Arsènal

May 17th 2006. In the changing room of the vanquished Champions League finalists, Thierry Henry walked over to Arsène Wenger. “I looked him straight in the eye and I simply said, ‘I am staying,’” Henry reported. Arsène Wenger shook his hand and replied, “I knew it. I was certain.” And yet, Henry had made up his mind only moments before. (The first that his wife, Clare, or his friend, David Dein, knew of the decision was on the plane returning to England.)

If the preceding 90 minutes of action had unfolded in a different manner, he might have made his own final appearance in an Arsenal shirt. Having resolved his quandary, it was easy to deny that possibility. “It was a decision made from the heart,” he said later, “and if on losing I decided to stay, how much stronger would the feeling have been if we had won?” He went on to explain: “Despite everything wonderful that I envisaged [at Barcelona] it was not as strong as the relationship with my club. I wanted to be seen like a [Paolo] Maldini. When someone spoke about Arsenal, they spoke about me and when they spoke about me, they were speaking about Arsenal.” The decision to stay may have been influenced by a very generous loyalty bonus paid upfront that became apparent when the club’s accounts for the period were published.

The final had not been played in a good spirit. Henry, in particular, had been singled out for gratuitous attention from opponents who most observers believed would soon be his teammates. He was surprised and disillusioned at their behaviour. Equally disillusioned was Robert Pires. From his perspective, his sacrificial substitution that allowed Manuel Almunia to fill in for the dismissed goalkeeper Jens Lehmann made his mind up about leaving for La Liga’s Villarreal. “I try not to live with regrets,” he reflected later. “I had to make a choice and, at that moment, it was painful to do it but I felt that regarding what happened during the final, I lost Arsène Wenger’s confidence. I wasn’t thinking about it before but, for me, it has been the trigger. It was the Champions League final in France, in front of all the family, all the French. So, for me, it has been the signal. He [Wenger] had plenty of options. I don’t know who I would have substituted but, for me, it was the fatal blow.”

If Arsenal had a full complement on the pitch, they would certainly have been able to push Barcelona much harder and might even have emerged victorious. Their confident start showed they were not in awe of their opponents and with two attacking formations the outcome could have remained in doubt until the very end. If Henry had lifted the trophy, he would have been able to depart reassured that he had given his side as much as he could, and that he was not leaving them in the lurch at a critical time of change. And Pires might have been content to accept the kind of arrangement Dennis Bergkamp had in his latter years. He wanted to feel appreciated, even if he felt he wasn’t going to start every game as a matter of course (a situation already occurring due to the competition for places and his own advancing years).

Losing Pires was a blow, but Henry’s decision to stay was crucial. Scheduled to move to their new home in the summer of 2006, Arsenal needed to provide value for money to a much larger audience of 60,000, of whom 9,000 would be asked to pay – on a fortnightly basis – the kind of sums that buy the best seats at a World Cup Final. In short, top of the bill stars who would both entertain and ensure the club contests the big prizes were essential, especially as they were not going to open the new ground as European champions.

Two days after the defeat in Paris, a press conference was called at which Thierry Henry, Arsène Wenger and David Dein all looked very pleased with themselves as it was announced that the number 14 shirt would continue to be worn by its present occupant. With a year remaining on his existing deal, Arsenal were in no position to let him see it out and leave for nothing in 2007. So it had came down to a choice of Henry either signing a new contract or moving on so that the club could receive substantial recompense on their investment.

David Dein later revealed “We turned down two world-record deals from Spanish clubs. You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to work out who they were.” (At the time the highest ever fee was the £47 million paid by Real Madrid for Zinedine Zidane to secure his services from Juventus in 2001.) When Dein added that “Our message was clear – he wasn’t for sale. I’d like to think he heard that”, one suspects that he can only have been talking about the past, as in 2006 Henry was most definitely on the market until pen had been put to paper to secure his services until 2010.

That Henry did decide to remain was a huge shot in the arm for both the club and its supporters. “I had two aims at the start of the week” said the manager, “to win the European Cup and then to make Thierry stay. I only managed one of those but, for the future of the club, that’s certainly the best one. I believe this season has created a special bond inside the team and there is much more to come. Wednesday night reinforced that feeling among the players and if you want to continue that progression it would rely on Thierry’s decision. It is basically an insurance for the future.” This despite Wenger later admitting “It’s not difficult to anticipate [that his performances would fall away as he got older] but I still signed him on a long contract because Thierry Henry has so many qualities that he could have played behind the striker as well. Or on the wing.”

