SECTION ONE
BRENTANO’S THEORY CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF TIME
§ 3. The Primordial Associations
By coming to grips with Brentano’s theory of the origin of time, we shall now gain an approach to the problems we have raised. Brentano believed he had found the solution to the problem in the primordial associations, in the “genesis of the immediate presentations of memory [Gedächtnisvorstellungen] which, according to a law that admits no exceptions, are joined to particular presentations of perception without mediation.” When we see, hear, or in general perceive something, it happens according to rule that what is perceived remains present for an interval although not without modification. Apart from other alterations, such as those in intensity and richness, which occur now to a lesser, now to a more noticeable degree, there is always yet another and particularly odd characteristic to be confirmed, namely, that anything of this kind remaining in consciousness appears to us as something more or less past, as something temporally shoved back [Zurückgeschobenes], as it were. When, for example, a melody sounds, the individual notes do not completely disappear when the stimulus or the action of the nerve excited by them comes to an end. When the new note sounds, the one just preceding it does not disappear without a trace; otherwise, we should be incapable of observing the relations between the notes which follow one another. We should have a note at every instant, and possibly in the interval between the sounding of the next an empty [leere] phase, but never the idea [Vorstellung] of a melody. On the other hand, it is not merely a matter of presentations of the tones simply persisting in consciousness. Were they to remain unmodified, then instead of a melody we should have a chord of simultaneous notes or rather a disharmonious jumble of sounds such as we should obtain if we struck all the notes simultaneously that have already been sounded. Only in this way, namely, that that peculiar modification occurs, that every aural sensation, after the stimulus which begets it has disappeared, awakes from within itself a similar presentation provided with a temporal determination, and that this determination is continually varied, can we have the presentation of a melody in which the individual notes have their definite place and their definite measure of time.
It is a universal law, therefore, that to each presentation is naturally joined a continuous series of presentations each of which reproduces the content of the preceding but in such a way that the moment of the past is always attached to the new.
Thus, phantasy turns out here in a peculiar way to be productive. We have here the one case in which phantasy in truth creates a new moment of presentation, namely, the temporal moment. Thus, in the sphere of phantasy we have uncovered the origin of ideas of time [Zeitvorstellungen]. Psychologists, with the exception of Brentano, have endeavored in vain to discover the true source of these ideas. This failure is due to a blending of subjective and Objective time, always natural to be sure, which confused the psychological researcher and prevented him from seeing the real problem present here. Many are of the opinion that the question of the origin of the concept of time is to be answered in much the same way as the question of the origin of our concepts of colors, sounds, and so on. Thus, just as we sense a color, so also do we sense the duration of the color; just as we sense quality and intensity, so also the temporal duration of an immanent moment of sensation. The external stimulus engenders the quality through the pattern of the physical processes involved, through the kinetic energy of the physical processes, the intensity, and, through the continuation of the stimulus, the subjectively sensed duration. This, however, is an obvious error. To say that the stimulus endures is not to say that the sensation is sensed as enduring but only that the sensation also endures. The duration of sensation and the sensation of duration are different. And it is the same with sensation. The succession of sensations and the sensation of succession are not the same.
We must naturally raise precisely the same objection against those who would trace the idea of duration and succession back to the fact of the duration and succession of the psychical act. Meanwhile, we shall carry out the reflection by applying it specifically to sensation.
