine European nations, led by Great Britain, were looking for ways to control sharp fluctuations in currencies, precipitated by the devalued dollar in early 1973. The European nations decided to link their various currencies and let them “float,” or derive their pricing through daily trading rather than monthly fixing by governmental agencies. Japan and the United States were invited to further conferences related to the crisis.

…

NIXON: Hello?

KISSINGER: Mr. President.

NIXON: Hi, Henry. How was the Peking duck?

KISSINGER: Oh, it was very nice, and your telegram was really very well received.

NIXON: Good. Everybody had a good time?

KISSINGER: It is really amazing what a spirit of nostalgia this trip has created.

NIXON: Really? Yeah.

KISSINGER: Well, first of all, there is no other trip where if you said—got them together, say, Moscow or anything else, you wouldn’t get—everyone except three people came.

NIXON: Well, I will be darned.

KISSINGER: And they were out of the country.

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: And they really spoke of it with a warmth and an affection.

NIXON: Good, good, good.

KISSINGER: You—

NIXON: Did you make some remarks? Did you speak?

KISSINGER: I made some remarks. Yes.

NIXON: Good.

KISSINGER: About half—

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: —an account of things they had done there—

NIXON: Mm-hmm. Right.

KISSINGER: —and the other half seriously on what you were trying to do and what it meant for the country that you [unclear].

NIXON: That will trigger them to writing it again.

KISSINGER: That’s right. I said it was a moral act of expanding our frontier.

NIXON: Yeah, great.

KISSINGER: The frontiers [unclear].

NIXON: Incidentally, I had an idea that I was—I wanted to get in touch with you earlier about but I just called Bill Rogers about these—this plane over there, and told him that it was all right. They had sent a request that they could drop the Belgian on the way back, which I think is a very good idea. Apparently so it gets an international thing to this. Then I had this thought, and he is looking into it, and he thinks it is a good idea. I have been thinking that we ought to find a way to go over to the State Department sometime. You know, and sort of like we did the Defense Department, and I said that it might be a good idea. Maybe Tuesday, if I could just go over and you know express sympathy and our support of them and so forth.

KISSINGER: That would be nice.

NIXON: And so we will have that in mind. He is going to do some thinking about it and check with some of the others. I had in mind—he said they had made—he had made a survey of all the Foreign Service people, because the point I wanted to get across was that this was a volunteer service and anyone that doesn’t think they should take the risk should be—have no need to go. You see what I mean?

KISSINGER: Right.

NIXON: He said they had surveyed them all and that it was unanimous in saying that we should not pay ransom in the event that they were caught or something. You see what I mean?

KISSINGER: Right.

NIXON: So I think it is a good idea, don’t you? To sort of show—it would show a little—it is a good way to show support for—

KISSINGER: I think it is a nice gesture. It is a very nice gesture.

NIXON: How is the POW thing? Came off all right?

KISSINGER: It came off all right. The—I have seen some of the movie—

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: —some of the clips this morning, and again they made great statements coming off the plane, just like the other group, and they looked so good. I didn’t see the other group—

NIXON: Yeah, but they looked good and made good statements.

KISSINGER: Excellent statements, and tomorrow the VC prisoners are coming out. Today it was the Hanoi prisoners, about a hundred and eight of them, and tomorrow thirty-four.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: —a hundred and six, and tomorrow thirty-four VC prisoners.

NIXON: They are the ones that have the roughest time.

KISSINGER: Well, I think they may have learned their lesson and they may have put them up to Hanoi.

NIXON: Fed them up a little.

KISSINGER: Yeah. I think that is the reason they are releasing them up there.

NIXON: Ah, yeah.

KISSINGER: I am not sure but—

NIXON: Incidentally, Bill brought up the fact of the POW thing. He said that it was handled just right. [laughs]

KISSINGER: [laughs]

NIXON: No, really, you were exactly right. I didn’t remember that, but he said—because I was only hearing these other things. He said, you know, that was just right. I said, “Well, Bill, you know we did some private tough things but we didn’t say anything about it.”

KISSINGER: Yeah.

NIXON: And I said then that allowed us to be in the public posture of—so they could back off. And he said, “Oh, it was just right.” Of course he obviously got a hell of a lot of credit on it. [laughs]

KISSINGER: Well, you know, it gave him a chance to be out there every day.

NIXON: Good, yeah. But it did work out well.

KISSINGER: And now this currency thing is working out beautifully so now—

NIXON: Give me the dope on that.

KISSINGER: We haven’t heard from the Europeans yet, because they are probably in a state of shock, but the Japanese—Tanaka sent you a note of extraordinary, great gratitude—

NIXON: He did?

KISSINGER: He is sending a special emissary. He is on the plane either now, or within the next hour, to come over here.

NIXON: Good.

KISSINGER: And I think it shows the Europeans there is a limit—that we can’t be pushed.

NIXON: Well, also it shows that—let’s face it, Henry, if we and the Japanese got together, that wouldn’t be too pleasant for Europe. Would it?

KISSINGER: That is exactly right. That is what it shows them, and it is a way to restore—

NIXON: And incidentally it was a very subtle way to get at the British to—you know, to just to send a sig—we learned through Brandt that, you know, suppose we’d got a wire like that? How would we feel?

KISSINGER: Exactly. No, I think—

NIXON: Did you talk to Cromer?

KISSINGER: No, I sent him a copy. I think they should make the next move.

NIXON: Oh, yes, we should just sit here.

KISSINGER: I don’t think we should explain anything, and I think we should sit and let them come to us now.

NIXON: Right. Just sit. I agree. I agree. I agree, and I think we are right though not going, even though Arthur [Burns] feels so strongly about it, on the option of, well, we will, which really—basically is convertibility [of U.S. dollars into gold] again, which puts the responsibility too much on us where, by golly, I am not sure we can deliver anymore.

KISSINGER: If they come back to us, and then it appears as if they want it.

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: I can see some advantage in it, too, but the integration part—

NIXON: Yeah, I agree.

KISSINGER: But if we offered it yesterday it would have looked as if we were trying to break up their system—

NIXON: That’s right.

KISSINGER: —with a power play. They have now one of two choices: either they are going to go ahead anyway, in which case it gets us greater latitude at the summit—

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: —or they are going to come toward us, in which case we have asserted our leadership.

NIXON: Right, right.

KISSINGER: But I think they are going to come towards us. I do not think that Brandt will dare to operate alone, and I think the British, given what they need from us in the nuclear field, aren’t going to take us on.

NIXON: Well, the British naturally are trying desperately to get along with the Europeans. But there is a limit, that they have to know that they can’t do that without cutting the umbilical cord with us.

KISSINGER: I think it is absolutely essential for the Europeans to know that the party is over. That they cannot pretend on the one hand that the alliance is indivisible in defense, that we have no right to conduct bilateral diplomacy, but they have the right to conduct unilateral economic policy and bilateral diplomacy on their own—

NIXON: That is worded—very well put.

KISSINGER: Which is how Brandt has been doing it.

NIXON: I am going to Camp David and will be working there tomorrow till around four or five o’clock, but I am available any time. So don’t hesitate to call if anything comes up.

KISSINGER: Mr. President—

NIXON: You don’t anticipate anything tomorrow anyway.

KISSINGER: I will be, in the morning, at the British embassy. They are sending somebody over on that nuclear treaty.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: I thought we should have a common decision before Dobrynin comes back.

NIXON: Right, right.

KISSINGER: And also on this nuclear assistance.

NIXON: Right. Fine. Well, you can call me, but when you are there I’d have a heart-to-heart talk with Cromer. He is our friend and I would say, “Now look here, what the hell is going on here?” Don’t you think so?

KISSINGER: I will have it.

NIXON: I wouldn’t—not to debate—just say—I’d just say that we didn’t want to embarrass him, but we thought that it was rather curious that we got this from Brandt. Now we would think that we—

KISSINGER: [unclear]

NIXON: —not that we were trying to limit them, but that we think they should at least inform us maybe.

KISSINGER: And to say that a currency issue will be settled on a basis of European integration. That is one consideration but that is not our principal consideration.

NIXON: Right, right, right, right, right. One other thing I want to do on the schedule thing briefly. Apparently Haldeman tells me that the State Department is giving a big dinner this spring for all the diplomats, and he feels—Haldeman does—

KISSINGER: That’s right.

NIXON: —that we ought to put our diplomatic white tie thing off until the fall.

KISSINGER: Well, I just found out about that State Department dinner when I received an invitation.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: I think under those circumstances perhaps you should put it into the fall.

NIXON: No. No, there is nothing in it for us to double up.

KISSINGER: No.

NIXON: And you can inform—they can inform the dean—the diplomat—you know, that we are going to have it in the fall, and that’s that. It will be a good time to pick up a few crumbs. Okay.

KISSINGER: I ran into Mrs. [Nancy] Maginnes [Kissinger’s future second wife]. You were very nice.

NIXON: Oh, well, I was glad to talk to her. She is a very attractive and obviously intelligent girl.

KISSINGER: She is a great fan of yours. It meant a lot to her.

NIXON: Well, she’s—did she enjoy the dinner?

KISSINGER: Very much, but she’s been, of course, she frankly thinks most of the newsmen are too far left for her taste.

NIXON: Interesting what she said about professors, wasn’t it?

KISSINGER: I am sure she sat next to somebody she didn’t care to be with.

NIXON: [laughs] Okay. Good. All right.

KISSINGER: Bye.

 

A senator is shot

March 5, 1973, 4:44 P.M.

Richard Nixon and John Stennis

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

On the evening of January 30, Senator John Stennis (D-MS) drove home from the U.S. Capitol and parked in front of his Cleveland Park home. When he exited his car, he was mugged and then shot in the chest and the leg. By early March, his recovery had finally reached a stage where he—the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—could resume some activity. Privately, Nixon commented that while the shooters could receive sentences in the ten- to thirty-year range, the Watergate burglars could receive sentences as high as thirty-five to forty-five years, according to Washington Post reporting at the time.

…

NIXON: Hello?

STENNIS: Yes, sir, Mr. President.

NIXON: Well, you seem to sound better each time I call you.

STENNIS: Well, thank you, sir. I have turned the corner for more I think.

NIXON: Right.

STENNIS: Everything is coming along all right?

NIXON: Everything is in good shape now—I mean it’s coming along on schedule?

STENNIS: It a process as you warned me in the beginning, you know. I hadn’t been briefed on how long it might take. It takes time.

NIXON: Well, the main thing is that all those organs are patched up again and then you need a little time to rest a bit and then you will be back on the firing line.

STENNIS: Well, I am anxious to get back of course.

NIXON: Of course.

STENNIS: I hope things are going well with you.

NIXON: We are coming along. We are—things seem to be going about what we’d expect. We were glad to get that second group of POWs back on schedule.

STENNIS: Yes, sir. I am proud for you.

NIXON: We were very tough on them on that—they started to fiddle around, and we didn’t say this publicly but as you may have noted we just told them to quit clearing the mines, and quit withdrawing, and we sent up a private message that we were going to continue until they do it and they came through in twenty-four hours.

STENNIS: That’s what it took. I knew that was your pattern as soon as you sounded off the first note.

NIXON: That’s right.

STENNIS: I knew you would get results, too.

NIXON: The others—they certainly are great when they come back, aren’t they though? Their statements are—

STENNIS: Oh, yes. Yes, Lord, I read a full statement today. This young naval pilot, you know—just great.

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

STENNIS: I hope you get all that compiled and put together in the right way.

NIXON: Yes, we received a letter from Captain [Jeremiah] Denton who was the first one off, you know, on the first flight. I’m going to send you a copy of it. It was really so good.

STENNIS: All right. I’d appreciate it.

NIXON: So good. He sums up everything. Well—

STENNIS: I will be making myself felt a little on the Hill even before I get back out there.

NIXON: Good.

STENNIS: I know where you stand.

NIXON: Right.

STENNIS: Call when you need help.

NIXON: We’ll call on you when [unclear].

STENNIS: Thank you for your call.

 

Segretti, dirty tricks, and a widening field

March 8, 1973, 9:51 A.M.

Richard Nixon and John Dean

OVAL OFFICE

On March 7, Gray told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the FBI had interviewed Nixon’s personal lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach of Los Angeles, the previous year. Kalmbach had admitted that the president’s appointments secretary, a fellow Angeleno named Dwight Chapin, had asked him to pay a salary in Republican Party funds to a man named Donald Segretti. Chapin and Segretti had been classmates at USC. During 1971–72, Segretti worked for Nixon’s reelection campaign, perpetrating schemes that were described in press reports on March 8 as “political sabotage.” Nixon was aware that Gray’s testimony opened the Watergate scandal far beyond the break-in at the Democratic offices. In something of a panic, he and Dean discussed ways to contain it.

…

DEAN: The point is that Dwight Chapin never hired anybody to operate a sabotage—espionage situation. The fact is that he hired somebody to go out and look at the opponents’ advancing operations. If this guy saw a chance to be a Dick Tuck–type guy—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —and throw something into their schedule that would screw it up and that was the extent of it and Dwight didn’t have any involvement in the day-to-day dealings with this man. So we’re working on how to get back and narrow a story that’s way out of hand. I think we can handle that.

NIXON: How about Kleindienst—I mean—

DEAN: On Pat Gray?

NIXON: Is Gray doing anything?

DEAN: Pat is going to not honor the innuendo stories in the Post this morning. I talked to—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Pat has closed the store. There’s no doubt about that. He did turn around the hearings yesterday.

NIXON: Have you done anything about [unclear]?

DEAN: Yes, sir.

NIXON: The points that I made about [unclear].

DEAN: Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I did. I got questions in yesterday and hopefully we’ll get some more in today and if not, when he goes back on the second round we’ll have them in. The questions we got in yesterday are questions of course that are not reported—are the investigation by the bureau of the bugging instrument that turned up at the Democratic National Committee in one of their telephones.

NIXON: What did they find, a bug?

DEAN: Well—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Well, that’s what Gray made the point is that one—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Not a word. Not a word. That’s the way it is. That was in the hearings yesterday, but they just won’t pick that up. Now the set of questions I’ve developed are not the kind the press can ignore.

NIXON: Well, they can’t ignore—you’ve got the one on the bugging on the plane.

DEAN: That’s right. I—well, I have a whole series of questions that—

NIXON: But be sure that you get the one on the plane—

DEAN: Absolutely, absolutely. And Hruska is programmed to handle that. I was told—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —that Gurney was not—if it got too hot, Gurney might say, “Well, I got these from the White House,” whereas Hruska would never say that. So that is in the works, and it’ll come up today or when they go back and return.

 

On perception, leadership, and the press

March 11, 1973, 10:47 A.M.

Richard Nixon and John Ehrlichman

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

Nixon chose not to go to the annual Gridiron Club dinner in Washington on March 10, but nonetheless he wanted to talk about it with Ehrlichman, who did attend. The Gridiron Club, composed in those days of Washington journalists, most of them bureau chiefs, was famous then and now for hosting an evening of satire every spring. It was at the 1973 dinner that George McGovern, who had lost the previous election by a landslide, delivered the line that “ever since I was a young man, I wanted to run for president in the worst way . . . and I did.” In a quiet conversation, conspicuous for its lack of focus on Watergate, Nixon discussed his deeper feelings about the media and the electorate, intertwined as they were and were not. He tried to analyze how such a likable man as McGovern could have been so thoroughly disliked as a presidential candidate.

…

EHRLICHMAN: Say, I sat between two of our POWs last night at the Gridiron—

NIXON: Did you really?

EHRLICHMAN: —and they are magnificent. My God—

NIXON: Yeah, aren’t they really?

EHRLICHMAN: Oh, what they have—

NIXON: Of course, I have met two as you know, and it just really moves you to tears, doesn’t it?

…

EHRLICHMAN: He just went through the tortures of the damned. He was down in the South—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —and didn’t go through a regular prison camp.

NIXON: If he was with the VC that is the worst thing—worse than death.

EHRLICHMAN: Holds his chin high. My God, he is just magnificent. It’s amazing.

NIXON: How they do it, I don’t know.

EHRLICHMAN: Now, you just wonder how in the world, because he was in solitary for six years.

NIXON: I was up—I was very pleased on two scores. Bob told me that—first, that McGovern had the good sense to do well, because we want him to stay up there. You know?

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, sure.

NIXON: But the second point is that, even more that that “Stars”—that John Philip Sousa number—that must have been very moving, wasn’t it?

EHRLICHMAN: It really was. And quite something for their—

NIXON: Yeah, and these guys, the Gridiron going perhaps just a bit—you know, it is an interesting thing. I was thinking back to our talk with [Washington Star editor] Newby Noyes—

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: —just a bit back to how it used to be. You know, I know the Gridiron in the old days, in the Eisenhower days. I mean, you know they have that famous song that the Gridiron glows but it never burns, or something like that.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

NIXON: But in recent years it has been so vicious that it burns.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, yeah.

NIXON: And a lot of the old Gridirons are very sorry about that because it’s not fun anymore.

EHRLICHMAN: Matter of fact, two or three of them came up to me, and said, “I don’t think we were too hard on you this time.”

NIXON: Of course, I don’t care about being hard.

EHRLICHMAN: I know but they have it on their mind. You see, it is very interesting the mentality.

NIXON: Yeah, yeah, yep. Well, that’s good. I was glad to see, incidentally, that your thing got a good ride. It was the lead story in the Times, as you know.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: And the dagger in the heart. You know, the phrases, that’s what we get. That’s what we need, isn’t it?

EHRLICHMAN: Right, right. They carried them. The Post of course blanked us out.

NIXON: I understand, I understand. And I suppose that is where you wanted it heard because of the damn congressmen, but nevertheless you know how it is. Just keep—

EHRLICHMAN: CBS carried it well.

NIXON: CBS carried it well, and the others noted it, but to have the lead in the Times is not insignificant.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: An awful lot read it. But the Post blanked it out because it’s not to their interest.

EHRLICHMAN: That’s right, and that will be useful to us.

NIXON: That’s right, that sort of thing.

EHRLICHMAN: Two or three months from now—

NIXON: Keep using it.

EHRLICHMAN: —we can cite that. You know, the fact that here was the president taking a position on fifteen bills, and because the Post disagreed with it they wouldn’t print it.

NIXON: That’s right. Use it. Use it today.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I—

NIXON: If they ask—

EHRLICHMAN: I don’t want to give them a chance to repair it. I would like to let it set as a matter of fact.

NIXON: I see, I see.

EHRLICHMAN: So let’s let that ride for a little bit, and then we can use it against them.

NIXON: You know it is quite interesting when people wonder whether radio talks are a good forum, when you have something to say.

EHRLICHMAN: Sure.

NIXON: Did you notice how that—

EHRLICHMAN: I am looking at all three papers. I have them out in front of me, and it is just right up there.

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: It’s beautiful. I don’t know if you—did you see the Gallup Poll—

NIXON: No, I didn’t.

EHRLICHMAN: —in the Post today?

NIXON: No, no.

EHRLICHMAN: The most important issues facing—the problems facing the nation today: high cost of living is one, drugs is two, crime and lawlessness is three.

NIXON: Yeah. High cost of living, I noticed U.S. News had a piece on that about their disgruntlement about it, but curiously enough not blaming the federal government all that much but blaming the spending and all the rest—some way they seem to feel it. That’s the way it goes. Well, let’s keep—but on the crime thing, and if you could, whatever you can turn and get a little stuff in on that.

EHRLICHMAN: I think I can ride that today.

NIXON: The idea being that, on all of this, that we have compassion. We want—for example, we want to improve the prisons and correctional institutions, but as you will have noted I struck out about two or three hundred words going on and on about the [Jerome] Jaffe office [the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention].

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: We should do the Jaffe office, but we shouldn’t talk about it.

EHRLICHMAN: I get you.

NIXON: You know, people, people, people—

EHRLICHMAN: —passion in here—it’s got passion for the victims.

NIXON: That’s right. Incidentally, let me ask, if this isn’t keeping you from your program, let me ask you one other thing. With regard to Noyes, it was very good to talk to him, but the problem, I just wondered at the end—I mean we always of course [unclear] but—I wonder if rather than us being—I mean sure the [unclear] thing and all that he senses. But you know it was very interesting to note if you read through everything he really is saying is that what we call the New Majority that it is basically a bad group of people—

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: —and that we should not appeal to those bad instincts—

EHRLICHMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: —but appeal to the good instincts of the good people. Did I—am I wrong on that?

EHRLICHMAN: No, that is the message. That is the message: that they have base instincts and that the president as the leader of the nation must bring them to overcome their base instincts.

NIXON: Yeah, but the point is, too, as far as the instincts are concerned, then who has the good instincts? Basically the people who either supported McGovern, or who would have if he hadn’t have been so nice.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, I think that is right. I think that is exactly what he is saying.

NIXON: In other words the old Establishment.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Although—but he is an awful nice guy.

EHRLICHMAN: He is a sweet guy.

NIXON: He really is, and he wants to help—

EHRLICHMAN: [laughs]

NIXON: —and he is right too on the compassion thing. I don’t know how you get it across.

EHRLICHMAN: Well—

NIXON: We have tried and tried and—you know, I deliberately stuck a little needle in, which is true, if they ever interviewed the personal staff here at the White House. They hated Kennedy. Johnson, they like him because he gave them gifts but Kennedy just treated them like scum.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: He—one of the boys, we get this through other sources, he’d bring in a plate of food and he’d slam the whole plate down on the floor. You know, I mean there was a terrible arrogance, you know—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, Noyes undoubtedly is privy to that as fellows around this town get to be.

NIXON: Yeah, but you know when you talk about the blacks, the personal relationship is terribly important and that is something we don’t get across. I don’t know why. But—you know what I mean? Well, when I say we don’t you know why—hell, the point is the press doesn’t use it.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, that’s the—

NIXON: What you brought out with regard—I had forgotten, you know, John, it wasn’t just New Orleans, but I had at least eight meetings in the Oval Office.

EHRLICHMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: And I stood there, and I talked to them, and I worked with them.

EHRLICHMAN: Yep.

NIXON: Now—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, it was very interesting. Now last night [District of Columbia mayor-commissioner] Walter Washington and [National Urban League president] Vernon Jordan made a big show of coming over and talking with me behind the head table—

NIXON: Good.

EHRLICHMAN: —up there in front of the whole, you know, the whole press establishment—

NIXON: Good.

EHRLICHMAN: But I just, that isn’t given credence. And it was almost to the exclusion of Hubert Humphrey and the others that were up there.

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: That is a signal, but it is a signal they don’t like and they won’t pick up.

NIXON: Yeah. So, well—how do we get—? Well, good luck on your program.

EHRLICHMAN: Okay.

NIXON: But you see what I mean on the food thing. We have got—we are probably doing everything we can, but we are saying the wrong thing. So we have got to get Butz—that is one of the things—I have got to get Butz off this grin-and-bear-it line too with regard to the consumer.

EHRLICHMAN: He is right about the things he is saying factually, but he is—

NIXON: He’s totally right.

EHRLICHMAN: —but it comes through as sort of an avaricious, special-interest kind of an orientation.

NIXON: Well, it comes through as far as the consumer is concerned as grin and bear it and you can’t say that. You have got to say look, it’s too damn high.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Hamburger is too high, and we are doing something about it. That the president is kicking the ass around here. In other words, put me in the position of kicking the farmer a little. Don’t you agree?

EHRLICHMAN: Okay, I’ll do that.

NIXON: And kicking the bureaucracy. Okay.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

 

Phrasing the president’s role in Watergate

March 11, 1973, 2:33 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Pat Buchanan

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

Patrick Buchanan was the first advisor hired by Nixon in 1966, at the outset of his successful campaign to gain the White House. Raised in Washington, Buchanan studied journalism and worked as an editorial writer before entering the political world full-time. He offered Nixon a reliable voice of American conservatism, but at the same time Buchanan’s mindset was flexible enough to relate with sensitivity to the greater American electorate. He was one of the least antagonistic of the famously rigid corps surrounding Nixon; perhaps for that reason, he didn’t become involved with the blatantly unethical “dirty tricks” of Watergate. As a speechwriter and media advisor he did, however, try to counsel the president on the best way to explain the ongoing Watergate investigation to the American people. In early March, Nixon also prepared to announce his support for a federal death penalty, another topic that he discussed with Buchanan. The death penalty had been effectively struck down by the Supreme Court the year before, although individual states—along with the president—were actively seeking ways to address the court’s concerns and reinstate it.

…

NIXON: Hello?

BUCHANAN: Yes, sir.

NIXON: Well, how did you like the play that soft-line crime statement got?

BUCHANAN: Yeah, terrific line. Have you seen all the morning papers?

NIXON: Yeah, I saw the papers, yeah.

BUCHANAN: It led all the first editions. Mort [Lyndon Allin, editor of Nixon’s daily news summary] was telling me that some of the later ones apparently it is the killing of the Bermuda prime minister [Sir Richard Sharples] which might have taken the headlines in the later editions.

NIXON: Who did they kill, [prime minister of the Bahamas Lynden] Pindling?

BUCHANAN: No, not Pindling—it is Bermuda I think.

NIXON: Oh, Bermuda. Bermuda, yeah.

BUCHANAN: Yeah. No, it got terrific play.

NIXON: Not Nassau. Yeah.

BUCHANAN: Terrific play.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, we have got to get across this law enforcement thing and the only way we can do it is to break through with some strong statements on it. Some follow-up with some legislative proposals which I think will come next week with Kleindienst. In other words, we will get a second ride on it about Wednesday or Thursday I think when they have the message go up to the Congress.

BUCHANAN: Well, there is no question that we are on the right side of this thing both substantively and politically. [unclear]—

NIXON: One of the things about it of course is that you know during the campaign, there are many that said, “Don’t do this, we will lose the votes” and so forth. But the point is that after the—what really mobilized opinion if it had to be mobilized here, was the killing of that ambassador.

BUCHANAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Because as Rogers was saying to me Friday, he said you can’t on the one hand call for the death penalty for the people that killed our prime minister [ambassador] and this chargé [d’affaires]—

BUCHANAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: —and then say now let’s—let this fellow who killed Bobby Kennedy have life imprisonment. Right?

BUCHANAN: That’s right. That’s right.

NIXON: Well, this is the line that I think we can—we ought to continue to try to work into our statements and so forth, and for the fact that we will get some opposition to it will make the issue—

BUCHANAN: Did you see the New York Times though? They ran a parallel story to yours right on the front page—

NIXON: About the state legislatures.

BUCHANAN: Yeah, the death penalties and the demands that are being made by various governors and the like and how they are getting—the only thing that got a round of applause from some governor was when he mentioned the death penalty.

NIXON: Is that right?

BUCHANAN: Yeah. The only thing he said—I think it was one of those governors. The only thing in his entire speech was when he mentioned the death penalty. So, we are on the right side on this one.

NIXON: Well, some will say we are only appealing, Pat, to our own constituency. But on the other hand what is wrong with that?

BUCHANAN: Well, here is the thing. I think it’s, I mean, this is broader than just conservatives and Republicans. There are a hell of a lot of these lower-income Democrats who are one hundred percent in favor of it.

NIXON: Why sure. The people that live in the central cities—

BUCHANAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: —are petrified at these people running around, you know? And also I think sticking it to them on the soft-headed judges and the soft-headed probation officers. [laughs] That gets through, too, because they are really the main cause of the problem.

BUCHANAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: It is the way they—the judges, you know, on the death—on the handling—when they get these people in, these cop killers and the rest, they just sort of let them out after three or four years of good behavior and they go out and kill again.

BUCHANAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Right? We are going to try to get another press thing for Thursday.

BUCHANAN: Right.

NIXON: And so, we would like something by Tuesday night.

BUCHANAN: Tuesday night, right. I am working on something.

NIXON: You don’t have to make it too—

BUCHANAN: Yeah, the last one was too long.

NIXON: Well, it was because we delayed, you know. We had—

BUCHANAN: Yeah.

NIXON: But we have a pretty good idea what the questions will be, and we will just, with regard to the whole business on Watergate and the rest, I am going to take a very hard line on that. I am going to say that I have responded to that, and Ziegler has answered on the others, and I am not going to comment on hearings while they are still in process. You see what I mean?

BUCHANAN: Right.

NIXON: Along that line doesn’t matter, don’t you agree?

BUCHANAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Otherwise you get into the position—

BUCHANAN: You can’t get into all that [unclear]—

NIXON: Well, if I get into responding to what about this charge and what about that charge—well, that is being considered in the Senate committee and I am not going to comment about it while they are in [unclear] process—

BUCHANAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: —and then just let them—because it is basically a PR thing really. It’s the—what makes the news the minute I say something about it, it just escalates it.

BUCHANAN: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah.

NIXON: Right.

BUCHANAN: It would stick it right in the headlines if you said something about those—it is going to focus in on the “Did you know that Chapin hired Segretti?”

NIXON: Yeah. That’s right. Well, I am just going to say that I am not going to comment on that. It is a matter that is being considered by the committee. Let them look into it. Okay, wilco. Okay, Pat. Thank you.

BUCHANAN: Yes, sir.

 

“China is bigger than ending the war.”

March 12, 1973, 9:30 A.M.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger

OVAL OFFICE

As the Vietnam War trailed off into its tenuous peace, Kissinger was especially anxious to leave it behind and concentrate on the superpowers, mainland China and the USSR, as well as the rising economic power of the region, Japan. He discussed strategies to that end, including visits from Chinese officials and further trips to the Far East by the president. Nicholas Platt, a diplomat on the scene, recalled that many of his colleagues worried that Kissinger was leaving Southeast Asia behind too abruptly. One American diplomat recalled him getting on an elevator in Saigon at that time, muttering, “I’ve screwed so many people, I ought to open a whorehouse.” Coaxing the president through his plans on March 12, he confessed to the same expediency by terming his methods “a cynical approach.”^*

…

KISSINGER: My view is we have to make the Japanese inability to choose work for us. We should suck them into Siberia, we should suck them into Southeast Asia for the reason that the more they frighten others, the better it is for us vis-à-vis China.

NIXON: That’s right.

KISSINGER: Again, I wouldn’t say this publicly, but we must prevent the Japanese from tying up with any one other country. The great danger is that they’ll choose China, and that their resources and Chinese intelligence are going to do to us in Asia what the Common Market may do to us in Europe. That’s why it—one reason we have to lean a little bit towards China wherever we can. On the other hand, we should tie the Japanese to us where we can, but one good guarantee—that’s why I am not against having the Japanese active in North Vietnam. If they’re active in North Vietnam, the Chinese get worried. If they’re active in Siberia, the Chinese get worried. If they’re active in China, the Russians get worried. It is in our interests to have the Japanese ten percent overextended.

NIXON: That’s right.

KISSINGER: Then they’ll be—I know that’s a cynical approach but that way they are always a little bit off-balance. And since it is impossible to make conceptual deals with the Japanese. Now I think the deal we made with Mao and Zhou is going to last for three to five years. We don’t have to maneuver the Chinese through every little device because they understand that. I don’t know whether you’ve signed these letters [drafts to Mao and Zhou]—

NIXON: No. I want to put some writing on it. I’ll have them by tonight.

…

NIXON: China is bigger than ending the war. The Russian is bigger than ending the war. The war was going to end. It’s a question of how, and the war [unclear]. Now the China and Russia angle—even as big as those things were, we don’t look at those as ends in themselves, which many of the jackasses in the press think. They think it’s great we’ve gone to China, we’ve shaken hands, and everything is going to be hunky-dory. It’s not going to be hunky-dory; it’s going to be tough titties. So now, now that we have come this far, the real game is how do you build on these great initiatives.

…

KISSINGER: I think, incidentally, Mr. President, that after the Russians are here I ought to go for two days to Beijing to brief them.

NIXON: Oh, of course.

KISSINGER: And on that occasion—

NIXON: I understand—

KISSINGER: —tell Zhou Enlai he should come here, and that then you can come back.

NIXON: Where would he go? The UN?

KISSINGER: He can come for the UN and then he comes and visits his liaison mission here.

NIXON: Will we give a dinner?

KISSINGER: Oh, yeah. We’ll work—I’m sure that’s what’s going to happen.

NIXON: Yeah, I think you should tell him that.

 

“We have passed that point.”

March 13, 1973, 12:42 P.M.

Richard Nixon, John Dean, and Bob Haldeman

OVAL OFFICE

After releasing a policy statement regarding Watergate, Nixon used part of the day to prepare for a news conference scheduled for March 15. Watergate would inevitably be the dominant issue, and so in the course of a long talk with Dean, the president covered what he would say. Even more important, he practiced what he would not say in answer to questions from reporters. Nixon and Dean faced the fact that the scandal was broadening, even trading notes on the political and executive crimes that had been committed under Nixon’s aegis—trying to launder money arriving from Mexico, for example, or posting an operative in Chappaquiddick, Massachusetts, solely to gather information on Senator Ted Kennedy.

In addition, Dean informed the president that one of his staff members, Gordon Strachan, did indeed know about the break-in at the Democratic Party headquarters before it took place. That destroyed, once and for all, the argument that the White House was innocent of the break-in. So it was that when Dean made a weak suggestion that Nixon simply “let it all hang out” and tell everything he knew, the two of them quickly decided that it was too late. Instead, they looked for a substitute, pouncing on ways that they could sacrifice the FBI to those who wanted to clean out government.

Better yet, Nixon and Dean shared a daydream about utilizing former FBI official William Sullivan to embarrass Democrats, or even putting Sullivan in as head of the bureau. For years, Sullivan ran secret internal security and domestic intelligence campaigns for the FBI and had even been chosen as Hoover’s successor before falling out with him and abruptly retiring in October 1971. Nixon and Dean thought they might be able to leverage what Sullivan knew about Presidents Kennedy and Johnson against any future Watergate disclosures. They also hoped Sullivan could restore discipline at the FBI and end leaks to the press.

…

HALDEMAN: Say, did you raise the question with the president on Colson as a consultant?

DEAN: No, I didn’t.

HALDEMAN: Was that something you [unclear]?

DEAN: It was—the thought was—

NIXON: Hire him as a consultant?

DEAN: Well, it’s a consultant without doing any consulting.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He wanted it [unclear].

DEAN: He wants it for continued protection on—

HALDEMAN: Solely for the purposes of executive privilege protection. So that—

DEAN: One of those things that’s kept down in the personnel office, and nothing’s done on it.

NIXON: What happens to Chapin?

DEAN: Well, Chapin doesn’t have quite the same problems appearing that Colson will.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but—you have the same problems as Chapin appearing versus Colson.

DEAN: Well—

NIXON: I can’t—that would be such an obvious fraud to have both of them as consultants. That won’t work. I think he’s right. You’d have to leave Chapin—

HALDEMAN: Well, you can’t make Chapin a consultant. I—we’ve already said he’s not.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Because we wanted the separation. The question is if he—are you then going to let—as of now, the way they have interpreted executive privilege is that you are not going to let Chapin testify—

NIXON: Anyway.

HALDEMAN: —because it applies to executive privilege but—

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: —by the former people in relation to matters while they were here.

DEAN: And the problem area is that Chuck—

HALDEMAN: That same thing would apply to Colson.

DEAN: Well, yes. If Chuck were truly going to be doing nothing from this day on—

HALDEMAN: That’s right. He’s concerned about what he’s doing. Colson’s concerned about what he’s doing from now on, and he would apply the consulting thing to what—to if he were called regarding actions taken now—

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: —that relate to Watergate actions.

DEAN: Probably because he will be out stirring up, you know, counter-news attacks and things of this nature and—

NIXON: Jesus Christ! Is he supposed to do that and be consulting with the president on it?

DEAN: No, no. But he’s consulting—it’s a, you know, wide-open consultantship. It doesn’t mean he consults with you.

HALDEMAN: Your idea was just to put this in the drawer, in case you want it [unclear].

DEAN: Put it in the drawer, and then—

NIXON: Not decide it.

HALDEMAN: It would be a consultant without pay.

DEAN: I’d even tell Chuck that, well, just tell Chuck something—

HALDEMAN: Better not tell Chuck. Chuck’s [unclear].

DEAN: Is—there is something in the drawer. And just say we—

NIXON: There is no reason to tell Chuck, is there? Why—I would tell him that for—he’s not to say anything, frankly.

HALDEMAN: The point would be to date it back last Saturday, so it’s continuous.

DEAN: Continuous.

NIXON: That is, his consultant fee stopped, for the present time, but he’s still available for purposes of consulting on various problems and the like.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: Unpaid consultant?

DEAN: Yes. [laughs]

HALDEMAN: We have some of those.

NIXON: Good ones.

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Well, what are the latest developments Bob should get something on?

DEAN: Yeah. Uh—

NIXON: Before going into that, I was wondering on that front—that jackassery about some kid who was infiltrating peace groups, which of course is perfectly proper. Christ, I hope they were! I would hope—I would expect we were heavily infiltrated that way, too.

DEAN: The only problem there, Mr. President, is that—

NIXON: Did he get paid?

DEAN: He was paid—

NIXON: By check?

DEAN: He was paid by personal check of another person over there who, in turn, was taking it out of expense money. When the ultimate source of the money—as best, as quickly as we’ve been able to trace it—was pre–April 7 money. There could be some potential embarrassment for Ken Reitz along the way.

NIXON: Oh. Working for him.

DEAN: So he is. But I think it’s a confined situation. Obviously it’s something that’s going to come up with the Ervin hearings, but it’s not another new Liddy-Hunt operation.

NIXON: Well, it’s such a shitass thing to think.

DEAN: Oh, it is.

NIXON: For Christ’s sake!

DEAN: It is.

NIXON: I mean, what, what happened to the kid? Did he just decide to be a hero?

DEAN: That’s right. He apparently chatted about it around school, and the word got out. And he got confronted with it and he knew he’d chatted about it, and so there he was. It’s absurd. It really is. He didn’t do anything illegal.

NIXON: Of course not. Apparently you haven’t been able to do anything on my—

DEAN: But I have, sir—

NIXON: —project of taking the offensive—

DEAN: No, to the contrary.

NIXON: —based on Sullivan.

DEAN: No—

NIXON: Did you kick a few butts around?

DEAN: I have all of the information that we have finished—that we’ve collected. There is some there, and I’ve turned it over to Baroody. Baroody is having a speech drafted for Barry Goldwater. And there’s enough material there to make a rather sensational speech just by, “Why in the hell isn’t somebody looking into what happened to President Nixon when, during his campaign—look at these events. How do you explain these? Where are the answers to these questions?” There’s enough of a thread. I’ve—

NIXON: Double standard.

DEAN: Yeah, and I’ve pulled all the information—

NIXON: Also, the senator then should also present it to the Ervin Committee and demand that that be included.

DEAN: A letter—

NIXON: He is a senator.

DEAN: What I’m working on now—

NIXON: A senator—

DEAN: —is a letter to Senator Ervin saying, “This has come to my attention, and why shouldn’t this be a part of the inquiry?” And he can spring out of ’64 and then quickly to ’72. And we’ve got a pretty good speech, Baroody tells me, if we can get out our material.

NIXON: Good.

DEAN: So it’s in the mill.

HALDEMAN: Good. [unclear] friends have you got [unclear].

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Thank God.

HALDEMAN: Why has there never been [unclear] come up and did it before?

NIXON: Just wasn’t enough stuff. They couldn’t get anybody to pay any attention. For example, the investigations were supposed to have been taken for the thirty-four-million-odd contributed to McGovern in small—oh, Christ, there’s a lot of hanky-panky in there, and the records used on it are just too bad to find out anything.

[HALDEMAN leaves the conversation.]

DEAN: That’s one of the problems that he has—

NIXON: That’s the problem. And can that be an issue?

DEAN: That will be an issue. That we have—there is a crew working that, also.

NIXON: Do you need any IRS [unclear] stuff?

DEAN: Not at the—

[WAITER enters.]

WAITER: Would you care for some coffee?

DEAN: No, thank you. I’m fine.

[WAITER leaves.]

DEAN: There is no need at this hour for anything from IRS, and we have a couple of sources over there that I can go to. I don’t have to fool around with Johnnie Walters or anybody. We can get right in and get what we need.

NIXON: Talk to Elliot Gompers.

DEAN: I’ve been preparing the answers for the briefing book and I just raised this with Ron. It’s my estimation, for what it’s worth, that probably this week will draw more Watergate questions than any other week you’re likely to see, given the Gray hearings, the new revelations about—they’re not new, but they’re now substantiated—about Kalmbach and Chapin that have been in the press.

NIXON: To the effect of what? They—

DEAN: That Chapin directed Kalmbach to pay Segretti, the alleged saboteur, somewhere between thirty-five and forty thousand dollars. There is an awful lot of that out in the press now.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: There is also the question of Dean appearing—not appearing—Dean’s role. There were more stories in the Post this morning that are absolutely inaccurate about my turning information over to the reelection committee for some woman over there—Mrs. Hoback—signed an affidavit, gave it to Birch Bayh, said that I was brought into Mardian’s—Bob Mardian’s office within forty-eight hours after a private interview I had with the bureau, and confronted with it. How did they know that? Well, it came from internal sources over there, is how they knew it—

NIXON: From what?

DEAN: Internal sources. This girl had told others that she was doing this, and they just told—just quickly filled her to the top when she was out on her own.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: She did. Said we had two or three of those.

NIXON: Why did she do that? Was she mad?

DEAN: She’s a registered Democrat.

NIXON: Why did we take her in?

DEAN: I’ll—to this day, I do not understand what she was doing. And she was—

NIXON: Who was she working for?

DEAN: She worked in Stans’s operation.

NIXON: [unclear] that was a bright move.

DEAN: It wasn’t a good move. He had, in fact, that was one of our problems—was the little pocket of women that worked for Maury Stans. No doubt about it, that was—things would have sailed a lot smoother without that pack. Not that they had anything that was devastating.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, now with regard to the questions, and so forth, sure, it would be my opinion, though, not to dodge it just because there are going to be questions.

DEAN: Well, it’s going to be—you’re probably going to get more questions this week. And the tough questions. And some of them don’t have easy answers. For example, did Haldeman know that there was a Don Segretti out there? That question is likely.

NIXON: Did he? I don’t know.

DEAN: He had knowledge that there was somebody in the field doing prankster-type activities.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: So I don’t know that. [unclear]

DEAN: So at this—I mean that’s the other thing—

NIXON: Yes, but what about my taking—basically, just trying to have to fight this thing at one time. I can fight it later, but it’s not going to get any better. I don’t think that the way to get into this—did he know or not? I think the thing to say, “This is a matter being considered by a committee and I’m not going to comment upon it while it’s being—I don’t want to get into the business of taking each charge that comes up in the committee and commenting on it. It is being considered by—and it’s being investigated. I’m not going to comment on it.”

DEAN: Well, that’s exactly the way I drafted these. I have kept them general answers.

NIXON: And I’d just cut them off. No. If I start getting—I think, John, if I start breaking down—it’s like on the court thing. The Watergate stuff, I’m not going to comment on it. I know all of these questions. “I am not going to comment on that. That’s a matter for the committee to determine.” Then I’ll repeat the fact that I, as far as the Watergate matter is concerned, there was no knowledge there. I am not going to comment on anything else. Let the committee find out. What would you say? You don’t agree?

DEAN: Well, the bottom line on a draft that—before I came over for [laughs] lunch was, “Well, if you have nothing to hide, Mr. President, here at the White House, why aren’t you willing to spread on the record everything you know about it? Why doesn’t the Dean report be made public? Why doesn’t everyone come out? Why does Ziegler stand out there and bob and weave, and no comment?” That’s the bottom line.

NIXON: Well, all right. What do you say to that?

DEAN: Well—

NIXON: You—we are furnishing information. We will do something.

DEAN: I think we—well, of course, we have—

NIXON: We have cooperated.

DEAN: We have cooperated with the FBI in the investigation of the Watergate.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: We will cooperate with the investigation of—a proper investigation by the Senate.

NIXON: Right. We will make statements.

DEAN: And, indeed we have nothing to hide.

NIXON: We have furnished information. We have nothing to hide. So we have [unclear] have to handle it.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: What else can we do, really? I mean, we can’t—you see, I can’t be in the position of basically hunkering down because we got a lot of tough questions on Watergate, and not go out—

DEAN: True.

NIXON: —and talk on other issues because they’re going to be—they’re embarrassing. It’s not going to get better. It’s going to get worse. Do you agree?

DEAN: That’s—I would agree. I think it’s cyclic somewhat. I think after the Gray thing takes one course one way or the other, there’ll be a dead period of news on Watergate until the Ervin hearings start again.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: This has obviously sparked the news again.

NIXON: Well, let me just run over the questions again. Now, isn’t it best, “What about Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Segretti, and so forth?” “That’s a matter which is being considered by a Senate committee. I’m not going to comment on it.” That’s true, isn’t it?

DEAN: That’s correct. That’s specifically—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —spelled out in their resolution that they will—

NIXON: I am not going to comment on that one [unclear] being considered by a committee. [unclear] as I have already indicated. I am just not going to comment on it. You already indicated my views on the Watergate thing.

DEAN: Did Mr. Chapin’s departure have something to do with his involvement with Segretti?

NIXON: No. The answer’s no. And, “But what about Mr. Dean?” My position is the same. “We are going to be—we were—we’ve been cooperative. We cooperated with the Justice Department—with the FBI completely in trying to—in furnishing information that was relevant in this matter. We will cooperate with the committee under the rules that I have laid out in my statement on executive privilege.” Period. Now what else? Let’s see.

DEAN: Well, then, you’ll get a barrage of questions probably on, “Will you supply—will Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean go up to the committee and testify?”

NIXON: No. Absolutely not.

DEAN: “Mr. Colson?”

NIXON: No. No.

DEAN: I think that’s—

NIXON: No. Absolutely not. I—no. It isn’t a question of—the question is not under what—or somebody—or Ziegler—or somebody had said that we—in our executive privilege statement it was interpreted as being that we would not furnish information. Oh, well. We said we will furnish information, but we’re not going to publicly testify. That’s the position. But will Dean, and all the rest, will they furnish—you’ll furnish information, won’t you?

DEAN: Yes. Indeed I will.

NIXON: Yeah. Sure.

DEAN: Well, I think possibly by the time—

NIXON: See, that’s what I do. My feeling, John, is that I better hit it now, frankly, as tough as it is. And rather than just let it build up to where we’re afraid of these questions and everybody and so forth, and let Ziegler get out there and bob and weave around. I know the easier thing is just to bug out, but I’d rather hit it now.

DEAN: You’re right. I was afraid for the sake of debate, because I was having reservations. And—

NIXON: I think so.

DEAN: —it is a bullet biter and you’ve just got to do it. And because they’re not going to go away—the questions. Now the other thing that we talked about in the past, and I still have the same problem, is to have sort of a “Well, here it all is” approach. If we do that—

NIXON: And let it all hang out.

DEAN: And let it all hang out—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —let’s say with the Segretti situation.

NIXON: I guess if we were going to do that, we have passed that point.

DEAN: We have passed that point, plus the fact they’re not going to believe the truth. That’s the incredible thing.

NIXON: They won’t believe the truth. They don’t even believe when they convicted seven people.

DEAN: That’s right. They will continually try to say that there is [unclear].

NIXON: They’ll say, “Haldeman did it.” And then they’ll say I did it.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: I don’t think they’ll get to that point. They might question his political savvy, but not mine. Not on a matter like that.

DEAN: [laughs] No. Well, the thing on Sullivan, which I have. Sullivan, who as I told you, and—have been prompting him and I said, “Bill, I would like, for my own use, to have a list of some of the horribles that you’re aware of.” Well, he hasn’t responded back to me, but he sent me a note yesterday saying that “John, I am willing at any time to testify to what I know if you want me to.” What he has, as we already know, has got a certain degree of—it’s a dynamite situation what he’s got already: the ’68 bugging, the surveillance that Goldwater [unclear].

NIXON: It’s not—we [unclear] on the ’68 bugging, that it was ordered, but he doesn’t know whether it was carried out.

DEAN: That’s right. Uh—

NIXON: But at least he will say that.

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: Tell them, for example, I mean I—

DEAN: I would think—

NIXON: That kind of thing.

DEAN: Well, I’ve never talked to Bill about this so it must be—I’ve never really gone into detail, because he’s always been very up close about it. But he is now getting to the point if we wanted him to do this, someone—and I don’t think the White House should do it—should sit down with him and really take him over cross-examination of what he does know and how strong it is—what he can substantiate.

NIXON: John, who the hell could do it if you don’t?

DEAN: Well, that’s probably—there’s no one. That’s the—

NIXON: That’s the problem.

DEAN: That’s the problem. Now, the other thing is, if we were going to use a tactic like this—let’s say in the Gray hearings—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —where everything is cast that we’re the political people and they’re not, that Hoover was above reproach, which is just not accurate.

NIXON: Bullshit! Bullshit!

DEAN: Total bullshit. The person who could—would destroy Hoover’s image is going to be this man, Bill Sullivan. That’s what’s at stake there. Also, it’s going to tarnish quite severely—

NIXON: Some of the FBI.

DEAN: Some of the FBI. And a former president.

NIXON: Fine.

DEAN: He’s going to lay it out, and he—it’s just all hell is going to break loose once he does it. It’s going to change the atmosphere of the Gray hearings. It’s going to change the whole atmosphere of the Watergate hearings.

NIXON: Not much.

DEAN: Now the risk—

NIXON: How will it change, John?

DEAN: How will it change? Because it’ll put them in context that a government institute was used in the past for the most flagrant political purposes.

NIXON: How does that help us?

DEAN: How does it help us?

NIXON: I’m being—I’m just being—

DEAN: Yeah, I appreciate what you are doing.

NIXON: Red herring—is that what you mean?

DEAN: Yes. It’s a red herring. It’s what the public already believes. It’s just that people would just, I would say react that—“Oh, Christ! More of that stuff. They’re all, you know, they’re all bad down there.” Because it’s a one-way street right now—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Pardon?

NIXON: Do you think the press would use it? They may not play it.

DEAN: It’d be difficult not to. It’d be difficult not to.

NIXON: Why is it that Sullivan’d be willing to do this?

DEAN: I think the quid pro quo with Sullivan is that he wants someday back in the bureau very badly.

NIXON: That’s easy.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Do you think after he did this to the bureau that they’d want him back? “They,” if there is a “they.”

DEAN: Probably not. But I think that he could also possibly do—what Bill Sullivan’s desire in life is to set up a national, or domestic national security intelligence system—a plan, a program. He says we’re deficient. We’ve never been efficient since Hoover lost his guts several years ago. If you recall, he and Tom Huston worked on it. Tom Huston had your instruction to go out and do it. Then the whole thing just crumbled.

NIXON: Do you think Hoover would have cooperated?

DEAN: That’s all Sullivan really wants. Even if we just put him off studying it for a couple of years, we could put him out in the CIA or someplace else where he felt—

NIXON: Put him there. We’ll do it.

DEAN: I think that’s what the answer is. I’ve never really—

NIXON: No problem with Sullivan. We’ll put him—I mean, he’s a valuable man. Now, would the FBI then turn on him—piss on him?

DEAN: There would be some effort at that. That’s right, they would say he’s disgruntled. He was canned by Hoover. He is angry—he’s coming back. But that would kind of—I would think a lot of that would be lost in the shuffle of what he is laying out. I don’t know if he’s given me his best yet. I don’t know if he’s got more ammunition than what he has already told me. Those were just a couple off-the-cuff remarks.

NIXON: And that’s why you said that—why do you think he is now telling you this? Why is he doing this now?

DEAN: Well, the way it came out is, when I—when the Time magazine article broke on the fact that it charged that the White House had directed that newsmen and White House staff people be subject to some sort of surveillance for national security reasons, I called, in tracking down what had happened. I called Sullivan and I said, “Bill, you’d better come over and talk to me about that and tell me what you know.” I was calling him to really determine if he was a leak. That’s one of the reasons. I was curious to know where this might have come from because he was the operative man at the bureau at the time. He’s the one who did it. He would not—you know, he came over and he was shocked and distraught, and the like [unclear] his own [unclear] [laughs] frankly, and then—and after going through his explanation of all what had happened, he started volunteering this other thing. He said, “John, what—this is the only thing I can think of during this administration that has any taint of political use but it doesn’t really bother me because it was a national security purpose. These people worked—there was sensitive material that was getting out to reporters.”

NIXON: You mean what we ordered?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Of course, [unclear] the stuff was involved in the goddamn Vietnam War.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That’s what it was.

…

DEAN: But he said, “John, what does bother me is that you all have been portrayed as politically abusing—”

NIXON: And we never did.

DEAN: And we never have. He said the Eisenhower administration didn’t either. The only—

NIXON: Never.

DEAN: —times that he can recall that there has been a real political use has been during Democratic tenures. I said, “For example, Bill, what are you talking about?” Then he told me this example of the Walter Jenkins affair, when DeLoach—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —and Fortas, and [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] The Kennedys used it, let me say, politically on that [investigation into the threat by U.S. Steel to raise] steel [prices] thing.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That was not a national security, was it?

DEAN: No. Now I asked somebody about that and they told me that what happened there is that they were being defensive of Kennedy, and so that the person who would defend Kennedy necessarily was saying that Kennedy had given Hoover orders and Hoover, being typical in his response, tried to get it yesterday as far as the answer for the president. And that’s why he sent people out in the middle of the night and the blame really fell on Hoover. And this might be [unclear] over there though, who knows.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Well, that’s right.

NIXON: It’s still wrong.

DEAN: That’s right. Sure.

NIXON: Good God! Can you imagine if somebody—steel company that had raised hell about—or an automobile company about something? Silly thing. Ruckelshaus does, and we send FBI agents out to arrest? Jesus Christ, now. Does he know about the bugging of Martin Luther King?

DEAN: Yep.

NIXON: I wonder if he’d tell that. That would be good.

DEAN: I think he would tell everything he knows.

NIXON: You do?

DEAN: Mm-hmm. That’s why I’m saying he is a trem—he’s a bomb. Now the fact is—

NIXON: You really have to keep telling—

DEAN: Well, if that’s—the real problem is how it’s structured—how can it be done. He sent me this note and I called up and I said, “Bill, I appreciate getting that note very much.” I said, “It takes a lot of guts to send a note like that to me.” And he said—I said, “It’s kind of a pleasure to see a man stand up, blowing a little smoke up him and the like.” He said, “Well, John, I mean it. I am perfectly willing to do anything you want. If you want me to go up and testify, I will.” I said, “Well, how much—you have just given me some tidbits that you, in our conversation, and I would really like to again repeat: can you put together what you do know? Just for your own use, right now? Just put it together on a pad? Go through all your recollections, and then also tell me how you can substantiate it, and what kind of cross-examination you might be subject to on it if you did testify.” So he is doing that. Now, the question I’ve had is how in the world can we program something like this? The—I just have a feeling that it would be bad for one, Bill Sullivan to quietly appear up on some senator’s doorstep, and say, “I’ve got some information you ought to have.” “Well, where did you get it? Where—why are you up here?” “The White House sent me.” That would be bad. The other thing is maybe this information could be brought to the attention of the White House, and the White House could say to the—to Eastland, “I think you ought to call an executive session and hear his testimony. This is quite troublesome, the information that has been presented to us. It’s so troublesome we can’t hold it here and hope to—and rest comfortable.”