If there was understandable euphoria at the time, hindsight provides a different perspective. The reality is that, even though Henry was terrific box office, he cast a shadow over the club, one that inhibited the development of an ever-increasing number of young teammates. His contribution in the final season at Highbury, his first as club captain after the 2005 sale of Patrick Vieira to Juventus, had been monumental. Not only did he lead the side to a Champions League final, his Premiership goals (27 in 32 appearances) ensured that the club finished fourth and guaranteed their participation for the next competition. Certainly, a first season at their new opulent home without Champions League football would have been a bitter disillusion – more so in that it would have been Tottenham who would have ousted them if the last day results had worked out in their favour. “If Thierry went to a club like Barcelona or Real Madrid he would just be a prince,” said David Dein. “Here he knows he is a king.” And therein lay the seeds of malaise.

Life began at their new home with many of the more experienced heads having departed, and along with Jens Lehmann, Gilberto Silva and later William Gallas, Henry was outnumbered by callow young men barely out of their teens. He spoke positively of his role as an elder statesman, but so often his body language conveyed a completely different message. If a pass went astray, or was not made in his direction, he would often glare witheringly at the guilty party in the manner of a disapproving parent. Cesc Fabregas later admitted, “Henry intimidated us. He is a great player but it was not easy to play alongside him.” Even for an unworldly personality such as José Antonio Reyes, whose command of English was practically non-existent, Henry’s disdain was all too apparent. Little wonder he couldn’t wait to get back to his homeland and – ironically – the more accommodating regime of Fabio Capello at Real Madrid. It would be too late for Reyes, but after Henry, Fabregas emphasised that “Now it is different.”

As the weeks went by at the Emirates, opponents quickly surmised that if they were able to stifle the home team with weight of numbers in and around their own danger area they could cope with the threat. Arsenal’s desire to hold onto the ball until a gilt-edged chance was fashioned meant a lack of penetration. This was in spite of dominating possession and due in the main to prioritising Henry when, perhaps, it would have been better either going it alone or finding a better-placed colleague.

If Henry had gone and Pires had stayed, the team would have been able to play with more cohesion and fluidity, with a greater number of players weighing in with goals and assists. As Henry was injured for much of the campaign, the supporters became accustomed to seeing, on a regular basis, an Arsenal side without him. Indeed, some of the team’s most satisfactory performances took place when he was on the sidelines. The Carling Cup run that culminated in a losing final against Chelsea showed the squad possessed real potential that was now ready for promotion. That final – Arsenal’s last visit of ten made to Cardiff’s Millennium Stadium in the seven years that Wembley was out of action marked the start of an 11-day period in which their involvement in all three cup competitions came to a sorry end. An FA Cup fifth-round replay at Blackburn saw an extra-time exit, before PSV visited north London the following midweek and concluded their host’s European adventures for the season, despite the gamble of Henry entering the fray during the second half when patently not in physical shape to do so.

In fairness to Henry, there was every indication that he was never fully fit at any stage of the season and at the beginning of December, Wenger took the decision to rest him on the eve of the Emirates’ first north London derby. There were back page headlines stating that Henry had taken the news very badly and argued with his manager before storming out of the training ground in a fit of pique. That version of events was vehemently denied by the player. “No one actually knows what we said to each other and still they are speculating,” Henry said. “Nothing that has been said in the paper is true. I did leave the training ground disappointed on Friday because I wanted to play against Spurs. Nobody forced me to not play. It was a discussion that we had and I was upset because I don’t like to not play. I want to be on the pitch. But sometimes you have to be honest with yourself and listen to your body.” In Wenger’s view, “August 15th finished Henry”, a reference to France coach Raymond Domenech’s insistence on playing the striker for the entirety of a friendly against Bosnia–Herzegovina. “He came out from an exhausting season that finished with a final in the Champions League and the final in the World Cup – which he both lost – and on top of that he didn’t get the FIFA World Player of the Year. It was difficult to swallow because he knew he arrived close to 30 and that was the year for him. He didn’t get rewarded and it was a killer for him. He was physically and mentally exhausted.” After a summer devoid of a decent rest, Wenger knew the vital importance of not rushing back his star forward. Henry was not even considered for the first leg of the critical Champions League qualifier against Dinamo Zagreb, even though it took place over four weeks after he picked up his runners-up medal in Berlin. “We do not play with players who are not at a certain level of preparation,” stated Wenger, a hint that was patently ignored by Domenech.

