Appendix III

Maj. Gen. Frederick Browning’s After-action Report on Operation Biting, March 1942

[UKNA WO106/4133]

OPERATION ‘BITING’

REPORT BY

MAJOR-GENERAL F A M BROWNING, DSO

COMMANDER, THE AIRBORNE DIVISION

INTRODUCTION

  1. The Air Ministry had information that the Germans had a new type of 53cm RDF equipment, which was playing an important part in the control of German ‘flak’ and probably in the control of searchlights. It was a serious menace to our aircraft. Counter-measures to give adequate protection to our aircraft were being investigated but these were hampered by the lack of information about the enemy apparatus.
  2. An object, presumed to be one of these 53cm sets was reported to be situated at THEUVILLE (49° 40’ 28” N, 09’ 41” E) a little north of LE HAVRE. It was believed to consist of a paraboloid (9ft diameter) and a small cabin (about 6ft x 5ft x 4ft) mounted rotatably on a trolley.
  3. The above information was given to Commodore, Combined Operations (Commodore The Lord Louis Mountbatten, GCVO, DSO) who, after consulting GOC The Airborne Division, obtained the approval of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee to an operation by parachute troops to capture this RDF set. The Chiefs of Staffs agreed on 21 Jan ’42 that one operational Whitley Squadron from Bomber Command RAF, one company of parachute troops and sufficient light naval craft to evacuate the force by sea, should be made available. It was later decided to include some personnel of 5 Corps to act as escort to the ALC’s; they were not to take part in the operations on land.

TRAINING

  1. ‘C’ Coy. 2 Parachute Bn., under command of Major J D Frost, Cameronians, were selected for the operation, though both 1 Parachute Bde and the company were then under the impression that they were required only for training in combined operations with Royal Navy and RAF. Major Bromley-Martin was detailed as Liaison Officer at HQ The Airborne Division, with the tasks of detailed preliminary planning and obtaining of equipment.
  2. Having been delayed for a few days by snow, ‘C’ Coy moved South from HARDWICK CAMP to TILSHEAD CAMP (SALISBURY PLAIN) on 24th Jan ’42 and commenced training immediately. The first part of their programme, as originally drawn up, was interrupted by the weather, with heavy falls of snow and intense cold. The result was, that when the Coy. moved to INVERARAY for preliminary training with Royal Navy on 9th Feb ’42, they had not been able to do any parachute drops and very little satisfactory ground training. At INVERARAY, elementary combined training was done with Royal Navy and inter-services signal codes were arranged.
  3. The Coy. arrived back at TILSHEAD on 14 Feb ’42, and were then kept very busy doing their own ground training, one drop as a company from the aircraft which would carry them on the operation, and combined training with Royal Navy and RAF. Much time had to be wasted in travelling by road between TILSHEAD and the South Coast, as the weather was very treacherous and no less than four unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the required training with the MGBs and ALCs of Royal Navy. This wasted time would have been of great value to the Coy. for ground training [in battle tactics].
  4. Apart from the normal training carried out by each of the Services, it was considered advisable that they should all be able to train on ground similar to that on which the operation would take place. A suitable place was found at Golden Ball Hill 5784 (on the South MARLBOROUGH DOWNS) which, with some alterations, resembled the actual place sufficiently both from the air and from the ground, though distances were not correct and slopes too gradual [in reality exercises were carried out slightly south of Golden Ball Hill, closer to the canal]. In future, it should be noted that, for ground training, it is often more important that distances should be correct than anything else.

Three beaches on the South coast between SWANAGE and WEYMOUTH were selected by Royal Navy as being suitable for practices. After further reconnaissance from the air and ground aspects, it was agreed that they should be used, weather permitting, in the following order of priority:

i. ARISH MELL COVE 2801

ii. ½ mile East of REDCLIFF POINT 1502

ii. BOWLEASE COVE 1302

113 Inf Bde (Brigadier D C Butterworth, DSO) through H, 38 Div, 5 Corps and Southern Command, were detailed to clear the beaches sufficiently of mines, scaffolding and wire. They were most helpful in doing this, which meant a very great deal of apparently wasteful work for them. Gunnery Wing, A F V School, LULWORTH, were also most helpful in allowing the use of their training ground and in providing excellent accommodation and meals at short notice.