NIXON: Why—on the other hand doesn’t he just present it to Eastland? I mean, why executive session? That doesn’t serve—

DEAN: Well, it would, one, because you’re trying—the first approach would be not to destroy the bureau, not to tarnish the name. It’s going to leak out of there, though, quite obviously. If it doesn’t, we’d make sure it did. If Sullivan went up to Eastland cold and just said—or Hruska—I would think they would say, “Go on back down to the Department of Justice where you work, and let’s not start all this.”

NIXON: Suppose another thing—Patrick Gray says to either Eastland or to Hruska or anybody on that committee, “Who is the tiger on the committee on our side—on the committee—the Judiciary Committee?”

DEAN: Cook’s—

NIXON: Cook.

DEAN: Gurney has been good. Gurney was good during the ITT hearings, and he’ll study. He’ll get prepared. Uh—

NIXON: But would he go after the bureau? Cook, I don’t know him.

DEAN: They’re not going after the bureau. What they are doing is they’re taking the testimony of somebody who is going after the bureau.

NIXON: Yeah. I know that. I’m just thinking of the—

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: They ought to look down the road and see what would be the result of what they are doing is—won’t they? I would think so. I mean, I’m just trying—how would they go after Johnson? Let’s look at the distant future. Look at the—how bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the FBI so terribly discredited? [unclear]

DEAN: Well, I’ve kicked this around with Dick Moore—these broader questions—and I think it would be damaging to the FBI, but maybe it’s time to shake the FBI and rebuild it.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: I’m not so sure the FBI is everything it’s cracked up to be. I’m convinced the FBI isn’t everything the public thinks it is.

NIXON: No.

DEAN: I know quite well it isn’t.

NIXON: [unclear] if you could get [chief of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department] Jerry Wilson in there rather than a political appointee. What is your feeling at the moment about Gray? Can he hang in? Should he? I don’t know.

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: [unclear] of course.

DEAN: I—they’re going to vote this—they have an executive session this afternoon to invite me to testify.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: There’s no question they’re going to invite me. I would say based on how I handle the, one, the formal letter that comes out of the committee asking for information, and I programmed that they do get specific. Just what in the hell do they want to know that I’ve got, and lay it out in the letter that’s sent down here asking me to appear so I can be responsive, fully—

NIXON: Respond to the letter.

DEAN: Respond to the letter in full. I think I have—I feel I have nothing to hide as far as the issue they’ve raised.

NIXON: Would you respond under oath?

DEAN: I think I would be willing to, yes.

NIXON: That’s what I’d say because that’s what I am preparing in the press thing. I’ll say you’ll respond under oath in a letter. But you will not appear in a formal session.

DEAN: That sets our precedent [unclear].

NIXON: What if they say, “Would he be willing to be questioned under oath?”

DEAN: That’s not what the question is. Yes, I’d be willing to be questioned under oath, but we’re not going up.

NIXON: No, no. But here?

DEAN: Oh, I think that would be a hell of a bad precedent.

NIXON: Okay, I just wanted to be sure we don’t cross that bridge. I agree. You—but you would respond to written interrogatories.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That’s it. Okay.

DEAN: Now after that, if we’ve been responsive, their argument for holding up Gray’s confirmation based on me is—should be gone. Sure, they’re going to say it raises more questions than it answers, but if we’re—but that can go on forever. We’ve taken the central points they want answers to—given them the responses. That puts something in Eastland’s hand that can say, “All right, it’s time to vote.” And Eastland says he’s got the votes to get Gray through. Now, but what happens on the Senate floor is something else, because [Senator Robert] Byrd is opposing Gray. Byrd’s got good control of that southern bloc.

NIXON: Not totally.

DEAN: No?

NIXON: Byrd is running for leader of the whole Senate. A lot of them may desert him on this.

DEAN: But Mansfield, on the other hand, of course, has come out and said that he favors—initially he supported Gray’s confirmation.

NIXON: My feeling is that they would like [unclear] I think that they’d like to have an excuse not to do it. Maybe they ought to use not you, but all this crap about this kid [unclear].

DEAN: Well, if they say they have to hold up Gray’s confirmation until the Watergate hearings are completed—

NIXON: Oh, that’s great.

DEAN: That’s the vehicle.

NIXON: The best of both worlds for us, John—

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Because Gray, in my opinion, should not be the head of the FBI. Not because of any character or other flaws or thoughtless flaws, but because he is going to be too much like Kleindienst. After going through the hell of the hearing, he will not be a good director as far as we’re concerned.

DEAN: I think that’s probably true. He’ll be a very suspect director. Not that I don’t think Pat won’t do what we want. I read him a little differently than Dick in that regard. Like he’s still keeping in close touch with me. He’s calling me. He’s given me his private line. We talk at night, just “How do you want me to handle this,” so on and so forth. So he still plays—playing in tight, and still being involved. But I think he—

NIXON: But he couldn’t do it.

DEAN: But he can’t do it. He’s under—he’s going to be under such surveillance by—his own people watch every move he’s making. That’ll be the difficult thing for Pat. Not that Pat wouldn’t want to still play ball, but he may not be able to.

NIXON: I agree. That’s what I meant.

DEAN: Pat has already gotten himself in a situation where he’s got this Mark Felt as his number-two man. These other people are surrounding him. If you put a guy like Jerry Wilson in there he could just, you know, wipe this, and say, “Gentlemen, I’m putting my own team in, and I’m going to bring people in I’ve met around the country who are good office directors—[FBI] SACs out of Chicago”—wherever, and just put his own team together for the headquarters office.

NIXON: So where do you come out?

DEAN: Gray’s already been locked into—to major personnel decisions. I wouldn’t be surprised to see that occur—that they say that they cannot go forward with Gray’s hearings because of Watergate.

NIXON: Where would that be done, John? At what point in the committee, or on the floor, or both?

DEAN: It could happen. It would certainly be voted on first in the committee—in the Judiciary Committee.

NIXON: How do you [unclear]?

DEAN: The question is, then, whether it’ll be put on the calendar by the leadership. I assume that that’s—

NIXON: The leadership might determine that we will not put it on the calendar until after the Watergate hearings.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Then we could then—Gray could then come in and say, “I will not wait that long.”

DEAN: And they’ll—when they—you’re, “This—you’re—this is damaging to the leadership of the FBI, and I will have to withdraw based on this.” What would be nice for all would be to get Gray voted out of the committee—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —with a positive vote, enough to get him out of committee, and then lock him at limbo there.

NIXON: What is Moore’s judgment about Sullivan? Does he know?

DEAN: Yeah, he says it’s a piece of dynamite. He says it depends, and we both agree, that it—the way it would be done would be a secret—whether it was done. Whether—this isn’t the sort of thing we could just leap out and do—have to be very carefully thought through. Have to be—have to decide in advance should the White House not be involved or should we be involved? If we’re going to play with it, we are going to probably have to say that we were involved and structure it in a way that there is nothing improper with our involvement.

NIXON: The difficulty with the White House being involved is that if we are involved in pissing on Johnson—that concerns me.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That’s why it really ought to be—I mean, if he could just—

DEAN: I suppose the answer is saying—to have him—to say to him—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: You’ve got—you know, this is something. “What—you’ve intimated a few things to me. The proper place to take that information is to the Senate Judiciary Committee or to the attorney general possibly.” And then have Dick take it to the committee. Or is that too close to the president still?

NIXON: Personally, if he takes it to the committee, it’s better if the committee’s conducting a hearing on his involvement. Well, wait a minute. He works for the attorney general, doesn’t he?

DEAN: That’s right. If he takes it to Kleindienst, Kleindienst is going to say, “Bill, just don’t do it because you are going to take DeLoach’s name down with it, and DeLoach is a friend of ours.”

NIXON: Bullshit.

DEAN: Something I have always questioned.

NIXON: Nobody is a friend of ours. Let’s face it. Don’t worry about that sort of thing.

DEAN: Well, it’s something I will—I think I need to kick around with Dick Moore, because—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: But first of all, I’ve got to—just have to be thought through every inch of the way. It came here—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: —late yesterday afternoon.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: It was not—Bob said, when I talked to him, he said he was quite excited about it. As Ehrlichman said—gave a very favorable “Mm-hmm.” And I said, “Well, I’m not going to rush anything on this. It’s—we’ve a little bomb here that we might want to drop at one—”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: “—point down the road.”

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

DEAN: Maybe the forum to do it is something totally out of the committee context between the Gray confirmation hearings and the Watergate hearings. Maybe let him go over to U.S. News, or who knows what it would be. But we ought to consider every option, now that we’ve got it, and see if—

NIXON: Rather than doing it in a hearing—doing it in the press. Then that will force the hearing to call him. That’s another way to do this. Have him be selected to—

DEAN: Give an interview.

NIXON: —to give an interview. I would do it in U.S. News, if you can do it. I would not do it with a wire-service guy or something. A respected damn reporter. Why not go to a jackass like Mollenhoff? No, he’s too close to us.

DEAN: Well, that’s interesting. Now Mollenhoff is close but, by God, you can’t program Mollenhoff to do anything.

NIXON: No.

DEAN: And if—

NIXON: No. And also, we are in a position on Mollenhoff, who’s been fighting us some, that maybe Mollenhoff could be a pretty good prospect for this thing. It’s the kind of a story he loves—he digs on some. You couldn’t tell him, however, [unclear] letting him know—look at the story part. Or Sullivan just goes to talk to him, says, “Look what I have here. You’re a hell of a guy, and I just want to tell you a few things.”

DEAN: Or can you call Clark and say—can I call Clark and say, “Listen, Clark, a guy has brought me a piece of dynamite I don’t even want in the White House”?

NIXON: He will write that, though, won’t he?

DEAN: Yeah. Because that’d look like that’s a setup deal. Well, Clark Mollenhoff is the first guy to uncover—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: [unclear] anything, and he will say no way.

NIXON: But he’s willing to do it.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: That’s very important, at least.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Broadens the scope. Getting to the bottom of the whole thing, don’t you feel that that’s the need here is to broaden the scope of the damn thing, instead of—

DEAN: The focus is right on us. That’s the problem.

NIXON: Yeah. Nothing on the Democrats, and nothing—

DEAN: Nothing.

NIXON: Nothing on what the previous three administrations did.

DEAN: Nothing. It’s making—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Well, it—of course it’s still a Washington story. You go out of this city—

NIXON: I know.

DEAN: —and you can’t find anybody that even knows what’s happening. Although it’s increased in the network coverage. That NBC thing last night, which is just a travesty as far as—the very thing Ron was talking about, about shabby journalism. They took the worst edited clips they could, out of context, to respond to things they would say on the lead and they would have a little clip of Ron saying, “Well, I deny that.” And he was denying something totally other than what they were talking about in their charge. It was incredible. Someone is going through and putting that all together right now, and Ron ought to be able to have a field day back with that one on NBC. It was just ver—it was very, very dishonest television reporting of a sequence of events. It was out of sequence.

NIXON: Well, you see, John—yeah, I know the situation. Ervin gets up there and, you know, gassing around, he was huffing and puffing about his being a great constitutional lawyer and all. I guess it just makes us wonder about our first decision, doesn’t it? [unclear] about sending Gray up. Probably a mistake, but then, we didn’t anticipate—

DEAN: Well—

NIXON: Or you think not? Who knows.

DEAN: Who knows. That’s right. If you didn’t send him up, why didn’t you send him up. Because he was—

NIXON: Right. I know. That’s what they—

DEAN: That’s true.

NIXON: That’s what they—you send somebody else somebody will take them on—not doing too well. You know what I mean?

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: I won’t even announce any [unclear]. I think the problem is, the reason that the Senate was not [unclear] being reasonable was because [unclear] a lot of this stuff hanging out there before the [unclear] has to be brought to the Ervin Committee.

DEAN: Well, we—you know, one thing is that I—the saturation level of the American people on this story is [laughs] depressing. Pretty close, in fact. [laughs] The saturation level in this city is getting pretty high now. They can’t take too much more of this stuff.

NIXON: Think not?

DEAN: Nothing really new is coming out.

NIXON: Some kid—they said—I don’t think that anybody, incidentally, will care about somebody infiltrating the peace movement that was demonstrating against the president, particularly on the war in Vietnam. Do you think so?

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Anyway, I don’t care about that. What happened to this Texas guy [oilman Robert Allen] that took his money [donated to Nixon’s Committee to Re-Elect the President] back? Was he—?

DEAN: All hell broke loose for him after. This is Allen.

NIXON: No, no. Allen—yeah.

DEAN: Allen, not [Texas land speculator Walter] Duncan. There were two—

NIXON: Nothing to do [unclear].

DEAN: [unclear]. All hell broke loose for Allen for this reason. He—the money, apparently, originally came out of a subsidiary of one of Allen’s corporations down in Mexico. It went to a lawyer in Mexico who put it down as a fee billed to the subsidiary. Then the lawyer, the Mexican lawyer, sent it back into the States, and it came back up here. But, the weakness of it is the Mexican lawyer: one, didn’t have a legitimate fee; two, it could be a corporate contribution. So Allen wanted—and Allen had personally put a note up with the corporation to cover it. But Allen is meanwhile having problems with his wife, and a divorce is pending, and tax problems. So he—

NIXON: [unclear] The only problem I saw there was where you put it off—lay it off [unclear] the fact that it was being used for Watergate.

DEAN: That’s—I don’t know why that went in the letter. I—it wasn’t used for the Watergate. That’s the interesting thing.

NIXON: It wasn’t?

DEAN: No. It was not. What happened is these Mexican checks came in. They were given to Gordon Liddy, who said, “What do we—why don’t you get these cashed?” Gordon Liddy, in turn, took them down to this fellow, Barker, in Florida, and said, “Would you cash these Mexican checks?” And so that’s how they went through Barker’s bank account back in here. They could have been just as easily cashed at the Riggs Bank. There was nothing wrong [laughs] with the checks. Why all that rigmarole? It’s just like a lot of other things that happened over there. God knows why it was all done. It was totally unnecessary, and it was money that was not directly involved in the Watergate. It wasn’t a wash operation to get money back in to Liddy, and the like.

NIXON: Who is going to be the worst witness up there?

DEAN: Sloan.

NIXON: Unfortunate.

DEAN: Without a doubt. He’s—

NIXON: He’s scared?

DEAN: He’s scared. He’s weak. He has a compulsion to cleanse his soul by confession. Now, we’re—he’s going—we’re giving him a lot of stroking, telling him, “You’re doing a beautiful job.” The funny thing is, this fellow goes down to the courthouse here before Sirica, testifies as honestly as he can testify, and Sirica looks around and calls him a liar. [laughs] He’s a sad—Sloan can’t win. So Kalmbach has been dealing with Sloan. Sloan [unclear] his job. Kalmbach has done a lot of that. The person that will have the greatest problem with—as a result of Sloan’s testimony—is Kalmbach and Stans. So they’re working closely with him to make sure that he settles down.

NIXON: Kalmbach will be a good witness.

DEAN: Oh, yes.

NIXON: Knowing what Kalmbach has been through.

DEAN: Kalmbach has borne up very well. In fact, I decided he may be—

NIXON: Kalmbach, of course—this is somewhat embarrassing—he is, they say, lawyer for the president. Well, hell, I don’t need a lawyer. He handles that property out there.

DEAN: He’s sensitive on that point. He over—he saw a briefing—saw a transcript of a briefing where Ron was saying, “Well, he’s really not. That’s not the right nomenclature—this ‘personal attorney.’” Herb said, “Well, gee whiz. I don’t know if Ron knows what all I do.” And I said, “Herb—well, don’t worry about it.”

NIXON: Well, what I meant is that this—I don’t care about that, but I meant, it’s just the fact that it’s played that way, as if he’s in—that I am—he’s in talking to me all the time. I don’t ask him [unclear].

DEAN: I know that.

NIXON: I don’t talk to him about anything. I mean, I don’t know—I see Herb once a year when he brings the income tax returns.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: I’m sure that he handles that San Clemente property and all the rest, but he’s—he isn’t a lawyer in the sense that most people have a lawyer.

DEAN: No, no. Although he didn’t even handle the estate plan, he’s done some, you know, dovetailing on it, like—

NIXON: Well, but anyway, we don’t want to back off of him.

DEAN: No. Anyway, he’s solid. He’s solid.

NIXON: He will—how does he tell a story when he gets [unclear]? He’s got a pretty hard row to hoe—he and Stans have.

DEAN: He’ll be good. He’s going over every—Herb is the kind of guy who will check, not once, not twice, on his story, not three times, but probably fifty to a hundred times. Literally. He will go over it. He will know it. There won’t be a hole in it. He’ll have thought it—he’ll do his own Q and A. He’ll be—have people cross-examine him from ten ways.

NIXON: Good.

DEAN: He will be ready, as John Mitchell will be ready, as Maury Stans will be ready.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: It’s—

NIXON: Mitchell is now studying, is he?

DEAN: He is studying. Sloan will be the worst witness. I think Magruder will be a good witness. This fellow [Herbert] Bart Porter will be a good witness. They’ve already been through it. They’ve been through grand jury. They have been through trial. They did well. And then, of course, people around here—

NIXON: I [unclear].

DEAN: —won’t be witnesses.

NIXON: They won’t be witnesses.

DEAN: Won’t be witnesses.

NIXON: Hell, no. They will make statements. That’ll be the line which I think we’ve got to get across to Ziegler, in all of his briefings where he is constantly saying we will furnish information. That is not the question. It is how it’s to be furnished, and we will not furnish it in a formal session. That would be to break down the [executive] privilege. Period. Do you agree with that?

DEAN: I agree. I agree. I have always thought that’s the bottom line, and I think that’s the good thing about what’s happening in the Gray hearings right now. If we—they send a letter down with specific questions, I send back written interrogatories, sworn. You know, as a lawyer, that you can handle written interrogatories, where cross-examination is another ball game.

NIXON: I know.

DEAN: They can—you can make a person look like they’re inaccurate even if they’re trying to tell the truth.

NIXON: “Well, now, really, you sh—you can’t mean that.” You know, I know—all their face making and all that crap. I know [unclear]. Written interrogatories you can—

DEAN: Can be artfully, accurately answered and give the full information.

NIXON: [unclear] that there will be total and full [unclear]. Well, what about the sentencing? When the hell is he going to sentence?

DEAN: We thought he was going to sentence last Friday.

NIXON: I know. You’ve said that.

DEAN: No one knows what in the world Sirica is doing. It’s getting to be a long time now. It frankly is.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: And no one really has a good estimation of how he will sentence. There’s some feeling that he will sentence Liddy the heaviest. Liddy’s already in jail. He’s in Danbury. He wanted to start serving so he can get good time going. But Hunt he’ll probably be very fair with.

NIXON: Why?

DEAN: Pardon?

NIXON: Why? Why Hunt?

DEAN: He likes Hunt. He liked Hunt. He thought Hunt was being open with him and candid, and Hunt gave a statement in open court that he didn’t know of any higher-ups involved and Hunt didn’t put him through the rigors of trial. And Hunt was a beaten man, the loss of his wife, was ill—they tried to move and have a—him severed from the trial. And Hunt didn’t cause a lot of problems. Bittman was cooperative, whereas Liddy played the heavy in the trial. His lawyer raised all the objections and the like, and embarrassed the judge for some in-chambers things he’d said, and—

NIXON: But Liddy’s going to appeal the sentence?

DEAN: Liddy is going to appeal the decision—the trial. He will appeal that.

NIXON: That’s right—the trial. The trial.

DEAN: Trial—and there’s—

NIXON: He was convicted.

DEAN: There is an outside chance that this man has gone, this judge has gone so far in his zeal to be a special prosecutor—

NIXON: Well, some of those statements from the bench—

DEAN: Incredible statements.

NIXON: To me—incredible.

DEAN: Commenting on witnesses’ testimony before the jury was just incredible. Incredible. So he may have—there may be a mistrial. I don’t—there may be reversible error even. I don’t know.

NIXON: What about the Cubans?

DEAN: The Cubans will probably be thought of as hired hands, and nowhere near the sentences of Liddy, I would think. Not all of them—Barker, the lead Cuban, may get more than the others. It’s hard to say. I—you know, I just don’t have any idea. Sirica’s a strange man. He is known as a hanging judge.

NIXON: That’s the kind that I want.

DEAN: That’s right. [laughs]

NIXON: I understand.

DEAN: That’s right. He’s tough. He is tough. Now, the other thing, Sirica—there was some indication that Sirica might be putting together a panel. They have this system down there now, based on this informal agreement, where a judge—a sentencing judge convenes a panel of his own to take advice from. If Sirica were being shrewd, he just might get himself a panel and take their recommendations.

NIXON: When will the Ervin thing be hitting the fan most, I mean by that time [unclear]?

DEAN: Well, I would say that the best indication we have now is public hearings will probably start about the first of May. Now, they will—you know, there’ll be a big, probably, bang of interest initially. We have no idea how they will proceed yet. We do have sources to find that out other than Baker. Incidentally, Kleindienst was—had called Ervin again—returned the call. Ervin is going to see him this week, with Baker. That’s—

NIXON: Public hearings the first of May. Well, that’ll be a big show. The public hearings, I wouldn’t think, though, I know from experience that, my guess is that—I think they could get through about three weeks of those and then I think it begins to peter out somewhat. Or do you agree?

DEAN: No, I—

NIXON: ITT went longer, but that was a different thing, and it seemed more important.

DEAN: When I told Bob several months ago—I hope they don’t think about weekend sessions. He said the way they could have those hearings and do a masterful job on us is to hold one hearing a week on Thursdays—Thursday mornings—they cover it live. That way, you’d get live coverage that day. You’d get the networks that night, the national magazines that week, get the weekend wrap-ups. You could stretch this thing out for nearly—

NIXON: We should insist—our members of the committee, at least, should insist, “Let’s get it over with, and go through five-day sessions, and so forth.”

DEAN: Yeah. Well, they—you know, they’re not that—I don’t think they are that—

NIXON: No.

DEAN: —perceptive to figure. [laughs]

NIXON: Well, so be it. This is a—I mean, I noticed in the news summary Buchanan was viewing with alarm the [unclear] the great crisis in the confidence of the presidency, and so forth. [unclear]

DEAN: Well, the best way—

NIXON: How much?

DEAN: Pardon?

NIXON: How much of a crisis? I mean, it’ll be in a newspaper—rhetorical—the point is that everything is a crisis. It doesn’t have to be a crisis. We’ve had—screw around with this thing for a while [unclear] it’ll be mainly a crisis among the upper intellectual types. The assholes, you know, the—

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: —soft heads, soft—our own, too—Republicans, Democrats, and the rest. Average people won’t think it is much of a crisis unless it affects them. But it’ll go on and on and on.

DEAN: Well, I think it’ll—you know, I think after the Ervin hearings, they are going to find so much there will be some new revelations. I don’t think that the thing will get out of hand. I have no reason to believe it will.

NIXON: Oh, yes, there’ll be the revelations in Watergate. They [unclear]? That’s the point.

DEAN: Well, they want to find out who—

NIXON: Who—is there a higher-up?

DEAN: Is there a higher-up?

NIXON: They’re really—let’s face it, after—I think they are really after Haldeman.

DEAN: Haldeman and Mitchell.

NIXON: Mitchell—I mean, Colson is not a big enough name for them. He really isn’t. You know, he is a thorn in their side, but Colson’s name bothers them none. So they get Colson. They’re after Haldeman and after Mitchell. Don’t you think so?

DEAN: That’s right. Or they’d take Ehrlichman if they could drag him in but they’ve been unable to drag him in in any way.

NIXON: Ultimately, Haldeman’s problem is Chapin, isn’t it?

DEAN: Bob’s problem is circumstantial.

NIXON: What I meant is, looking at the circumstantial, I don’t know that anything—Bob had nothing—didn’t know any of those people, like the Hunts and all that bunch. Colson did. But Bob did know Chapin.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Now, what—now however the hell much Chapin knew I’ll be goddamn. I don’t know.

DEAN: Well, Chapin didn’t know anything about the Watergate, and—

NIXON: You don’t think so?

DEAN: No. Absolutely not.

NIXON: Did Strachan?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: He knew?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: About the Watergate?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: Well, then, Bob knew. He probably told Bob then. He may not have. He may not have.

DEAN: He was judicious in what he relayed, and—but Strachan is as tough as nails. I—

NIXON: What’ll he say? Just go in and say he didn’t know?

DEAN: He’ll go in and stonewall it and say, “I don’t know anything about what you are talking about.” He has already done it twice, as you know, in interviews.

NIXON: Yeah. I guess he should, shouldn’t he? In the interests of—why, I suppose we can’t call that justice, can we? We can’t call it [unclear].

DEAN: Well, it—

NIXON: The point is, how do you justify that?

DEAN: It’s a personal loyalty with him. He doesn’t want it any other way. He didn’t have to be told. He didn’t have to be asked. It just is something that he found is the way he wanted to handle the situation.

NIXON: But he knew? He knew about Watergate? Strachan did?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I’ll be damned. Well, that’s the problem in Bob’s case, isn’t it? It’s not Chapin then, but Strachan. Because Strachan worked for him.

DEAN: Mm-hmm. They would have one hell of a time proving that Strachan had knowledge of it, though.

NIXON: Who knew better? Magruder?

DEAN: Well, Magruder and Liddy.

NIXON: Ah, I see. The other weak link for Bob is Magruder, too. He having hired him and so forth.

DEAN: That’s—applies to Mitchell, too.

NIXON: Mitchell—Magruder. Now, where do you see Colson coming into it? Do you think he knew quite a bit? And yet, he could know a great deal about a lot of other things and not a hell of a lot about this, but I don’t know.

DEAN: Well, I’ve never—

NIXON: He sure as hell knows Hunt. That we know. And was very close to him.

DEAN: Chuck has told me that he had no knowledge—specific knowledge of the Watergate incident before it occurred. There have been tidbits that I have raised with Chuck. I have not played any games with him. I said, “Chuck, I have indications—”

NIXON: Don’t play games.

DEAN: I don’t. I—

NIXON: You’ve got to be—the lawyer has got to know everything.

DEAN: That’s right. And I said, “Chuck, people have said that you were involved in this, involved in that, involved in this.” And he said, “I—that’s not true,” and so on and so forth. I don’t—I think that Chuck had knowledge that something was going on over there. A lot of people around here had knowledge that something was going on over there. They didn’t have any knowledge of the details of the specifics of the whole thing.

NIXON: You know, that must be an indication, though, of the fact that they had goddamn poor pickings. Because naturally anybody, either Chuck or Bob, was always reporting to me about what was going on. If they ever got any information they would certainly have told me that we got some information, but they never had a goddamn [laughs] thing to report. What was the matter? Did they never get anything out of the damn thing?

DEAN: No. I don’t think they ever got anything.

NIXON: It was a dry hole, huh?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Jesus Christ.

DEAN: Well, they were just really getting started.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah. But, Bob one time said something about the fact we got some information about this or that or the other, but I think it was about the [Democratic] convention—what they were planning. I said [unclear]. So I assume that must have been MacGregor—I mean not MacGregor, but Segretti.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Bob must have known about Segretti.

DEAN: Well, I—Segretti really wasn’t involved in the intelligence gathering to speak of at all.

NIXON: Oh, he wasn’t?

DEAN: No, he wasn’t. He was out just—he was out—

NIXON: Who the hell was gathering intelligence?

DEAN: That was Liddy and his outfit.

NIXON: I see. Apart from Watergate?

DEAN: That’s—well, that’s right. That was part of their whole—Watergate was part of intelligence gathering, and this—

NIXON: Well, that’s a perfectly legitimate thing. I guess that’s what it was.

DEAN: What happened is they—

NIXON: What a stupid thing. Pointless. That was the stupid thing.

DEAN: That was incredible. That’s right. That’s right.

NIXON: I wouldn’t want to think that Mitchell would allow—would have allowed this kind of operation to be in the committee.

DEAN: I don’t think he knew it was there.

NIXON: You kidding?

DEAN: I don’t—

NIXON: You don’t think Mitchell knew about this thing?

DEAN: Oh, no, no, no. Don’t mis—I don’t think he knew that people—I think he knew that Liddy was out intelligence gathering.

NIXON: Well?

DEAN: I don’t think he knew that Liddy would use a fellow like McCord, for God’s sake, who worked for the Committee [to Re-elect the President]. I can’t believe that. You know, that—

NIXON: Hunt? Did Mitchell know Hunt?

DEAN: I don’t think Mitchell knew about Hunt either.

NIXON: So Mitchell’s thing is to puff the pipe and said, “Gee, I hired this fellow and I told him to gather intelligence, but I”—maybe [unclear].

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Magruder says the same thing?

DEAN: Magruder says that, as he did in the trial, he said it was, “Well, of course, my name has been dragged in as the guy who sent Liddy over there,” which is an interesting thing. That’s a—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: That’s right. They said, well, what happened is Magruder asked for a lawyer. He wanted to hire my deputy over there for general counsel and I said, “No way. I can’t give him up.”

NIXON: Was Liddy your deputy?

DEAN: No, Liddy never worked for me. There was this fellow Fred Fielding, who works for me. And I said, “I can’t give him up.” He said—Magruder said, “Will you find me a lawyer?” I said, “I will be happy to look around.” I checked around the White House. Krogh said, “Liddy might be the man to do it—to go over there. He would be a hell of a good lawyer. He has written some wonderful legal opinions over here for me—”

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: “—and I think he is a good lawyer.”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: So I relayed that to Magruder.

NIXON: How the hell does Liddy stand up so well?

DEAN: He’s a strange man, Mr. President.

NIXON: Strange or strong, or both?

DEAN: Strange and strong.

NIXON: Good.

DEAN: He—his loyalty, I think, is just beyond the pale. He’s just—nothing—

NIXON: He hates the other side, too?

DEAN: Oh, absolutely. He’s strong. He really is.

NIXON: What about the hangout thing? [gives a series of instructions to an unknown assistant]

…

NIXON: Is it too late to, frankly, go the hangout road? Yes, it is.

DEAN: I think it is. I think—here’s the—the hangout road—

NIXON: The hangout road’s going to be rejected by—somebody on your staff has rejected it.

DEAN: It was kicked around. Bob and I, and—

NIXON: I know Ehrlichman always felt that it should be hangout. [unclear]

DEAN: Well, I think I convinced him why—that he wouldn’t want to hang out either. There is a certain domino situation here. If some things start going, a lot of other things are going to start going, and there are going to be a lot of problems if everything starts falling. So there are dangers, Mr. President. I’d be less than candid if I didn’t tell you there are. There’s a reason for us not—not everyone going up and testifying.

NIXON: I see. Oh, no, no, no, no, no. I didn’t mean go up and have them testifying. I meant—

DEAN: Well, I mean just—they’re just starting to hang out and say, “Here’s our story—”

NIXON: I mean putting the story out to PR buddies somewhere. “Here’s the story, the true story about Watergate.” I don’t know.

DEAN: They would never believe it.

NIXON: That’s the point.

DEAN: The point is—the two things they are working on, on Watergate—

NIXON: Who is “they”? The press?

DEAN: The press—

NIXON: The Democrats?

DEAN: The Democrats, the intellectuals—

NIXON: The Packwoods [recent criticism by Senator Packwood]?

DEAN: Right. Right. “They” would never buy it, as far as, one, White House involvement in the Watergate which I think there is just none—for that incident that occurred over in the Democratic National Committee headquarters. People just—here would—did not know that that was going to be done. I think there are some people who saw the fruits of it, but that’s another story. I am talking about the criminal conspiracy to go in there. The other thing is that—the Segretti thing. You hang that out, they wouldn’t believe that. They wouldn’t believe that Chapin acted on his own to put his old friend [unclear] Segretti in to be a Dick Tuck on somebody else’s campaign. They would have to paint it into something more sinister, something more involved—a part of a general plan.

NIXON: Shit, it’s not sinister at all. None of it is.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Segretti’s stuff hasn’t been a bit sinister.

DEAN: It’s quite humorous, as a matter of fact.

NIXON: As a matter of fact, it’s just a bunch of crap. It’s just a [unclear]. We never knew. Never objected to—you don’t object to such damn things. Oh, anyway. On and on and on. No, I tell you this, the last gasp of the, you know—of the—our partisan opponents. They’ve just got to have something to squeal about.

DEAN: The only thing they have to squeal on.

NIXON: Squeal about that, and perhaps inflation, but that will end. Oh, yeah, they’re going to squeal and then they’re [unclear]. They’re having a hell of a time, you know. They got the hell kicked out of them in the election. They really are. They’re going to Watergate around in this town, not so much our opponents, but basically it’s the media. I mean, it’s the Establishment. The Establishment is dying, and so they’ve got to show that after some rather significant successes we’ve had in foreign policy and in the election, they’ve got to show, “Well, it just is wrong because this is—because of this.” In other words, they’re trying to use this to smear the whole thing.

DEAN: Well, that’s why I—in fact, I keep coming back with this fellow, Sullivan, who could—

NIXON: Who could—

DEAN: —could change the picture.

NIXON: How would it change it though?

DEAN: Well, it—

NIXON: By saying you’re another—is that what it is?

DEAN: That’s—yeah. But here’s another, and it happens to be Democrats. Your—I, you know—I just wish—

NIXON: If you get Kennedy in it, too, I’d be a little more pleased.

DEAN: Well, now, let me tell you something that’s—lurks at the bottom of this whole thing.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: If, in going after Segretti, I—Segretti, right—they go after Kalmbach’s bank records, you’ll recall that sometime back—maybe you, perhaps, didn’t know about this, it’s quite possible. That right after [Ted Kennedy’s role in the death of Mary Jo Kopechne at] Chappaquiddick somebody [Anthony Ulasewicz] was put up there to start observing. Within six hours.

NIXON: Did we?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: I didn’t know that.

DEAN: That man watched that—he was there for every second of Chappaquiddick, for a year, and almost two years he worked for—he worked for Jack Caulfield, who was originally on John’s staff.

NIXON: Oh, I’ve heard of Caulfield, yeah.

DEAN: He worked for Caulfield originally and then he worked for—when Caulfield worked for John, and then when I came over here I inherited Caulfield and this guy was still on this same thing.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Well, if they get to those bank records between—it starts on July of ’69 through June of ’71, and they say, “What are these about? Who is this fellow that’s up in New York that you paid?” There comes Chappaquiddick with a vengeance. This guy is a twenty-year detective on the New York State—New York City Police Department.

NIXON: In other words, we—

DEAN: He is ready to disprove and to show that everything from—

NIXON: We don’t consider that wrong.

DEAN: Well, if they get to it, it’s going to come out and the whole thing is going to turn around on that one. I mean, if Kennedy knew the bear trap he was walking into—

NIXON: How do we know—why don’t we get it out anyway?

DEAN: Well, we sort of saved it. [laughs]

NIXON: Does he have any record? Is it any good?

DEAN: He is probably the most knowledgeable man in the country. He can’t—you know, there are certain things he runs up against walls when they closed the records down—things he can’t get. But he can ask all of the questions and get some—many of the answers. As a twenty-year detective—but we don’t want to surface him right now. But if things ever surfaced, this is what they’ll get.

NIXON: Now, how will Kalmbach explain that he’d hired this [unclear] in view of Chappaquiddick? Did he—out of what type of funds?

DEAN: We’d have—he had money left over from preconvention—

NIXON: Are they going to investigate those funds, too?

DEAN: They are funds that were quite legal. There’s nothing illegal with those funds.

NIXON: How can they investigate them?

DEAN: They can’t.

NIXON: Huh?

DEAN: They—the only—the—what they would—happens what would occur, you see, is they would stumble into this in going back to, say, ’71 on Kalmbach’s bank records. They’ve already asked for a lot of his bank records in connection with Segretti, as to how he paid Segretti.

NIXON: Are they going to go back as far as Chappaquiddick?

DEAN: Well, yeah, but this fellow worked into ’71 on this. He was up there. He talked to everybody in that town. He—you know, he’s the one who caused a lot of embarrassment for Kennedy already by saying—he went up there as a newspaperman. “So why aren’t you checking this? Why aren’t you looking there?” And pointing the press’s attention to things. Gosh, the guy did a masterful job. I have never been—had the full report.

NIXON: Coming back to the Sullivan thing, you’d better now go ahead and talk to him. You will now talk to Moore—again to Moore and then what?

DEAN: I’ll see if we have something that’s viable. And if it’s—

NIXON: In other words, have you talked to Sullivan again?

DEAN: Oh, yes. Yes, I plan on it.

NIXON: Why the hell don’t you get him in and talk to him? [unclear]

DEAN: Well, he’s—I asked him last night and he said, “John, give me a day or so to get my, all my recollections together.”

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: And that was yesterday. So I thought I would call him this evening and say, “Bill, I’d just like to know—”

NIXON: You see, the fact that you’ve talked to him will become known. So maybe the best thing is to say, “I am not concerned here,” and you say that he’s to turn this over, and you say we will not handle it. Then make—then anyway, it gets to the committee. Aren’t they going to say, “The White House turns over information on the FBI”? That’s the—I don’t know how the Christ to get it down there.

DEAN: Well, that’s what I think I can kick around with Dick Moore. He and I do very well just bouncing these things—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —back and forth and coming up with something that we don’t have to be embarrassed about it.

NIXON: I think a newsman—a hell of a break for a newspaper.

DEAN: Oh, yeah.

NIXON: A hell of a story. Maybe the Star would just run a hell of a story, I mean a real bust on the FBI. Then, and then the committee member, the man you, for example, on this basis could call Gurney, and say, “Now look, we’re onto something very hot here. I can just tell you—I’m not going to tell you anything more. Go after it, forget you ever had this call.” Then he goes.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: It seems to me that that’s a very effective way to get it out.

DEAN: Mm-hmm. Another thing is, I don’t think Sullivan would give up the White House. Sullivan, as I said, could—there’s one liability in Sullivan here, is that’s his knowledge of the earlier things that occurred—

NIXON: That we did?

DEAN: That we did.

NIXON: Well, now you should tell them. Oh, you mean he wouldn’t—he’d say, “I did no political work at all. My work in the—for the Nixon administration was solely in the national security.”

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: And that is totally true.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Okay. Well, good luck.

DEAN: All right, sir.

NIXON: It’s never dull, is it?

DEAN: Never.

 

“I have to respectfully decline the invitation of the committee.”

March 14, 1973, 8:55 A.M.

Richard Nixon and John Dean

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

The week leading up to the March 21 “cancer on the presidency” conversation between Richard Nixon and John Dean is arguably the most important week of the Watergate investigation. Nixon’s Watergate defense experienced a serious setback as a result of the twin blows of Watergate burglar James McCord’s letter to Judge John Sirica that suggested witnesses had perjured themselves and that yet-unscathed higher-ups were involved in the Watergate cover-up. By the end of the week, Nixon’s “desk officer” on Watergate—Dean’s term for himself—would question his future as the president’s counsel. Here, Dean consults with Nixon on how he should respond to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s request for him to appear as part of the Gray confirmation hearings.

…

NIXON: Hello?

DEAN: Good morning, Mr. President.

NIXON: I thought that before you—before Ziegler went out that maybe you and he would—that you probably ought to come over and let me—and run by your questions and answers today, don’t you think so?

DEAN: I think that’d probably be a good—very good idea.

NIXON: Yeah. So, that he’s—he may be the [unclear]—have you had the chance to—if—you probably talked to them last night, but you haven’t had any chance to [unclear] this morning, huh?

DEAN: No. I—we do have the invitation and response I’ve been kicking around to Eastland. That’s something that, probably, Ron ought to have in hand this morning—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: —also before he goes out.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: They did not, as you’re aware now, ask me any specific questions.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, how it stands then, is about like we anticipated, isn’t it? That is—it’s an invitation which—do all the Republicans, as—join this as a matter of tactics, or—what is the situation on that? Or do they honestly feel you should be subpoenaed?

DEAN: Well, I think they’re in this position. They’re afraid to say—and this is probably indicative of what we’re going to face all along—“Why shouldn’t he come up? Why shouldn’t we invite him? What do we need to hide?”

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

DEAN: “We don’t want to block. We don’t want to whitewash.”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: And [unclear]—

NIXON: Well, why—you haven’t got anybody that would say, “Look, let’s find a procedure where he could come up”? Won’t any of them step up to that?

DEAN: Well, in the response that I’m—I’ve drafted, I have not—I wasn’t in the meeting where they kicked it around. I thought it best to not be in the meeting this—to hear what, you know, somebody’s—a lawyer’s not always his own best counsel.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: [laughs]

NIXON: Oh, hell, you aren’t the one that’s—

DEAN: But it’s—

NIXON: —that’s involved here.

DEAN: No, I know, but I did say in the response that, after the acknowledgment of the letter, “as a matter of the president’s personal staff, and consistent with the president’s statement of March 12—”

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: “—on the subject of White House testimonial appearances, I have to respectfully decline the invitation of the committee to formally appear and testify. However, as the president has stated, it’s the policy of this administration to provide all necessary and relevant information to the Congress. And if members of the president’s personal staff can provide such information in a matter that preserves intact the constitutional separation of the branches, such information will be provided. Accordingly—”

NIXON: Rather than, “if members of the staff”—the way I would state that: “and members of the president’s staff will provide such that information in ways that”—I think it’d be—I’d state it positively.

DEAN: Right. Then I went on to say, “Accordingly, if the Senate Committee on the Judiciary believes that I can be of assistance in providing relevant information, and wishes to submit questions to me that have a bearing on the nomination of Mr. Gray, I am pleased to respond consistent with the president’s statement.”

NIXON: You don’t want to indicate that you’re pleased to respond in a—with a sworn statement. Or do you think—?

DEAN: Well, I thought why not maintain all options at all times—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —here and just—if they come back with a question, if they’re—even do that, then swear to them?

NIXON: Mm-hmm. Don’t want to say so now?

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Because—if—you know, there’s a possibility we could set a precedent here—

NIXON: Yeah?

DEAN: —of a non-sworn response to interrogatories.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

DEAN: Just—that’s all the better for later precedents.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah. Which means that—it’s—it probably won’t work, but nevertheless, then that’s all right, too. Then we could come to the other thing if we have to.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: If they—because they might come back and say, “Well, you’re just going to have a response. What does that mean?” All right, fine, then we’ll make it sworn response. “What more do you want, except to badger the witness up there in front of your committee?”

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Okay, after you’ve had a chance to run it by the others, and so forth—I don’t to talk to the—you know, the difficulty here is that I don’t want to get Haldeman and Ehrlichman in the thing because they’re both parties in interest—

DEAN: Mm-hmm?

NIXON: —but—and you’re not. You know—[laughs]—that’s—well, that’s quite true. You see, because both of them—and I think the best thing is for you to have Ziegler and I to talk about it. And then—

DEAN: All right.

NIXON: —let me make a rather cool decision about it—as to what we ought to do. Don’t you agree?

DEAN: I think that’d be a very—

NIXON: Now, you get the views of the others, however. You get all their views and see what they are. Have you—come over whenever you’re ready.

DEAN: I shall do, sir.

NIXON: Fine. Bye-bye.

 

The threat of renewed bombing in Vietnam

March 16, 1973, 7:41 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

During the day on March 16, President Nixon called an unscheduled news conference to announce that he was strongly considering new attacks by air on North Vietnam. He was responding to reports a few days earlier that the North Vietnamese had moved thirty thousand troops and three hundred tanks toward the border with South Vietnam. Any such repositioning would have been a violation of the Peace Accords, and so Nixon employed what he himself called his “irrationability.” Kissinger regarded Nixon’s irrationality as one of his “great assets.” In the same conversation, the president expressed his utter disrespect for the air force, even consoling himself that if he did order the attacks, the pilots wouldn’t hit anything anyway. Although the plan to bomb North Vietnam was largely a bluff, Nixon was prepared to back it up and send a message to the region with a new air campaign against Cambodia.^*

…

NIXON: Hello?

KISSINGER: Mr. President?

NIXON: Henry, anything new today?

KISSINGER: No, it has been fairly quiet. The head of the North Vietnamese, the member of the North Vietnamese Economic Commission, took aside our guy and was bleeding all over him how they were observing the treaty and how we—our intelligence was wrong. And they were not infiltrating. So they are getting nervous.

NIXON: What about our guy? Did he have the gumption to say something?

KISSINGER: Oh, yeah, we had him well coached.

NIXON: Good.

KISSINGER: We had him very well coached. I think just clobbering them for two days next week is going to be very healthy to them.

NIXON: Yeah, because we know they are violating, so what the hell?

KISSINGER: We know they are violating, Mr. President, and they are not going to face us down now.

NIXON: Well, if they want—if they really—I just can’t believe they seriously want the economic thing and could blow the whole thing because of a bombing. That’s the point.

KISSINGER: They won’t blow it.

NIXON: But the point is what the hell the good the bombing does is irrelevant I think perhaps. It isn’t going to do much good. The air force never hits a goddamn thing, as you know, except when they put it over Hanoi.

KISSINGER: It will do a little good, but it just raise the price of admission. What it will really do is to show that even while you have prisoners there you are just putting it to them.

NIXON: Yes, I suppose.

KISSINGER: I think that our best hope for preserving this accord is your reputation, Mr. President.

NIXON: Yeah. Yep, interesting thing that Denton told me that when he was talking to them this high-ranking fellow that saw him two or three days before that something that impressed the high-ranking guy was that the prisoners had been so irrational in their conduct. The fact that they—had they been rational they would have caved, but that they were irrational and that was the thing that disturbed them about the president that he was so irrational in the way he conducted himself. So the irrationability, he said, Denton’s point was that he said the irrationability really got through to them.

KISSINGER: That is your greatest—one of your great assets with them.

NIXON: And the fact that the—all of your friends in the press—you know, all your old Harvard and other colleagues—constantly talk about irrationability.

KISSINGER: Of course the funny thing is the Chinese all over the world are saying you are the best force for peace. They are the best propagandists we have got.

NIXON: Really?

KISSINGER: Oh, yeah, we are picking up—I don’t bother you with it, but we are picking up intelligence all over the world. They are really puffing you up.

NIXON: Because they realize that without us they are nothing.

KISSINGER: Exac—they are in mortal danger.

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: And that you are the only one that had the guts to draw the conclusion from it. You know, McGovern or even Humphrey would have bled all over them about understanding and communication—

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: —which doesn’t mean a damn thing.

NIXON: Right. Mm-hmm.

KISSINGER: And, we are delivering your letters tomorrow morning.

NIXON: Right. To the Chinese?

KISSINGER: Yeah.

NIXON: Right.

KISSINGER: Well, we have until Wednesday, Mr. President. We can always call the other thing off.

NIXON: Let’s wait. I mean, we may not call it off. I mean, my point is, we are going to go forward unless they do something.

KISSINGER: Well, that is my very strong advice.

NIXON: Right. Oh, hell yes.

KISSINGER: And that they would have to do something—

NIXON: No, I haven’t heard of anything they’re going to do yet that sounds like anything but a bunch of damn words which are pretty cheap.

KISSINGER: That is exactly right.

NIXON: And if we can, the only thing that is disturbing to me about it is the ineffectiveness of the air force and the way, you know, except for when we did the Hanoi drill. But goddamn it on the [Ho Chi Minh] Trail, Henry, they never have been worth a damn, as you know. Never been worth a damn.

KISSINGER: They have never had the targets they have now.

NIXON: You don’t think so?

KISSINGER: No, they have never—

NIXON: Now, I want a plan this time though that doesn’t, you know, give them a lot of warning, and do it all in the daytime and they are gone at night, and we go in and drop a lot of, you know, nothings. Goddamn it! Let’s have some surprise. Go back and forth. And then end, and let them think we have gone. Now is Abrams—I mean, well, of course Abrams is in it, and everybody else. But goddamn it, does Moorer got a good plan or not?

KISSINGER: It looks like a good plan to me, because they are going to fake as if they are going into Cambodia. And in the daytime they really have a photo—I have seen the photograph. These trucks are bumper-to-bumper. They are going to get a lot of trucks. You see they do not have to do it at night this time.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: They are going to do well, but that is not the real justification. The real justification is to set up a situation where you—

NIXON: They fear it would happen in other places.

KISSINGER: And where that they fear it may happen in the fall.

NIXON: Sure.

KISSINGER: If that is when they want—

NIXON: And that it may happen in other places.

KISSINGER: That’s our big point. I will be in Mexico, Mr. President, for the next week.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: I am going down there tonight.

NIXON: Yeah.

KISSINGER: But, I will have good communications, and I am easy to reach.

NIXON: Right. Now with regard to the—that’s fine you are going to work on the World Report and all that, but the point is that with regard to this whole situation on the North we just keep the heat right on them.

KISSINGER: Right.

NIXON: Everybody is all programmed at State and Defense. There isn’t going to be any backwash on this.

KISSINGER: Absolutely not. They are all on board.

NIXON: And the Chinese and the Russians have both been informed so they know.

KISSINGER: They have not been informed what we will do, but they both got very serious warnings.

NIXON: They had a very serious public warning which they will pay attention to.

KISSINGER: That’s right.

NIXON: Well, what is your feeling about the bargaining position we have in view of the statements of the Senate caucus, the Democratic Senate caucus? What the hell does it do to us? Does it destroy us, or not quite?

KISSINGER: It doesn’t destroy us but it means—here again I think, Mr. President, we have to take them on fairly soon. These bastards made it impossible to negotiate—nearly impossible to negotiate a peace. Now they are making it nearly impossible to preserve a peace. Now they are wrecking us in Europe.

NIXON: They are. That is my point.

KISSINGER: And I think we just have to attack them as being—

NIXON: This isn’t just wrecking us in Europe, it is wrecking the chance to negotiate a settlement, a reduction of forces on a mutual basis which would produce—

KISSINGER: You must—of course, they wouldn’t dare to put it through two months before Brezhnev comes over here.

NIXON: Well, maybe not.

KISSINGER: We are going to get way ahead of them again but still that doesn’t change the moral issue.

NIXON: Yeah, I hope that this gets across. I’d get it across to—good God! Can’t some of the columnists or somebody pick this up and knock the shit out of them on this? What is the matter with [Joe] Alsop and the rest? Are they all afraid of this kind of—?

KISSINGER: Oh, no, Alsop is all right but most of them are pretty stupid.

NIXON: They aren’t stupid. They are gutless.

KISSINGER: Gutless.

NIXON: That’s right. They know what the Senate is doing. They don’t say it.

KISSINGER: Well, except that, I think—essentially, in foreign policy you are likely to win any battle that you really join right now.

NIXON: Maybe. I wouldn’t overestimate that though because these people are so partisan now and the mood of the country is so peacenik. You know everything—you know, we got peace, and we are meeting with the Russians and the rest. Why do we have to have all these arms, and why can’t we get out of Europe and all the rest. You know?

KISSINGER: Well, it is going to be tough. You would have thought that someone who accomplished what you did would then be left alone for a while.

NIXON: That’s my point. They are not leaving us alone. You see, they are making it harder, aren’t they?

KISSINGER: Exactly.

NIXON: You get that across to a few people before you leave.

KISSINGER: Right, Mr. President.

NIXON: [Journalists] Dick Wilson, Bill White—call them tonight and tell them goddamn it, they ought to write something. Okay?

KISSINGER: Right, Mr. President.

NIXON: Okay.

 

“We will win!”

March 16, 1973, 8:14 P.M.

Richard Nixon and John Dean

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

At the end of the week, Dean checked in with Nixon to let him know the latest news. Senators Sam Ervin and Howard Baker had met with Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to work out a mechanism to transmit information from FBI files to the Ervin Committee. Judge Sirica was planning to sentence the Watergate burglars the following week, which would be the talk of the town. Finally, Dean reported that his Watergate investigation concluded that there was “not a scintilla” of evidence that led to the White House. At the same time, he told Nixon that he was hesitant to put that in a written report. “There is a degree of impossibility in writing a sort of let’s-hang-it-all-out report without creating problems,” Dean said, “that would cause difficulty for some who’ve already testified.” Despite that warning, Dean remained a team player. “We will win!” he said.

…

NIXON: Hello?

DEAN: Yes, sir.

NIXON: Any report on the meeting with Kleindienst?

DEAN: There was a report, a good report, a very successful meeting. He laid it out—

NIXON: Who’d he meet with?

DEAN: —exactly what he would do, and he said they didn’t balk an inch.

NIXON: Who’d he talk to? Ervin and—?

DEAN: Ervin, and Baker, and both counsel.

NIXON: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

DEAN: And they bought it. That, one, there would be a summary report, a synopsis report, which would be issued to them only, not for any other members of their committee.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: It would be for investigative purposes only. It could not be put in the record. It could not be displayed publicly in any way. And if they had any questions about that, the synopsis report, then they could come down to the bureau—those four—and look at the raw file they wanted to look at, if they contested something that was in the synopsis.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: That was it. Zero.

NIXON: In other words, this is a report that would be given by Gray?

DEAN: By Gray. Right.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: They put out—in fact, there’s a press release that Ervin put out that said they had worked out a satisfactory arrangement with the Department of Justice to receive the necessary information from the FBI in a way that would protect any innocent persons from damage.

NIXON: Mm-hmm. Hmm—

DEAN: And that’s the—that went out this afternoon, and—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —we got a question. Ziegler got a question, and the press office was asked—was the arrangement satisfactory with us? “Absolutely.”

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: So that—again, that’s the spirit of cooperation of turning over information, and—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —no problem at all.

NIXON: Well, you should go forward, and working with Dick Moore and others, with regard to the matter of getting sort of a general statement that might be prepared—I mean to be given to me after the court sentences. You see?

DEAN: Right, I—

NIXON: I don’t know whether we will want to use it or not, but we, in order to know, we’ve got to see what it could be. You see?

DEAN: I just learned late this afternoon that Sirica is going to, definitely, sentence on Fri—a week from today.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: He plans to give a speech from the bench at that time—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —that the government is recommending no specific term in years for any of the defendants. Rather, prison sentences for all of them, but not a specified term of years. But the whole thing is up to him—

NIXON: Up to the jury? Then, how—who determines the term of years?

DEAN: Sirica himself will.

NIXON: Oh. Mm-hmm. Then, when will he announce that?

DEAN: That’ll be on Friday. At least for the five that pleaded. They may not sentence the two that are on appeal.

NIXON: Mm-hmm. And, so he’ll announce the sentences a week from Friday?

DEAN: That’s correct. A week from this—today.

NIXON: A week from today. Mm-hmm.

DEAN: I had a long conversation with Dick Moore just this evening. I just arrived home and Dick and I really have been talking all this time about—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: —this whole thing, and there is a degree of impossibility in writing a sort of let’s-hang-it-all-out report without creating problems that would open up a new grand jury—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —without creating problems that would cause difficulty for some who’ve already testified.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: I’ve caveated some of these to Dick. Dick doesn’t have—possess all the knowledge I have.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: Particularly this fellow assigned with Dick.

