The United States and China: the “critical problem of our age”
May 3, 1973, 9:48 A.M.
Richard Nixon and David Bruce
OVAL OFFICE
The month of April hollowed out the Nixon presidency, sweeping away dominant personalities, as well as some measure of Nixon’s own passion for the office. His gusto returned, however, whenever he discussed foreign relations and especially the relationships of the world’s superpowers. In a masterful overview, he described his strategy for China and to some extent the USSR, India, and Japan in a conversation with David Bruce. Within a few weeks Bruce would leave to lead the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. Nixon’s expectations were complex, even on the personal level. Although he was increasingly dependent on Rogers, the secretary of state, for advice pertaining to the Watergate investigations, he continued to give him low status in matters of diplomacy. The State Department was relegated to matters of “this is how we grow figs,” as Nixon termed common consular work. Kissinger was still in place to handle major issues with Beijing. Nixon envisioned that Bruce, a remarkably sociable man, could make friends with Chinese officials and learn who was likely to take over the government in the near future, after the era of Mao and Zhou Enlai ended. Unfortunately, the Chinese forbade fraternization with foreign diplomats, and so Bruce’s charms were wasted in what was to become a very lonely posting, much different from his experience as an ambassador in European capitals.*
NIXON: Well, the great thing for you, as you know, substantively, probably not a great deal will happen for a while.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: But the most important thing about this is the symbolism. I mean, symbolism sometimes is not important, but now it is enormously important.
BRUCE: The fact that—
NIXON: The fact that you are there. Let me tell you one thing that I particularly would like is that I know that the social world is a total pain in the rump, but to the extent that you can, if you could get around and have your colleagues get around and give us an evaluation of the people on the way up who are there now.
BRUCE: Yes. Yes.
NIXON: You’ve got to understand, Mao will soon be leaving; Zhou Enlai is in his seventies but he’s as vigorous as can be—terrific. You’re going to really like him, you’ll like them both. Zhou Enlai is an amazing man. But on the other hand, except for some men in their thirties—late thirties and forties—I don’t see much coming up. And I think, you know, you can do that. Look around, see who the power is. That’s one thing that would be very important for us to know. Isn’t it?
BRUCE: Well, I think it is, yes. Because if they have sort of a collegial [unclear]—
NIXON: The Russians have quite a few in their shop that you know might come along.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: And you know, an interesting thing, the Russians too [unclear], so pretty soon we know in four or five years there’s going to be change there. But there will be a change in China. And the world changes. Well, there’s that. Then, of course, the just, you know, your sense of the country, its people. I mean, I’m really, really more interested in that than I am in the routine cables, “Well, today we did this, or that, or the other thing. We signed an agreement.” You know, “This is how we grow figs.”
BRUCE: Exactly. [laughs]
NIXON: Huh?
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: Don’t you agree?
BRUCE: I do agree.
NIXON: We’re trying to see what this great—I mean, we’ve got to get along with this one-fourth of all people in the world. The ablest people in the world in my opinion—potentially. We’ve got to get along with them. It’s no problem for the next five years, or the next twenty years, but it’s the critical problem of our age.
BRUCE: Yes, I think it is.
NIXON: The other thing is, if you could, constantly of course, whenever you’re talking, they’re very subtle—and they’re not like the Russians, who, of course, slobber at flattery and all that sort of thing. But you should let them know how—two things: one, from a personal standpoint how much I appreciated the welcome while we were there. Second, we look forward to sometime returning. Third, I would very much hope that Zhou Enlai will see his way clear to come here to the UN.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: Or something. I would like to entertain him here, and it can be worked out in a proper way. And fourth, and I think this is the most important, that I look upon the Chinese-American relationship as really the key to peace in the world. Always have in the back of your mind without playing it too obviously, the fact that the only thing that makes the Russian game go is the Chinese game. Always have in the back of your mind that if you say anything pro-Russian is not in our interest. Always have in the back of your mind the fact that the Russians are their deadly enemies.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: And they know it, and we know it. And that we will stand by them.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: And that’s the commitment that I have made.
BRUCE: Right, sir.
NIXON: I have.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: How we do it, I don’t know. But that’s what keeps—because, David, what is probably in our time maybe that big collision could occur. And collisions even between enemies these days will involve all nations of the world, they’re that big. So we want to avoid that too. But my point is the Chinese must be reassured they have one heck of a friend here. They hate the Indians, as you know.
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: Well, they don’t hate them as much as they have contempt for them. They think that India is becoming a, you know, a sort of a satellite of Russia. And of course the Japanese, they have a fear and respect for them as well. So with the Japanese, sort of say the right thing in terms of we want to get along with Japan and the rest. And it’s very important that we have our, that we maintain our, in other words the shield there, because otherwise Japan goes into business for itself and that’s not in their interest. And the other point that they’re terribly interested in, looking at the world scene, another point, apart from the fact they’ll go through the usual jazz as to [unclear] all countries and all that—revolutions in mind. That’s fine. What they do in Africa I don’t care anymore. But Europe—they don’t want us to get out of Europe. Because they realize as long as the Russians have a tie down in Europe, that—you see what I mean?
BRUCE: Oh, I do.
NIXON: So some of our well-intentioned congressmen go over there and reassure them, “Oh, look, we’re going to get out of Asia. We’re going to get out of Japan, we’re trying to reduce our forces in Europe.” Well, that for the Chinese scares them to death.
BRUCE: Well, I was struck by the conversations that you’ve had, and how they came back to the necessity about preserving forces in Europe. They were very pro-NATO for their own reasons. It was interesting.
NIXON: Absolutely.
BRUCE: Well, I’ve got all those points in mind. Those conversations that you had there I’ve read. I must say they really are quite not only [unclear] but fascinating to read.
NIXON: Yeah. You’re one of the few in the country who’s read them.
BRUCE: I’d forgotten—but I do think they’re absolutely fascinating.
NIXON: Yeah. A lot of history was made there.
BRUCE: It was indeed. I think probably the most significant history, diplomatic history, of our time. No question about it. And I don’t see anything which could really ruin it in the time being. Without any hesitation I can tell you I always thought the preservation of good relations should have sort of ordinary courtesies and whatnot in the beginning, it’ll probably be all business, but you try and get to know as many people as possible. [unclear]
NIXON: Let them think that we are strong, respected, and we’re not going to be pushed around by the Russians or anybody else. Mideast—we have no answer there, as you know.
BRUCE: I know.
NIXON: They haven’t either. But I think the great irony is that today the United States of all nations is China’s most important friend. [laughs]
[Unclear exchange]
NIXON: Romania? Tanzania? Albania? [unclear]
BRUCE: [unclear] That’s pretty good stuff.
NIXON: My point is, with that in mind—would you like a little coffee?
BRUCE: No, I wouldn’t like some. I just had some.
NIXON: Oh, fine. I’ll have a little, just a cup.
BRUCE: But this is a most fascinating development, I think.
NIXON: It sure is.
BRUCE: We must replace the policies that have become so embedded almost in the American consciousness that nobody in particular complained about it, and nobody intended to do anything about it.
NIXON: Look, for twenty years, do you know, we were sort of—now look, I’m supposed to be the number-one Red-baiter in the country. I have earned that reputation for what you know very well. Had we just continued the policy of just a silent confrontation and almost non-communication with the PRC—
BRUCE: Yes.
NIXON: —in the end we would reap a nuclear war. No question.
BRUCE: Yes. Yes.
NIXON: We just had to break through.
BRUCE: Yeah.
NIXON: Also, as I said, it was so important to the Russian game.
BRUCE: Terribly important.
NIXON: Yeah.
BRUCE: Terribly important.
NIXON: Yeah.
BRUCE: It must have [unclear]. How hard does one explain to the Chinese that we want to preserve a relationship that has great importance to us, a meaningful relationship with Russia? The Chinese are undoubtedly our favorites between the two. But—
NIXON: The Russians are saying—“Now look, this is very important—that Nixon is having another meeting with Brezhnev.” There’s going to be a lot of agreements that come out of that meeting. The important thing there to remember is that Russia and the United States are superpowers. That our interests do rub together in the Mideast and in Europe, particularly. That their rubbing together is a danger that is almost unbelievably great, and that under these circumstances that we feel what we have to do is try to limit that danger as much as we can through communication. But, on the other hand, we do not consider putting it quite bluntly as between the two—we consider the Soviet, because of its power and of its long history of expansionism, we consider it more of a danger that we have to deal with than we do China, which has a longer history of, frankly, defense. Now, I think a little of that is well worth saying. In other words—and also I’d be very blunt about it. Just say you’ve had a long talk with the president and there’s no illusions—our systems are different—both the Chinese and the Russians. They’re better Communists than the Russians are today. But we want to get back to national interests. And the president considers—he’s a man of the Pacific—he considers that China and America have a hell of a lot more in common than Russia and America, and that is the God’s truth.
BRUCE: Yes, that’s true.
NIXON: And that therefore, looking at the historical process, I want to work toward that direction. And I think that’s what we have to do. But the Chinese-American relationship can be the great linchpin of peace in the world.
BRUCE: Well, I’ll tell you that after you’ve talked to Brezhnev, the Chinese will be filled in rather completely.
NIXON: Totally. I’ve instructed, I’ll have—of course we’ll be in touch with you, but we’ll probably have Kissinger go over again. Incidentally, I want to tell you one thing. Normally on these visits when he goes, this is very important, he has sometimes met alone with their leaders—so far. But in this instance, I want you to feel, David, that you are basically not the State Department’s ambassador, you are the president’s, and I want you to be in on everything. You see what I mean? You’ve got to remember that we cannot—there’s parts of these games that we don’t want to go to the bureaucracy. It’s no lack of confidence in Bill or any of the others. But you know how it is. So will you have this in mind, please?
BRUCE: I will, Mr. President. I certainly will. Because the security of the State Department, in my mind, is nonexistent.
NIXON: It’s nonexistent. [unclear]
BRUCE: No, it’s absolutely impossible.
NIXON: That’s right.
BRUCE: No, I think that I understand that part of the [unclear]. And I think the back channel can be used [unclear].
NIXON: Well, I want to use the back channel. And also, when Henry gets over there to do the briefings, I think it’s very important that you be with him.
BRUCE: Well, I would like that.
NIXON: So that you can, you know, get the feel of the thing too.
BRUCE: Yes, I think it would be on that occasion, good. He offered when they came to Paris in connection with the Vietnam peace talks taking me to secret meetings. And I was very indisposed to do it. I think it was my great mistake. I never would have been able to—
NIXON: Oh, yes. When you were there?
BRUCE: Yes. But I think in China it’s probably a different thing.
NIXON: Well, in China it’s [unclear] I know I have—I’ll see that it’s done.
BRUCE: All right, sir. I’ve only got one other thing, which I have not talked to the ambassador but I [unclear] because they are behind the times with what’s going on. This Cambodia thing, I wonder if it’s possible to settle.
NIXON: God, I don’t know. I wish it were. We’re willing to settle anyway—China and them.
“Soccer is very different from American football.”
May 8, 1973, 12:34 P.M.
Richard Nixon, Edson Arantes “Pelé” do Nascimento, and Rosemeri dos Reis Cholbi
OVAL OFFICE
In a twist on Ping-Pong diplomacy, Brazilian soccer great Pelé and his wife visited President Nixon for an exchange of greetings and gifts. Pelé discussed the sport’s rising popularity in the United States, and Nixon responded that the greatest American players were at Howard University in Washington, DC. Pelé discussed his interest in initiating cultural exchanges between Latin America and the United States.
NIXON: You are the greatest in the world.
PELÉ: [Hands Nixon a newspaper clipping from São Paolo while photographers take photos]
NIXON: Do you speak any Spanish?
PELÉ: No, Portuguese. It is all the same.
NIXON: He always wins.
CHOLBI: Yes.
NIXON: The national champions of soccer in the United States are here in Washington, at Howard University. Here is a clipping of my visit with Pelé to São Paolo in 1967.
PELÉ: Soccer is very different from American football.
NIXON: Do I know that! The main thing is to use your head.
PELÉ: Here is a film of soccer which I would like to present. I know you are busy.
NIXON: Sports films I watch.
PELÉ: It shows the worldwide soccer and the training that is required.
NIXON: You have no sons, but maybe your grandsons will want to learn from it. [Nixon hands out pens.]
PELÉ: Soccer is played more and more around the world and in the United States. My aim is to send soccer technicians to the U.S. and have your basketball technicians come to Latin America.
NIXON: That is a great enterprise and I wish you well.
Kissinger’s trip to Moscow
May 11, 1973, 10:15 A.M.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger
OVAL OFFICE
On May 10, Kissinger returned from a trip to Moscow, where he had met with Leonid Brezhnev, ostensibly about the plans for a June visit by the Soviet leader to the United States. During the course of four official meetings and a boar-hunting trip, Kissinger also discussed matters that included the possibility of reaching an agreement on MIRV missile systems, as well as relations with China. The high-level mission meant a lot to Kissinger at that juncture, with the White House in turmoil and his position within it under pressure, at least in his perception. In an off-the-record conversation, atop a hunting blind, Brezhnev had expressed his concern that Senator Henry Jackson’s legislation on the emigration of Jews from the USSR would do more harm than good. Kissinger and then Nixon were not hard to convince on that point.