OTHER TROOPS TAKING PART

  1. Other troops taking part in the operation were:

i. 5 ORs per ALC to act solely as escort to the ALCs. Each of the parties were armed with four Bren LMGs (with 500 rounds per gun) and four anti-tank Rifles (with 40 rpg). To provide the required numbers and reserves, one officer and 25 ORs from each of 8th Monmouth Regt. and 11th Bn. Royal Fusiliers joined HMS Prince Albert at INVERARAY on 10 Feb and remained on board her or in the ALCs until 1 Mar ’42. 20 ORs from each R’ment actually accompanied the ALCs but did not land or attack the beach defences.

ii. 1 Officer and 20 ORs. Medical personnel from 181 Fd Amb, the Airborne Division. They also joined HMS Prince Albert at INVERARAY on 12 Feb and left her on 1 Mar ’42. They accompanied the ALCs during the operation (see Appendix ‘K’).

PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

  1. The provision of special equipment and weapons required was rendered very difficult for two reasons:

i. The fact that much of this equipment was very new and only in the experimental stage and that it had to come from many different sources. As the Division becomes better equipped, this difficulty will not be so acute.

ii. For security reasons, the need for both new and standard equipment not actually held by the Division could not always be quoted as an operational requirement and questions by inquisitive staff officers had to be parried. It is essential that in future HQ Combined Operations should be empowered to demand.

A list of special equipment obtained (other than Engineer or Signal) is given at Appendix ‘B’. A list and description of Engineer and Signal Equipment is given in Appendix ‘J’ and ‘K’.

  1. Containers were obtained and provided by AFEE Ringway under special arrangements made by them. These arrangements were not then produced in any numbers. All containers were specially marked and fitted with coloured lights turned on by impact, to assist in easy identification. The packing of every container was worked out by AFEE who also calculated CG positions, for every aircraft lending and supplied packing diagrams and loading schedules. These are attached at Appx ‘C’ and ‘F’.
  2. Statichutes were provided by 38 Wing RAF, both for practices and for the operations.

INFORMATION

  1. All information about the RDF Station, the enemy’s dispositions, and defences, and all photos and models of the ground and buildings, were provided through HQ Combined Operations. Apart from anything else, this is essential for reasons of security and no enquiries can be made direct to other sources by personnel of the Airborne Division.

A summary of all the intelligence is contained in Airborne Div. Operation Order No 1 and in an additional intelligence summary attached to that order.

Additional photos, of which there is only one copy, are attached. The model of BRUNEVAL and district (scale 1/2000) is held at HQ The Airborne Division. Another model of the house and the RDF Station was returned to HQ Combined Operations. All photographs and models, which were really excellent, were provided by CIU Medmenham, through HQ Combined Operations.

SPECIALIST PERSONNEL

  1. Certain specialist personnel were required to deal with the RDF Station. Flight Lieutenant Priest was given a temporary commission in the RAF so that he could accompany the force and provide expert scientific knowledge if required; he was taken over in an ALC and was not allowed to drop by parachute, as his capture by the enemy could not be risked. In fact, he did not land but his knowledge was of great assistance.

F/Sgt Cox, RAF, a RDF specialist, was trained in parachute jumping at PTS RINGWAY and actually dropped with ‘C’ Coy. to assist in dismantling the RDF apparatus. His work was excellent throughout.

No. 13801753 Pte. Nagle, 93 Pioneer Coy., a German fighting against Hitler, also joined ‘C’ Coy. and dropped with them. His knowledge of the German language and the psychology of Germans proved of great assistance.

All the above specialists were obtained through HQ Combined Operations.

SECURITY

  1. The success of the operation proved that there had been no leakage of information to the Germans. Nevertheless security was by no means perfect.