NIXON: Yeah. [laughs]

DEAN: And, in fact, it might—I told him, I said, “It might be to your attorneys, Dick, [laughs] to write from your basic—”

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

DEAN: And, so we’ve planned to—

NIXON: And then you could look it over. [laughs]

DEAN: Right. We plan to meet tomorrow and see what—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —we can frank out, and—

NIXON: Well, that’s something is worth, perhaps, doing in terms of the off—well, frankly, what is, what could be helpful if it could be worked out, or just something that where, in the most general terms, the—is virtually saying what I might even say in answer to a press conference question, but in more general terms, that an investigation has been conducted, and we find this, and that, and the other thing. And whack. Just like that. You see what I mean?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Rather than going into the specifics of who did what to whom. You see what I mean?

DEAN: I do.

NIXON: So that—so that people could say, “Well—”

DEAN: Not a total stonewall.

NIXON: Oh, no, no. And not a total—and not supposed to be a total answer.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: But, simply saying, “Well, the president has finally said, ‘Now that it’s over this is it.’” And the—after this is over we can now say that this person—these people were not involved, and et cetera. These were, and—I don’t know. But at least think in those terms to see if something could be worked out. In very general terms, I realize the problems of getting too specific, because then—then you do open up the possibility of, “Why didn’t you say that? Why didn’t you say that?” But you just put it in very general terms, you see?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I don’t know. Do you think that’s possible?

DEAN: It’s going to be tough, but I think—I think it’s a good exercise and a drill that is absolutely essential we do—to go through—

NIXON: Yeah, that’s the point. The exercise is important.

DEAN: It sharpens thinking and it, as I—as—

NIXON: Find out what our vulnerabilities are and where we are and so forth and so on.

DEAN: Right. I would—there’s [laughs]—maybe there will be sometime when I should possibly report a little fuller than I really have, so you really can appreciate in full some of the vulnerable points and where they lead to.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: I don’t think that should be a written document right now.

NIXON: Oh, by no means. No, by—I don’t want any damn written document about any of that.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: I’m just speaking of a document that is put out.

DEAN: A public document.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: Which you, as sort of a report, perhaps, which we could then deliver to Ervin. You know?

DEAN: That might—it’s gonna be tough, but I say it’s certainly worth the effort—

NIXON: Yeah. Just sort of a general thing, and very general, very general. You know? Without—by all means, laying off of—don’t get into the, “Well, we investigated this. We investigated that. We saw this. We deny this. We support this. And so forth.” Lay off of all that. I have in mind a sort of—basically, so that it can be said that something was presented that I have seen, or that—you know what I mean? So that they—so that my reiterated statements from time to time, that, “Well, no one on the White House staff is involved” have some basis, you see.

DEAN: A lot of the—a lot of my conclusions were based on the fact that there was not a scintilla of evidence in the investigation that led anywhere to the White House.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: There’s nothing in the FBI file that indicates anybody in the White House was involved.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: There’s nothing in what was presented before the grand jury indicating—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —White House involvement.

NIXON: Well, just saying some of those things could be helpful.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: See? It could be helpful—

DEAN: [unclear]—

NIXON: And then we just put it out and then let, let the committee try to prove otherwise.

DEAN: And, I understand that they will not get the grand jury minutes, which is good because the grand jury is even more thorough than the FBI.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: The committee’s starting ten paces behind, and Ervin does not, I’m told, have a total disposition for what he’s doing. He just doesn’t relish it. He wants to find out things. He’s—

NIXON: Why not?

DEAN: He’s more excited about the confrontation on executive privilege, I think, than he is about what else he might find.

NIXON: We would welcome that, wouldn’t we?

DEAN: Oh, he’d love that.

NIXON: Well, so would we.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I mean, let’s have it. Particularly if it’s on you—oh, no, he won’t have it on you. He’ll—

DEAN: No, I don’t think he’ll [laughs] bite for that—

NIXON: On Chapin, huh?

DEAN: Chapin or Colson.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: I think that the other part of the report that we can probably put out with even greater detail than, say, Watergate is Segretti. And that—

NIXON: That I would like.

DEAN: And that—you see, that would put us in a very forthcoming posture.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: Here’s—

NIXON: We could point out that the one case has now been determined by the courts, and that we have nothing to indicate that the White House was involved. Now, second, with regard to Segretti, let’s lay all this—let’s lay it all out. Here it is.

DEAN: Now, sure, it’s a little embarrassing—

NIXON: The problem there—

DEAN: It’s nothing evil. It’s nothing—

NIXON: Well, it’s less embarrassing than what’s been charged, and the innuendo.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Of course, I realize the major problem there is the financing, but even that.

DEAN: That’s going to have to be answered well before Ervin—

NIXON: That’s gonna come out. That’s right, so you—

DEAN: —so we might as well leave it out—

NIXON: Yeah. That’s right. So, you can think about it. Okay?

DEAN: All right, sir. Well—

NIXON: Fine.

DEAN: We will win! [laughs]

 

Nixon suggests that Dean prepare a report

March 17, 1973, 1:25 P.M.

Richard Nixon and John Dean

OVAL OFFICE

Nixon’s newest idea regarding Watergate was the need for a written report. Describing the break-in, in both planning and execution, the report would be the truth and nothing but the truth. It wouldn’t, however, be the whole truth. As Nixon outlined the report for Dean, it was apparent that the text would present conclusions without full documentation. As Dean discussed the proposition, Nixon was particular in determining that Dean didn’t know about the break-in before it occurred—though he himself was furtive about his own knowledge of the crime. In fact, when Dean expressed surprise that anyone would bother breaking into the national offices of a political party, saying, “Anybody who’s walked around a national committee knows that there’s nothing there,” Nixon responded by starting to explain just what there was to be gained by such a break-in. He changed topics without finishing. They once again discussed the idea of somehow utilizing former FBI official William Sullivan.

…

NIXON: Well, I was wondering what your latest developments were. Do you plan to keep your boys all hopping around?

DEAN: Well, hopefully. Dick Moore and I are going to work on it this afternoon and today.

NIXON: Where do you work?

DEAN: Pardon?

NIXON: Where do you do it—are you staying?

DEAN: Over in [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Well, to work over in my office. It’s pretty quiet around here today.

NIXON: Anytime that you need to [unclear] it helps, Camp David place is very conducive to that kind of thoughtful work [unclear].

DEAN: I think that might be a good thing. I mentioned that to Mitchell yesterday, that we probably need a good sit-down-kick-this-thing-around session. I would say that as a result of your press conference that the forward momentum that was going and building stopped, and that it fluctuated and again we’re in this breathing space. The press this morning is different, for example. It says the—an accord has been reached. The Post is even willing to say that as far as the information being provided. It couldn’t—I try to find something nasty to say but they realized that it was a cooperative effort. What we have to do is be in a good posture come the opening gun on Ervin’s hearings. It’s always been to me the most troublesome thing is that if he were going to be nonbiased, if he were going to be nonpartisan, if he were going to be fair and just, and the judge he likes to believe he is, ninety percent of his hearings would be held in executive session—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: —rather than—

NIXON: And also the ten percent of them or so [unclear].

DEAN: That’s right. That’s right. What I’ve been trying to conceive of is some way that Ervin himself could come to that position. If he did, he would be harming innocent people, but he will be dragging people into things that—it’s like really dragging them in, but that’s the name of the game in the city and he’s going to love to play it.

NIXON: You’d be interested to know that—well, to hark back to the Hiss case. We did that on the Hiss case.

DEAN: You went into executive?

NIXON: The first confrontation, between I—we interviewed—we took—after Chambers went on and called into session, he tried to challenge it.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Hiss went on and denied it. Then after that, I—executive session with Chambers alone for a couple of hours [unclear] an executive session, Hiss alone. And then the two together in New York in a hotel room.

DEAN: And that was private also, huh?

NIXON: Executive—and then only after the executive, would we go public.

DEAN: Well, that—you know, that would be the fair way for Ervin to play it. And when you’re ready to go public—

NIXON: Yeah. Well, anyway, that’s a possibility. The thing I guess you’ve got to figure is to—whether you and Moore, perhaps even individually or [unclear] write the thing collectively—nothing can be done collectively when you’re writing a paper, and say that—and sit down and write what I would call a general, a very general statement that maybe I just send to Ervin. I would say, “Senator, you’d be interested to know what the hell we’ve got here.” Here’s my point. The—that’s one way. The other way would be to put it out. The arg—of course the fact that it’s being done, the point that I make is this: we don’t want to be in a position of Dean and the White House—you and Dean, et cetera, are acting as the president’s counsel to forward him information on the basis of it’s confidential. You might just say, “Now I can’t say that this is all—everything. But it’s everything we know.” We can say basically—this would be right after the judge sentences—based on what we [unclear] investigation has been made [unclear] was not involved, or if he was this is all he knows. Chapin—this is what he knows and I’d go into Chapin and Segretti and just lay it all out there. [unclear] and Colson, you know what I mean?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: And—or without going into it you could say no one on the White House staff is involved, so forth and so on. This may be that those kind of [unclear] statements. What I am getting at is that the moment that you get it too specific, then I realize that they’re going to say, “Why did you withhold something?” that you could simply say, “Here are the conclusions we have reached based on your evaluation of the information that came to your attention.” They got a chance to look at all the other. We want to be as helpful as we can. “Here’s what we’ve concluded and we welcome you to review it.”

DEAN: You’ve raised something that—let me just take one step further. It might be a very interesting approach. If Ervin were to be called down here, and given sworn statements that were given to you, that’s after I have prepared my report on Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Dean, everybody—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: They stated to the degree of their knowledge—now what would be in there that would be embarrassing politically. And you might put Ervin on the spot—is—because I don’t think he would want to embarrass for the sake of embarrassment alone—is that there was knowledge that there was an intelligence operation in place.

NIXON: I say that?

DEAN: But no knowledge that these people were going to do something criminal.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: And to the contrary, Mr. President, efforts by the White House to cut off these things that would be illegal.

NIXON: As a matter of fact, as you point out, you could make some self-serving statements all over that I had put—I had given instructions to Mitchell, and I said that he was to pass on to the campaign committee. I did not see them at that point. In other words, there was to be no acting. There was to be no violence. That we expected ours to be—we had to get intelligence on it from the standpoint of security, et cetera—

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: —to be prepared. You know? Put that whole thing out. Put out the seamy record of what we expected in San Diego [at the Republican convention], what we expected there and there’s what we were trying to get at through intelligence, et cetera. You know what I mean?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: But point out that—you could just say, “Here are some sworn statements signed by [unclear] people that I’ve gotten from them. I—it was for the record.”

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: “Want further information? You can ask for it.”

DEAN: The interesting thing is in the sequence of the way things occurred. I don’t know if anyone has ever taken you through this, but the last involvement to my knowledge of the White House was when I came back from a meeting—

NIXON: [unclear] answer, “I know nothing about Watergate.”

DEAN: Right, well—

NIXON: I stayed miles away from it so I didn’t know even if there was a White House involvement.

DEAN: Well, there was—you know, there was a preliminary discussion of setting up an intelligence operation—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —and the last, and the last—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: All right. And the last phase of that—

NIXON: Phase of it was—

DEAN: I came back from a meeting with Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy and told—after telling them that they couldn’t discuss this in front of the attorney general of the United States, came back and told Bob that if there’s something like that going on, we’ve got to stay two miles away from it, ten miles away from it, because it just is not right and we can’t have any part of it. Bob said, “I agree” and “We’ll have no part of it.” That was where I thought it was turned off and the next thing I heard was that—was this—the break-in on June 17, which was—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —over six months later.

NIXON: You heard discussion of that, but you didn’t hear any discussion of bugging, did you, in that—your meetings? Or did you?

DEAN: Yeah, I did. That’s what distressed me quite a bit.

NIXON: Oh, you did?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Who raised it? Liddy?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Liddy at that point said we ought to do some bugging?

DEAN: Right. Mitchell just sat there on his pipe and puffed and said nothing. He didn’t agree to it, and I—at the end of the meeting—

NIXON: Well, you won’t need to say in your statement about the bugging.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: You could say that they were going to engage in intelligence operations. You said the main thing is that it must be totally legal and that the laws and ethics and so forth and so on. You came back and Bob says, he says [unclear]. You know what I mean?

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: I would think, make—I think you could make self-serving goddamn statements [unclear] and all that. Now—

DEAN: The embarrassment for you would be that the White House knew that there was an intelligence operation going, but—

NIXON: But—why did you mean embarrassed?

DEAN: All right.

NIXON: I think—everybody said it was a naive basis. Who knows? Haldeman knows, right?

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: And of course, but you could be there if you justify it along the basis that—

DEAN: We knew it was to be legal.

NIXON: Not only be legal but that it was totally necessary because of the violence, the demonstrations, the heck—the kind of activities that we knew were threatened against us in our convention and in our campaign and in all of our appearances. We had to have intelligence and about what they were going to do that we could in turn issue instructions to [unclear] to find out what they’re doing, and something like that.

DEAN: This is another point on not using the FBI for political purposes either. While we would collect normal demonstration intelligence, we needed specific intelligence as to were there concerted efforts by opposing political people to demonstrate, cause disruption, get these peaceniks whipped up into a frenzy, and the like.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: That’s not the function of the bureau.

NIXON: You see, I’ve been thinking I should say, for example, the matter was discussed as to whether or not the bureau should be—it was pointed out that in the 1964 elections, the bureau was used by [unclear].

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Could you get that—the [unclear]?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: You get my point?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: And that’s—then Haldeman said under no circumstances, or mention them whatever they are. It all had to be done privately because the bureau may not be involved in a partisan contest. We could not use the bureau in this. You can use them against demonstrations. But for political character, the bureau is never used. Which is true.

DEAN: But I—

NIXON: The Secret Service was used by us, but they—that’s their job.

DEAN: But that’s their job—

NIXON: They were protecting my life there.

DEAN: But they weren’t collecting the same type. They were—

NIXON: Oh, no. They were—

DEAN: Threats and—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —they were looking to see who was behind it or—

NIXON: What I’m getting at is you have got—you can put off all the self-serving men and they in turn—the main thing is the president has then, you see, that basically clears the president frankly—

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: That’s got to be done. That’s right.

NIXON: Where it has got to be done. And then—and frankly, they’ve got to say, “I did this, this, this, and this,” and Chapin has to file one, too. Agreed?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: And he would say, “I had this and da-da-da-da-da, but I had nothing to do with this—”

DEAN: No.

NIXON: “—or this other thing.”

DEAN: It seems to me the way that you would—the way these would be handled publicly—or you want to say or publicly out of—external from the White House—that you might well just give these to Ervin and—directly—and say, “I want you to see—”

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: “—what I know.”

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: “And I think that you know innocent people here, who have committed no crime—”

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: “—but to the contrary have tried to operate in the most proper—”

NIXON: Yeah. That’s right.

DEAN: “—way are going to be maligned.”

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: This is the truth.

NIXON: “I want you to know this beforehand. I just want you to know this is all we know—all I know and this is a fact.”

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: And I hand it to him—and incidentally, I wouldn’t have Baker along.

DEAN: No, I would agree with that.

NIXON: You know, it’s just a little shot across the bow.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: What do you think, or [unclear] Baker? You got any further intelligence about his operation?

DEAN: Nothing affirmative that’s good at all.

NIXON: Right.

…

NIXON: Go ahead.

DEAN: If it might be an affront to Baker, not to bring him in, since he is—

NIXON: Okay, you can bring him in.

DEAN: And try to, you know, get them both on the—

NIXON: We’ll try to be spread around. But I’m not going to have a counsel.

DEAN: No, oh Lord, no. I would think at the end there’s a lot of appeal just bringing Sam Ervin alone in—

NIXON: [unclear] that’s my point. I mean—

DEAN: And a lot of appeal—he is—

NIXON: He is—basically, he is going to be running it. I can just call him down and say I’d informed Baker that—

DEAN: That’s the way I think it would be better.

NIXON: That’s—I’d say, “Now look, the president wants to be [unclear] put it this way. He’s had a talk with you. He wants to have a talk with Ervin.”

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Put it that way.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: [unclear] say here it is. I said I want you to know that we cooperated and here’s—I’ve asked for Dean to take sworn affidavits from everybody. They’re here. Then he’ll say, “Will they appear?” Nope. “Have written interrogatories.” Yes, if he wants to go further, but—

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Well, “Suppose I want to come down with my counsel and question them?” No.

DEAN: No. Written interrogatories. We’ve said every—these are honest, humble men who are going under oath. They’re swearing to me this is the extent of their knowledge—

NIXON: And they will what—but on the other hand, we’re not saying that—if they have additional questions that come out as a result of this, that you won’t answer written interrogatories.

 

Testing the peace in Vietnam

March 18, 1973, 10:12 A.M.

Richard Nixon and Alexander Haig

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

On March 17, a ranking Viet Cong general responded to the charges that Nixon had leveled the previous week, regarding the Communists moving men and materiel toward South Vietnam, in violation of the Peace Accords. In denying the accusation, General Tran Van Tra stated that, to the contrary, it was the United States that was violating the Accords by stockpiling munitions in the South. Staying abreast of the situation, Nixon asked Haig for further details on the Viet Cong announcement and, on a related issue, the return of American POWs from Vietnam.

…

NIXON: Hello?

HAIG: Good morning, Mr. President.

NIXON: Hi, Al. Any—do you have any new evaluations of the intelligence this morning from where you sit?

HAIG: No, sir. I think there is nothing really significant.

NIXON: What did you think of the North Vietnamese blasting my statement?

HAIG: Yeah—

NIXON: They are very sensitive about that, aren’t they?

HAIG: —they are sensitive and I think they obviously paid a great detail of attention to it.

NIXON: You know they are lying, Al. As you know, in that this is all medical supplies and that sort of thing.

HAIG: Right.

NIXON: We know that is incorrect, don’t we?

HAIG: Oh, yes—

NIXON: Right.

HAIG: —that is about as phony as it can be.

NIXON: What about the—I mean the ICCS [role in providing oversight of Vietnam peace terms] and so forth—we don’t want them into this to check this out, do we?

HAIG: No, I don’t think we are going to get anywhere with that. They are turning down one request for inspection violation after another.

NIXON: That is what I had guessed. Somebody asked me—I knew that it was useless. It’s just the same kind of a façade that the other one was. Huh?

HAIG: It is, although I am still not convinced that their intention is to do any more than to ride it as far as they—

NIXON: Well, I meant the ICCS thing—

HAIG: Oh, no.

NIXON: As far as instrument it is not particularly effective. As far as policing the agreement we have got to do it. Right?

HAIG: That’s right, and we—of course, we are trying to keep this four-party thing intact.

NIXON: Yeah, right. The way it seems to me is that in the light of having gotten their attention though and they are putting the emphasis here that we ought to continue to hold that decision till Wednesday. Don’t you think, and not to—?

HAIG: Oh, absolutely. And even beyond that.

NIXON: Because basically, this thing is—I sort of have, after my talk with you, this same, uneasy feeling about our intelligence. You see the basic thing—I don’t have an uneasy feeling about—in terms of say the fact that they are putting in tanks and guns, and that sort of thing. We know the bastards will do that, but let’s face it so have we.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: You know that they know it. We poured it in, and we poured it in before the cease-fire, and they have got to know that. But the second point is that I am not justifying them because they will cheat and we won’t. Now the second point is however that what the intelligence does not tell you. The key point we are discussing is what the hell are their intentions?

HAIG: What they are up to?

NIXON: In other words—what they are up to? They can put in atomic bombs, if they aren’t going to use them it doesn’t bother me. That is the whole point, isn’t it?

HAIG: That’s right, sir. I think it is going to be hard in any event to get a handle on—

NIXON: That’s right.

HAIG: —their intentions.

NIXON: That’s right, but I mean, my point is that’s why we cannot make a decision—that is what I am saying, based simply on the fact that they have moved certain quantities and so forth. Because first the intelligence in regard to the movement is not all that accurate, but second because the movement may have several different purposes. Well, in any event, we will have to take a hard look at it.

HAIG: Yeah, I think we should be able to pick up some change in the next week.

NIXON: What is the situation now? Is it the—the last of the prisoners in North Vietnam out now already or are they—?

HAIG: We have the one batch here. That is cleanup. Now we don’t—

NIXON: What do we have left then?

HAIG: I think we have got just about everything out now, except for the Laos problem.

NIXON: I see.

HAIG: And we have—no, I am sorry we have one more batch. This is the third group. We have a fourth group to come out—

NIXON: From Hanoi?

HAIG: Yes, sir.

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: And that, in other words, it has been four move—

NIXON: Fourth increment. Yeah, right.

HAIG: We have just now completed the third. The fourth will start at the end of next week. That is why they are looking towards Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.

NIXON: Right, right, right, right. Okay, well, we will just continue to watch it.

HAIG: Yes, sir. We have got it intensely.

NIXON: Bye.

HAIG: Bye.

 

“Our friends at least have got to be reassured.”

March 20, 1973, 10:47 A.M.

Richard Nixon and Bob Haldeman

OVAL OFFICE

For weeks, Nixon had been insistent that his aides would testify before the Senate committees only at his discretion. He sometimes allowed that a few minor White House staff members might appear, but he was adamant in denying access to his inner circle, especially Dean, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. By the middle of March, however, he was aware that the Judiciary Committee, then hearing testimony on the nomination of Patrick Gray to head the FBI, planned to call his close advisors, notably Dean. On March 19, the chairman, Senator Ervin, made his intentions crystal clear, stating that “I’d recommend to the Senate that they send the sergeant-at-arms of the Senate to arrest a White House aide or any other witness who refuses to appear.” The following day, Nixon’s spokesman, Ron Ziegler, duly termed Ervin’s statement “sensationalism,” but the fact remained that no one on the president’s staff was to be exempted from appearing. That news, so starkly stated, seemed to shock Nixon. He did not intend to capitulate, however. In a talk with Haldeman, they spoke of the need to look for help beyond their inner circle. Nixon’s chief of staff, a former advertising executive from J. Walter Thompson, had weathered political storms going back more than a decade at Nixon’s side. But this was unlike anything else they had faced together. It was as though Nixon finally realized how dangerously insular his office had become, as he exhorted Haldeman to embrace Republicans in Congress and pull them closer onto the side of the White House.^*

…

NIXON: What I think—what it really gets down to, basically, that—I think what needs to be done is that the leadership needs to be briefed on Watergate. Just got—just at least our own friends have got to have a feeling that everything is okay. You understand? Maybe their people will put out a statement. I’ve worked that out with Dean and they apparently after—according to Dean and Moore, and they’ve talked to Chapin and Strachan [unclear] just let it go, in other words submit without saying it’s a [unclear], you know? I have thought of the possibility—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: But you see, Bob, our own people have got to have some assurance they are not going to get out there on a goddamn limb. They’ve got to be told and that has not been done—

HALDEMAN: If they do—

NIXON: —and I am surprised it hasn’t.

HALDEMAN: If they do the leadership they ought to, shouldn’t they also include the Republican members of the Ervin Committee—so those guys know where we are, too?

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: And that means Weicker, which is a problem. But what the hell? He’s going to be investigating it—

NIXON: Sure.

HALDEMAN: —and seems to me we’re better off to tell him.

NIXON: True, true. Well, I don’t let—but we haven’t thought of such things and I guess that’s popular what we need to get at, you know. I’m not going to try [unclear].

HALDEMAN: You have to.

NIXON: What I meant, you see—what I’m getting at—at least our friends have got to know. I think the problem is, Bob, that there’s probably too much time spent around the White House. Everybody around here—you’ve talked about the goddamn thing, you know this and that, and I understand all that, but—

HALDEMAN: Well, it was those—

NIXON: —those guys have got—our friends at least have got to be reassured—that’s the whole point—on this issue. They read about it. They read the charges and so forth so you’ve got to reassure them.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, well, this is—that’s the point I’ve raised.

NIXON: Yeah, well, I asked them. They said they couldn’t do it.

HALDEMAN: I know it. That’s what they tell me.

NIXON: I said we’ll put out any kind of a statement and let [unclear]. The point is that we, well, there’s only one thing—at least some of them seem to be. Now, what this lacks [unclear] basically is, goddamn it—somebody is in charge. They will come in and say, “All right, now here’s the PR plan for your appearance.” Now, I haven’t been doing it. I’ve instructed Ziegler and the rest. They haven’t been saying much. But, I mean, the point is you can’t depend on them to do it. I mean, Timmons is not a guy who can go out—you can’t—just won’t—can’t do it. They aren’t going to listen to Timmons as to what points ought to be made.

HALDEMAN: Didn’t MacGregor?

NIXON: Huh?

HALDEMAN: Didn’t MacGregor when he was [unclear]?

NIXON: You’re damn right, it was MacGregor. When I wasn’t here, MacGregor’s say he didn’t see the point to make. Somebody’s got to do it, though, see? Ziegler can’t [unclear]. Ziegler is good at telling them the questions they’re likely to get. But Ziegler does not think enough in terms of “Here is the point we want to get across this day”—huh? You see the point?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: This is the point. Here’s where [Herb] Klein would be better than Ziegler with his—all of his fuzzy-mindedness and everything. At least Klein would say—“This is the point you’ve got to get across today.” Ziegler of course is infinitely better in being ready for all the goddamn minefields.

 

“How it used to be” and “how it will be” in Vietnam

March 20, 1973, 3:10 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Alexander Haig

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

As the border between North and South Vietnam continued to jostle with activity and what one American journalist cynically called “a tolerable level of violence,” Nixon spoke about the prospects there with Haig, who was then serving as the vice chief of staff of the army. Nixon also reconsidered his warning that he would unleash a new wave of American bombers if the Communists failed to pull back. He paused to describe his style of brinksmanship, comparing himself with Kissinger and what he termed his security advisor’s “psychosis” about following through on threats. As the last American combat soldiers left Vietnam, however, Nixon’s rationale for new air attacks weakened, and the prospect of having to involve Congress in his plans only furthered his indecision.^*

…

NIXON: Hi, Al. I wondered if you had any further thoughts on—in reviewing the intelligence on the things? From what I see, I don’t see anything changed from what you told me.

HAIG: No.

NIXON: It doesn’t seem to—in fact, if anything, it seems to have tapered off considerably. But I don’t know. But maybe the first reports were wrong; maybe the second are wrong. [laughs] What’s your view?

HAIG: Well, my view is that there is slightly less reason for quick action. But I think we ought to hold off on that decision another twenty-four hours.

NIXON: Mm-hmm. The problem that I have with it, actually, is this: that I don’t know whether the action, at this point—whether the provocation is adequate. That’s—you see what I mean? I don’t—I never—

HAIG: Right.

NIXON: —never have any damn doubt about action, but you just can’t just get up and do something because of a whim, or what appears to be a whim.

HAIG: No, I think we ought to, ought to watch it very carefully. I know that they’re intensely trying to look for any changes in the status quo, one way or the other.

NIXON: You mean the intelligence people?

HAIG: Yes, yeah. We just haven’t gotten anything, and I don’t think we really have enough to make a decision here—

NIXON: Yeah. What is—now, I haven’t bothered Henry. He’s in Mexico, isn’t he?

HAIG: Yes, sir.

NIXON: Yeah. And—

HAIG: He’s there, and he’s—he’s watching the thing. I’ve talked to Scowcroft—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: —and he said that Henry’s inclination is to—is to watch it. Although he’s still inclined to think we’re going to have to do something.

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: I just finished forty-five minutes with Ambassador [Tran Kim] Phuong, who—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: —just came back from Saigon.

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: And, I was quite encouraged by the discussion. One, he said that, that they’re very confident—the South Vietnamese. Two, that the morale of the South Vietnamese military is high and strong. And, three, that he doesn’t believe that they have any intentions of seriously upsetting this thing, but that he thinks they’re going to just keep pressing in every direction to see what they can get away with.

NIXON: Yeah. I see. The problem I have, Al, actually is that it gets down to the point that I don’t want to be influenced in this by the sort of the bravado type of thing, which, you know—

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: —psychosis, which Henry goes through at times. You know? I mean, having, you know—the idea that, well, we’ve said we might do something, and now we’ve got to do something. Well, we don’t have to do a goddamn thing, you know. [laughs] You understand what I mean?

HAIG: Yeah.

NIXON: Now, if—so, we mustn’t do it simply because—in order to prove that what he has told Dobrynin and others and so forth that we’ve got to demonstrate. You see, even if, on the other hand, there is an action—I mean, if there’s—we’ve just got to have some pretty solid stuff. But—

HAIG: Well, I don’t—

NIXON: And, actually, I don’t know. From him—from his sitting down, there, I don’t know whether his judgment isn’t going to be all that good on it, as on an up-to-date matter.

HAIG: No, I don’t, sir. I don’t either, and that’s one of the odd—oddities of this current moment.

NIXON: Yeah, it is. Isn’t it?

HAIG: If he really—

NIXON: Yeah?

HAIG: —feels that something must be done, then he should be back here—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: —when it is done. That I have no question about. But, I would say that—what I would do, sir, is I’d just watch this again.

NIXON: If there’s nothing, certainly, then, we’ll wait twenty-four hours and—

HAIG: That’s right. We have time. We have four or five more days, and it wouldn’t make an awful lot of difference if it happens in the midst of the other thing.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

HAIG: If—

NIXON: Yeah, the whole point is that—yeah, there are other reasons, though, to—we may have to take the, take the good of it at—well, while we can. I—if I really thought—look, here’s the other point that we have to have in mind, Al, that—so we say we’d do this in order to indicate that, maybe, we’d do something later. Well, now, there’s been enough written, and it’s quite on the mark, by even our friends, like an [Joseph] Alsop and others, that—to the effect that, well, after we get everybody out, and after we’ve withdrawn everything, then you damn near have to get congressional approval to do something.

HAIG: Yes.

NIXON: You—you see that, don’t you?

HAIG: Yes.

NIXON: You see, because we have a cease-fire, right?

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: And for, for them just to up and say, “Now, because of this and that,” you say, “For what purpose are you doing it?” Well, you’re—for the purpose of [laughs]—you see? I’m—I think we have a—I think we’ve got a problem there that may not have occurred to Henry. I—it’s always occurred to me. I mean—

HAIG: It’s a real problem.

NIXON: And, of course, we have, as you know, we’ve assured Thieu that we would do things. But, do you have any serious doubts in your own mind that we’d really—we would really have to go to their aid, in this case, with—if—let’s face it: one of the reasons we were able to do what we were able to do is because they had the prisoners, and we had some troops there. Now, when they’re all out, when all the prisoners are out, you’re going to have one hell of a time.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: I mean, without going to the Congress, right?

HAIG: No, I agree with that, sir—

NIXON: Hitting the North, now—now in the—in the event—in the event there’s a massive reinstitution, and so forth, of the—of military actions, that’s something else again. But I’m speaking now that the idea that, well, by doing something now, that indicates we might be trigger-happy later. I don’t think that argument is quite as strong as Henry has—see, he’s thinking as to how it used to be, and not as to how it will be, I think.

HAIG: Well, that’s right, although there is something to be said for that logic. That [unclear]—

NIXON: That at that—I know, if we do something now. But my point is: it was more believable before, because we had people there. But, at a time when we don’t have anybody there, it’s going to be damn tough.

HAIG: Yes. Absolutely.

NIXON: That’s the point. I mean, it’d mean—they’re smart enough to know that we will have to get some sort of approval. Well, in any event, I haven’t decided. We’ll take a look at it, and—

HAIG: Yes, sir. I really don’t think it’s that crucial in terms of timing, because it’s not going to be that clean a difference.

NIXON: Well, look, it isn’t that clean a difference because it’s—

HAIG: I think the whole thing will rest on our ability to justify, through provable violations that are serious in character.

NIXON: Well, the provable violations—what he’s basing everything on, at the present time, is the infiltration of equipment, correct?

HAIG: That’s right, sir.

NIXON: Now, on that—

HAIG: Individual replacements.

NIXON: What?

HAIG: Phuong told me he didn’t think—he thought these are—these were replacements to replace other people that are going to go back home.

NIXON: Well, they aren’t even allowed that, I guess, under the thing, are they?

HAIG: No, they’re not—

NIXON: Yeah—

HAIG: —but it certainly makes the character of the—

NIXON: Yeah. [laughs]

HAIG: [unclear]

NIXON: It doesn’t increase the threat, does it?

HAIG: No.

NIXON: All right. Well, we’ll keep in touch. But, it is—I say, it is rather curious that—if Henry feels as strongly about it, that he’s there rather than here, too.

HAIG: Well, it’s a nice insurance policy, and that’s what he’s thinking of. Of, you know—

NIXON: You mean an insurance policy in the sense of—

HAIG: No longer [unclear]—

NIXON: —warning them?

HAIG: Yes.

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

HAIG: It’s just that simple, I think.

NIXON: Yeah. But, you—but, you’re not convinced that it’s worth doing, yet?

HAIG: No, I’m not. If—the indications are it’s less of a problem [unclear]—

NIXON: Yeah, than we—than it was last week?

HAIG: That’s right.

 

Further consideration of the viability of renewed bombing in North Vietnam

March 20, 1973, 5:45 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Brent Scowcroft

OVAL OFFICE

Later in the afternoon, Nixon continued his analysis of Vietnam—and Henry Kissinger—with Major General Brent Scowcroft, who had replaced Haig as Kissinger’s deputy. Scowcroft, originally from Utah, graduated from West Point in 1947. He alternated between the military and academic worlds, ultimately receiving a doctorate from Columbia in 1967. Two years later, he joined Kissinger’s staff in the Nixon administration. Scowcroft was fascinated by the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger, terming it later as both a “a brilliant partnership” and a “constant rivalry.” In the meeting with Nixon about the potential air attack in Vietnam, Scowcroft was meticulous in representing Kissinger, who was traveling in Mexico at the time, even reading verbatim a message from him on the topic of Vietnam.^*

…

NIXON: I was wondering what the situation is with regard to our—infiltration, and so forth. [unclear] Henry’s back [unclear].

SCOWCROFT: Yes, sir.

NIXON: [unclear]

SCOWCROFT: Yes, there has.

NIXON: The point is—the question is: what are the provocations, exactly?

SCOWCROFT: Yes, and I think the reduction is based on the climate season—

NIXON: Right.

SCOWCROFT: —rather than on—

NIXON: Yeah.

SCOWCROFT: —any representations that we have made.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

SCOWCROFT: As near as we can figure out, their infiltration has been, this year, just like it was last year. And that there has been no—in other words, the cease-fire—the agreement, had no effect at all on what they’ve done. It is, apparently, tapering off.

NIXON: Yeah. What is it—has he—have you had any message from Henry as to what his present feeling about it is? He’s there?

SCOWCROFT: Yes. Yes, I have. He is inclined to think that maybe we should delay a day, instead of—I think [unclear] Thursday and Friday—Friday and Saturday. He’s afraid, I think, that if we don’t do something now, that we’ll be in worse shape next fall. And that this is, perhaps, the best time to send them a signal that’s unmistakable. There is a consideration that—about the Laos situation, and Ambassador [George McMurtrie] Godley has pointed out to us that the twenty-third is the date that the new Laotian government is supposed to be formed.

NIXON: That’s right.

SCOWCROFT: That—

NIXON: It’d be a pretty good—pretty bad time to hit them then.

SCOWCROFT: That’s what he says: that some Laotians want you to encourage a postponement to the twenty-fifth, or the twenty-sixth. There, apparently, may be some acceleration in the last POW release. The PRG have now recommended the—or, proposed the twenty-fifth—

NIXON: Yeah.

SCOWCROFT: —for theirs.

NIXON: The twenty-fifth?

SCOWCROFT: The twenty-fifth. That’s Sunday the coming week. Now Henry doesn’t really think that a strike would interfere with the POW release.

NIXON: Of course, nobody knows.

SCOWCROFT: I think that the closer the two are together, the more difficult it makes it for them to go ahead with a release. But, I—

NIXON: But, in any event, he’s had some second thoughts about the terms, at least as far as the timing.

SCOWCROFT: Yes, he has. Because as a matter of fact, I’ve got here just a brief paragraph, here. He says, “I believe Godley makes a good point with the possibility of time fouling up the Laotian negotiations. However, none of the considerations advanced last week have really changed,” which is true. “I don’t believe the North Vietnamese decision on withdrawal will depend on one series of strikes. Another danger is that they will delay release of the POWs. The counterargument is that they would tend to be much more ruthless next fall. The president should be made aware of the Godley argument. We should not, in any case, go before Thursday night. My recommendation, on balance, would be that we go then.”

NIXON: That’s right.

SCOWCROFT: “The other possibility would be to do it next week, after the POWs are out.”

NIXON: Well, except that what Henry’s overlooking is the fact that it’s—I mean, this makes this one less effective, too. With the use of the—after they are out, the support here for any kind of strike is way down.

SCOWCROFT: It’s way down, and I think it also—

NIXON: And it breaks the cease-fire, don’t you think?

SCOWCROFT: That’s right.

NIXON: Even though it’s in Laos.

SCOWCROFT: That’s right.

NIXON: The point is, therefore—also, the argument is that if you just—if you hit now, is that the idea being that, well, if you hit now, with the POWs still there, that sort of puts them on notice that, maybe, we might do it again. That’s going to evaporate, in my opinion. I mean, we have to be candid about what’s really going to happen, due to the fact that the Congress will insist upon an approval of any major strike—I mean, with any strikes—after the withdrawal is complete.

SCOWCROFT: I think I—that’s at least right—

NIXON: That’s now. But you may be able to do this, depending on how the Congress will vote on the use of American air power. In other words, to help South Vietnam. Cambodia we can get away with for a while. Laos, not after the—if they get a cease-fire there, now. But as far as the use of American air power against North Vietnamese forces coming into the South, unless there is a raw, naked invasion [unclear] it’d be terribly—it would be impossible, really, to get it without a congressional uproar. You see, that’s the point of that. The argument that you can make—the arg—it’s a very nice argument to say that well, by, by hitting now, we demonstrate that the president is the kind of guy who will use power. Fine. It may demonstrate we’ll use it now, but it does not necessarily demonstrate we’ll use it later.

SCOWCROFT: No, the circumstances are—

NIXON: That’s the problem.

SCOWCROFT: —are very different.

NIXON: And the circumstances will be substantially changed, and that’s something we have to consider. So, the real question is whether it’s worth doing just by its own sake.

SCOWCROFT: Yes. I, I think that—

NIXON: By its own sake. Not because of the calling card for next November, but by its own sake; whether it’s really worth sending these planes over to knock out a few trucks and tanks, or whatever the hell they’ve got on those roads.

SCOWCROFT: Uh—

NIXON: I know. That’s the question.

SCOWCROFT: In terms of its military effect, I don’t think it is worth it.

NIXON: That’s the point.

SCOWCROFT: You know, we’d—

NIXON: We’ve hit for years—

SCOWCROFT: —we’d hit them on the road for the first day or two, and—

NIXON: Yeah.

SCOWCROFT: —they would hurt modestly, but—

NIXON: Look, we’ve done it for years.

SCOWCROFT: —you know, we’re talking about a few more days of something to, to make up for what we’d lose in a—what they would lose in a—

NIXON: A strike. Right.

SCOWCROFT: —strike. I feel that if we’re going to strike, it really needs to be before the last POW release. So—

NIXON: Yeah, well, I think [unclear]—

SCOWCROFT: I think afterwards, as you say—

NIXON: Afterwards, I think all hell would break loose—

SCOWCROFT: Well, I do too—

NIXON: —here, for the strike. They’d say, “What the Christ are you doing it now for?”

SCOWCROFT: That’s right.

NIXON: Well, unless it was tied directly into something in Laos, like—

SCOWCROFT: Well, and that’s not likely. We’re not likely to have any one incident around which we could coalesce—

NIXON: So—

SCOWCROFT: —support for a strike.

NIXON: —basically, let’s face it: this infiltration is not directed against Laos; it’s directed against South Vietnam.

SCOWCROFT: That’s right. That’s right.

NIXON: So, my point is, why do you do it, then? If you do it now, for what purpose? To let them know that, watch out, you’re going to lose it again? I guess you can’t. I don’t know. I don’t know whether it’s going to be very believable after the rash of stories that are going to come out, without question, after the last American leaves there, the whole feeling of Congress and the country would be, “Now, for Christ’s sakes, we’re out of Vietnam. Let’s don’t go back in.” [unclear]—

SCOWCROFT: There’s no—

NIXON: That’s right. And, I just don’t—I don’t buy that argument. I don’t buy that thesis at all, but that’s going to be the fact. [unclear]—

SCOWCROFT: There’s no question about that.

NIXON: And—

SCOWCROFT: I think—

NIXON: See, Henry’s often—always is [unclear] thinks, well, we did it in December, and we’re clear. It was quite risky then. And it did work [unclear] difficult things.

SCOWCROFT: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Well, this time we wouldn’t—that we were interested in. To wit: POWs. That was a major difference [unclear]. Then, get a settlement.

SCOWCROFT: Yeah. That’s right.

NIXON: But, now, why are we doing it?

SCOWCROFT: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: To guarantee the settlement? Of course, we’ve told Thieu we’d do it and all that. But, we’ve also told the American people that we’ve gotten them ready to defend themselves, and they’ve got an air force and all the rest, and they say, “Why the hell don’t they [the South Vietnamese] do it?”

SCOWCROFT: Well, that, and—though, there’s no question about that. I think, on the other side, the argument would be that they obviously are pushing against the agreement. They’re testing—

NIXON: That’s right.

SCOWCROFT: —to see what they can get away with, to see how far they can go. And, that if we hit them now, we will have registered something with them that—

NIXON: Indicating that, maybe, we can be pushed too far.

SCOWCROFT: That’s right. And that, maybe, it would forestall them doing something later on, which they otherwise would do, having decided that they can get away with almost anything, because we didn’t react this time.

NIXON: Right. That’s the argument.

 

Sides within an administration and within a scandal

March 20, 1973, 6:00 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Bob Haldeman

OVAL OFFICE

As a busy afternoon turned to evening, Nixon abruptly left his decision on the bombing of North Vietnam and began a discussion of Watergate with Haldeman. Watergate burglar and former CIA director of security James McCord had written a letter to Judge John Sirica strongly suggesting that witnesses had perjured themselves, that the burglars had been paid to stay quiet, and that unnamed higher-ups were involved. Conversations inside the Oval Office could be as defensive as testimony in a hearing, but Haldeman and Nixon were far more candid, discussing the people and crimes of Watergate. Haldeman credited Dean with developing a strategy of containment early in the scandal. Both he and Nixon readily subscribed to it, even as containment evolved into cover-up. The two began to recognize that trap on March 20, as they sorted through the scandal and those it encompassed. At the time, they still hoped the investigation might stop with those closely associated with the break-in—those they called “the Watergate side.” It’s indicative of the atmosphere in Nixon’s administration that Nixon and Haldeman considered themselves utterly separate from them.

…

HALDEMAN: Dean’s theory is that you aren’t necessarily going to get hung. It depends what you define by “hang.” There’s no question we’re going to get smeared.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: There’s no question that they’re going to keep building the innuendo that will lead into the White House and will be able to come to some proof.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: What they’ll call proof—consider proof on the basis that the line of reasoning they’re using now, that Dwight Chapin wouldn’t have done anything that I didn’t know about.

NIXON: That’s right. I understand.

HALDEMAN: Or, it might—that wasn’t in my orders and certainly Gordon Strachan did.

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: That’s only partly true. But it’s a sustainable assumption—but that part we can live with it and I see all four of them. Now, I’d like to go out and have us go out now and hit—if you take that part of the case and hit mine and admit. Say it’s absolutely true. I knew that Chapin was recruiting an old college friend of his to go out and run around doing Dick Tuck stuff—which is absolutely true. I did know. I did not know the guy’s name. I did not know the guy. I did not know what he was going to do. I did not know what we were going to pay him. I did know that Chapin was going to authorize some payment to him to cover his expenses and a basic income.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: That he was going to work full-time on this and was going to try to recruit other college-type guys to do this kind of stuff.

NIXON: Intelligence work [unclear]?

HALDEMAN: Not really intelligence. Because that wasn’t what was talked about. See, he wasn’t engaged in this—at least I don’t think he was engaged in espionage. He was engaged in—

NIXON: Tricks.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I think some of them got a little—that’s a euphemistic term for them—some of them. Because he did get a little far on the tricks. But they talked about—when they talked about doing it—the kind of tricks—that I said, for Christ’s sake don’t fool around with stuff like—they were going to cut cars, cut tires on press buses. You know, and take the keys out of cars in motorcades and that sort of stuff. I said that’s ridiculous. It’s childish and doesn’t do us any good. So I—

NIXON: [unclear] screw around.

HALDEMAN: What does—do us some good is to have a guy standing around with a sign saying, “McGovern, what about your illegitimate daughter?” or something. I hope we never used that one, but we were ready to—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Which I just might say if I didn’t call them somewhere someday. So I knew they were getting a guy and Chapin did do it with my concurrence and Strachan was a friend of the guy’s too. I knew that. That I have no problem with saying.

NIXON: I understand [unclear].

HALDEMAN: And I don’t think that hurts you.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Just say I did that. The problem is can’t the truth stop at the truth? Which that does—or does the innuendo go so—come then so hard on top of it that you can’t turn it off?

NIXON: And it goes to [unclear] of the truth—

HALDEMAN: It goes to the Watergate or which it seems to me, we ought to be able to turn off. But the problem is the price of turning it off may hurt the people on the Watergate side. At least that’s what they tell me. What bothers me is that I still think I’m being had in a sense for being tarred in order to protect some other people.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I think Chapin is being far worse tarred in order to protect other people—

NIXON: Yeah. The people on the Watergate side unfortunately are also our friends.

HALDEMAN: The people on the Watergate side are our friends and there it is far more seriousness. Because there—this one you can say was bad judgment on my part to let Chapin do this or I can say it was bad judgment on Chapin’s part to let the guy go as far as he did, or Chapin can say it was bad judgment on Segretti’s part—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —to do some of the things he did.

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: That’s probably right. All the way up to maybe bad judgment on my part. But on Watergate it isn’t a question of bad judgment. On Watergate it’s a question and there it goes and, ultimately, it seems to me that’s what they have got to focus on. And this—who was it that was telling me that what—or convinced they’re going to go after is—I guess it’s Ziegler. Ziegler’s theory is based on what the press guys say—convinced that what they’re after is Colson on criminal. They think he’s the highest guy they can get on criminal in the White House and Mitchell on the outside. Now, there—the worst—it isn’t—the worst you can get to is damn bad out there.

NIXON: It’s Mitchell.

HALDEMAN: Because if Mitchell was the authority.

NIXON: He’s the attorney general of the United States.

HALDEMAN: As attorney general of the United States, and—

NIXON: The president’s campaign manager. That’s pretty goddamn bad. That’s damn near as bad as it is out here. Do you agree with this?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Problems—

HALDEMAN: And there, if you have—

NIXON: Protect them to protect them—

HALDEMAN: —then you have to—then you start working your way back down that chain again. And maybe you can’t turn it off somewhere and that’s what John Dean—where he comes out every time we go around this circle.

NIXON: Yes, sir.

HALDEMAN: Then you get to the thing with Segretti. There is a potential—

NIXON: Segretti?

HALDEMAN: —a criminal violation on Segretti, too.

NIXON: On what? Some mailing? Horseshit, that’s so inconsequential.

HALDEMAN: Okay. But then he was Chapin’s agent, so does that make Chapin criminally liable? Chapin was my employee so does that make me criminally liable?

NIXON: Is that a felony?

HALDEMAN: No. It’s a misdemeanor.

NIXON: That’s what I mean.

HALDEMAN: It’s a misdemeanor committed without our specific knowledge, so I don’t see how we’re liable.

NIXON: Listen, campaigns—there’s never a campaign that didn’t have a mailing disclaimer or—

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: —[unclear] all they want. There’s all sort of [unclear].

HALDEMAN: We had the same thing in ’60—’62 in California. Democrats for Nixon—

NIXON: Yeah, I guess you’re right.

HALDEMAN: The Dem—no the Committee to Preserve the—the Committee to Preserve the Democratic Party in California. The thing that crazy woman got us into—Naomi Baxter.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah. You see the point is that it isn’t just Bob [unclear] whatever we’re calling it here, but it is a question of—to be frank with you, I—big fish, as we mentioned. Colson I knew was going to be hard to prove. I don’t see, I think, unless Colson’s lying to Steve—I mean Dean was questioning him. Dean does not believe that Colson—that they [unclear] Colson.

HALDEMAN: I don’t either. And as I’ve told you I’ve been convinced all along that Colson wasn’t—did not know.

NIXON: About this?

HALDEMAN: About the Watergate—

NIXON: I don’t think he did, and yet—

HALDEMAN: I don’t think he did either.

NIXON: —part of it [unclear] was saying that, of course—this is Magruder’s argument. Apparently he’s made it, too. Colson was insisting on getting the information but I don’t know why. I don’t know what—it was all a hoax—why he would be involved. If they were going to have a demonstration in San Diego or not was something I couldn’t quite figure out. Know what I mean? But he was in a lot of things. He got interested in too many things.

HALDEMAN: But Mitchell, as you know, was very much involved in the demonstration in San Diego. Remember Mitchell came in very concerned about changing the convention site because he was afraid of inability to control San Diego.

NIXON: Oh, yeah. Well, we got a lot of bad breaks there.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: We got a bad break with the judge, for example—

HALDEMAN: Monumental bad breaks and a string of them one leading to another.

NIXON: This judge, that—

HALDEMAN: Starting with the just incredible thing that one—was Time magazine this week started off their thing that one lousy part-time night guard [Frank Wills] at the Watergate who happened to notice the tape on the locks on the doors. If he hadn’t seen them the thing probably would have never busted. If you hadn’t had Watergate you wouldn’t have had Segretti. You wouldn’t have had any of that stuff. And then all the stuff on the contributors.

NIXON: Must be for—it isn’t they’re really after [unclear] the administration and so forth. The people that are yelling about us at us about it are basically the old Establishment, the Times, [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Well, let’s see.

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: The one niche that they—and I don’t think they see here where they’re going to get but they see there’s still an opportunity and they’re going to grind away till they either exhaust it or get to something.

NIXON: In a sense, if there was a way to get the hearings over in a hurry, that’s it. The theory that Baker had, which of course I rejected, but was [unclear]—give us—get all of them—get us all of them—everybody—have them all up there and have them all testify and he said choke the goddamn thing for the week and after that people will be bored to death. Well, that makes sense provided you could—

HALDEMAN: It doesn’t go anywhere.

NIXON: No, provided you can run the risk of having your people go out there and be asked a lot of tough questions by a smart goddamn lawyer. So, my view is probably we would be better advised to stick—the guy that most wants to stick to it is Colson. Obviously, he’s—you know, I don’t think he wants to be questioned and I can see why because of other involvements [unclear]. So, therefore—

HALDEMAN: He’s the only one who doesn’t want to be.

NIXON: [unclear] needs to fight for executive privilege. Obviously, no, we’re just not going to allow it mainly because we just can’t allow that sort of thing to come out. But then what you have to do is to—you’ve got to fight through the goddamn courts. It’s going to take a long time. [unclear] for a long time. The story of cover-up—that’s what’s involved.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Right?

HALDEMAN: And that’s bad. That’s really worse than the—

NIXON: Than the act that [unclear].

HALDEMAN: It isn’t really worse—it isn’t worse than John Mitchell going to jail for either perjury or complicity.

NIXON: No, no, no. I’ve balanced that out, too. But you see what they’re really after. Hell, take cover-up till hell freezes over. You know what I mean? Because—

HALDEMAN: If that’s really where it goes and I guess it is.

NIXON: But John—Bob—you can’t figure Magruder did it by himself. That’s what—I just don’t believe Magruder’s that much as a competent operator. [unclear]

HALDEMAN: I’m not sure if that’s—I’m not sure.

NIXON: Sounds to me like—see that’s the only thing that I think they must really think—the investigator thinks. “Christ, Magruder would a—I mean, a decision like that would be made by Magruder?” Of course, he was the managing manager in effect. Yeah, I think—

HALDEMAN: I think it’s now—I think Dean thinks it’s possible that it was—

NIXON: —that Magruder may have done on it on his own, because—do you think he was capable?

HALDEMAN: Well, done the specific thing on his own within a broad authority that he misinterpreted—

NIXON: In other words—

HALDEMAN: In other words, Mitchell was clearly aware and fully aware of the Liddy intelligence operation. No question about that.

NIXON: But maybe not of the specific—

HALDEMAN: But maybe not of the specific act, and it would be perfectly—

NIXON: Magruder was aware of the act.

HALDEMAN: Well, he says he wasn’t in court. And you can even go to that step and buy it.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Which is that Liddy was doing it and on—under the broad authority, but then you get down to will Liddy take the heat?

NIXON: Well, let me say this but coming back to the business about trying to get everybody up there and all the rest we’ve got to remember what could be involved. Let’s see the whole view going up, and so forth. [unclear] or maybe not.

HALDEMAN: It wasn’t me and I don’t think it has to be Dwight, but Dwight I think may have to recant some of these [unclear] or explain them.

NIXON: Yes, that’s—

HALDEMAN: Some of what I said earlier.

NIXON: That’s right. Well, what I meant then might be an advantage. Let’s see. Oh, it’s what—I mean, maybe my reasoning is fallacious, if our real concern is Mitchell. Maybe they’re going to get him anyway.

HALDEMAN: Well, John, at least the last I got into it in any detail, John Dean didn’t think so.

NIXON: That they’re going to get Mitchell—that right?

HALDEMAN: See, John Dean’s whole approach as I understand it—this is when we went through it out in California for two full days. What came out of is his whole premise—his basic approach to this is one of containment. Keep it in this box and he thinks he can. And that box goes on the theory that Liddy did it without authority from above and Liddy’s been convicted of doing it. Liddy was the responsible guy at the campaign organization. He’s the highest guy that they’ve got. The other people were employees of Liddy’s.

NIXON: Well, that’s the way the case stands at the moment. Then, of course, if the judge blasts the hell out of that Friday I suppose he could say he doesn’t believe in that—it must go further—didn’t get cooperation and so forth.

HALDEMAN: Liddy apparently is a little bit nuts and a masochist and apparently he wants to—looks to the martyrdom of doing this. He kind of likes it. And that’s true. Maybe that’s where it’ll stay. That’s Dean’s—that’s his hope. That’s what he’s frantically trying to keep—not frantically—persistently trying to keep—

NIXON: Liddy’ll appeal it—

HALDEMAN: [unclear] strings in—

NIXON: Who are appealing it? McCord? Liddy should beat it. Son of a bitch, they’re two of them—McCord. Hunt’s not it.

HALDEMAN: Hunt went and pleaded guilty. They all pleaded guilty and—

NIXON: He’s appealing.

HALDEMAN: Liddy and McCord didn’t plead guilty.