KISSINGER: Now, we have a massive problem with the Chiefs and [William] Clements, who’s stupid but well meaning on SALT.
NIXON: Ah, yes.
KISSINGER: And I’m not going to bother you with the technical details, but they are digging in on almost everything. The point is, the Russians will turn down almost anything, and we—
NIXON: I know.
KISSINGER: —just the—the issue is they want to nail the Russians now to agree to equal numbers on both sides before they will talk about MIRVs. Now, the MIRV proposal they are making is so unilaterally advantageous to us. Namely, that we should stop deployment of our land-based missiles, MIRVs, of which we have already completed nine-tenths of our program. If they don’t put any MIRVs on their land-based missiles, there’s no chance that it will ever be accepted, but if we can make it and get them to turn it down—but, if they did accept it, it would be spectacularly advantageous to us because we—our program would be nearly complete—
NIXON: Mm-hmm.
KISSINGER: —and they would never start theirs.
NIXON: That’s right. Right. Right. All right, what do you want me to do? To get the Chiefs—
KISSINGER: I—
NIXON: —in and what else?
KISSINGER: No, no—
NIXON: And tell them—
KISSINGER: No, no—
NIXON: By God, then, I will—
KISSINGER: I—
NIXON: —because I’ve had enough with these goddamn Chiefs.
KISSINGER: I’ll draft a memo for your signature today to send over to them.
NIXON: All right, let me say: make it tough. Say that I have—you know, I have thought this thing through. This is a decision, and I expect it to be loyally and scrupulously adhered to, and I’m placing personal responsibility on everyone who gets the memorandum to see that there is no undercutting, and no playing members of the Congress, or with the press—
KISSINGER: Right.
NIXON: —on this matter. How’s that sound to you?
KISSINGER: That’s excellent.
NIXON: Put the words in to that effect. Okay?
KISSINGER: On China, I’m getting worried. I’m beginning to think that they [the Soviet Union] want to attack China. [unclear, Brezhnev?] took me hunting. He—you hunt there from a tower. You sit in a tower and shoot these poor bastards as they come by to feed. They put out the food. Well, when night fell, and he had killed about three boars and God knows what else—and that’s when it was dark—he unpacked a picnic dinner and said, “Look, I want to talk to you privately—nobody else, no notes.” And he said, “Look, you will be our partners, you and we are going to run the world—”
NIXON: Who’d he use as translator on that?
KISSINGER: [Viktor] Sukhodrev. And he said, “The president and I are the only ones who can handle things.” He said, “We have to prevent the Chinese from having a nuclear program at all costs.” I’ve got to get that information to the Chinese, and we’ve got to play a mean game here—
NIXON: I know.
KISSINGER: —because I don’t think we can let the Russians jump the Chinese.
NIXON: No.
KISSINGER: I think the change in the world balance of power would be—
NIXON: [unclear]
KISSINGER: —too unbelievable.
NIXON: We all know that.
KISSINGER: And, uh—so he [unclear] on politics, he said, “Anything you want,” he said, “the Republicans have to be back in in ’76.” He said, “Anything we—”
NIXON: He didn’t give you the crap on Watergate [unclear] been exposed to here?
KISSINGER: The only thing on Watergate that Dobrynin said—
NIXON: Don’t let it get you down, Henry—
KISSINGER: No. And, now, Dobrynin, the basic—the only thing Dobrynin is complaining about is the amateurishness of the guys who did it. He said, “Why did you do it out of the White House?”
NIXON: [unclear]
KISSINGER: But, I’m just telling you what Dobry—that’s the only—
NIXON: Well—
KISSINGER: —the only concern the Russians have is they hate the Democrats. I mean, you should hear Brezhnev on Jackson. It’s not to be believed.
NIXON: Good.
KISSINGER: And he says they want you [unclear]—
NIXON: Oh—did they get into the business of—of the—that doggone exit visa, and that other thing?
KISSINGER: Yeah.
NIXON: I worked with the senators [unclear]—
[Unclear exchange]
KISSINGER: —promised it wouldn’t be reintroduced. I gave them a list of those forty-two people who are being kept.
NIXON: Yeah?
KISSINGER: And they promised—
NIXON: And if we look at all we can do [unclear]. “Just don’t let it”—I keep threatening the senators that if they continue to insist on [the] Jackson [amendment], it’ll blow the whole thing. Now, you know it won’t, but my point is—
KISSINGER: Oh, it will. Who knows?
NIXON: What I meant is, it won’t because we’re going to get Jackson modified.
KISSINGER: Yeah.
NIXON: Jackson’s got to be modified in a way that they could be given [unclear]. I have threatened the hell out of the senators.
KISSINGER: Yeah.
NIXON: But, did he mention—is there anything they know about that?
KISSINGER: Well, he said that if the Jackson amendment goes through, no Jew is going to leave the Soviet Union again.
NIXON: That’s right.
KISSINGER: He—he said to me—
NIXON: That’s the point I’ve been making.
KISSINGER: Well, you can’t repeat this, but he said—he took me aside privately, he said, “Do you know what your people are doing?” He said, “The Jews are already the privileged group—in a way, a privileged group. They live in cities, they’re the only group that can have an exit visa. No one else receives an exit visa, and if you people keep humiliating us you’re going to create the worst anti-Semitism ever in the Soviet Union.” And I believe that it’s true.
NIXON: We can—we’re going to work on the Jackson amendment. I’m working my tail on it, Henry.
A mysterious set of documents
May 16, 1973, 2:51 P.M.
Richard Nixon and J. Fred Buzhardt
WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE
On May 14, 1973, John Dean turned over a secret cache of intelligence records to Judge John Sirica, effectively a shot across the Nixon White House bow. The intelligence community panicked, scrambling to determine exactly which documents were included, as well as to make sure they would not become public or even fall into the hands of congressional investigators. Among the documents were the White House copy of the Huston Plan, a program of surveillance and illicit activities aimed at American citizens, and related correspondence. The CIA, NSA, and DIA worked intensely to make sure the records, which included details of government domestic intelligence, electronic eavesdropping, and even break-ins, were not linked to the Watergate wiretapping and break-in. In the end, they cut a deal with Sirica, and the records have remained in the custody of the District Court for the District of Columbia ever since.
NIXON: Did you finish your meeting with Chuck [Colson]?
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: Are you free now?
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir. We are now going over these documents, Mr. President—
NIXON: I see.
BUZHARDT: —that we have—
NIXON: Oh, yeah.
BUZHARDT: —and we would like to get in a report to you. I would like a little while longer.
NIXON: Yeah. Take your time.
BUZHARDT: All right. Thank you, sir.
NIXON: But they are the type that you described?
BUZHARDT: They are the type, but they do present problems nevertheless.
NIXON: Well. Okay.
BUZHARDT: All right, sir.
White House espionage and its attempted use of the CIA
May 16, 1973, 4:55 P.M.
Richard Nixon and Alexander Haig
OVAL OFFICE
Within days of losing four key advisors, Nixon faced two new issues in the Watergate investigation. First, the existence of the Huston Plan was now public. It was, at least in part, a reaction to the protest movement. Unchecked by any legal mechanism, the plan was serious enough as an infringement of civil rights, but it also opened the door to political espionage. A second problem to emerge during the first week of May was that of White House pressure on the CIA to suppress the Watergate investigation. The deputy director of central intelligence, General Vernon Walters, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that Dean had requested help in paying hush money and that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had sought the CIA’s help in stopping an FBI investigation into political funds laundered through a Mexican bank. He also submitted a written statement to clarify his position. Walters, a native of New York City, had been raised in France and England. He rose quickly in the ranks of the army and served as an aide to President Dwight Eisenhower, in part because he was entirely fluent in several languages. A Nixon loyalist, Walters was at first mildly sympathetic to the request for help with the FBI, though his boss at the time, Richard Helms, squelched any such idea. Ultimately, Walters didn’t cooperate with either request and testified to that effect before Congress. Nixon discussed the new problems with his new chief of staff, Alexander Haig, and a special advisor, Fred Buzhardt.*
NIXON: I remember this [Huston] Plan, and I think [unclear] put it out, you see rather than—I think there’s one—[unclear] damn good man—a little bit of a tendency to, you know [unclear] let’s go out and, for example, this thing on Walters. I am not too sure we have to give on that. What do you think? I don’t know. We may have to.
HAIG: I would never give on it. There is no reason for it yet. Our problem right now is to get the facts and I bet a million dollars they are (a) nothing was ever done. A summary [unclear] by the NSA by [unclear] totally political. (b) Huston—have you talked to Fred since he talked to you?
NIXON: No. Has he talked to you? Did he talk to you?
HAIG: Yes.
NIXON: What did he say? I just talked—
HAIG: Huston, first of all, he said he says to make it clear that you rescinded the approval.
NIXON: I made the order for the rescission.
HAIG: Well, he says that he recalls [unclear] when they broke in: “My God, what have [unclear]?”
NIXON: [unclear] Oh, that’s right. The plan wasn’t working. That’s why I rescinded it or something like that. This may be more of a flap than an opportunity here. Goddamn it, Al, we can’t react so—you know what I mean, it’s a nightmare.
HAIG: I know that.
NIXON: I don’t think [unclear] would come up on that, that we still have on. But don’t tie it into Krogh, and don’t tie it into the buggers, and don’t tie it into the [unclear]. That is a terrible mistake, and makes it look like a giant conspiracy. I feel that I’ve just got to say that Krogh did this and that was a mistake, and the buggers did this.
[FRED BUZHARDT joins the conversation.]
NIXON: I think Dean planned it all. When I say I think that, something in the back of my mind tells me that. I don’t know—
HAIG: Be careful—
NIXON: He’s never told me this. He never admitted it to me.
HAIG: Well, it wasn’t his plan anyway. [unclear] thinks one of these young activists planned it and said here’s what we’re really [unclear] at that point.
NIXON: But as far as Huston was concerned, he doesn’t remember anything being done with the damn plan?
HAIG: Yes.
NIXON: That is what I thought. I never—[unclear] check my memory a little bit. Al is right on [Tom Charles] Huston. Huston got pissed off and left. He said that nothing was ever done under this goddamn thing.
BUZHARDT: I talked—
NIXON: He said [unclear] is a lie.
BUZHARDT: I talked—
NIXON: And he [unclear] it. And Al says that Huston recalls that I rescinded it and I think that is right. I don’t remember it but I think what happened was it just wasn’t working or something like that. I don’t remember—something came across—but look like hell—we may find something in the file.
BUZHARDT: Let me give you where we are right now. Huston says that his best recollection is that it was recalled. I am going to search his files. He may have a copy. He thinks not but I have sent him home to look.
NIXON: Is he here in Washington?
BUZHARDT: No, sir. He is in Indianapolis.
NIXON: He took his files with him?
BUZHARDT: He did take his files with him.
NIXON: Well, [unclear] Jesus Christ.
BUZHARDT: Next, he said that in August of 1970 John Dean came into the White House. He was moved to Dean’s office and Dean took over his responsibility with respect to this type of activity.
NIXON: Oh, that’s how Dean got in it.
BUZHARDT: He said at the same time Mardian came in as assistant attorney general for internal security. And he was aware that Dean and Mardian formed an interagency committee [on intelligence]. He doesn’t know anything about what they did. His recollection is that he had sent out a memorandum saying the decision is reversed in implementing the plan.
NIXON: That who had sent out the memorandum?
BUZHARDT: He originally said he thinks that he had sent out a memo implementing the plan. Telling that your decision—
NIXON: Huston did?
BUZHARDT: Huston did.
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: He said he thinks he probably sent out a memorandum telling—recalling that document.
NIXON: After—
BUZHARDT: After—
NIXON: —Dean came in?
BUZHARDT: —he said that he thought Mitchell—no, before Dean came on board—he said that Hoover went to Mitchell, Mitchell came to you, and you turned it off.
NIXON: I don’t recall except for that I know that Mitchell did that—that Hoover didn’t like it worth a damn and wasn’t working on it. And—but you know what I mean, for God’s sakes you see how it is on these things.
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: I just had one meeting and I don’t recall anything else.
BUZHARDT: That was the initial meeting.
NIXON: Mitchell was following my goddamn advisors!
BUZHARDT: Yeah. That was the initial meeting apparently.
NIXON: That’s right—in this room! [unclear]
BUZHARDT: Just to put together the plan.
NIXON: As a matter of fact, they all wanted a meeting—
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
NIXON: —at that point. Helms, Gayler, and Hoover were all—
BUZHARDT: Worked up.
NIXON: —working together and I said get them one room, and I said now goddamn it, get together and Hoover is in charge. Hoover wanted that. And that’s what they came up with.
