THE CONSTITUTION OF SPONTANEOUS UNITIES AS IMMANENT TEMPORAL OBJECTS [Zeitobjekte]—JUDGMENT AS A TEMPORAL FORM AND ABSOLUTE TIME-CONSTITUTING CONSCIOUSNESS1
If we have a judgment (e.g., 2 × 2 = 4), what is meant as such is a non-temporal idea. The same thing can be meant in countless acts of judgment in an absolutely identical sense, and this same thing can be true and false. Let us take this idea as the “principle” and consider the “judgment” as the correlate of this principle. Therefore, should one not say, “the act of judgment, the consciousness in which precisely the 2 × 2 = 4 is meant”? No. Let us consider: instead of directing my glance of attention toward what is meant as such, I direct it toward the judging, to the process in which it comes to be given to me that 2 × 2 = 4. A process goes on. I begin with the forming of the subject-thought 2 × 2 and bring this formation to an end. This serves as the fundamental affirmation for then affirming “is equal to 4.” Therefore, we have a spontaneous act of forming which begins, goes forward, and ends. What I form there, however, is not the logical principle which is meant therewith. What is “formed” is not the meant; rather, what is formed in spontaneity is first of all the 2 × 2 and on this, the 2 × 2 = 4. As soon as this formation is complete, it is already over as a process, and immediately sinks back into the past.
At the same time, what is formed is obviously not the process of formation (otherwise, the comparison in terms of forming would be wrongly employed). I can also attend to the continuously advancing consciousness and to the unity of the advancing process (just as in the perception of a melody I can attend to the continuous consciousness, the continuous running-off of the “phenomena,” but not to the notes themselves). But the end of this process is not the completed phenomenon in which precisely 2 × 2 = 4 is meant. In just the same way, the process of consciousness constituting the appearance of a hand motion is not the appearance itself in which the hand motion appears. In our case what corresponds to the appearance is the intending that it is true that 2 × 2 = 4, the explicit “predication” in which, so to speak, the “it is so” appears. In the unity of the appearances of the hand motion belong not the phases of the processes of consciousness but the phases of appearance being constituted in them. The components of the predication, the subject term, the predicate term, etc., are also constituted in the process of the consciousness of judgment (as the flux of the same). And, after it has been constituted, the subject term of the judgment, as of the unitary intending of the judgment, likewise belongs to the intending of the judgment, although the consciousness of this term is continuously further modified (exactly as the present appearance of the initial phase of a motion, always in the mode of sinking back, belongs to the appearance of the motion; the forms of consciousness, however, in which the initial phase is constituted as the stable phase of the motion, do not so belong).
We must say, therefore, that there are two things to be distinguished:
(1) the flux of consciousness and
(2) what is self-constituting in it,
and from the second side, on the other hand:
(a) the judgment as the self-constituting “appearance” of the intending of 2 × 2 = 4, which is a process of becoming, and
(b) that which becomes there, the judgment which stands at the end as the formed, the become: the complete predication.
The judgment is here, therefore, an immanent process of unity in immanent time, a process (not a flux of consciousness but a process which is constituted in the flux of consciousness) which begins and ends and with the end is also over, just as a movement is over in the moment in which it has taken place. Of course, while with the appearance of a sensible perceived becoming it is always conceivable that the becoming may pass over into enduring being or that motion in any given phase may pass over into rest, here rest is, in general, inconceivable.
With the above, however, we have not yet exhausted all distinctions. With every act of spontaneity something new emerges. This act functions, so to speak, in every moment of its flux as a primal sensation which undergoes its shading-off according to the fundamental law of consciousness. The spontaneity which sets about its work in steps in the flux of consciousness constitutes a temporal Object, namely, an Object of becoming, a process, essentially only a process, and not an enduring Object. And this process sinks back into the past. In view of this, one must consider the following: if I begin with a this-positing [Diessetzung], then the spontaneous laying hold of and comprehending is a moment which stands forth in immanent time as a moment only to sink away forthwith. To this, however, is joined a retaining [Festhaltung] for the formation of the total unity of the process of judgment in immanent time. The primal positing of the this (the “snapping-in” [Einschnappen] as Lipps says) passes continually over into the retentive this-consciousness. This retaining is not the preserving of the primal positing, which, to be sure, undergoes its immanent temporal modification, but a form involved with this consciousness. Therewith there is something noteworthy, namely, that in this stable phenomenon is constituted not merely the sinking away of the beginning phase; rather, the continuous self-preserving, self-perpetuating this-consciousness constitutes the this as an enduring posited thing. This implies that beginning and continuing [Einsetzen und Fortsetzen] make up a continuity of spontaneity which is essentially grounded in a process of sinking away temporally, which causes the beginning phase and the preserving phase which follow it in the temporal running-off to sink down, and by this also causes to sink down what it brings with itself as supporting ideas (intuitions, empty representations) and modifications of ideas. The act begins, goes on, but in a changed mode as act (as spontaneity), and then a new act, let us say, that of the predicate-positing [Pradikat-setzung] begins, continuing this total spontaneous running-off. The result, if the formation does not proceed further, is not the new (in its way) primal-welling spontaneity of the predicate-positing; rather, this positing proceeds from a ground. In the same immanent temporal phase in which the positing occurs, and, indeed, in the form of a retentive spontaneity, in the modified form which it has in contrast to the primal-welling subject-positing, the positing of the subject is really accomplished. On this positing of the subject is built the originary predicate-positing. With this, the subject-positing forms a unity, the unity of the entire judgment as an existing phase of the temporal process, as a temporal moment in which the judgment is actually “completed.” This moment sinks away, but I do not immediately cease to judge, i.e., an interval in which the judging is retained is continuously joined, here as otherwise, to the last perfecting moment of accomplishment. By this, the judgment as temporally formed in such and such a way gains a further extension. If the occasion should arise, I again join thereon new, higher formations of judgment, build on them, and so forth.