NIXON: Liddy’s appealing that—

HALDEMAN: Liddy’s appealing but Liddy’s not appealing on the merits. He’s appealing on the errors. Liddy’s going for errors. There you’ve got another problem. Liddy’s a lawyer who thinks he’s smarter than the judge and the court, and the court prosecutor, which every lawyer seems to have to convince himself of. Liddy’s game is purely, as I understand it, his appeal game is purely on errors.

NIXON: Oh, sure.

HALDEMAN: Then he’s apparently got some—at least some possibilities—

NIXON: Sirica?

HALDEMAN: Has some areas of potential challenge of errors.

NIXON: Well, coming back to this, I mean it is the coming free of the White House people.

HALDEMAN: That doesn’t impair that other case at all.

NIXON: Magruder and Mitchell, that’s my point.

HALDEMAN: Because if containment theory works then I don’t see what danger it is in our going up because we don’t have anything to say. The people you’re protecting by executive privilege—let’s face it are—well, Jesus, you’ve got Ehrlichman. I don’t know about Ehrlichman. John knows a hell of a lot.

NIXON: He does know a hell of a lot but not about this case.

HALDEMAN: Doesn’t he? Okay.

NIXON: Not about Watergate. He doesn’t know a goddamn thing.

HALDEMAN: I don’t think he [unclear].

NIXON: He ran the other thing. He ran, you know—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: You know, the stuff about—

HALDEMAN: Well, can they expand to that? If they can what does he do? Sure they can. There are no rules of evidence up there. Their charter is to cover all the campaign activity.

NIXON: They were [unclear]. Fine, fine. But I can’t—Ellsberg, I can’t.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Teddy Kennedy.

NIXON: Well, I don’t think that’s going to be on the market. I think John’s in pretty good shape. Now I don’t think we could now—however, I don’t think we can shift our ground and cave on the idea of privilege thing. But I think we have to find a way to make statements. They will not accept statements until they are free to subpoena. That’s the theory I’m working on with them now and Dean and Moore are trying to see what can they say, and then of course everything we say will raise additional questions. But so be it.

HALDEMAN: Well—

NIXON: It’s better to have statements—

HALDEMAN: All right, all right. Look, we’ve agreed to answer written interrogation, right? I—for instance—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —I have to do that. Chapin has to do that.

NIXON: Everybody.

HALDEMAN: We’ve all agreed to do that.

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: Okay, but why the hell don’t we do a—instead of if they submit it, why don’t we sit down and do our statement right now?

NIXON: That’s what I have suggested.

HALDEMAN: Why doesn’t Dean ask me the questions that the committee will ask me? Why don’t I write my answers down? Why doesn’t Chapin write his? And why don’t we give those to the Washington Star and let them print the goddamn things in total tomorrow morning?

NIXON: We went over all that.

HALDEMAN: What’s wrong with that?

NIXON: I told him—try to see why couldn’t each of you make a sworn statement. He and Moore over the weekend decided that it would open too many doors for him.

HALDEMAN: Really?

NIXON: Dean’s the expert here. Bob—I think this is—

HALDEMAN: Well damn it, why don’t we make them and see? I mean, without putting them out? Why don’t we take the step we’re doing? We’re going to have to apparently anyway and so he says we’re going to open too many doors. Aren’t they going to open? We’ve already agreed to do that anyway.

NIXON: Except that they’ll—you see his point is, well, anyway let’s try it. I don’t mind. It’s worth trying. His point is that we don’t—that they will never take the statements so it’s never going to happen. See, that’s the other course that’s the problem. They’re never going to take written statements.

HALDEMAN: You mean they won’t accept them at all?

NIXON: Hell no. But that’s all right. You see, my point is the way we end up is that if we refuse to go up but they will have a—they will say, “We will not accept that” and then they’ll go down and under the law they’ll try to subpoena, which we will quash, and we’ll have a court test. All right, that’s where it stands, so we have to fight that out in the courts and try to make a case with the other witnesses waiting for the court test. Of course, [unclear] and the other way to do it is to—so that rules that out—and you have got no statements at all. Now the problem with that—confronts me with is that it appears that I covered up the White House people. I won’t let that statement—so what, that’s why I told Dean and the rest, I said, “Why don’t you just put out a statement?” Any kind of a statement. Of course, I said make it as general as possible but just so somebody can say that the president—that a statement has been made through the president, upon which he has based his statement to the effect that he has confidence in his staff. See, I mean it looks now that I am just doing that as a thumb-your-nose—screw-off. You see my point?

HALDEMAN: Except that everybody seems to accept the fact that there is a Dean report to the president on the basis of which the president said that.

NIXON: Yeah. Maybe.

HALDEMAN: And we’ve now established that—as I understand it, that Dean—no, I guess we haven’t, but we can’t—that it was an oral report, not a written report.

NIXON: Yeah. And that he conducted an investigation and so forth, but that needs—you see, by having a statement prepared—statement or statements prepared which are delivered to the committee, preferably I’d like to have delivery—what I told Dean—make one up, that’s what he’s working on now, to make a delivery to Eastland. Eastland then puts it out, and the purpose of answering all the recent charges. The most recent charges, not everything—

HALDEMAN: The Dean charges.

NIXON: The Dean charges. And Ziegler said, but “that raises too many questions—new questions,” so then John Ehrlichman says that those questions [laughs] are going to be raised anyway.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: That’s my point of view that maybe they’re going to be raised anyway.

HALDEMAN: I don’t understand what Ron means, but maybe he’s right. I don’t think—

NIXON: I don’t think—

HALDEMAN: I’ve spent more time on this than anybody really and I don’t know any questions that aren’t already out.

NIXON: But they—I don’t quite know either, that’s my point. I don’t know what the hell other questions—

HALDEMAN: Well, I think if Ron says it’ll raise new questions, the burden of proof is on him. What are they?

NIXON: Yeah. I see.

HALDEMAN: I don’t—I’m not so sure—

NIXON: He’s already [unclear] people [unclear] something to do. Mostly has to do with Segretti and Chapin, that’s the thing.

HALDEMAN: Well, I don’t understand why we can’t run that one out—

NIXON: I personally think that you’ve got to—you’ve got a bunch—Segretti and Chapin. We’ve just got to let that one hang out—

HALDEMAN: Here’s the first thing—

NIXON: I really do.

HALDEMAN: I don’t—in the first place, the guy that knows the most about the Segretti thing is Segretti.

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: The guy that knows the next—well, the guy that knows the next most is Chapin, who is protected. The guy that knows the next most after that is Strachan, who’s protected. The guy that knows the next most after that is Kalmbach, who’s not protected. And the guy that knows the next most is me, who’s protected and that’s the end of the Segretti story I think.

NIXON: Yeah. So put it out.

HALDEMAN: Okay. The point there is that the guy that knows the most is Segretti. He is not protected.

NIXON: So, he’s going to get questioned?

HALDEMAN: So, he’s going to get questioned. Now, I’ve heard Segretti’s—Dean has a two-hour tape where he interrogated Segretti and went through the whole damn thing and, maybe I’m stupid, but I listened to the whole tape and for my dough I’d just as soon play it out on the radio tonight on CBS and let the world hear it.

NIXON: That’s my feeling.

HALDEMAN: Because what it says to me is not nearly as bad as what I would venture ninety percent of the people in this country think happened.

NIXON: Sure.

HALDEMAN: But it does confirm that Dwight Chapin recruited him, and he gives him the details. He had him to dinner at his house and he had—Gordon Strachan was there. But, what the hell? He went to school with Dwight Chapin.

NIXON: Already, Bob, that’s already put out anyway—

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That’s already been put out.

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That he had been recruited. What the hell [unclear]? I disagree.

HALDEMAN: Now Ron’s worried because that make—because we denied—we didn’t deny it and Ron had covered that.

NIXON: Who denied it? I thought—

HALDEMAN: The press—that Ron—see we denied the Chapin story in the Post, but he denied it on the basis that it was based on hearsay—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —and was fundamentally incorrect.

NIXON: Fundamentally—

HALDEMAN: And it was.

NIXON: Yeah, fundamentally. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: We didn’t deny any specifics in it.

NIXON: That, of course—I think what Ron should say is that “fundamentally incorrect.” Fundamentally.

HALDEMAN: All we can—let’s go back and make the case on that.

NIXON: Say that the Post story said this, this, this, and this, and I think that’s the way you want to handle that. For example, the Post story said this, this, and this. This was incorrect. This is incorrect. This is incorrect. Why? Now what is correct is this, this, this, and this. That’s the way you ought to handle that so as to get us off the hook on that. So the press secretary did not lie. Well, my feeling is that taking a—we’re not going to [unclear] a plan here. That’s all I’m after. The point is, my feeling is that if the facts are going to come out in all this period of time, I would rather have us get them out to the extent we can in a forthcoming way so that [unclear].

HALDEMAN: I don’t know if Dean’s filled you in on this stuff. I know another thing that worries him. This I’d forgotten about, that it leads to—because he’s afraid that Sloan—

NIXON: Sloan?

HALDEMAN: He’s afraid that—that you know, he gets Sloan up that—that he’s—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —that he’s got to say something because there’s another fact that’s never come out—they’ve never tracked down but they could. And again it appears it’s terrible—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

HALDEMAN: —but it isn’t at all. And the facts on it are worked out fine. But there was three hundred fifty thousand dollars in cash transferred out of the campaign fund over to a separate holder and it was under Strachan’s control. It was, in a sense, trans—in essence, transferred to me. What that was supposed to have been, if you recall, was two million dollars which we, way back, had told Stans we wanted—it was that leftover cash [from the 1970 election] that we wanted set aside.

NIXON: Oh, yeah.

HALDEMAN: Before reporting and all that just so it was there as a reserve fund.

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Well, it got boiled down because of reporting problems and everything else to where we only moved three hundred fifty thousand. The three hundred fifty thousand in cash was moved.

NIXON: And that was used for polls?

HALDEMAN: That was the purpose of that was to be for polls and everything else. It was not used for polls or anything else. It wasn’t used. And that has been transferred back to the reelection committee. It was transferred after the election. The cash was moved back over—

NIXON: Oh, I see.

HALDEMAN: —to Mardian—not Mardian—LaRue. Fred LaRue and his backup. So, the money was not spent.

NIXON: What’s the difference then?

HALDEMAN: Okay. The difference is that establishes, if they want to call it that—you can look at the yellow journalism—a secret fund that Haldeman controlled. You could say, which I guess I did. The question of who controlled it never arose because it was never used. Physically Strachan—actually Strachan did. Then some other guy did. I don’t even know who had it—some guy I don’t even know put the stuff in a box—in a safe out in Virginia somewhere, I understand. That’s where it was held.

NIXON: Well, if they go into all that, there are boxes in every campaign.

HALDEMAN: That worries Dean. That one has never worried me. I—and maybe there’s more to it than I—there’s something to it than I’ve found.

NIXON: Sure. Well, that worries me, too. Can you start to [unclear]—I don’t know. Of course, none of us really knows what to do here because of—

HALDEMAN: I think each of us filing a statement now that’s as complete as we can make it.

NIXON: That’s right. That’s the way.

HALDEMAN: But that it is not a statement under—

NIXON: Duress.

HALDEMAN: —under questioning that says there is nothing else to say. I wouldn’t say it.

NIXON: No.

HALDEMAN: I wouldn’t say that this is the whole truth.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I’d say in relation to the charges—

NIXON: Yeah, very good.

HALDEMAN: —that have been raised—

NIXON: Charges that have been made and then I’ll be glad to answer any other questions.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Yeah. I would say is there any other? I think you’ve got to abandon the disclaimer at the end.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Now if other questions are raised I’ll be glad to answer them. See what I mean? Sure. Now, that way I don’t see how this—and if they raise the other questions, then you answer them.

 

Dean’s off-the-record story of Watergate

March 20, 1973, 7:29 P.M.

Richard Nixon and John Dean

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

The Judiciary Committee’s intention to call Dean to testify in Gray’s confirmation hearing became a battle even more important than the war. Those within the White House and on the committee had long since realized that Gray’s nomination to head the FBI was all but dead, due entirely to the acting director’s candor in discussing the Watergate investigation and the aftermath of the break-in. On March 20, in fact, Attorney General Kleindienst starkly ordered Gray to stop discussing Watergate in the hearings. By then it was something of a moot point, though, and his order only roiled committee members, both Democratic and Republican. Even as the chances of a confirmation slipped away, committee members were insistent that Dean testify regarding Gray’s comments on Watergate. In fact, they made it an issue more important than Gray’s status as a nominee.

…

NIXON: Well, you’re having rather long days these days, aren’t you?

DEAN: Yeah. [laughs]

NIXON: I guess we all have. Yeah.

DEAN: Well, I think they’ll continue to be longer.

NIXON: What happened today in the Senate? Anything—

DEAN: Well, I understand that Gray took a little beating up there today. He was—the approach they’re working that he’s been an abandoned man.

NIXON: Oh boy.

DEAN: Evidenced by the fact that Kleindienst would not let him [coughs]—excuse me—insert things in the record that he desired to insert in the record and it was quite clear that he has been left hanging by—being countermanded by you and your decision.

NIXON: Well, you know in a sense that I didn’t countermand him at all, I simply said—

DEAN: No, I know, this is a theme they’re playing.

NIXON: Yeah, fine.

DEAN: They’re trying to play. And, uh—

NIXON: This is in the committee or on the floor?

DEAN: It’s in the committee.

NIXON: Open or executive?

DEAN: This was in open session.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: They are, they subpoenaed three additional witnesses—Tom Bishop, who is a former FBI man who was canned by Gray, who used to run their PR section.

NIXON: Good. That’s good.

DEAN: They’re trying to pull him in there on sour grapes and—

NIXON: Good. That wouldn’t bother me. Does it bother you?

DEAN: No, and it sets a precedent—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —for this fellow Sullivan going up.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: Which is interesting.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Then—

NIXON: Well, the fellow that we could—isn’t Gurney a member of that committee?

DEAN: Gurney is.

NIXON: He could just ask for Sullivan.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: How would that be?

DEAN: That wouldn’t be bad at all.

NIXON: You don’t have Sullivan’s report yet?

DEAN: No, Sullivan told me—he was out of town—he will have it for me tomorrow.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: He will skip a meeting that he has in the morning to make—

NIXON: Just a second. [gives series of instructions to an unknown assistant]

DEAN: —sure he gets it [unclear] and over to me.

…

NIXON: Yeah, go ahead.

DEAN: So he will have it over to me tomorrow, and I said—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —I absolutely have to have it tomorrow. There just can’t be any further deadline. The time is here to look and see what you’ve got and he said, “Well, I think I’ve got good stuff. I think it’s supportable, documentable.” I said, “Well, Bill, I want to see it just as quickly as possible tomorrow morning.”

NIXON: Good.

DEAN: ’Cause it will be over. And the other witness they’ve now subpoenaed—there are two other witnesses—there’s the [Judy] Hoback girl from the reelection committee, who, she was interrogated by committee staff and counsel as a result of her confidential interviews with the FBI—alleging that that had been leaked by me to them and then, of course, that was not—

NIXON: That’s not true.

DEAN: —not true. And the other fellow they’re calling is a fellow by the name of Thomas Lombard who is trying to establish a link between Dean on that one. Lombard did volunteer work for me in my office and did volunteer work for Liddy and at one time he saw Liddy in my office. Big deal. [unclear] purely campaign. You know.

NIXON: Well, is that what Lombard will testify to, or will he testify to—

DEAN: Well, that’s what he’ll—he’s written a very lengthy letter to the committee asking, declining to testify originally and saying, “This is all I would have to say and it’s obviously not relevant. I know nothing of Dean and Liddy’s—”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: “—connection—”

NIXON: Yeah, right.

DEAN: “—other than the fact that they—”

NIXON: That’s not bad then. Maybe he’ll make a pretty good witness.

DEAN: He might. He might. Uh—

NIXON: What about the Hoback girl?

DEAN: The Hoback girl should be broken down. She should come out in tears as a result of the fact that she’s virtually lying about what she’s saying. And our people will, beyond a—

NIXON: Well, you mean, do our people know what to ask her?

DEAN: Yes, they do. Yes, they do.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: Why is she doing it? Do we know?

DEAN: She, uh—

NIXON: Disgruntled? Somebody—

DEAN: Disgruntled. She’s been fairly disgruntled all along. She’s a Democrat that worked over there in the Finance Committee. She professes a personal loyalty to Maury Stans but that is about the extent of it—any extent of her loyalty.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: I never did figure out how she got in there. So, all told—I’m told that today was a bad day for Gray and not much of a, uh—

NIXON: [laughs]

DEAN: —not much of a—but they’re taking a whip—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —out on the floor to see what the [unclear] out there.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: We’ll have that tomorrow morning.

NIXON: What’s your feeling, though, John, about Gray? Aren’t you just as comfortable to let him go down?

DEAN: I don’t—

NIXON: Which do you want? I mean, we can put some pressures on, and I just wonder.

DEAN: I don’t think it’s worth saving, sir. I really don’t.

NIXON: Yeah, well, that’s my point. Isn’t it really a case of if they want to make him the martyr, they’re gonna make him the martyr.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Do you agree or not or—?

DEAN: I would—

NIXON: If you feel differently, let me know.

DEAN: I would agree that they’re trying to make him a martyr. I think that Pat Gray’s been so damaged by these hearings that he will—

NIXON: Shouldn’t be the head of the bureau.

DEAN: —will be difficult for him to be the head of the bureau.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: It will be a year, two years for him to recover.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: It’s like [Congressman] Dick Poff [R-VA] when he decided to withdraw [a Supreme Court nomination in 1971] even from consideration for the court knowing that he would never be an effective justice [during confirmation hearings] for years.

NIXON: That’s right. The thing is, too—that Gray though has got to make up his mind on that pretty soon. Don’t you think so?

DEAN: I would—you know, I thought I’d be a called [witness]—

NIXON: In fact, I was thinking you ought to do it fairly soon.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Excuse me, what were you gonna say?

DEAN: I was thinking he might call today, very easily, and say you know, at least make a pro forma gesture to see if someone over there—you know, if you were interested. Now—

NIXON: What’s the Kleindienst view of the whole thing now? Is he stayin’ a mile away?

DEAN: I’ll—haven’t talk to Dick tonight, so I don’t know—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —what his reading is on the latest activity.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: It’s uh, it might be better to let it just die in—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —committee and not get it out of there. Apparently, there’s—it’s tied up at seven to seven now. [unclear] the votes.

NIXON: Oh, it is seven to seven in the committee?

DEAN: That’s right. And McClellan and Eastland are hanging, in not knowing which way—not—McClellan and Mathias are hanging in the balance. I suspect we could probably get McClellan’s vote and lose Mathias’s.

NIXON: It will be eight to eight, huh?

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: [laughs]

DEAN: That ties it up and that will not confirm it from a [unclear].

NIXON: Yeah. Well, if you got it out, yeah. McClellan surprises me. Good God, he knows better than this.

DEAN: He’s turned a little funny recently. He’s generally, you know, pretty much of a soldier on—

NIXON: What’s his trouble, for Christ’s sake? He’s just got reelected and I helped him.

DEAN: I know it.

NIXON: One hell of a lot.

DEAN: I know it. I know it.

NIXON: Well—

DEAN: Well, [unclear]—

NIXON: Getting old!

DEAN: That’s right! [laughs]

NIXON: That’s right. Yeah. Well, on that score I don’t consider this too bad a day. I think maybe that’s the way the dreary thing’s gonna roll itself out, isn’t it?

DEAN: It’s, I think this will be a self-terminating situation. It will just be a no end and—

NIXON: But they didn’t bite the bullet with regard to subpoenaing you?

DEAN: No. I don’t think there’s any chance they’re going to do that.

NIXON: That’s rather interesting, isn’t it? Something ought to be made of that.

DEAN: Unless they get—they’re taking more evidence on me, obviously with these other two witnesses. Not that they’re going to find something out—it’ll just be more—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —of the same old stuff. I had a conversation with John Ehrlichman this afternoon before he came down to visit you, and I think that one thing we have to continually do and particularly right now, is to examine the broadest implications of this whole thing, and I, you know, maybe thirty minutes, of just my recitation to you of—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —the facts so that you operate from the same facts that everybody else has.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: And I don’t think—we’ve never really done that. It’s been sort of bits and pieces. Just paint the whole picture for you, the soft spots, the potential problem areas—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —and the like. So that when you make judgments you’ll—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —have all that out.

NIXON: Would you like to do that? When?

DEAN: I would think if it’s not inconvenient for you, sir, I would like to sort of draw all my thoughts together and have a, you know, just make a couple notes to myself so I didn’t—

NIXON: Well, could you do it tomorrow?

DEAN: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

NIXON: Mm-hmm. Then we could probably do it, say, around ten o’clock?

DEAN: That would be fine, sir.

NIXON: How about—you just want to do it alone? Want anybody else there?

DEAN: I think just—

NIXON: It is better with nobody else there, isn’t it?

DEAN: Absolutely, I think that’s a good way.

NIXON: Anybody else you—they’re all parties in interest, virtually.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Right. Fine. The other thing I was going to say is this, that just for your own thinking, I still want to see, though, you know the—you and Dick I guess have still worked on your letter and all that sort of thing?

DEAN: We are and [laughs] we’re coming and—the more we work on it the more questions we see that—

NIXON: You don’t want to answer.

DEAN: —are creating problems by answering.

NIXON: And so you’re coming up then with the idea of just a stonewall then? Is that—

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Is that what you come down with?

DEAN: A stonewall with lots of noises that we are always willing to cooperate, but no one’s asking us for anything to—

NIXON: And they never will, huh? But, you know, there’s no way that you could make even a general statement that I could put—you understand what I’m do—

DEAN: I think we could, uh—

NIXON: See, for example, I was even thinking if you could even talk to the cabinet, the leaders, you know, just you—just orally say, “I have looked into this, and this is that” period, so that people get sort of feel that—you know, your own people gotta be reassured.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Could you do that?

DEAN: Well, I think I can but I don’t think you’d want to make that decision until we have about a—

NIXON: No, I wanna know. I wanna know where all the bodies are first.

DEAN: Right, and then once you decide after that—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —we can program it any way you want it to.

NIXON: Yeah. Because I think, for example, you could do orally, for example, even if you don’t want to make the written statement, you could do orally with, say, the cabinet and the leaders and the rest. You can lay it all out and say, “Look, I”—see I would not be present. You just lay it all out and I just—see what I mean?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Now that is one thing. The other thing is that in—I do think there is something to be said for this, not maybe this complete answer to this fellow, but maybe just a written statement to me. You know, saying [laughs], “My conclusions are this: bing, bing, bing, bing.”

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Even that’s a possibility. So what I mean is we need something to answer somebody, answer things with. You know they say that “what are you basing this on,” you can say, “Well, I’ve exam—my counsel has advised me that”—is that possible or not? Or are you—

DEAN: Well, I—you know there’s that, and there’s always the FBI report which we have probably not relied upon enough, that there’s not one scintilla of evidence.

NIXON: I know. But I mean, can’t you say that? Or do you want to put it out?

DEAN: Yes, it could be said, and it is something we haven’t really emphasized. Pat Gray is the only person that has said it and it has really never gotten picked up.

NIXON: Yeah. How would you do it then? What I meant is isn’t that something that you could say? Do you want to publish the FBI report?

DEAN: Oh, no. Oh, no—

NIXON: Then—

DEAN: —because in our, our own—

NIXON: Fine. Right.

DEAN: —structures we’re trying to place on it [unclear]—

NIXON: But what—but you could say, “I had this and this is that.” What I am getting at is that if apart from a statement to the committee or anything else, if you could just make a statement to me that we can use, you know, for internal purposes and to answer [unclear] and so forth.

DEAN: As we did when you, back in August, made the statement that—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —[unclear] all the things.

NIXON: You’ve got to have something where—

DEAN: That was a [unclear]—

NIXON: —where it doesn’t appear that I’m just doing this, you know, just in a—saying to hell with the Congress and the hell with the people, we’re not going to tell you anything because of executive privilege. That they don’t understand. But if you say, “No, we are willing to cooperate, and he’s made a complete”—you’ve made a complete statement, you see, but make it very incomplete. See, that’s what I mean. I don’t want a, quite too much in chapter and verse as you did in your other—your letter. I just want a general—

DEAN: —general [unclear]. Let me, uh—

NIXON: Try just something general.

DEAN: —[unclear] it around.

NIXON: “I have checked into this matter. I can say categorically, based on my investigation, the following: Haldeman is not involved in this, that, and the other thing. Mr. Colson did not do this and Mr. So-and-So did not do this and Mr. Blank did not do this.” And da-da-da-da-da, right down the line. See, taking the most glaring things.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: “If there are any further questions, please let me know.” See?

DEAN: Mm-hmm. I think we can do that.

NIXON: That’s one possibility, and then if you could say that such things—and then use the FBI report to the cabinet and leaders, it might be very salutary. Just—see our own people have gotta have confidence or they are not going to step up and defend us. You see my problem—see our problem there, don’t you?

DEAN: And I think at the same time it would be good to brief these people on what executive privilege means, so they can go out and speak about it.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: Some of them are floundering, uh—

NIXON: And why it’s necessary.

DEAN: I started having somebody in my office today prepare some material that can be put out by the congressional people so they can understand—people who want to defend us have a piece of paper—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: —that they know they can talk from as to what it all—

NIXON: Pointing out that we’re defending the Constitution, it’s the responsibility, the separation of powers, and that we have to do it, distinguishing the [Sherman] Adams case [involving improper gifts he had received] and sort of ignoring Flanigan [laughs].

DEAN: [laughs]

NIXON: Which is one we shouldn’t have ever agreed to. But nevertheless—anyway, let’s think a little about that, but we’ll see you at ten o’clock tomorrow.

DEAN: Yes, sir.

NIXON: Fine.

DEAN: All right, sir.

NIXON: All right, fine.

DEAN: Good night.

NIXON: Take the evening off.

DEAN: [laughs] All right.

 

A cancer on the presidency

March 21, 1973, 10:12 A.M.

Richard Nixon, Bob Haldeman, and John Dean

OVAL OFFICE

Overnight between March 20 and 21, Dean came to recognize two points: (1) both he and the administration were in the midst of a truly massive crisis, and (2) the president had a shockingly poor grasp of the facts of Watergate. This realization came just four days after Dean emphatically said “We will win!” to Nixon.

Dean was facing an uncertain fate, in terms of testimony and implication in criminal activity. He simultaneously realized that his boss, the man whose lead he followed almost blindly, was making decisions based on a confused or even oblivious understanding of Watergate. Dean resolved that night to take a blunt tone in their meeting on the twenty-first and drive home the realities. Leaving his more usual “yes-man” personality behind, he started his meeting the next morning by telling the president something rather simple: what happened. Just how much of it Nixon already knew has been questioned ever since, but in their conversation that day, Dean left a succinct record of, at the very least, what he knew and when he knew it. Nixon, Haldeman, and Dean all feared that Hunt or one of the Watergate burglars would try to save himself by implicating others, including White House staffers. Nixon pressed the idea of payments in the form of hush money: up to $1 million. Within one day, Hunt had his first payment of $75,000. That constituted obstruction of justice and was the beginning of the end of the Nixon presidency.^*

…

NIXON: Well, sit down. Sit down.

DEAN: Good morning.

NIXON: Well, what is the Dean summary of the day about?

DEAN: John [Ehrlichman] caught me on the way out and asked me about why Gray was holding back on information—if that was under instructions from us. And, it was and it wasn’t. It was instructions proposed by the attorney general, consistent with your press conference statement, that no further raw data was to be turned over to the—

NIXON: Full committee.

DEAN: —full committee.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: And that was the extent of it. Then Gray himself is the one who reached the conclusion that no more information be turned over. He’d turned over enough. So this is again Pat Gray making decisions on his own as to how to handle his hearings. He has been totally unwilling all along to take any guidance, any instruction. We don’t know what he is going to do. He is not going to talk about it. He won’t review it and I don’t think—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —he does it to harm you in any way, sir.

NIXON: He’s just quite stubborn and—he’s quite stubborn. Also, he isn’t very smart. You know what I mean?

DEAN: He is bullheaded.

NIXON: He is smart in his own way, but—

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: —he’s got that typical, “Well, by God, this is right and they’re not going to do it.”

DEAN: That’s why he thinks he’ll be confirmed, because he thinks he’s being his own man. He’s being forthright, honest. He is—feels he has turned over too much and so it’s a conscious decision that he is harming the bureau by doing this and so he is not going to—

NIXON: I hope to God that we get off—later off though today that this is because the White House told him to do this or that or the other thing. And also, I told Ehrlichman, I don’t see why our little boys can’t make something out of the fact that, God darn it, this is the only responsible decision you could possibly make. The FBI cannot turn over raw files. Has anybody made that point? I have tried.

DEAN: Sam Ervin has made that point himself.

NIXON: Did he?

DEAN: In fact, in reading the transcript of Gray’s hearings, Ervin tried to hold Gray back from doing what he was doing at the time he did it—thought it was very unwise. I don’t think that anyone is criticizing—

NIXON: Well, let’s say—

DEAN: —your position on it.

NIXON: Let’s make the point that the raw files cannot be turned over. Well, I think that point should be made.

DEAN: That—

NIXON: We are standing for the rights of innocent individuals. The American Civil Liberty [Liberties] Union is against it. We’re against it. We will—because tradition, and it will continue to be the tradition that all files are—I’d like to turn them all over to somebody. I’d like to get a chance for [unclear] to put it out. What don’t you talk to [unclear] and see what his [unclear] on it.

DEAN: How damaging—?

NIXON: Any further word on Sullivan? Is he still—?

DEAN: Yeah, he’s going to be over to see me today—this morning, hopefully sometime. Uh—

NIXON: As soon as you get that, I’ll be available to talk to you this afternoon.

DEAN: All right, sir.

NIXON: I will be busy until about one o’clock. After that you can come back. Anytime you are through I would like to see whatever he has. We’ve got something but I’d like to just see what it is.

DEAN: The reason I thought we ought to talk this morning is because in our conversations, I have the impression that you don’t know everything I know—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —and it makes it very difficult for you to make judgments that only you can make—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —on some of these things and I thought that—

NIXON: You’ve got—in other words, I’ve got to know why you feel that something—

DEAN: Well, let me—

NIXON: —that we shouldn’t unravel something.

DEAN: Let me give you my overall first.

NIXON: In other words, your judgment as to where it stands, and where we go now.

DEAN: I think that there’s no doubt about the seriousness of the problem we’re—we’ve got. We have a cancer—within—close to the presidency, that’s growing. It’s growing daily. It’s compounding. It grows geometrically now, because it compounds itself. That’ll be clear as I explain, you know, some of the details of why it is. And it basically is because, one, we’re being blackmailed, two, people are going to start perjuring themselves very quickly that have not had to perjure themselves to protect other people and the like. And that is just—and there is no assurance—

NIXON: That it won’t bust.

DEAN: That that won’t bust.

NIXON: True.

DEAN: So let me give you the sort of basic facts, talking first about the Watergate, and then about Segretti, and then about some of the peripheral items that have come up. First of all, on the Watergate: how did it all start? Where did it start? It started with an instruction to me from Bob Haldeman to see if we couldn’t set up a perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence operation over at the reelection committee.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: Not being in this business, I turned to somebody who had been in this business—Jack Caulfield, who is—I don’t know if you remember Jack or not. He was your original bodyguard before—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —they had—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —candidate—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —protection—an old New York City policeman.

NIXON: Right. I know—I know him.

DEAN: Jack had worked for John [Ehrlichman] and then was transferred to my office. I said, “Jack, come up with a plan that, you know, is a normal infiltration—I mean, you know, buying information from secretaries and all that sort of thing.” He did—he put together a plan. It was kicked around and I went to Ehrlichman with it. I went to Mitchell with it, and the consensus was that Caulfield wasn’t the man to do this. In retrospect, that might have been a bad call, because he is an incredibly cautious person and wouldn’t have put the situation where it is today.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: All right, after rejecting that, they said, “We still need something,” so I was told to look around for somebody that could go over to 1701 [Pennsylvania Avenue SE, the address of Nixon’s CRP] and do this. That’s when I came up with Gordon Liddy, who—they needed a lawyer. Gordon had an intelligence background from his FBI service. I was aware of the fact that he had done some extremely sensitive things for the White House while he’d been at the White House, and he had apparently done them well—going out into Ellsberg’s doctor’s office—

NIXON: Oh, yeah.

DEAN: —and things like this. He’d worked with leaks. He’d, you know, tracked these things down. And so the report that I got from Krogh was that he was a hell of a good man and not only that a good lawyer, and could set up a proper operation. So we talked to Liddy. Liddy was interested in doing it. Took Liddy over to meet Mitchell. Mitchell thought highly of him because, apparently, Mitchell was partially involved in his coming to the White House to work for Krogh. Liddy had been at Treasury before that. Then Liddy was told to put together his plan—you know, how he would run an intelligence operation. And this was after he was hired over there at the Committee [to Re-elect the President]. Magruder called me in January and said, “I’d like to have you come over and see Liddy’s plan.”

NIXON: January of ’72?

DEAN: January of ’72. Like, “You come over to Mitchell’s office and sit in on a meeting where Liddy is going to lay his plan out.” I said, “Well, I don’t really know as I am the man, but if you want me there I will be happy to.” So I came over and Liddy laid out a million-dollar plan that was the most incredible thing I have ever laid my eyes on: all in codes, and involved black bag operations, kidnapping, providing prostitutes to weaken the opposition, bugging, mugging teams. It was just an incredible thing.

NIXON: But, uh—

DEAN: And—

NIXON: —that was not, uh—

DEAN: No.

NIXON: —discussed in the—

DEAN: No.

NIXON: —first instance.

DEAN: No, not at all. And—

NIXON: But I [unclear]—

DEAN: Mitchell just virtually sat there puffing and laughing. I could tell because after he—after Liddy left the office I said, “That’s the most incredible thing I have ever seen.” He said, “I agree.” And so then he was told to go back to the drawing boards and come up with something realistic. So there was a second meeting. They asked me to come over to that. I came into the tail end of the meeting. I wasn’t there for the first part. I don’t know how long the meeting lasted. At this point, they were discussing again bugging, kidnapping, and the like. And at this point I said right in front of everybody, very clearly, I said, “These are not the sort of things, one, that are ever to be discussed in the office of the attorney general of the United States”—where he still was—“and I am personally incensed.” I was trying to get Mitchell off the hook, because—

NIXON: I know.

DEAN: —he’s a nice person—doesn’t like to say no under—when people he’s going to have to work with.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: So, I let it be known. I said, “You all pack that stuff up and get it the hell out of here because we just—you just can’t talk this way in this office and you shouldn’t—you should reexamine your whole thinking.” Came back—

NIXON: Who else was present? Besides you—?

DEAN: It was Magruder—Magruder—

NIXON: Magruder.

DEAN: —Mitchell, Liddy, and myself. I came back right after the meeting and told Bob. I said, “Bob, we’ve got a growing disaster on our hands if they’re thinking this way.” And I said, “The White House has got to stay out of this and I, frankly, am not going to be involved in it.” He said, “I agree, John.” And I thought, at that point, the thing was turned off. That’s the last I heard of it, when I thought it was turned off, because it was an absurd proposal.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Liddy—I did have dealings with him afterwards. We never talked about it. Now that would be hard to believe for some people, but we never did. Just the fact of the matter.

NIXON: Well, you were talking about other things.

DEAN: Other things. We had so many other things.

NIXON: He had some legal problems at one time.

DEAN: Now—

NIXON: But you were his advisor, and I understand how you could have some—what, cam—what are they, campaign laws? I knew that was you—you have—Haldeman told me you—that you were heading all of that up for us. Go ahead.

DEAN: Now. So Liddy went back after that and was over, over at 1701, the committee, and I—this is where I come into having put the pieces together after the fact as to what I can put together what happened. Liddy sat over there and tried to come up with another plan that he could sell. One, they were talking—saying to him he was asking for too much money, and I don’t think they were discounting the illegal points at this, after—you know, Jeb is not a lawyer. He didn’t know whether this was the way the game was played or not, and what it was all about. They came up with, apparently, another plan, but they couldn’t get it approved by anybody over there. So Liddy and Hunt apparently came to see Chuck Colson, and Chuck Colson picked up the telephone and called Magruder and said, “You all either fish or cut bait. This is absurd to have these guys over there and not using them, and if you’re not going to use them, I may use them.” Things of this nature.

NIXON: When was this?

DEAN: This was apparently in February of ’72.

NIXON: That could be—did Colson know what they were talking about?

DEAN: I can only assume, because of his close relationship with—

NIXON: Hunt.

DEAN: Hunt. He had a damn good idea of what they were talking about—a damn good idea. He would probably deny it today and probably get away with denying it. But, I still—

NIXON: Unless Hunt—

DEAN: Unless Hunt blows on him—

NIXON: But then Hunt isn’t enough. It takes two, doesn’t it?

DEAN: Probably. Probably. But Liddy was there also and if Liddy were to blow—

NIXON: Then you’ve got a problem. I was saying as to the criminal liability in the—

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: —White House. Okay.

DEAN: I will go back over that and tell—

NIXON: Was that Colson?

DEAN: —you where I think the soft spots are.

NIXON: Colson—that Colson, you think, was the person who—

DEAN: I think he—

NIXON: —pushed?

DEAN: I think he helped to get the push—get the thing off dime. Now something else occurred, though—

NIXON: Did Colson—had he talked to anybody here?

DEAN: No. I think this was an independent—

NIXON: Did he talk to Haldeman?

DEAN: No, I don’t think so. Now, but here’s the other—where the next thing comes in the chain. I think that Bob was assuming that they had something that was proper over there, some intelligence-gathering operation that Liddy was operating. And through Strachan, who was his tickler, he started pushing them—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —to get something—to get some information and they took that as a signal. Magruder took that as a signal to probably go to Mitchell and say, “They are pushing us like crazy for this from the White House.” And so Mitchell probably puffed on his pipe and said, “Go ahead,” and never really reflected on what it was all about. So, they had some plan that obviously had, I gather, different targets they were going to go after. They were going to infiltrate, and bug, and do all this sort of thing to a lot of these targets. This is knowledge I have after the fact. And, apparently, they had after—they had initially broken in and bugged the Democratic National Committee—they were getting information. The information was coming over here to Strachan. Some of it was given to Haldeman, there is no doubt about it. Uh—

NIXON: Did he know what it was coming from?

DEAN: I don’t really know if he would.

NIXON: Not necessarily.

DEAN: Not necessarily. That’s not necessarily. Uh—

NIXON: Strachan knew what it was from?

DEAN: Strachan knew what it was from. No doubt about it, and whether Strachan—I have never come to press these people on these points because it—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —it hurts them to give up that next inch, so I had to piece things together. All right, so Strachan was aware of receiving information, reporting to Bob. At one point Bob even gave instructions to change their capabilities from Muskie to McGovern, and had passed this back through Strachan to Magruder and apparently to Liddy. And Liddy was starting to make arrangements to go in and bug the McGovern operation. They had done prelim—

NIXON: They had never bugged Muskie, though, did they?

DEAN: No, they hadn’t, but they had a—they had—they’d—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —infiltrated it by a—they had—

NIXON: A secretary?

DEAN: —a secretary and a chauffeur. Nothing illegal about that.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: Now, so the information was coming over here and then I finally, after the next point in time where I became aware of anything was on June 17, when I got the word that there had been this break-in at the Democratic National Committee and somebody from the committee had been caught from our committee [CRP]—had been caught in the DNC. And I said, “Oh, my God, that—I can only.” You know, if—instantly putting the pieces together.

NIXON: You knew what it was.

DEAN: I knew what it was. So I called Liddy on that Monday morning, and I said, “Gordon,” I said, “first, I want to know if anybody in the White House was involved in this.” And he said, “No, they weren’t.” I said, “Well, I want to know how in God’s name this happened.” And he said, “Well, I was pushed without mercy by Magruder to get in there, get more information—that the information, it was not satisfactory. Magruder said, ‘The White House is not happy with what we’re getting.’”

NIXON: The White House?

DEAN: The White House. Yeah. Uh—

NIXON: Who do you think was pushing him?

DEAN: Well, I think it was probably Strachan thinking that Bob wanted things, and because I have seen that happen on other occasions where things have been said to be of very prime importance when they really weren’t.

NIXON: Why did they want to do it in June I wonder? I am just trying to think as to why then. We’d just finished the Moscow trip. I mean, we were—

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: The Democrats had just nominated McGovern. I mean, for Christ’s sakes! I mean, what the hell were we—I mean I can see doing it earlier but—I mean, now let me say, I can see the pressure, but I don’t see why all the pressure would have been around then.

DEAN: I don’t know, other than the fact that they might have been looking for information about—

NIXON: The convention.

DEAN: —the conventions.

NIXON: Well, that’s right.

DEAN: Because, I understand, also, after the fact, that there was a plan to bug Larry O’Brien’s suite down in Florida.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: So Liddy told me that, you know, this is what had happened and this is why it had happened.

NIXON: Liddy told you he was planning—where’d you learn there was such a plan—from whom?

DEAN: Beg your pardon?

NIXON: Where did you learn of the plans to bug Larry O’Brien’s suite?

DEAN: From Magruder, after the—long after the fact.

NIXON: Oh, Magruder. He knows?

DEAN: Yeah. Magruder is totally knowledgeable on the whole thing.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: All right, now, we’ve gone through the trial. We’ve—I don’t know if Mitchell has perjured himself in the grand jury or not. I’ve never—

NIXON: Who?

DEAN: Mitchell. I don’t know how much knowledge he actually had. I know that Magruder has perjured himself in the grand jury. I know that Porter has perjured himself in the grand jury.

NIXON: Porter [unclear].

DEAN: He is one of Magruder’s deputies.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: They set up this scenario which they ran by me. They said, “How about this?” I said, “I don’t know. I—you know, if this is what you are going to hang on, fine.” That they—

NIXON: What did they say before the grand jury?

DEAN: They said—as they said before the trial and the grand jury, that Liddy had come over as a counsel—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —and we knew he had these capacities to—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —you know—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —to do legitimate intelligence. We had no idea what he was doing.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: He was given an authorization of two hundred fifty thousand dollars—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —to collect information, because our surrogates were out on the road. They had no protection. We had information that there were going to be demonstrations against them, that we had to have a plan to get information as to what liabilities they were going to be confronted with—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —and Liddy was charged with doing this. We had no knowledge that he was going to bug the DNC.

NIXON: Well, the point is that’s not true.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Magruder did know that—

DEAN: Magruder specifically instructed him to go back in the DNC.

NIXON: He did?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: You know that? Yeah. I see. Okay.

DEAN: I honestly believe that no one over here knew that. I know, as God is my maker, I had no knowledge that they were going to do this.

NIXON: Bob didn’t either [unclear]?

DEAN: Uh, but—

NIXON: They know you’re not the issue. Bob, now—he wouldn’t know.

DEAN: Bob I don’t believe specifically knew they were going in there.

NIXON: I don’t think so.

DEAN: I don’t think he did. I think he knew there was a capacity to do this but he wouldn’t—wasn’t giving it specific direction.

NIXON: Strachan—did he know?

DEAN: I think Strachan did know.

NIXON: They were going back into the DNC? Hunt never [unclear].

DEAN: All right, so those people are in trouble as a result of the grand jury and the trial. Mitchell, of course, was never called during the trial. Now—

NIXON: Mitchell has given a sworn statement?

DEAN: Yes, sir.

NIXON: To the bureau?

DEAN: To the grand jury—

NIXON: Did he go before the grand jury?

DEAN: He had—we had an arrangement whereby he went down to, with several of the—because it was, you know, the heat of this thing and the implications on the election. We made an arrangement where they could quietly go into the Department of Justice and have one of the assistant U.S. attorneys come over and take their testimony and then read it before the grand jury. Uh—

NIXON: That was [unclear].

DEAN: —although I—that’s right, Mitchell was actually called before the grand jury. The grand jury would not settle for less. The jurors wanted him.

NIXON: And he went.

DEAN: And he went.

NIXON: Good.

DEAN: I don’t know what he said. I have never seen a transcript of the grand jury. Now, what has happened post–June 17? Well, it was—I was under pretty clear instructions not to really investigate this, that this was something that just could have been disastrous on the election if it had—all hell had broken loose, and I worked on a theory of containment.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: To try to hold it right where it was.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: There is no doubt I—that I was totally aware what the bureau was doing at all times. I was totally aware of what the grand jury was doing.

NIXON: You—I mean—

DEAN: I knew what witnesses were going to be called. I knew what they were going to be asked, and I had to. There just—

NIXON: Why did Petersen play the game so straight with us?

DEAN: Because Petersen is a soldier. He played—he kept me informed. He told me when we had problems, where we had problems, and the like. He believes in you. He believes in this administration. This administration has made him. I don’t think he’s done anything improper, but he did make sure the investigation was narrowed down to the very, very—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —fine—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —criminal things, which was a break for us. There is no doubt about it.

NIXON: He honestly feels that he did an adequate job?

DEAN: He—they ran that investigation out to the fullest extent they could follow a lead and that was it.

NIXON: But the point is, where—I suppose he could be criticized for not doing an adequate job. Why didn’t he call Haldeman? Why didn’t he get a statement from Colson? Oh, they did get Colson.

DEAN: That’s right. But see, the thing is based on their FBI interviews. There was no reason to follow up. There were no leads there. Colson said, “I have no knowledge of this” to the FBI. Strachan said, “I have no knowledge of”—you know, they didn’t ask Strachan any Watergate questions. They asked him about Segretti. They said, “What’s your connection with Liddy?” And he just said, “Well, I, you know, I just met him over there,” and they never really pressed him. They didn’t—you know, they—look, Strachan appeared as a result of some coaching, he could be the dumbest paper pusher in the bowels of the White House.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: All right. Now post–June 17: these guys—immediately it is very, very [laughs] interesting. Liddy, for example, the Friday before—on, I guess it was, the fifteenth, sixteenth of June—had been in Henry Petersen’s office with another member of my staff on campaign compliance [laughs] problems joking. After the incident, he went—he ran Kleindienst down at Burning Tree Country Club and told [laughs] him that “you’ve got to get my men out of jail,” which was kind of a—Kleindienst said, “Now, you get the hell out of here, kid. Whatever you’ve got to say, just say to somebody else. Don’t bother me,” and—but this has never come up.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Liddy said that, you know, they all got counsel instantly and said that, you know, “We’ll ride this thing out.” All right, then they started making demands. “We’ve got to have attorneys’ fees. We don’t have any money ourselves, and if—you are asking us to take this through the election.” All right, so arrangements were made through Mitchell, initiating it in discussions—that I was present—that these guys had to be taken care of. Their attorneys’ fees had to be done. Kalmbach was brought in. Kalmbach raised some cash. They we’re obv—you know.

NIXON: They put that under the cover of a Cuban committee or something.

DEAN: Yeah, they had a Cuban committee and they had—some of it was given to Hunt’s lawyer, who in turn passed it out. This, you know, when Hunt’s wife was flying to Chicago with ten thousand. She was actually, I understand after the fact now, was going to pass that money to one of the Cubans—to meet him in Chicago and pass it to somebody there.

NIXON: Why did they [unclear]? Maybe—well, whether it’s maybe too late to do anything about it, but I would certainly keep that cover for whatever it’s worth.

DEAN: I’ll—

NIXON: Keep the committee.

DEAN: After—well, that’s—

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: —the most troublesome post-thing, because, one, Bob is involved in that. John is involved in that. I am involved in that. Mitchell is involved in that. And that’s an obstruction of justice.

NIXON: In other words, the fact that you’re taking care of the witnesses.

DEAN: That’s right. Uh—

NIXON: How was Bob involved?

DEAN: Well, they ran out of money over there. Bob had three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in a safe over here that was really set aside for polling purposes. And there was no other source of money, so they came over here and said, “You all have got to give us some money.”

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: I had to go to Bob and say, “Bob, you know, you’ve got to have some—they need some money over there.” He said, “What for?” And so I had to tell him what it was for because he wasn’t about to just send money over there willy-nilly. And John was involved in those discussions, and we decided, you know—that, you know, that there was no price too high to pay to let this thing blow up in front of the election.

NIXON: I think you should handle that one pretty fast.

DEAN: Oh, I think—

NIXON: That issue, I mean.

DEAN: I think we can.

NIXON: So that the three fifty went back to him. All it did was—

DEAN: That’s right. I think we can, too.

NIXON: Who else [unclear]?

DEAN: But, now, here—here’s what’s happening right now.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: What sort of brings matters to the—this is the one that’s going to be a continual blackmail operation by Hunt and Liddy and the—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —Cubans. No doubt about it. And McCord—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —who is another one involved. McCord has asked for nothing. McCord did ask to meet with somebody, and it was Jack Caulfield, who is his old friend who’d gotten him hired over there. And when Caulfield had him hired, he was a perfectly legitimate security man. And he wanted to know—well, you know, he wanted to talk about commutation and things like that. And as you know Colson has talked to—indirectly to Hunt about commutation. All these things are bad in that they are problems. They are promises. They are commitments. They are the very sort of thing that the Senate is going to be looking for. I don’t think they can find them, frankly.

NIXON: Pretty hard.

DEAN: Pretty hard. Damn hard. It’s all cash. Uh—

NIXON: Well, I mean, pretty hard as far as the witnesses are concerned.

DEAN: That’s right. Now, the blackmail is continuing. Hunt called one of the lawyers from the reelection committee last Friday to meet with him on—over the weekend. The guy came in to me—to see me to get a message directly from Hunt to me for the first time.

NIXON: Is Hunt out on bail?

DEAN: Pardon?

NIXON: Is Hunt on bail?

DEAN: Hunt is on bail. Correct. Hunt now is demanding another seventy-two thousand dollars for his own personal expenses, another fifty thousand dollars to pay his attorneys’ fees—a hundred and twenty-some thousand dollars. Wants it—wanted it by the close of business yesterday. Because, he says, “I am going to be sentenced on Friday, and I’ve got to be able to get my financial affairs in order.” I told this fellow [CRP attorney Paul] O’Brien, “You came—all right, you came to the wrong man, fellow. I’m not involved in the money. I don’t know a thing about it. Can’t help you.” Said, “You better scramble around elsewhere.” Now, O’Brien is a ball player. He’s been—he’s carried tremendous water for us. Uh—

NIXON: He isn’t Hunt’s lawyer, is he?

DEAN: No, he is our lawyer at the reelection committee.

NIXON: I see. Good.

DEAN: So he’s safe. There’s no problem there. But it raises the whole question of Hunt now has made a direct threat against Ehrlichman as a result of this. This is his blackmail. He says, “I will bring John Ehrlichman down to his knees and put him in jail. I have done enough seamy things for he and Krogh that they’ll never survive it.”

NIXON: What’s that, on Ellsberg?

DEAN: Ellsberg, and apparently some other things. I don’t know the full extent of it. Uh—

NIXON: I don’t know about anything else.

DEAN: I don’t know either, and I [laughs] almost hate to learn some of these—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —things. So that’s that situation. Now, where are the soft points? How many people know about this? Well, let me go one step further in this whole thing. The Cubans that were used in the Watergate were also the same Cubans that Hunt and Liddy used for this California Ellsberg thing—the break-in out there.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: So they are aware of that. How high their knowledge is, is something else. Hunt and Liddy, of course, are totally aware of it and the fact that it was right out of the White House.

NIXON: I don’t know what the hell we did that for.

DEAN: I don’t either.

NIXON: What in the name of God did that—?

DEAN: Mr. President, there have been a couple of things around here that I have gotten wind of. There was at one time a desire to do a second-story job on the Brookings Institute where they had the Pentagon Papers. Now I flew to California because I was told that John had instructed it and he said, “I really hadn’t. It is a misimpression. That for Christ’s sakes, turn it off.” And I did. I came back and turned it off. Because you know the—when you—you know, if the risk is minimal and the gain is fantastic, it’s something else. But with a low risk and no gain, gee, it’s just—it’s not worth it. But who knows about this all now? All right, you’ve got the Cubans’ lawyer, a man by the name of [Henry] Rothblatt, who is a no-good, publicity-seeking son of a bitch to be very frank about it. He has had to be turned down and tuned off. He was canned by his own people because they didn’t trust him. They were trying to run a different route than he wanted to run. He didn’t want them to plead guilty. He wants to represent them before the Senate. So F. Lee Bailey, who was the partner of one of the men representing McCord, got in and cooled Rothblatt down. So F. Lee Bailey’s got knowledge. Hunt’s lawyer, a man by the name of Bittman, who’s an excellent criminal lawyer from the Democratic era of Bobby Kennedy, he’s got knowledge. Uh—

NIXON: Do you think that he’s got some? How much?

DEAN: Well, everybody—not only all the direct knowledge that Hunt and Liddy have, as well as all the hearsay they have.

NIXON: I [unclear].

DEAN: You’ve got the two lawyers over at the reelection committee who did an investigation to find out the facts. Slowly, they got the whole picture. They are, I—they’re solid, but they’re—

NIXON: But they know.

DEAN: But they know. You’ve got then an awful lot of—all the principals involved know. Hunt—some people’s wives know.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: There’s no doubt about that. Mrs. Hunt was the savviest woman in the world. She had the whole picture together.

NIXON: Did she?

DEAN: Yeah, it—apparently she was the pillar of strength in that family before the death, and—

NIXON: Great sadness. The basis—as a matter of fact there was some discussion over there with somebody about Hunt’s problems after his wife died. And I said, of course, commutation could be considered on the basis of his wife, and that is the only discussion I ever had in that light.

DEAN: Right. So that’s it. That’s the extent of the knowledge. Now, where are the soft spots on this? Well, first of all, there’s the problem of the continued blackmail—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —which will not only go on now, it’ll go on when these people are in prison. And it will compound the obstruction of justice situation. It’ll cost money. It’s dangerous. Nobody, nothing—people around here are not pros at this sort of thing. This is the sort of thing Mafia people can do: washing money, getting clean money, and things like that we’re—we just don’t know about those things, because we’re not used to, you know—we are not criminals and not used to dealing in that business. It’s—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: It’s a tough thing to know how to do.

NIXON: Maybe we can’t even do that.

DEAN: That’s right. It’s a real problem as to whether we could even do it. Plus there’s a real problem in raising money. Mitchell has been working on raising some money. Feeling he’s got, you know, he’s got one—he’s one of the ones with the most to lose. But there’s no denying the fact that the White House, and Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean are involved in some of the early money decisions.

NIXON: How much money do you need?

DEAN: I would say these people are going to cost a million dollars over the next two years.

NIXON: Could you get that?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: You—on the money, if you need the money, I mean, you could get the money. Let’s say—

DEAN: Well, I think that we’re going—

NIXON: What I meant is, you could get a million dollars. And you could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I mean it’s not easy, but it could be done. But the question is who the hell would handle it?

DEAN: That’s right. Uh—

NIXON: Any ideas on that?

DEAN: Well, I would think that would be something that Mitchell ought to be charged with.

