Cavalry units conjure up images of the Old West, where leaders like Phil Sheridan, Jeb Stuart, and Nathan Bedford Forrest led elite forces deep into enemy territory to terrorize supply trains, attack the flanks, and report on their enemy’s whereabouts and disposition. They were known for their red and white guidons,1 cavalry hats, sabers, and spurs. These men and their units serve as an inspiration for the modern-day cavalryman. But the cavalry panache can be taken to an extreme. Sure, it’s exciting to live the flamboyant lifestyle of a cavalryman. Riding into battle behind the red and white guidon, wearing a big Stetson hat with crossed sabers on the front and golden spurs strapped to cavalry boots, jingling as you charge into battle on a trusty steed can be intoxicating, but that is not what makes cavalry special.
It’s true that cavalrymen passionately cling to the traditions of their forebearers. The Stetson hat and spurs are coveted accoutrements proudly worn by contemporary cavalrymen, but I have become somewhat well known for repeatedly reminding my cavalry troopers that, “cavalry is not about horse shit and gun powder. It’s about standards.” What sets quality cavalry units apart is that they establish high standards, and demand that all of their troopers must consistently meet those standards.
Task Force Pale Horse was an air cavalry squadron. Our crews knew how to conduct their primary missions of reconnaissance and security. I was confident in their technical abilities, but in my mind the tactical tasks of reconnaissance and security were only half of the equation. There is something called the “cavalry mentality,” and this term cannot be downplayed or understated. Historically, a cavalry unit is the eyes and ears of the commander. In a reconnaissance role they are sent ahead of the main force to scout out terrain, determine route suitability, bridge serviceability, and, most important, find the enemy. The cavalry scout is trained to see things others might miss, notice what is out of place, analyze a situation, and report his observations. In a security role, the cavalry protects the main force by finding or interdicting an approaching enemy force. In Afghanistan we protected convoys by looking for ambushes and IEDs.
While cavalry scouts operate independently, they are not to become decisively engaged with the enemy unless absolutely necessary or required by the mission. Tasked with a specific purpose, yet entrusted with the ability to adjust their mission as necessary to achieve the commander’s broader intent, a cavalryman is afforded tremendous trust and latitude, something he takes very seriously and must never violate.
Our steeds have changed over the years. Today the air cavalry’s primary helicopter is the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. Due to the vast distances and mountains in Afghanistan we “task organized” our units. Back at Fort Campbell our battalions were structured around one aircraft type, except for 7-101, the general support aviation battalion. 7-17 cavalry had thirty Kiowas, 3-101 had twenty-four Apaches, 4-101 had thirty Black Hawks, and 7-101 had a company of Chinooks, a company of Black Hawks, an air traffic control company, and a medevac company. In Afghanistan we gave ten Kiowas to 3-101 and ten to 7-101. In return they gave us Apaches, Black Hawks, and Chinooks. Task organization meant that we reorganized ourselves to best meet the specific requirements of the ground force brigade commander.
A task-organized unit is called a task force. Task Force Pale Horse was comprised of AH-64D Apaches, OH-58D Kiowas, CH-47F Chinooks, UH-60M Black Hawks, UH-60L Medevac, and Hunter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). While each aircraft was designed for a specific role, I required all of the aircrews to think and act like cavalrymen. It wasn’t the type of helicopter that made us cavalrymen but rather our attitude, our mentality.
The Black Hawk is an assault helicopter, designed to move an infantry squad around the battlefield. I wanted the pilots to do more than just move soldiers and supplies on the battlefield. I wanted them to scout as they flew from one place to another. I wanted them to notice patterns of life in the various villages and the Afghan countryside. I wanted them to observe activity along their route of flight: how the locals responded when they flew over, what appeared to be lashed to donkeys on the mountain trails, and people who looked out of place. Most important, after each mission, I wanted them to report what they saw in great detail. Their observations were invaluable.
My assault company commander bought into my idea wholeheartedly, often transmitting over the radio, “You Kiowas guys go do your thing, and we Black Hawk pilots will come in and clean up the mess behind you.” He was fond of saying he thought like a gun pilot but flew a Black Hawk.
