Grenade training is provided in most armies’ basic training. Most soldiers, even in supporting services, are given at least minimal training. This includes identification of different types, safety, the basics of how grenades function, and throwing practice. Most armies provide little detailed instruction on the effects of grenades. This means they are not always used to their maximum effectiveness and can cause them to be more dangerous to the thrower and other friendly forces. Most armies have soldiers throw only one or two live grenades, mainly for confidence building. During wartime, especially with armies in extremis, there may be no opportunity to throw a live grenade. It was not uncommon, though, for veterans to require replacement troops to practice throwing live grenades before engaging the enemy. Often rocks, weighted tin cans, or chunks of wood were all that were available.
A US Army Vietnam-era basic trainee practices throwing an M30 dummy grenade (the practice version of the M26) from a foxhole. Trainees were taught to be aware of the parados to prevent their striking it and dropping the grenade. (US Army)
Live-grenade throwing appears to be virtually standardized in most armies. Different throwing positions are demonstrated and each soldier practices the positions using dummy (inert) grenades. Practice grenades, which make a small smoke puff, are seldom provided at this stage. They are mainly used in force-on-force exercises. Other than the visual effect of the smoke puff showing where it lands, practice grenades do little to enhance training. “Instructor’s Notes: Instructors will impress on men the necessity for common sense, care, and knowledge of the nature of grenades, but will not lay too much stress on the question of danger, which would cause lack of confidence and nervousness in handling” (Small Arms Training. Grenade, Volume I, Pamphlet No. 13, British Army, 15 July 1942).
Throwing a live grenade for the first time is stressful to most recruits, and instructors habitually give a motivational and assurance talk. An instructor accompanies each recruit to a throwing position. This not only protects the instructor from the grenade’s detonation on the range, but an adjacent barrier or foxhole is provided into which they can duck if the grenade is dropped. Typically, the recruit is told that if he drops the grenade he is not to attempt to recover it, but to take cover and the instructor will recover and throw it. It is reasoned the instructor would have a cooler head, and for both men to scramble for the grenade would be dangerous. An over-nervous recruit or one who refused altogether would be given further reassurance and allowed to watch others throw grenades. This just about always gives him the pluck to take his turn. One soldier, after pulling the pin, threw his grenade before the order was given. When asked why, he claimed to feel it “swelling” in his hand.
Armies usually have an assault qualification course of some kind. This requires a soldier to move from position-to-position with full combat equipment and rifle attacking different targets with dummy grenades using different throwing positions at different ranges. The US Army Grenade Assault Qualification Course using dummy grenades and in use since World War II includes seven elements:
(1) moving to a foxhole and engaging “enemy” silhouette targets at 35m (38yd);
(2) moving to a bunker on a blindside and throwing a grenade into the firing port;
(3) engaging a mortar position at 20m (22yd) from the kneeling position;
(4) engaging “enemy” silhouettes from the prone position at 20m;
(5) engaging a trench from kneeling position at 25m (27yd);
(6) engaging a stationary vehicle from the kneeling position at 25m;
(7) identifying five different types of grenades.
Each event is timed. From World War II to the 1970s the US Army included a dummy grenade throw for range and accuracy in the Army Physical Fitness Test. The Soviets likewise included a grenade throw in their combat physical fitness course. The reality is that most soldiers perfect their grenade skills in combat while experiencing a wide range of conditions, especially with respect to unusual and awkward throwing positions. They also learn the actual effects of grenades and just how dangerous they can be to friendly troops.
Grenades do require a degree of preparation before use. Most modern grenades are shipped with the fuses inserted. During World War II and earlier, grenades were packed without the fuses. They were packaged in one or two metal cans packed in the grenade case. The fuse was screwed in prior to entering combat. Some early grenades were protected by a wax coating, which had to be removed. Some of the British and French explosives used in World War I and World War II grenades could ignite with friction. If loose grains had infiltrated into the fuse well, screwing in the fuse could detonate it. The fuse and its well had to be thoroughly cleaned. The cotter (split) pins were spread wide apart at the factory and these were partly straightened before entering combat, but not too much so the arming pin would not slip out.