NIXON: I would think so too.

DEAN: And get some pros to help him.

NIXON: Let me say, there shouldn’t be a lot of people running around getting money. We should set up a little—

DEAN: Well, he’s got one person doing it who I am not sure is—

NIXON: Who is that?

DEAN: He’s got Fred LaRue doing it. Now Fred started out—going out trying to—

NIXON: No.

DEAN: —solicit money from all kinds of people. Now, I learned about that, and I said—

NIXON: No.

DEAN: “My God—”

NIXON: No.

DEAN: “—it’s just awful. Don’t do it.”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: People are going to ask what the money is for. He’s working—he’s apparently talked to [former ambassador and CRP fundraiser] Tom Pappas.

NIXON: I know.

DEAN: And Pappas has agreed to come up with a sizable amount, I gather, from—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —Mitchell.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, what do you need then? You need—you don’t need a million right away, but you need a million. Is that right?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: You need a million in cash, don’t you? If you want to put that through, would you put that through—this is thinking out loud here for a moment—would you put that through the Cuban committee?

DEAN: Uh, no.

NIXON: Or would you just do this through a [unclear] that it’s going to be—well, it’s cash money, and so forth. How, if that ever comes out, are you going to handle it? Is the Cuban committee an obstruction of justice, if they want to help?

DEAN: Well, they’ve got a pr—they’ve got priests and—

NIXON: Would you like to put—I mean, would that give a little bit of a cover, for example?

DEAN: That would give some for the Cubans and possibly Hunt.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Then you’ve got Liddy, and McCord is not accepting any money. So he is not a bought man right now.

NIXON: Okay.

DEAN: All right. Let me—

NIXON: Go ahead.

DEAN: —continue a little bit here now. The—I—when I say this is a growing cancer, I say it for reasons like this. Bud Krogh, in his testimony before the grand jury, was forced to perjure himself. He is haunted by it. Bud said, “I haven’t had a pleasant day on the job.”

NIXON: Huh? Said what?

DEAN: He said, “I have not had a pleasant day on my job.” He talked, apparently—he said to me, “I told my wife all about this,” he said. “The curtain may ring down one of these days, and I may have to face the music, which I’m perfectly willing to do.” Uh—

NIXON: What did he perjure himself on, John?

DEAN: His—did he know the Cubans? He did. Uh—

NIXON: He said he didn’t?

DEAN: That’s right. They didn’t press him hard—or that he—

NIXON: He might be able to—I am just trying to think. Perjury is an awful hard rap to prove. He could say that I—well, go ahead.

DEAN: Well, so that’s the first—that’s one perjury. Now, Mitchell and Magruder are potential perjuries. There is always the possibility of any one of these individuals blowing. Hunt. Liddy. Liddy is in jail right now. He’s serving his—trying to get good time right now. I think Liddy is probably, in his own bizarre way, the strongest of all of them. So there’s—there is that possibility.

NIXON: Well, your major guy to keep under control is Hunt.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: I think. Because he knows—

DEAN: He knows so much.

NIXON: —about a lot of other things.

DEAN: He knows so much. Right. He could sink Chuck Colson. Apparently, he is quite distressed with Colson. He thinks Colson has abandoned him. Colson was to meet with him when he was out there, after—now he had left the White House. He met with him through his lawyer. Hunt raised the question. He wanted money. Colson’s lawyer told him that Colson wasn’t doing anything with money, and Hunt took offense with that immediately, that Colson had abandoned him. Uh—

NIXON: Don’t you—just looking at the immediate problem, don’t you have to have—handle Hunt’s financial situation—

DEAN: I think that’s—

NIXON: —damn soon?

DEAN: —that is—I talked to Mitchell about that last night—

NIXON: Mitchell.

DEAN: —and I told—

NIXON: Might as well. May have the rule you’ve got to keep the cap on the bottle that much—

DEAN: That’s right. That’s right.

NIXON: —in order to have any options.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Either that or let it all blow right now.

DEAN: Well, that—you know, that’s the question. Uh—

NIXON: Now, go ahead. The others. You’ve got Hunt—

DEAN: All right, now we’ve got—

NIXON: —you’ve got Krogh, and you’ve got—

DEAN: Now we’ve got Kalmbach.

NIXON: Yeah, that’s a tough one.

DEAN: Kalmbach received—

NIXON: Totally loyal. Do you agree with that?

DEAN: —at the close of the ’68 campaign—in January of ’69, he got a million seven dollars—a million seven hundred thousand dollars—to be custodian for. That came down from New York. It was placed in safety deposit boxes here. Some other people were on the boxes and ultimately, the money was taken out to California. All right, there is knowledge of the fact that he did start with a million seven. Several people know this. Now since ’69, he’s spent a good deal of this money and accounting for it is going to be very difficult for Herb. For example, he’s spent—oh, close to five hundred thousand dollars on private polling. Now that just opens up a whole new thing. It’s not illegal, but it’s more of the same sort of thing.

NIXON: I don’t think that poses a hell of a problem, does it?

DEAN: No, I don’t think so. Uh—

NIXON: Practically everybody does polling.

DEAN: That’s right. It’s not—there’s nothing criminal about it. It was private polls. It was—

NIXON: Nothing—

DEAN: —proper money.

NIXON: The law didn’t [unclear] polled all through the years.

DEAN: That’s right. He sent four hundred thousand dollars, as he’s described it to me, somewhere in the South for another candidate. I assume this was four hundred that went—

NIXON: [George] Wallace.

DEAN: —to Wallace. Right. He has maintained a man who only know by the name of “Tony,” who is the fellow who did the Chappaquiddick study and—

NIXON: I heard about that.

DEAN: —other odd jobs like that. Nothing illegal—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —but closer. I don’t know of anything that Herb has done that is illegal other than the fact that he doesn’t want to blow the whistle on a lot of people and may find himself in a perjury situation.

NIXON: Well, if he—could because he will be asked about that money?

DEAN: He will. What’ll happen is, when they call up there and he, of course, has no immunity, they’ll say, “How did you happen—how did you pay Mr. Segretti?” “Well, I had cash on hand.” “Well, how much cash did you have on hand?”

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: Where does he go from there? “Where did you get the cash?”

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: A full series of questions. His bank records indicate he had cash on hand because some of these were set up in trustee accounts.

NIXON: How would you handle him then John? For example, would you just have him put the whole thing out? I don’t think. I mean I don’t mind the five hundred thousand dollars and I don’t mind the four hundred thousand dollars—

DEAN: No, that—

NIXON: —for activities and so on.

DEAN: —that doesn’t bother me either. There’s—as I say, Herb’s problems are—

NIXON: There’s a surplus—

DEAN: —politically embarrassing, but not as—not criminal.

NIXON: Well, they’re embarrassing, sure. He just handled matters that were between the campaigns before anything was done. There were surveys, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. There is no need to account for that. No law requires him to account for that.

DEAN: Right. Uh, now—

NIXON: The source of the money—there’s no illegality in having a surplus, is there, in cash after—?

DEAN: No, the money—it has always been argued by Stans—came from preconvention—

NIXON: Preconvention.

DEAN: —for the—and preprimary for the—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —’68 race.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: It was just set aside.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: That all can be explained. I think that the—

NIXON: All right. How do your other vulnerabilities go together?

DEAN: The other vulnerabilities. We’ve got a runaway grand jury up in the Southern District [of New York].

NIXON: Yeah, I heard.

DEAN: They’re after Mitchell and Stans on some sort of bribe or influence peddling—

NIXON: On Vesco.

DEAN: —with Vesco.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: They’re also going to try to drag Ehrlichman into that. Apparently, Ehrlichman had some meetings with Vesco also. Don Nixon Jr. came in to see John a couple of times about the problem.

NIXON: Not about the complaint.

DEAN: That—there’s—the fact of the matter is—

NIXON: [unclear] probably wanted about a job.

DEAN: That’s right. And, I—

NIXON: We’re—is it—Ehrlichman’s totally to blame on that.

DEAN: Yeah, well, I think the White House—

NIXON: [unclear] attorney—

DEAN: No one has done anything for—

NIXON: —Vesco. Matter of—not for the prosecutor.

DEAN: No. The—

NIXON: Would Ehrlichman, incidentally, have to appear there?

DEAN: Before that grand jury? Yes. He could very well.

NIXON: We couldn’t presume immunity there?

DEAN: Not really. Criminal charge—

NIXON: Criminal charge. Yeah, well [unclear] charges [unclear]. Go ahead.

DEAN: Right. That’s a little different. I think that would be dynamite to defend—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —against that.

NIXON: Also, he distinguishes it. He says, “It’s a criminal charge. I’ll be glad to go up.” Use the Flanigan—

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: —analogy.

DEAN: Right, well that’s pretty much the overall picture, and probably the most troublesome thing—well, the Segretti thing. Let’s get down to that. I think Bob has indicated to me he told you a lot of it. That he, indeed, did authorize it. He didn’t authorize anything like [what was] ultimately involved.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: He was aware of it. He was aware that Chapin and Strachan were looking for somebody.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Again, this is one that—it is potential that Dwight Chapin could have a felony charge against him in this, because he’s—

NIXON: Felony?

DEAN: Felony, because he has to disprove a negative. The negative is that he didn’t control and direct Segretti.

NIXON: Would the felony be in perjury again? Or—

DEAN: No, the felony—this—in this instance being a potential use of the—one of the civil rights statutes. For anybody who interferes with a candidate for national office—no, interferes with their campaign in any way.

NIXON: Why isn’t that civil rights statute used to pick up any of these clowns that were demonstrating against us then?

DEAN: Well, I have—I’ve argued that they use that for that very purpose. Uh—

NIXON: Really?

DEAN: Yes, I have. And—

NIXON: We were—those were—that was interfering with the campaign.

DEAN: That’s exactly right. It’s exactly right, but they—

NIXON: Segretti—when I think—I’m not as concerned about that because it’s so bad the way it’s been put out on the PR side. Then I think it will eventually end up on the PR side very confused. And it’ll look bad when that’s attributed, but I don’t—I can’t see the criminal thing. But I may be wrong.

DEAN: Well, here—what really bothers me is that this—this growing situation. As I say, it is growing because of the continued need to provide support for the—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —Watergate people who are going to—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —hold us up for everything they’ve got—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —and the need for some people to perjure themselves as they go down the road here. If this thing ever blows, and we’re in a cover-up situation, I think it’d be extremely damaging to you and the—

NIXON: Sure. The whole concept of administration justice.

DEAN: That’s right—

NIXON: We cannot have—

DEAN: That’s what really troubles me. For example, what happens if it starts breaking, and they do find a criminal case against a Haldeman, a Dean, a Mitchell, an Ehrlichman? That is—

NIXON: Well, if it really comes down to that we cannot—maybe we’d have to shed it in order to contain it again.

DEAN: That’s right. I’m coming down to the—what I really think is that Bob and John and John Mitchell and I should sit down and spend a day, or however long, to figure out, one, how this can be carved away from you, so it does not damage you or the presidency. Because it just can’t. And it’s not something—it—you’re not involved in it and it’s something you shouldn’t—

NIXON: That is true.

DEAN: I know, sir. It is. Well, I can just tell from our conversations that, you know, these are things that you have no knowledge of.

NIXON: The absurdity of the whole damn thing.

DEAN: But, it—

NIXON: Bugging and so on. Well, let me say I am keenly aware of the fact that Colson, et al., and so forth, were doing their best to get information and so forth and so on. But they all knew very well they were supposed to comply with the law.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: No question.

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: [unclear] you think—you feel that really the man—the trigger man was Colson on this then?

DEAN: Well, no. He was one of a—he was just in the chain. He was—he helped push the thing.

NIXON: Called [unclear] up and said, “We’ve got a good plan.” I don’t know what the Christ he would be doing. Oh, I’ll bet you I know why. That was at the time of ITT. He was trying to get something going there because ITT—they were bugging us. I mean they were—

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: —giving us hell.

DEAN: Well, I know he used—

NIXON: Hunt to go out there?

DEAN: Hunt.

NIXON: I knew about that.

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: I did know about it. I knew that there was something going on there—

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: —but I didn’t know it was Hunt.

DEAN: Right. That’s what really troubles me is, you know, one, will this thing not break someday, and—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Then whole thing—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —it’s a domino situation. You know, they just—I think if it starts crumbling, fingers will be pointing. And—

NIXON: That’s right. That’s right.

DEAN: —Bob will be accused of things he has never heard of—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —and then he’ll have to disprove it, and it’ll just get nasty and it’ll be a—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —real, uh—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —real bad situation. And the person who will be hurt by it most will be you and—

NIXON: Of course.

DEAN: —the presidency, and I just don’t think—

NIXON: First, because I am expected to know this, and I am supposed to check these things and so forth—

DEAN: —that’s right.

NIXON: —and so on. But let’s come back. Go further. Sure. Yes indeed. But what are your feelings, yourself, John? You know pretty well what they all say. What are your feelings about the options?

DEAN: I am not confident that we can ride through this. I think there are—I think there are soft spots.

NIXON: You used to feel comfortable.

DEAN: Well, I feel—I felt comfortable for this reason. I’ve noticed of recent—since the publicity has increased on this thing again, with the Gray hearings that everybody is now starting to watch out for their own behind.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: Everyone’s pulling in. They’re getting their own counsel. More counsel are getting—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —involved.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: You know, “How do I protect my ass?”

NIXON: Well, they’re scared.

DEAN: They’re scared and that’s just—you know, that’s bad. We were able to hold it for a long time.

NIXON: Yeah, I know.

DEAN: Another thing is, you know, my facility now to deal with the multitude of people I have been dealing with has been hampered because of Gray’s blowing me up into the front page.

NIXON: Your cover is broken.

DEAN: That’s right and it’s with—it was—

NIXON: [unclear] cover. All right. Now. So on. So what you really come down to is—what in the hell will you do? Let’s—let us suppose that you and Haldeman and Ehrlichman and Mitchell say, “We can’t hold this.” What then are you going to say? Are you going to put out a complete disclosure? Isn’t that the best plan?

DEAN: Well, one way to do it is to—

NIXON: That’d be my view on it.

DEAN: One way to do it is for you to in—tell the attorney general that you finally—you know, really—this is the first time you are getting all the pieces together. Uh—

NIXON: Ask for another grand jury?

DEAN: Ask for another grand jury. The way it should be done though is a way that—for example, I think that we could avoid criminal liability for countless people and the ones that did get it—it could be minimal.

NIXON: How?

DEAN: Well, I think by just thinking it all through first as to how—you know, some people could be granted immunity—

NIXON: Like Magruder?

DEAN: Yeah. To come forward. But some people are going to have to go to jail. That’s the long and short of it, also.

NIXON: Who? Let’s talk about that.

DEAN: All right. I think I could, for one.

NIXON: You go to jail?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Oh, hell no! I can’t see how you can. But I—no—

DEAN: Well, because—

NIXON: I can’t see how. That—let me say I can’t see how a legal case could be made against you, John.

DEAN: It’d be tough, but you know—

NIXON: Well—

DEAN: I can see people pointing fingers, you know, to get it out of their own. Put me in the impossible position, disproving too many negatives.

NIXON: Oh, no. Let me say I—not because you’re here—but just looking at it from a cold legal standpoint. You are a lawyer. You were a counsel. You were doing what you were doing as a counsel, and you were not doing anything like that. You mean—what would you go to jail on [unclear]?

DEAN: The obstruction of justice.

NIXON: The obstruction of justice?

DEAN: That’s the only thing that bothers me.

NIXON: Well, I don’t know. I think that one—I think that, I feel, could be cut off at the pass. Maybe the obstruction of justice—

DEAN: It could be a—you know how—one of the—that’s why—

NIXON: Sometimes it’s well to give them something, and then they don’t want the bigger fish then.

DEAN: That’s right. I think that with proper coordination with the Department of Justice, Henry Petersen is the only man I know bright enough and knowledgeable enough in the criminal laws and the process that could really tell us how this could be put together so it did the maximum to carve it away with a minimum of damage to individuals involved.

NIXON: Petersen doesn’t know—

DEAN: That’s what I think.

NIXON: —the whole story?

DEAN: No, I know he doesn’t now. I know he doesn’t now. I am talking about somebody who I have over the years grown to have enough faith in. It’s possible that he’d have to—put him in a very difficult situation as the head of the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, and the oath of office—

NIXON: Tell me—talking about your obstruction of justice role, I don’t see it. I can’t see it. You’re—

DEAN: Well, I’ve been a con—I have been a conduit for information on taking care of people out there who are guilty of crimes.

NIXON: Oh, you mean like the blackmail.

DEAN: The blackmail. Right.

NIXON: Well, I wonder if that part of it can’t be—I wonder if that doesn’t—let me put it frankly. I wonder if that doesn’t have to be continued? Let me put it this way. Let us suppose that you get the million bucks, and you get the proper way to handle it, and you could hold that side.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: It would seem to me that would be worthwhile. Now we have—

DEAN: Well, that’s—yeah, that’s—

NIXON: —one problem. You’ve got a problem here. You have the problem of Hunt and his clemency.

DEAN: That’s right. And you’re going to have the clemency problem for the others. They all would expect to be out and that may put you in a position that’s just—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —untenable at some point. You know, the Watergate hearings just over—Hunt now demanding clemency or is he going to blow. And politically it’d be impossible for, you know, you to do it. You know, after everybody—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: I am not sure that you will ever be able to deliver on the clemency. It may be just too hot.

NIXON: You can’t do it till after the ’74 elections, that’s for sure. But even then your point is that even then you couldn’t do it.

DEAN: That’s right. It may further involve you in a way you shouldn’t be involved in this.

NIXON: No, it’s wrong. That’s for sure.

DEAN: Well, whatever—you know, I—there’ve been some bad judgments made. There’ve been some necessary judgments made. Uh—

NIXON: Before the election.

DEAN: Before the election and, in a way, the necessary ones—you know, before the election. There—you know, we’ve—this was—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —to me there was no way—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —that, uh—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: But to burden this second administration—

NIXON: We’re all in on it.

DEAN: —was something that—it’s something that is not going to go away.

NIXON: No, it isn’t.

DEAN: It is not going to go away, sir.

NIXON: Not going to go away. It is the idea that—well, that people are going to get tired of it and all that sort of thing—

DEAN: Anything will spark it back into life. It’s got to be—

NIXON: Well, it’s too much to the partisan interest of others to spark it back into life.

DEAN: And it seems to me the only way that—

NIXON: Who else, though? Let’s leave you and—I don’t think on the obstruction of justice thing—I think that one we can handle. I don’t know why I feel that way, but I—

DEAN: Well, it is possible that I—

NIXON: I think you may be overplaying, but who else do you think has—?

DEAN: Potential criminal liability?

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: I think Ehrlichman does. I think that—I think—

NIXON: Why Ehrlichman? What’d he do?

DEAN: Because of this conspiracy to burglarize the Ellsberg [psychiatrist Dr. Lewis Fielding’s] office.

NIXON: You mean that—that is—provided Hunt breaks—?

DEAN: Well, the funny—let me say something interesting about that. Within the files—

NIXON: Oh, I saw that. The picture [burglars Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt took of themselves in front of Dr. Fielding’s office].

DEAN: Yeah, the picture. That, see—that’s not all that buried. And while we can, we’ve got—I think we’ve got it buried. There is no telling when it’s going to pop up. The Cubans could start this whole thing. When the Ervin Committee starts running down why this mysterious telephone was here at the White House listed in the name of a secretary. One of these, some of these secretaries have a little idea about this and they can be broken down just—

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: —so fast. That’s another thing I missed in the cycle—in the circle. Liddy’s secretary, for example, is knowledgeable. Magruder’s secretary is knowledgeable.

NIXON: Sure.

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: So Ehrlichman on the—

DEAN: But what I am coming to you today with is I don’t have a plan of how to solve it right now, but I think it’s at the juncture that we should begin to think in terms of how to cut the losses, how to minimize the further growth of this thing rather than further compound it by, you know, ultimately paying these guys forever.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: I think we’ve got to look—

NIXON: But at the moment, don’t you agree that you’d better get the Hunt thing? I mean that’s worth it at the moment.

DEAN: That’s worth buying time on, right.

NIXON: And that’s buying time on, I agree.

DEAN: The grand jury is going to reconvene next week after Sirica sentences. But that’s why I think that, you know, that John and Bob have met with me. They’ve never met with Mitchell on this. We’ve never had a real down-and-out with everybody that has the most to lose. And the most—and it is the most danger for you to have them have criminal liability. I think Bob has a potential criminal liability, frankly. I think—in other words, a lot of these people could be indicted. They might never—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —might never be convicted, but just the thought of—

NIXON: Suppose—

DEAN: —indictments—

NIXON: Suppose that they are indicted in this. Suppose—

DEAN: I think that would be devastating.

NIXON: Suppose the worst—that Bob is indicted and Ehrlichman is indicted. And, I must say, maybe we just better then try to tough it through. You get my point?

DEAN: That’s right. That—

NIXON: If, for example, our—say well let’s cut our losses and you say we’re going to go down the road. See if we can cut our losses and no more blackmail and all the rest, and the thing blows and they indict Bob and the rest. Jesus, you’d never recover from that, John.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: It’s better to fight it out instead. You see, that’s the other thing—the other thing. It’s better just to fight it out and not let people testify, so forth and so on. Now, on the other hand, we realize that we have these weaknesses—that we’ve got this weakness in terms of blackmail.

DEAN: It’s—what—if we—you know, there are two routes, you know. One is to figure out how to cut the losses and minimize the human impact and get you up and out and away from it in any way—in a way that would never come back to haunt you. That is one general alternative. The other is to go down the road—just hunker down, fight it at every corner, every turn, don’t let people testify, cover it up is what we’re really talking about. Just keep it buried, and just hope that we can do it. Hope that we make good decisions at the right time and keep our heads cool. We make the right moves—

NIXON: And just take the heat.

DEAN: And just take the heat.

NIXON: Now, with the second line of attack. You discussed this, though I do want you to still consider my scheme of having you brief the cabinet, just in very general terms, and the leaders—very general terms—and maybe some very general statement with regards to my investigation. Answer questions, and to basically on the question of what they told you, not what you know.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: Haldeman is not involved. Ehrlichman—

DEAN: Oh, I can—you know, if we go that route, sir, I can give a show that, you know, there’s—we can sell—you know, just about like we were selling Wheaties on our position. There’s no—

NIXON: The problem that you have are these minefields down the road. I think the most difficult problem is the—are the guys that are going to jail. I think you’re right about that. I agree. Now. And, also the fact that we’re not going to be able to give them clemency.

DEAN: That’s right. How long will they take—how long will they sit there? I don’t know. We don’t know what they will be sentenced to. There’s always a chance—

NIXON: Thirty years, isn’t it? Maximum?

DEAN: It could be. You know, they haven’t announced yet, but it—

NIXON: Isn’t that what the potential is?

DEAN: It’s even higher than that. It’s about fifty years, with all the—

NIXON: So ridiculous.

DEAN: Oh, well—you know, what’s so incredible is the—these fellows who sh—

NIXON: People break and enter, and so forth, and get two years.

DEAN: Well, the other thing—

NIXON: No weapons. No results. What the hell are they talking about?

DEAN: The individuals who are charged with shooting John Stennis are on the street. They were given—you know, one was put out on his personal recognizance rather than bond. They’ve got these fellows all stuck with hundred-thousand-dollar bonds. The same judge, Sirica, let one guy who’s [laughs] charged with shooting a United States senator out on the street.

NIXON: Sirica did?

DEAN: Yeah. It’s just—it’s phenomenal.

NIXON: What is the matter with him? I thought he was a hardliner judge.

DEAN: He’s a—he is just a peculiar animal, and he set the bond for one of the others—I don’t have all the facts, but he set the bond for one of the others—around fifty or sixty thousand dollars. But still, that guy is in—didn’t make bond. But, you know, sixty thousand dollars as opposed to a hundred thousand dollars for these guys is phenomenal.

NIXON: When could you have this meeting with these fellows? As I think, that time is of the essence, in my opinion. Could you do it this afternoon?

DEAN: Well, Mitchell isn’t here, and—

NIXON: Tomorrow?

DEAN: It might be worth it to have him come down. And now, I think that Bob and John did not want to talk to John about this—John Mitchell. And I don’t believe they’ve had any conversations with him about it.

NIXON: Well, let me get Haldeman in here now.

DEAN: Bob and I have talked about just what we’re talking about this morning. I told him I thought that you should have the facts and he agrees. Because we’ve got some tough calls down the road if we—

NIXON: Let me say, though, that Hunt [unclear] hard line, and that a convicted felon is going to go out and squeal about this [unclear] decision [unclear] turns on that.

DEAN: Well, we can always—you know, on the other side, we can always charge them with blackmailing us, and it’s—you know, this is absurd stuff they’re saying, and—

NIXON: That’s right. You see, even the way you put it out here—of course, if it all came out—it may never—it may not ever—never get there.

[HALDEMAN joins the conversation.]

NIXON: I was talking to John about this whole situation, and I think we—so that we can get away from the bits and pieces that have broken out. He is right in having—in recommending that there be a meeting at the very first possible time. Ehrlichman—and now Ehrlichman’s gone on to California but is today—is tomorrow Thursday?

HALDEMAN: He—John doesn’t go until Friday.

DEAN: Friday—

NIXON: Well, in any event, could we do it Thursday? This meeting? This meeting—you can’t do it today, can you?

DEAN: I don’t think so. I was suggesting a meeting with Mitchell—

NIXON: Mitchell, Ehrlichman, yourself, and Bob. That’s all. Now, Mitchell has to be there because he is seriously involved and we’re trying to keep—we’ve got to see how we handle it from here on. We are in the process of having to determine which way to go and John has thought it through as well as he can. I don’t want Moore there on this occasion.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: You haven’t told Moore all of this, have you?

DEAN: Moore’s got—by being with me—has more bits and pieces. I’ve had to give him—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —because he is making—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —judgments that—

NIXON: Well, the point is, once you get down to the PR—once you decide what you’re going to do, then we can let him know, and so forth and so on. But it is the kind of thing—I think what really has to happen is for you to sit down with those three and for you to tell them exactly what you told me.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: It may take him about thirty-five or forty-five minutes. In other words, he knows—John knows about everything and also what all the potential criminal liabilities are. You know, whether it’s—what’s it like that thing—what, about obstruction—?

DEAN: Obstruction of justice. Right.

NIXON: So forth and so on. And the—I think that’s—then we’ve got to see what the line is. Whether the line is one of continuing to run a—try to run a total stonewall and take the heat from that, having in mind the fact that there are vulnerable points there. The vulnerable points being that, well, the first vulnerable points would be obvious. In other words, it would be if one of the defendants, particularly Hunt, of course, who is the most vulnerable in my opinion, might blow the whistle. And he—and his price is pretty high, but at least we should buy the time on that, as I pointed out to John. Apparently—who is dealing with Hunt at the moment now that Colson’s—?

DEAN: Well, Mitchell’s lawyer and—

NIXON: Colson’s lawyer [unclear]—

DEAN: —Colson’s lawyer, both.

NIXON: —familiar with him. Hunt has at least got to know before he is sentenced that he’s—

HALDEMAN: Who’s Colson’s lawyer? That Jew in his law firm?

DEAN: Shapiro. Right. Who lied to the, you know, who just—the other day he came up and—

HALDEMAN: Colson’s told him everything, hasn’t he?

DEAN: Yup, I gather he has. The other thing that bothered me about that is that he’s a chatter. He came up to Fred Fielding, of my office, at Colson’s going-away party. I didn’t go over there. It was over at the Blair House the other night. And he said to Fred, he said, “Well, Chuck has had some mighty serious words with his friend Howard and had some mighty serious messages back.” Now, you know, what’s a lawyer—how does he know what Fielding knows? Because Fielding knows virtually nothing. [laughs]

NIXON: Well, anyway.

HALDEMAN: That’s where your dangers lie is in all these stupid human errors in what has happened.

NIXON: That’s very—

DEAN: That’s—that—

NIXON: Well, the point is—Bob, let’s face it, the secretaries know. The assistants know. There’s a lot of the—many of the damn principals may be hard as a rock, but you never know when they’re going to crack. But, so—we’ll see. First you’ve got the Hunt problem. That ought to be handled.

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Incidentally, I do not think Colson should sit in this meeting. Do you agree?

DEAN: No. I would agree.

NIXON: Okay. How then—who does sit and talk to Colson? Because somebody has to. Shouldn’t we talk to—?

DEAN: Chuck, uh—

NIXON: Talks too much.

DEAN: I—you know, I like Chuck, [laughs] but I don’t want Chuck to know anything that I’m doing, frankly. [laughs]

NIXON: All right.

HALDEMAN: I think that’s right. I think you want to be careful not to give Chuck any more knowledge than he’s already got.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Sure. Well—

DEAN: I wouldn’t want Chuck to even know of the meeting, frankly.

NIXON: Fortunately with Chuck it is very—I talk to him about many, many political things. But I never talk about this sort of thing because he’s very harmful. I mean I don’t think—he must be damn sure I don’t know anything. And I don’t. In fact, I’m rather surprised at what you told me today. From what you said, I gathered the impression—and of course your analysis does not for sure indicate that Chuck knew that it was a bugging operation for certain.

DEAN: That’s correct. I don’t have—

NIXON: On the other hand, that—

DEAN: Chuck denies that—

NIXON: On the other hand, the other side of that is that Hunt had conversations with Chuck, and it may be that Hunt told Chuck that it was bugging, and so forth and so on.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Is that correct?

DEAN: Mm-hmm. They were very close. They talked too much about too many things.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: They were intimate on this sort of—

HALDEMAN: Well, then Chuck—

NIXON: There’s another thing you can’t—

HALDEMAN: Chuck has a problem. Chuck loves—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He loves what he does.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He likes to talk about it.

NIXON: He also is a name-dropper. Chuck might have gone around and talked to Hunt and said, “Well, I was talking to the president and the president feels we ought to get information about this, or that, or the other thing,” and so forth and so on.

DEAN: Well, Liddy is the same way, and—

NIXON: I have talked to—I have talked to—this and that and the other thing. I have never talked to anybody, but I have talked to Chuck and John and the rest and I am sure that Chuck may have—Chuck might have even talked to Hunt along those lines.

HALDEMAN: I would—well, anything could happen. I would doubt that.

DEAN: I would doubt that, too.

HALDEMAN: I don’t think he would. Chuck is a name-dropper in one sense, but not in that sense.

NIXON: Well, then do you think—?

HALDEMAN: I think he very carefully keeps the president out of things—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: —except when he’s doing it—when he’s very intentionally bringing the president in for the president’s purposes.

NIXON: He had the impression, though, apparently that he was the, as it turns out, really is the trigger man. May have damn well been the trigger man where he just called up and said, “Now look here, Jeb, go ahead and get that information.” And I recommend there’s got to be a decision on it at that time. This is February.

DEAN: Yes, sir. I figure it was somewhere—

NIXON: It must be the—I—it must have been after—

DEAN: This was the call to Magruder from Colson saying, “Fish or cut bait.” Hunt and Liddy were in his office.

HALDEMAN: In Colson’s office?

DEAN: In Colson’s office. And he called Magruder and said, “Let’s fish or cut bait on this operation. Let’s get it going.”

HALDEMAN: Oh, really?

DEAN: Yeah. This is—Magruder tells me this.

HALDEMAN: Of course, that—

NIXON: Well, on the other hand—

HALDEMAN: Now wait, Magruder testified [unclear].

DEAN: Chuck also told me that Hunt and Liddy were in his office and he made a call.

HALDEMAN: Oh, okay.

DEAN: So it did—it was corroborated [laughs] by the principal.

HALDEMAN: Hunt and Liddy haven’t told you that, though?

DEAN: No.

HALDEMAN: You haven’t talked to Hunt and Liddy?

DEAN: I talked to Liddy once, right after the incident.

NIXON: That’s right, but not—all right. The point is this, that it’s now time, though, to—that Mitchell has got to sit down, and know where the hell all this thing stands, too. You see, John is concerned, as you know, Bob, about Ehrlichman, which worries me a great deal because it’s a—it—and this is why the Hunt problem is so serious, because it had nothing to do with the campaign.

DEAN: Right, it—

NIXON: Properly it has to do with the Ellsberg thing. I don’t know what the hell—

HALDEMAN: But why—

NIXON: Yeah. Why? I don’t know.

HALDEMAN: What I was going to say is—

NIXON: What is the answer on that? How do you keep that out? I don’t know. Well, we can’t keep it out if Hunt—if, you see the point is it is irrelevant. Once it has gotten to this point—

DEAN: You might put it on a national security ground—basis, which it really—it was.

HALDEMAN: It absolutely was.

DEAN: And just say that—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —that this is not, you know, this was—

NIXON: Let them think it was CIA funds.

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: No, seriously—national security. We had to get information for national security grounds.

DEAN: Well, then the question is why didn’t the CIA do it or why didn’t the FBI do it?

NIXON: Because they were—we had to do it—we had to do it on a confidential basis.

HALDEMAN: Because we were checking them.

NIXON: Neither could be trusted.

HALDEMAN: Well, I think—

NIXON: That’s the way I view it.

HALDEMAN: —that has never been proven. There was reason to question their—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —position.

NIXON: You see—really, with the [Kennedy national security advisor McGeorge] Bundy [Bay of Pigs] thing [which involved Howard Hunt and the Cubans] and everything coming out, the whole thing was national security.

DEAN: I think we can probably get by on that.

NIXON: I think on that one, I think you’d simply say this was a national security investigation that was conducted. And the same with the drug field with Krogh. Krogh could say I—if Krogh were to—if he feels that he [unclear], it was a national security matter. That’s why—

DEAN: That’s the way Bud rests easy, because he’s convinced that he was doing it. He said there was treason about the country—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —and it could have threatened the way the war was handled.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: Uh, and by God—

HALDEMAN: Bud said this?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: Well, Bud could say that and say this—it does involve—it was a national security. And I was not in a position to divulge it. Well, anyway, let’s don’t go beyond that. We’re—forget—but I do think now we—I mean, there is a time now when you don’t want to talk to Mitchell. He doesn’t want to talk and the rest. But John is right. There must be a four-way talk here of the particular ones that we can trust here. We’ve got to get a decision on it. It’s not something that—you see, you’ve got two ways, basically. There are really only two ways you could go. You either decide the whole goddamn thing is so full of problems with potential criminal liability, which is what concerns me. I don’t give a damn about the publicity. We could rock that through if we had to let the whole thing hang out. It would be a lousy story for a month. But I can take it. But the point is I don’t want any criminal liability. That’s the thing that I am concerned about for members of the White House staff, and I would trust for members of the committee. And that means Magruder.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Let’s face it. He’s the one that’s—I think Magruder is the major guy over there.

DEAN: I think he’s got the most serious problem.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Well, then we talked about yesterday, you’ve got a question where your cutoff point is. There is a possibility of cutting it at Liddy, where you are now.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: But to accomplish that requires—

NIXON: Requires what?

HALDEMAN: Requires continued perjury by Magruder.

NIXON: Yeah. And it requires total—

DEAN: Commitment—

NIXON: —control—total control over all of the defendants, which in other words [unclear].

DEAN: The basic position—

HALDEMAN: They don’t know anything beyond Liddy.

DEAN: Uh, no. Other than the fact that Liddy—they have hearsay—

HALDEMAN: Oh, does he not know about Hunt? Maybe Hunt has it tied into Colson. We don’t know that, though, really.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: I think Hunt knows a hell of a lot more.

DEAN: Yeah, I do, too. And, now what McCord—

HALDEMAN: You think he does? I am afraid you’re right, but we don’t know that.

NIXON: I don’t think [laughs]—I think we better assume it. I think Colson—

DEAN: And he’s playing hard ball, and he wouldn’t play hard—

HALDEMAN: Is he?

DEAN: Yeah. He wouldn’t play hard ball unless he were pretty confident that he could cause an awful lot of grief.

HALDEMAN: Right.

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: He is playing hard-boiled ball with regard to Ehrlichman, for example, and that sort of thing. He knows what he’s got.

HALDEMAN: What’s he planning on, money?

DEAN: Yeah, money and—

HALDEMAN: Really?

DEAN: Oh, yeah. He’s—

NIXON: It’s a hundred and twenty thousand dollars. It’s about what—about how much, which is easy. I mean, it’s not easy to deliver, but it is easy to get. Now—if that is the case—if it’s just that way, then the thing to do is—if the thing all cracks out—if, for example, you say look, we’re not going to continue to try to—let’s state it frankly—cut our losses. That’s just one way you could go—on the assumption that we’re—by continuing to cut our losses—we’re not going to win. That in the end, we are going to be bled to death. And it’s all going to come out anyway, and then you get the worst of both worlds. We are going to lose, and people are going to—

HALDEMAN: And look back at—

NIXON: —and it’s going to look like we covered up. So that we can’t do. Now, the other line, however, if you take that line that we’re not going to continue—to cut our losses, that means then we have to look square in the eye as to what the hell those losses are, and see which people can—so we can avoid criminal liability. Right?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: And that means we’ve got to keep it off of you, which I—which as I say I really think [unclear] the obstruction of justice thing. We’ve got to keep it off Ehrlichman. We’ve got to keep it naturally off of Bob, off Chapin, if possible, and Strachan. Right?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: And Mitchell. Right?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Now—

HALDEMAN: And Magruder, if you can. But that’s the one you pretty much have to give up.

NIXON: But Magruder—John’s—Dean’s point is that if Magruder goes down, he’ll pull everybody with him.

HALDEMAN: That’s my view.

NIXON: Is it?

HALDEMAN: Yup. I think Jeb—I don’t think he wants to. And I think he even would try not to, but I don’t think he is able not to.

DEAN: I don’t think he is strong enough, when it really—

HALDEMAN: Well, not that—

NIXON: Well, another way to do it then, Bob, is to—and John realizes this—is to continue to try to cut our losses. Now we have to look at that course of action. First, it is going to require approximately a million dollars to take care of the jackasses that are in jail. That could be arranged.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: That could be arranged. But you realize that after we are gone—I mean, assuming these [unclear] are gone, they’re going to crack. You know what I mean? And that’ll be an unseemly story. Eventually, all the people aren’t going to care that much.

DEAN: That’s right. It’s—

NIXON: People aren’t going to care.

DEAN: So much history will pass between then and now.

NIXON: In other words, what we’re talking about is no question. But the second thing is, we’re not going to be able to deliver on any kind of a clemency thing. You know Colson has gone around on this clemency thing with Hunt and the rest.

DEAN: Hunt is now talking in terms of being out by Christmas.

HALDEMAN: This year?

DEAN: This year. He was told by O’Brien, who is my conveyor of doom back and forth—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

DEAN: —that, hell, he’d be lucky if he were out a year from now, after the Ervin hearings were, you know, over. He said, “How in the Lord’s name could you be commuted that quickly?” He said, “Well, that’s my commitment from Colson.”

HALDEMAN: By Christmas of this year?

DEAN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: See that really—that’s very believable because Colson—

NIXON: Do you think Colson could have told him?

HALDEMAN: Colson is an—that’s your fatal flaw, really, in Chuck, is he is an operator in expediency, and he will pay at the time and where he is—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —whatever he has to, to accomplish what he’s there to do.

DEAN: Right.

HALDEMAN: And that’s—I would believe that he has made that commitment if Hunt says he has. I would believe he is capable of saying that.

NIXON: The only thing you could do with him would be to parole him for a period of time because of his family situation. But you couldn’t provide clemency.

DEAN: No, I—Kleindienst has now got control of the parole board, and he said that now we can pull paroles off now where we couldn’t before. So—

NIXON: Well, parole—

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but Kleindienst always tells you that and then never delivers.

NIXON: Parole, parole.

DEAN: Well, I mean—

NIXON: Let’s talk candidly about that. Parole, one, in human terms, and so forth, is something that I think in Hunt’s case—you could do Hunt, but you couldn’t do the others. You understand?

DEAN: Well, so much depends upon how Sirica sentences. He can sentence in a way that makes parole even impossible.

NIXON: Oh, he can?

DEAN: Sure. He can do all kinds of permanent sentences.

NIXON: On this kind of thing?

DEAN: Yeah. He can be a—just a son of a bitch as far as the whole thing.

HALDEMAN: Of course, can’t you appeal on an unjust sentence as well as on an unjust conviction?

DEAN: You’ve got sixty days to ask the judge to review it. There is no appellate review of sentences.

HALDEMAN: There isn’t?

DEAN: Not that I—

NIXON: The judge can review it, yeah.

HALDEMAN: Only the sentencing judge can review—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —his own sentence?

NIXON: Coming back, though, to this. So you got that—the—hanging over. Now, if—you see, if you let it hang there, the point is you could let all or only part—the point is, your feeling is that we just can’t continue to pay the blackmail of these guys?

DEAN: I think that’s our greatest jeopardy.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Now, let me tell you, it’s—

DEAN: Because that is—

NIXON: —no problem. We could get the money. There is no problem in that. We can’t provide the clemency. The money can be provided. Mitchell could provide the way to deliver it. That could be done. See what I mean?

HALDEMAN: But, Mitchell says he can’t, doesn’t he?

DEAN: Mitchell says that, well—Mitch—that’s—it’s—you know, there has been an interesting thing—phenomena all the way along on this—is that there have been a lot of people having to pull oars and not everybody pulls them all at the same time, the same way, because there are developed self-interests.

HALDEMAN: What John is saying is that everybody smiles at Dean and says, “Well, you better get something done about it.”

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: And Mitchell is leaving Dean hanging out on a—none of us—well, maybe we’re doing the same thing to you.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: But I—let me say that I don’t see how there’s any way that you can have the White House, or anybody presently in the White House, involved in trying to gin out this money.

DEAN: We are already deeply enough in that. That’s the problem, Bob.

NIXON: I thought you said you could handle the money?

DEAN: Well, in fact, that—when—

NIXON: Kalmbach?

DEAN: Well, Kalmbach, was a—

HALDEMAN: He’s not the one.

DEAN: No, but when they ran out of that money, as you know, they came after the three fifty that was over here.

NIXON: And they used that, right?

DEAN: And I had to explain what it was for before I could get the money.

NIXON: Well, you said—

DEAN: Now, they—now that—they—

HALDEMAN: That was put—that was—in the first place, that was put back to LaRue—

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: —where it belonged. It wasn’t all returned in a lump sum. It was put back in pieces.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: And then LaRue used it for this other purpose?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Well, I think they can get that.

HALDEMAN: And the balance was all returned to LaRue.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: The problem is we don’t have any receipt for that, do we? We have no way of proving that.

NIXON: [unclear]

DEAN: And I think that was because, you know, of self-interest over there. Mitchell would—

HALDEMAN: Mitchell told LaRue not to take it at all.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: This is what you told me.

DEAN: That’s right. And then you don’t give them a receipt.

NIXON: Well, then, but what happened? LaRue took it, and then what?

DEAN: Well, it was sent back to him because we just couldn’t continue piecemeal giving, you know? I ask it—every time I asked for it I had to tell Bob I needed some, or something like that—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —and he had to get Gordon Strachan to go up to his safe and take it out and take it over to LaRue.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: This was just a forever operation.

NIXON: Then what—why didn’t they take it all to him?

DEAN: I had to send it over to him.

HALDEMAN: Well, we had been trying to get a way to get that money back out of here anyway.

NIXON: Sure.

HALDEMAN: And what this was supposed to be was loans. This was—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —immediate cash needs that was going to be replenished. And Mitchell was arguing, “You can’t take the three fifty back till it’s all replenished.” Isn’t that right?

DEAN: That’s right. Well, you know, we—

HALDEMAN: And then they never replenished it, so we just gave it all back anyway.

NIXON: I have a feeling we could handle this one. Well—

DEAN: Well, first of all, they’d have a hell of a time proving it. That’s one thing.

NIXON: Yeah, yeah. I just have a feeling on it. But let’s now come back to the money, a million dollars, and so forth and so on. Let me say that I think you could get that in cash, and I know money is hard, but there are ways that could be [unclear]. But the point is what would you do on that? Let’s look at the hard facts.

DEAN: I mean, that’s been very interesting. That has been, thus far, the most difficult problem.

NIXON: Why?

DEAN: They have been—that’s why these fellows have been on or off the reservation all the way along.

NIXON: So the hard place is this. Your feeling at the present time is the hell with the million dollars. In other words, you say to these fellows, “I am sorry. It is all off,” and let them talk. Right?

DEAN: Well—

NIXON: That’s the way to do it, isn’t it?

DEAN: That—

NIXON: If you want to do it clean—

DEAN: Then what—

NIXON: —[unclear] it comes out.

HALDEMAN: See, then when you do it, it’s a way you can live with. Because the problem with the blackmail, and that’s the thing we kept raising with you when you said there’s a money problem—when we need twenty thousand or a hundred thousand or something was yeah, that’s what you need today. But what do you need tomorrow and next year and five years from now?

NIXON: How long?

DEAN: Well, that was just to get us through November 7, though.

HALDEMAN: I recognize that’s what we had to give—

DEAN: Right.

HALDEMAN: —to November 7. There’s no question.

DEAN: Except they could have sold—these fellows could have sold out to the Democrats for a fantastic amount.

NIXON: Yeah, these fellows—but of course you know, these fellows though, as far as that plan was concerned—

HALDEMAN: But what is there?

NIXON: As far as what happened up to this time, our cover there is just going to be the Cuban committee did this for them up through the election.

DEAN: Well, yeah. We can put that together. That isn’t, of course, quite the way it happened, but—

NIXON: I know, but it’s the way it’s going to have to happen.

DEAN: It’s going to have to happen. [laughs]

NIXON: That’s right. Finally, though, so you let it go. So what happens is then they go out and they’ll start blowing the whistle on everybody else. Isn’t that what it really gets down to?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: So that would be the clean way. Right?

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: Is that really your—you really go so far as to recommend that?

DEAN: That—no, I wouldn’t. I don’t think necessarily that’s the cleanest way. One of the—I think that is what we all need to discuss. Is there some way that we can get our story before a grand jury, and so that they can have really investigated the White House on this? I mean, and I must be perfectly honest, I haven’t really thought through that alternative. We’ve been, you know, been so busy—

NIXON: John—

DEAN: —on the other containment situation.

NIXON: John Ehrlichman, of course, has raised the point of another grand jury. I just don’t know how you’re going to do it. On what basis? I could call for it, but I—

DEAN: That would be, I would think—

NIXON: The president takes the leadership, and says, “Now, in view of all this stripped land and so forth, I understand this, but I think I want another grand jury proceeding and we’ll have the White House appear before them.” Is that right, John?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: That’s the point, you see? That would make the difference. I want everybody in the White House called. And that gives you the—a reason not to have to go up before the [unclear] committee. It puts it in an executive session, in a sense.

HALDEMAN: Right.

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: Uh, well—

HALDEMAN: And there’d be some rules of evidence, aren’t there?

DEAN: There are rules of evidence.

NIXON: Both evidence and you have lawyers.

HALDEMAN: So you are in a hell of a lot better position than you are up there.

DEAN: No, you can’t have a lawyer before a grand jury.

NIXON: Oh, no. That’s right.

DEAN: You can’t have a lawyer before a grand jury.

HALDEMAN: Okay, but you do have rules of evidence. You can refuse to talk.

DEAN: You can take the Fifth Amendment.

NIXON: That’s right. That’s right.

HALDEMAN: You can say you forgot, too, can’t you?

DEAN: Sure.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: But you can’t—you’re—very high risk in a perjury situation.

NIXON: That’s right. Just be damn sure you say, “I don’t—”

HALDEMAN: Yeah—

NIXON: “—remember. I can’t recall. I can’t give any honest—an answer to that that I can recall.” But that’s it.

HALDEMAN: You have the same perjury thing on the Hill, don’t you?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Oh hell, yes.

HALDEMAN: And they’ll be doing things on [unclear]—

NIXON: My point is, though—

HALDEMAN: —which is a hell of a lot worse to deal with.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: The grand jury thing has its—in view of this they might—suppose we have a grand jury proceeding. Would that—what would that do to the Ervin thing? Would it go right ahead anyway?

DEAN: Probably.

HALDEMAN: If you do it in executive—

NIXON: But then on that score, though, we have—let me just run by that. You do that on a grand jury, we could then have a much better cause in terms of saying, “Look, this is a grand jury, in which the prosecutor”—how about a special prosecutor? We could use Petersen, or use another one. You see he is probably suspect. Would you call—

DEAN: No—

NIXON: —in another prosecutor?

DEAN: I’d like to have Petersen on our side advising us [laughs], frankly.

NIXON: Frankly, well, Petersen is honest as anybody—not being questioned him, are they?

DEAN: No, no. But he’ll get a barrage when these Watergate hearings start.

NIXON: Yes, but he can go up and say that he’s been told to go further in the grand jury and go into this and that and the other thing. Call everybody in the White House. I want them to come—I want the—to go to the grand jury.

DEAN: This may result—this may happen even without our calling for it when these—

NIXON: Vesco?

DEAN: No. Well, that’s one possibility. But also when these people go back before the grand jury here, they are going to pull all these criminal defendants back in before the grand jury and immunize them.

NIXON: Immunize them—why? Who? Are you going to—on what?

DEAN: The U.S. attorney’s office will.

NIXON: To do what?

DEAN: To talk about anything further they want to talk about.

NIXON: Yeah. What do they gain out of it?

DEAN: Nothing.

NIXON: To hell with them.

DEAN: They’re going to stonewall it, as it now stands. Except for Hunt. That’s why—that’s the leverage in his threat.

HALDEMAN: This is Hunt’s opportunity.

DEAN: This is Hunt’s opportunity.

NIXON: That’s why—

HALDEMAN: God, if he can lay this—

NIXON: That’s why your—for your immediate thing you’ve got no choice with Hunt but the hundred and twenty or whatever it is. Right?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Would you agree that that’s a buy-time thing? You better damn well get that done—but fast?

DEAN: I think he ought to be given some signal, anyway, to—

NIXON: Yes.

DEAN: Yeah, you know.

NIXON: Well, for Christ’s sakes get it in a way that—who’s going to talk to him? Colson? He’s the one who’s supposed to know him.

DEAN: Well, Colson doesn’t have any money though. That’s the thing. That’s been our—one of the real problems. They have been unable to raise any money. A million dollars in cash, or the like, has been just a very difficult problem as we’ve discussed before. Apparently, Mitchell has talked to Pappas, and I called him last—John asked me to call him last night after our discussion and after you’d met with John to see where that was. And I said, “Have you talked to Pappas?” He was at home, and Martha picked up the phone, so it was all in code. “Did you talk to the Greek?” And he said, “Yes, I have.” And I said, “Is the Greek bearing gifts?” He said, “Well, I want to call you tomorrow on that.”

NIXON: Well, look, what is it that you need on that—when, now look—well God, I am unfamiliar with the money situation.

DEAN: Well, that, you know, it sounds easy to do, apparently, until everyone is out there doing it and that’s where our breakdown has come every time.

NIXON: Well, if you had it, where would you—how would you get it to somebody?

DEAN: Well, I gather LaRue just leaves it in mailboxes and things like that and tells Hunt to go pick it up. Someone phones Hunt and tells him to pick it up. As I say, we’re a bunch of amateurs in that business.

HALDEMAN: That was the thing that we thought Mitchell ought to be able to know how to find somebody who could do all that sort of thing, because none of us know how to.

DEAN: That’s right. You got to wash money and all that sort. You know, if you get a hundred thousand out of a bank, and it all comes in serialized bills, and—

NIXON: Oh, I understand.

DEAN: And that means you have to go to Vegas with it or a bookmaker in New York City, and I’ve learned all these things after the fact. It’s [laughs] great shape for the next time around! [laughs]

HALDEMAN: Jesus!

NIXON: Well, the main point now is the people who will need the money [unclear]. Well, of course, you’ve got the surplus from the campaign. That we have to account for. But if there’s any other money hanging around—

HALDEMAN: Well, but what about all the—what about the money we moved back out of the—here?

DEAN: Apparently, there’s some there. That might be what they can use. I don’t know how much is left.

NIXON: Kalmbach must have some, doesn’t he?

DEAN: Kalmbach doesn’t have a cent.

NIXON: He doesn’t?

DEAN: See the new law—

HALDEMAN: No, see that three fifty that we moved out was all we saved. Because they were afraid to—because of this, that’s what I mean. That’s the trouble. We are so goddamn square that [laughs] we get caught on everything!

NIXON: Well, could I suggest that—this though. Now let me go back around [unclear]. They will then—

HALDEMAN: Be careful.

NIXON: The grand jury thing has appeal. Question is—it at least says that we are cooperating—

DEAN: Well—

NIXON: —with the grand jury.

DEAN: Once we start down any route that involves the criminal justice system—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —you’ve got to have full appreciation of there is really no control over that.

NIXON: No, sir.

DEAN: While we did—we had an amazing job of—

NIXON: Yeah, I know.

DEAN: —keeping the thing on the track before—

NIXON: Straight.

DEAN: —while the FBI was out there, all that—and that was only because—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —I had a [unclear] on where they were going.

NIXON: [unclear] Right. Right. But you haven’t got that now because everybody else is going to have a lawyer. Let’s take the new grand jury. The new grand jury would call Magruder again, wouldn’t it?

DEAN: But, based on what information it would? For example, what happens if Dean goes in and gives a story, you know, that here is the way it all came about. It was supposed to be a legitimate operation and it obviously got off the track. I heard of these horribles, told Haldeman that we shouldn’t be involved in it.

NIXON: Yeah. Right.

DEAN: Then Magruder’s going to have to be called in and questioned about all those meetings again, and the like. And it begins to—again he’ll begin to change his story as to what he told the grand jury the last time.

NIXON: Well—

DEAN: That way he’s in a perjury situation.

HALDEMAN: Except that’s the best leverage you’ve got on Jeb is that he’s got to keep his story straight or he’s in real trouble.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: Unless they get smart and give him immunity. If they immunize Jeb then you have an interesting problem.

NIXON: He wouldn’t want—

DEAN: Well, I think we have—

HALDEMAN: [unclear] immunity.

DEAN: —we have control over who gets immunized.

HALDEMAN: Do we?

DEAN: Yeah, I think they wouldn’t do that without our—

NIXON: But you see, the grand jury proceeding [unclear] sort of thing, you can go down that road and then—if they had—I’m just thinking of now how the president looks. We would be cooperating. We would be cooperating through a grand jury. Everybody would be behind us. That’s the proper way to do this. It should be done through a grand jury, not up there in the klieg lights of the committee or—

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Nobody’s questioning if it’s a grand jury, and so forth. So, and then we would insist on executive privilege before the committee. Flat-out say, “No, we won’t do that. We’re not going to do it—matter before a grand jury,” and that’s that. You see—

HALDEMAN: All right, then you go to the next step. Would we then—the grand jury meet in executive session?

DEAN: Yes, sir. They’re—

NIXON: Always—

DEAN: —secret sessions. They’re secret.

HALDEMAN: Secret session.

NIXON: Secret.

