THE OBJECTIVATION [Objektivation] OF TIME AND OF THE MATERIAL IN TIME1
Parallel problems are the constitution of the one all-space [All-Raumes] which is co-perceived with every particular perception so far as the perceived thing as regards its substance appears lying in it, and the constitution of the one time in which lies the temporality of the thing, in which the duration of the thing is ordered, as well as the duration of the things and material processes which pertain to the environment of the thing. In this same time the ego is also ordered, not only the physical self [Ichlieb] but also its “psychical lived experiences.” The time pertaining to every material thing is its time and yet we have only one time—not only in the sense that things are ordered beside one another in a unique linear extension but also that different things or processes appear as simultaneous. They do not merely have parallel similar times but one time, numerically one. The situation is not the same here as with a manifold of spatial fullness where visual and tactile fullness coincide. Rather, here we have separated, non-coincident materialities which endure and are still in the identical temporal interval.
Material givenness takes place as a process in phenomenological temporality. The total flow of motivating sensations of motion (K) and the “images” (i) motivated by means of them are temporally extended. In the transition from K0 to K1, the images motivated in this way have their discharge i0—i1 and stand in temporal coincidence with K. As is the case with every temporal flux that is fulfilled, this one also has its temporal form, and this form can be a changing one. The flow of K and therewith that of i can follow quickly or more slowly, and yet in the most diverse ways, at a like or unlike speed according as the temporal fullness spreads out in the temporal interval, fills this or that partial interval with greater or lesser “thickness” [Dichte]. Further, the running-off of K and therewith the succession of images can be reversed, and again in a changing temporal form. The temporal forms of the consciousness of a givenness conform to this.
In certain respects, all this is irrelevant to the Object which appears and stands forth as given. This is also the case with the greater or lesser extension of the kinesthetic image-discharge or the greater or lesser discharge of possible appearances from the ideal total multiplicity. I say irrelevant so far as indeed at all times the same thing, static and unaltered as to content, let us say, is there, ever spreading out its material fullness of content in the same temporal form and in uniform thickness throughout. And yet the temporality of the flux has something to say for the Objectivation. It appears, indeed, that something temporal, temporality itself, belongs essentially to the appearing object and, in our case, temporality in the form of the duration of the unaltered, static thing. But one may now say that the Objectivation of time must still have its “exhibitive” content in the phenomenon, and wherein otherwise than in its phenomenological temporality? More precisely, the appearance in the narrower sense of the term, that falling under the actual motivating circumstances, will naturally come into question, and as in this appearance, the image exhibits the Objectively local through its localness [Ortlichkeit], through its quasi-shape and quasi-size, its Objective shape and size, and, further, through its quasi-coloration, the Objective coloration, so through its temporality it exhibits Objective temporality. The image is the image in the flux of the continuity of images. To every image-phase in this flux corresponds the appearing Objective temporal phase of the thing, more precisely, the side of the Object which exhibits itself in this image. The pre-empirical temporal position of the image is the exhibition of the Objective position; the pre-empirical temporal extension in the running-off of the continuity of images is the exhibition of the Objective temporal extensity of the thing, therefore, its duration. All this is self-evident.
Observed more closely, this “exhibition” of Objective time is, to be sure, one essentially other than that of the thing existing in Objective time, enduring in it as identical in time, and filling time in the mode of duration. If, for the sake of simplicity, we assume a continuity of like images (therefore, of like richness) within the limited sphere of “clearest seeing,” then an intentional bundle of rays goes through the images flowing off in quasi-time so that by this means the images are posited in unequivocal correspondence. Points lying on the same intentional ray exhibit through their contents one and the same Object-point. Here, therefore, a unity-positing consciousness goes through the pre-empirical temporal continuity. A flux of content, strung along the intentional ray, exhibits phase for phase the same material point [Dingpunkt]. Every image-point also has its pre-empirical temporal position. However, a consciousness of unity does not again go through the successive temporal positions, Objectifying them to identical unity. The point-series of images spreading out in this countinuity of temporal positions exhibits the same thing-point [Ding-Punkt]; however, the series of temporal positions does not exhibit an identical temporal point of the same thing-point but again a temporal series. And the individual image-point has the same temporal position as all other co-existing image-points. The entire image has a temporal position, and every different image a different position. Every different temporal position in the pre-empirical flux of images exhibits a different Objective temporal position. Otherwise, indeed, a thing which as such has its duration, a filled, Objective temporal series, would not appear.