Grenade throwing positions were similar among most armies. Standard positions were prone, kneeling, and standing, usually from behind cover owing to some fragmentation traveling beyond the advertised casualty radius. The British 1942 grenade pamphlet (Pamphlet No. 13) advised:
These grenades cannot be “thrown” in the strict sense of the word by the average man. They require to be delivered at a high angle, and the best way of achieving this delivery is by an overarm swing similar to bowling cricket. Accuracy should be the first consideration. This is obtained by a free and natural swing, which should be vigorous.
A Japanese manual of the interwar period demonstrates the three common throwing positions used by virtually all armies: prone (in this instance the thrower has risen to better observe the target), standing overarm, and kneeling. Most armies taught soldiers to continue to observe target and follow the grenade’s track to confirm the target was neutralized or if follow-on grenades were necessary. The reality of combat typically saw the thrower ducking for cover immediately after releasing the grenade. (Courtesy of Akira “Taki” Takizawa)
In spite of the conflict between “cannot be ‘thrown’ … by the average man” and “a free and natural swing,” this form of grenade throwing originated from throwing grenades from deep trenches and behind walls in World War I. Using one’s energy to achieve a higher arc diverted that strength for throwing to a longer range with a lower trajectory. Theoretical throwing ranges were often optimistically high, up to 50m (55yd). Of course there are a wide range of grenade weights, but realistically 30–40m (33–44yd) can be achieved in combat conditions – although there are always exceptions. Regardless of how far a soldier can throw a grenade in training, it is a different matter in combat. Exhaustion, stress, lack of sleep, and poor diet degrade performance. Wearing combat equipment and carrying a weapon also influence throwing range. Heavy layered winter clothing and gloves/mittens seriously affect throwing and can cut the range by half. Awkward throwing positions demanded by combat or throwing from confined positions also reduce range.
The current US grenade field manual (FM 3-23.30, dating from 2000), describing the same techniques found in earlier editions dating as far back as the 1940s, prescribes the standing position: “[It] is the most desirable and natural position from which to throw grenades. It allows you to obtain the greatest possible throwing distance. Soldiers normally use this position when occupying a fighting position or during operations in fortified positions or urban terrain.” Constant pressure must be maintained on the lever once the arming pin is removed. If pressure is relaxed, the striker may rotate, igniting the delay fuse while the lever is still attached, unknown to the grenadier. This is called “milking.” A natural overhand throw is used, observing the target beforehand and immediately taking cover after throwing.
The kneeling position reduces the distance a soldier can throw a grenade. It is used primarily when a soldier has only a low wall, a shallow ditch, or similar cover to protect him. The prone position reduces both distance and accuracy. It is used only when an individual is pinned down by hostile fire and is unable to rise to engage his target. It is also employed when only very low cover such as a fallen tree, shallow gulley, or similar cover is available. Basically, a grenade throw from the prone position is accomplished by lying on one’s back and rolling toward the target as the grenade-arm is flung. The same American manual recognizes:
Since few soldiers throw in the same manner, it is difficult to establish firm rules or techniques for throwing hand grenades. How accurately they are thrown is more important than how they are thrown. If a soldier can achieve more distance and accuracy using his own personal style, he should be allowed to do so as long as his body is facing sideways, towards the enemy’s position, and he throws basically overhand. (FM 3-23.30)
Many Americans simply equate grenade throwing to baseball throwing. An individual’s stature has a bearing on one’s ability to throw grenades. The Japanese kept their grenades small, recognizing strength shortcomings. A Japanese document captured by the Americans, Lessons from Actual Experiences in Eastern New Guinea Operations, July 1942–April 1943, discusses the use of weapons in the jungle. It states, “The regular hand grenade is inconvenient to throw. We are able to throw grenades up to 20–25m [22–28yd], whereas the enemy throws them 50 meters [55yd]. It is necessary to train diligently in throwing hand grenades as prescribed in the training manual.” The document goes on to suggest that regular grenades could be improved by adding a “Chinese-type handle” (stick grenade) and that an ordinary person could throw such a grenade 40–50m (44–55yd).