Because our ideas do not bear the slightest trace of temporal determinateness, it is conceivable that our sensations could endure or succeed one another without our being aware of it in the least. If we observe, for example, a particular instance of succession and assume that the sensations disappear with the stimuli producing them, we should have a succession of sensations without a notion of a temporal flow. With the emergence of the new sensation we should no longer have any memory of the having-been [Gewesensein] of the earlier. In each moment we should have only the consciousness of the sensation just produced and nothing further. But even the continued duration of the sensation already produced would not help us procure the idea of succession. If, in the case of a succession of sounds, the earlier ones were to be preserved as they were while ever new ones were also to sound, we should have a number of sounds simultaneously in our imagination [Vorstellung], but not succession. The situation would be no different in the case in which all these sounds sounded at once. Or, to take another example, if, in the case of motion, the body moved were to be held fast unaltered in its momentary position in consciousness, then the space traversed would appear to us to be continuously occupied but we should have no idea of motion. We arrive at the idea of succession only if the earlier sensation does not persist unaltered in consciousness but in the manner described is specifically modified, that is, is continuously modified from moment to moment. In going over into phantasy, the sensation preserves its constantly varying temporal character; from moment to moment the content thus seems to be shoved back more and more. This modification, however, is no longer the business of sensation; it is not brought about through the stimulus. The stimulus produces the actual content of sensation. If the stimulus disappears, the sensation also disappears. But the sensation itself now becomes productive. It produces a phantasy-idea [Phantasievorstellung] like, or nearly like, itself with regard to content and enriched by a temporal character. This idea again awakens a new one which is always attached to it, and so on. This continuous joining of a temporally modified idea to those already given Brentano calls “primordial association.” As a consequence of this theory, Brentano came to disavow the perception of succession and alteration. We believe that we hear a melody, that we still hear something that is certainly past. However, this is only an illusion which proceeds from the vivacity of primordial association.
§ 4. The Gaining of the Future and Infinite Time
The intuition of time which arises through primordial association is still not intuition of infinite time. It undergoes a further elaboration and, in fact, not only with regard to the past. It obtains an entirely new branch through the addition of the future. On the basis of the appearance of momentary recollections, phantasy forms ideas of the future in a process similar to that through which, circumstances permitting, we arrive at ideas of certain new varieties of color and sound while keeping to known forms and relations. In phantasy, we can transpose a melody which we have heard in a certain key and on the basis of a definite tonal species to different registers. In this way it can very well be that, proceeding from known sounds, we can arrive at sounds which as yet we have never heard. In a similar way—that is to say, in expectation—phantasy forms the idea of the future from the past. The notion that phantasy is able to offer nothing new, that it exhausts itself in the repetition of the same elements already given in perception, is one that is completely erroneous. Finally, what the complete idea of time, the idea of infinite time, arrives at is a structure of conceptual representation [Vorstellen] exactly like that of an infinite numerical series, infinite space, etc.
§ 5. The Transformation of Ideas through Temporal Characters
An especially important characteristic still remains to be considered with regard to Brentano’s idea of time. The time-species of past and future are uniquely characterized by the fact that they do not define the elements of sensible representation with which they are combined as do other supervenient modes, but alter them. A louder tone C is still the tone C, and so is one that is softer. On the other hand, a tone C which has been is no tone C, a red which has been is no red. Temporal determinations do not define; they essentially alter in a manner wholly similar to determinations such as “imagined,” “wished,” etc. An imagined dollar, a possible dollar, is no dollar. Only the determination “now” is an exception. The A existing now is indeed a real A. The present does not alter, but on the other hand it also does not define. If I add “now” to the idea of man, the idea acquires no new characteristic thereby; in other words, the “now” attributes no new characteristic to the idea of man. In perception, when something is represented at present, nothing is added to the quality, intensity, or spatial determinateness thereby. The temporal predicates which qualify that to which they refer are, according to Brentano, non-real [irreale]; only the determination “now” is real. This involves something remarkable, namely, that non-real temporal determinations can belong in a continuous series with a unique, actual, real determinateness to which they are joined by infinitesimal differences. The real now becomes ever and again non-real. If one asks how the real is able to become non-real by being joined to qualifying temporal determinations, no answer can be given other than this: temporal determinations of every kind are joined in a certain way as necessary consequences to every instance of coming to be and passing away that takes place in the present. For, as is completely obvious and self-evident, everything that is or that becomes, in consequence of the fact that it is, has been, and in consequence of the fact that it is, in the future will have been.