The consciousness of unity, spreading out in the pre-empirical flow of time, posits unity in the temporal flow of the exhibitive images, in that it turns every image into precisely an exhibitive one, posits givenness in it and with every new image, givenness “of the same.” What is given in every phase, however, is given and posited as a now with such and such a content. In the transition to the next phase it is held fast in its now. Thus the new phase (and every new phase) is given with its now held fast; therefore, in the continuous transition, the phases are so posited in unity that every phase in the Objectivation keeps its now, and the series of now-points (as Objective temporal points) is filled with a continuously uniform and identical content. When phase a is actual, it has the character of the actual now. But in the temporal flux, phase joins to phase, and as soon as we have the new actual phase those which have just “now” been have altered their character as actual. In this flux of alterations, temporal Objectivation takes place so far as, in the flux of phenomenological alteration which a undergoes in sinking back, a continuous positing of the identical a with the determinate temporal point results. In Objectifying consciousness, the flux of images running off appears as a flux of alterations of sensible contents. If every image with its now were so Objectified as it is in itself, the unity of this multiplicity would be the unity “lying in it,” and to be inferred from it.
In the Objectivation of a thing, however, the image-content, in the sense of the kinesthetic unity of motivation, is thus and thus apprehended. It is not, therefore, simply accepted as it is but as exhibition, as the bearer of an intentional bundle characterized as thus and thus and always being fulfilled in the mode of pure coincidence. This intentionality pervades the image-content, while every now-moment which belongs to the actual image undergoes the same temporal point-Objectivation which it would even without the Objectivation of the thing. An Objective temporal series, therefore, is everywhere constituted in the same way. However, the series of appearances in whose flux Objective temporality is constituted is, with respect to its matter, different according as it is material or non-material temporality which is constituted, e.g., according as Objective time is constituted in the duration of alteration of an immanent sound or of a thing. Both series of appearance have something in common, a common form which makes up the character of the Objectivation of time as such. However, the appearances are at one time appearances of the immanent, at another of the material. Thus comes to be the identity of the sound in the flux of tonal phases, each of which has its temporal individuation and a unity in the continuity of phases, comprising an identity of sound which exists in all phases and consequently endures. Thus the identity of the thing in the flux of appearances is identity of the thing appearing in all appearances in the mode of self-and-now-givenness, the thing which appears in an ever fresh now and consequently endures.
At the same time, it must be stressed that in transcendent perception the phases of the earlier appearance do not merely remain retentionally preserved, as occurs with every sequence of appearances or at least occurs within certain limits. The actual perceptual appearance at any given time does not conclude with what it brings to actual givenness, the reality posited by the perception as now. It is not true that the preceding appearances are merely preserved as appearances of what have been. The (primary) consciousness of memory of earlier phases is memorial consciousness, to be sure, but with regard to the earlier perception. What was perceived earlier not only is present now as the earlier perceived but is taken over into the now and is posited as still in being now. Not only is what is just really perceived posited as now but also what has been given previously. During the flux of real perception not only is what is really seen posited as enduring being in the flux of its appearances but also what has been seen. And the same is true with regard to the future. Posited as now in the expectation of additional phases of real perception is also the about-to-be-perceived. The about-to-be-perceived is now; it endures and fills the same time. Precisely the same thing holds for everything unseen but capable of being seen, i.e., everything which could be perceived with the possible flowing-off of K as belonging to it.
There is accomplished here only an extension of the Objectivation of time which we have discussed under the limitation of what is continually seen and what in the course of the seeing again and again exhibits itself differently. Everything seen can also be unseen but still remains capable of being seen. In conformity with its essence, every flux of perception admits of an extension which finally transforms the perceived into a not-perceived. However, just as the positing of time, since it identifies the visual thing which appears there “complete” in the succession of its complete appearances, co-objectifies every temporal position of the phases of the appearance and gives it the significance of an Objective temporal position, with the result that an Objective enduring thing is displayed in the series of appearances, so also takes place and in a similar way the positing of time with regard to the totality of appearances. These appearances bring about the exhibition of one and the same Objectivity in a way which is always incomplete.
1. To § 43, pp. 117ff.