Once the arming pin is pulled, it can be reinserted if the grenade is not needed. However, it is recommended that pins not be reinserted as the striker could be inadvertently released while realigning the pin holes in the lever and the fuse housing. It is advised to go ahead and throw the grenade if not needed. When handling a grenade with gloves it may be difficult to feel if the lever is released too much and the striker released.
Movies often depict a soldier pulling an arming pin with his teeth so his weapon would remain in his hand. Unless the cotter pin was completely straightened, this could damage teeth. It was done, but not often. Rather than a ring, Italian grenades had a rubber tab that could be pulled with the teeth. During World War II most grenades made a faint “pop” sound when the arming lever was released, and they may have released sparks or a faint stream of smoke. This might have alerted the enemy to incoming grenades, enabling them to avoid them or throw them back. Japanese percussion-activated grenades made a distinctive pop and American troops learned to rush forward when hearing it, to avoid incoming grenades. Late in the war, “silent fuses” began to appear. Some grenades still cause a faint snap and a ping when the lever flies off.
A risky technique sometimes employed to prevent the enemy from throwing back grenades is termed “cooking-off” or “cooking a grenade.” The arming pin is pulled, the lever released, the thrower counts to two or three – 2 seconds is sufficient, and safer – and then throws it. One has to have great confidence in the manufacturer’s quality control. It is unsafe to “cook-off” or “cook” a grenade and it is not recommended.
British infantry of 17 Platoon, H Company, 2nd London Irish Rifles hurl hand grenades during an attack on a German strongpoint on the southern bank of the River Senio, Italy, on March 22, 1945. (© IWM NA 23243)
To throw a grenade regardless of position the following considerations are taken, according to FM 3-23.30:
(1) Observe the target to establish the range between the throwing position and target. Be aware of any obstacles in the throwing zone. In observing the target, minimize exposure time (no more than 3 seconds).
(2) Firmly grip the hand grenade in the throwing hand.
(3) Grasp the pull ring with the index or middle finger of the non-throwing hand. Remove the safety pin with a pulling and twisting motion. If the tactical situation permits, observe the safety pin’s removal.
(4) Look at the target and throw the grenade using the overhand method so the grenade arcs, landing on or near the target.
(5) Allow the motion of the throwing arm to continue naturally once the grenade is released.
(6) Immediately duck behind cover and after the detonation quickly observe the target to ensure it was destroyed.
While most grenade throwing is done overhand, the underarm throw is sometimes necessary to avoid low-hanging vegetation and other obstacles. Obstacle avoidance is critical to ensure the grenade reaches the target and does not bounce back toward friendly troops. It is especially critical if using an impact-detonated grenade, as the obstacle may detonate the grenade too close to the thrower. A sideways or side-handed throw may be necessary to avoid obstacles, toss it into a small opening, or throw it around a corner of a building or trench angle. This tends to be less accurate except at close ranges.
Care has to be taken when throwing grenades from vehicles such as a halftrack, truck, or tank turret to avoid radio antennas and other fixtures. A moving vehicle jolting about might cause one to lose his grip on a grenade. Crew-members of transport aircraft, gliders, and helicopters were extremely nervous of grenades handled by passengers. They were to be kept stowed and never under any circumstances dropped from aircraft. That said, there were instances of spotter planes and helicopters dropping grenades, but by aircrewmen and usually only smoke grenades for target marking. The first aircraft bombs were in fact grenades and saw use early in World War I. Grenades dropped from aircraft were held outside the aircraft’s confines, armed, and immediately dropped.