HALDEMAN: All right, then would we agree to release our statement, our grand jury transcripts?

DEAN: That’s not for our—we don’t have the authority to do that. That’s up to the court and the court, thus far, has not released the ones from the last grand jury.

NIXON: They usually are not.

DEAN: It would be highly unusual for a grand jury to come out. What would happen is—

HALDEMAN: But a lot of the stuff from the grand jury came out.

NIXON: Leaks. Well—

DEAN: It came out of the U.S. attorney’s office—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —more than the grand jury. We don’t know. Some of the grand jurors may have leaked—

NIXON: Right, right.

DEAN: —it, but they were—

NIXON: Bob, it’s not so bad. It’s—that’s just not the bad—or the worst place. But—

HALDEMAN: Well, what I was—I was going the other way there. I was going to it might be to our interest to get it out.

NIXON: Well, we could easily do that. Leak out certain stuff. We could pretty much control that. We’ve got much more control there. Now, the other possibility is not to go to the grand jury. Then you’ve got three things. One, you just say, “The hell with it. We can’t raise the money. Sorry, Hunt, you can say what you want.” And so Hunt blows the whistle. Right?

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: All right, if that happens then that raises some possibilities of other criminal—because he is likely to say a hell of a lot of things and he’s certain to get Magruder on it.

DEAN: It’ll get Magruder. It’ll start the whole FBI investigation going again.

NIXON: Yeah. So, what else? It’ll get Magruder. It could possibly get Colson. He’s in that danger.

DEAN: That’s right. Could get—

NIXON: Could get Mitchell. Maybe? No.

HALDEMAN: Hunt can’t get Mitchell.

DEAN: I don’t think Hunt can get Mitchell. Hunt’s got a lot of hearsay.

NIXON: Ehrlichman? He could on the other thing except Ehrlichman [unclear].

DEAN: Krogh could go down in smoke.

NIXON: Because Krogh—where could anybody—but on the other hand, Krogh just says he—Krogh says this is a national security matter. Is that what he says? Yeah, he said that.

DEAN: Yeah, but that won’t sell, ultimately, in a criminal situation. It may be mitigating on sentences but it won’t in the main matter—

HALDEMAN: Well, then that—

NIXON: That’s right. Try to look around the track. We have no choice on Hunt but to try to keep him—

DEAN: Right now we have no choice.

NIXON: But my point is, do you ever have any choice on Hunt? That’s the point. No matter what we do here now, John—

DEAN: Well, if we—

NIXON: Hunt eventually, if he isn’t going to get commuted and so forth, he’s going to blow the whistle.

DEAN: What I have been trying to conceive of is how we could lay out everything we know in a way that, you know, we’ve told the grand jury or somebody else. So that if a Hunt blows—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —so what’s new? You know, it’s already been told to a grand jury, and they found no criminal liability, and they investigated it in full. We’re sorry, fellow—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: We don’t—it doesn’t—

NIXON: Including Ehrlichman’s use of Hunt on the other deal?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: You’d throw that out?

DEAN: Well, Hunt will go to jail for that, too, he’s got to understand that.

NIXON: That’s the point, too. I don’t think that—I wouldn’t throw that out. I think I would limit it to—I don’t think you need to go into every goddamn thing Hunt has done.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: He’s done some things in the national security area. Yes. True.

HALDEMAN: We’ve already said that. Anyway, I mean, we’ve laid the groundwork for that.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: But here is the point, John. So you go that—let’s go to the other extreme. The other angle is to decide, well, if you open up the grand jury, first, it won’t do any good. It won’t be believed. And then you’ll have two things going. The grand jury and you have the other thing. At least the grand jury appeals to me from—the standpoint is the president makes the move. “Since all these charges have been bandied about, and so forth, the best thing to do is to—I have ordered, or I have asked the grand jury to look into any further charges. All charges have been raised.” That’s the place to do it, and not before a committee of the Congress. Right?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Then, however, we may say, Mitchell, et al., God, we can’t risk that. I mean, all sorts of shit’ll break loose there. Then that leaves you to your third thing. The third thing is just to continue to—

DEAN: Hunker down and fight it.

NIXON: All right. If you hunker down and fight it—fight it and what happens?

DEAN: Your—

NIXON: Your view is that that is not really a viable option.

DEAN: It’s a very—it’s a high risk. A very high risk.

NIXON: A high risk, because your view is that—what will happen out of that is that it’s going to come out. Somebody’s—Hunt—something’s going to break loose—

DEAN: Something is going to break and—

NIXON: When it breaks it’ll look like the president—

DEAN: —is covering up.

NIXON: —is—has covered up a huge—this—right?

DEAN: That’s correct.

HALDEMAN: But you can’t contain the charge.

NIXON: That’s not—

DEAN: I just don’t—

NIXON: You’re—

DEAN: I don’t think it’s—

NIXON: You now have moved away from the hunker down.

DEAN: Well, I’ve moved to the point that we’ve certainly got to make a harder look at the other alternative, which we haven’t before.

NIXON: The other alternative appeals.

DEAN: The other alternatives. Right.

NIXON: Three other choices, wouldn’t you say? As a matter of fact, your immediate middle ground of grand jury. And then there’s finally the other ground of—no, I suppose there’s a middle ground—

DEAN: And I would—

NIXON: —or the middle ground of a public statement, but without a grand jury.

DEAN: What we need also, sir—

NIXON: And also—

HALDEMAN: But John’s view is if we make the public statement—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —that we talked—I raised that this morning, the thing we talked about last night.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: If each of us—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —make moves—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —he says that will immediately lead to a grand jury.

NIXON: Fine—all right, fine.

HALDEMAN: As soon as we make that statement they’ll have to call a grand jury.

NIXON: Then maybe we make the public statement before the grand jury, in order to—

HALDEMAN: So it looks like we are trying to do it over.

DEAN: All right. Say—all right, say here are public statements, and we want—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —full grand jury investigation—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —by the U.S. attorney’s office.

NIXON: Curious to see whether this statement’s then—that’s right. That I—but—and that we’ve said that the reason that we have delayed this is until after the sentencing. You see, the point is—the reason that time is of the essence—we can’t play around with this—is that they’re going to sentence on Friday. We’re going to have to move the goddamn thing pretty fast. See what I mean?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: So we’ve got to act. We really haven’t time to move.

DEAN: The other thing is that the attorney general could call Sirica and say that “the government has some major developments that it’s considering. Would you hold sentencing for two weeks?” If we set ourself on a course of action.

NIXON: Yep, yep.

DEAN: Say that “the sentencing may be in the wrong perspective right now. I don’t know for certain, but I just think there are some things that I am not at liberty to discuss with you, that I want to ask that the court withhold two weeks—sentencing.”

HALDEMAN: So then the story is out: “Sirica Delays Sentencing Watergate for—”

DEAN: I think that could be handled in a way between Sirica and Kleindienst that it would not get out.

NIXON: No.

DEAN: Sirica tells me—I mean Kleindienst apparently does have good rapport with Sirica. He’s never talked to him since this case has developed—

HALDEMAN: Why not?

DEAN: —but, uh—

NIXON: That’s helpful. Kleindienst could say that he’s working on something and would like to have a week. I wouldn’t take two weeks. I would take a week.

DEAN: I’ll tell you the person that I would—you know, I feel that we could use his counsel on this, because he understands the criminal process better than anybody over here does—

NIXON: Petersen?

DEAN: —is Petersen. It’s awkward for Petersen. He’s the head of the Criminal Division. But to discuss some of these things with him, we may well want to remove him from the head of the Criminal Division and say, that “related to this case, you will have no relation.” And give him—on some special assignment over here where he can sit down and say, “Yes, this is an obstruction, but it couldn’t be proved,” or so on and so forth. We almost need him out of there to take his counsel. That would—I don’t think he’d want that but he is the most knowledgeable—

NIXON: How could you get him out?

DEAN: I think an appeal directly to Henry [Petersen] that—

NIXON: Why doesn’t the president—could the president call him in as special counsel to the White House for the purpose of conducting an investigation? Represent—you see, in other words rather than having Dean in on it—

DEAN: I have thought of that. I have thought of that.

NIXON: —have him as special counsel to represent to the grand jury and the rest.

DEAN: That is one possibility.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: On the basis that Dean has now become a principal, rather—

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: —than a special counsel.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: And that he’s a—

DEAN: And I could recommend that to you.

NIXON: He could recommend it—you could recommend it, and Petersen would come over and be the—and I’d say, “Now—”

HALDEMAN: Petersen’s planning to leave anyway.

NIXON: And I’d say, “Now—”

DEAN: Is he?

NIXON: “I want you to get—we want you to, one,” we’d say to Petersen, “We want you to get to the bottom of the goddamn thing. Call another grand jury or anything else.” Correct? Well, now you’ve got to follow up to see whether Kleindienst can get Sirica to put off. Right? If that is—if we—second, you’ve got to get Mitchell down here. You and Ehrlichman and Mitchell and let’s—and by tomorrow.

HALDEMAN: Why don’t we do that tonight?

NIXON: I don’t think you can get him that soon, can you?

HALDEMAN: John?

NIXON: It would be helpful if you could.

DEAN: I think it would be.

NIXON: You need—

DEAN: Get him to come down this afternoon.

NIXON: It would be very helpful to get it going. And, you know, and then—actually, I’m perfectly willing to meet with the group, or I don’t know whether—

HALDEMAN: Do you think you want to?

NIXON: Maybe have Dean report to me at the end as to what are—as to what conclusions, et cetera—is that what you want to do? I think I should stay away from the Mitchell side of it at this point.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Do you agree?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: And, uh—

DEAN: And I think, unless we see—you know, some sort of a reluctant dragon there—

HALDEMAN: You might try to meet with the rest of us. I’m not sure you’d want to meet with John in a group of us. Okay, let me see if I can get it done.

NIXON: All right. Fine. And my point is that we can—you may well come—I think it is good, frankly, to consider these various options. And then once you decide on the plan—John—and you had the right plan. Let me say I have no doubts about the right plan before the election. And you handled it just right. You contained it. Now after the election we’ve got to have another plan, because we can’t have, for four years, we can’t have this thing—you’re going to be eaten away. We can’t do it.

DEAN: Well, there’s been a change in the mood—

HALDEMAN: John’s point is exactly right, that the erosion here now is going to you. And that is the thing that we’ve got to turn off at whatever the cost. We’ve got to figure out where to turn it off at the lowest cost we can, but at whatever cost it takes.

DEAN: That’s what we have to do.

NIXON: Well, the erosion is inevitably going to come here. Apart from anything, you know, people saying that, well, the Watergate isn’t a major concern. It isn’t. But it would—but it will be. It’s bound to be.

DEAN: We cannot let you be tarnished by that situation.

NIXON: Well, I [unclear] also because I—although Ron Ziegler has to go out, they blame the [unclear] the White House [unclear].

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: We don’t—I say that the White House can’t do it. Right?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

DEAN: Yes, sir.

 

“While Mitchell is here, I should see him.”

March 22, 1973, 9:11 A.M.

Richard Nixon and Bob Haldeman

EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

By March 22, Nixon saw the Watergate scandal with more urgency than before. Dean’s no-nonsense account the day before almost certainly contributed to the perspective Nixon exhibited in his discussion with Haldeman, which was more intense than previous ones on the same subject. Nixon recognized that the “second-story job” at Democratic National Committee headquarters could well lead to questions about the slush fund that financed all such shadowy activities. With that, he and Haldeman outlined in remarkable detail the flow of undocumented money. In a combination of new strategies and the same old wishful thinking, they planned ways to protect those working in the White House, even at the expense of close associates, including former attorney general Mitchell—who was then visiting Washington from his home in New York City. The issue on Nixon’s mind, all the while, was the degree to which “Mitchell would take some responsibility.”

…

NIXON: Here’s the thing. I think—this concerns me, Bob. [unclear] cancer growing around the president and that’s got to be cut out—somehow. And then, of course, we’re trying to figure how we can cut it out. Why you cut it out without hurting and killing a lot of people. [unclear] kill a lot of people.

HALDEMAN: That may be what you have to do.

NIXON: Now—well, I don’t know. The point is—

HALDEMAN: Then Dean—

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: —his argument is those people are going to be killed anyway—

NIXON: Well, that’s the point.

HALDEMAN: —why not kill them with a—

NIXON: Dean—

HALDEMAN: —clean bullet now?

NIXON: Dean goes—

HALDEMAN: And leave the—

NIXON: Dean goes down the line and then the line goes [unclear]. He gets, for example, it appears to me that it’s—if you really want to look at the thing, it’s—and he’s been completely honest. He says that he’s involved. He—and I said, “Why the hell—how are you involved?” He said because he was aware of and participated in the obstruction of justice by reason of the fact that he was aware of the fact that they were—they had a fund to take care of these various defendants. I don’t know. I don’t believe that that is going to be something that is going to set Dean—myself—you know what I mean? That’s—well, when Dean ran the fund to—he didn’t hand out the money. Others did.

HALDEMAN: We—John and I—worked on that with him. Perhaps he thinks I’m tied into that too because of this. In a sense, it’s my fund that he was taking.

NIXON: Yeah. Well—I, that’s the kind of thing I’d kind of like to get—

HALDEMAN: What?

NIXON: —out of the way.

HALDEMAN: Okay, but we’re very clear on that—except this concern is what they do on the other side. What happened was that—is they needed the money.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: They were supposed to be getting it themselves from other sources, from other Cubans and all that kind of crap.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: So they got back to a crunch once in a while when a guy had to have another three thousand dollars or something or he was going to pull the plug—

NIXON: Then, who did it? Dean? That’s what worries him.

HALDEMAN: No. Then what happened was, the only—see they knew over there that the only money there was that was usable was this three hundred fifty thousand.

NIXON: Who’s they? Who’s they?

HALDEMAN: LaRue and Mitchell.

NIXON: Okay.

HALDEMAN: And so, Mitchell said, “You’ve got to use that money.” So, I said, “Turn the whole thing back to ’em. We don’t want the money anyway. Give them just enough—I’ve been looking for a way to get rid of it.” I’ll admit I was worried about this money. I wanted to get it back into the—where it belonged. So I said give it back to them, and they wouldn’t take—Mitchell wouldn’t let them take it back, but he did say, “You’ve got to use some of it.” So Dean told Strachan, who was the guy that had the—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —the physical possession to give X thousand dollars to LaRue. So, Strachan would go and open his safe, take out X thousand dollars, and go trudging over to LaRue’s. And this is all after the election. This is in the—

NIXON: After the election?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, on the—yeah, and this in—

NIXON: Oh, after the election.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. And he would go over and give LaRue—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —you know, X thousand dollars and we can certainly claim that Strachan had no knowledge of what that was for. He was carrying out Dean’s instructions—that Dean was carrying out instructions from me, and you’ve got a provable thing. And my point there was, it’s their money, give it back to them, give it all back to them. So we were giving—

NIXON: The way I would—the way I was going to say about it—of course, on the money was [unclear]. First, what was it? The money was money that was collected without regard to the campaign laws at all—

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: It was in cash. It was for the purpose of taking polls and surveys, and so forth—prior to that—and so forth.

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: It was not used. After the election it was a surplus.

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: It was turned back—

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: —period. Right?

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Now, what happened to it after that? Do we have to account for what happened to that money after the election?

HALDEMAN: Well—

NIXON: If it was used to pay campaign bills—

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Somebody has to. We don’t have to, but the campaign has to—

NIXON: Somebody has to what—now?

HALDEMAN: The campaign has to account for it.

NIXON: But it wasn’t collected in the cam—

HALDEMAN: But they still have to account for—it was cash on hand at the time of the campaign. No, it wasn’t, because they got rid of it.

NIXON: Not in the campaign, not in the camp—my point is, I would not treat that—I, that in my view, was—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: —not campaign funds. That was campaign—that was not given for a campaign at all. These were funds that were, shall we say, collected after the 1968 elections and had nothing to do with any campaign law, was not campaign funds, you know, for any purpose. They wanted to know—what did they poll? They polled—what happened to Goldwater, what happened on the meat prices—

HALDEMAN: Yes, sir. Issue—issue polls.

NIXON: Issue polls—

HALDEMAN: And the—

NIXON: —and the rest. The study that you made—

HALDEMAN: —geographic analysis.

NIXON: —and after that they returned it over to the campaign committee.

HALDEMAN: It was a gift to the campaign committee.

NIXON: Well, I don’t. I don’t know. Anyway, it’s a problem, and that’s—if Dean sees that it’s a problem because the question will be asked. Dean is very good this way. You saw how the next question would be—whack, whack, whack, whack.

HALDEMAN: Well, it’s a potential problem. If Dean is inordinately worried about that problem because it does involve him.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Uh—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: His view, and we—this is what we were talking about—I mentioned to you last night on the phone.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: His view that pulling—

NIXON: The White House—

HALDEMAN: —the wagons around the White House. And Dean’s point is, when you get down to it, the White House literally doesn’t have any problem prior to the Watergate break-in. And, in other words, there was no White House involvement in the Watergate, he’s satisfied. That—

NIXON: Even Colson?

HALDEMAN: He’s satisfied with that.

NIXON: He thinks that telephone call—that’s the one that worries me.

HALDEMAN: You see that’s—yeah.

NIXON: Colson has Liddy and Hunt in his office and calls Magruder and says, “Get off your ass and do something.”

HALDEMAN: Well, but he argues that wasn’t necessarily—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —and probably, and maybe—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —in reality, wasn’t knowledge—

NIXON: I guess, but that—

HALDEMAN: —of the operation.

NIXON: I don’t know—

HALDEMAN: Now, he did know there was an intelligence apparatus.

NIXON: I recall myself, Bob, that [unclear] the ITT thing. I can imagine Chuck and how he was. Hell, he’d go on for an hour about what he was trying to do like that, and it wasn’t like that he was trying to get a counteroffensive. I don’t know what he was trying to do.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. That’s when he was playing Teddy Kennedy stuff. He was—

NIXON: That’s right. Damn most [unclear]. But, well, anyway, I guess that—

HALDEMAN: Dean’s point is the only place that the White House is culpable—

NIXON: Yes.

HALDEMAN: —in this thing—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

HALDEMAN: —in any criminal basis—

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: —or any real basis—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —is in the potential charge of obstruction of justice after the fact—that we have no problem with the crime itself.

NIXON: Right, and on that one he says, “Why don’t we just say we turned over the money?”

HALDEMAN: And I don’t see why we’re even—so the money is used for support stuff for defendants?

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Why is that obstruction of justice anyway?

NIXON: Well, particularly when it’s not to sip champagne. I wouldn’t say that, I guess maybe—

HALDEMAN: You may not have to get into that at all, see? He’s just worried that you might get into it. And if you follow his containment line, the odds—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —he feels, and I feel strongly on this, are pretty good you won’t get into it. He’s just worried that there’s a little lurking some [unclear]—

NIXON: Possibility [unclear].

HALDEMAN: —because somebody, well, because Hugh Sloan knows that the money was delivered here. That’s really where it—what it boils down to.

NIXON: Hugh Sloan knows it.

HALDEMAN: Or if you put Gordon Strachan—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —up before a grand jury—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —if they ask the right question—Gordon will never volunteer. He’s a lawyer and he’s—

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —smart—

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —and he’ll pull—

NIXON: But he must not perjure himself.

HALDEMAN: But, if you get Gordon to a point where they say, “Was there any money?”—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —somehow—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —he may—they may get him into where—

NIXON: But this had already been, some had been used yet—is it our money [unclear]?

HALDEMAN: No—well, yeah, but never a fund over here—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —only that there—that Stans had this fund in his safe, which he did—which, of course, he would have. He had a cash fund in his safe. It was used for various payments and that’s where—

NIXON: As far as this is concerned, this is—I’d say constructively that Stans is clean. Now, to go on to—did you ever sign any [unclear]?

HALDEMAN: I don’t know. I didn’t—I never saw him. I never had a thing to do with the situation.

NIXON: There was nothing in writing involved in it.

HALDEMAN: Well, Strachan may have had to sign a receipt when he took [unclear]—

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: Well, what it was, was that money—

NIXON: I know.

HALDEMAN: —that we had left over from ’70. Remember we collected all our cash in ’70—

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: And we told ’em not to spend all of it if they didn’t have to. We ended up, we had a—and it was probably ’68 surplus that we used in ’70 and carried over.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: It got mixed, of course.

NIXON: Why don’t we just say on this money—

HALDEMAN: The money [unclear].

NIXON: Kalmbach’s money [unclear]—

HALDEMAN: [unclear] Kalmbach.

NIXON: —was to be used—this was to be used for various candidates but was never used.

HALDEMAN: It was to be used for candidate support and research.

NIXON: For candidate support and research. It was never used, turned over to the committee at the end of the campaign. What they did with it is their problem.

HALDEMAN: That had been collected in years prior to 1971.

NIXON: That’s right. Very simple.

HALDEMAN: Which is true, also. At least that was my understanding of that. Now, the problem is that—I think those funds got mixed together and we never got all the money.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Because they told us we couldn’t—

NIXON: Sure.

HALDEMAN: —make a [unclear]. Uh—

NIXON: They didn’t use what they thought they did. Anyway, [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Well, it wasn’t they thought they needed it. It was their point that under the laws there was no way we could use it—which they were right.

NIXON: Which we never did.

HALDEMAN: There really wasn’t. There wasn’t even a way we could use what we had.

NIXON: What you mean is that you didn’t do a thing with the money, which is good.

HALDEMAN: See, I had the money. I was going to use it to pay for polls [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] you did the polling through—

HALDEMAN: But they said they had the money to pay for it and they needed places to show where they spend money, so they paid for the bills.

NIXON: I would say that looking at the thing now—Ehrlichman, for example, he gets to him—

HALDEMAN: Not on Watergate.

NIXON: No, but he gets to him on the—if Hunt, with Hunt’s—

HALDEMAN: But John doesn’t think it does. It gets to Krogh.

NIXON: Well, that bothers me.

HALDEMAN: It—and it clearly does, and it gets to David Young, and David Young is a weaker reed than Krogh.

NIXON: Has Young also lied? They both—

HALDEMAN: Well, they haven’t gotten to Young yet, I don’t think. I shouldn’t say that because I don’t know. I don’t know.

NIXON: But, what were Young and—

HALDEMAN: It’s my impression that they—

NIXON: What were Young and—Krogh didn’t, Krogh hit a critical question in his case, apparently, said he didn’t know the Cubans. Now how does he get out of that? Has anybody thought of that?

HALDEMAN: Well, Ehrlichman’s view on it is—which kind of surprises me—is to be cold-blooded. Yesterday, he said, “When Krogh gets finished with his lying—”

NIXON: He said, “No, I didn’t.” They said they know Krogh. It’s a convicted felon against his word. Well—

HALDEMAN: Plus they may not say anything. You still—the Cubans seem to be the least matter of concern. They’re fanatics and they don’t seem to really be too concerned about their pulling the plug and their needs are fairly minimal, and Dean confirms again that Liddy is enjoying—Liddy’s in jail. He didn’t—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —stay out. He said, “I want to start serving my term,” and he’s at Danbury and thoroughly enjoying it. He’s a little strange.

NIXON: That son of a bitch of a judge gave him thirty-five years.

HALDEMAN: He may enjoy that. As long as he thinks we’re going to deal something up for him someday when he—it’s, incredibly he’s got five kids and all he’s concerned about is that there’s enough income to take care of his kids and that’s being taken care of right now by his father. His lawyer’s got something worked out.

NIXON: Goddamn it! The people are in jail! It’s only right for people to raise the money for them. I’ve got to let them do that and that’s all there is to it. I think we ought to. There’s got to be funds. I’m not being—I don’t mean to be blackmailed by Hunt. That goes too far. But we’re taking care of these people that are in jail. My God, they did this for—we’re sorry for them. We do it out of compassion and I didn’t [unclear] the Cuban fund and the people that contribute to it didn’t have to report on that damn thing. There’s no reporting requirement of any kind whatever. You don’t agree? What else should we do?

HALDEMAN: That’s why I—it seems to me that there’s no real problem on obstruction of justice as far as Dean’s concerned. I mean—it doesn’t seem to me that we are obstructing justice, for Christ’s sake. The people—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —pled guilty—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: When a guy goes and pleads guilty, are you obstructing justice?

NIXON: When you help his—

HALDEMAN: His argument is when you read the law, that the—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —that, uh—

NIXON: Yeah, but, Dean didn’t do it. Dean, I don’t think Dean had anything to do with the obstruction. He didn’t deliver the money or—that’s the point. I think what really set him off was when Hunt’s lawyer was off at this party and said Hunt needs a hundred and twenty thousand dollars. Well, that was a very—that was a shot across the bow. You understand that that would have constituted goddamn blackmail if Dean had gotten the money and never—you see what I mean?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Let’s come to the other. We—when you talk about the wagons around the White House, Bob, what really happens here is that we really have to take a hard look at the situation and realize that we [unclear]. I don’t think that we can—has anybody candidly suggested that Magruder was not aware that they were tapping?

HALDEMAN: I don’t think so. I don’t know, but I have my opin—I have no knowledge. My opinion is that he knew.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And from the way he talks I’m thoroughly convinced of that. Dean is thoroughly convinced that he knew.

NIXON: All the way through. And it’s Magruder’s word against the others and he said he didn’t.

HALDEMAN: Well, nobody said he did.

NIXON: Well, did he [unclear]?

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah, but not—they haven’t testified [unclear].

NIXON: Speaking now of what Dean tells me—yes, that’s what I’m going to do this afternoon, and Dean tells me things have gotten out of control. And he says, well, [unclear] and asked him how Magruder was doing and Dean said Magruder perjured himself. Well, it’s pretty rough. I’d say well, with that knowledge can I appoint Magruder to a position in government? That’s the problem, you see [unclear].

HALDEMAN: You didn’t appoint him to a position in the White House.

NIXON: [unclear] I hired him out. I’d say—

HALDEMAN: That’s exactly why we didn’t let him get into anything that was a presidential appointment. And you can also argue that we should have told the secretary of commerce. On the other hand, we don’t—we can’t prove he perjured himself, that’s Dean’s opinion.

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: Well, Magruder, anyway, that’s—we went that route for exactly that reason.

NIXON: I know, I know. We didn’t.

HALDEMAN: But the other side of that coin is, if you’re—unless you decide to throw Magruder to the wolves, you need to keep Magruder on as even a keel as you can. If you decide to throw him to the wolves, [unclear] kind of problem, he’s not a guy—he’s not a Liddy type. He’s exactly the opposite.

NIXON: If you decided to throw him to the wolves, what does that [unclear]? You wouldn’t say anything [unclear]. I mean, the point is we say that we have found that Magruder [unclear].

HALDEMAN: No. We don’t have anybody who can even testify on Watergate, because we don’t have anybody who knows anything about it.

NIXON: Except possibly Colson, and that’s just a big possibility—possible. Yet, I don’t agree that nobody else would know. Strachan?

HALDEMAN: Well, that’s right—I keep forgetting about Strachan. And Gord—what’s his name, Dean says Strachan did know.

NIXON: What we do with getting information in sort of a—he may not have known about how we’re—you know what I mean? I think Strachan is not that bad if his fish is going to get fried. He’s at too low a level.

HALDEMAN: That’s the point. Strachan had no authority.

NIXON: He got a tremendous amount of—he just got information, but he didn’t issue orders or anything on what he wanted to do.

HALDEMAN: Right. You look at Gordon Strachan. Here’s a little, young lawyer, who used to work for John Mitchell in his law firm, and came down to Washington to work in the government, and he’s working under a campaign with the attorney general of the United States is in charge of it. Now, how the hell do you expect him to decide whether something that’s being done is right or wrong?

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: I don’t know, I don’t think—Gordon doesn’t, I don’t think, doesn’t worry Dean much and he doesn’t worry—I don’t, I would not be concerned about Gordon. He is—

NIXON: A hell of a guy.

HALDEMAN: You never know about anybody. You know, I would have never thought that navy aide would have a nervous breakdown.

NIXON: Didn’t you? [unclear] can sure be wrong in picking people that—

HALDEMAN: Gordon is a guy I wouldn’t worry about. But, Magruder is a guy I would. Because Magruder is loaded with ego, personal pride, political ambition—

NIXON: He’s never going to make it this way.

HALDEMAN: He’s had some major success as a young guy. He’s, you know, a boy wonder type—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: —and that kind of guy is—

NIXON: How does John answer the Ellsberg thing? That’s the other point I wanted to raise that—John seems to say well—

HALDEMAN: He says, “I didn’t know anything about it.” He says, “I didn’t think they—I—”

NIXON: Talked to Hunt [unclear].

HALDEMAN: No, he didn’t. He says he didn’t talk to Hunt about it.

NIXON: Krogh did.

HALDEMAN: Krogh did.

NIXON: But what was—what were we doing at that meeting though is the whole point [unclear] about that. I’m rather curious to know myself.

HALDEMAN: Well, you better ask John, because I don’t really know. All I know is—

NIXON: All I know is that I think it was part of that whole operation of John and Young, where we were just looking into the whole business of leaks. Henry was in on that. Henry must be aware of some of that. I’ve got to—

HALDEMAN: What they—the enterprise out of there, which is the key thing that Hunt, you see—what Hunt says is that he’ll uncover some of the sleazy work he did for Ehrlichman. He said particularly remind him of the—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —of the—

NIXON: The Ellsberg affair. That’s what Dean told me.

HALDEMAN: All right, and the Ellsberg affair—

NIXON: Yeah, what happened?

HALDEMAN: I’m not sure what happened, but it has something to do with they sent Hunt out, and I guess the Cubans—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —to break in—

NIXON: To a doctor’s office.

HALDEMAN: —to a psychiatrist’s office to get a report—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —on Ellsberg’s mental analysis or something, and they bungled [laughs] the break-in—didn’t get what they were supposed to get or something, and then they came back and said could they go back again and that request got to Ehrlichman, and he said, “Absolutely not,” he says. And they didn’t, apparently. That’s—

NIXON: Why did they want a report on [unclear]?

HALDEMAN: I don’t know, but they had—there was a lot of stuff. They had a lot of interesting stuff on Ellsberg that showed he was, that was—we got some of it.

NIXON: What was the purpose of it though? I mean, to discredit—?

HALDEMAN: I forgot—yes. [unclear]

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: Try and make a spy out of him, and—

NIXON: Oh, I see. Did it make him look as bad after all that national security was involved and so forth?

HALDEMAN: Well—

NIXON: I’m not sure I [unclear].

HALDEMAN: And why were we using private people? Because the question—there was a valid or a real question here as to where the CIA and the FBI fit into it.

NIXON: Also, whether they were leaking—

HALDEMAN: [unclear] because things were leaking from all over.

NIXON: They were leaking from all over and somebody had to find a way—

HALDEMAN: And it had to be done independently.

NIXON: It had to be done independently because of the possibility of leakage.

HALDEMAN: [unclear]

NIXON: Huh?

HALDEMAN: I don’t know whether that’ll hold up. I am sure that doesn’t make it legal—

NIXON: [unclear] now looking again. If you come back, why—

HALDEMAN: That’s a long stretched-out [unclear].

NIXON: I’m trying to get down to the end of the point, that the man who knows all this is Hunt—

HALDEMAN: [unclear]

NIXON: So, Hunt becomes rather important.

HALDEMAN: Probably.

NIXON: And Dean’s line, Bob, if we want—

HALDEMAN: Dean’s point on that one is that—

NIXON: Dean would say that he’d just cut that off [unclear]. That’s what you really come down to. Or you, you give him a hundred and twenty thousand dollars or at least give him another contact, you know what I mean? That’s a lot of dough. Let’s face it, in terms of a pardon or so forth, that if Colson is talking of a pardon by Christmas, you know, right after the fact that the court, that they’re convicted, or either before they’re sentenced—he’s out of his mind. He knows we can’t do that.

HALDEMAN: But if Hunt thinks that’s what he’s been promised—

NIXON: He’ll shut up now.

HALDEMAN: He’ll, he may shut up now.

NIXON: Yeah, but my point is—

HALDEMAN: But what do you do at Christmastime?

NIXON: Yeah. That’s right. And the question is that now it seems to me you’d better find out from Colson what did he promise so that—don’t you think so?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: But you’ve got to go about that before he’s sentenced. [unclear] a pardon. Well, what—that would be a—

HALDEMAN: But not if you get the parole board to—a pardon might be, an early pardon—an early parole might not if you get the parole board to—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —look at the point that the sentence was—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —way out of proportion to the—

NIXON: Well, the point is that—Dean says—that’s why he’s thinking of using Petersen. He says that, and Ehrlichman agrees, that the judge has the power to sentence him without parole. That’s a rough son of a bitch it seems to me for something like this on the ground that they didn’t talk about it, you see. Might make it tough titty, wouldn’t it—don’t you think, to pardon him? I think it would be perfect [unclear].

HALDEMAN: But the point—the moral of it is that he doesn’t—we don’t know what Sirica’s going to [unclear]. Again, Dean looks at the—what might be the worst. It may not be the worst.

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: [laughs] In fact what usually happens is something beyond what you thought was the worst.

NIXON: Well, on the wagons theory, that—what does that mean, I wonder, to put the wagons up around the White House? I mean that—who do you let down the tube? Do you let Magruder down?

HALDEMAN: You don’t intentionally. You leave Magruder—what you do is—you see we’re doing stuff now. We’re keeping quiet and all that—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: Just try and cov—and putting up this money and everything else. We’re trying to keep—when you get right down to it, as Dean says, the only White House guilt—culpability, is in the cover-up.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And what’s the purpose of the cover-up, to protect the White House? No, it protects some individuals at the committee.

NIXON: Mitchell, Magruder.

HALDEMAN: And the question then is how—what individuals—how far up does it go, that you’re protecting? And we’ve already—we’re not protecting Liddy, so we [unclear] so we’ve got to talk to him. The question is can it, if you could—his idea is you separate, you look at the committee as one thing, the White House as another.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: The White House has no guilt in the Watergate thing.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: So you come up with wagons around the White House, and you just turn it up to—you do whatever you do—issue statements, issue a new statement, well, whatever, to totally cut off the White House from the whole Watergate business. Now, at the same time you do that, it might be—we haven’t gotten to this, but it might be you also have to do the Segretti thing and, to a degree, implicate the White House, which is fine.

NIXON: There must be a Dean statement [unclear]. I don’t know how you feel about that—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: —or a Moore statement, or a—

HALDEMAN: There has to be something. That’s right.

NIXON: Or do you agree?

HALDEMAN: No, I think you do. I think they do.

NIXON: I think we need—I mean, let me say—let me put it—I have a certain balance [unclear] that Dean statement, or a Moore statement, or what have you, sure will [unclear] and so forth, but it’s better to have something rather than nothing. You know what I mean?

HALDEMAN: Well, but then the questions that that raises are: they can successfully do that, but can you—are you any better off if the White House is clean but your campaign committee’s dirty or if we cut the whole thing off?

NIXON: That’s not what I was referring to.

HALDEMAN: In other words, we need [unclear] the campaign committee and [unclear] the White House. First of all, is that believable? It happens to be true, but can it be convincing?

NIXON: Well, that—well, they—what you’re—

HALDEMAN: And Dean—if they get as high as Magruder, probably it doesn’t hurt too much. If they get to Mitchell—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He’s awfully close to you.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He’s not as close to you as Ehrlichman and, I guess, than Dean and Haldeman now, which [unclear]. Mitchell will find a way out. You have to let them get to him, I think. But Dean’s thought, I think—what convinced him to put the wagons around the White House is that it forces Mitchell to take the responsibility rather than allowing Mitchell to hide under the blanket of the White House, which he’s been doing, and I think Dean feels that that’s—and in a way, it does Colson too, who’s out. He feels that Mitchell and Colson can take care of themselves.

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: I don’t know. But the problem is Magruder can’t take care of himself, except with this straight line—his present position—

NIXON: Yep.

HALDEMAN: —and see whether he can make it stick. Now, they may be able to hang him on that—

NIXON: They’ll kill him.

HALDEMAN: —but still, it will get to a question. They may be able to indict if they get other people to talk, but can they convict him beyond a reasonable doubt? Maybe not, if he stays with his line they may not be able to convict him. Then Magruder indicted and winning acquittal may be a pretty good route for us to go. We won’t know unless we try. And they’re—what’ll you do if they call us? We can’t not go there again. And if I were the prosecutor, well, that decision, it’s the Justice Department that prosecutes that so maybe we can control the prosecution and not call ’em.

NIXON: Well—

HALDEMAN: But there again, at least if you call us, we’re under rules of evidence and—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: —and germaneness.

NIXON: You’ve got lawyers who object—you can go to relevancy there.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, and they can only—

NIXON: Go to relevancy. That’s no problem there.

HALDEMAN: So they can’t go fishing. And there [the grand jury] there is no problem, unless they get to Strachan and maybe start running that stream.

NIXON: Another thought that has been raised is the idea that [unclear] things going wrong [unclear] a special counselor.

HALDEMAN: I don’t know, not being a lawyer, I [unclear] this kind of stuff, but Dean feels very strongly, and John Ehrlichman seems to concur, that it would—that we do need the advice of somebody who knows more about the criminal setup than we do—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And they—

NIXON: We can’t go to Petersen—

HALDEMAN: Well, they both know Petersen’s the guy. They wonder if you know what we got into last night after we were in here was the question of whether, I guess it was Dean, could call Petersen and just say we need advice. “Can I talk to you on a totally confidential basis, outside of school, and it will [unclear].”

NIXON: You wouldn’t do that through Kleindienst?

HALDEMAN: No.

NIXON: Kleindienst wouldn’t know about it until after you told him? I’m just asking.

HALDEMAN: I don’t know. That—the way that we were talking, it’s going—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: —to have to either be—

NIXON: Right. Okay.

HALDEMAN: —just straight bilateral—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: —Dean to Petersen—

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: —or Dean would just say, “I’m over my head on this—”

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: “—and I need counsel on an informal and totally confidential basis. Will you sit down and let me go through this with you? But it’d have to be understood and it might—I recognize that you may be—can’t do it because as the head of the Criminal Division it puts you on the other side.” It can’t be separated. Dean has the feeling that the more Petersen knows, the more helpful he can be, and that he will be.

NIXON: I’m not sure that that’s what you can count on.

HALDEMAN: I’m sure you can’t count on it, because Petersen’s another human being, too.

NIXON: And he’s a knowledgeable man. [unclear] you stuck somebody [unclear].

HALDEMAN: But you don’t know what his ambitions are and—

NIXON: [unclear] and I just don’t know.

HALDEMAN: Well, I know they’re all possibilities, but apparently, all the way through this he’s been a very solid rock.

NIXON: More so than Kleindienst.

HALDEMAN: The problem you’ve got with Petersen is that he wants to go out in private practice with Kleindienst.

NIXON: Well, I’d sooner take [unclear].

HALDEMAN: And if you didn’t—

NIXON: What are you [unclear] tell Kleindienst too?

HALDEMAN: I don’t think that—if you’re going to do this—you can’t do it without Kleindienst.

NIXON: Right. I think here you’ve just got to [unclear] get Kleindienst in. [unclear] I’ll just call him and say look [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Well, he used to, and I assume that that [unclear] same ones, I think.

NIXON: Does have any report from Sullivan?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, he does.

NIXON: Not very good?

HALDEMAN: Oh, it’s got to—it’s some—of mostly the same old stuff. It’s the Anna Chennault and all—crap, and—well, there’s one thing that we could build up that would—that I think we could get built up that would be pretty good which is about the extensive use of the FBI in the 1964 Democratic convention and an attempt to use them in ’68. There is also some cover-up on Walter Jenkins, and some instructions by Johnson to the FBI as to what they were to find in their Jenkins investigation and—I don’t think we can use that, I mean, it isn’t—that isn’t—

NIXON: Too nasty?

HALDEMAN: Ah—then there’s some Abe Fortas stuff they were involved with. That was intended [unclear] to use Fortas to implicate [unclear]. As precise [unclear] he didn’t like but there’s a—I think you could blow a hell of a bombshell out of the ’64 Democratic convention—

 

Friends and law partners: Nixon and Mitchell

March 22, 1973, 1:57 P.M.

Richard Nixon, John Dean, Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Mitchell

EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

In early afternoon, Mitchell visited the Oval Office for a meeting that included Nixon and his three closest advisors. In one of the seminal conversations in the Nixon White House, the president of the United States suggested that Mitchell and those he influenced should “cover up or anything else” in order to block ongoing investigations. Mitchell grew up on Long Island, an athletic young man who worked his way through law school at Fordham University and then joined a law firm specializing in bonds and public finance. He was a success in his profession, liked by those with whom he worked for his genuine courtesy and respect. He could be, however, a cunning and sullen adversary. After meeting Nixon when their firms merged, Mitchell felt that he had found a leader he could support. During the 1960s, Mitchell was openly antagonistic toward the protest movement. He helped to present Nixon in 1968 as the candidate who would return calm to the nation.

Named attorney general at the beginning of Nixon’s first term, Mitchell implemented policies that were long on expediency for the police and short on rights for private citizens. For that he was unapologetic. He resigned in mid-1972 in order to head the Committee to Re-elect the President. In fact, the compelling aspect of the conversation he had at the White House on March 22 is how his loyalty continued unabated, helping to sort out solutions to Nixon’s many problems with the Justice Department, the FBI, the Senate committees, and the press. At the time, Mitchell was surrounded by four men who had been for weeks—even up to that morning—discussing how to sacrifice him for their own survival.^*

…

HALDEMAN: Well, John, Howard Baker just had—Hunt had this [unclear] sort of a buddy and Bittman just had lunch with Howard Baker’s administrative assistant at the administrative assistant’s request.

NIXON: The same one that saw Colson?

HALDEMAN: I don’t know that it was the same one, but I would guess. But this fellow wanted to get guidance from Timmons as to what the president was expecting out of the hearings and what he wanted to talk to him about this executive privilege business and where are we going to stand on that. He expressed the personal view that the president couldn’t waive executive privilege, which that son of a bitch [unclear] Ervin would accept the written interrogatories, and that they would probably go to the subpoena route [unclear]. But nothing was raised about Baker being concerned that he didn’t have contact—nothing on that other report was raised at all. But he did say that Baker was a little pissed off at Kleindienst because he had not met with him at all. He had had one meeting scheduled which they finally were able to set up, but Kleindienst canceled it. And it has not been rescheduled, and so Baker has had no communication with Kleindienst. The day it was scheduled was the day you had your press conference and announced your executive privilege or announced that the president with Dean and nobody would go up which caught Baker unaware. And the disturbing thing is that his understanding is [unclear] the view that Kleindienst would keep him informed of this next time. [unclear]

MITCHELL: Plus the fact they’re having a meeting with that committee, as soon as he—

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah.

MITCHELL: And all Weicker does is [unclear] Moore and Howard [unclear] Justice Department [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Well he’s objecting to the agreement that they made with Kleindienst—that Ervin made with Kleindienst—that FBI raw files would be made available to the chairman and the ranking member.

MITCHELL: Yeah, well—

HALDEMAN: Demanding that they be—he’s going to demand that they subpoena the attorney general and the director of the FBI to produce all the files, the materials, and so forth.

DEAN: I talked to Kleindienst last night and he raised that. And he said that he worked this out with Weicker, but Weicker was now dissatisfied with the arrangement. So he’s going to the chairman and the ranking minority member and the counsel.

NIXON: [unclear] a letter to [unclear].

HALDEMAN: That could be the [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] Baker’s idea. He wanted to talk to Kleindienst about it—didn’t want to talk to anybody else. That’s the way we left it.

DEAN: [unclear] I think that Kleindienst ought to be aware of the fact that Baker is distressed that he hasn’t made any greater effort to see him.

NIXON: Good point. Yeah.

DEAN: I will.

NIXON: Fine [unclear]. Follow through and pick up on that idea. I just want—I think you’d better do it yourself. Don’t you?

EHRLICHMAN: Could I suggest that you call Kleindienst? You had the other conversation with him. Could you call him and say you’ve gotten a rumor that Baker’s unhappy? Because [unclear] nobody else can do it.

HALDEMAN: I think he’s not really standing on his tippytoes completely.

NIXON: [unclear]

MITCHELL: The nature of the liaison—he’s got [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] communicate back and forth.

EHRLICHMAN: [unclear] will not want to be in position—Baker does not want to be in the position of talking to anybody in the White House.

NIXON: He doesn’t want to talk to anybody.

MITCHELL: [unclear] wants to collaborate with us.

NIXON: He doesn’t want to talk—

HALDEMAN: But he wants to collaborate—this AA was saying he wants to be helpful, he wants to work things out. He told the president he wanted to do that through the—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —attorney general.

NIXON: That’s right. Said he did want to talk to Kleindienst.

EHRLICHMAN: Does Kleindienst know that?

NIXON: Yes, of course.

HALDEMAN: Well then, call Kleindienst.

UNIDENTIFIED: [unclear] Were you there? [unclear]

MITCHELL: What are they going to collaborate on?

NIXON: [unclear] what?

MITCHELL: Well, now, what are they going to collaborate on?

NIXON: Well, I suppose on such matters—you may recall that Gray wants to—[unclear] wants the FBI. However, [unclear] and so forth having Kleindienst [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Well, again, I know exactly what the trouble is.

NIXON: Oh, okay. [unclear] all done. [unclear] I’m the one that should do it. But you—what Baker was thinking of, says that Kleindienst canceled [unclear] I would think Kleindienst should have done it.

EHRLICHMAN: [unclear] broadcast [unclear].

MITCHELL: Well, that’s another thing that [unclear]. For instance—said to Timmons, Baker was expecting all the lawyers to try to get into the confidence of Sam Ervin that [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but he shouldn’t be too concerned about Baker’s public statements in agreement with Ervin with—that established him [unclear].

NIXON: Well, he said that he [unclear] against it. That’s what he wants to do. [unclear] Okay. Well, you’re going to follow up about two thirty on Gray [unclear]. He’s [laughs] a little bit on the stupid side, to be frank with you.

DEAN: The prospects to let himself get sandbagged until then won’t happen.

NIXON: You’d better counsel him about it. The problem with him, John, is with Gray, is a certain stubbornness [unclear] talk to Kleindienst. Frankly, I think, too—I think maybe Kleindienst ought to counsel him and talk to him.

DEAN: He has—

NIXON: Did he listen to him?

DEAN: John Ehrlichman talked to Kleindienst last night and said that’s where Gray was getting his guidance.

EHRLICHMAN: The whole trouble is that Dick gives him guidance which is very general. Something like this comes up and Gray overreacts—it’s almost a spasm reaction. We had, the other day—whether or not, you know, giving them access to the FBI files.

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: It was the opposite of what Kleindienst told him.

NIXON: I know it.

EHRLICHMAN: And, uh—

NIXON: He shouldn’t have even needed guidance on that.

EHRLICHMAN: Of course.

NIXON: Nobody—the director of the FBI should not have even known—should have even known, second nature, that you never turn over raw files to a full committee.

EHRLICHMAN: I talked to Dick Saturday night—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —and he just was beside himself because of that. And he said, “Hell, we covered this,” he says, and he was really obsessed on it. And I feel—

NIXON: Well, okay. I’ll tell him.

…

NIXON: Well, where do we—what words of wisdom do we have from this august body on this point?

EHRLICHMAN: Our brother Mitchell brought us some wisdom on executive privilege which, I believe—

MITCHELL: Technically, Mr. President, I think the only problem [unclear] and I’d prefer you just coming out and stating—

NIXON: That’s right.

MITCHELL: —and I would believe that it would be well worthwhile to consider to spoil the picture to the point where under the proper circumstances you can settle with certain former people in the White House and some [unclear] some of the current people at the White House under controlled circumstances should go up and—

…

NIXON: We’re fairly certain—you could probably hear this afternoon. He [Kleindienst] said he’s called Baker about—dozens of times, and Baker, it seems he’s out of town making a speech [unclear] and this trip just goes on, and on, and on. But, he’ll try. He’ll call him right away. He said he talked to Weicker for an hour on the phone [unclear] furnishing the files [unclear]. Well, anyway, he says he talked to him for an hour and a half. When I talked to Kleindienst [unclear]. Maybe it’s not Kleindienst, maybe it’s Baker.

HALDEMAN: I would guess that there’s truth to that, too. I have always said, they’re always down here bitching about nobody calling them—nobody giving them anything and all that. They say, “When you catch them, you can’t get to them.”

EHRLICHMAN: [unclear] catch them [unclear] pass the word to Colson, Webster—

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: —and this—

NIXON: And his—and incidentally, it just looks like he—his administrative assistant called Colson. Now that’s what Colson informed me. And I said, “But, what the hell,” he said [unclear], but I said—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, that isn’t a casual pitch.

NIXON: No.

DEAN: Maybe he’s looking for some—Baker’s looking for some sort of a link with the White House. Maybe that’s what he’s—

UNIDENTIFIED: Well—

DEAN: —trying to hint at.

NIXON: It’s got to be Kleindienst. Go ahead on executive privilege, I suppose—how would you handle it?

MITCHELL: All I have worked out was—

NIXON: Work out the arrangements.

MITCHELL: —the best formula that we’ve discussed.

NIXON: Well, I guess under the situation that you—under the statement that we have—we’re in a position to [unclear] I think we could—we’re in a position to negotiate with the committee as to how—but we are not in a position to have—to cross the bridge in terms of saying that Hunt and Liddy will go down and testify and that members of the White House staff will testify in open, public session, or something like that. But you’ve got a lot of—

EHRLICHMAN: Formal—

NIXON: —other things—

EHRLICHMAN: Formal is the word.

NIXON: Formally is the word I use. And incidentally, that’s what I told Baker, too. I said, “Fine, that’s the term.”

MITCHELL: On executive—

NIXON: We begin with that proposition—I’d be comfortable there—and see what you can get by with.

MITCHELL: On executive privilege, Mr. President, stay well aware that some have waived it, and the more I think about it [unclear].

NIXON: Yes.

EHRLICHMAN: And it hurts the more you do it, the more you—

MITCHELL: The more it’s less [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] Sherman Adams.

MITCHELL: The point—beyond which you might be able to work it out here.

NIXON: Yeah.

MITCHELL: The point being that this seems to be the only way in which you get involved [unclear].

NIXON: You do.

MITCHELL: I would lay out a formula and negotiate it with Sam Ervin or either through Baker or however else [unclear]. And I would also put together a damn good PR team. [unclear] made available so that the facts can be adduced without putting on a political road show.

EHRLICHMAN: What about this?

MITCHELL: What about the president’s team? The team is important.

EHRLICHMAN: Okay, I’ve written this. I can see that Chapin, for instance, could appear without it in any way being germane to the presidency. So I’m going to decide right now—

HALDEMAN: Baker—

EHRLICHMAN: —that—

NIXON: Not Baker, that’ll be a little too—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, whoever you talk to. I’ve got a report here and I think I see where the danger points are and where they aren’t. I’d want to reserve, obviously, as to any question that might be asked.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: I can pinpoint some people now, but it really wouldn’t make any difference.

HALDEMAN: John, do you admit there’s any danger point? You admit that any one member of the White House staff can testify because it’s no danger point for him, but that some other one can’t because it’s a danger point with him. Then what you’re saying is—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, but the first [unclear]—

HALDEMAN: —then you’re saying the president was involved.

EHRLICHMAN: I’m saying danger in the sense of that he could—provocative.

MITCHELL: But [unclear] for the sake of going about discussion, in other words that—maybe we think that it’s appropriate at this time to formalize John’s theory on the Segretti matter and the Watergate matter based on the documentation from the FBI and you may even want to call on the FBI [unclear] in other words based on—can the grand jury—what we know came out of there, the trial [unclear] as far as that’s one incident—whatever the record—could have been available to me. This is why the investigation of—we had the memorandum with the backup—you know, obviously the FBI after all [unclear] and so forth couldn’t find anything more. It’s not expected that you could or [unclear] get out by way of their interrogation [unclear] two memoranda from Dean is important [unclear] appropriate time with it. John did, and say I [unclear] all the public records [unclear].

NIXON: We’ve tried that though, John.

DEAN: Why won’t—

NIXON: We still have grave doubts about it, though.

DEAN: Well, I don’t know—

MITCHELL: I did too before, Mr. President. I had severe doubts about it. The—now that the facts have come out as have the FBI reports, and we have had the trial, that you have some documentation [unclear].

DEAN: I think the proof is in the pudding, so to speak—it’s how the document is written and until I sit down and write that doc—I’ve done part B so to speak. I’ve done the Segretti thing.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: And I am relatively satisfied that we don’t have any major problems with that. All right, as I go to part A—the Watergate—I haven’t written—I haven’t gone through yet—because I—in real whole effort to write such a report, and I really can’t say if I can do it where we are. And I think it’s certainly something that should be done though.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: And, uh—but we—

MITCHELL: You never know.

DEAN: —you never know until we sit down and try to do it.

NIXON: Now, let me say on the Watergate, that’s a case [unclear] Segretti [unclear].

DEAN: We can’t be as complete because we don’t know. All we know is what—is whether—

NIXON: That’s a question [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: It’s a negative setting for us.

NIXON: In setting forth this general conclusion based on [unclear] all these questions. You are—that based on all of your considerations, all of your analysis, and so forth—you have found and very carefully put down that this individual, that individual, that individual, were not involved. We’re going [unclear] to have to presume that. Rather than going into every leaked story and other charge, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and knock this down—I don’t know—

DEAN: Yeah, well, that’s why I’d like to—and I don’t think I can do it until I sit down this evening and start drafting—

NIXON: Exactly.

HALDEMAN: I think you ought to hole up—now that you—for the weekend and do that.

NIXON: Sure.

HALDEMAN: Let’s put an end to your business and get it done.

NIXON: I think you need a—that’s right. Why don’t you do this? Why don’t you go up to Camp David? And—

DEAN: I might do that. I might do that. A place to get away from the phone.

NIXON: Completely away from the phone and so forth. Just go up there and [unclear] I don’t know what kind of work this is, but I agree that that’s what you could—see what you come up with. You would have in mind and assume that we’ve got some sort of a document [unclear] and then the next step once you have written it you will have to continue to defend [unclear] action.

EHRLICHMAN: That would be my scenario, that he presents it to you as—at your request. And you then—

NIXON: Publish it.

DEAN: Well, that’s—

MITCHELL: That introduces the problem for us [unclear]—

DEAN: —trial.

MITCHELL: —criminal trial and then appeals which may—

EHRLICHMAN: I know that, but I don’t care.

DEAN: Well, you ought to be—

HALDEMAN: I don’t see why. You’re not dealing with the defendants’ trial. You’re only dealing with the White House involvement. You’re not dealing with the campaign.

DEAN: That’s where I first [unclear].

NIXON: Well, you can write—you could write it in a way that you say this report does not re—it’s not—will not comment upon and so forth and so forth, but, “I—as you directed, Mr. President, and without at all compromising the rights of defendants and so forth, some of which are on appeal, here are the facts with regard to members of the White House staff, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, which you have asked from me. I have checked the FBI records. I have read the grand jury testimony and this is it—these are my conclusions, chit, chit, chit, chit.”