BUZHARDT: Now I talked to NSA. I talked to both Sam Phillips and Lou Tordella. Lou Tordella says that to the best of his memory he had it orally that the plan had been approved and that he never remembered getting a memo on any of it. He remembers no turn-off. Now Lou Tordella, I told him to pull together every scrap of paper he had related—
NIXON: All right.
BUZHARDT: —and to come in here and tell me what procedures he did under the authority of this thing. He is on his way in and should be here shortly. I got ahold of DIA—Defense Department’s very recent director Bennett—
NIXON: [unclear]
BUZHARDT: —and he says, “So far as I know we didn’t do a damn thing.” He knows they didn’t do anything. I mean he swears to me. He has talked to his people. He said there may have been a memorandum here—we have no receipt for it. But he’s got memos still working—searching the files to see if there was a memorandum turning it off or turning it on—that matter—to see any records they have regarding it. I have not met managed to reach Schlesinger yet. He is out of pocket. Mardian was out for an hour. They couldn’t reach him. I left word for him to call back. That is where we are at the moment.
NIXON: Mardian’s the chief.
BUZHARDT: Mardian’s the [unclear] because we can talk to Dean—
NIXON: That’s right.
BUZHARDT: —as to what they did.
NIXON: Huston was the [unclear] and I know he didn’t do—did he know of anything while he was here?
BUZHARDT: He says nothing was done while he was here. See, he left just after the approval of the thing. He moved to Dean’s office and out he went. And he said Dean took it over. He left in frustration at Hoover. He was just furious.
NIXON: But he wrote the memorandum.
BUZHARDT: He wrote the memorandum.
NIXON: Then maybe Dean did something then.
BUZHARDT: Maybe Dean did do something. If anything was done it was done between Dean and Mardian. There was some activity, Mr. President. I know they had a committee. I know they produced intelligence reports—whether they got it from the [unclear]—whether they did anything extra I don’t know. I suspect quite frankly that we’ll find there’s a fair likelihood that the Ellsberg thing was justified on this. I know Bob Mardian quite well.
NIXON: Yeah, I know—
BUZHARDT: Bob was extremely aggressive. It may be that that’s what he’ll hang his hat on if he was involved. He may not have been but we will find out when we get him. In the meanwhile we’ve got the others looking to see if there are any documents—turning it on, turning it off, or whatnot to look into.
NIXON: Well, I will lay a little bet on that that Ellsberg was not justified on that. They may try it on it.
BUZHARDT: I say they may try to justify it—
NIXON: Because I’ll tell you what—I think this is [unclear]. The Ellsberg thing was something we set up. Let me know tell you—I don’t [unclear] here, and Al knows what happened. We set up in the White House an independent group under Bud Krogh to cover the problems of leaks involved at the time of the goddamn Pentagon Papers. Right? Remember we called it—they called it—I don’t remember—remember they called it the Plumbers operation. That was independent. It was not connected with these things at all [unclear]. Not at all. They had no connection whatever—in addition to those.
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: And may I say that I think that back to our earlier conversation. I think we should treat them separately. Treat them separately. I think this idea of saying that could have been this, and maybe the reason that we had to check the Watergate buggers was because of this. Then—aha! I don’t think so. I think that you are going to find that this thing was either dead, because it appears in limbo, or it was one of those things that was never implemented. Now here is my theory of the case at this point, which of course is a little different than what we thought it was at first. I think you can prepare a contingency as I think they may think they have got more than they have got. Well, they may think, well maybe Dean knows, but Dean is going to have to—
HAIG: This is what we are talking about.
NIXON: What?
HAIG: This is what Dean’s defense is—
BUZHARDT: That’s right.
HAIG: —the son of a bitch is—that’s why he created that document—
BUZHARDT: That is why I say that they’re—that’s why I say they’re probably going to try—
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: —to hang the whole business on this. That is how they are going to try to get—I am not saying it will work—
NIXON: Well, so Dean’s defense will be what? The whole Watergate thing was the result of this? That’s [unclear]—I’m just trying to think.
BUZHARDT: I can conceive he will try to hang the whole thing on that. Yep!
NIXON: It won’t work.
HAIG: That he would say—of course it would work—[unclear] a man who’s got his hand in the cookie jar and is about to get fried. [unclear]
BUZHARDT: That’s right. That’s the paper I can only figure he could [unclear].
NIXON: Okay. Well, let me say what I think, Fred. I’d like for you to think of it in totally separate terms.
BUZHARDT: All right.
NIXON: I don’t want to get Ellsberg involved. Let’s leave that where he belongs. Let Ellsberg be where it was. I mean I’m sorry for Krogh and hope that California law isn’t too tough on Danbury, Connecticut. Have you found out yet?
BUZHARDT: No, sir. I’ll have the answer [unclear].
NIXON: Goddamn let’s hope it’s a misdemeanor.
BUZHARDT: I hope so.
NIXON: It should be. Incidentally are you in touch with Krogh?
BUZHARDT: I have not. I haven’t talked to Bud.
HAIG: I haven’t talked to him either.
NIXON: Someday when you call him just tell him that I think he’s a hell of a guy, would you?
HAIG: All right, sir.
NIXON: Good. Okay, as far as this thing and as far as [unclear]. As far as this thing is itself is concerned, I wouldn’t anticipate that [unclear] in effect that we’re going to get all our bowels in an uproar because something like this is going to—maybe come out. Let’s see, in—remember, this is a classified document. Let’s remember that. My view is if they start leaking the goddamn document, and then we go on the attack of the leak of classified documents—in other words, make the case about—again about the Pentagon [Papers]—here’s a classified document. But then here is my third point—most important point is this: if we found that very little if nothing was done with the goddamn thing, or if we happen to find that it happened to have been rescinded, you can kill it. I doubt anything was done with this at all. I just think it was a nonstarter.
HAIG: Well—
NIXON: I’m not trying to say—but that’s—my recollection of the thing, Al, was that we were all around here—I remember when you [unclear] and you said Huston left because he was pissed off. And I do remember. He was, you know, he was an arrogant—
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: —an activist kind of a guy, and he got pissed off—just took off—said it didn’t work. Now I don’t know where—somebody else did something. I would doubt it. I would doubt it.
BUZHARDT: I would doubt if they had any illegal entries.
NIXON: That’s my point.
BUZHARDT: Now I am very sure that NSA brought [unclear].
NIXON: What did the NSA—will they—what kind of action did they do—do they do?
BUZHARDT: Well, they picked up communication stuff. They don’t actually tap things. There is no tapping of the [unclear].
NIXON: Anything that NSA did is totally defensible.
BUZHARDT: I think it is defensible but they moved into a broader category with respect to domestic affairs.
NIXON: Right. Right. Meaning picking up by—
BUZHARDT: [unclear]
NIXON: —electronic surveillance?
BUZHARDT: Targeting—yes, sir. Targeting U.S. citizens’ conversations that were on international circuits.
NIXON: Doing so because of their concern about their being involved in violence?
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: Is that right?
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir. Now, I will get a complete rundown—
NIXON: Fight them like hell on that issue.
BUZHARDT: What?
NIXON: Fight them like hell on that issue. Well, that’s interesting. I would not move too quickly on this.
BUZHARDT: Well, we want to move quickly to get as many facts as we can. That’s the only way we can move what we’re doing—
NIXON: No, what we’re doing, really—this is just the way—what I meant is I am thinking of our PR strategy here. This is one—
BUZHARDT: Let me tell you. They bought a little time.
NIXON: What?
BUZHARDT: They bought a little time. The intelligence agencies consigning to intercede on the basis of the sensitivity of the document with the Ervin Committee—to lock the document up. So he is going to take the mainstay and they are going to try to convince him tomorrow of the high sensitivity and the damage that could be done—to try to hold this document—
NIXON: Who is going to do it?
BUZHARDT: —get it turned back. It is going to be done by CIA and NSA.
NIXON: Are going to see who? Ervin?
BUZHARDT: They are going to see [Senator] Symington. If Symington is convinced he is going will try to get Ervin to give the document back. I don’t frankly think it will work, but in the meanwhile it buys us time while they are considering the question. We have nothing to lose. It might buy us some time.
NIXON: What are [unclear]?
BUZHARDT: It has bought us some time so far.
NIXON: You mean Ervin. But Ervin is likely to say [unclear].
BUZHARDT: I think that is a likely result but in the meanwhile he has at least told me—
NIXON: You see, the thing that is good about this is that it is so broad based. Do you understand—what I meant is they don’t like to get caught with their hands in the cookie jar but basically the worst kind of a thing is frankly the Plumbers operation.
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: It looks like well, a few goddamn clowns hired a bunch of people here. But here you have the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, the FBI all working together on something—
BUZHARDT: —and Internal Revenue.
NIXON: Huh?
BUZHARDT: And Internal Revenue.
NIXON: They did it too?
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: There you are. All working on something like this. Well, goddamn it! Now when they all get together on a paper for the president of the United States that something is pretty goddamn important, isn’t it? That is what is involved here. It involved groups that were engaging in violence, disruption—unbelievable hell around this place. The trouble is that we didn’t do much to it.
“A certain domestic intelligence plan”
May 16, 1973, 4:57 P.M.
J. Fred Buzhardt and Robert Mardian
WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE
After J. Edgar Hoover tried to put an end to the Huston Plan in 1970, a new avenue of intelligence gathering emerged. An entity called the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was formed as a means of using surveillance capabilities already in place to respond to White House initiatives. In the aftermath of Dean’s revelations about the Huston Plan, the extent of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee’s work also became an issue, especially since the body was more or less a sequel to the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, the Hoover-chaired group that created the Huston Plan.
In an Oval Office conversation that did not include Nixon, Fred Buzhardt called Robert Mardian to find out what the committee actually did. Buzhardt, a South Carolina lawyer, had been a fervent supporter of Strom Thurmond and had worked for him in Congress during the 1960s. He had a focused mind and an almost heroic dedication to the Republican Party. While Buzhardt was working as counsel at the Defense Department in early May, Nixon tapped him to become special counsel for Watergate. Mardian had been out of government for a year. A native of Pasadena, California, he was working successfully as a lawyer in the banking industry when he was swept up in Republican politics, ultimately serving as an assistant attorney general under John Mitchell. He left that post to work for CRP as chief counsel. A professed supporter of law and order, Mardian was an outspoken opponent of the protest movement, even when it operated within the law. He was living in Arizona when Buzhardt reached him to discuss the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.*
BUZHARDT: Hello?
MARDIAN: Hello, Fred. How are you?
BUZHARDT: Bob, how the hell are you?
MARDIAN: Fine, thanks.
BUZHARDT: It’s been a long time.
MARDIAN: It has. What’s your new job?
BUZHARDT: I am special counsel to the president.
MARDIAN: Good.
BUZHARDT: On guess what?
MARDIAN: [laughs]
BUZHARDT: Bob, there were some documents that were released by the court today—
MARDIAN: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: —which consisted of a certain domestic intelligence plan—
MARDIAN: A what?
BUZHARDT: A certain domestic intelligence plan—that’s dated the summer of 1970. Are you reading me?
MARDIAN: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: Okay. Now this was handled here by a fellow named Huston until about August of ’70 at which time Dean came aboard and took over the responsibility.
MARDIAN: Right.
BUZHARDT: Sometime along about that time you came aboard and formed a committee—Interagency [Committee on Intelligence].
MARDIAN: Yes.
BUZHARDT: Now, we—you know, the [Ervin] committee has the documents incidentally—
MARDIAN: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: Now there are certain things we need to know quite urgently.
MARDIAN: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: On the committee you ran, Bob, was it an analysis group, solely and simply, or were there any activities?
MARDIAN: No activities whatsoever.
BUZHARDT: No collections?
MARDIAN: What?
BUZHARDT: No collections?
MARDIAN: No. The only activity was an attempt to—I understood this was at the direction of Ehrlichman—the president actually, that’s what they told me—and the only purpose was to—originally, it was set up in the White House, then it was moved over to [Department of Justice] Internal Security because everybody—the various members of the intelligence group were concerned about everybody seeing them coming in and going out together when they had meetings.
BUZHARDT: Right.
MARDIAN: The sole purpose was to attempt to bring the intelligence, to coordinate the activities of the various law enforcement intelligence agencies within the government.
BUZHARDT: All right, now—
MARDIAN: Now what they were doing—see, now as I say, it started—it was a White House operation—
BUZHARDT: [unclear] my shop.
MARDIAN: —and what they would do would be to respond to requests. There’s a charter—there’s a—I don’t call it a charter, but an agreement as to what they would do. What their scope would be.
BUZHARDT: When did this come into being, Bob?
MARDIAN: Oh, I would guess January or February of 1971 and it was a friend of—a judge, a former justice of the Washington Supreme Court was supposed to be the working director of it [the Intelligence Evaluation Committee].
BUZHARDT: Did he ever show up?
MARDIAN: Oh, yeah, and he was just there on—served as a special assistant to the attorney general. We put him on the payroll there. That was Ehrlichman’s idea. He was Ehrlichman’s neighbor and subsequently when he got appointed back on the court—he went back on the—I think the Federal District Court. Bernie Wells, who was in my shop—
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
MARDIAN: —was put in charge of it, and he is still in charge of it.
