Arsènal

Arsène Wenger’s most successful spell to date at Arsenal occurred between the 2001/02 and 2004/05 seasons, when the club landed five major trophies in four years. The pinnacle was the Premiership campaign of 2003/04 when the team accomplished the feat of going through the entire league programme without incurring a single defeat, a phenomenal feat that had only been achieved once before in England – by Preston North End in the 19th century, and they only played 22 matches compared to Arsenal’s 38.

Within the ‘Invincibles’, there were contributors from his 1997/98 team – Patrick Vieira, Dennis Bergkamp, Ray Parlour and (albeit in more of a supporting role) Martin Keown – but for the most part a new team had been constructed largely with the chequebook, although there was no profligacy on the manager’s part. In Wenger’s first nine seasons at the club, the haul of titles and FA Cups was accum ulated for a deficit of around £44 million (£136 million being the total spend). That he was able to attain such value for money was due to his knack of realising a high return on players whose reputations had been enhanced by his tutelage. Most notably, Nicolas Anelka (£23 million) and Marc Overmars (£25 million) brought in colossal sums from Real Madrid and Barcelona respectively, accounting for over half of the income received through transfer sales in that period. The profit from such deals enabled the club to establish itself as a major force in Europe without spending the huge amounts other teams did. If one definition of a great manager is someone who makes fewer mistakes in acquiring players, then coupled with his ability to develop youngsters, Wenger’s shrewdness in the transfer market places him in this rarefied category. Moreover, his sense of timing of when to release a star has usually been spot on. Although he would not have chosen to sell Anelka, to secure Thierry Henry as a replacement for less than a third of the fee received from Real Madrid, was a masterstroke (and the remainder underwrote the construction of the sumptuous new training centre at London Colney, jokingly referred to as the ‘Nicolas Anelka training ground’ by former goalkeeping coach Bob Wilson). On the other hand, there is no argument that Wenger got the best years out of Overmars – his subsequent seasons were littered with injuries, with an enforced retirement four years after leaving Highbury, as well as turning a profit of over £18 million on the sale.

Later, anticipating a drop in their contribution, Wenger began to break up the Invincibles, with Patrick Vieira departing for £13.7 million in 2005 and Thierry Henry bidding adieu two years on for the £16.1 million paid by Barcelona. Aside from making way for younger replacements, both have subsequently missed a notable amount of playing time due to the ravages of injury. In hindsight, Wenger did well to get what he did, even if at the time some fans felt he was being short-changed, such was the contribution Vieira and Henry had made. Yet even if the supporters were sad to see their heroes move on, Wenger is ruthless when the welfare of the group is at stake, invariably being proved correct, as both the cast-aside apprentice and experienced international would reluctantly admit (though some individuals who went onto better things, such as Jermaine Pennant, David Bentley or Lassana Diarra, might argue that Wenger acted too expediently).

And so it was from the transfer fees received, together with the revenue from the Champions League, that Wenger constructed his ‘second’ team. The summer of 2000 saw some significant spending, as did the following close season. A characteristic of the majority of the new arrivals (includ ing Robert Pires, Lauren and Sylvain Wiltord) was their unfamiliarity with the English game. Indeed, against Crystal Palace on Valentine’s Day 2005, for the first time ever in a Premiership match, a 16-man squad totally devoid of any British players was named.

However, it wasn’t all bad news for English patriots. Ashley Cole and Sol Campbell were not selected against Palace due to illness and injury respectively, and in building a new back line to succeed his inherited defence, both England internationals were key components. Whilst Cole improbably came through the ranks, Campbell had been acquired on a free transfer (personally profiting from a remunerative signing-on fee as Tottenham had foolishly allowed his contract to expire). However, two other arrivals showed that for all his acumen in the transfer market, Wenger was prone to error. Goalkeeper Richard Wright arrived from Ipswich to challenge for David Seaman’s position and was selected enough times to gain a Premiership winner’s medal, yet, having played in every match of the FA Cup, was dropped for the final in favour of still first choice Seaman. No one would have predicted Wright’s leaving before the older keeper, but after just one season he was offered to Everton for a loss of £2.5 million. Another notable flop was Francis Jeffers, a striker who cost £8 million but failed abysmally to justify the outlay, eventually moving on at a loss of over £5 million, having played a few games with a negligible return in the goals scored column. Wenger would wait almost five years before he invested substantially in another Englishman, teenager Theo Walcott.