The Apache helicopter is unquestionably the most lethal killer on the modern battlefield, but it is also very good at reconnaissance. In fact some units use Apaches as their cavalry platform. Sensors enable the pilot to slew the 30-mm cannon to their helmet, thus the gun points where the pilot looks. This technology allows the pilot to quickly engage enemy forces. Once an Apache pilot locks onto an enemy fighter it is almost impossible for him to get away. The faster they run, the hotter they glow in the thermal system. But the Apache cockpit is a tandem two-pilot cockpit—one pilot sits in front of the other. The cockpit design prevents the pilots from easily observing things outside of the helicopter with the naked eye.
OH-58D Kiowa Warriors are equipped with a 50-caliber machine gun. The gun is fixed forward, meaning it points forward and can’t be moved in flight; therefore, the pilot must maneuver the aircraft to adjust the impact point of bullets when engaging targets. This makes it less accurate than the Apache, but the highly maneuverable and agile Kiowa is a fantastic scouting helicopter. Kiowa pilots have tremendous visibility from the cockpit, particularly since they remove the doors when flying missions. Kiowa pilots are trained to be inquisitive.
Afghanistan’s heavy lifter is the Chinook. Without her the mission in Afghanistan would be nearly impossible. Only the Chinook can carry heavy loads of personnel and equipment into the high mountainous terrain. While the Chinook’s primary role is lift, the pilots can also pay attention to what they see and report their observations back to the intel team. The Chinook has a crew of five—potentially a lot of eyes observing the battlefield. I did not want Chinooks and Black Hawks assigned specific reconnaissance missions; I wanted Jillian to develop a collection plan that required the Chinook and Black Hawk crews to pay particular attention to certain locations based on the time they were flying. They would then be required to report what they had seen in their debriefing following the mission. If we were to maximize our capability it would mean that every pilot was a scout to some degree—a battlefield sensor. For us, cavalry was not a helicopter. Cavalry was a state of mind.
There were certainly challenges that I knew we would have to overcome. I was keenly aware that our pilots were products of their previous experiences, which would make some of them resistant to change. The majority of our pilots had one or more combat tours in Iraq, but we had very few pilots with Afghanistan experience. Aviation operations in Afghanistan, particularly Regional Command (RC) East, differed vastly from those in Iraq. Fighting in Iraq had taken place primarily in an urban environment. In RC-East the majority of our fights would occur in the mountains and valleys outside of villages.
Kiowa teams in Iraq commonly departed their FOBs with a specific mission but almost always deviated when a “troops in contact” (TIC) was declared, and ground forces were engaged with the enemy. Due to the distances, complex terrain, and limited rotary-wing assets available in RC-East, prioritization of assets was essential. I knew that crews would naturally want to “run to the sound of the guns.” While this was a common practice in Iraq it was not always what ground force commanders wanted in RC-East. TICs occurred in many locations multiple times daily. The use of artillery and mortars normally silenced the enemy in a matter of minutes. If our Kiowas deviated from an assigned mission to help troops in contact at a COP or FOB, while seemingly logical to the pilot, it could potentially detract from the brigade’s larger mission and priorities. We would have to educate battle captains and aviators that deviating from assigned missions required brigade authorization unless lives were at risk on the ground. Clearly subjective, that would not be an easy call for our teams to make.
In a counterinsurgency fight, every soldier on the battlefield is a sensor. Perhaps the most underutilized collection assets were the rotary-wing aviation aircrews. Helicopters traverse and observe more of a brigade’s battle space daily than any other sensor on the battlefield. It is essential to integrate them into the collection plan, give them specific reconnaissance objectives, and thoroughly debrief them after each flight. In 2009, we were determined to prove just how valuable an aviation task force could be, not only for air assaults, convoy and patrol security, and hasty attacks, but also as a collection asset. In order to achieve success we had to get genuine buy-in from our crew members. They had to commit to the cavalry mentality.
I would soon see our crews embrace the cavalry way of thinking quite well, as evidenced in this journal entry from First Lieutenant Aaron Nichols, a Black Hawk platoon leader in our task force.
14 Feb 2009
SPC A.J. Mick pointed out a HUGE train of donkeys headed into Pakistan. Each donkey (est. 150–200 donkeys) was packed with large yellow bundles of stuff … not sure exactly what the “stuff” was. Mike Downing and I whipped the aircraft around and got some pretty good pictures for the S2. We’d already done quite a few recons with Special Operations Forces guys before, but this was the first time where we found some possibly shady activity. Our crew felt pretty good about the whole venture, and felt even better when the S2 drummed up a pretty in-depth story-board for BDE about what we found.
—Aaron Nichols