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
MARDIAN: But there is nothing—all it is, all it was, was an attempt to get the various agencies to work together. It included National Security Agency—
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
MARDIAN: —your shop, Defense Intelligence Agency, although I guess they never admitted they had anybody working on it over there. But there was a—as I recall—
BUZHARDT: I know the guy that was liaison.
MARDIAN: Yeah. Well, that is all they had was liaisons.
BUZHARDT: Okay, let me ask you—
MARDIAN: It was a problem that the White House wanted staffed out, if CIA had input on it, it had a foreign aspect, it would contribute what information it had. If the FBI had input on it they would give it input—
BUZHARDT: All right. Let me ask you this, Bob. I have got to know some specifics here. To your knowledge, and I need to know this on the square, were any surreptitious entries made specifically for this purpose?
MARDIAN: Absolutely not. Hell no!
BUZHARDT: Okay.
MARDIAN: Well, if it were—that’s—no, it couldn’t have been. Bernie Wells was running it, for Christ’s sake. It was—all they were doing were making assessments.
BUZHARDT: Okay.
MARDIAN: To my knowledge that’s all they ever did.
BUZHARDT: Only assessments.
MARDIAN: That’s all. There would be a request for information concerning whatever it was that the White House wanted—an assessment was made and copies went to the constituent liaison agencies—
BUZHARDT: Right.
MARDIAN: —as well as the White House and that’s all.
BUZHARDT: Okay.
MARDIAN: But that’s all they did was to make assessments. They weren’t operating anything.
BUZHARDT: All right. Who was your point of contact over here? Did you work with Dean at all on it?
MARDIAN: Actually I didn’t really have much to do with it except to put, to help put the group together.
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
MARDIAN: The contact was direct from Dean’s office, as I recall, to Bernie Wells.
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
MARDIAN: And copies of the work product, as I say, went to each of the constituent departments and agencies. But look, I forget what the hell assessments they made but there was nothing of any consequence and there certainly weren’t any covert operations that I was aware of. I am sure there weren’t. Bernie Wells wouldn’t have gone into anything like that—
BUZHARDT: At this time—
MARDIAN: In fact, they never did work together too well, Fred, because, well, you can imagine trying to get a bunch of people like that all—they are all holding their own information. This was simply an attempt to establish liaison between them with respect to particular problems that the White House had.
BUZHARDT: Okay. To the best of your knowledge, I know the problem while Hoover was there—I am sure there weren’t any. But thereafter you know of no entries made by the bureau?
MARDIAN: Hell, no. No siree. Here again, not as a result of that operation. What the hell did they come up with as far as in these papers to indicate what this group were doing?
BUZHARDT: Well, I don’t want to talk too specific over the phone. But—
MARDIAN: I would suggest you get in touch with Bernie Wells. You know Bernie.
BUZHARDT: Yeah, I will talk to Bernie.
MARDIAN: I’d get Bernie, and Jesus Christ—Fred, if there is anything amiss over there I would sure appreciate you calling me and letting me know.
BUZHARDT: I don’t believe there is, Bob. I am just trying to verify that there isn’t.
MARDIAN: I am sure there wasn’t.
BUZHARDT: I am trying to verify a negative—you know how hard that is.
MARDIAN: Well, you talk to Bernie and he will level with you.
BUZHARDT: But I have got to know. You know? We can’t say no—
MARDIAN: Is there some inference that there was?
BUZHARDT: I suspect there is going to be a claim there was.
MARDIAN: Well, that’s a lot of crap.
BUZHARDT: Okay.
MARDIAN: Well, to my knowledge. Unless—I am never surprised by anything like that—
BUZHARDT: Right. Okay.
MARDIAN: —but I just can’t imagine Bernie. In fact, after the Watergate thing came out and Liddy was arrested, Bernie Wells told—I heard from Bernie Wells, or Jim McGraff that worked over there, that this asshole was over there and said hell, the only way to break—this was during the Time and Post case, or the Pentagon Papers case—there is only one way to do that and that was to bug the New York Times.
BUZHARDT: Oh, God.
MARDIAN: They thought he was joking and never reported it to me.
BUZHARDT: Yeah. Okay. Thanks a lot, Bob. I’ve got to run.
MARDIAN: I am just telling you that Bernie [unclear] on that basis.
BUZHARDT: I’ll go back.
MARDIAN: Will you call me back and let me know?
BUZHARDT: Yeah, I will.
MARDIAN: I’d appreciate it.
BUZHARDT: Okay.
MARDIAN: Thank you.
The Intelligence Evaluation Committee as a cover
May 16, 1973, 5:39 P.M.
Richard Nixon and J. Fred Buzhardt
OVAL OFFICE
As special counsel for Watergate, Buzhardt hit the ground running, determined to research the president’s position on a number of issues related to Watergate. As in the call to Mardian, he tried to pull bad news from those who had been involved in related activities. Unlike his predecessors in advising the president on the scandal, Buzhardt wasn’t interested in coercing selective memory from those who had been involved. Soon after Buzhardt hung up with Mardian, he and the president discussed the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and what Nixon should say about it to the American people. They further worked on a theory that Dean would try to explain away all of his Watergate-related activities by claiming they came under the aegis of the committee.
NIXON: Mardian been reached yet?
BUZHARDT: They found him. I was dealing with the Sullivan call and I was going to get him next.
NIXON: Fine. My feeling is that I guess you have got to check with—I guess Mardian can tell you. I think, Fred, the damn thing was rescinded. That is the [unclear]. I think [unclear] or something, you know what I mean? I cannot recall, but there is something there. Huston seemed to think so—is looking, is that correct?
BUZHARDT: That is correct. Also, the DIA can help. Somebody there thinks it was rescinded.
NIXON: They think it was.
BUZHARDT: They are now looking. I’ve got them looking.
NIXON: If they can find one piece of paper and—
BUZHARDT: We are in business.
NIXON: Yeah. Where else? What about the CIA?
BUZHARDT: CIA—I haven’t gotten [James] Schlesinger yet. He’s somewhere they can’t reach him, which is unusual.
NIXON: Maybe Walters can try and help.
BUZHARDT: That’s true, but Walters didn’t know anything about this.
NIXON: Neither did Schlesinger.
BUZHARDT: Schlesinger knows nothing about it but he can find the right people to inquire. We might be a little bit better. Since Walters is a witness—
NIXON: I agree. I agree. I agree. Walters is a witness.
BUZHARDT: Since Walters is a witness—
NIXON: Walters is a witness.
BUZHARDT: —I think we shouldn’t pick anybody we know is going to be a witness.
NIXON: I am going to take Al and investigate something [unclear] out of this house for a little while. So I—and we’ll call you within—well, you’ve got to go, don’t you?
BUZHARDT: No, I’ll be here. I’ll be here.
NIXON: But I’ll try to call you back. But I’ll tell you, if we can detain this one, we can handle this. I think this—I have a recollection that the goddamn thing is—look, I know it isn’t an operation. It hadn’t been in operation in two years!
BUZHARDT: I am sure—
NIXON: I just don’t know how went out of business. That is my point.
BUZHARDT: I am sure it hasn’t been operating legitimately in quite a while. I feel that is true.
NIXON: Without—as an operation as a group. It hasn’t been operated with the—it had an original authorization and then the question is—
BUZHARDT: It was terminated, but we can’t find a record of the termination. That would be our best bet—to find the record of the termination.
NIXON: But if we can’t we’ll still say it was terminated.
BUZHARDT: We will still have to say it was terminated.
NIXON: It was terminated.
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: And all the agencies will then say that—just have to back it up.
BUZHARDT: That’s right. That is the recollection of DIA. They are looking for the papers. I believe we will find the papers, Mr. President.
NIXON: DIA says they think it was terminated.
BUZHARDT: They think it was terminated. They think that the—and they told me independently from Huston that they think the approval was recalled and that’s what Huston said. He thought we recalled the approval he gave it. Now we’re going to check this thoroughly with NSA and the reason it is important is because, as you remember, that was the most aggressive group to go forward.
NIXON: NSA?
BUZHARDT: NSA and I suspect they are the only ones that did do it.
NIXON: You haven’t been able to reach them, huh?
BUZHARDT: They are on their way in here now. Traffic hour—it takes a while to get from Fort Meade in here. But they will be here shortly.
NIXON: Why you’ve got to tell me.
BUZHARDT: So, I am going to find out.
NIXON: Stir it up—find anything—I am just confident that I never heard of them doing anything on this. But you know what I mean.
BUZHARDT: Well, whatever their operations are there’s no problem with them.
NIXON: NSA, DIA—so forth and so on.
BUZHARDT: DIA—they did absolutely nothing.
NIXON: NSA probably did some electronic work. Goddamn it! We’ll defend that—
BUZHARDT: We can defend that.
NIXON: —until hell freezes over.
BUZHARDT: We’ll defend that.
NIXON: The problem with the memorandum is what it says in regard to the break-in.
BUZHARDT: That is the only problem.
NIXON: Because it says “break-in.”
BUZHARDT: A “surreptitious entry.” What—in the accompanying memorandum it says this is a forced burglary. That’s our problem.
NIXON: The copy of the memorandum is from me?
BUZHARDT: From Huston to Haldeman.
NIXON: Well, for Christ’s sake. It’s his characterization of the thing, but the way he will have to answer that is to say that his characterization of a surreptitious entry meant electronic. He—
BUZHARDT: It is made clear, Mr. President, in the memorandum. That is what is spelled out.
NIXON: Huh?
BUZHARDT: This one is spelled out in the memorandum.
BUZHARDT: [unclear] domestic disturbances—
NIXON: All right.
BUZHARDT: —and with respect to the selected internal security targets to find out much the same thing. What they are doing—what—
NIXON: This would be the Weathermen—things like that?
BUZHARDT: They name them—the Weathermen, the SDS—
NIXON: Good.
BUZHARDT: —the Black Panthers, and all of the organizations are described, their capabilities are given, all it’s laid out.
NIXON: Yeah, and they’re to find out there—
BUZHARDT: That’s right. What they’re up to.
NIXON: Well, my own view though I still think, Fred, is to play them as separable instances. I know that the Krogh incident is separate. I know it is, wasn’t it? Is Krogh—?
BUZHARDT: Oh, yeah. The record so indicates.
NIXON: —he operated from here with my total approval. My approval didn’t include the burglary. But my point—it was stupid, but nevertheless Krogh is a great guy and operated here. I was totally aware of it—as was everybody in this shop. But when you get, for example, to the break-in of the Chilean embassy [on May 13, 1972, but never linked to the White House], that thing was a part of the burglars’ plan as a cover!
BUZHARDT: That’s true.
NIXON: Those assholes are trying to have a cover for a CIA cover, I don’t know. I think Dean concocted that—
BUZHARDT: I think that he concocted and it may come out that he concocted more than what we now know about, Mr. President.
NIXON: There’s strong signs—
BUZHARDT: All indications are now that the thing got badly askew and by his statement, this document I can only assume he wasn’t aware of evidence of the turnoff of this thing, or the withdrawal of approval—
NIXON: If there was one.
BUZHARDT: —if there was one, and that he thought that he had a cover—
NIXON: A cover for everything that he had done.
BUZHARDT: —for everything that he had done in the form of a document that would give him the cover of presidential approval. I can’t help but feel, you know—
NIXON: But I don’t think he’s in for that. Because I don’t—what it involves is [unclear] Watergate and the [unclear]. He says—go ahead—
BUZHARDT: —[unclear], Mr. President.
NIXON: It’d be better for me.
BUZHARDT: I really think what happened is probably—
NIXON: Because he would say that the Watergate thing was approved because of this? If this was [unclear]?
BUZHARDT: I anticipate they might. He, because you know, we’ve heard the stories how the reason—we’ve read in the paper that McCord had said the reason they were going in was to find out their connections with the dissident groups and the demonstrators. Now if Dean is using this as a cover, particularly if we can find a memorandum of withdrawal or something of this, it cuts him off at the water. I suspect, looking at the date—see Dean didn’t get this document back till the summer or spring of ’72. He probably didn’t recognize the utility of it in terms of his activities until much later.
NIXON: Well, [unclear]. He didn’t even know the document existed.
BUZHARDT: He probably knew it existed but he didn’t have this copy of it probably.
NIXON: When? To when?
BUZHARDT: Until ’72. I don’t know. You see it is not clear how much of the material was sent to him by Sol Lindenbaum.
NIXON: But when did that come to him? In March of ’72?
BUZHARDT: In March of ’72. He probably didn’t even think of this document as a cover until long after the incident occurred and the heat got on him. I suspect he really didn’t think of it as a cover perhaps until the week that he really made the break. When he was looking desperately for something to cover with.
NIXON: Yeah, but if he [unclear]. This fellow sent this over to Dean in March of ’72.