However, the transfer failures are mere footnotes to a rich history of coups. Henry and Pires were joined in the hall of fame by Freddie Ljungberg, Lauren, Gilberto and Kolo Toure, forming a squad with the likes of Kanu, Sylvain Wiltord and Edu in reserve producing a depth in quality unmatched in Wenger’s time at the club. There was no issue with a panoply of foreign stars as the trophies were being collected in ever-increasing number. As the old guard moved on, the newcomers gelled and a relatively seamless transition took place as this new group unveiled performances that had the likes of the Dutch maestro Johan Cruyff drooling over them: “I watch Arsenal all the time and I admire their style. If they win playing football the way only they know how then Europe would be proud to have such champions.”

The period was highlighted by the securing of two league records. Firstly, they put together a sequence of 23 away matches without suffering a defeat (in tandem with being unbeaten at home after December 2001) that effectively ensured the 2001/02 title. The run was ended in October 2002 by a late winner from a 16-year-old Everton substitute called Wayne Rooney. However, Wenger’s men surpassed even this exploit by remaining unbeaten home and away for 49 games, beginning in May 2003 and continuing for 17 months until October 2004 when once again Arsenal’s nemesis proved to be Rooney (now a Manchester United player). He scored the second goal, as well as earning a contentious penalty for the first in the 2–0 league defeat at Old Trafford. After both setbacks, the team took time to recover, dropping points that would ultimately cost them their chance of retaining the league titles secured in putting the runs together.

In 2002, the Everton defeat bequeathed a series of four losses in eight league outings. As Arsenal only lost six times over the course of the entire campaign, finishing five points behind champions Manchester United, it was a lethal slump. Similarly, two years on, 12 points were then dropped from 18 available after starting the season like a runaway train, continuing their invincibility of the previous campaign. The steady stream of missed opportunities allowed the free-spending Chelsea to overtake them and become the dominant team in England, with Arsenal again finishing runners-up.

In both seasons, as defending champions, it seemed a case of picking up where they had left off before the summer break. A 4–1 humbling of Leeds at Elland Road early in the 2002/03 season elicited fulsome praise from fans, media, pundits and even opponents. Wenger described his team as “danger everywhere, tremendous spirit, a privilege to watch. It was total football.” “It was demoralising. They just pass and move, pass and move. You find yourself working for nothing,” said Olivier Dacourt of Leeds. “They are better than the Manchester United team who won the treble and they are even better than Real Madrid. I’m sure Arsenal would beat them.” As Real were at the time the Champions League-winning self-styled ‘Galacticos’ featuring Zinedine Zidane, Ronaldo, Luis Figo and Raúl amongst others, it was certainly a rare accolade from a vanquished foe.

The sense of a supreme side at the peak of its powers was such that the media – with its collective tongue firmly planted in its cheek – asked Wenger whether it would be possible for the team to go unbeaten for an entire season. “It will be difficult but we can do it,” was the unexpected reply. “It was done by Milan and I can’t see why we cannot do it this season. Other teams think exactly the same but they don’t say it because they’re scared of looking ridiculous.” Or indeed setting themselves up for a large dose of hubris, although Wenger had the last laugh when his team did actually achieve the feat in May 2004. Recalling the scenario some years later, he said, “When you win and [then] you have lost a game you think, ‘Maybe we could have done better there.’ But when you do not lose any games you do not have those questions. We lost the title in 2003 but we had done the double the year before. I asked the players after the summer break what had gone wrong. They said, ‘It’s because of you, Boss.’ I said, ‘Yes, OK, but why do you really think you lost.’ They said again, ‘No, Boss, it was because of you. You put so much pressure on us by saying we would go the whole season unbeaten.’ I said to them, ‘All right then, but I’m going to say it again. You can go through the whole season without losing. I believe in you.’ Normally when you win the title the team loses the next match. It happens every year. But that year [2004] we had won the title with some games to go and when we played as champions they made sure they did not lose. It meant the seed had been planted in their minds. It took a while to come but in the end they achieved what they didn’t think was possible.”