By the beginning of December, Wenger had seen enough to know his captain was way below par. He was still scoring goals and registering assists, but the familiar burst of pace was sadly absent. Nevertheless, despite his better judgment he continued to select him until their spat brought matters to a head. Wenger decided to bite the bullet and admit that physically the club’s record scorer, though not yet even 30, might have fallen victim to the immutable law of diminishing returns. And to expect a continuation of season after season of 25 goals and 20 assists (which had come to be taken for granted by Arsenal fans) was unrealistic.

Henry probably didn’t help his cause with his newspaper column in The Sun on the day of the Tottenham game as he began his enforced rest. He said, “Our situation at Arsenal is like a boxer going in the ring, a lightweight going up against a heavyweight. You can have a surprise sometimes but, more often than not, the heavyweight will last longer over 12 rounds. The depth of the squad is nowhere near the others. I am not having a go at the board or the manager. It is just a fact. There will always be teams that have more money than you. But you can rest assured Arsène Wenger will try to – once again – land a few bargains in January. Even using the loan system, there are top-class players who would jump at the chance of first-team football. One player who springs to mind is Chelsea’s Shaun Wright-Phillips. If he could be picked up on loan, I’m sure he could do a great job, given half a chance.” Arsène Wenger doubtless did not take kindly to Henry telling him how to do his job. So when quizzed on Henry’s comments, his terse response – “I don’t know, you should ask him,” – hinted that his captain was operating outside his remit. Less diplomatic was an unnamed international colleague who told the French press that the striker is “an enormous bighead who cannot take criticism”.

In truth, after what turned out to be his final appearance in an Arsenal shirt against PSV, Henry could have been pressed back into service for the final weeks of the campaign, but as there was little likelihood of failing to ensure a top-four finish and Champions League qualification, nor on the other hand of challenging for the top two positions, Wenger took the opportunity to assess the prospects for the following season rather than field one he had already decided was expendable. Henry’s sudden sale in the summer to Barcelona for £16.1 million took supporters by surprise in much the same way as had Vieira’s to Juventus two years earlier, not least because the day before the news of the deal become public, Henry took part in the launch of Arsenal’s commercial relationship with Ebel watchmakers, a very ironic piece of timing.

Henry’s own willingness to leave the UK may have been influenced by the break-up of his marriage, news of which came out after the move. He reportedly told friends, “Lots of things have changed recently and I had to get away from everything English, including my wife unfortunately. It’s a very sad time for all of us, but you’ve got to know when to move on.” The feeling had been growing that perhaps he had been too hasty in rejecting Barcelona’s advances. Certainly, a year earlier the Catalans had believed they had their man, whom they anticipated – after their double of the Champions League and La Liga – would set them up wonderfully for the defence of their titles. They felt they had been badly let down by Henry. A year on and Ferran Sorriano, Barcelona’s vice-president in charge of all economic activities, was prepared to try again, but only after Henry had indicated a change of heart. The departure of his close friend, David Dein, on the one hand and the close professional ties with the Dein family on the other – Dein’s eldest son Darren is Henry’s commercial adviser, and his daughter Sascha, who had worked in Barcelona, acted as a conduit – facilitated the rapprochement between the two parties. As Arsène Wenger recalls, “He’s a very intelligent guy. And he said, ‘Listen, I have two or three years at the top, top, top. We have a very good young side but I do not want to wait for success. And so I want to go somewhere where I can get immediate success because in two, three years that will not be possible anymore for me.’” Barcelona received the assurances they sought and the transfer was speedily concluded. Yet Wenger emphasised: “It was his decision. Like it was his decision to stay. But when he wanted to leave I didn’t want to stand in his way because if he feels deeply like that as the captain of the club I want to do what he wants.”