EHRLICHMAN: As a matter of fact you could say, “I will not summarize some of the FBI reports in this document because it is my understanding that you may wish to publish this.” Or you can allude to it in that way without saying that flatly. You can say that “I do not summarize all the FBI documents in this report.”

DEAN: Or I could say that all of the FBI—it is my understanding that all the FBI reports have been turned over to the Ervin Committee. Another vehicle might—

HALDEMAN: And he has only seen half of them.

DEAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Oh, yeah.

DEAN: Another vehicle might be, take the report I write and give it to Ervin and Baker—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —under the same terms that they’re getting the FBI reports. Say, “Now, this has innuendo in it, little things the press would leak from this and assume things that shouldn’t be assumed. But I want you to know everything we know.” And publicly state that you’ve turned over a Dean report to the Ervin Committee. And then begin to say—the next step is, “I think that you can see that various people have various ingredients where they may be of assistance in testifying. But it is not worth their coming up here to be able to repeat really what is here in some forum where they are going to be treated like they are in a circus. But I am also willing, based on this document, to set some ground rules for how we have these people appear before your committee.”

EHRLICHMAN: A case in point: the issue of whether or not I had a phone call reporting the burglary.

DEAN: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: Now, that’s all I know about the damn thing is that the Secret Service, or some policeman, phoned.

DEAN: But they could go on forever with you on that.

EHRLICHMAN: Exactly.

DEAN: And I think it ought to be things like we’ve got in this report and this might be, you know—get—give it to Ervin on the confidence that we’re not talking about documents being released. We’re talking about something that’s entirely facts. You could even [unclear] write a [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] accomplish our purpose if it isn’t released.

DEAN: I think it—

NIXON: And I thought the purpose—I thought John’s concern [unclear] I guess you’d want him for me to—

DEAN: I do. I—

EHRLICHMAN: My thought is—

NIXON: In other words, rather than fighting it, we’re not fighting the committee. We are, of course—but what we’re fighting is a public relations battle.

EHRLICHMAN: And I am looking to the future assuming that some corner of this thing comes unstuck at some time you’re then in a position to say, “Look, that document I published is the document I relied on, that’s the report I relied on and it codified and included all the secret identification of the FBI—”

NIXON: This is all we knew.

HALDEMAN: All the stuff we could find out—

EHRLICHMAN: “—And now, this new development is a surprise to me, and I’m going to fire A, B, C, and D—now.”

DEAN: John, let me just raise this. If you take the document publicly, the first thing that happens is the press starts asking Ziegler about it, inspecting the document each day. “Well, why did Ehrlichman receive the call? How did they happen to pick out Ehrlichman?”

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: “What did he do with the information after he got it?” And so on. Each—every item can be a full day of quizzing.

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: They’ll just go through the document day after day after day.

MITCHELL: Now what is your concerned judgment as to when and under what circumstances—?

NIXON: Another thing, however, let me say that while Ziegler could be given all those questions, I would say those are questions—I think Ziegler should cut it off.

MITCHELL: Let it die.

NIXON: This—yeah, fine. I think there should be a cutoff point which [unclear]. If John just sort of [unclear] “I’m not going to comment on the basic questions that are properly before the committee on the [unclear].”

DEAN: Well, you—you’ve said you are going to cooperate with a proper investigation.

NIXON: Yeah, but I’m not going to comment on it while it is proper.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: As long as it’s proper.

DEAN: So why would you—why not put ourselves in a framework where you’re way out above it? You’re cooperating with this committee. You’ve turned over the materials—

NIXON: And then no further comment.

DEAN: —and no further comment.

NIXON: You see, I think you could get off with the Ziegler business. I mean, I don’t want Ziegler—I was trying to pull Ziegler off of that by my own statement, too. [unclear] cooperate with the committee, give full cooperation, but we’re not going to comment while the matter is being considered by the committee—

HALDEMAN: But you don’t say—

NIXON: —unless the committee does this and that.

HALDEMAN: —but you don’t say that people don’t give, don’t release, don’t publish the Dean report. Only hand it over—

DEAN: —to a proper investigative committee.

NIXON: Well, then if you turn over the—do that, though—then can we get anything out about the Republicans putting out that much of a report? Can we still get out the fact that—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, the president—

NIXON: —there has been a report in which everybody in the White House—which bears out the president’s—

HALDEMAN: Ron can make the statement.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: That the president—

[Unclear exchange]

NIXON: John wants the statement—

EHRLICHMAN: Another way to do this, and that would be for you to have a meeting with Ervin and Baker.

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: That would—I told them—

NIXON: Well, we’ve thought of that—I mean we’ve thought of that and we’ve tried it.

EHRLICHMAN: But we didn’t have a reason for the meeting. This would be for the purpose of turning over the document and discussing the ground rules. Before you did that you want to have that all agreed in advance as to what the ground rules would be. And you’ve got quid pro quo here because you could come to Baker and you could come to the committee or to Ervin direct and say, “Look, I’ll turn over the Dean report to you provided we can agree on how witnesses will be treated up there.” I can even construe—

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: —executive privilege.

NIXON: John, for example, if you were—just talking about executive privilege, this really gets down to the specifics in terms of the question what do you do when they say, “What about Colson?” Does he go or not?

MITCHELL: I think that Colson goes.

NIXON: He has to go. Right.

MITCHELL: I think Colson—

HALDEMAN: Everybody goes under John’s—including Ehrlichman and me—everybody except John Dean, who doesn’t go because he’s got the lawyer privilege.

MITCHELL: I think what is happening to you and John and so forth with the committee could be negotiated out of the contents of this report.

NIXON: We should negotiate it—how?

MITCHELL: The president’s report will show that your simple thought—your simple involvement was missing in the [unclear].

HALDEMAN: No, it would show more on my book, I’m afraid.

DEAN: But, they’ll still—one strong argument—

HALDEMAN: Let us—let us go.

DEAN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I don’t see any argument against our going if you are going to let anybody go.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: Let us go. But, on the condition—you get less trouble with us than you do with some of the others. And if it’s not—and, now sure if you get, if you get the big fish up there in front of the television cameras I think that would be tough. I think Strachan going up wouldn’t get them nearly as excited as John and me going up.

NIXON: That’s Strachan and Chapin.

HALDEMAN: Well, Chapin wouldn’t have to appear—

DEAN: Well—

HALDEMAN: —as a focal point, but I think if you could do it in executive session—

EHRLICHMAN: Then I would have a reason to testify.

HALDEMAN: Then why hold us back?

NIXON: The executive session thing has always appealed to me. Now of course, you could say, “Well, in terms of people coming up here, of course you have to adjourn the session, but you got to convin—the committee feels constrained under executive session—

DEAN: We can invite the committee down to the Roosevelt Room or the Blair House.

NIXON: Yeah.

MITCHELL: Oh, hell, you could—

NIXON: Yeah, you could set it at a different venue, that’s true. You could put it in a different place. You could say we—which is what I—

MITCHELL: That would be hard to negotiate.

HALDEMAN: Can we maintain informality?

EHRLICHMAN: It will never—

HALDEMAN: It would never fly.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I don’t know why not. Those others go up there.

NIXON: Well, would executive session fly?

EHRLICHMAN: Executive session, I suspect, would at this point, yes, sir—yeah, I really think these guys are concerned about this Mexican standoff that they’ve got and I think they’re—

NIXON: They’ll also—

EHRLICHMAN: I think that the—Ervin’s crack on television about arresting people crossed the line.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: That would take it quite a bit far.

MITCHELL: In addition to that you have the problem of the long lengthy litigation.

NIXON: It’s going to go on for a hell of a long time.

HALDEMAN: Ervin doesn’t want that.

DEAN: Let him take it on the counsel then.

HALDEMAN: That’s what he doesn’t want.

DEAN: I know, but let him—if he—

HALDEMAN: We have offered to do it on Dwight Chapin. That’s the easy one for him.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: You got some guy who had no contact with this [unclear].

NIXON: It was quite clear to me that as long as Dean—

HALDEMAN: Won’t they test it?

NIXON: No, they didn’t test it. We asked them to. We said let’s find out. They didn’t bite that one very fast, did they, John?

HALDEMAN: Chapin’s the guy they’d test it on. You try to hold privilege on Chapin and that’s one they’d go to court on. They—they’d—

NIXON: Probably.

HALDEMAN: You might do pretty well, because here’s a former employee, a guy who had no policy role, had no—

NIXON: —contact—

HALDEMAN: —major contact with the president and he’d have a hell of a time demonstrating—

MITCHELL: Obviously you’ll have to expect a subpoena.

NIXON: Chapin?

MITCHELL: Yeah, because he’s no longer employed.

HALDEMAN: Well, because—

NIXON: What I’d—

HALDEMAN: —because with the subpoena, if he’s called to testify regarding his employment but not regarding his—any present stuff.

MITCHELL: He doesn’t [unclear] legroom. They can get him up there.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, the precedent on this is interesting. I think that his lawyer would advise him to go.

[Unclear exchange]

MITCHELL: They could get him to talk.

NIXON: Do you have any precedent for that? In the case of a present White House employee they couldn’t get him up here, right?

MITCHELL: Right.

NIXON: In the case of a past one you could get him up, but then he could—then he would have to go in front of the cameras and say, “I will not because of executive privilege.”

MITCHELL: Well, they can get up with him.

EHRLICHMAN: But it’s your privilege—you interpose it.

NIXON: I see.

EHRLICHMAN: And first we have the anomaly of Clark Mollenhoff running up and trying to give testimony in a civil service hearing over here now. He’s running up saying, “Ask me a question, ask me a question, this is a kangaroo court, and I waive”—the hearing examiner just says, “Sit down and shut up.” And what’s happening is that the government is asserting the executive privilege.

MITCHELL: No, they are not.

EHRLICHMAN: Well—

MITCHELL: Not executive privilege.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, all right—

MITCHELL: In fact you have—

EHRLICHMAN: All right. It’s the closest thing to it. But the point is—whose privilege is it to assert? Now, what do you do if it’s Chapin? I think—I haven’t thought this—this is the reason I called you here to figure out what the scenario is. But I assume what would happen is that immediately the subpoena is issued, that on behalf of the president a letter would go to the committee saying the Executive asserts privilege.

NIXON: Let me ask this. The—this question is for John Ehrlichman and John Dean. Now you were the two who felt the strongest on the executive privilege thing [unclear]. If I am not mistaken, you thought we ought to draw the line where we did. [unclear] Have you changed your mind now?

DEAN: No, sir, I think it’s a terrific statement. It’s—it puts you just where you should be. It’s got enough flexibility in it. It’s—

NIXON: But now—what—all that John Mitchell is arguing, then is that now we use flexibility—

DEAN: That’s correct.

NIXON: —in order to get off of the cover-up plan.

EHRLICHMAN: And as I told him I am so convinced we’re right on the statement that I have never gone beyond that. He argues that we’re being hurt badly by the way it’s being handled. And I am willing—let’s see—

MITCHELL: That’s the point.

HALDEMAN: I think that’s a valid evaluation. I think [unclear].

MITCHELL: See, that’s the only point, the only point—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

MITCHELL: —where the president—

HALDEMAN: That’s where you look like you’re covering up right now. That’s the only thing—the only active step you’ve taken to cover up the Watergate all along.

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: What is?

HALDEMAN: Was that.

NIXON: Even though we’ve offered to cooperate.

HALDEMAN: To the extent—and on legal grounds, and precedent—

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: —and tradition, and constitutional grounds and all that stuff, you’re just fine. But to the guy sitting at home who watches John Chancellor say that the president is covering this up by re—this historic review blankets the widest exercise of executive privilege in American history and all that. He says, “What the hell’s he covering up? If he’s got no problem why doesn’t he let them go and talk?”

MITCHELL: And it relates to the Watergate. It doesn’t relate to Henry Kissinger—

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

MITCHELL: —or foreign affairs.

HALDEMAN: That’s right. Precedent and all that business—they don’t know what you’re talking about.

NIXON: Well, maybe then we shouldn’t have made the statement.

HALDEMAN: I think we should have because it puts you in a much better position to—they were over here. That’s what Ervin wanted. He wanted all of us up there—unlimited, total, wide open. We—the statement in a sense puts us over here. Now you move back to about here and probably you can get away with it.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, you can get away with it in the Watergate context. You see, you said—

HALDEMAN: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: —executive privilege would work and then you’ve applied it in the first instance to Gray. You said this fellow can’t go.

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: And, I wouldn’t change that.

NIXON: I [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: I can’t—anything about that.

NIXON: Great.

EHRLICHMAN: Exactly right.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: At the same time—

MITCHELL: By the way isn’t that [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: [unclear]

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: Uh—

NIXON: [unclear] one-syllable names.

EHRLICHMAN: At the same time, you are in a position to say, “Oh, well, now this, this other case, and what I’m going to do there, consistent with my statement, is so and so, and so and so.”

HALDEMAN: Because it very clearly—the questions that the committee properly wants to ask don’t have any bearing on these people’s relationship to the president. Which they don’t. The president had nothing to do with it.

NIXON: I don’t know at all. I—

EHRLICHMAN: There again, it’s going to be hard to get proof. Well, it’ll be hard to—if you—you’re right, we’re going to need some kind of a PR campaign.

NIXON: Yes, that’s true. That’s true—what?

EHRLICHMAN: For the average guy.

NIXON: Is thinking about [unclear] Dean—

EHRLICHMAN: This is—the argument will be the president’s backed off his rock-solid position on executive privilege and is now letting Chapin and Colson and Haldeman and everybody testify.

NIXON: That the rest of us said that that’s perfectly [unclear].

DEAN: It is. I think they’re—

EHRLICHMAN: —saying that there are PR problems.

NIXON: But people don’t think so, is that right?

EHRLICHMAN: That’s right.

DEAN: Sure.

NIXON: In spite of what [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah. They don’t think the—

NIXON: I agree. I understand. I understand.

HALDEMAN: They think you clanged down an iron curtain here and you won’t let anybody out of here ever. That have ever worked here—scour lady on up. It was my understanding—I thought from you, or maybe it was someone else, that the committee’s operating rules do not permit witnesses to have counsel.

DEAN: That’s grand jury. I’ve never heard that about—

HALDEMAN: About the committee?

DEAN: About the committee, no. I can’t believe—

NIXON: The committee, on the contrary—committees, ever since the day I was there they always allowed counsel.

MITCHELL: I can’t imagine their not having counsel.

NIXON: No, sir. Committees allow counsel.

HALDEMAN: If that’s—it seems to me if you’re going to do this, that becomes important in that any White House staff member who testifies should not only have private counsel if he wants it—personal counsel—but the president’s counsel should be there because you’re under a limited waiver of executive privilege and the president’s counsel should be there to enforce the limitation and the witness should not have to be in the position of saying, “That’s one I can’t answer because it is outside the ground.” You or Fielding or somebody should be doing that for him.

NIXON: Have you—the executive session thing?

HALDEMAN: They’ll bitch about that, too. What are you going to hide? If you’re going to let them come up, why do you—why is that secret?

NIXON: Yeah, yeah. How do you handle that PR-wise?

MITCHELL: You don’t. One of the hazards [unclear] another Roman holiday like they’ve had with Kleindienst and Gray. This fact-finding operation—they’re to get the facts and not to put another political circus on like they have in the past.

DEAN: And if there were no cameras up there, there would be no reason to have it in executive session because—

HALDEMAN: Well, then they come back and say, “All right, we’ll do it in open session, but we’ll permit television coverage.”

NIXON: Oh, no. They won’t do that. That [unclear] their problem because of television. It’ll kill them [unclear] executive session written testimony be released. I think that that’s the basis of the relation. That is stupid to talk about formal sessions, so that gets away from it. That’s a—it is a formal session. Executive session [unclear] release testimony. Correct?

DEAN: That’s correct. We have said that no—

HALDEMAN: Point of debate, too. You argue they shouldn’t.

MITCHELL: Well, they won’t buy it.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, but I probably can’t get away with it. [unclear] But it’s a good thing to start with.

NIXON: Sure.

EHRLICHMAN: You want a bargaining position. I think it’s arguable that all they’re really interested in this is information, and I think they don’t need to release the transcripts, you know.

HALDEMAN: Is there an executive session of a Senate committee—are other senators permitted? They are, aren’t they? Any senator has the privilege of committee [unclear]. So Teddy Kennedy could come in and sit there.

NIXON: Sure. He can’t ask questions.

HALDEMAN: He can’t?

MITCHELL: Not unless you’re a member of the parent committee which he is.

HALDEMAN: But this isn’t subject—

DEAN: Select—Select Committee.

NIXON: Other members cannot—whether—that should be worked on, too. But I—it normally is the practice that nobody can ask questions except members.

HALDEMAN: Of course, Teddy could still sit there in the audience and then go out to the TV cameras and say, “Look [unclear].”

DEAN: Wouldn’t it be wonderful if he would?

NIXON: Probably we’re going to have that.

DEAN: I think if he did that, that would be terrific.

HALDEMAN: I was just thinking that, in the membership of the committee, we’re in reasonably good shape. The members—the people that you have on the committee are not as bad as most—as some senators who would turn the use of TV afterwards for their own—

NIXON: Not as spectacular—what?

EHRLICHMAN: You know, no way, and [unclear]—

[Unclear exchange]

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I would say [unclear].

NIXON: It’s very soon that we’re going to be moving on [unclear].

DEAN: Can I point out [unclear]?

NIXON: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: When do they start hearings now?

NIXON: The thing—

DEAN: There’s no time set.

HALDEMAN: How would they time that?

NIXON: Well, the top—the hearings won’t be—we have plenty of time before the hearings, but what—

EHRLICHMAN: The PR.

NIXON: John’s concerned about the PR. We don’t have much time.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, but—

NIXON: You don’t have much.

DEAN: PR is going to start on this right away with the termination of the Gray hearings for two weeks that’ll let some steam out of the—

NIXON: Yeah. Your PR would—

DEAN: Well, it’ll have to—

NIXON: The PR would. What I meant is—and anyway the main thing is to do the right thing. Don’t rush too fast on the PR but it’ll take some time to write something. John’s got to have time to write this report. He’s got to have a chance to look at—I guess we don’t breach—we don’t broach or do we broach this whether we have a report or not?

MITCHELL: I think you can broach that.

NIXON: Fine.

MITCHELL: Now—

NIXON: Let me ask you this: on the broaching of that, should we have Kleindienst be the broacher? The point is—who else? I can’t.

DEAN: That’s right. Well, Kleindienst in his conversations with Ervin and Baker—Ervin indicated that he would like to talk to Kleindienst about the executive privilege question. Maybe it’s now time to get that channel reopened again.

MITCHELL: Let me make this suggestion.

HALDEMAN: Write it out so Kleindienst said that both chapter and verse—on this—

NIXON: Without anybody else present.

MITCHELL: For a first step, you’re going to have that meeting and we’re going to keep John out of that. But you’re going to have everybody screaming about executive privilege going on in a committee meeting again. And I think, well, before the committee meeting is held, for somebody to say, “We want to discuss with the chairman of the committee his concept of the appearances of witnesses.” And don’t discuss it with him until you get all your ducks in a row all laid out. But, at least you advise them that it is a discussion of the subject matter so they don’t come out and blast you [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: Then ask him not to take a committee vote on the subject either until—

HALDEMAN: [unclear] committee locked in, but you can work something, maybe you can work on that.

NIXON: Well, is this the time to—I mean, the point is if the committee—is this the time to [unclear]? That’s it. Who’s going to talk to him? Who’s going to be there? Who do you think should do it?

MITCHELL: Kleindienst talks—

NIXON: Talks to—in other words to Baker and Ervin, basically. That conversation should occur late tomorrow. Why not? If you’re going to move in this direction, regardless of the report, we’ve got to move in this direction [unclear] start the negotiation.

MITCHELL: Well, I think that’s too much lead time. In the process before the committee meeting [unclear]. Now what’s Wally Johnson’s status?

DEAN: That’s funny, because I—he is still here—hasn’t gone up yet, but he’s been announced apparently. I gather he’ll be an assistant attorney general. What I was thinking is maybe to preserve my counsel role with Ervin and Baker that I ought to be present with Kleindienst.

NIXON: I agree.

DEAN: And the four of us sit down and talk about executive privilege—we won’t get into—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: —any of the substance.

NIXON: Well, the thing about your being at this is that you can keep Kleindienst in step with it.

DEAN: Plus they would appreciate the fact they’re dealing with me as counsel. That’s another reason I am not—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —you know, when the final wire is drawn—

MITCHELL: Well, it’s appropriate for the president’s counsel to be present when the discussions take place.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Well, all right. Now let’s get down to the [unclear]. How do we want to do this? How do we start there?

DEAN: I would think that possibly Kleindienst ought to call today and let Ervin and Baker know that he would like to meet with them early next week to talk about executive privilege—indicate that I would be present to see if we can find—

NIXON: A formula for—

DEAN: —a formula to resolve—

NIXON: —getting information that they desire.

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: It’s an unpublicized meeting.

DEAN: Unpublicized.

NIXON: I think we’d [unclear] go ahead.

HALDEMAN: [unclear] on top of that. I would say early in the week. You better say Monday so you can get them before the committee meets.

MITCHELL: And naturally cover Watergate first.

NIXON: I don’t know how far Ervin’s going to go. Ervin’s insistence on letting Dean testify—whether he might. We’d have to draw a line there, wouldn’t we, John?

MITCHELL: I would agree wholeheartedly that you better not go back on your final statements on the subject.

NIXON: That’s right. That’s right.

UNIDENTIFIED: Even if there hadn’t been statements—

NIXON: That’s right. But the point is, we’ve got to accept the decision of Judge Byrne’s [unclear] on the bail. The other thing to do on the Dean thing is say—you’d simply say, “Now, that’s out. Dean has—he makes the report. Here’s everything Dean knows.”

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: That’s where—that’s why the Dean report is critical.

EHRLICHMAN: I think John, on Monday, could say to Ervin if that question comes up, “I know the president’s mind on this. He’s adamant about my testifying, as such. At the same time he has always indicated that the fruits of my investigation will be known.” And just leave it at that for the moment.

DEAN: One issue that may come up as the hearings go along, if it then becomes a focus, is what did Dean do? As you all know I was all over this thing like a wet blanket. I was everywhere—everywhere they look they are going to find Dean.

NIXON: Sure.

HALDEMAN: That’s perfectly proper.

DEAN: But it—I don’t think that’s bad.

NIXON: I don’t know.

EHRLICHMAN: You were supposed to be.

NIXON: You were on it at the first. You were directed by the president to get me all the facts. Second, as White House counsel you were on it for the purpose of representing any people in the Executive Branch who were being questioned on it. So you were there for the purpose of getting information. In other words, that was your job. Correct?

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Then you heard—but, but the main point is that you can certainly tell them that Dean had absolutely no operational—the wonderful thing about your position is, I think, as far as they’re concerned—Watergate is—your position’s one of truly of counsel. It is never as an operator. That’s the—

HALDEMAN: You can even, in the private sessions, then maybe volunteer to give them a statement on the whole question of your recommendation of Liddy which is the only possible kind of substantive [unclear] that you could have and in that you can satisfy one of those arguments.

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: And that you—if you wanted to.

NIXON: At the president’s direction you’ve never done anything—any operational—you were always just as counsel. Well, we’ve got to keep you out anyway—the Dean thing. I guess we just draw the line, so we give them some of it—not give them all of it. I don’t suppose they’d say, John, “No, we don’t take him in executive session.” Would he go up in public session? What would your feeling on that be?

MITCHELL: I wouldn’t let him go.

NIXON: You wouldn’t.

MITCHELL: I would not.

NIXON: Why not? You just take the heat of being—all right. How about you wouldn’t—but on the other hand you’d let Chapin go. And you’d let Colson go.

HALDEMAN: No, he doesn’t.

MITCHELL: No, because—

NIXON: Because they’re former White House people.

MITCHELL: You can’t keep them out of open sessions. Now, I want to get back to that [unclear] Dean spoke to Chapin. On the basis of that Chapin talked to Segretti last weekend.

DEAN: Well, they can subpoena any of us. There’s no doubt about that. They—if they don’t serve us here because they can’t get in they can serve you at home or somewhere. They can ultimately find you.

EHRLICHMAN: I’m going to move to Camp David.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: By helicopter. [laughs]

NIXON: Go ahead. [unclear]

DEAN: So, the question is once you’re served and you decline, then you’ve got a contempt situation. Now, I would say that it gets very difficult to believe that they’ll go contempt on people who—

NIXON: Present White House staff.

DEAN: Present White House staff.

NIXON: They would on Colson. They could do that, could they?

DEAN: That would be a good test case for them to go on. The other thing is, though, they could subpoena Colson to come up there and Colson could then say, “Well, I decline to testify on the basis that I think this is a privileged communication”—or “privileged activities.” And again you get a little fuzzier as to whether or not you—

MITCHELL: I’d rather not answer the question that’s asked.

DEAN: That’s right.

MITCHELL: See my point.

DEAN: That’s right. There it—then it would get much fuzzier as to whether or not they cite him for contempt or not.

NIXON: Suppose the judge tomorrow orders the committee to show its evidence to the grand jury [unclear] then the grand jury reopens the case and questions everybody. Does that change the game plan?

DEAN: I would send them all down.

NIXON: What? Before the committee?

MITCHELL: The president’s asked [unclear] this.

DEAN: Now are you saying—?

NIXON: Suppose the judge opens—tells the grand jury and says, “I don’t,” says, “I want them to call Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and everybody else they didn’t call before.” What do you say to that? Then do you still go on this pattern with the Ervin Committee? The point is if a grand jury decides to go into this thing what do you think on that point?

EHRLICHMAN: I think you’d say, “Based on what I know about this case, I can see no reason why I should be concerned about what the grand jury process—”

NIXON: All right.

EHRLICHMAN: That’s all.

HALDEMAN: And that would change—

NIXON: Well, they go in—do both. Appear before the grand jury and the committee?

DEAN: Sure.

EHRLICHMAN: You have to bottom your defense—your position on the report.

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: And the report says, “Nobody was involved—”

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: —and you have to stay consistent with that.

MITCHELL: Well, theoretically, I think you will find the grand jury is not about to get out of the [unclear] substance.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: Thus the danger of a grand jury is they bring indictments on the basis of—

MITCHELL: Which they’ve studied.

DEAN: Well, there are no rules.

NIXON: The rules of evidence before grand juries are not—pretty fair at this point.

DEAN: That’s right.

MITCHELL: When you have something that’s reasoned and controlled—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: You have attorneys—

NIXON: Yeah.

MITCHELL: [unclear] the rules of the evidence meet.

NIXON: [unclear]

EHRLICHMAN: Somebody can get one in the form of a letter.

MITCHELL: [unclear] according to [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Well, what would happen? Would Silbert be the prosecutor on this?

DEAN: Unless the court appointed a special prosecutor, which he could do.

NIXON: Yeah. So, we better see tomorrow on that. But—the—so that if that’s the case how do we—let’s move now on the first one. Now who is to call Kleindienst?

DEAN: I’m involved [unclear].

NIXON: You going to call him and tell him what?

DEAN: I’m going to tell him to call Baker first, and then Ervin, and tell them that you would like to meet with them on Monday to discuss and explore a formula for providing the information they need in a way that does not cause a conflict with the president’s general policies on executive privilege.

NIXON: Yet meets their—meets their need for information.

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: Have they requested—they’ve requested that kind of a talk already, haven’t they?

DEAN: Yes.

EHRLICHMAN: And you’ll sit down with Dick, Mr. President?

NIXON: Yeah. Yeah. [unclear] you’re going to be so busy doing the report there will be no one—

DEAN: Well, I’ll work on that over the weekend, and actually it’s good because things do slow down a little over the weekend.

HALDEMAN: Also write out a thing for Kleindienst so that—

NIXON: I think you can talk to him. I think you can do most of the talking. Get the main—get to thinking—you can do it. Say you have studied the subject. You also know what my position is.

DEAN: I don’t think we ought to read anything in this first session but I think we ought to let him know that we are thinking about—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: —reaching some sort of—

NIXON: Say, “Now, what is—what would you think here?”

HALDEMAN: Well, just stay loose [unclear].

DEAN: Stay loose.

NIXON: I would say, “Now look, that’s what we’re going to do. We’ll lay out the thing about—with regard to this. We want to see what can be worked out with regard to—we talked about informal sessions. Has Ervin’s position been—he insists on formal sessions? Is that his position?

DEAN: Well, we don’t know. We’ve never really [unclear].

MITCHELL: [unclear] gotten into that.

HALDEMAN: His response to your position—that’s really what you’ve got now—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Ervin’s response to the Nixon position and that is, “Written stuff isn’t any good. I want the body—you can’t ask paper—you can’t ask a piece of paper questions.” Okay. Now, what we’re saying meets that requirement—

NIXON: The written thing was in which?

EHRLICHMAN: That was a Ziegler, I believe.

NIXON: I think so.

EHRLICHMAN: I don’t know how it came out. It’s not in a statement.

HALDEMAN: No, but it’s a general thing. I think—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —it was in your press conference where you said they will provide written—I think you said it.

NIXON: I may have said it and I don’t—

HALDEMAN: In a press conference. And I think Ervin’s response was to that.

NIXON: Right.

HALDEMAN: Your statement, if—

NIXON: Could have been.

HALDEMAN: “These people will be happy to provide written answers to questions—”

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: “—that—appropriate questions.”

NIXON: You think—are you sure it wasn’t in the statement—the written statement?

EHRLICHMAN: No.

HALDEMAN: No.

EHRLICHMAN: I think—I am sure we—

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: —used formal, informal—

DEAN: It came up the first time is when I responded to—

MITCHELL: That’s right. Exactly.

DEAN: —to Eastland. I responded to Eastland’s invitation to—

NIXON: You said you would furnish written—

UNIDENTIFIED: Right.

DEAN: Furnish written—

NIXON: I think the—I think that’s where you’ll find it.

DEAN: And then you—and then it was repeated after that, that we would be happy to supply information and—

NIXON: I think we’ve been [unclear].

HALDEMAN: But, then Ervin responded—he specifically rejected that only on the grounds that you can’t ask questions of a piece of paper.

NIXON: Cross-examine.

HALDEMAN: We need to deal with our questions. So we are giving him that opportunity. He hasn’t said that the processes of the Senate require that those questions be answered in [unclear].

NIXON: What is the argument that you give, John, to people who—and why executive session rather than open session?

DEAN: Well, I—

NIXON: You can’t really give—

DEAN: I think we’ll have—

NIXON: You can’t really attack the committee’s flamboyance.

DEAN: No, you can’t.

NIXON: So, what do you say?

DEAN: I think what I’d do is we’ll talk a little about the Constitution, and I’ll remind him of the position that he took so vocally in the [Senator Mike] Gravel [D-AK] case [in which Gravel sought to introduce a copy of the Pentagon Papers into the record of the Senate]—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —where he came out and said that legislative aides cannot be called to question for advice they give their senator or congressman. He just went on at great length and cited executive privilege—

NIXON: Then he’ll say, “This was not advice to the president.” Go ahead.

DEAN: Well, and I’ll say that these are men who do advise the president.

NIXON: And that’s the principle involved.

DEAN: And we have to draw the line.

NIXON: And to have the principle discussed in open session, and so forth, is the kind of a thing where you’ve got to—you ought to go off to the bench where the jury doesn’t hear it, basically.

DEAN: Well, I—

HALDEMAN: I don’t think John or Dick should tip their hands in the Monday meeting as to an offer to appear in executive session and get them onto the executive session wicket. It seems to me—

DEAN: No. No, I agree.

HALDEMAN: —they should only indicate a willingness to listen to ideas as to what would be done—

DEAN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —and an open-mindedness to try and work something out.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Because if you get to that, that’s going to become the issue—

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —and it seems to me that’s an issue we could win publicly where we may not be able to win it with the—

DEAN: I think—

EHRLICHMAN: How about—

HALDEMAN: —Senate, but you [unclear]—

EHRLICHMAN: What about expressing the president’s concern about the protection of his people from a spectacle?

NIXON: That’s fine. And also concern about his—about frankly the—having matters that really are a subject of executive privilege debated publicly rather—that’s a matter that ought to be debated privately.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Other matters—we have no, and—without, and the fact that it’s raised does not indicate guilt. That’s part of his argument on Gravel, too. The fact that it’s raised does not indicate guilt. That’s what we are really talking about here. But having it in public session does indicate that.

DEAN: Well, I will work out a complete negotiating scenario and have thought it through before I go up.

HALDEMAN: Really all your objective in that meeting is simply to indicate to them a willingness to discuss. It’s not—

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: —to lay out a proposal for them—

DEAN: I agree.

HALDEMAN: —to accept or reject.

DEAN: I will—

MITCHELL: John, as part of that—as part of the scenario, you want to hold executive session for the protection of those records.

DEAN: Very true. Uh—

NIXON: There, and it’s the record for the future. But that’s—that maybe you can tell Ervin—maybe on a mountaintop that this is perhaps a good way to set up a procedure where we could do something in the future and all. You know what I mean?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: Where future cases of this sort are involved. “We’re, we’re making a lot of history here, Senator. And—”

MITCHELL: And the senator can be a great part of it.

NIXON: No, really. We’re making a lot of history. And that’s it—we’re setting a historic precedent. The president, after all—let’s point out that the president—how he bitched about the Hiss case. Which is true—I raised holy hell about it.

DEAN: Ervin away from his staff—

NIXON: Huh?

DEAN: Ervin away from his staff is not very much, and I think he might just give up the store himself right there and lock himself in. I—you know, I’ve dealt with him for a number of years, and have seen that happen and have reached accord with him on legislation.

HALDEMAN: That’s another thing, if you don’t offer him anything, you may get an offer—

DEAN: That’s—

HALDEMAN: —from him—

DEAN: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: —you can’t accept. He’ll ask you [unclear].

DEAN: That’s exactly what he’ll do.

NIXON: And if he just takes the adamant—suppose now he just takes the adamant line? Nothing.

HALDEMAN: Sits there and says—

DEAN: I’ll say—

HALDEMAN: “—I’ll think about that.”

DEAN: “That’s all right.”

NIXON: You could go back—

DEAN: “Doesn’t sound like you’re interested in information—”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: “—it sounds like you’re interested in, in fighting—”

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: “—on principle.”

NIXON: He says, “Look, we are just going to have public sessions. It’s got to be that or else.”

EHRLICHMAN: Then, “We’ve got a lawsuit, Senator, and it is going to be a long one.”

UNIDENTIFIED: That’s right.

MITCHELL: “How can you expedite your hearings?”

NIXON: Yeah. “If you want your hearings”—and that’s the other thing. The other point is, would it not be helpful to get Baker enlisted somewhat in advance? If that could be done by not begging him [unclear]. If we—can we put Kleindienst to that thing?

MITCHELL: On the second step—not on the opening.

NIXON: Well, even on the opening step the problem that I have here, if Baker sits there and just parrots Ervin’s adamant thing saying, “Hell, no, there can’t be anything except the public sessions,” you have nothing to bargain with.

MITCHELL: But, Mr. President, you know how these senators act. Baker will lay the whole thing out on the table.

NIXON: Yeah, I guess you are right.

MITCHELL: Including the contempt. They’ll be—

NIXON: Baker, on the other hand—Kleindienst should at least talk to him and say, “Look, Howard, why don’t you try to work something out here?” Why couldn’t he say that?

HALDEMAN: He could say, “We’re going to try—we want to work something out.” “Yeah, but then—”

NIXON: “Glad to work something out.”

HALDEMAN: “—work with us.”

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: “We’re—”

NIXON: “Now, work—”

HALDEMAN: “—questioning how you—”

NIXON: “—with us, but you can’t be [unclear]. Right now, Howard, we’re just going for a lawsuit.”

HALDEMAN: “Give us a hand and try to open this up.” That’s—Baker would be fine that much ahead of time.

NIXON: That’s right.

HALDEMAN: Be positive this time around.

DEAN: Don’t lock yourself in. You hear every—

HALDEMAN: Right.

DEAN: All—

NIXON: Right.

DEAN: So you have another session or so on it.

NIXON: Yeah. The other point is that you be reminded so you get to it. Now, just assume, however, it happens so [unclear] insists that [unclear] you just—then it becomes essential then to put the Dean report out, it seems to me, and say, and then have the lawsuit.

EHRLICHMAN: We can say that if he really—I would say, “Well, okay, then, why don’t we now discuss how we frame the legal issue here?” And, “Perhaps we can at least agree on how to frame the legal issues, so that instead of taking three years it will only take a year and a half.”

HALDEMAN: Get it settled before this administration leaves [unclear].

DEAN: They know that it’s—depending upon who they are going after and the circumstances, that they’ve got a tough lawsuit ahead of them.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: They’ve got to hire counsel to—

NIXON: Yeah.

DEAN: It’s going to cost money to brief it on their side. They don’t have the government repre—you know they don’t have the Department of Justice to handle their case. They’ve got to bring in special counsel who probably knows nothing about executive privilege—has to be educated. Get the Library of Congress clanking away at getting all the precedents out and the like, and—we’ve got all that. Of course, it’s a major operation for them to bring in and they have to—

EHRLICHMAN: The other way—

DEAN: —get a resolution of the Senate to do it.

EHRLICHMAN: Fortunately, Ervin is a constitutional expert.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. He calls himself—

EHRLICHMAN: Self-certified. That’s a constitutional expert—

NIXON: Well, anyway—

EHRLICHMAN: While you do that—

NIXON: The—now, we could—have you considered any other poss—have you considered the other—all other possibilities you see here, John? You, you’re the one who is supposed to—

DEAN: That’s right. I think we—

NIXON: You know the bodies.

DEAN: I think we’ve had a good go-round on—

NIXON: You think we want to go this route now? And the—let it hang out, so to speak?

DEAN: Well, it isn’t really that—

HALDEMAN: It’s a limited hangout.

DEAN: It’s a limited hangout.

EHRLICHMAN: It’s a modified limited hangout.

NIXON: Well, it’s only the questions of the thing hanging out publicly or privately.

DEAN: What it’s doing, Mr. President, is getting you up above and away from it. And that’s the most important thing.

NIXON: Oh, I know. But I suggested that the other day and we all came down on—remember we came down on the negative on it. Now what’s changed our mind?

DEAN: The lack of alternatives or a body.

[laughter]

EHRLICHMAN: We went down every alley. [laughs] Let it go over.

NIXON: Well, I feel that this is, that—I feel that at the very minimum we’ve got to have the statement and let’s look at it, whatever the hell it is. If it opens up doors, it opens up doors. You know?

EHRLICHMAN: John says he’s sorry he sent those burglars in there, and that helps a lot.

NIXON: That’s right.

MITCHELL: You are very welcome, sir.

[laughter]

HALDEMAN: Just glad the others didn’t get caught.

NIXON: Yeah, the ones we sent to Muskie and all the rest—Jackson, and Hubert, and [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: I get a little chill sitting over there in that part of the table there.

NIXON: Yeah [unclear]. Getting pr—I—

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: I got to handle my Canadian friend [Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau] right at the moment. Incidentally, you don’t plan to have—you weren’t planning to have a press briefing [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: We hadn’t planned it. It wouldn’t hurt—

NIXON: [unclear] three thirty with John [unclear]. All right.

EHRLICHMAN: He is going to talk to the press tomorrow.

NIXON: Yeah, let’s let it go. [unclear]. Suppose you take it—you take care of it now [unclear] and I won’t come over there. I—you might, if you get him waltzed around, you let me hear—

EHRLICHMAN: All right.

NIXON: It would be my thought then that I would then break it off at four thirty.

DEAN: All right. Fine.

…

[HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN leave the conversation.]

MITCHELL: Believe me, it’s a lot of work.

NIXON: Oh, great, I may [unclear]. Well, let me tell you, you’ve done a hell of a job here.

DEAN: [unclear]

NIXON: I didn’t mean for you. I thought we had a boy here. No, you, John, carried a very, very heavy load. Both Johns as a matter of fact, but I was going to say John Dean is [unclear] got—put the fires out, almost got the damn thing nailed down till past the election and so forth. We all know what it is. Embarrassing goddamn thing the way it went, and so forth. But, in my view, some of it will come out. We will survive it. That’s the way it is. That’s the way you’ve got to look at it.

DEAN: Well, we’ve got a few miles and months ago, but we’re—

NIXON: The point is, get the goddamn thing over with.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: That’s the thing to do. That’s the other thing that I like about this. I’d like to get—but you really would draw the line on—but, I know, we can’t make a complete cave and have the people go up there and testify. You would agree on that?

MITCHELL: I agree.

NIXON: You agree on that, John?

DEAN: If we’re in the posture of everything short of giving them a public session [unclear] and the whole deal. You’re not hiding anything.

NIXON: Yeah. Particularly if we have the Dean statement.

DEAN: And they’ve been given out.

NIXON: And your view about the Dean statement is to give that to the committee and not make it public, however.

DEAN: That’s correct. I think that’s—

NIXON: And say it’s—

MITCHELL: Give it to the committee for the purpose—

NIXON: —the purpose of their investigation.

MITCHELL: —to limit the number of witnesses—

NIXON: Yeah.

MITCHELL: —which are called up there, instead of a buckshot operation.

NIXON: And say here, and also say, “This may help you in your investigation.”

MITCHELL: Right.

NIXON: “This is everything we know, Mr. Senator.” That’s what I was preparing to say. “This is everything we know. I know nothing more. This is the whole purpose, and that’s that. If you need any further information, my—our counsel will furnish it. That is not in here.” To the extent that we have it—“this is all we know. Now, in addition to that, you are welcome to have people—but you’ve got to have”—I think that the best way to have it is in executive session, but incidentally, you say executive session for those out of government as well as in?

MITCHELL: That’s right.

NIXON: Chapin and Colson should be called in.

DEAN: Yeah, they’re already [unclear].

NIXON: I would think so.

MITCHELL: Sure. Because you have the same problem.

NIXON: You see we ask—but your point—we ask for the privilege, and at least, you know, we—our statement said it applies to former as well as present [unclear].

DEAN: Now, our statement—you leave a lot of flexibility that you normally—for one thing, taking the chance appearing, and—however, informal relationships will always be worked out [unclear].

NIXON: Informal relations.

DEAN: That’s right.

MITCHELL: You have the same basis—

NIXON: Well, it might. When I say that the written interrogatory thing is not as clear [unclear] maybe Ervin is making it that way, but I think that’s based on what maybe—we said that the—I don’t think I said we would only write, in the press conference, written interrogatories.

DEAN: That’s right. I don’t think—

NIXON: I didn’t say that at all.

DEAN: Ervin just jumped to that conclusion as a result of my letter to—

NIXON: I think that’s what it was.

DEAN: I think that’s what’s happened.

NIXON: Not that your letter was wrong—it was right. But, the whole written interrogatory—we didn’t discuss other possibilities.

MITCHELL: With respect to your ex-employees, you have the same problem of getting into areas of privileged communications. You certainly can make a good case for keeping them in executive session.

NIXON: That’s right.

MITCHELL: [unclear]

NIXON: And in this sense the precedent for working—you can do it in cases in the future—just do it in executive session, and then the privilege can be raised without having, on a legal basis, without having the guilt by the Fifth Amendment, not like pleading the Fifth Amendment—

MITCHELL: Right.

NIXON: The implication always being raised.

MITCHELL: [unclear] and self-protection in that view?

NIXON: What? Yeah.

DEAN: [unclear] Fifth Amendment.

NIXON: That’s right. That’s what we’re going to do here.

MITCHELL: Those—boy, this thing has to be turned around. Got to get you off the lid.

NIXON: Right—

DEAN: All right.

NIXON: All right, fine, Chuck [John].

[DEAN leaves the conversation.]

MITCHELL: Good to see you.

NIXON: How long were you in Florida? Just—

MITCHELL: I was down there overnight. I was four hours on the witness stand testifying for the government in these racket cases involving wiretapping. The goddamn fool judge down there let them go all over the lot and ask me any questions that they wanted to. Just ridiculous. You know, this had—all has to do with the discretionary act of signing a piece of paper that I’m authorized by the statute. There were twenty-seven [unclear] lawyers that questioned me.

NIXON: You know, the—you can say when I [unclear] I was going to say that the—[picks up the phone] can you get me Prime Minister Trudeau in Canada, please? [hangs up] I was going to say that Dean has really been something on this.

MITCHELL: That he has, Mr. President. No question about it, he’s a very—

NIXON: Son-of-a-bitching tough thing.

MITCHELL: You’ve got a very solid guy that’s handled some tough things. And, I also want to say these lawyers that you have think very highly of him. I know that John spends his time with certain ones—

NIXON: Dean? Discipline is very high.

MITCHELL: [CRP attorneys Kenneth] Parkinson, [Paul] O’Brien.

NIXON: Yes, Dean says it’s great. Well, you know I feel for all the people, you know, I mean everybody that’s involved. Hell, all we’re doing is the best to their abilities and so forth. [unclear] That’s why I can’t let you go down. John? It’s all right. Come in.

[DEAN joins the conversation.]

DEAN: Uh—

NIXON: Did you find out anything?

DEAN: I was—I went over to Ziegler’s office. They have an office over there. Paul O’Brien will be down here in a little while to see you. I’m going over to Ziegler’s office and finish this up now.

MITCHELL: Are you coming back?

DEAN: Yes, I’ll come back over here then.

MITCHELL: Okay.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, when you come back—he can—is that office open for John now?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: Then he can go over there as soon [unclear] this.

[DEAN leaves the conversation.]

NIXON: But, the one thing I don’t want to do is to—now let me make this clear. I thought it was a very, very cruel thing as it turned out—although at the time I had to tell [unclear] what happened to [Sherman] Adams. I don’t want it to happen with Watergate—the Watergate matter. I think he made a mistake, but he shouldn’t have been sacked. He shouldn’t have been—and, for that reason, I am perfectly willing to—I don’t give a shit what happens. I want you all to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up, or anything else, if it’ll save it—save the plan. That’s the whole point. On the other hand, I would prefer, as I said to you, that you do it the other way. And I would particularly prefer to do it that other way if it’s going to come out that way anyway. And that my view, that—with the number of jackass people that they’ve got that they can call they’re going to—the story they get out through leaks, charges, and so forth, and innuendos, will be a hell of a lot worse than the story they’re going to get out by just letting it out there.

MITCHELL: Well—

NIXON: I don’t know. But that’s, you know, up to this point the whole theory has been containment, as you know, John.

MITCHELL: Yeah.

NIXON: And now we’re shifting. As far as I’m concerned, actually from a personal standpoint, if you weren’t making a personal sacrifice—it’s unfair—Haldeman and Dean. That’s what Eisenhower—that’s all he cared about. He only cared about—Christ, “Be sure he was clean.” Both in the fund thing and the Adams thing. But I don’t look at it that way. And I just—that’s the thing I am really concerned with. We’re going to protect our people, if we can.

MITCHELL: Well, the important thing is to get you up above it for this first operation. And then to see where the chips fall and get through this grand jury thing up here. Then the committee is another question. What we ought to have is a reading as to what is coming out of this committee and we—if we handle the cards as it progresses.

NIXON: Yeah. But anyway, we’ll go on. And I think in order—it’ll probably turn just as well getting them in the position of—even though it hurts for a little while.

MITCHELL: Yeah.

NIXON: You know what I mean. People say, “Well, the president’s [unclear],” and so forth. Nothing is lasting. You know people get so disturbed about [unclear]. Now, when we do move we can do it—we can move in a—in the proper way.

MITCHELL: If you can do it in a controlled way it would help and good, but the other thing you have to remember is that this stuff is going to come out of that committee, whether—

NIXON: That’s right.

MITCHELL: And it’s going to come out no matter what.

NIXON: As if I—and then it looks like I tried to keep it from coming out.

MITCHELL: That’s why it’s important that that statement go up to the committee.

…

NIXON: Christ. Sure, we’ll—

MITCHELL: It’s like these Gray hearings. They had it five days running that the files were turned over to John Dean—just five days running the same story.

NIXON: Same story.

MITCHELL: Right.

NIXON: The files should have been turned over.

MITCHELL: Just should have demanded them. You should have demanded all of them.

NIXON: [unclear] what the hell was he doing as counsel to the president without getting them? He was—I told him to conduct an investigation, and he did.

MITCHELL: I know.

NIXON: Well, it’s like everything else.

MITCHELL: Anything else for us to—

NIXON: Get on that other thing. If Baker can—Baker is not proving much of a reed up to this point. He’s smart enough.

MITCHELL: Howard is smart enough, but we’ve got to carry him.

NIXON: I think he has—

MITCHELL: I think he has and I’ve been puzzling over a way to have a liaison with him and—

NIXON: He won’t talk on the phone with anybody according to Kleindienst. He thinks his phone is tapped.

MITCHELL: He does?

NIXON: Who’s tapping his phone?

MITCHELL: I don’t know.

NIXON: Who would he think would tap his phone? I guess maybe that we would.

MITCHELL: I don’t doubt that.

NIXON: He must think that Ervin—

MITCHELL: Maybe.

NIXON: Or a newspaper.

MITCHELL: Newspaper, or the Democratic Party, or somebody. There’s got to be somebody to liaison with Kleindienst to get in a position where—it’s all right from foreknowledge through Kleindienst.

NIXON: You really wonder if you take Wally Johnson and—he’s a pretty good boy, isn’t he?

MITCHELL: Yeah. Very, very [unclear].

NIXON: You might throw that out to Dean. Dean says he doesn’t want to be in such a public position. He talked to the attorney general. It could be Wally Johnson. And he said that—

MITCHELL: Well, he will be in the department—

NIXON: Yeah.

MITCHELL: —talking to the department.

NIXON: [unclear] Mansfield’s down there—

MITCHELL: Everything else under control?

NIXON: Yeah, we’re all doing fine. I think, though, that as long as everyone and so forth is a [unclear] still [unclear].

MITCHELL: All of Washington—the public interest in this thing, you know.

NIXON: It isn’t the national—big national story [unclear] worries the shit out of us here. Watergate [unclear] concerns me.

MITCHELL: Just the Times.

NIXON: But the point is that I don’t—there’s no need for [unclear]. I have nothing but intuition, but hell, I don’t know. I, but—again you really have to protect the presidency, too. That’s the point.

MITCHELL: Well, this does no violence to the presidency at all, this concept—

NIXON: The whole scenario.

MITCHELL: Yeah.

NIXON: No, it d—that’s what I mean. The purpose of this scenario is to clean the presidency. [unclear] what they say, “All right. Here’s the report. We’re going to cooperate with the committee,” and so forth and so on. The main thing is to answer [unclear] and that should be a goddamn satisfactory answer, John.

MITCHELL: It should be.

NIXON: Shouldn’t it?

MITCHELL: It answers all of their complaints they’ve had to date.

NIXON: That’s right. They get cross-examination.

MITCHELL: Right. They get everything but the public spectacle.

NIXON: Public spectacle. And the reason we don’t have that is because you have to argue—

MITCHELL: They have to argue and—

NIXON: —on a legal matter and you don’t want them to be used as a—for unfairly—to have somebody charged.

MITCHELL: It’s our fault that you have somebody charged with not answering the committee’s questions [unclear] to John. Make sure you put it in—make sure that you put it again in the argument, the clean record, and that’s the reason why you have an executive session. Because the record that comes out of it is clean. But in areas of dispute—

NIXON: I’d rather think, though, that all of their yakking about this we often said, John—we’ve got problems.

MITCHELL: [unclear]

NIXON: Might cost them [unclear]. Think of their problems. They—those bastards are really—it’s really something. Where is their leadership?

MITCHELL: They don’t have any leadership, and they’re leaping on every new issue.

 

Dean is implicated

March 27, 1973, 11:00 A.M.

Richard Nixon, Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Ronald Ziegler

EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

From March 23 to 27, Nixon spent a long weekend at his home in Key Biscayne, Florida. No tapes were made of his conversations during that eventful span. It was a time of reckoning, though, especially for Dean. First, Gray testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 22 that Dean “probably” lied to the FBI when he told an investigator that he didn’t know whether Hunt had an office in the White House. The accusation made an infamous man of Dean. The following day, March 23, Judge Sirica received an unsolicited letter from James McCord, one of those who broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters. McCord convincingly informed the judge of many ways in which the testimony of witnesses in the Watergate trial had been warped, unleashing new suspicions of the White House. Judge Sirica, who’d had a recent birthday, told one of his clerks a short time later, “This is one of the damnedest birthday presents I’ve ever gotten. I always told you I felt someone would talk. This is going to break the case.”

A few days later, on the twenty-fifth, reporters learned that McCord had been even more specific with Watergate Committee investigators, telling them that Dean, as well as Jeb Magruder, knew about the plans for the Watergate break-in before it occurred. Publicly, Nixon expressed his confidence in Dean, who was even then working on the long-awaited presidential report on Watergate. Privately, Nixon needed to plot a path through a cover-up without Dean. Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and press secretary Ronald Ziegler discussed the many figures who might come forward in the wake of McCord: notably Magruder and Martha Mitchell.^*

But first, before getting to the latest on Watergate, a different type of crisis was emerging: a standoff at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, between Native Americans and federal officials. Chosen for its significance as the site of the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre, on February 27 followers of the American Indian Movement started a demonstration that would last seventy-one days and result in three killed and fifteen wounded.

…

EHRLICHMAN: Hi.

NIXON: Hi. Well, did you get religified over the weekend?

EHRLICHMAN: Yep. Got all pumped up.

NIXON: Great. What’s the advice on the Wounded Knee first?

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I had the impression that this thing was drifting and so I got all the players together, and it was. So I’ve got them working on a plan to a finite conclusion now, one way or the other.

NIXON: Who are they? For us, on our side?

EHRLICHMAN: Ken Cole is chairing the working group.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: And we have Justice and Interior and—

NIXON: Is the marshal [Lloyd Grimm] going to die?

EHRLICHMAN: No. Apparently not. He’s serious, but he’s not critical.

NIXON: Thank God.

EHRLICHMAN: But the thing’s steadily getting worse and worse and worse. The fellow who—

NIXON: The thing to do at the present time—I have a feeling myself—I have watched it drift. I never felt it should get too much, but I think you’ve [unclear] this kind of crap too long. Now, Indians have gotten very special treatment. Blacks are a special group—

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: —and the bad Indians are just like bad blacks. And I think they ought to move tanks, the whole goddamn thing. Put a division in if necessary.

EHRLICHMAN: The army’s scared to death of it but—

NIXON: Too bad.

EHRLICHMAN: —I told them I wanted to see—

NIXON: I want a plan.

EHRLICHMAN: —a plan. Spelling out exactly what the military would do. How they would do it. What their estimate of loss of life is and so on.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: Then the whole difficulty here on so many things is they have no PR concept in this thing, and so the government’s story is not getting across. The reason why we would send soldiers in is not apparent to anybody. A foundation has to be laid. And so I want a step-by-step as to how we lay the foundation for the use of troops to bring this thing to an all-around conclusion, and so they are in the process of putting those together now.

