1 The PAST must be administered by a qualified CCT, Special Tactics Officer, or certified Air Force recruiter, in the following order: 500-meter surface swim (maximum time 15:00 minutes), chin-ups (minimum six), sit-ups (minimum fifty), push-ups (minimum forty-two), a 1.5-mile run (maximum time 11:30). If a volunteer stops, rests, or otherwise fails to continue until muscle failure during any of the calisthenics, the test is halted at that point and they are failed. Minimum numbers are frowned upon and typically indicate the volunteer is an unlikely graduate of the two-year training pipeline.

2 The unit’s actual naming conventions were Brand X, 1977–June 1981; Det 1 MACOS, June 1981–June 1983; Det 4 NAFCOS, July 1983–April 1987; 1724th Combat Control Squadron, May 1987–September 1987; 1724th Special Tactics Squadron, October 1987–March 1992; 24th Special Tactics Squadron (informally known as “the 24”—pronounced “the two-four”), March 1992–present.

3 Delta selection is open to any soldier regardless of background, whereas SEAL Team Six, like the 24, only takes volunteers from within the ranks of its “white” SOF teams. For CCT, that was every other Special Tactics squadron.

4 The same unit that augmented the 24 for the Panama invasion.

5 The first two ODAs to enter Afghanistan went in the same night, but their initial effects through airpower could not have been more divergent. ODA 555, with Calvin Markham, put bombs on target beginning with his first strike, as outlined in this chapter. ODA 595 (the team featured in the Hollywood movie 12 Strong), electing to go without a CCT, was so unsuccessful in airstrikes that the 5th Special Forces Group commander, Colonel John Mulholland, directed a CCT, Matt Lienhard, along with a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), to be attached to them even though they were already in the field. According to Bart Decker, one of the “Horse Soldiers” in Doug Stanton’s book of the same name and the man in the most circulated photo of their exploits, “They were ‘yard-saleing’ bombs all over the place.” From his location with their field commander, Major Mark Mitchell, he helped coordinate Lienhard’s insertion, recognizing that 595 needed the Controller if they were to succeed and not kill friendlies. “Major Mitchell was a smart commander and a great guy,” recalls Decker. On 22 October the two airpower experts joined ODA 595. It was not an easy assignment. “Toughest job in the world is to try and integrate into an ODA that doesn’t want you,” adds Decker. But Lienhard and the TACP performed flawlessly, dividing themselves into separate 595 elements and calling numerous “danger close” airstrikes with surgical precision.

6 A B-52 can carry as many as fifty-one 500-pound bombs and thirty 1,000-pounders distributed inside its cavernous bomb bay and slung from its wings. A B-1’s payload (all of it internal) is 5,000 pounds more than the venerable 1950s-era B-52’s, but it enjoys a sleeker design and a reputation for speed of delivery.

7 Stockdale is known as “the Admiral” inside Delta Force for his name’s resemblance to the Vietnam naval Medal of Honor recipient’s. All Delta Force operators use a personalized call sign to identify themselves. Tom Greer, the team leader, was Redfly and would go on to write the story of Delta’s and Stockdale’s Tora Bora mission in the book Kill Bin Laden under the pseudonym Dalton Fury. The Delta A Squadron sergeant major also there to lead the mission was a man whose inexhaustible courage, resilience, and leadership on the Tora Bora mission remain legend in Delta. His Delta call sign: Ironhead. The names are bestowed by group consensus and not chosen by the individual.

8 Barely a year later, the Iraqi army would circulate copies of the movie Black Hawk Down as a primer on how to defeat US forces.

9 Haqqani’s prediction appeared in the Laissez Faire City Times in an article titled “Afghanistan: An American Graveyard?” by Richard S. Ehrlich.

10 All enemy excerpts describing their participation in and impressions of Operation Anaconda originated on the Taliban website www.azzam.com and were generated by at least three individuals. Originally posted in 2003, they inevitably and eventually took on a predictable propagandist cast as the site was revised over the years. However, the author was able to corroborate original (2003) versions with friendly and enemy sources of information, such that the passages appearing on these pages most closely reflect eyewitness accounts by enemy combatants at the time. However, no passage should be read as accurate reporting of battle events but rather as insight into the disposition and mindset of enemy combatants.