“I think in that period when we were going on the pitch, we knew that we were going to win the game,” recalls Patrick Vieira. “I think Arsène created at this moment the belief that we were the best and even when we were 1–0 or 2–0 down we knew that we were going to win the game or take a point. So we really believed that we were the best. The way we were playing, the way we believed in each other was unbelievable.”

Yet the backlash after the long unbeaten runs were brusquely terminated raised the question of how a group so seemingly resolute and unconquerable can suddenly fall away in such an alarming fashion merely because they lose a game. Certainly Arsène Wenger has a case to answer. Perhaps the reason lies in the coaching or rather the lack of it. The focus is on maximising ability, improving skills, developing into better technicians. “He makes an average player into a good player, a good player into a very good player and a very good player into a world-class player,” according to David Dein, but he doesn’t specifically teach them how to win. As a result of enhancing the attributes Wenger holds dear – pace, power, skill, creative thinking and desire – victory should be the natural consequence, the end product. And with such productive end results winning has become accepted as the norm. Losing is not contemplated and therefore everyone – players and coaches alike – are dumbfounded when it happens. The ‘unbelievable belief’ coined by Paul Merson has a flip side when the faith is punctured. There seems no fallback position from which to regroup. A collective trauma invades the group. It is as if they have forgotten how to lose, or at least how to react positively to defeat, so unexpected is it.

Wenger may be a master manager, but it seems that he has no solutions when the unthinkable happens, no way of countering the doubt when infallibility is disproved. His words may sound re-assuring (“I think you will be surprised by my team’s reaction. They will react strongly on Tuesday,” he said after the Everton defeat in October 2002, only to see his side lose at home to Auxerre in the Champions League) but they seem full of self-delusion, at least if the response of the players is anything to go by. Bizarrely, given his teams endure so few setbacks, they are tarnished with an Achilles’ heel of mental fragility, which is often brought up by Alex Ferguson, implying that he doesn’t suffer from the same chronic condition. Could it be that a more pragmatic manager might have actually restored equilibrium more quickly in the autumns of 2002 and 2004 and provided a very talented group with the strength of purpose to go on and win League Championships rather than FA Cups the following May? In response, Wenger might justifiably argue that a more pragmatic manager might not be able to create a team that could go unvanquished for so long in the first place. However, for supporters and manager alike it’s difficult to close the book on the ones that got away.

Wenger himself admits, “I am very critical with myself. I believe as well when you do not lose for 49 games it’s such a long period, when you keep always the team under tension. When you get there and suddenly you lose the game you start here again and you say to your players and they think, 49 games, we will never make that again. And you have to tell them, ‘Now my friends, we climb back there again and you do 50.’ And they say, ‘Come on, give us a breather a little bit, we just did 49 games.’ So what I mean is defeat is very difficult to take. When I was very young it was very difficult to take because it was such a big disappointment. And then you hate so much to lose. When you are more experienced, you anticipate all the problems and the difficulties you will face because you know the consequences. You can anticipate the confidence will go down, the motivation goes down, the understanding in the team will be less good, less spontaneous and you have to respond to all that. The longer the period goes the more difficult it is to act as if nothing has happened. It depends as well on the cycle of the team. If the cycle of the team goes to an end and they have done that 49 games and they lose, sub consciously they think, we have done our best. If it’s a young team, the next game, they go again.”

In 2002/03, while Wenger was awaiting to discover the final component of his new back four (Kolo Toure would solve the missing link), the team seemed bereft of the figure of calmness and authority conspicuous by its absence since Tony Adams retired. Martin Keown was in the twilight of his career and Pascal Cygan, brought from Lille, had proved disappointingly inconsistent. With their own high standards slipping both David Seaman and Sol Campbell were looking increasingly vulnerable. The late, late strike by Rooney for Everton had established an unfortunate precedent. Away to Liverpool, Newcastle, Aston Villa and Bolton, leads were lost and points sacrificed. Even at Highbury, Manchester United perpetuated the pattern by coming from behind to gain a 2–2 draw. That game saw Sol Campbell dismissed with the consequence that he missed the run-in, including a home defeat to Leeds that confirmed the trophy presentation would take place at Manchester United’s next game. Such was the alarming loss of confidence in their ability to hold onto a lead that a fortnight after the title concession, the FA Cup Final against Southampton witnessed the unedifying sight of Robert Pires taking the ball to the corner flag in the closing stages to use up time. This was anything but total football. It was a sad reflection on the heights they had scaled earlier in the season but they realised that in the cold light of day they might end up empty-handed. Regardless of the manager’s philosophy, the players determined the entertainment was over. They were going to make sure that they had a tangible reward for their efforts.