An ill-timed correlation among some of the more mature players who have left Arsenal in recent years was that they seemed to become injury prone with their new clubs. Certainly this applied to both Vieira and Henry (the former missing spells through injury at both Juventus and subsequently Internazionale and the latter experiencing a stop-start first season at Barcelona). More seriously, Edu and Robert Pires both missed almost their entire first seasons with their new Spanish clubs as a result of pre-season injuries. Going further back, Marc Overmars and Emmanuel Petit also had problems remaining fit at Barcelona. Whether Wegner anticipated falling performance levels or they were just unfortunate coincidences only he can say. With hindsight, his judgment on when to let older heads move on is rarely at fault, even if there is a good deal of head scratching at the time.

Undoubtedly the longer Wenger manages, the greater is his own preference for youth (and physical capability) over experience, although he acknowledges the gap in his team’s armour created by the potential mental fragility that this can bring. Which begs the question, is his policy a consequence of Hobson’s choice (with a limited available budget) or a genuine conviction that it is the only way to achieve optimum results in a sport that is becoming ever faster and placing greater physical and psychological demands on its participants?

Despite the company line that Arsène Wenger’s transfer budget was unaffected by the board scrambling around to raise funds to build their new home, the facts tell a very different story. The summer of 2001 was the last period when substantial sums (£22.5 million on three players) were spent in the close season. The outlay in the following three summers totalled less than £15 million – and that amount was recouped by Vieira’s transfer alone. Wenger did buy Sevilla’s José Antonio Reyes in January 2004 for an initial payment of £10.5 million, although there was not enough in the kitty to complete the purchase of Robin van Persie from Feyenoord, whose move, despite only costing £2.75 million, had to be postponed for six months. Perhaps if Van Persie had arrived earlier, the Invincibles side may have able to extend their prowess to the FA Cup or Champions League, where they fell agonisingly short. It was a matter of keeping the ship afloat rather than trying to keep up with the liners disappearing over the horizon, a policy that sunk Leeds United.

So the manager had to gamble on potential rather than relying on reputation, prospects who would be unlikely to reach the standard of Vieira, Henry and Pires as rapidly, if at all. As a consequence for two seasons the club was well off the pace at the top of the Premiership, yet ironically Wenger was inured against criticism by the move that had created the handicap in the first place. There was little danger of lack of demand to attend for the final season at Highbury, whilst the novelty of the Emirates also produced full capacity. So despite the extra 22,000 places (a good portion of which were in the highly priced middle tier) as many were coming through the turnstiles as would have if the team they were coming to see were the Invincibles reprised.

The only real imposition placed on the manager as he replenished his resources was the prerequisite of year-on-year involvement in the Champions League for the income it guaranteed. He pulled it off, but certainly flirted with danger as qualification became a serious distraction in Highbury’s home stretch, Arsenal only squeezing past Tottenham and into fourth place on the last match day. Points were certainly sacrificed as more and more of the players pencilled in for his future plans were blooded: the defence that was put out after the turn of the year often featured 24-year-old Kolo Toure as its oldest head.

With the financial restrictions placed upon him, Wenger’s shopping had to be even smarter, which meant procuring less-established players than he might have picked up in more affluent times. The mark of a typical signing during this time was their anonymity, even those who were already internationals. So instead of Kanu, possessor of a Champions League winner’s medal, 2006 saw Emmanuel Adebayor join from Monaco – an unused substitute in the 2004 final with a loser’s medal for watching his vanquished teammates. Who in the English game was familiar with Abou Diaby or Bacary Sagna from Auxerre? Even internationals like Alex Hleb and Eduardo had fans wondering about their pedigree. The one exception was William Gallas, an atypical signing as the likelihood of Wenger hiring a 29-year-old apart from a goalkeeper under normal circumstances are almost non-existent. However, David Dein was determined that if Ashley Cole was going to Chelsea it must be at the cost of weakening their squad rather than making a minuscule dent in their owner’s bank balance. A more characteristic purchase who arrived at the same time as Gallas but with far less fanfare was the 18-year-old Brazilian Denilson from São Paulo.