11 The cave complex, as it came to be known, would later be revealed to have housed Osama bin Laden before his relocation to Tora Bora in December 2001. Kris’s after-action report supported the notion: “Based on all the security positions overwatching the cave, all the mule feces and signs of occupation, I would say there was a good chance of this being true.”

12 Based in part on Operation Anaconda, the Royal Australian Air Force, recognizing the need for a comparable capability Down Under, initiated the creation of its first Combat Control Team in 2006. Designated B Flight, No. 4 Squadron RAAF, it now operates from RAAF Base Williamtown, deploying Aussie CCT in support of Australian SOF worldwide.

13 D. J. Turner’s crew would play a critical role in the coming hours and days. For Haas’s men and the ATF, they would be involved in a friendly-fire incident less than an hour after striking the DShK. But as events developed on Takur Ghar forty-eight hours later, it was Turner who would find himself over the mountain when the battle there unfolded.

14 Every Combat Controller used the same “fires” frequency for strikes in the Shahi Khot. Not only did this allow for sequencing and handoffs, it crucially prevented fratricide. Despite the coming battles and dozens of “danger close” airstrikes conducted by CCT during Anaconda, not one instance of friendly fire took place under their control.

15 The nine-line brief is used by all US, NATO, and allied fighters and bombers to receive information from the individual controlling the strike or bomb drop on the ground. It is conducted upon first contact, usually over a predetermined geographic point known as the Initial Point but referred to as IP.

16 The guidon-fielding commander observed by J Team would turn out to be none other than Maulawi Saif-ur-Rahman Nasrullah Mansoor, who had refused to consider his subordinate’s request for reinforcements.

17 This actually happened to Jay and Delta during the insertion of the main 101st forces earlier in the morning, when a flight of two AH-64 Apaches turned on J Team’s OP, lining up for a gun/rocket run. Jay recalls all of them at the OP reflexively shouting “No! No!” as he grabbed for the handset and radio, rapidly switching to 243 MHz (the Guard frequency, used by all aircraft for emergencies and always monitored during operations), and called them off at the last second, saving the team and preventing a tragedy.

18 In light of events and the passage of time, there is no definitive answer as to which SEAL officer actually gave the implied order. Official accounts vary, as do the recollections of individuals involved, and nowhere are any names given. However, there are only two possibilities—Captain Kernan, the SEAL Team Six commander, or his operations officer, Commander Szymanski. Individuals with firsthand knowledge believe it was most likely Szymanski. In the official TF-11 JOC log, the call from Razor-03 on Slab’s behalf received no official answer. The call sign acknowledging the call was Shark-78, the operations officer. Later, TF-Blue officers attempted to place the transmission’s responsibility on the enlisted sailor manning the radio, but the Joint Operations Center log clearly shows the call as Shark-78, the TF-Blue operations officer, Szymanski.

19 Reporting on the enemy’s disposition, or even its occupation of Takur Ghar prior to Razor-03’s insertion of Mako-30, is a study in contradictions. Slab maintains they would never have inserted if informed about enemy forces. However, Glenn, the Delta intel analyst, claims to have briefed the threat. Additionally, members of both J Team and Mako-31 have stated they reported Takur Ghar’s occupation by Al Qaeda. It is impossible to say where the critical disconnect was, but it was most likely within the SEALs’ separate chain of command. It was another consequence of the SEAL senior leadership failure to communicate and coordinate their intentions and actions. What is clear: Mako-30 was not aware before insertion.

20 This scenario resolves several conflicting theories put forth in other accounts and after-action reports, and Slab’s own statements. Slab remains confident he checked a body. However, Slab’s own testimony in various interviews, historical recordings, and witness statements is not consistent on the matter, some versions contradicting others. Fifteen years later, in the course of the Air Force’s Medal of Honor investigation, the five surviving SEALs would change their stories further, countering their original witness statements widely circulated and used in awarding Chapman’s Air Force Cross and confounding the Air Force’s efforts. Later, Slab would claim to have moved across the Controller’s feet and wondered why he didn’t react if he was alive. But he never stopped to check a pulse or otherwise inspect the fallen man, who in reality was almost certainly Roberts.

21 Of Chapman’s initial actions ahead of all the SEALs and in the face of an unknown and superior-positioned enemy, Slab would state unequivocally in his testimony, “I know if John hadn’t engaged the first enemy position, it would have surely killed us all before we reached cover.” Adding, “John died saving us from the enemy fire which was effective from three sides when he was killed,” concluding with, “I feel privileged, honored to have known him and have called him my Friend. John deserves the highest medal we can get for him.” These words, while expressing gratitude for the Combat Controller’s bravery and audacity, would prove challenging to live by for some of Slab’s higher-ups at SEAL Team Six in the years to come.