The summer break and a productive 2003 pre-season got the show back on the road. Not only did the team rediscover its touch but it went on to post the record breaking 49-match unbeaten run and land another title in the process. “My ambition was always to go a whole season without losing,” said Wenger. For him and all purists the league reigns supreme. There is only one answer to the question of which is the best team – the league champions. The league is the only competition that represents the strength and depth of the domestic game. It is football in its purest, fairest form. Everybody plays everybody else, home and away; three points for a win, one for a draw and none for a defeat. There are no bonus points. Away goals are not worth more. There is no extra time, replays, penalty shoot-outs, golden or silver goals. So 2003/04 was the finest Arsenal season ever: played 38, won 26, drew 12, lost 0. It was arguably also the finest league season ever by an English club.

What made the exploit all the more remarkable was that it was accomplished by playing offensively. The team went out with a philosophy to subdue their opponents by skilful interplay. It was a heady mix of abilities that ensured the team could appear audacious, even wanton (Henry, Pires and Vieira even became known as the three musketeers) but crucially, the screening qualities of Gilberto in central midfield allowed his teammates to boldly go out on a limb and additionally he would often cover for a defender caught out of position if an attack did break down suddenly. He performed a similar role to the one he had carried out for Brazil in winning the 2002 World Cup, and had he not needed a period of assimilation, Arsenal could well have secured three league titles in a row. It may be no coincidence that on the two occasions Arsenal’s first choice selection lost to English opposition that season (Manchester United in the FA Cup and Chelsea in the Champions League) Gilberto was absent due to illness. His calm comportment compensated for the element of defensive composure the club had lost with the retirement of Tony Adams.

Thus the scene was set for some of the finest approach work, passing and movement that English supporters had ever set eyes upon as all and sundry were taken apart. Often the side were applauded off the field away from home by opposition fans who were knowledgeable enough to appreciate that they were witnessing something extra ordinary. A 5–1 sixth round FA Cup drubbing for Portsmouth drew a standing ovation from all four sides of Fratton Park. Such was the admiration and so many the plaudits that once they had secured the title, it felt as if thousands of non-Arsenal supporters (with certain obvious abstentions from Manchester and parts of London) were actually willing them to go on and finish unbowed. It was a rare time when exhibitions of such purity transcended the traditional parochial resentment that is endemic to football fans. After overhauling Nottingham Forest’s 42-match unbeaten run Brian Clough said, “Arsenal are nothing short of incredible.” And then, true to form, “They could have been nearly as good as us.” For good measure, he added that they “caress a football the way I dreamed of caressing Marilyn Monroe.” And although obviously biased, Dennis Bergkamp’s view, “This is the closest I have seen to the Dutch concept of total football” must be taken at face value. And such excellent notices were not restricted to England. “When I travel abroad,” said Wenger, “it made a major impact because people know how difficult it is to play a whole season unbeaten.” For football purists, it bettered the near perfection of Arsenal’s 1990/91 title in two respects. George Graham’s team suffered a single defeat in the 38 outings, and Wenger’s side were renowned more for what they did going forward than in defence. It was an irony then that, having secured their status as champions, they took their foot off the pedal and ended up with a goal less than Graham’s team, totalling 73 by the end of the season. However, when the Invincibles met their denouement, lightning struck again and a serious challenge for the title was not mounted until the team had been rebuilt.