When the operation was first planned, only a very few essential people knew that it was contemplated at all, what was the object of the operation and the fact that the Airborne Division was taking part. Secrecy was to be preserved by using a ‘cover story’ to the effect that training was being carried out in a new phase of combined operations. Further, it was understood that no army personnel outside the Airborne Division was to take part; the resources of the Airborne Division were entirely adequate and no waste of specialists would have been involved in any way.

Three main reasons contributed to breaches of security as training progressed:

i. Difficulties in obtaining essential weapons, amn. and equipment without quoting operational requirements. This was reduced to the minimum by HQ Combined Operations, who, as far as possible, obtained all that was required for the Division.

ii. The necessity for beaches in Southern Command to be cleared of mines, scaffolding etc, for training. This work was very extensive and had to be done by, or with the knowledge of, the local troops.

iii. The fact that the ‘cover story’, that the whole object of everything was ‘combined training’, was not adhered to by GHQ Home Forces. Their letter No. HFS/CC/122/Ops (P) dated 28th Jan. 1942, which was not seen by the Airborne Division until after it had been sent, was the first indication to anyone outside HQ Combined Operations and HQ The Airborne Division, that British parachutists were ready for or about to take part in an operation.

There were a few cases of officers and ORs mentioning unnecessarily that an operation was to take place, or hinting to that effect. They did not realise that the fact that an operation is even being considered is as much of a secret as the details of that operation. They did not appear to realise that their carelessness or desire to ‘show off’ might result in a disaster and loss of life. Action has been, and is being, taken to prevent such mistakes in future.

Security would be far more easily preserved if:

i. Troops from units outside the Airborne Division need not be used.

ii. The Heads of departments at the War Office and GHQ Home Forces which must be concerned with an operation, ie Operations, Intelligence, Staff Duties, could be told that an operation by the Airborne Division was planned and that when requirements backed by the HQ Combined Operations were submitted, they must be met on the highest priority. No officers except heads of departments should be told under any circumstances that an operation is to take pace, and they should be forbidden to pass on any information to either senior or junior officers without permission from CCC.

iii. A ‘scrambled’ telephone could be provided at HQ The Airborne Division.

CO-ORDINATION OF PLANNING

  1. The co-ordination of all planning, including preliminary training and provision of equipment, was done by HQ Combined Operations until Commander-in-Chief, PORTSMOUTH, took over, as Supreme Commander. Copies of minutes of all meetings held at HQ Combined Operations are attached at Appx. ‘D’.

ORGANISATION OF COMMAND FOR THE OPERATION

  1. 16. Commanders of the forces of Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force taking part were nominated as under:

Naval Force Commander – Commander F N Cook, RAN

OC Parachute Troops – Major J D Frost, OC ‘C’ Coy., 2 Parachute Bn.

RAF Force Commander – Group Capt. Sir Nigel Norman, Bt. OC 38 Wing, RAF

Commander-in-Chief, PORTSMOUTH (Admiral Sir W M James, KCB) was nominated as Supreme Commander and Operation HQ was in his Operations Room at FORT WALLINGTON.

All troops on board HMS Prince Albert and the MGBs and ALCs were under the orders of Commander F N Cook.

Wing Commander P C Pickard, DSO, DFC, commanded 51 Sqn RAF, Lieut. Commander W G Everitt, RN commanded 14th Motor Gunboat Flotilla, and Lieut. Commander H B Peate commanded HMS Prince Albert.

Group Captain Sir Nigel Norman and Lt. Col. A G Walsh, GSO1 The Airborne Division, were at the HQ of Commander-in-Chief, PORTSMOUTH, throughout the operation.

38 Wing RAF had arranged direct telephone communications with 51 Sqn’s aerodrome at Thruxton and with RAF TANGMERE.

RE, SIGS, MED

  1. Separate reports are attached

Their orders for the operation are included in Airborne Division Operation Order No. 1

PRESS REPRESENTATIVES

  1. HQ Combined Operations arranged for three representatives of the Press to sail in HMS Prince Albert, under the orders of SNO. Two were allowed in the ALCs. None were allowed to land. Their reports were subject to control by HQ Combined Operations direct.

ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE OPERATION

  1. On 27th Feb. ’42, the following message was received at HQ The airborne Division, following a ‘disguised’ telephone message received at 1500 hrs.

MESSAGE CYPHER

(IMMEDIATE)

To: HQ 11 Gp, HQFC, HQBC, GOC Airborne Div., SOUTHERN COMD. Rptd. Admiralty. 257 Commodore Combined Ops.

From: C-in-C PORTSMOUTH

MOST SECRET (.) following is repetition my 1507 A 27th Feb. (.) Begins added HMS PRINS ALBERT TORMENTOR senior offr 14th Motor Gunboat flotilla GOC Airborne Div. Southern Comd. HQ Bomber Comd. rptd HQ 11 Group. HQ Fighter Comd. HQ Bomber Comd. rptd Admiralty 257 Commodore Combined Operations from C in C PORTSMOUTH (.) Carry out operation BITING tonight 27 Feb.

TOO. 1507

A/27 ends.

TAKE-OFF AND FLIGHT IN AIRCRAFT

  1. The take-off and flight in aircraft went exactly according to plan. Some flak was met in the area of ST. JOUIN and some damage was done to aircraft but not to personnel. This has been reported in detail by the Air Force Commander.

DROPPING OFF PARACHUTISTS

  1. Two aircraft dropped their parachutists South of the dropping zone. Estimates of how far South they were dropped vary between 1500 yards and 3 miles. One aircraft dropped 15 minutes late. The remaining aircraft dropped their parachutists according to plan. All containers were dropped successfully and were found quickly. There was no enemy AA fire on the dropping zone and none of the parachutists were fired at as they dropped.

ACTION AFTER LANDING

  1. NELSON (less that part which had been dropped short) moved off unopposed to attack the beach defences. They were partly successful but could not complete their task owing to shortage of personnel.

HARDY and JELLICOE formed up and moved off according to plan. During this time a few shots were heard and it appeared that some of the enemy were aware of the attack. HARDY surrounded and took the House and found it empty except for one German in the attic – he was killed.

JELLICOE surrounded the Radio location set; the crew of 5 men offered little resistance but all were killed [incorrect] with the exception of one Luftwaffe man who was taken prisoner. From him it was learnt that there were 100 Germans in the Rectangle and approximately one company in the BRUNEVAL area. The lighthouse at Cap d’Antifer had warned them that a parachutist raid was taking place.

In the meantime RODNEY and DRAKE had dropped. DRAKE moved to their positions near the Rectangle and when they received orders to withdraw, threw grenades and opened fire on the enemy in the Rectangle.

Some of RODNEY were in the aircraft which dropped short and RODNEY were therefore slightly under strength. However, they took up their positions in reserve without difficulty.

After the RE and RAF RDF experts had taken what was required from the RDF set, HARDY, JELLICOE and DRAKE withdrew Southwards about half way to the beach, when it was learnt that the beach defences had not yet been taken completely by NELSON.

The Company Commander detailed a party under Lieut. Young from HARDY, JELLICOE and DRAKE to assist NELSON to take the remaining beach defences.

This was done successfully and soon afterwards 2/Lieut. Charteris, who was in charge of that party of NELSON which had dropped short, arrived with 4 of his men and took over the beach according to plan.

RODNEY, who had been engaged with some enemy fire from the Rectangle, then moved to the beach under the orders of the Company Commander.

HARDY and all technical experts, with the equipment which they had collected, also moved down to the beach. The remainder of the company was arranged in defensive positions near the beach while contact was made with the Navy.

This was done by No. 38 Wireless Set and a Very Pistol, as the signallers with No. 18 sets were amongst those who had been dropped short.

As soon as the ALCs arrived, orders were given for the whole company to withdraw and embark. This was done successfully with the exception of a small party, including the signallers mentioned before who had not yet reported to the beach.