Turning now to a critique of the theory as presented above, we must ask first of all: What does it accomplish and what is it meant to accomplish? Obviously, it does not proceed on the basis that we recognized as necessary for a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness. It proceeds in terms of transcendent presuppositions, with existing temporal Objects which put forth “stimuli” and “produce” sensations in us, and the like. Thus it shows itself to be a theory of the psychological origin of the idea of time. At the same time, however, it contains parts of an epistemological study concerning the conditions of the possibility of a consciousness of Objective temporality, which consciousness itself appears as temporality and must be able to so appear. To this end, there are statements concerning the characteristics of the temporal predicates which must stand in relation to psychological and phenomenological predicates. These relations, however, are not pursued further.
Brentano speaks of a law of primordial association, according to which representations of a momentary recollection are joined to particular perceptions. What is meant by this is obviously a psychological law concerning the new formation of psychical lived experiences on the basis of given psychical lived experiences. These lived experiences are psychical, they are Objectified, they themselves have their time, and the point at issue is their generation and development. Such matters belong in the sphere of psychology and do not interest us here. Nevertheless, there is a phenomenological nucleus in these observations, and the following exposition will be concerned with this exclusively. Duration, succession, and alterations appear. What is involved in this appearing? In a succession a “now” appears and, in unity therewith, a “past.” The unity of the consciousness which encompasses the present and the past is a phenomenological datum. The question now is whether, as Brentano asserted, the past really appears in this consciousness in the mode of phantasy.
When Brentano speaks of gaining the future, he distinguishes between the originary intuition of time, which according to him is the creation of primordial association and extended intuition of time that arises from phantasy3 but not from primordial association. We can also say: the intuition of time stands in contrast to the idea of time, which is unauthentic, the idea of infinite time, of temporal periods and temporal relations that are not intuitively realized. It is most extraordinary that in his theory of the intuition of time Brentano did not take into consideration the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time, for the difference, here obtrusive, is one that he could not possibly have overlooked. Although he was inclined to disavow talk of the perception of the temporal (with the exception of the now-point as the boundary between the past and future), the distinction which lies at the basis of the talk of the perception of succession and the calling to mind at some future time of a perceived succession (or the mere phantasy of the same) cannot be denied and must in some way be explained. If the originary intuition of time is indeed a creation of phantasy, what then distinguishes this phantasy of the temporal from that in which we are aware of a past temporal thing, a thing, therefore, that does not belong in the sphere of primordial association and that is not closed up together in one consciousness with perception of the momentary, but was once with a past perception? If the presentification4 of the succession lived and experienced yesterday implies a presentification of the temporal field originarily lived and experienced yesterday, and if this field manifests itself as a continuum of primordially associated phantasies, then what we now have to do with are phantasies of phantasies. Here we run up against an unresolved difficulty with regard to Brentano’s theory which brings the accuracy of his analysis of originary time-consciousness into question.5 That he was never able to overcome these difficulties lies not only in what has been said but also in other deficiencies.
Brentano did not distinguish between act and content, or between act, content of apprehension, and the object apprehended. We ourselves must be clear, however, as to where to place the temporal element. If primordial association joins a continuous sequence of ideas to the actual perception and the temporal moment is generated thereby, we must ask: What kind of temporal moment? Does it belong to the character of the act as an inherent difference essential to it or to the content of the apprehension, to the sensible content, let us say, when, for example, we consider colors and sounds in their temporal being? According to Brentano’s theory, namely, that the act of representation as such does not permit differentiation, that, apart from their primary content, there is no difference between ideas as such, there is nothing left to consider but that to the primary content of perception are joined phantasms and more phantasms, qualitatively alike and differing, let us say, only in decreasing richness and intensity of content. In parallel with this, phantasy adds a new moment, the temporal. These explanations, however, are in various respects unsatisfactory. We do not encounter temporal characters such as succession and duration merely in the primary content, but also in the Objects apprehended and in the acts of apprehension. An analysis of time which is restricted to one level is not adequate; it must rather pursue the constitution of time at all levels.