There was undoubtedly a sense of injustice at the turn of events that saw the unbeaten run come to an end at Old Trafford on 24th October 2004, a venue where incidents often play a pivotal role in the outcome of Arsenal’s season. They justifiably felt hard done by due to Rooney’s penalty award (the key moment of the game, a late second goal being largely academic) and the perceived thuggery of their opponents. Weak refereeing allowed Gary Neville, Ruud van Nistelrooy (subsequently banned for three matches for a challenge missed by the referee) and Rio Ferdinand to make their presence felt in exchanges where the existence of a ball seemed incidental. The hostility was a hangover from the previous season’s encounter at the same venue, when the away team rounded on Van Nistelrooy at the final whistle, so perturbed were they by his theatrics and unsporting play in earning a last minute penalty which he subsequently missed. The FA determined though, by the fines and bans they handed out to Arsenal personnel, that United were more sinned against than sinners.

With their unbeaten run ended, once inside the tunnel the Arsenal players let their opponents know how unfairly they felt they had been treated, resulting in an argument between the two managers. Ferguson, at the door of the visitors’ dressing room told Wenger to control his players, before some post-match refreshment was thrown at the United manager, although precisely what it was is dependent on which tabloid version of events that became known as ‘Soupgate’ and ‘Pizzagate’ is to be believed. What is in no doubt is that such was the extent of the melee, United’s security staff had to separate representatives of the two clubs. Wenger probably felt that he had been stitched up by his bête noire so there was never any likelihood of him admitting that maybe there should be some internal self-questioning and recrimination. Unfortunately, this holier-than-thou position ceded the moral argument to Ferguson, who was able to claim with some justification, his own reputation as a bad loser notwithstanding, “To not apologise for the behaviour of [his] players is unthinkable. It’s a disgrace. But I don’t expect him ever to apologise.” The hubbub aside, most critically, Arsenal failed to just accept that they had been the victims of poor refereeing and downright unlucky, and move on. Rather, a team that (as two years before) was lauded as one of the best ever club sides the world had ever seen, allowed the incident to undermine them and a more resilient Chelsea to take the initiative and establish a convincing lead in the title contest.

The players take their cue from the manager. Arsène Wenger is a modest, self-effacing philosopher who finds it easy enough to move on from triumph, never resting on his laurels or enjoying his success. “With your club it is a love story that you expect will last forever and also accept that you could leave tomorrow,” he reflects. Which is perhaps why he agonises over defeats, running over in his mind the factors that produced the unexpected. But he doesn’t roll with the punches. Recovery takes too long, and his team seems to follow his lead. Although aware of the dangers – “the face of the manager,” he admits, “is a mirror to the health of his team” – too much time and energy are expended on self-pity. Even the Invincibles’ season was nearly halted in its tracks after elimination from the FA Cup and the Champions League in the space of four days. In their subsequent league fixture at home to Liverpool, they found themselves 2–1 down at the interval. It took what was arguably Thierry Henry’s finest performance in an Arsenal shirt to turn the game around and get the quest for the Premiership back on track with a 4–2 victory.

The defence that season was improved by two changes, addressing the salient weaknesses that allowed the 2002/03 title to slip away. German international Jens Lehmann replaced the fading Seaman, whilst Kolo Toure, previously a utility player who had featured at both full-back positions as well as in midfield, was moved to partner Sol Campbell in the centre of the defence. His versatility endeared him to the manager – “I think about him as a centre back or right back, but sometimes I think this guy could make a centre forward. When he plays closer to the goal – in midfield or up front – he always creates chances and it’s too tempting when I think about it.” Given the importance to Wenger of keeping possession and ability on the ball – not least in defence – it is no coincidence that both Lauren and Ashley Cole played the earlier part of their careers further forward before being converted to full backs. Compared with Lee Dixon and Nigel Winterburn, the pair gave the team a great deal more threat going forward, even if defensively, they were not as tenacious as their predecessors, although Cole did improve to such an extent that he was eventually touted as one of the outstanding left backs in world football. Tony Banfield reveals “Technique and body shape are critical in all positions for Arsène. He wants full backs who can defend and when they go forward cross the ball like a winger. He doesn’t just put people in boxes.” It is Wenger’s way to envisage how changing positions can lead to optimum performance. Other examples are Thierry Henry, a winger converted to a centre forward, Emmanuel Petit, a centre back moved to midfield and Freddie Ljungberg switched from a striker to wide midfield. The only downside is that the prioritisation of possession, with seemingly suicidal passes made within the team’s own penalty area, can see some moments that frighten the living daylights out of fans who would sometimes prefer to see the ball hoofed to safety à la George Graham’s men of old. Fortunately the current crop are adept enough not to get caught out too often.