BUZHARDT: He sent over a memorandum that said, “I am enclosing documents.” I don’t know how many of those documents were enclosed, how many of these documents were actually enclosed with Lindenbaum’s memorandum. But I suspect that sometime around the time he went to Camp David he was desperate. He looked in the files and found this document, thought he needed a cover, and took it on the outside. And from there on in he found a smug out.
NIXON: Let me say, however, this document did not authorize any nongovernmental activity at all.
BUZHARDT: No, sir.
NIXON: Now that is where he has no cover for that. This didn’t authorize any nongovernmental activity at all, as bad as it is. Goddamn it! I bet you it had been knocked off though. I bet it was knocked off in the summer of that year. It was about two or three months only—can’t Huston even remember that?
BUZHARDT: He thinks it was.
NIXON: Huh?
BUZHARDT: I told him—
NIXON: Did he volunteer it?
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir. He volunteered it.
NIXON: But can he—is there anybody else we can check with? We don’t have—
BUZHARDT: He is looking at his own files. I think we will find it in one of the agencies. One of the agencies probably—
NIXON: You’ve got to—my God, that’s one time I have to find something.
BUZHARDT: We’re going to look.
NIXON: [unclear] if we do, we could cut these boys right off at the pass.
BUZHARDT: Then we can really lay it in the woods.
NIXON: Lay it in the woods, and cut them off at the pass. Okay. We’ll call you when we get back.
BUZHARDT: All right, sir.
The Huston Plan: its firm beginning and nebulous end
May 17, 1973, 8:44 A.M.
Richard Nixon and J. Fred Buzhardt
OVAL OFFICE
Buzhardt and Nixon continued to examine the effect of the Huston Plan, even as reports circulated that the White House had done the unthinkable in American society: spying without limit on law-abiding citizens. An article in the Washington Post that morning described “an elaborate, continuous campaign of illegal and quasi-legal undercover operations conducted by the Nixon administration since 1969.” When the Watergate Committee hearings convened only hours later, Ervin took a longer view, stating at the very outset that “the questions that have been raised in the wake of the June 17 break-in strike at the very undergirding of our democracy.” On that same morning, Nixon and Buzhardt talked through the dates relevant to the Huston Plan. One of those whose name was pulled into the discussion was James Schlesinger, the acting director of the CIA. Raised in Chicago, Schlesinger was educated at Harvard, culminating with a PhD, an economist with a special knowledge of nuclear power. Schlesinger chaired the Atomic Energy Commission in the Nixon administration until February 1973, when Helms was forced out as CIA director over his refusal to squelch the FBI’s investigation into Watergate. Schlesinger, with no particular credentials in espionage, took his place. A hawkish man, Schlesinger was loyal to Nixon. One of Buzhardt’s jobs was to establish just how loyal.
NIXON: I was thinking a little about our program here and how we get this thing handled. I mentioned one thing to [unclear] have that in mind. It seems to me that as soon as you get your facts—I trust you will get them early at least—
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: —as soon as you get everything nailed down—or some of it nailed down—that you should alert on a very quiet basis our friends like, for example—and the people we have to count on. By that I mean Petersen, Schlesinger, and Ruckelshaus should know—
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: —what happened here. Now maybe they already know, but how—can you do that?
BUZHARDT: I can do that. Yes, I can talk to Henry [Petersen] and Bill [Ruckelshaus]. Jim Schlesinger already knows.
NIXON: Yeah, how—what does he know?
BUZHARDT: He knows that it was not—never went forward.
NIXON: Yeah, I want him to know. I want him to have utter confidence, you see, so that—
BUZHARDT: I have taken time out to talk to him. I went to see him Sunday afternoon. He had some misgivings, and I had a long talk with him and explained, I think, the Walters memorandum—sit him on down, personally called Henry, made the appointment, reassured him all the way through.
NIXON: You called Henry about this—
BUZHARDT: No, Jim was a little worried about the—
NIXON: Walters.
BUZHARDT: —Walters thing and so I—
NIXON: Worried about presidential involvement?
BUZHARDT: Yes, so I went over and—
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: —personally had a talk with him. Jim and I are kind of longtime friends.
NIXON: I just wanted Jim to know that by God, I am totally [unclear] the Walters thing, whatever it may have been. [unclear] CIA [unclear].
BUZHARDT: I explained that to him.
NIXON: ’Sixty-eight?
BUZHARDT: ’Sixty-eight they made an effort. They had a meeting here about reinstituting.
NIXON: This is not involve the bureau. [unclear]
BUZHARDT: Yes, it did involve the bureau.
NIXON: Right. Right. And NSA also?
BUZHARDT: NSA. [Secretary of Defense] Clark Clifford presided at the meeting.
NIXON: And they decided not to do it?
BUZHARDT: He didn’t make a decision.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: He held that one—
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: —he was going to think about it some more—
BUZHARDT: —and they raised the question again in ’70 when they could get somebody’s attention. They had discussions with Hoover meanwhile.
NIXON: They raised that one [unclear]. Well, Dean’s meeting which is—from which the Dean—or the forty-three-page memorandum emanated, the policy shift—emanated as a result of a battle between the various agencies after the Cambodia thing as to what the hell they should do in this area. Is that correct?
BUZHARDT: It wasn’t a battle at that point, Mr. President. There had been a number of meetings between the agencies. There was concern.
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: In the initial instance, Hoover did not really express his objections. He had a two-and-a-half-hour meeting apparently with Noel Gayler and Lou Tordella. Just the three of them.
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: Over there. As it was explained to me, they got a lecture on communism and he got a lecture on why they needed these entries.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: He appeared to be convinced.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: So they then had the meeting when it was all discussed. Here. Supposedly.
NIXON: That was the meeting here.
BUZHARDT: That they needed additional intelligence coverage.
NIXON: That’s right. Everybody discussed it.
BUZHARDT: They were told, “All right, go develop a plan. Tell me what these limitations are. Look at them all—”
BUZHARDT: At that point, no specifics were apparently discussed, Mr. President.
NIXON: I see.
BUZHARDT: They just talked about constraints. They were then sent back, with the results of that meeting to have an interagency group to sit down and thoroughly work this thing out—what it was they were supposed to do.
NIXON: Right, right.
BUZHARDT: That the result of that was the forty-three-page plan [the Huston Plan].
NIXON: Who is your—who is your witness that tells you this—this is Sullivan?
BUZHARDT: Tordella—
NIXON: Tordella?
BUZHARDT: —is the best witness.
NIXON: He’s still—he’s at NSA?
BUZHARDT: Yes. He has been deputy director out there since the place was formed.
NIXON: Is he an honest man?
BUZHARDT: Very honest.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: Very honest.
NIXON: Okay, then what happened? They developed a forty-three—
BUZHARDT: Then they developed a forty-three-page plan. It was signed by the four of them: Helms, Hoover, Gayler, and Bennett.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: All four of them signed it. All the recommendations were unanimous.
NIXON: Except—
BUZHARDT: Nope. No excepts. It was unanimous when it came to you.
NIXON: Right. And I approved it.
BUZHARDT: You approved it.
NIXON: The policy paper.
BUZHARDT: The policy paper. Then—and this place is kind of murky. You didn’t approve it immediately.
NIXON: I didn’t?
BUZHARDT: Not when it was submitted. There was a period of two or three months in there, about when a decision was discussed. Hoover, at some point, raised the objection. Now it’s—this is where we are getting the notes on—to get pinned down on the dates. Because when the approval and the subsequent disapproval came was not immediately following submission of the plan. It was some later date.
NIXON: But—I understand I approved the plan. I was thinking about it last night—one day—I wouldn’t to [unclear] two days later and I—
BUZHARDT: Right. We are still looking to get the specifics—
NIXON: Yeah. No, what I meant is about—this representation was made to me. I approved the plan. Did I sign it or something?
BUZHARDT: No, sir—didn’t. I say you approved the plan.
NIXON: I approved the policy.
BUZHARDT: One of the—well, it was a policy. There were no specifics in that.
NIXON: So the plan later [unclear].
BUZHARDT: The Haldeman note back to Huston, telling him to go ahead—
NIXON: Haldeman wrote a note?
BUZHARDT: He wrote a memo to Huston.
NIXON: Saying what? Go ahead?
BUZHARDT: Saying the president has approved the plan.
NIXON: Now this was the forty-three-page plan?
BUZHARDT: Yes, and to go ahead. But to do it with the procedures they had discussed, or to that effect instead of you signing off on the plan.
NIXON: Oh, I see.
BUZHARDT: At the end of the plan they had a page for you to sign on each one.
NIXON: Right, right. Okay. Go ahead.
BUZHARDT: Now we need to pin down—we still don’t have pinned down the precise dates on—subsequently, at some point in the process, Hoover had agreed to it, and then—
NIXON: Tolson.
BUZHARDT: Tolson got to him. He changed his mind. Now on one copy of this plan, somewhere, we are going to try and find it, Hoover wrote footnotes. This is indicated by the memorandum we have—we don’t have the actual footnotes—to which he took exceptions to a number things that were in there. There are a lot of exceptions.
NIXON: Wiretapping and break-ins?
BUZHARDT: Yes. Those were the two key things.
NIXON: That’s right.
BUZHARDT: Then at—when that came back he took it to Mitchell, or came here to see you. Now we don’t know whether he went through Mitchell and Mitchell came, or whether he came. And, as a result, according to the word that I get, or was told the word was passed that the decision had been suspended. The go was recalled. The decision was held in abeyance.
NIXON: The what?
BUZHARDT: The decision was—the go was held in abeyance.
NIXON: Sure, the go. The go, yeah.
BUZHARDT: It did not come out as an absolute no. It was just a suspension of your earlier decision to go.
NIXON: Which meant that things were to go forward as they had previously, but nothing new.
BUZHARDT: That’s right. Nothing new.
NIXON: Now that was implemented, however, by Sullivan, as we know.
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: Sullivan—
BUZHARDT: Sullivan was the one that passed the word. Sullivan—we are going to try to get him down here to get his notes—he’s up in New England.
NIXON: But he remembers that?
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: He told you that on the phone?
BUZHARDT: Sullivan—well, we know from Tordella also.
NIXON: Sullivan. All right.
BUZHARDT: Little leery of Sullivan’s memory.
NIXON: Huh?
BUZHARDT: I am a little leery of Sullivan’s memory.
NIXON: So am I. But Tordella says—Tordella says—what does he say?
BUZHARDT: Tordella specifically remembers—
NIXON: That—
BUZHARDT: —Sullivan calling him and telling him it was “go.” Calling him back very shortly thereafter and telling him—
NIXON: No.
BUZHARDT: —“no go.” And he’s looking for his notes now.
NIXON: All right. Now you haven’t found anyone who knows the principals?
BUZHARDT: No, sir.
NIXON: What about the CIA?
BUZHARDT: They’re checking, but they don’t—they don’t think that anyone out there did anything. They are checking now to make sure. They are going down into the bowels of the place. I am sure that had to have come—
NIXON: I am not—I was wondering not simply whether they did something, but whether they ever got the word from Sullivan. Besides Tordella, do you have anyone that get the word from Sullivan? That there were—
BUZHARDT: We know—the word came independently to me from DIA that some of the people knew that the plan was no go—
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: —that it never did go. But they have not located who called, who got the call yet.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: I suspect it was Bennett. But Bennett is in Korea and I have not been able to reach him.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: I think it was probably the deputy director because he was a participant.
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: So this is—
NIXON: He’s a what—general?
BUZHARDT: Yes sir. He’s four stars now. He’s commanded—
NIXON: I’d just ask him. I’d do it on the phone.
BUZHARDT: I’ll call him and ask him. Now, this morning’s Washington Post—they’ve already placed the business. You know, you can see it all—
NIXON: Right.
BUZHARDT: —that the two Washington Post reporters have—interestingly, they say that the series of burglaries, they say that this was a whole pattern. There were many of them, yet undisclosed—
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: —you know, what we anticipated. Wide-scale wiretappings, but they allege that these were not done by the agencies, but done by separate front groups and special groups working out of the White House. That’s the word this morning, Mr. President.
NIXON: Well, it’s worse when it’s true.
BUZHARDT: Well, I doubt if it’s true. You know, outside of this one group, and all the evidence indicated that they really didn’t do any others. You know, Hunt was telling everything. I went back and read his testimony this morning. He swore under oath and laid it all out, but he said no, they did no others.
NIXON: They did no wiretapping and no burglaries and all that stuff.
BUZHARDT: No wiretaps and no burglaries, except the one of them—the psychiatrist. Krogh’s affidavit says he knew of no other—
NIXON: That’s right.
BUZHARDT: —of these activities.
NIXON: I mean, I know of no other group.
BUZHARDT: I know of no other group.
NIXON: I know another group, whatever—
BUZHARDT: I have never heard of another group. Of course, we hadn’t heard of this one either, but I—somebody would have a rumble of it surely. Whether they used a front group such as the Cubans—now our problem is that they used Cubans in this and obviously the Cubans could have done a lot of things on their own. You know, if they play this every time a Cuban is involved in a burglary, even if they are just there to steal money—
NIXON: Well, but maybe—
BUZHARDT: —so we are going to—it’s—what I’m saying is we’re going to have to work very hard because it’s difficult to recuse a negative—prove a negative.