NIXON: And of course the foundation, if the guy had died that would have been the foundation.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, it was a terrible damn thing, the way they did it to him. And that hasn’t gotten out. There is nothing about his family, or what kind of a fellow he is, or any of those kinds of things. So I have got them on that. But he was standing there, and actually Kent Frizzell, who is our assistant attorney general that we are moving over to be solicitor at the Department of Interior, a high-ranking guy, and they are standing way, way off in the distance in an observation point looking down into this village and a sniper picked this marshal off just four feet away from Frizzell. Just the two of them standing there. He could very easily have picked off our assistant attorney general. And it was just one shot. In fact, the guy dropped before the shot was heard. So it was a vicious damn thing.

NIXON: When did this happen?

EHRLICHMAN: Yesterday afternoon.

NIXON: [unclear] out there—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, the Indians have asked for a meeting. Frizzell is in a meeting with them today. Now my sense of this, the reason I called this group together, one of the reasons besides just fear that we didn’t have a plan was that we need to have, in my view, some constructive domestic White House activity going on. Now this is a problem, and it isn’t constructive in a pure sense, but it would be White House activity if we had a White House person involved in the settlement or the PR of this thing at this point. Pull off some of this poison, and show another aspect of this thing in terms of the White House. So we are going to explore the pros and cons of it. There are a lot of cons to it in the long run and it is a question of whether you want to pay the long-run price for the short-run PR advantage, and that is something I am not prepared to suggest right now, but it is a possibility and would involve somebody like me or Garment, or somebody going up there to neutral ground, talking to Indians on both sides, and in effect delivering an ultimatum in the end and then finding every camera you can get your hands on to put across the PR foundation. It would show the White House in operation in a different setting and different context just like the price thing is—

NIXON: On Thursday, the price thing—

EHRLICHMAN: —is constructive in that business is going on, and things are happening.

NIXON: [unclear] back.

EHRLICHMAN: Yes, you bet.

NIXON: Then you can say so.

EHRLICHMAN: So that is what this is all about, and tomorrow I’m going to work—

NIXON: Well, I am for action on it. Even from the long run.

EHRLICHMAN: Right.

NIXON: Even from the long run, I don’t believe you can temporize with this kind of crap. So let—so Indians get shot, that’s too goddamn bad. If we lose a couple of Americans that’s too bad too.

EHRLICHMAN: Of course that is my concern. Looking at this coming summer, if we fiddle around up there for seven weeks we are just inviting the blacks, or the Chicanos, or somebody to occupy a hotel, or a railroad station, or an airline terminal, or some damn thing with rifles and say, you know, we have these certain demands. It’s unanswerable.

NIXON: Should have gone the extra mile.

…

EHRLICHMAN: This one—this Watergate thing is potentially very debilitating to morale. But we have to devote a large part of our time to keeping people busy in—

NIXON: I know.

EHRLICHMAN: —affirmative kinds of [unclear].

NIXON: [unclear] because it involves people we know.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: It involves, frankly, people who don’t [unclear] guilty. This and that.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: And also for—you don’t want anybody guilty, or—it isn’t the question. We know that everybody in this thing did it, whatever they did, with the best of intentions. That’s the sad thing about it.

EHRLICHMAN: Sure.

NIXON: I told them all this morning, I don’t want people on the staff to divide up and say, “Well, it’s this guy that did it, or this guy that did it,” or da-da-da-da—

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: The point is what’s done is done. Do the very best we can, and cut our losses and so forth—best you could ever do.

EHRLICHMAN: Did he talk to you about this thing—commission thing?

NIXON: No, I’d like to talk about it, but I don’t know what you can do. I don’t think, though—I don’t think that I—even though it’s moving along, that story and so forth. I don’t believe that I should go out on national television like tonight or tomorrow and go out on the Watergate Committee and then come on the next day on national television on Vietnam. I don’t like the feeling of that. I don’t think you get it ready by that time. My view would be to get the Vietnam out of the way and maybe get this right if you could. I think that gives you time.

EHRLICHMAN: The picture of the Congress having an inquiry going on—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: And the grand jury having an inquiry going on in the Judicial Branch.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: It seems to me gives you—opening—thinking about it after Bob was talking about it—

NIXON: Step in and say look—

EHRLICHMAN: —step in and say, “There doesn’t seem to be anybody except me in the position to resolve this. I have talked with the chief justice of the United States and I have talked with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker and I—after that consultation, have proposed this three-branch—”

NIXON: Well—

EHRLICHMAN: “—board of inquiry.”

NIXON: To start with the proposition of Ervin and Baker, where you don’t come across right there at the beginning on whether you can get the three men. I’m not sure you can get the three branches, John.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I’m not sure you could get it either. It—

NIXON: But just suppose you couldn’t. Then still think that it is good—possibly a good idea. I mean, but we’ve got to have somebody other than me that could broker it. The problem you’ve got to recognize, you see, is that Haldeman can’t. You can’t. Dean can’t. Mainly because—you possibly could, but it’s also that I don’t want to put out the whole White House. You’re the only one who could do it.

EHRLICHMAN: The—

NIXON: I have to do—this is why I told you [unclear], but I might have to use Rogers on the job to be the broker.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. Fine. If he can do it, do it.

NIXON: He’d be good [unclear]. I don’t know whether you could get a—

[ZIEGLER joins the conversation.]

NIXON: Come in. Oh, hi. How are you?

ZIEGLER: Well, just checking in.

NIXON: Sure, sure. Right.

ZIEGLER: The reason—

NIXON: In position, righ—

ZIEGLER: —we have the patient rehabilitation veto today and the—we hope it’s a return shipment to Thieu in South Vietnam, preparations that—

NIXON: Right.

ZIEGLER: —describing—

NIXON: Right.

ZIEGLER: —[unclear] working [unclear].

NIXON: Right.

ZIEGLER: Then tomorrow we should send statistics and so forth. I talked to Dean and to Moore this morning in terms of whether or not we say anything [unclear]—

NIXON: Right, right.

ZIEGLER: —the grand jury stuff, and Dean’s feeling is that we should not today.

NIXON: That is my feeling.

ZIEGLER: And Moore’s feeling is that we should not today, and I concur in that [unclear].

NIXON: Yeah. My view is today, unless you’ve got something more to say—

ZIEGLER: That’s right.

NIXON: —I would simply say I have nothing to add to what they said yesterday.

ZIEGLER: That’s right.

NIXON: I think that would be better [unclear].

ZIEGLER: The, uh—

NIXON: Just get out there and act like your usual cocky, confident self.

ZIEGLER: Then the—if I am asked a question about whether or not Dean would appear before the grand jury, if I’m asked that question—

NIXON: Yeah. It’s, uh—

ZIEGLER: How should I handle that? That’s where I [unclear]. I could—two options: one would be to say that [unclear]. The other would be to say well [unclear].

NIXON: I’m just saying that if this charge is wrong [unclear] the charge. Well, if you say [unclear] people that have information about it [unclear]. What do you think, John?

EHRLICHMAN: You tell him.

NIXON: Well, it’s easier to get out of because it’s—that’s not a matter [unclear], this point [unclear].

ZIEGLER: I’m inclined to think [unclear]. I’m inclined to think that today my best position is just to say that this was discussed yesterday. I’ve said all along [unclear].

NIXON: Yeah.

ZIEGLER: We are willing to cooperate [unclear].

NIXON: Couldn’t you just say that we’ve indicated cooperation unless—

ZIEGLER: [unclear]

NIXON: —the forum of the request, or whatever it is—

ZIEGLER: These matters must proceed—this matter must proceed in an orderly and judicious manner and I’m not going to get up here on the podium and listen to that.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: The other thing you might do is say you know a fellow like John Dean is in a very tough spot when somebody levels an accusation against him. He’s really in the poorest position to defend himself of anybody in the government.

…

EHRLICHMAN: I don’t know whether it would add anything really from our standpoint to say this but the point is here that the poor guy is under disability to step out and defend himself because of his position. Because he is counsel to the president, and that in a—

NIXON: I know.

EHRLICHMAN: —inhibits him from stepping [unclear].

NIXON: I wonder if it is very difficult for John or for Ron to get into that?

EHRLICHMAN: Well, but it is in the setting of—would he appear before a grand jury?

NIXON: That’s the thing. Why don’t we just say, “Well, that’s the matter, that—this is a matter that is not before us.” I should point out that he is counsel to the White House—he’s the White House counsel, and therefore his appearance before any political group, therefore, is on a different basis from anybody else, which is basically what I, you know, when I flatly said Dean would not appear but that others would. You know, I did say that, of course he—

EHRLICHMAN: It was on a different basis. At the same time—

NIXON: The same time he—

EHRLICHMAN: —a man in any position ought to be given a chance to defend himself—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —against groundless charges.

NIXON: That’s it. Mr. Dean certainly wants the opportunity to defend himself against these charges. He would welcome the opportunity and what we have to do is to work out a procedure which will allow him to do so consistent with his unique position of being not just a member of the president’s staff, but also the counsel—that is a lawyer—counsel—not lawyer, but the responsibility of the counsel for confidential—

ZIEGLER: Could you apply that to the grand jury?

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: The grand jury is one of those occasions where a man in his situation can defend himself.

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: Clearing himself.

NIXON: Yeah, yes. The grand jury, that—well, actually, if called—look, we’re not going to refuse to—for anybody called before the grand jury to go, are we, John?

EHRLICHMAN: Can’t imagine it.

NIXON: No, well, he was called—he will be—he will be cooperative, consistent with his responsibilities as counsel. How do we say that?

EHRLICHMAN: That he will be cooperative.

NIXON: He’ll fully cooperate.

EHRLICHMAN: You better check that with Dean. I know he’s got certain misgivings on this.

ZIEGLER: He did this morning.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, then, don’t say that.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I think you could pose the dilemma without—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —saying flatly what you’re going to do.

NIXON: Yeah. We—but maybe you just don’t want to [unclear]. You better not try to break into it, John.

ZIEGLER: You get into posing the dilemma.

NIXON: Then you’re going to break into questions. I’d simply stonewall them today.

ZIEGLER: I think so.

NIXON: That is not before us at this time. But let me emphasize, he will coop—as the president has indicated, there will be complete cooperation consistent with the responsibilities that everybody has on the separation of powers. Fair enough? And, of course, and consistent with Mr. Dean’s responsibilities is—other responsibilities as a counsel. See? How about just saying it that way? Well, John, do you have doubts?

EHRLICHMAN: No. Why don’t we—

NIXON: If Ziegler opens—Ziegler has to answer something.

EHRLICHMAN: The only thing that occurred to me is, when I read this stuff yesterday, was that somehow or another we should be introducing the fact that Dean’s going to get a chance to clear his name.

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: But eventually that’s going to—there’s going to be an opportunity for that in some forum, at some time, in some way. But maybe you get into the business of saying you don’t—

NIXON: I don’t think this is the day to do it. This is the day [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: [unclear]

NIXON: Yeah.

ZIEGLER: I think so—

NIXON: Yeah.

ZIEGLER: Give more than a—

NIXON: Say.

ZIEGLER: [unclear] how we approach the whole matter instead of moving [unclear]. The president’s expressed confidence [unclear].

NIXON: You can also say that the president is talking [unclear] staff today regarding the Dean situation. I think we should say that—

EHRLICHMAN: There was a meeting here this morning—

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: —involving Deputy—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —Attorney General—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —Undersecretary of Interior—

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: —and others—

NIXON: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: —on the [unclear] reservation [unclear].

NIXON: Yeah. And that we’re—and the [unclear] it doesn’t matter if the president is [unclear].

EHRLICHMAN: That the White House is following—

NIXON: The White House is following and we are [unclear] the president’s direction. A meeting was held here, the White House is now examining the situation to see what action can be taken to resolve it.

…

NIXON: All right. Let it go.

ZIEGLER: [unclear] because if we—

NIXON: Fine, well, we’re ready to go something on Wounded Knee.

ZIEGLER: Okay.

NIXON: Let it go. Okay, you go ahead.

EHRLICHMAN: [unclear] Wounded Knee until we have a plan. Just keep out of the stuff today.

ZIEGLER: Okay.

NIXON: Also say that I met with the Japanese—the—

ZIEGLER: Yes, sir. Finance minister.

NIXON: —finance minister.

[ZIEGLER leaves the conversation.]

…

EHRLICHMAN: On the FBI, we’ll start moving some names to you—

NIXON: I hope you’ll look into that guy that Dean mentioned.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, I’ve got [William] Webster.

NIXON: Sounds good.

EHRLICHMAN: We’re to get a résumé and some background.

NIXON: A judge with a prosecuting background, claimed that to put him on would be a hell of a good thing.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, uh—

NIXON: I have decided that when we move on it, it must be simultaneous. Gray comes in and says, “I’m sorry we can’t put you, you can’t,” he says, “I can’t get confirmed and I don’t want to be confirmed in a way that I—that, in which there is any division. There must be unanimous support for whoever is, and support for and trust in the director of the FBI. As a result of the hearings to date, it is obvious that I am not going to get that kind of support in the Senate even though I believe that I may be confirmed. Under the circumstances, I respectfully request you withdraw my name.” And send somebody else down. That’s a very sound basis. I’m thinking of doing that. I would hope next week right after Thieu.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, what do you think about doing that simultaneous with the appointment of a commissioner? We could—

NIXON: Oh, yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —it could be written up in the same announcement. Say, “Here’s a fine man who’s been unfortunately splattered by this thing. It is a case study in how—”

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: “—bystanders can get splashed with this sort of thing.”

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: It’s now to the point where he can’t even—

NIXON: You think, also, John, or at least you thought somewhat of the idea, that we should get Kleindienst out, too, at this point?

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, yeah.

NIXON: How do we do that?

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I’m going to see him today and Bob’s going to talk to him and we will hit him from two directions on this. And—

NIXON: Get Kleindienst to resign?

[HALDEMAN joins the conversation.]

EHRLICHMAN: Oh, no—get him out front. No use of hitting him out of the office. Oh, no. I hadn’t—we hadn’t talked about that.

HALDEMAN: That’s Bill Rogers.

NIXON: Well, I’m sorry, John.

EHRLICHMAN: No. I—we talked this morning about getting him out front. I’m afraid it’s—

NIXON: [unclear] of canning him right away. Let’s see about that. Maybe we should can him. Well, whatever—what have you got to report? John and I have just started a [unclear].

HALDEMAN: All I have is Dean’s report. I did not talk to Mitchell because this may change what we want to do from Mitchell. He had a long conversation again today with Paul O’Brien, who’s the guy. He’s been—talked with yesterday—you know, this, that, and all that, and he says O’Brien is very distressed with Mitchell. The more he thinks about it the more O’Brien comes down to Mitchell could cut this whole thing off if he would just step forward and cut it off. That the fact of the matter is as far as Gray could determine that Mitchell did sign off on it. And if that’s what it—

NIXON: You mean as far as O’Brien is concerned?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: You said, “Gray.”

NIXON: What’s that?

HALDEMAN: I’m sorry. O’Brien, not Gray. As far as O’Brien can determine, Mitchell did sign off on this thing and that’s—and Dean believes that to be the case also. He can’t—Dean doesn’t think he can prove it, and apparently O’Brien can’t either, but they both think that that—

NIXON: That’s my suspicion.

HALDEMAN: The more O’Brien thinks about it the more it bothers him with all he knows—to see all the people getting whacked around—that he sees getting whacked around—in order to keep the thing from focusing on John Mitchell, when inevitably it’s going to end up doing that anyway and all these other people are going to be so badly hurt they’re not going to be able to get out from under it. And that’s one view. Now to go back on the Magruder situation as O’Brien reports it, having spent several hours with Magruder yesterday afternoon—O’Brien and Parkinson. Jeb believes, or professes to believe, and O’Brien is inclined to think he really does believe, that the whole Liddy plan, the whole supersecurity operation, superintelligence operation was put together by the White House—by Haldeman, Dean, and others.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Really, Dean—that Dean cooked the whole thing up at Haldeman’s instruction—the whole idea of the need for a superintelligence operation. Now there’s some semblance of validity to the point that I did talk, not with Dean, but with Mitchell, about the need for intelligence activity and—

NIXON: And that Dean recommended Liddy?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but not for intelligence. Dean recommended Liddy as the general counsel.

NIXON: Yeah, but you see this is where Magruder might come—well, go ahead. Okay.

HALDEMAN: That Mitchell bought the idea that was cooked up in the White House for a superintelligence operation, and that this was all set and an accomplished fact in December of ’71 before Liddy was hired by the committee. But then Liddy was hired by the committee to carry it out and that’s why Dean sent Liddy over to the committee. Then there was a hiatus. There were these meetings in Mitchell’s office where Liddy unveiled his plan. And the first plan he unveiled nobody bought. They all laughed at it. Because it was so bizarre. So he went back to the drawing board and came back with a second plan and the second plan didn’t get bought either. That was at the second meeting and everything just kind of lingered around then. It was sort of hanging fire. Liddy was pushing to get something done. He wanted to get moving on his plans. And at that point he went to Colson and said, “Nobody will approve any of this—you know, we could—we should be getting—”

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: “—getting going on it.” And Colson then got into the act in pushing to get—which started with the Colson phone call to Magruder saying, “Well, at least listen to these guys.” Then the final step was—all of this was rattling around in January. The final step was when Gordon Strachan called Magruder and said Haldeman told him to get this going. “The president wants it done and there’s to be no more arguing about it.”

NIXON: “This” meaning—

HALDEMAN: —the intelligence activity, the Liddy program. Magruder told Mitchell this, that Strachan had ordered him to get it going on Haldeman’s orders on the president’s orders and Mitchell signed off on it. He said, “Okay, if they say to do it, go ahead.”

NIXON: Was that—this is the bugging?

HALDEMAN: The whole thing including the bugging.

NIXON: Shit.

HALDEMAN: The bugging was implicit in the second plan. I—Dean doesn’t seem to be sure whether it was implicit or explicit.

NIXON: Well, anyway—

HALDEMAN: He doesn’t think that particular bug was explicit, but that the process of bugging was implicit and—as I didn’t realize it, nor did Dean, but it was also in the [Operation] Sandwedge plan [to collect intelligence on the antiwar movement and Democratic rivals] way back—the early plan. That, incidentally, is a potential source of fascinating problems in that it involved [Vernon] “Mike” Acree, who’s now the customs commissioner or something [who left his position as assistant commissioner at the IRS to become the head of the Customs Service], Joe Woods [brother of Rose Mary Woods]—a few other people.

NIXON: Nothing happened?

HALDEMAN: It wasn’t done—that’s right. But there—at some point, according to Magruder, after this was then signed off and put away, Mitch—Magruder—Mitchell called Liddy into the office and read him the riot act on the poor quality of stuff they were getting. That’s basically the scenario or the summary of what Magruder told the lawyer. Dean’s theory is that both Mitchell and Magruder realize that they now have their ass in a sling and that they’re trying to untangle it, not necessarily working together again—at least he doesn’t think they are. But in the process of that they are mixing apples and oranges for their own protection. And that they’re remembering various things in connection with others [unclear] like Hunt and Liddy [unclear].

…

HALDEMAN: He says, for example, Magruder doesn’t realize how little Dean told Liddy. He thinks that Dean sent Liddy in. Liddy said—frankly, now as far as Dean screening to Liddy was that—“You as general counsel over there can also take as a side activity the political intelligence question because we do need some input on demonstrators and stuff like that. That they’re not doing anything about—” but he never got into any setting up an elaborate intelligence apparatus.

NIXON: Okay.

HALDEMAN: Dean says that as a matter of fact, in contrast to Magruder’s opinion, at the first meeting where a Liddy plan was presented everybody at the meeting laughed at the plan on the basis that it was just—it was so bizarre that it was absurd and it would be funny.

NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: The second meeting, Dean came into the meeting late. He was not there during most of the presentation but when he came in he could see that they were still on the same kind of a thing. And he says in effect, “I got Mitchell off the hook because I said—I took the initiative in saying, ‘You know it’s an impossible proposal and we can’t—we shouldn’t even be discussing this in the attorney general’s office,’” and all that. Mitchell agreed and then that’s when Dean came over and told me that he had just—had seen this wrap-up on it and that they—still it [unclear] was impossible and then we—that they shouldn’t be doing it—that we shouldn’t be involved in it and we ought to drop the whole thing. Then as Dean said, “I saw a problem there and I thought they had turned it off and in any event I wanted to stay ten miles away from it, and did.” He said the problem from then on, starting somewhere in early January, probably, was that Liddy was never really given any guidance after that. Mitchell was in the midst of the IT and T and all that stuff, and didn’t focus on it—

NIXON: Martha.

HALDEMAN: —and Magruder was running around with other things and didn’t pay much attention, and Liddy was kind of bouncing around loose there—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, now how do you square that with the allocation of money to it? That presumably was the subject in focus by—

HALDEMAN: Somebody else signed off on that.

EHRLICHMAN: Magruder, possibly Mitchell, possibly Stans, certainly [unclear]—

NIXON: But I suppose they could say the allocation of money was just for intelligence operations generally. I think [unclear]. That’s what my guess is. That’s what Magruder said is true.

EHRLICHMAN: Some was paid to focus on—somebody—

HALDEMAN: Yeah, someone focused and agreed that there had to be some intelligence and that it would take some money and that Liddy should get it.

EHRLICHMAN: And against the background of the two plans being presented and rejected the natural question that would arise is, “Well, what are you going to do with the money? You don’t have an approved plan?”

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: So that doesn’t put anything together.

NIXON: Well, it doesn’t hang together but it could in the sense that the campaign—

HALDEMAN: Well, what he thinks—he thinks—

NIXON: My guess—

HALDEMAN: —that Mitchell did sign off on it.

NIXON: That’s the point. But my guess is Mitchell could just say, “Look, I”—he says, he has this and that and the other thing, “and I said, ‘All right, go ahead,’” but there was no buying of this ba-ba-ba—

HALDEMAN: He says if you heard—Dean’s opinion is that he thinks Mitchell kind of vacillated.

NIXON: So—

HALDEMAN: Now O’Brien says that Magruder’s objective or motive at that moment is a meeting with Mitchell and me. And that what he has told some of the lawyers may well be a shot across the bow to jar that meeting loose. O’Brien doesn’t really believe Jeb but he’s not sure. O’Brien is shook a little bit himself as he hears all this. But he does see very definitely and holds also to the theory of mixing of apples and oranges. He’s convinced that Jeb is pushing together things that don’t necessarily fit together in order to help with a conclusion. And again he’s very disappointed in Mitchell. He feels that Mitchell is the guy that’s letting people down. O’Brien made the suggestion that if you wanted to force some of this to a head, one thing you might consider is that O’Brien and Parkinson, who are getting a little shaky now themselves, are retained by the committee. That is by Frank Dale, who is the, the chairman of the committee.

NIXON: Does it still exist?

HALDEMAN: The—they, did their—

NIXON: They aren’t involved in the damn thing, are they? O’Brien and Parkinson?

HALDEMAN: Yes.

NIXON: They ran this all from the beginning?

HALDEMAN: Oh, no.

NIXON: Well, that is what I thought.

HALDEMAN: But they are involved in the post-discovery, post–June 17.

NIXON: They were [unclear]. [Gives instructions to unknown assistant.]

HALDEMAN: O’Brien says, “Everything with the committee,” said, “What you might want to consider is the possibility to waive our retainer—waive our privileges and instruct us to report to the president all of the facts as they are known to us as to what really went on at the Committee to Re-elect the President.”

NIXON: I’ve been informed. For me to sit down and talk to them and go through—

HALDEMAN: I don’t know that—he doesn’t mean necessarily personally talk to you, but he means to talk to Dean or whoever you designate as your man to be working on this. Now—other facts: Hunt is at the grand jury today. [unclear] We don’t know how far he is going to go. The danger area for him is on the money, that he was given money. He’s reported by O’Brien, who has been talking to his lawyer, Bittman, not to be as desperate today as he was yesterday, but to still be on the brink or at least shaky. What’s made him shaky is that he’s seen McCord bouncing out there and probably walking out scot-free.

NIXON: Scot-free—a hero.

HALDEMAN: And he doesn’t like that. He figures maybe it’s my turn. And that he may go—

NIXON: That’s the way I would think all of them would feel.

HALDEMAN: And that he may decide to go with as much as is necessary to get himself into that same position, but probably would only go with as much as is necessary. There isn’t a feeling on his part of a desire to get people as there is a desire to take care of himself. And that he might be willing to do what he had to do to take care of himself, but he would probably do it on a gradual basis and he may in fact be doing it right now at the grand jury. He feels, in summary, that on both Hunt and Magruder questions we’re not really at the crunch that we were last night. He isn’t as concerned as he was when he talked to me last night. We are now going with Silbert—

NIXON: Who’s that?

HALDEMAN: The U.S. attorney has—is going to Sirica seeking immunity for Liddy so that he can be a witness. Liddy’s lawyer will argue against immunity for he does not want it. Dean’s judgment is that he’ll probably fail. Sirica will grant it given Sirica’s clear disposition—

NIXON: Then he gets—if he doesn’t talk, then he gets contempt. Is that it?

HALDEMAN: If Liddy is in—if he gets immunity, his intention as of now at least is to refuse to talk and be in contempt. The contempt is civil contempt and it only runs for the duration of the grand jury which is of a limited duration. And as long as he’s in jail anyway, it doesn’t make a hell of a lot of difference to him.

NIXON: I would almost bet that’s what Liddy will do.

HALDEMAN: Well, that’s what Dean will also bet. Dean has asked through O’Brien to see Maroulis, or whatever his name is—Liddy’s lawyer—for Liddy to provide a private statement saying that Dean knew nothing in advance on the Watergate, which Liddy knows to be the case. To his knowledge, Dean knew nothing about it and Dean would like to have that statement in his pocket and has asked Liddy—Liddy’s lawyer to ask Liddy for such a statement, which he feels Liddy will—would want to give him. Raised the question whether Dean actually had no knowledge of what was going on in the intelligence area between the time of the meetings in Mitchell’s office, when he said don’t do anything, and the time of the Watergate discovery. And I put that direct question to Dean and he said, “Absolutely nothing.”

NIXON: I would—the reason I would totally agree with—that I would believe Dean there [unclear] say would be lying to us about that—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, he said—

NIXON: But I would believe for another reason—that he thought it was a stupid goddamn idea.

EHRLICHMAN: There just isn’t a scintilla—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —of hint that Dean that knew about this.

NIXON: No—

EHRLICHMAN: Dean was pretty good all through that period of time in sharing things and he was tracking with a number of us on—

NIXON: Well, you know the thing that, the reason I told Bob—and this incidentally also covers Colson—and I don’t know whether—I know that most everybody except Bob, and perhaps you, think Colson knew all about it. But I was talking to Colson, remember exclusively about it—and maybe that was the point—exclusively about the issues. You know, how are we going to do this and that and the other thing? Everything from, mainly the [unclear] how do we get the labor thing, how do we get this, how do we get the Catholic school [unclear]?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, the Cath—the aid to Catholic schools on the new, you know—the, Ehrlichman’s—I mean, Colson’s fight with the parochial.

NIXON: Right. That’s what it is—that’s what started it. But in all those talks he had plenty of opportunity. He was always saying, “Hey, we’ve got to do this,” but Colson in that entire period, John, I think he would have said that there was, say, “Look, we’ve gotten some information,” but he never said a word. Haldeman, in this whole period, Haldeman, I am sure—Bob and you, he talked to both of you about the campaign. Never a word. I mean now maybe that all of you knew and didn’t tell me, but I can’t believe that Colson—well [unclear].

HALDEMAN: Maybe Colson is capable of—if he knew anything out of that—of not telling you what we were at least—

NIXON: Well, at least—

HALDEMAN: We were—

NIXON: —nothing of that sort because as a matter of fact, I didn’t even know. I didn’t know, frankly, that the Ellsberg thing and so forth—electronically thing—you know what I mean?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: You were reporting to me on that.

EHRLICHMAN: I was—

NIXON: And I guess there you deliberately didn’t tell me—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, sir, I didn’t know what—

NIXON: Dean—

EHRLICHMAN: —Dean and his crowd were up to until afterwards.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: And I told you, afterwards we stopped it—stopped it from happening again.

NIXON: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: In that setting, but—

NIXON: That was in the national security—

EHRLICHMAN: That was in the national security—

NIXON: Leak thing.

EHRLICHMAN: That’s right, but the interesting thing about Colson—corroborates what you say—is that when I got a phone call from Secret Service saying there had been this burglary—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —the first guy I called was Colson.

NIXON: Yeah. Of course.

EHRLICHMAN: And his response, as I recall it, was one of total surprise and there was just a—and he could have said then, “Oh, those jerks, I should have, you know, they shouldn’t have,” or “I knew about it earlier.” He could have inferred that he knew about it in a way that would have been meaningful to me but he didn’t. He was totally nonplussed—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —the same as the rest of us.

NIXON: Well, the thing is too—that I know that—you know, when they talk about this business of Magruder’s saying that Haldeman had ordered it, the president had ordered it to go forward, of all the people who were surprised was, I mean, on the seventeenth of June—I was in Florida—was me!

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: Why? Were you there?

EHRLICHMAN: No, I was here. [unclear] called me.

NIXON: Who was there?

EHRLICHMAN: Bob was down there. I called Ziegler—in this order I called Colson, Haldeman, and Ziegler—

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: —and alerted them to this.

NIXON: Yeah. And I read the paper and I said, “What in the name of God is this?”

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: I just couldn’t believe it.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: So you know what I mean is that—I mean I believe in playing politics hard but I’m also smart. What I can’t understand is how Mitchell would ever approve if somebody signs it off. That’s the thing I can’t understand here. Well, Magruder I can understand doing things. He is not a very bright fellow. I mean he is bright, but not—he doesn’t think through to the end. Jesus Christ! But Mitchell knows the consequences of such.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but I’ll tell you what could have happened very easily there. Mitchell was attorney general. He was using legally and sometimes approaching illegally—and using his very great capacity to wiretap and do other kinds of things every day and you got into a mindset and you get used to that.

NIXON: Could be. Could be.

HALDEMAN: And it doesn’t—you don’t regard it with the same kind of feeling that—

NIXON: Yeah. Could be. Could be. Well, anyway.

HALDEMAN: Dean says—he says—“I did see Liddy roughly five or six times during that period of January to June and it was always on campaign legal matters.” You know?

NIXON: Well, I know, Dean was—remember you always said Dean was—remember you told me—making all these studies of it—

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: —and all.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

NIXON: I believe that.

HALDEMAN: He said at one of those meetings at one time, you know [unclear]. I said to Liddy something about how is it going? He said he started to say, “I’m having a hell of a time getting approval on the intelligence operation.” I says—and Dean says, “You know, Gordon, I told you that’s something I know nothing about and don’t want to know anything about,” and he said, “That’s right. Okay.”

NIXON: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: January to June of ’72. Right?

HALDEMAN: Now here’s another factor. I know he was following up that point. He says, “As a matter of fact, the reason I called Liddy on June 19”—I said, “Now wait a minute. You called Liddy on June 19?” “Yes, and the reason I did is because Kleindienst told me that Liddy had come to see him on the eighteenth at Burning Tree.” That was the day after the discovery on Sunday the eighteenth, and the purpose of that was to tell Kleindienst he had to get his men out of jail and all that. Kleindienst said, “I wish that goddamn Liddy would quit talking to me about this stuff.” At that time, Liddy told Kleindienst that Mitchell had ordered it.

NIXON: Oh.

HALDEMAN: And you don’t know that that’s true. All you know is that Liddy was using that as his means for trying to get to the—then the [unclear].

NIXON: You know Mitchell could be telling the truth. Liddy could be, too. But Liddy would just assume he had constructive—

EHRLICHMAN: That’s right.

NIXON: —approval. Mitchell could say, “I ordered intelligence. But I never approved this goddamn plan.” You’ve got to figure the lines of defense that everybody’s going to take here—that’s Mitchell’s, right? What’s Haldeman’s line of defense? Haldeman’s line of defense, “I never approved anything of this sort. I just”—you know that—what’s Ehrlichman’s? Ehrlichman—there’s no doubt he knows nothing about it. The earlier thing, yes. We did have an operation for leaks, and so forth. What would you say if they said, “Did you ever do any wiretapping?” What would you say? There is a question on that. Were you aware of any wiretapping?

EHRLICHMAN: Yes.

NIXON: Then you would say, “Yes.” Then, “Why did you do it?” You would say it was ordered on a national security basis.

EHRLICHMAN: National security. We had a series of very serious national security leaks.

 

“I’m too hot to do it now.”

March 27, 1973, 4:20 P.M.

Bob Haldeman and John Dean

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

Within days of the “cancer on the presidency” conversation, the fallout was evident. John Dean was quickly becoming a public figure, which meant he could no longer quietly call Department of Justice Criminal Division head Henry Petersen to get the latest scoop on the grand jury’s happenings—the schedule of witnesses to be called, the mood of the grand jury, and the current strategy of the prosecution. The Nixon cover-up strategy, and Dean’s ability to continue as the Watergate “desk officer,” was coming apart. Here, using one of Nixon’s telephones that was taped, Haldeman and Dean discuss ways to overcome their latest setback.

…

HALDEMAN: John?

DEAN: Yes, Bob.

HALDEMAN: What is our status on getting a report from grand jury activity now?

DEAN: I was just raising that with Dick Moore—to call—ask him if he would call Henry Petersen.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

DEAN: I used to do that, but I don’t think I ought to do it right now.

HALDEMAN: All right, will Petersen talk tomorrow?

DEAN: I’m sure he will.

HALDEMAN: Okay. We’re trying to reach Kleindienst now. He’s gone to Arizona and we’re ordering him back.

DEAN: Good.

HALDEMAN: Ehrlichman is. But we ought to know what happened today. We have to find out what Hunt did.

DEAN: Well, I would—I’ll tell you what I was told. After we talked the last time, it was planned that Hunt was going to give a written statement, answer some questions they’d ask him, and take the Fifth on everything else.

HALDEMAN: Well, what is the written statement regarding?

DEAN: Nothing particularly sensitive.

HALDEMAN: And taking the Fifth on everything else, huh?

DEAN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

DEAN: Now, it’s going to be hard to get a report out of counsel as to what occurred down there until five or six o’clock or so because they’ll have been in court—they had a two o’clock meeting in court—counsel were to be present.

HALDEMAN: Oh. So, the grand jury didn’t meet this afternoon?

DEAN: Hmm—yes, they did, but it was after that meeting. All counsel were present in the courtroom, and then Hunt was to go before the grand jury after that situation.

HALDEMAN: Mm-hmm. So, it’s going to be going on now?

DEAN: [unclear]

HALDEMAN: Probably. Okay.

DEAN: We have a terrible breakdown in communication with both the committee and now the grand jury. I used to be able to stay plugged in with the grand jury, but I’m too hot to do it now.

HALDEMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: I should call Dick right away and see if he’s gotten a report, or—

HALDEMAN: Could Fielding step in and do that? The point being I don’t think Dick [Moore]’s fast enough to handle your communication stuff for you.

DEAN: I agree. Let me talk to Fred. Press Henry to know his position—relationship with him. The—here’s what the other thing is: he just probably won’t know right now what’s happened. [unclear] don’t report to him hour by hour. He is—has not injected himself into it, so—

HALDEMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —probably it won’t be until this—and you wouldn’t get a report from him anyway.

HALDEMAN: Okay. He doesn’t expect anything anyhow now.

DEAN: No. Let me tell you another development, though.

HALDEMAN: Okay?

DEAN: F. Lee Bailey called Mitchell. He called him initially to raise that thing that he, apparently—you know, that Mitchell raised down here.

HALDEMAN: That lawyer?

DEAN: That was the—he called on this thing that—you know, he’s quiet regarding the gold reserve thing, and all—

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah.

DEAN: —and then they went on from there and revealed this: that Fensterwald has called F. Lee or Alch—one of the two, I’m not clear on which it was—to ask that they be present in the court when McCord appears on Thursday or Friday. Ask that he, Fensterwald, be present. And—

HALDEMAN: To request that Fensterwald be present?

DEAN: Yeah, along—and join as co-counsel with Bailey’s firm. And in the course of the conversation, Fensterwald said to Bailey, “We don’t give a damn about McCord. We’re after Richard Nixon.”

HALDEMAN: Really?

DEAN: Mm-hmm. Now Moore, that’s what he’s working on right now. He’s getting some of the facts back from—some additional information back from—and Mitchell will have F. Lee Bailey step forward. We should have a conference on this.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

DEAN: Fensterwald put up his bond for one thing.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

DEAN: And the more I think about Fensterwald, the more I think that could be a [unclear] link to Kennedy. The point was raised that Fensterwald served as the chief counsel to the Administrative Practice and Procedures Subcommittee, which was run by Ed Long, as chairman. Kennedy was the second-ranking member of that committee and then became chairman. I’ve—it’s possible that Fensterwald was even on a while after Kennedy came on. Obviously, they have a relationship.

HALDEMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: It’s very, very possible.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

DEAN: Plus the fact that Fensterwald suddenly put up forty thousand dollars for McCord.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

DEAN: Okay?

HALDEMAN: Yup.

DEAN: Good.

HALDEMAN: Thanks.

 

“Sooner or later you’re going to be subpoenaed to that grand jury.”

March 29, 1973, 5:35 P.M.

John Ehrlichman and John Dean

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

At the end of March, the Watergate investigation had not yet reached Haldeman or Ehrlichman, but it had reached Dean. The problem was that other witnesses were being called, and they were corroborating Dean’s role in the lead-up to the break-in. Leaks from the grand jury were happening almost daily—to Congress, to the White House, and directly to the press. Ehrlichman, using one of Nixon’s taped phones, discussed with Dean how to handle some of the difficult questions being raised. The next day, Ehrlichman would take over Dean’s duties as Nixon’s top advisor on Watergate.

…

EHRLICHMAN: John?

DEAN: Yes.

EHRLICHMAN: Returning your call.

DEAN: You’re in with the boss right now?

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I just stepped out right now.

DEAN: Oh, okay. What I wanted to bring you up-to-date on is, first of all, how would you handle the question, if called: “Were you aware, either before or after the fact of the meetings in the attorney general’s office?”

EHRLICHMAN: Well, you’d have to answer that—well, flat-out, I would think.

DEAN: I mean, how would you answer it?

EHRLICHMAN: Oh, you mean on the basis of hearsay?

DEAN: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: Oh, I’d have to say I was aware that there had been some. I had been told of one.

DEAN: Okay. Bob’s in the same situation, right?

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, you told me about one.

DEAN: It’s one of these arguments that I should, you know, I’m getting a lot of pressure to go down and do something I’m not capable of doing. And [unclear] as to why it’s feasible to even consider it.

EHRLICHMAN: Oh, well, I would never suggest to you that if you went you would anything but say what’s true.

DEAN: I understand, I understand. But you understand the consequences of that.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, that was what I was trying to explore with you on the phone earlier.

DEAN: Well, what I was—I was talking to O’Brien about it a little bit further.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm?

DEAN: And what it’ll do is open a—open war pissing match between Magruder, Mitchell, and Dean and the White House. The ultimate solution to this thing is—I mean, to deal with the problems from a post, as well as—

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm?

DEAN: —anything pre- is something that John Mitchell’s unwilling to face. He has this lingering hope that he can pull this out.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: And it occurred to me—I don’t know. Has the president ever talked this over with John?

EHRLICHMAN: Not that I know of.

DEAN: Well, it’s a thought. I’ve mentioned this to Bob, too. That that might be the ultimate solution.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, my thought here is this: that regardless of what, you know, his—Mitchell’s feral mind is, is that sooner or later you’re going to be subpoenaed to that grand jury. Maybe you don’t agree with that?

DEAN: Well, that’s what O’Brien is saying—that maybe it won’t happen. He’s following pretty closely the tidbits that are coming out in the press on McCord.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah?

DEAN: McCord, apparently, and upon close reading, has said that he understood that Liddy was going to a meeting in Mitchell’s office. He would not just say that he was at a meeting.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: I think we’re reading too much into that press report. We haven’t seen any—

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm?

DEAN: —any transcripts or anything of that nature.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: The other thing I want to know: did you—were you aware of Weicker’s press conference?

EHRLICHMAN: No.

DEAN: Ha! He’s supposed to go out and criticize the press for their leaks and [unclear]—

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

DEAN: On the contrary, he went out and praised them for the beautiful, diligent job they’re doing on this whole thing. And that the—the fact of the matter was that the man that ultimately is responsible for this is sitting in the White House today.

EHRLICHMAN: My word! Meaning whom?

DEAN: I don’t know. [unclear]—

EHRLICHMAN: They didn’t ask him?

DEAN: They didn’t. He wouldn’t reveal anything but he’s done this independent investigation—it’s a kind of a McCarthy-type style of thing—

EHRLICHMAN: Well, yeah, because, you know, we had Kleindienst and then Gray get ahold of him and say, “What evidence do you have?” And he says, “Oh, I was just talking about the Segretti business.”

DEAN: Well, that’s his latest.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: It’s—and it’s—apparently it was not—you know, it did not infer Dean. It was more of a—

EHRLICHMAN: Huh?

DEAN: Fielding, who picked this up from Gurney’s men, said it was more like Haldeman.

EHRLICHMAN: Mm-hmm. Well, I think that really the basic question here is a—one of prophecy as to whether or not you’re going to be called or not. But if you are, then obviously the best position to be in is that you volunteered. If you aren’t, then O’Brien’s—

DEAN: That’s the thing: if you volunteer it’s sort of like you’ve—well, I can appreciate the fact you want to go down and cleanse your name sort of [unclear] willing to do that anytime. But, however, the grand jury has charged me with nothing right now—

EHRLICHMAN: I understand.

DEAN: —[unclear] denied everything.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, obviously, the angle would be one can’t expect probity, fairness, and guarantees of rights before a committee of the Senate that does the kinds of things this committee’s done in the last couple of days. My safe refuge is with the grand jury.

DEAN: Well, and the thing is I really wonder if now is the time to volunteer that.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, of course, that’s the question. That’s the basic question. And I gather you and O’Brien feel that it is not.

DEAN: I think we ought to wait and see how—there’s always the chance I won’t be called.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, I see.

DEAN: Because they’re working on about thirdhand hearsay.

EHRLICHMAN: But if you are then it’ll be too late. They just won’t care.

DEAN: That’s right, but they’re—

EHRLICHMAN: The question is whether it’s worth the trade.

DEAN: That’s right.

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

DEAN: The—and if [unclear] go down, then there we go.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, obviously, we’re not in the position [laughs] to say you volunteered, unless you are. So, why don’t we sleep on it, see where we are in the morning?

DEAN: Okay.

EHRLICHMAN: Okay, good.

DEAN: Bye-bye.

 

Strong words for North Vietnam

March 30, 1973, 1:09 P.M.

Richard Nixon and Alexander Haig

WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE

On the evening of March 29, Nixon made his first nationally televised speech to the nation since January 23, when he announced the Vietnam Peace Accords. It was a dramatic gesture and he used it skillfully, sounding “tough and combative,” according to a reporter for the New York Times. Nixon expressed his dissatisfaction with North Vietnam’s continuing mobilization along the border with the South. In terms far stronger than those he’d used in the middle of the month, he asserted his willingness to begin the bombing again. Discussing the same decision with Haig the next day, the president seemed frustrated that “Vietnamization” only meant that the Communists were still his problem. He pounced on a suggestion that perhaps it was South Vietnam that would initiate the bombing—not a peaceful prospect, but one that might keep America out of the lingering hostilities.^*

…

NIXON: As you know, I’m leaving for California soon, and I just read a very ominous memorandum from Henry about his concern about the North Vietnamese buildup, and all that sort of thing and so on.

HAIG: Right, sir.

NIXON: And what’s happening in Cambodia. Now you may recall when we made the decision last week not to do the [Ho Chi Minh] Trail, Henry, at that time, was sort of pushing for it but then he backed off some when they had that twenty-third day—oh, you know, in Laos. I still think it was wise that we probably didn’t do that. I don’t know that we had the provoca—I mean, the—I mean, I don’t think we had the public provocation set up obviously. But I don’t know. What do you think?

HAIG: I think that last week’s timing was not—

NIXON: It wasn’t the right time.

HAIG: It wasn’t right. It just—

NIXON: Yeah, yeah.

HAIG: It was an awfully tough one and—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: —a tightly balanced one.

NIXON: Right. Everything is that. In any event, that doesn’t mean you can’t do it. But what is your present evaluation, Al, as to yourself as you look at the whole situation?

HAIG: I’m getting increasingly concerned about Cambodia.

NIXON: Cambodia? But what about the thing—you see, these intelligence reports, you know, the thing you had talked about now, they seem to be going almost overboard in the direction of indicating that everything is going to hell in a hat. I’m not—I don’t know that it—you know, they’ve—I—it’s just hard for—you know, you’ve been analyzing them. I don’t know. What do you see in the thing—

HAIG: Well, I—

NIXON: —and, incidentally, what the hell is the South doing? Good God, they’ve got a hell of a big army. I mean, yes, sir, are they—aren’t they doing a little fighting themselves?

HAIG: Yes, they are—

NIXON: The number of incidents is actually down some, is it not? Or, not much, but—?

HAIG: No, the incident rate has been slowly and very mildly decreasing.

NIXON: But only mildly, right. I noticed—that’s what I meant. Some, but just very slowly. Yeah.

HAIG: But I think the, the danger is that there are a combination of reasons for it in Cambodia. There have been a series of violations across the board in Laos, South Vietnam, and, of course, no action at all in Cambodia, although we didn’t expect that initially. The areas that worry me the most are the broad applications of the overall agreement in Laos, and in South Vietnam, with infiltration, incidents, refusal to investigate. And this—when you combine that with what could be happening in Cambodia, it is reason for some concern. I really—I think it is. But I don’t think it’s a—it’s an immediate thing in the sense of we’ve got a crisis.

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: I think we have an obligation to take a look at every kind of leverage we can—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: —apply to this.

NIXON: You see, the problem we’ve got, Al, here is on the—that we mustn’t get into is the sort of the crisis mentality that like on Cambodia that, well, we’ll start to bomb on the—well, we’re bombing the hell, there, out of it already, you know.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: Good God, I don’t know. Are they hitting anything? What is the situation?

HAIG: Well, there are indications that they’re hitting it so hard that they’re driving a lot of the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. You know, in that—

NIXON: That’s not good.

HAIG: —[unclear] area. Well, no. That’s good, I think.

NIXON: It’s good to get them out of there.

HAIG: It disrupts them and it keeps them under pressure. And, it takes some of the heat off of Lon Nol.

NIXON: To what extent do you feel that—would you feel right now that we ought to start hitting the—well, I don’t mean like today, but maybe next week—start hitting the Panhandle again?

HAIG: I wouldn’t discount that. No, I wouldn’t, sir. I think the thing that I’m not aware of is what we’ve said to our customer up there in Hanoi. If we’ve given him good, strong warnings, I think—well, if we do anything, it’s got to be—we’ve got to make a lot of things evident to him that we’re nearing the breaking point.

NIXON: Yeah. Well, of course, I put a very strong warning in that speech last night.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: And they can’t just ignore that.

HAIG: No.

NIXON: I think—I—strong warnings have gone, I can assure you. Private warnings—

HAIG: Yes.

NIXON: —goddamn strong.

HAIG: Well, then I—I think we should take a very careful look at all of the possible leverage we have. And, we don’t have to—it shouldn’t be done in a crisis atmosphere, but in a very steely way.

NIXON: See, we got this problem; you have to face it. We’ve got it growing, building up with the goddamn Congress, now. They all want to stop us doing anything in Cambodia.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: Now—

HAIG: We can’t do this justified on the Cambodian situation. The only way we’ll ever get away with anything, if there’s a decision to do it, is in the context of a sacred agreement—

NIXON: Well, the fact—I think we’ve got to do it not to save Cambodia but because they broke an agreement.

HAIG: Exactly right.

NIXON: Exactly.

HAIG: That’s—

NIXON: And that we are keeping an agreement, and that they violated an agreement, and we’re therefore continuing ahead. I think as long as it’s air operations, that people will generally support it, too.

HAIG: Yes, I do too. I don’t think it—there would be a problem with—you know, if we had decided that earlier that if we hit Laos or something. Hell, that’s not going to be much of a stir.

NIXON: Yeah, if—except that, before the POWs are out, the one problem, rather symbolically that would have been very bad is that it—before they were out—that you’d lose some planes and have some more.

HAIG: Yeah.

NIXON: You know?

HAIG: And, I think a lot of people will—would say, “Well, you’re dumb—”

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: “—to have done it that—”

NIXON: That’s right.

HAIG: “—that way.”

NIXON: But now, again, at this point we can just have to take a damn hard look if these guys are willing to.

HAIG: I think so. I think this—if it were over time to really seriously erode, the price would be incalculable. It just would be very serious. And that we’ve always played for enough time for other events to—just to—

NIXON: Overrun it, yeah.

HAIG: —pull away from our obligations worldwide. And that’s what we’ve got to have. We’ve just got to have that.

NIXON: You can’t have it collapse, like, immediately.

HAIG: No.

NIXON: That’s the point. And, you sure, sure as hell can’t have it collapse. Well, as you know, we’ve been very tough with the Russians, and they claim they’re pulling the string, but I don’t know. I doubt it.

HAIG: It—there sure isn’t an awful [laughs]—much sign of any, anything—

NIXON: Well, it’s—and, it—maybe they’re pulling the string at the pipeline, but they’re—pulling the string, but the pipeline is so full, that it hasn’t had any effect yet.

HAIG: Yes. Yeah. Well, I think we should do a very thorough job. Actually, Henry’s kicked one off in the WSAG. I’m not confident that it’ll be the best thing in the world, but—

NIXON: You mean a, a study?

HAIG: Yes. It’s a—he’s formed a little interdepartmental group—

NIXON: Yeah, I know.

HAIG: —to solve it.

NIXON: They won’t come out. That won’t do much. But, anyway, we’ve got to get something, and we’ll have to—we got to line up our, our forces within the government on this, goddamn it.

HAIG: This is right.

NIXON: As we can’t have any, any flinching once we—

HAIG: That’s—

NIXON: Now one thing that’s been mentioned, as probably Henry’s talked to you, that I might want you to go out there to Cambodia and take a look.

HAIG: Well, that’d be fine.

NIXON: I don’t know what the hell you—but what the hell are you going to find out? I mean, what can we do? They can’t—

HAIG: It’s just the—

NIXON: They’ve got to get Lon Nol the hell out of there, some way or other, but you can’t overthrow him. But—

HAIG: I don’t think we should rush on it in the context of the recent flurry on the Hill. It’ll just look like a—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: And it will—

NIXON: I get your point.

HAIG: —increase that syndrome, that we’re doing it for Cambodia.

NIXON: Right.

HAIG: We don’t want that.

NIXON: You could go out and look at both.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: That’s what—you might just visit all the areas. That’s the way, I think, you’re—I mean, if you took a trip, I think you should visit all.

HAIG: That’s right. So, it’s just—

NIXON: Right.

HAIG: —just an overall assessment.

NIXON: That’s right. Fine. Well, certainly, if the DRV continues this kind of asshole stuff, which I—we [laughs]—we’re off the hook on the aid thing. That’s for damn sure.

HAIG: Oh, yeah.

NIXON: And that’s, that’s—I don’t know if they want it or not. But if they do want it, good God, they are—they aren’t going to get it. Not—not as long as they’re rolling—doing this. And another thing, too, is that these POWs are now gonna be talking about how they’ve been lacerated, and—

HAIG: Well, you see, that’s right. And that’s going to build up a hell of a—you know, among the average American, yesterday’s television, and this morning’s, is going to raise a hell of a lot of hackles with these monkeys, because this was brutal treatment. And, I don’t think you’re going to find a lot of people that are going to be patient with—patient with their, now, violating these agreements.

NIXON: If they’re in violation, no way.

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: No way.

HAIG: That’s why we have to—that’s the theme we have to use, and we have to start drawing attention to it where it’s happening. We did that last week. You gave a good shot last night.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

HAIG: We’re looking at every possible military preparatory—

NIXON: Right.

HAIG: —signal—

NIXON: Right.

HAIG: —in character. And that’s what we’re doing over here right now. We’re working on a paper—

NIXON: Right. Right, right. That’s—what’s Abrams’s evaluation? Or is he—about the same as yours?

HAIG: I think so. I think so. He—he’s concerned about it. He knows we can’t have the thing happen quickly, but he’s also—he doesn’t panic and doesn’t—

NIXON: He also knows—I guess what we got to also realize, Al, is that if Vietnamization meant anything, good God, the South Vietnamese, looking at their situation, ought to be able to do something here. I don’t know.

HAIG: They could. There’s no question about that. And they’re—

NIXON: Hell, they’ve got—

HAIG: —not going to get upset here in a, in a six-month period. It just couldn’t happen. They’re—

NIXON: Yeah, Henry was saying that he’s—in his memo this morning, I think he’s gone a little bit overboard. Here he says that he thinks that there might be even a North—a big Communist offensive in April. Hell, that’s, that’s three weeks—two weeks away.

HAIG: Well, the intelligence community is—what CIA came in with—they said there could be—

NIXON: Yeah?

HAIG: —an offensive in April.

NIXON: Jesus. I just—I don’t—

HAIG: Thieu will probably make that point to you.

NIXON: Yeah, so? So, what does he want us to do, send our forces back in?

HAIG: No, I don’t think so.

NIXON: No.

HAIG: No, I don’t—

NIXON: He wants us to bomb?

HAIG: I’m not sure that he wants anything other than, maybe, understanding if he takes some action.

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: I don’t think we’ll get any panic from him.

NIXON: Well, as a matter of fact, I don’t give a damn if he takes some action. I mean, as far as the cease-fire is concerned now, and—if they’re breaking it, he can break it. I mean—and, he could take some rather effective action, couldn’t he?

HAIG: Oh, yes. He could take those missiles out of Khe Sanh, and he could put a—

NIXON: With his own air, couldn’t he?

HAIG: With his own air. He could put some heavy strikes in around that MR-3 [Military Region 3, which stretched from the northern Mekong Delta to the southern Central Highlands]. In Tay Ninh, they’ve been constantly taking on this little ARVN unit there, and pounding the hell out of them. They won’t let any investigators in and you know, but it’s not—none of this is major. It’s the compounding of the whole—

NIXON: Yeah.

HAIG: —the whole picture.

NIXON: Cambodia, the real problem there basically is getting a government, Al. Good God, we’re putting money in, and we don’t have any advisors there. That’s—

HAIG: That’s right.

NIXON: I don’t know.

HAIG: The same strategic considerations that drove us in ’70 are—could appear if that country went Communist.

NIXON: Of course. Of course. Well, okay, Al. Thank you.

HAIG: Yes, sir.

NIXON: Bye.