Perhaps then, Wenger’s Arsenal should have performed better than they have in their ten consecutive Champions League campaigns. The first two (1998/99 and 1999/2000) were effectively sacrificed by the decision to play their home matches at Wembley. The sell-out crowds confirmed Arsenal had outgrown their Highbury home, but the neutral venue didn’t faze, and in some cases may even have inspired, oppon ents and they did not survive the group stage (although at least on the second occasion, their third place led to UEFA Cup involvement and the opportunity for Highbury to host European nights once again as the team progressed to the final and defeat on penalties to Galatasaray).

The unfamiliarity of the larger stadium and its bigger pitch dimensions counted against the ‘home’ side. Wembley undoubtedly held back the team’s progress on the European platform, not least in upsetting the manager’s well-honed pre-match routine, developed to maximise the players’ focus on the job in hand and minimise extraneous distractions. Attention to detail went as far as ensuring adult movies were out of bounds (the night before a game, home or away, Premiership or Champions League, is spent at a hotel). “Films can be distracting,” Wenger believes. “I feel that once you are together you want your players to focus on the game, not on anything else.” Of the porn ban, he recalls, “I said we don’t do that and that was it, nobody said a word. I could control that, but now, if players come with a computer and want to take a porn film you cannot control it any more. Things change. Before they only had the television in the hotel.”

At the time of the decision to use Wembley, Wenger had been in the job less than two years and did not wield the power he has since appropriated. For some time now he has done it his way. Particular care is taken with the peculiar circumstances of European competition. Home or away, the routine is the same. The players train at London Colney the day before a match and spend that night in a hotel before making their way to the stadium after their pre-match meal – consumed precisely three hours before kick-off – by coach. Even for away trips, the only variation is the length of the flight involved (travelling is a necessary evil and even domestic journeys of any distance involve flying to minimise journey time). For Champions League away fixtures the party fly from Luton in the afternoon after training in the morning, relax in the evening and return as soon as possible after the following day’s match. The opportunity for a training session at the actual venue is not taken up, a rare Wenger procedure that has not been copied. Whether or not there is an advantage to be gained from becoming accustomed to the stadium and the pitch is debatable, but for the manager, it is a variation, a distraction he doesn’t need. The hours before a game – be it an afternoon or evening kick-off – involve nothing more strenuous than a stroll or a jog.

So, with such a precise programme is there any flexibility to accommodate any idiosyncrasies? Dennis Bergkamp, so integral to the team, was not going anywhere by plane, and although television’s The A-Team got around the phobia of BA Barracus with the aid of sedatives, fact was not about to imitate fiction. Initially, Bergkamp made the trip to the more accessible grounds by car, boat and train, sometimes using all three modes of transport on one journey. The furthest he travelled in Arsenal’s cause was probably when he played against Fiorentina in Florence in 1999. On that occasion, his contribution did not appear affected by the journey in a game Arsenal should have won but for a missed spot-kick. However, the time taken and the physical condition of the player on arrival soon had Wenger reluctantly deciding he was better off without him. The consequence was the equivalent of losing probably his key man to suspension or injury every other European match, with the adverse affect on selection and tactics. For so many seasons Bergkamp’s link-up play was a prerequisite and the team often struggled when he was not on the pitch. He contributed so much towards the domestic trophies that one wonders whether Arsène Wenger would have signed him if he had known he would be handicapped in this way in European competition. Of course, in 1995 when Bergkamp arrived in London to play for Bruce Rioch’s Arsenal, the Champions League format was still in its infancy and had yet to evolve into the prestigious money-making phenomenon it is today. Very few clubs, if any, with serious European aspirations would sign a non-flyer now.