NIXON: The main point though that I, Fred, to work on today is—to knock the Dean papers out of the goddamn water.
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: Because the Dean papers would indicate that it was a government-wide, official thing done, and it was not.
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: You have no evidence of any government agency doing anything as a result of this paper.
BUZHARDT: None whatever.
NIXON: None whatever.
BUZHARDT: No, sir.
NIXON: Now, you have a Sullivan on that and you have Mardian.
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: And you have Tordella?
BUZHARDT: Tordella on that. [De] Poix on that at DIA.
NIXON: You got him.
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir. He says absolutely nothing—
NIXON: Right, right, right.
BUZHARDT: —and I know pretty well on DIA because I monitored that one very closely.
NIXON: Now, CIA didn’t—they’re so damn terrible.
NIXON: On this one though, Fred, we can blow them out of the water—
BUZHARDT: We can.
NIXON: —if we move at our pace.
BUZHARDT: I want to get affidavits on all these people.
NIXON: Mm-hmm.
BUZHARDT: Get them in concrete.
NIXON: That’s right. Now I think Tordella will give you an affidavit, won’t he?
BUZHARDT: I don’t think there is any doubt. I can get affidavits across the board.
NIXON: If you get Tordella, you get Sullivan, and say that there will be nothing in [unclear]. All right. We’d hope to get Gayler an affidavit.
BUZHARDT: I hope to get Gayler’s, and Bennett’s, and their successor people—whoever worked in this area. I will get one from—
NIXON: What about—?
BUZHARDT: —Bernie Wells who ran the committee.
NIXON: Ran the committee, but ran the committee after all this.
BUZHARDT: After all this.
NIXON: And his committee was what? What was his committee?
BUZHARDT: That was the coordinating committee [Intelligence Evaluation Committee] of the intelligence community to try to get them to work together. And he puts it just bluntly—he said however much we talked about being able to analyze the intelligence, the truth of the matter was that Hoover cut off liaisons to all the agencies. No agent would meet with the other agencies. So we had this group—
NIXON: The reason we had this darn meeting in here, as I now remember, is every agency was bitching about Hoover and they said we’ve got to get Hoover to cooperate.
BUZHARDT: That’s right.
NIXON: That’s what it was.
BUZHARDT: This was the whole fracas.
NIXON: And Hoover didn’t even want to meet in the same room with Helms.
BUZHARDT: That’s true.
NIXON: So I think what happened was he went back and thought about it a bit and a couple of months later apparently Tolson said it. When they got the go signal, and then he said you got a go signal and two days later a no signal. Is that right?
BUZHARDT: That’s Tordella’s recollection and he is looking now for his notes.
NIXON: He’ll have them, won’t he?
BUZHARDT: I am quite sure he will, coming from where he does. I don’t know—I wouldn’t be surprised if they tape the conversations going in and out of there. I don’t think they would admit it, but—
NIXON: No, they shouldn’t.
BUZHARDT: Even to me, but—
NIXON: Well, [unclear] sure, I think Hoover tapes all his conversations.
BUZHARDT: I think it is a common practice in town.
NIXON: Sure. But they never have to admit it. They never have to use it. And shouldn’t. [unclear]
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: I am sure everything in here is taped. I never used it.
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: I just—I guess they probably do it. You know what I mean?
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: Johnson set it up years—no, Kennedy did. They tell me. They tell me. I don’t know. But I’ll never use it.
BUZHARDT: Yeah.
NIXON: Well, anyway, if you can get this one nailed today.
BUZHARDT: Right. We are going to work diligently on getting it.
NIXON: Can you get a plane and get Sullivan flown down—
BUZHARDT: We’ll get him flown down.
NIXON: —and get an affidavit from him? He is the key in the sense that it was turned off.
BUZHARDT: I think so. I think we need to bring Huston back, too.
NIXON: Yes. He’s in California?
BUZHARDT: He is in Minneapolis.
NIXON: Minneapolis. You bring Huston back, and Huston comes back with all those terrible memories so that he—
BUZHARDT: He told me it didn’t go.
NIXON: Huh?
BUZHARDT: He told me that it didn’t go.
NIXON: And that is why you’re—
BUZHARDT: The decision went against him, and that’s why—he said, you know, “I was really keyed up and I left.” He didn’t say precisely that was the reason—
NIXON: I know.
BUZHARDT: —but he said, “I was really teed off and I left.”
NIXON: If you know Tom Huston that sounds like him. I only met him about three or four times but he was an explosive—
BUZHARDT: I think I met him when—
NIXON: —right wing—
BUZHARDT: —he was a college freshman, Mr. President.
NIXON: He was smart as hell. Smart and ruthless. Well, and a decent man. But he just wanted to do something.
BUZHARDT: Naturally.
NIXON: But Huston should have a memorandum because he was here at the White House.
BUZHARDT: He looked last night. He hasn’t found the memorandum in his files. He said he would not have taken anything that was classified with him.
NIXON: Yeah. But he could come here and find out where his files were.
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: This would have been classified possibly. Might have been.
BUZHARDT: It might have been. Depending on what he put in it. I suspect he didn’t write a memorandum. Maybe he called Hoover—I mean called Sullivan.
NIXON: Sullivan. He would have—Hoover would never have been called on this. And Huston said it did not go.
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: All right, so independently, I’m just—understand. I’m just trying to get the facts.
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: No matter how we want the facts to appear, if the facts are wrong screw it. I mean, [unclear] is wrong anyway. Goddamn it, we want the truth. Independently, you’ve heard a tip from Huston that the [unclear] as planned—whatever that damn thing he talked about was that he talked about—did not go. Independently, Sullivan told you that he made calls—
BUZHARDT: He did not tell us—
NIXON: —indicating that it did not go. And independently, Tordella said he got a call that it did not go.
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: Is there anybody else you should have? There’s nobody else really.
BUZHARDT: No, we have people in the Defense Intelligence Agency who know it did not go, but they don’t know who received the word.
NIXON: No, but they didn’t—when you say they know it, they heard that it did not go at the time?
BUZHARDT: That’s right. General [Richard] Stilwell was there with staff at the time—
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: —and he said it did not—it never went. They got the word. He doesn’t remember from precisely where.
NIXON: God. They must have made notes on that.
BUZHARDT: Whoever did the talking should have made notes.
NIXON: [unclear]
BUZHARDT: They are trying to find out.
NIXON: But, based on what we have up to this point. It seems to me that you are in a position to have—to give [unclear] talking points—
BUZHARDT: Yes.
NIXON: —so that he can—I mean [unclear] no link. No link.
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: My view is don’t—what I meant is simply say that—I mean put in the whole story that in 19—da-da-da-da—that there has been an issue within government going back to ’67. It was discussed in ’67. It was discussed again in 1968. In 1967, it was brought to the president’s attention. There was a unanimous recommendation for the policy. The president approved the policy. For two months—no, after two months—
BUZHARDT: We will run down the exact dates.
NIXON: After two months, the president approved the policy—was conveyed by Huston—I mean Haldeman. Let’s put it that way. The approval was conveyed by Haldeman to—
BUZHARDT: Huston.
NIXON: Huston. And Huston conveyed it to the agencies. Two days later, as a result of—I would then say then let’s give the bureau a brownie point, as a result of the objections of the FBI—that’s really what it was, wasn’t it?
BUZHARDT: It was. As to reconsideration.
NIXON: Yeah.
BUZHARDT: Because Hoover—because see he signed it originally.
NIXON: Yeah, and the result—
BUZHARDT: Changed their minds.
NIXON: And as a result eventually—and Mr. Hoover asked for reconsideration, and the policy was then—
BUZHARDT: The approval was withdrawn.
NIXON: The approval was—withdrawn.
BUZHARDT: Withdrawn.
NIXON: Approval withdrawn. And then the bottom line—no activities were undertaken under this policy. Not in accordance with law. Correct?
BUZHARDT: Right.
NIXON: No activities were undertaken under this policy. The point being that it basically, Fred, turns out to be, if you look at it, a study paper. What I mean by a policy paper that is developed in the government by the [unclear] where you go through and agonize and you come up with a paper and somebody signs it and then somebody bitched about it and then the goddamn thing doesn’t go through.
BUZHARDT: Yes, sir.
NIXON: And then nothing ever happens. Is that about a fair and accurate [unclear]?
BUZHARDT: That’s right. I would say almost the majority of papers we generate go that way.
NIXON: Right. Now, [unclear] handle that depends on how it is handled—
BUZHARDT: How it develops.
NIXON: —by others. But if you could get that kind of a paper to, for example—Schlesinger should have that. It seems to me, I don’t know, or do you think the best thing for you to do is get Schlesinger?
BUZHARDT: I think I can talk to Jim. I don’t think you should hand your paper around.
NIXON: Right. Okay.
BUZHARDT: Until the time comes to use it.
NIXON: Otherwise it will leak.
BUZHARDT: That’s true.
NIXON: Fine. You just tell Jim, “Jim, there is no worry. No sweat on this. Because it was a thing where,” and point out that the activation—it was true—was in NSA—
BUZHARDT: That’s true.
NIXON: It was—the activation.
BUZHARDT: No question.
NIXON: And that the result of Hoover’s objections—it was approved and then disapproved. We want him to know that that is the situation. And that’s that.
BUZHARDT: Right.
“Reassure John though that I am taking total responsibility on this.”
May 20, 1973, 12:26 P.M.
Richard Nixon and Bob Haldeman
CAMP DAVID TELEPHONE
Although Haldeman was no longer a part of the administration, Nixon still spoke with him by telephone and sometimes saw him in person. On May 20 he called him to discuss the content of a formal statement that he planned to release on the subject of Watergate. While going over some of the points pertinent to the Huston Plan, Nixon insisted that he would protect Haldeman and Ehrlichman from indictment or the need to testify regarding some Watergate activities. It was a grand gesture, yet Haldeman didn’t seem impressed. The president was going to claim that some of the meetings and even the break-ins were critical to national security. Haldeman had heard that line of defense before, many times. Nonetheless, he still spoke with Nixon, which is more than Ehrlichman was willing to do, except on rare occasions.
HALDEMAN: Hello?
NIXON: Hi, Bob?
HALDEMAN: Morning.
NIXON: How was your church today? You didn’t get followed?
HALDEMAN: No, they got me at home before I went.
NIXON: I’ll be goddamned. [laughs] What did they get you there about?
HALDEMAN: They just wanted to ask about the CIA stuff, and the—I don’t know, whatever was in the news. I don’t pay much attention to questions because I don’t answer them, which is—
NIXON: Right. That’s good.
HALDEMAN: —the same thing—I did get a chance—they raised—I made my usual pitch about, you know, that I am cooperating fully and that I know that when the truth is known there, this is going—
NIXON: Good.
HALDEMAN: —to get this all cleared up. And then they said something about, “Well, did the president know anything about the Helms meeting?” or something like that. I said, as I said before—“I am not going to comment on any specific questions. I can tell you flatly and categorically that the president had absolutely no knowledge or involvement in any kind of cover-up or anything else related to the Watergate in any way, shape, or form.”
NIXON: Good.
HALDEMAN: And I said, “I am sure that that will become totally clear, too—”
NIXON: Right.
HALDEMAN: “—as the facts are known.”
NIXON: The general statements are the best to make.
HALDEMAN: And I just left it at that. I am not going to get into—
NIXON: That’s right.
HALDEMAN: —the specifics at this point.
NIXON: Well, we will get into that. Look, I didn’t want to—I don’t want to hold you if you were just going to have lunch or something. You got about a couple of minutes?
HALDEMAN: Sure.
NIXON: I can go over three or four things and nail them down?
HALDEMAN: Sure.
NIXON: For what we are planning to do, first, with regard to the—I am planning, probably, to meet with the leaders, including bipartisan leaders, including the Armed Services Committee, and I am going to put out all of the national security kind of stuff—which, incidentally, is going to be very helpful, not so far from your standpoint but from John’s standpoint, because I am going to take the—say that I ordered the Plumbers operation, that I ordered the meeting. I am going to say that I directed that you and John meet with Helms and Walters for the purpose of seeing whether the CIA was involved, and so forth and so on. I think this is a good idea. Don’t you think so?
HALDEMAN: Absolutely. I think it is essential.
NIXON: Yeah. Well, you see the point is that—
HALDEMAN: That way you can clear your—
NIXON: It’s the truth and also—
HALDEMAN: Clear it then.
NIXON: And we put the issue out where it belongs. That you are goddamn right we had a meeting and so forth.
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: And so forth. The—you see, the only difficulty—well, the difficulty with the so-called Helms—I mean the memor—Walters’s memcons [memoranda of conversation] is—
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: —an indication that—that is the follow-up of Dean’s—
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: —you see, where he went and asked for cover. Because the implication there would be that you and John and of course then the president. That we set up this whole goddamn thing for the purpose of getting the CIA to put a cover on this and so forth. Which is not the truth.