Consequently, the judgment as an immanent Object in internal time-consciousness is a unity of a process, a continuous unity of a stable positing (naturally, the positing of a judgment) in which two or more moments of accomplishment, moments of primal positing, appear. This process runs out in an interval without such moments, an interval which in a “neutral” [zuständlicher] way is consciousness of this process, belief in that which in a “primordial” way through the moments of accomplishment has attained consciousness. Judgment (predication) is possible only in such a process. This implies, of course, that retention is necessary for the possibility of judgment.
The mode in which a spontaneous unity, e.g., a predicative judgment, is constituted as an immanent temporal Object is sharply distinguished from the mode of the constitution of a sensible process, a continuous succession. The distinction rests on this, that in the latter case the “primordial” element that is the primal source-point of the ever newly filled temporal moment is either a simple primal phase of sensation (its correlate is the primary content in the now) or a similar one formed through an apprehension as a phase of primal appearance. The primordial element in the case of judgment, however, is the spontaneity of positing, which is based on some material or other of affection. The structure, therefore, is, in this respect, already more complex.
Furthermore, a double primordiality appears here. The “primordial” constitutive element for the judgment as a temporal form is the continuity of the “positing,” which in this respect is always primordially giving. The continuous moments of judgment of the temporal points, as of the temporal form, are constituted then in time-consciousness with its retentions. But we must distinguish the moments of authentic effective positing of productive spontaneity as opposed to the continuous moments of retentive spontaneity which preserve what is produced. This is a difference in the constituted temporal form in which the source-points are distinguished, and naturally also a difference in the constitutive time-consciousness in which the original phases fell into two modes: the creative and the neutral.
If, accordingly, we may consider the idea of the judgment as of the temporal form in distinction from the absolute, temporally constitutive consciousness as clarified (and precisely therewith the corresponding differences with regard to other spontaneous acts), then we can now say that this judgment is an act of meaning, an analogue of the immanent-Objective appearance in which, for example, an external spatio-temporal being appears. What is meant appears, as it were, in the meaning, in the meaning (of the temporal form) “2 × 2 = 4,” precisely the propositional state of affairs, syntactically formed in such and such a way. This state of affairs, however, is no thing, no Objective-temporal being, neither an immanent nor a transcendent one; what is meant in the state of affairs is enduring, but the state of affairs itself is not enduring. Its meaning as meant [Meinung] begins; however, it does not itself begin any more than it stops. In conformity with its essence, it can be known or given in various ways. It can be articulated, and then in a determinately constructed spontaneity can be known. This spontaneity as an immanent temporal form can proceed more or less “rapidly.” We can, however, also be conscious of the spontaneity in a neutral way, and so on.
Spontaneous temporal forms, like all immanent Objects, have their counter-images in reproductive modifications of themselves. The phantasy of judgment is, like every phantasy, itself a temporal form. The primordial moments of its constitution are the “primordial” phantasies, in contrast to the retentional modifications, which are joined immediately to them according to the basic law of consciousness. Since phantasy is constituted as an immanent Object, the immanent quasi-Object, the unity of what is immanently phantasied, in the immanent quasi-time of phantasy, is also constituted by means of its proper phantasy-intentionality, which has the character of a neutralized presentification. And where the phantasy is a presentifying modification of an “appearance,” there is also constituted the unity of a transcendently phantasied thing, let us say, the unity of a phantasied spatio-temporal Object or the unity of a phantasied state of affairs, one that is quasi-given in a quasi-judgment of perception or quasi-thought in a phantasy-judging of another kind.
1. To § 45, pp. 124ff.