Of course, the debatable decision to dispense with experience was a matter of choice for Wenger. Starting with Dennis Bergkamp, the policy of only offering single-year contract extensions to the over-30s was introduced. Thus, a player in his late 20s knew that any deal he signed would be the last to give him any long-term security. If the new approach meant the loss of Robert Pires and Sylvain Wiltord (who was offered a two-year contract as a 29-year-old, but rejected it in order to be able to leave on a free transfer) then so be it. The manager was prepared to forego a potential transfer fee rather than subsidise for any length of time someone who he felt had his best days behind him. On occasion, Wenger’s intransigence strained relationships. While Dennis Bergkamp was prepared to accept what was on offer and come back for more at yearly intervals, others wanted and felt they deserved greater security. It became apparent from January 2004 onwards that Wiltord would leave in the summer and, once he had recovered from injury, he was marginalised in much the same way Ian Wright had been several years earlier. As Wiltord went on to enjoy three title-winning seasons with Lyon, there is certainly an argument to be made that Wenger would have been better served by retaining him in spite of his age, rather than investing heavily in his youthful replacement, José Antonio Reyes, who ultimately flattered to deceive.

Wenger though had different priorities. He had to ensure that if, financially, things did not work out, he had a young group who would grow older together and that, in the worst case scenario, would have some sell-on value. “My priority will always be to keep the players I already have,” he says, “because above all I believe in the virtues of teamwork. And one can only maintain and develop the players by communicating a culture, a culture which passes from generation to generation.” In the short term, trophies would actually be a bonus. It was a delicate balancing act, operating with a miniscule budget compared to his rivals whilst keeping his team competitive enough to ensure Champions League football, with its attendant (and essential) income.

The corollary at the start of the 2006/07 season was a largely inexperienced squad. The opening skirmishes at the Emirates saw Henry and Ljungberg start, although their injury woes soon gave the fans a glimpse of the future. Aside from Gilberto and William Gallas, the oldest outfield squad members were 25-year-olds Tomas Rosicky and Kolo Toure. So much for Wenger’s optimum ages. By his own criteria, only William Gallas was playing at the peak of his powers. His qualifying assessment, “because they have exceptional talent they play already”, was still to be proved.

Compared to the past there were a high number of home draws in the first half of the Premiership campaign – five in the first nine fixtures. A pattern emerged as a result of unworldliness on the one hand and exceptional stamina and fitness on the other. Either Arsenal scored first, and went on to a comfortable victory, or conceded the lead and then salvaged a draw, often equalising right at the death as the visitors visibly wilted under the pressure. But it was often naivety – specifically a lack of concentration – that sometimes handicapped them when they fell behind. Still, the omens were good. As the team gradually became accustomed to their new surroundings, results improved. The concluding ten league matches saw only five points dropped, compared with twice as many from the first nine. They even came from behind to beat eventual champions Manchester United, and taken in conjunction with a victory at Old Trafford, the conviction grew that, with greater consistency, this young side could challenge their free-spending rivals.

Wenger believes that “the elevation of the general physical level has made the game faster and therefore you need a minimum high standard of physical ability to survive, even if you have experience and talent. So, instead of driving at 100 miles an hour football is now 150 miles an hour. So at 150 mph you can use your experience, but you must be [physically] capable of driving at 150 mph. The physical level of any team in the Premier League compared to ten years ago is higher. Because every new generation is better prepared. And the measurement of the physical performances of the players has kicked out some players who were not at the level.”

Certainly the Arsenal squad for the first seasons at the Emirates, with at least two players for every position, was numerically as strong as any other. However, due to the lack of experience, there was less quality in depth. So, needing to overturn a 1–0 deficit against PSV in the home leg of the Champions League game, Wenger fielded Gilberto at centre back whilst the raw Johan Djourou remained on the bench. In central midfield there were two teenagers. No one questioned the selection of the precocious Fabregas, but was Denilson the right partner? Up front Emmanuel Adebayor, yet to notch his first Champions League goal, was partnered by Julio Bapista who, outside of the Carling Cup, had scored a total of two goals since his arrival on loan from Real Madrid. Arsenal’s scorer on the night? A PSV player putting through his own net. It was not enough. In desperation, Wenger was forced to send on an unfit Thierry Henry for his final appearance in a futile attempt to score a second goal. PSV qualified thanks to a late equaliser.

With every passing transfer window since Wenger splashed out on Theo Walcott, Adebayor and Abou Diaby in January 2006, Arsenal’s supporters became increasingly frustrated at the small amount of chequebook activity, not least because with the club at last on more solid financial ground and the board’s pronouncements of available fund ing, the only restraint on the manager is his own parsimony. Many fans believe the squad is simply not strong enough, doubting Wenger’s faith in the younger players, or indeed that certain of the older ones that he has signed (such as Pascal Cygan) were ever good enough in the first place. What is revealing about the youthful inflow is that, in spite of not paying huge sums to get them, Arsenal’s 2006/07 wage bill (£89.7 million) was similar in size to that of Manchester United, though at just over 50% of turnover is way below the Premiership average (Chelsea write their own rules with staff costs of over £100 million). The message seems to be that even if Arsène Wenger now chooses not to shop at Harrods, once he has bought what he wants, he is determined to hang onto it if he can (without undermining the club’s wage structure).