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: And John flatly will testify to that effect, or has, I assume.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: I just want to be sure, you know, that we don’t put anything into this statement that is not—
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: —is going to be at all—
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: —contrary to what he says. But that you and John talked about it, you had your meeting, but the purpose of the meeting was the four things that you mentioned.
HALDEMAN: That’s right.
NIXON: Right. We’ll get that in, but I think that is a very good thing to do and we are working on that today.
HALDEMAN: Good.
NIXON: I am going to slap it to them hard and tell them why we did it.
HALDEMAN: Well, that is the only answer on this now is to—
NIXON: Go on the offensive.
HALDEMAN: —do it exactly that way.
NIXON: That’s right.
HALDEMAN: Because it is right.
NIXON: And the whole Plumbers operation I am going to take that. Also, I want you—I, deliberately, am only calling you, because I don’t want to talk to John—
HALDEMAN: Plus he is out of town. He is out in California.
NIXON: —and obviously I don’t want to talk to Colson but I want to talk to you because I think you can follow through better than anybody else. Tell John he need have no question. I will take sole—complete responsibility for putting a national security cover on this. Also, see I called Petersen on the eighteenth at John’s suggestion and told him, “Look, you can question Hunt about anything about Watergate but you must not get into national security matters.” And I have told Petersen that since.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: So—and that will stand up. If—I mean, because as Petersen says, well, “The important thing is that we did get the information out there before the trial was over.”
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: Also, he says the important thing is, as you told me on the phone, none of the information obtained in this so-called operation ever got to the prosecution.
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: Which is what John will also remember.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: But those recollections—
HALDEMAN: Well, that is all solid I am sure.
NIXON: Yep. Second point, on the famous Dean papers, you’ll be pleased to know, that we have got that nailed down on all four corners. [laughs]
HALDEMAN: Good.
NIXON: The order—the “go” order was issued by you. I mean, to—and carried out by Huston on one day, and then twenty-four—forty-eight hours later a “no” order was issued.
HALDEMAN: Mm-hmm.
NIXON: And everybody—and we have affidavits on that, and some have notes on it that they had the “no” order. The other point is that nothing whatever was done by any of the agencies involved.
HALDEMAN: That is what I thought.
NIXON: You know, what I mean is there were no break-ins. There were no—so forth and so on, even though that sort of thing was in the damn paper. But the main point is, as that—as far as we are concerned—you see, what happened here was that this thing, this paper took two months for them to write.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, I remember that.
NIXON: And then it came in to me and I had, you know, I said all right, fine, let’s go forward on it, you see. Let’s go forward. Then Hoover objected on two counts. And I, my recollection is that Mitchell probably called me, but I am not going to say that, because I don’t know what the hell Mitchell would say.
HALDEMAN: Yeah. I wouldn’t. Yeah.
NIXON: I don’t want to get him in it. But I am just going to say that because of his objections we therefore put a “no” order. But that sounds pretty good. Doesn’t it? I mean it is the truth.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: But you have nothing that—
HALDEMAN: I recall nothing that would in any way not go along—
NIXON: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: —with that, because—as I told Haig when he first told me about it—the only thing I could remember about it was that, everything I recall, was that nothing had been done.
NIXON: That’s correct.
HALDEMAN: I forgot why, but I knew Hoover—
NIXON: Well, we have had Buzhardt check the damn thing from A to Z and nothing was done. That we know. As far as we know. Now, of course some asshole may have done something we don’t know about.
HALDEMAN: But you are going to cover that though?
NIXON: Oh, hell yes.
HALDEMAN: That’s great. Because then you’ll be out ahead on—
NIXON: Yeah, and we’re going to put out the whole damn statement, too.
HALDEMAN: Good.
NIXON: Now, it’s a rough one. I mean, not rough on us so much but it’s rough in terms of these agencies recommending everything from surreptitious entries to bugging to everything else. But the point is—
HALDEMAN: But it was signed by all of them.
NIXON: They all recommended it.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: It was unanimous.
HALDEMAN: Well, that is good because that shows the tenor of the times—
NIXON: That’s right.
HALDEMAN: —and that needs to be done.
NIXON: It needs to be done, Bob. Also I will point out the Plumbers thing—why we did it. That we had massive leaks and that I had given—they had given orders to all departments to do everything that they could, and at the White House we developed a capability to do what we could there.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: And that everything that we did there was on that. Now on that point, just a couple of things to nail down. I want to be sure—because I don’t want to do a damn thing that would be at all harmful, or inconsistent with what you or John may have recalled, and therefore have testified to. I have no recollection of John ever telling me about the unsuccessful break-in, or whatever it was, until after—I mean until we got into the March period.
HALDEMAN: The psychiatrist?
NIXON: Yes, and I don’t know what his recollection is. Do you know?
HALDEMAN: That’s what I recall too, but I can check it with him.
NIXON: Just—well, if he is—the point is that he once said that he thought that I knew, and I don’t remember. I have no recollection of his coming in and saying, “Look, Krogh’s—or the group did this.” My—you know what I mean. See, John says that, you know, Krogh stood up like a man and took the blame for it—
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: —and said that Ehrlichman had done it, but I don’t remember, Bob—John ever telling me that “look, there was an unsuccessful break into a psychiatrist’s office and you should know it.” Will you nail that one down for me?
HALDEMAN: Sure.
NIXON: Because I don’t want to say it unless it is true.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: You know what I mean?
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: If I had to know, I had to know. But I—what I meant is, I don’t [laughs]—
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: —I don’t want John to get up and testify to the effect, “Well, I told the president something and then—”
HALDEMAN: Yeah. Okay.
NIXON: I don’t think he would, because I don’t think he did tell me, my point is.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: But he’s never discussed that with you? You have never been specific on that.
HALDEMAN: The only thing I can remember on it was simply that, you know, he didn’t know.
NIXON: No, I did—
HALDEMAN: He did at some point, because he knew about that picture [of Liddy and Hunt posing in front of Dr. Fielding’s office].
NIXON: Yeah, that was in March though, but—
HALDEMAN: Oh, was it? Okay.
NIXON: I mean, we heard about this damned picture, you know, and we heard about it from Dean.
HALDEMAN: Yeah. Yeah, because I didn’t know about that. You must have been told about that sometime when I wasn’t there. Because that came as a surprise to me later when—no one told me about it and I raised it, and you said yeah, you had heard about that.
NIXON: Heard about the picture? When did—?
HALDEMAN: Heard about it from John or somebody I think, or maybe from Justice.
NIXON: When did you raise that with me?
HALDEMAN: That would have been probably in April.
NIXON: I see. Well, get that nailed for me. You get the facts, and I don’t want it to go through too many hands here. If you could do it—and I could do it. The third point is that be sure to reassure John though that I am taking total responsibility on this. So that he can—see he has, very properly I think, told the grand jury that he will not testify with regard to national security matters. I have told Petersen that, too, on the Hunt thing. And I am saying that—you know what I mean. I am not backing off that one goddamn inch—
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: —and I shouldn’t. Don’t you agree?
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: That’s right. The third point is that—you have already told me, but I just want to be sure. That there is nothing that you have said, or anything—I was not told about the three fifty transaction until March is my recollection. And if you have testified to something else, I, of course—
HALDEMAN: I think at some point in March when this was coming—
NIXON: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: When Dean had told you about our—the concern that—
NIXON: He said, “Bob’s got a problem, and that’s the three fifty.”
HALDEMAN: Yeah, and I think I told you then.
NIXON: Yeah, yeah.
HALDEMAN: That yes, I can see why he would feel that.
NIXON: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: Because there was this question.
NIXON: Yeah, but they may have been after the twenty-first. They may have been part of the March 21 thing. It may have been earlier in March, but I—
HALDEMAN: It was in that period.
NIXON: But it was in that period.
HALDEMAN: I think it was probably later.
NIXON: But, whatever—or it might have even been March 21. The other point is the—that I need some recollection on the part of John, is on this issue of clemency. I have said, you know, that I—and Ziegler has said that I never authorized anyone to offer clemency. Now that is a flat statement and that is true. I never did. The question is that they said well, whether or not anyone ever discussed it with me. The only recollection I have of any discussion was—which John reminded me of—was on the beach in June or July just before we went over to there, and it was only for a minute. He said, “Looking down the road one of the problems that we are going to have is that I imagine”—he said, “I would imagine these fellows will want clemency.” And I said, “Well, we will have to face that when we come to it,” or words to that effect. I need to know whether he has—is going—has—
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: —all I need to know is this: whether I just want him to—
HALDEMAN: Because that’s a correct recollection.
NIXON: Here’s—no, the main point is this. Dean had made this preposterous statement to the effect that they had talked about clemency, and that John Ehrlichman had walked into the Oval Office and then came back and said that you can offer clemency but don’t be too specific. The president says so.
HALDEMAN: John totally denies that.
NIXON: Does he deny that?
HALDEMAN: Yes.
NIXON: Well, the point is—the other point is whether or not we discussed it and so forth.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: As far as the meeting with Colson, as I told you about that because that came in when he just mentioned it again tangentially—he said about Hunt. Only Hunt. He didn’t mention the others, but Hunt—and Hunt’s wife having been killed in an accident. And I said, well, that was a factor that certainly could be considered, you know, but that would have to be considered, you know, at the time—but this was not the time. Colson now, I think, backs that a hundred percent. I don’t know. You don’t know either?
HALDEMAN: I don’t know.
NIXON: Well, don’t you bother with that. I’ll handle that.
HALDEMAN: I can’t because—
NIXON: No, no, no.
HALDEMAN: —I have to stay clear of him.
NIXON: No, no, no. Stay clear of that. Fine.
HALDEMAN: But I think you are right.
NIXON: Yeah.
NIXON: I am going to lay it all out there.
HALDEMAN: Well, I think that will—
NIXON: On the national security thing, I am going to defend the bugging. I am going to defend the bugging. I am going to defend the Plumbers. I am going to defend—not only am I going to defend it I am going to say why we did it. And I am going to say why we tried to keep it out of the Watergate—
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: —and that was that.
HALDEMAN: Yep.
NIXON: But these other questions are questions on Watergate that, you know—
HALDEMAN: Henry [Kissinger] has got to have a positive attitude on all this, too.
NIXON: Henry?
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: Oh, he will!
HALDEMAN: And they’re are trying to make him out as being so deeply concerned about the morality of this and all that, and that is a lot of baloney. And he has got to get off of that and get on to the thing—
NIXON: Well, Haig is—
HALDEMAN: —that was the question of leaking the stuff out.
NIXON: Haig is being—going to be very tough with him when he gets back.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
NIXON: If Henry wants to be—to talk about morality, I mean, we have him nailed six ways to one.
HALDEMAN: Right.
NIXON: Because, you remember, Bob—
HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah.
NIXON: —who the hell was pushing for this stuff?
HALDEMAN: Absolutely.
NIXON: Who was squealing the most about the leaks? You know, about these NSSMs, the mems—the NSSMs and so forth. I didn’t give a shit about the NSSMs.
HALDEMAN: But he was right.
NIXON: I know. I know he was right.
HALDEMAN: He was right about squealing about them.
NIXON: I know. What I meant is though that he can’t say now that whether or not it was moral or immoral to bug these goddamn people. How else are you going to get the leaks? And that is what we were trying to do—
HALDEMAN: Yep.
“They threw their arms around me, kissed me, had pictures taken. It was the damnedest thing I ever saw.”
May 25, 1973, 12:58 A.M.
Richard Nixon and Alexander Haig
WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE
The evening of May 24, 1973, saw the largest dinner ever held at the White House, before or since: a welcome-home celebration for six hundred Vietnam War prisoners of war and their families. It was so large that a special tent had to be erected on the South Lawn. After the festivities finally wound down in the wee hours of the next morning, Chief of Staff Al Haig called Nixon to tell him, “I don’t think the White House has ever had a greater evening, sir. I just think it was outstanding.”
NIXON: Hello, Al.
HAIG: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
NIXON: Oh, well—you saw the show?
HAIG: I don’t think the White House has ever had a greater evening, sir. I just think it was outstanding.
NIXON: Ziegler wouldn’t see this, but my daughters did. They said that they have never seen the press so furious and frustrated. See, you know what I did? I went around tabletops and shook hands with these people and so forth, and my God they were just moved beyond belief, you know? And how did you like when they said—when I said, “By God, I was so proud of those guys that went in with those B-52s [during the Christmas 1972 bombing].”
HAIG: Well, I tell you, sir. I don’t think the White House ever had a night like it had tonight.
NIXON: Do you think it will do any good?
HAIG: These guys, of course they know exactly what it was that did it. Everyone I talked to said that the December bombing is what got them home.
NIXON: Yeah.
HAIG: Every one of them. Of course, having seen the [unclear] news, the demonstrations. My God, the press is just—they really are just reeling from it.
NIXON: Well, what’s Henry [Kissinger] doing [unclear]?