Perhaps this might explain why there was no great clamour for the player’s services as he grew older and accepted the unsentimental year-at-a-time renewals that became Wenger’s policy for over-30s. In effect, such contracts were the manager’s way of saying “You might be useful to me for another season, but if necessary I can survive without you and I won’t stand in your way if you want to leave.” Most players take the option of free agency, a move and a good salary to see out their days elsewhere, with the added bonus of a better chance of a first-team starting place. But Bergkamp was happy at Arsenal, his family were settled in Hadley Wood in Hertfordshire, and he was wealthy enough not to concern himself with diminished earning power. Besides, unlike many in his trade he wasn’t materialistic. As he said when he arrived at Highbury, “I never believed in star status,” and so easily adapted to the cameo role of the bit-part player. Ironically, Arsenal came closest to winning the Champions League in his final year at the club, by which time he had been phased out of the starting line-up, with compatriot Robin van Persie, José Antonio Reyes and Emmanuel Adebayor all ahead of him in the queue for the strikers’ positions.

In Europe that season of 2005/06, Wenger often fielded a 4–5–1, leaving Thierry Henry to forage alone in attack whilst withdrawing his second striker into the midfield. It was a relatively new approach on the manager’s part and the team was visibly more compact in the centre when not in possession. The notion of the second striker playing off the front man in the way Bergkamp sometimes did was dispensed with; this was no 4–4–1–1. It had been employed in the previous season’s FA Cup Final (with Bergkamp as the lone front man) in desperation due to Wenger’s con viction that his team was ‘physically gone’ and in his view there was no alternative. On that occasion, Lady Luck was probably Arsenal’s outstanding contributor in a victory over Manchester United, secured via a penalty shoot-out after 120 tortuous minutes that was ill-deserved. So although Wenger will never go so far as to prepare a plan to deny his rivals, dire circumstances and the Champions League can force a more cautious approach, a rare concession of sorts. Of course the choice over when and where to involve Bergkamp was in the past now he was playing out his final year in a supporting capacity, which may have influenced the decision to deploy a line of five across the centre. The battle for midfield control often determines the outcome of European encounters. In past seasons, Arsenal were too dependent on Patrick Vieira and it was asking too much of one man to win the midfield battle almost single-handedly. Despite Vieira’s heroics, there simply weren’t enough tackles being made. Similarly, in defence, there was not enough quality support and cover to aid Sol Campbell. So when Henry and Pires flourished, they did so as a result of their own gifts and in spite of the system which was often fire-fighting rather than providing them with a solid platform on which they could freely express themselves.

When in possession with 4–5–1, there was no lack of flair, but the extra body in midfield aided the backline, and Arsenal were able to compile a Champions League record for not conceding a goal that spanned 12 fixtures. It was as if the manager, having reached a semi-final with Monaco in 1994, had finally remembered how to tackle the particular exigencies of the competition. Arsenal had tried and failed so many times to make the last four that he could not be credited with a tactical masterstroke after all this time, but rather, just trying something less adventurous that Henry, although not liking the role, could see the sense of: “[In the Champions League] we always played against teams who wanted to play positively apart from Juventus. We persevered with 4–5–1 and it worked well.”

By not needing to alter the team between home and away legs, Arsenal developed a greater harmony and advanced to the final, taking the notable scalps of Real Madrid and Juventus en route. Bergkamp’s last competitive duty for the club was for the final against Barcelona in Paris. With plenty of time to recover from the short trip by Eurostar, he was available for selection. However, it was no surprise that he only made the bench, and with stamina a priority due to the reduction to ten men after only 18 minutes with Jens Lehmann’s dismissal (in tandem with the sacrifice of Robert Pires to make way for Manuel Almunia to keep goal) there was no chance of him making a valedictory appearance. Arsenal lost the final 2–1, Bergkamp a mere spectator. It was sad that he should be joined by Pires to watch the concluding 72 minutes, who it later transpired had also made his last bow in an Arsenal shirt.

The match turned out to be a watershed. Not only would the team never again grace their historic Highbury home, but three more of those who appeared would be joining Pires in bidding farewell. Sol Campbell, Ashley Cole and José Antonio Reyes never played for the club again. Following the loss of Patrick Vieira and before him Ray Parlour, could the dressing room now come to terms with the absence of so many key men? Could Arsène Wenger rebuild once again? And would he have to do it without his captain and star player?