With a combined budget for transfer activity and player wages, the Arsenal manager knows his limits, though they have been considerably extended as a result of the high rise in income: the Emirates effect. If former managing director Keith Edelman is taken at his word (“Arsène has got sufficient funds for any signing he wishes to make”) Wenger chooses not to spend everything he has available to him. Towards the end of the 2006/07 season, Peter Hill-Wood, Danny Fiszman and Arsène Wenger met up for dinner at Wiltons, a renowned West End restaurant. Hill-Wood recalls, “At the end of the dinner, we were talking about a new contract for him. And Danny said, ‘Arsène, if we gave you £100 million to spend, what would you do?’ And this was exactly his remark. ‘I’d give it back.’ Good, nice to hear it.”

It is apparent that the manager places more importance on keeping happy those he has taken time and energy to find and develop than he does taking a chance on expensive new additions. “I will always stick to the same policy,” Wenger explains, “but if there is a guy who could one day reach out to another level and will cost a fortune, we could nevertheless buy him.” It would be inaccurate to claim that Wenger used to sign current stars, as really only Marc Overmars, Davor Suker, Sol Campbell and William Gallas ever arrived with well-established reputations that the manager was never going to markedly enhance. But it could certainly be argued that Arsenal had more success when there was stiffer competition for places, with experienced campaigners often unable to get a start. At no point in their careers at the club could the likes of Kanu, Sylvain Wiltord, Edu, Gilles Grimandi and Oleg Luzhny claim that they had a first-team place nailed down. That resource disappeared with the stadium move and cries for its return have seemingly fallen on deaf ears.

Is it possible that, in reaction to what Wenger has referred to as “financial doping” (a veiled attack on certain clubs’ extravagant spending) he has decided to build a team in a completely different way, declining to engage in any auction? Could he be reluctant to spend his budget by way of proving a point? Namely, anyone can buy success, but there is another way: constructing a side stuffed full with players produced by his own coaching methods. “You may forget that one of the joys of team sports is the development of a group who have been together for some time,” reflects Wenger. “Take the example of this young Arsenal team [2007/08]. They have grown up together which means they have also suffered together and shared the pain. When you think about the disappointments of last season, I feel in spite of everything it was a turning point. We held on. We never gave up and we always fought. I said to myself, ‘There is something special there, a mental strength that will surprise people when it goes well.’”

Granted, the approach is almost certainly a result of (financial) necessity being the mother of (youthful) invention, but how many other managers could have produced a team on such meagre resources that sells out a 60,000 stadium on a habitual basis? And not only that, but wherever in the world they play, Arsenal attract crowds as glamour opposition, a consequence of the regular broadcasting of their Premiership adventures and the sheer entertainment value they provide. So now Milan or Real Madrid versus Arsenal is an 80,000-plus sell-out as a live event with millions more around the world watching the television spectacular. Indeed, the Arsenal versus Milan Champions League first leg in February 2008 had more commentary teams covering the game in the flesh than any previous match in the competition’s history outside the final. Wenger’s young team are top of the bill, as he concurs: “I think we are more respected in Europe because of eight or nine consecutive seasons in the Champions League. Everywhere we go it looks like it is a big, big game. We had to gain respect and we are [now] looked upon as a big scalp.” (Gooners still chuckle at Zinedine Zidane’s response when a journalist asked him if he almost joined Tottenham earlier in his career. The answer – “Who?” – would never have been given about Arsenal.)

The significance of Europe is uppermost in Wenger’s mind. Firstly, continued participation goes a long way towards underpinning his budget. Secondly, in his own mind, the absence of the Champions League trophy is a gaping hole in his CV that he is determined to fill in before his work at Arsenal is complete. “I want to win the Champions League but it’s step by step,” he says. “And to win not once but two or three times, to go into the history of European football.” And if he can do it with his ‘third’ Arsenal side, it will be the supreme achievement, against all the odds.