HAIG: He was very moved. I walked back with him from the [unclear] and he said he has never been so moved in his life. He said these were the greatest people, and he—he wants to fight. He said, “Boy, I tell you it is time to take all these monkeys on.” He is a very good fellow, sir. I think he said something tonight—
NIXON: If he—he doesn’t know it though. If I take them on, it will be a fight to the death. It will probably kill me, but by God if I do I am going to kick their ass around the block. I really am, because we cannot allow this crap about Watergate and all the cover-up and the rest destroy the greatest foreign policy this country has ever had. And good God, wasn’t Jimmy Stewart nice? And ol’ John Wayne, you know? He says just, “Thank you, boss. Not just for something, but for everything.”
HAIG: Well, it just—I just—I tell you I was so proud tonight. It made everything, all the fighting we have done worthwhile to see what it accomplished. And by God, sir, it just makes you want to stand up and take these monkeys on, as we are doing, and we’re going to wipe them out.
NIXON: Well, of all this crap, good God, you know, what they are really trying to do is tell the—I was telling [unclear] and Julie [Nixon Eisenhower]—I can now see it so clear—the Democrats are basically just trying to destroy the president because they realize that that will destroy the Republican Party, and they don’t give a damn about what happens in the world. You know, the thing about my speech today, which Henry wouldn’t understand because he thinks in more sophisticated ways, but I was really saying, “Look, fellows, we got where we are by being strong and respected and now there is the chance, the greatest chance in the world, to go forth and do more. Now goddamn it, let’s do it!” That is what the goddamn New York Times and the Washington Post ought to be writing.
HAIG: Exactly.
NIXON: Yeah.
HAIG: Well, they never will, but it doesn’t make any difference because they are not with the country and the country isn’t with them. You saw the country out there tonight with those fine young men.
NIXON: Well, I am not sure. There is a part of the country that is grateful to me to bring them back.
HAIG: Well, just [unclear]—
NIXON: Well, you should have seen the women, and of course I met all the men. My God, I table-hopped because I wanted to be sure that the people didn’t feel they were out—my God, Negro girls and others. Good God, they threw their arms around me, kissed me, had pictures taken. It was the damnedest thing I ever saw.
HAIG: I think it is the greatest night the White House has ever had. I really do.
NIXON: They tell me though that the press girls—you know, [UPI journalist] Helen Thomas they said was utterly furious.
HAIG: Yeah. [laughs]
NIXON: So what do you do about that?
HAIG: No, well, I am not so sure. They were down to their knees with their long faces, they just can’t cope with it. What they saw there was real, true—
NIXON: But coming right down to it, Al, you look at it and all this crap they’re taking, and the Congress being Democratic and the Republicans being weak and all the rest. Wouldn’t it really be better for the country to just check out and—
HAIG: [laughs]
NIXON: —and—no, seriously, I mean that because I—you see, I am not at my best. I have got to be at my best and that means fighting this damn battle, fighting it all out. And I can’t fight the damn battle, you know, with people coming in with their little tidbits, and their rumors, and all that crap, and “Did the president,” you know, “make a deal?” You know, “to pay off this one or that” and the other thing?
HAIG: I tell you, sir, if you ever even conceived of leaving [unclear], think about what it would have done to those people who were there tonight.
NIXON: Yeah, but they are such a small group, Al.
HAIG: No, sir, they are not. Not at all. I saw two groups, one at noon today, last night, and I tell you it is just not so. They are all with us, and they are with you. It would be the greatest shock the country ever had.
“This is a great moment to have this guy in here.”
May 30, 1973, 9:15 A.M.
Richard Nixon, Huang Zhen, Chi Chao-chu (interpreter), and Henry Kissinger
OVAL OFFICE
Like Nixon’s selection of a senior official—David Bruce—for the assignment to Beijing, Huang Zhen was no ordinary ambassador assigned to Washington. Huang was the senior overseas Chinese diplomat, the first PRC ambassador to Paris, and a former deputy foreign affairs minister. His loyalty to Chairman Mao went back to the Long March in the 1930s, and he was among the original cadre of officials who helped to form the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Huang was also the first PRC official to step foot into the Oval Office, here in a conversation in which Nixon reassured him that the upcoming agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would not be detrimental to China. Nixon also emphasized the importance of working toward a supplementary Southeast Asian peace agreement that included Cambodia and Laos.
KISSINGER: There are two things—two points you might make, [unclear].
NIXON: Oh, yes.
KISSINGER: Cambodia.
NIXON: Two: Soviets.
KISSINGER: Two: Saying that you want to give him an understanding which repeats what I’ve already said, that we will do nothing—
NIXON: That would be detrimental to their interests. Yep.
KISSINGER: Right. And I offered to them yesterday that you’re willing to formalize that. They’ll make a consultation between you [unclear].
NIXON: Well, I’ll write a letter.
KISSINGER: I know, but then—that you—an agreement that we will not do anything with a third country directed at—involving their—
NIXON: [unclear] He’ll know. He’s been through it. I suppose he’s very [unclear]. This is a great moment to have this guy in here.
KISSINGER: I hope you have a press picture.
NIXON: Don’t worry! I ordered it. But the Chinese journalist thing was a good thing, too, you know?
KISSINGER: It played well in—
NIXON: [unclear] a little history thing like that. Everything with China touches a sensitive nerve. You know, the idea of saying, “Well, I might be there in the spring,” and that “this is the most significant thing we’ve done,” and all that. I believe that it was! People will think [unclear]. You know, you’re worried—you’re concerned about the press meddling on you on this [Watergate]. Listen, they won’t even remember who the hell did the bugging. Incidentally, a study is now being made in the Justice Department. We’re going to find—I’m going to—I’ve decided that we have to publicly prove [Mc]George Bundy is a liar.
KISSINGER: Good.
NIXON: And—
KISSINGER: Good.
NIXON: Edgar Hoover told me that he bugged twice as much for Bobby Kennedy as he did for Johnson or for me.
KISSINGER: That’s what I was told.
NIXON: Hell yes!
KISSINGER: I was here when—
NIXON: Joe Alsop told me that—told me that!
KISSINGER: And I was here when Hoover told you that! Now this fellow [Huang Zhen] is a member of the Central Committee, the only ambassador to be—
NIXON: Yeah.
[HUANG ZHEN, CHI CHAO-CHU, RONALD ZIEGLER, and members of the press join the conversation.]
NIXON: Come on in. Hello! Come on in. Well, good morning! How are you, my friend?
HUANG [through interpreter]: The ambassador is very much happy to be able to meet Mr. President in the White House today and he would express his respect for you and this special honor.
NIXON: Why don’t we have pictures of the two of us over here? We’ll send a copy of this to [unclear]. Just sit here for the press pictures. You don’t have to look up. Right there.
[ZIEGLER gives instructions to members of the press, who take numerous photographs.]
[Unclear exchange]
NIXON: We were very appreciative of the welcome you gave to Ambassador Bruce. The crew worked all night. Ambassador Bruce is more accomplished than any ambassador in the history of America. Before he left, he said he thought that this [the assignment to Beijing] was the whole peak of his career.
HUANG: Well, we are all grateful from all of our [unclear]. And for [unclear] you have provided for our group [unclear]. And the possibility [unclear] some of our work [unclear].
PRESS: Thank you.
NIXON [to the press]: I wish you could stay a while, but we have to talk a little about substantive matters for the next [unclear]! [laughs] You’re all welcome.
[ZIEGLER and members of the press leave the conversation.]
[Unclear exchange]
NIXON: I said yesterday to the press from China that I hoped to go again, in the spring. I didn’t say—while I was president—you could say—which spring? But I would love to go back.
HUANG: This is very good news indeed. In fact, our [unclear].
[Refreshments are served.]
HUANG: As the ambassador told Dr. Kissinger yesterday, we would like to thank Mr. President for your very frank reception for press delegation. When we talked with them, they told us [unclear] and to also [unclear]. And the ambassador might avail himself [unclear] to make to Mr. President, the greetings of Chairman Mao Zedong, his wife, Madame Jiang Qing, our Premier Zhou Enlai, his wife, Madame Deng Yingchao, to you personally and Mrs. Nixon.
NIXON: Would you extend my best wishes from Mrs. Nixon and me to them?
HUANG: And also, the ambassador also says the chairman and the premier have both read your letter to them dated the fifteenth of March.
NIXON: After Kissinger’s visit?
HUANG: That’s right.
NIXON: Well, since we have such a short time, and also since I know that we—that you are a member of the Central Committee—that you direct—with regard to some messages I would like for you to pass directly to, on substance, to the chairman and, of course, to Premier Zhou Enlai. First, Dr. Kissinger had some very sensitive talks with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai with regard to U.S. relations, particularly insofar as those relations might involve the actions of a third party. The statements that Dr. Kissinger made, and that I confirmed in my letter, are statements that were not made off the cuff. They represent a considered position that this government, at least as far as I represent it—that they represent a commitment on our part regarding this policy. If Premier Zhou, and Chairman Mao, approve, I would welcome the opportunity for the ambassador, Dr. Kissinger, and myself to work towards a more formal understanding on these points. However, I wish to emphasize that a formal understanding is not necessary in terms of the commitment. The commitment is made. The ambassador does not know me well, but most people who do know me well know that, really, when I make a personal commitment it is solid. Let me put it in terms of U.S. self-interest. I believe the self-interest of the United States requires good relations between the government of the People’s Republic and the government of the United States. I also believe the self-interest of the United States requires the People’s Republic remain an independent, strong nation, without having its sovereignty in any way threatened by its neighbors. It will be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, as long as I am in this office, to see that actions are taken which will help to guarantee that a strong, independent PRC—which I would like to say that those actions are being taken because of the good personal relations that I have with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. But let me be quite candid. Those actions are taken because I believe they serve the interests of the United States. I also believe they serve the interests of the PRC. And that’s why we’re together. Now, there is a meeting coming up with Brezhnev. It’s a very important meeting. We’re going to try to get a limitation on nuclear arms. We’ll be working towards other matters. When I say a limitation—just an extension of what we had previously is very hard. There will be—
KISSINGER: The [unclear] Russian here so that he could greet Brezhnev! [laughs]
[Unclear exchange]
NIXON: The important thing that I want the ambassador to convey to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai is this: we’re going to have eight days of conversations. We will make some agreements about trade and some other important matters. But I can make a commitment that nothing will be agreed to between the United States and—at this point nothing will be agreed to—that is [to unknown assistant who enters: “I’ll let you know when I’m ready—I will be delayed—I’ll let you know when I’m ready”]—that in any way—that in any way would be detrimental to the PRC. I want to—I asked Dr. Kissinger to talk directly to the ambassador to fill him in on these talks. He is—I do not need to impress upon the ambassador the need for confidentiality. We have found, incidentally—
KISSINGER: [unclear]
NIXON: We find that in terms of our friends in the PRC, Henry, that they’re the best people we know at keeping a secret. The other point I wish to relate to the ambassador relates to the talks we have had with Le Duc Tho on the Southeast Asia situation. The peace agreement removes a major irritant in our relations, something we—that Premier Zhou Enlai and I had to talk about a great deal in Beijing, February last year. There is one outstanding problem, as the ambassador knows. That is Cambodia. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance that we place on trying to get a peace agreement or a cease-fire in Cambodia such as we hope to have in Laos. Here, China plays a very important role. It would be a tragedy of our time, and it would be a tragedy in this new year of our relationship if we allow the Cambodian situation to be the cause of a flare-up of hostilities throughout Indochina. Let me emphasize for the ambassador, we are not committed to any one man in Cambodia, in any form of government, to any one government. What we want is a government that will bring peace to that troubled country. But it cannot be peace if it comes at the point of a gun. On either side. There are warring elements there that must learn to live together. They must be, basically, a coalition. Then, over a period of time, the people of Cambodia will determine which part of the coalition is the best for their future. In the meantime, I would greatly appreciate it if the ambassador would convey to—show that Dr. Kissinger and I—Dr. Kissinger [unclear] should have the highest priority attempting to implement a—or not implement, unfortunately—to work out a—some sort of peace agreement in Cambodia. I have talked too much, but I had these things on my mind. And I knew that the ambassador was quite aware of the issues, but if he [unclear] these messages I would appreciate it. And on our part, the ambassador can be sure that anytime he has anything that he needs to pass to me—no need to come in. He can give it to Dr. Kissinger—the secret channel—at that direction, however—anything that is really confidential, rather than putting it on diplomatic channels—
KISSINGER: [unclear]
NIXON: —diplomatic channels.
HUANG: I am very grateful to you, Mr. President, for seeing me at this present time. I will do right away what the president has asked me to do. At the same time, the ambassador will give a report of the messages the president has just said, for Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. In my work, I look forward to the support and help from you, Mr. President, and the support and help of Dr. Kissinger. [unclear]
NIXON: Well, I will say that when we—I would say that when we finish this meeting [unclear] with Brezhnev, when I talk to the ambassador again I will give him a personal report—again, for his convenience.