At about 0300 hours it appeared from various vehicle lights that were seen that reinforcements were arriving just North of the Rectangle and possibly a counter-attack might have been put in at about 0330 hours. The troops actually left the beach at 0315 hours.

At 0815 hours a wireless message was received from Commander Cook that the operation had been successful.

RETURN SEA VOYAGE

  1. One MGB, with the RDF equipment and technical experts, returned independently at high speed and reached HMS Prince Albert off SPITHEAD at 1000 hours 28 Feb.

The remainder of the force arrived at 1630 hours on 28 Feb, the sea being moderately rough most of that day.

No. 11 Group Fighter Command had fighters protecting the returning boats from about 0815 hours 28 Feb until they were all back. In consequence, no German aircraft interfered in any way.

PRISONERS

  1. 3 German prisoners were brought back in the boats, including one man of the Luftwaffe.

CASUALTIES

  1. German casualties are estimated at a minimum of 40 killed.

Our own casualties were as follows. There were no casualties amongst 5 Corps troops in the boats, the Royal Navy or RAF.

Killed

3252284 Pte. McIntyre, H – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

Pte. Scott – /Wounded.

Wounded

2751640 CSM Strachan, G – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

3195970 Sgt. Boyd, J – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

2929915 Cpl. Heslop, G – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

2879337 Cpl. Stewart, V – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

2037582 L/C Heard, R – Air Troops, RE, 1 Parachute Bde.

2928756 Pte. Grant, W – ‘C’Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

3058375 Pte. Shaw, H – ‘C’Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

Missing (ie left in France, no details available)

2930416 L/C MacCallum, J – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

2879968 Pte. Sutherland, J – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

4745152 Pte Willoughby, J – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

5951642 Pte. Thomas, D – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

4622613 Pte. Cornell, G – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

5047949 Pte. Embury, E – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

5347681 Pte. Scott, A – ‘C’ Coy, 2 Parachute Bn.

  1. GERMAN TROOPS AND DEFENCES

See Appx. ‘O’.

  1. SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION

The operation was completely successful.

A preliminary report on the value of the RDF equipment captured is attached to Appx. ‘1’. Since that report was written, it has been ascertained definitely that all the equipment required was captured and brought in very good condition.

The prisoner of the Luftwaffe who was captured had spent some time previously in a German Concentration Camp and was willing to talk. As he is a RDF expert, the information he has given has been sufficient to complete the whole picture.

  1. PUBLICITY

In addition to the reports of the three Press representatives who accompanied the boats, one officer, one NCO and one Pte. of the parachutists reported to HQ Combined Operations to give interviews to the Press. They were allowed to describe the operation in full, except that they were forbidden to reveal the fact that RDF equipment was brought back; that is still secret information.

The BBC were to have broadcast a talk by Major Frost, but, although recorded, the talk was later forbidden by the Ministry of Information.

  1. DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION TO WAR CABINET AND CHIEFS OF STAFF

At 2100 hours on 2 Mar 42, GOC the Airborne Division, with GSO1 and Major J D Frost, attended a meeting of the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff at which the following were present:

The Rt Hon W L S Churchill, PC,CH, TD, LLD, MP – Prime Minister

The Rt Hon R A Eden, PC, NC, MP – Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Rt Hon Sir James Grigg, PC,KCB, KCSI – Secretary of State for War

The Rt Hon A V Alexander, PC, CH, MP – First Lord of the Admiralty

The Rt Hon Sir Archibald Sinclair Bt., KT, PC, CMG, MP – Secretary of State for Air

The Rt Hon C R Attlee, PC, MP – Deputy Prime Minister

Capt. The Rt Hon O Lyttleton, PC, DSO, MC – Minister of Production

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, GCH, GCVC – First Sea Lord

General Sir Alan Brooke, CB, DSC – Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, KCS, DSO, MC – Chief of the Air Staff

Commodore the Lord Louis Mountbatten, GCVC, DSO – Commodore, Combined Operations

Wing-Commander The Marquis of Casa Maury – SIC, HQ, Combined Operations