22 The following excerpt demonstrates the international composition of the enemy’s forces: With the first signs of night, [AC-130] planes arrived that carried machine guns similar in caliber to the DShK (12.7mm), although they were also able to fire missiles, and had night vision, which would allow vision for a distance of up to six kilometers away. We could do nothing but raise our hands and pray to Allah. Our brothers had dispersed, and were motionlessly positioned in trenches, for the enemy’s weapons could detect any movement. Since the brothers had been engaged in battle until night, the planes found us to be easy night-targets and on that night, about twenty mujahideen were killed by their planes. Seven of them were Arabs, these being: Abul-Baraa Al-Maghribi (Morocco), Abul-Baraa Ash-Shami (Syria), Abu Bakr Al-Maghribi (Morocco), Abul-Hasan As-Somali (Somalia), Khalid Al-Islambooli Al-Ghamidi (Arabian Peninsula), Abu Bakr Azzam Al-Urduni (Jordan), and Abdus-Salam Ghazi Al-Misri (Egypt).

23 The young Ranger officer had an embedded Air Force Tactical Air Control Party, but when Gabe and Self talked, the Ranger told him, “You’re fires,” thus settling any confusion as to who would be controlling airstrikes once the team hit the ground.

24 As with Mako-30, SEAL Team Six leadership rushed Mako-21 into the field, ill-prepared for their mission and leaving critical gear behind. Unbeknownst to AFO personnel in Gardez, they also established a separate line of communication with the TF-Blue TOC in Bagram, asking to be pulled from the mission. Ultimately they were extracted early without putting eyes on their objective or calling any airstrikes.

25 Attempts to claim that Bunker 1 is not occupied by the live Chapman are refuted by the fact that only those in Bunker 2 could have occupied Bunker 1. Only Gore-Tex Pants and the lone stalker from below came from elsewhere. Also, Bunker 2 had been attacking Bunker 1 repeatedly. Since that is the case, even if Gore-Tex Pants charging to hand-to-hand distance is a mistake, and then six minutes later the lone gunman does the same, the follow-on firefight that ensues (again) between the two bunkers is otherwise inexplicable. They’d know if it was fellow Al Qaeda at this point, having seen them and because they originally sent the forces to take the bunker in the form of the first flanker. Finally, it is now daylight.

26 The outcropping seen by Calvert was the same rock that the 60 gunner SEAL tumbled off when he got shot in the leg, just next to Bunker 1, which Chapman no doubt had just vacated.

27 The gunships above Operation Anaconda have sometimes received criticism for their failure to deliver results or remain on station. This is best refuted by D. J. Turner and his Grim-32 crew who remained on station overhead as the dawn broke, completely against AC-130 protocol and despite direct orders to return to base. As they flew north toward K2 airfield, headed for a severe “ass chewing” from Colonel Mulholland, the Task Force Dagger commander, the entire crew agreed it was the right thing to remain into daylight until fuel forced them from the battle. Gabe and the QRF had arrived at a coincidentally unfortunate time.

28 This was a second MH-47 with nothing but Rangers and the second part of the QRF. Diverted to Gardez until the situation stabilized or crystallized, it eventually landed at the base of Takur Ghar and disgorged thirteen more Rangers. Also aboard was Vic, the SEAL who left the safe house and hopped on the helicopter to get to Mako-30 without informing Blaber or anyone else. This would have far-reaching implications as the battle wore on.

29 Cory Lamoreaux survived to see his children. Greg Calvert kept his hand and, more remarkably, returned to full flight status and continued his career as a pilot.

30 According to the Pentagon’s foremost Medal of Honor staffing expert, John Chapman earned not one but two Medals of Honor that morning. The first by charging and destroying the machine-gun bunker ahead of the SEALs and saving their lives and the second when he protected the CSAR helicopter. Each action rose to the level of the nation’s highest honor, but the Air Force chose to pursue only a single medal, preferring (one presumes) to combine his actions into one irrefutable package.

31 For the first time in the history of air forces—any air force—the most decorated organization of a nation is not a flying unit. There are no pilots in the 24 SOW.