Let us ignore all transcending interpretations, however, and try to carry out the following explication with regard to the immanent content, namely, that the temporal modification is to be understood through the supervention of a moment, called the temporal moment, which is interwoven with the running-off [Ablauf] of the other content, with quality, intensity, and so forth. Let sound A be experienced as having just sounded and let it be renewed through primordial association and as regards its content continuously retained. This implies, however, that A (in any event, up to the weakening of its intensity) is not past but remains present. The whole difference consists in this, that the association must also be creative and add a new moment called “past.” This moment grades off [stuft sich ab], varies continuously, and according to circumstances, A is more or less past. This implies, therefore, that the past, insofar as it falls into the sphere of the originary intuition of time, must also be present, and that the temporal moment “past” must, in the same sense as the element “red” that we actually experience, be a present moment of lived experience—which, of course, is an obvious absurdity.
One may perhaps object that, although A itself is past, a new content A with the character “past” may be in consciousness by virtue of primordial association. Nevertheless, if a similar content A is continually in consciousness, be it also with a new moment, then A is not past but present. Consequently, it is now and always present and this together with the new moment of the “past,” past and present in one.—But how do we know that an A has been earlier even before the existence of the present A is past? Whence comes our idea of the past? The being-present of an A in consciousness, by means of the linking-on of a new moment (we may also call it a moment of the past), cannot be explained by the transcending consciousness by saying it is A past. Not even the slightest notion can be given of this, namely, that what I now have in consciousness as A with its new character is identical with something that is not now in consciousness but, rather, has been. What then are the moments of primordial association lived and experienced now? Are they themselves times, perhaps? If so, we are faced with the following contradiction: all these moments are there now, are enclosed in the same consciousness of objects. Therefore, they are simultaneous. But, still, the succession of time excludes their being all-at-once [Zugleich]. Are these moments, perhaps, not themselves temporal moments but rather temporal signs? But with this we have in the first place only coined a new expression. The consciousness of time is not yet analyzed. We have not yet made it clear how consciousness of something past is constituted on the basis of such signs, or in what sense, in what manner, and through what apprehensions these lived and experienced moments function otherwise than as moments of quality, and function in such a way that the reference of consciousness that a now is to be comes about through a not-now.
The attempt, therefore, to set forth what is past as something not real or not existing is very questionable. A supervenient psychical moment cannot make something non-real, or get rid of what presently exists. In fact, the whole sphere of primordial associations is a present and real lived experience. To this sphere belongs the whole series of originary temporal moments produced by means of primordial associations together with the other moments which belong to the temporal object.
We see, therefore, that it is no use to have an analysis of time-consciousness which will make the intuitive temporal interval comprehensible solely through the continuous gradation of new moments which somehow are pieced to or melted away from those moments of content which constitute the temporally localized objective entity [Gegenständliche]. To put it briefly, the form of time is itself neither the content of time nor is it a complex of new content added to the timecontent in some fashion or other. If Brentano did not also fall into the error of reducing everything, after the manner of sensualism, to mere primary content, even if he was the first to recognize the radical separation between primary content and characters of acts, still his theory of time shows that he did not take into consideration the act-characters which are decisive for this theory. The question of how time-consciousness is possible and is to be understood remains unsolved.
3. “Phantasy” always includes here all presentifying [vergegenwärtigenden] acts and is not employed in contrast to acts of position [setzenden Akten]. [I use the neologism presentify as the translation of vergegenwärtigen despite the fact that the appropriate, although obsolete, term presentiate (to make present as in time or space) exists, because of the danger of confusing corresponding forms of present and presentiate, e.g., presentation and presentiation. J.S.C.]
4. [Cf. note 3. J.S.C.]
5. For the corresponding positive statement, cf. § 19, pp. 68ff.