Many troops learn grenade safety issues the hard way – in combat and suffering casualties. Employing safe carrying means is one way of reducing risks to the user. Others include: occasional fragments traveling far beyond the safety radius; erratic and uneven fragmentation patterns; blast and fragmentation muffled by snow and mud; and smoke grenades starting unintentional brush and grass fires, which even in combat cause problems. Some problems are more serious. A slight miss when throwing a grenade through a window, door, or firing port could mean a bounce-back toward friendly troops. There is no room for error at extreme close ranges. An example of employing grenades to reinforce the advance – and the risks to the thrower associated with throwing grenades in cramped confines – is furnished by the actions of Sergeant Herbert J. Thomas Jr. of the US Marine Corps, as reported in his Medal of Honor citation:
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the Third Marines, Third Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the battle at the Koromokina River, Bougainville Island, Solomon Islands, on November 7, 1943. Although several of his men were struck by enemy bullets as he led his squad through dense jungle undergrowth in the face of severe hostile machinegun fire, Sergeant Thomas and his group fearlessly pressed forward into the center of the Japanese position and destroyed the crews of two machineguns by accurate rifle fire and grenades. Discovering a third gun more difficult to approach, he carefully placed his men closely around him in strategic positions from which they were to charge after he had thrown a grenade into the emplacement. When the grenade struck vines and fell back into the midst of the group, Sergeant Thomas deliberately flung himself upon it to smother the explosion, valiantly sacrificing his life for his comrades. Inspired by his selfless action, his men unhesitatingly charged the enemy machinegun and, with fierce determination, killed the crew and several other nearby defenders. The splendid initiative and extremely heroic conduct of Sergeant Thomas in carrying out his prompt decision with full knowledge of his fate reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.
Two 1st Marine Division riflemen on Peleliu, 1944, throw Mk II fragmentation grenades while covered by a BAR man and rifleman (not visible). The covering men not only protected the grenadiers, but to shoot down any enemy flushed out of hiding by the grenades. Note the grenadier to the right – his grenade is smoking profusely, a common deficiency in many World War II grenades, which might enable an enemy soldier to find a grenade quicker and throw it back. (US Marine Corps Historical Center)
Another problem is coordination within small units. Inexperienced units often fail to adequately warn all troops when grenades are thrown and this is especially dangerous when undertaking fire and maneuver with exposed troops. “Grenade,” should be shouted when throwing a grenade or when detecting incoming enemy grenades. Of course this can alert the enemy to incoming grenades, as many use a variant of the term “grenade.” It is not uncommon for grenadiers to be hit by fire when exposing themselves. This can result in dropping a grenade and perhaps casualties among friendly troops – another reason to warn nearby friendly forces. Covering fire is essential.
Owing to the nature of World War I trench warfare, grenades reemerged as important weapons, used both offensively and defensively. Initially, most armies considered grenades as specialist weapons employed by engineers. By late 1915 doctrine was revised, however, accepting that all infantrymen had to be proficient with grenades.
A No. 23 grenade prepared for use as a rifle grenade. The No. 23 Mk I differed from the No. 5 with improvements to the fuse, differently shaped lever brackets, and the base plug was tapped for a 5.5in rifle bore rod. It could be launched from a rifle from a No. 1 Mk I grenade cup. Some 30 million No. 23s were produced before production ceased in March 1918. It was declared obsolete in 1921. No. 5, No. 23, and No. 36 grenades were varnished inside and out, which usually appeared dark brown or almost black. The red band at the top signified it was filled with explosive. (© IWM MUN 1385)
Abandoning the concept of grenades being limited to the Royal Engineers, in late 1915 the British Army specified that all officers and 12 NCOs of each rifle company be trained in division schools to employ grenades. They would then instruct their companies. Training with live grenades was emphasized to maximize exposure to explosives. Regardless of all troops receiving grenade training, it was recommended for platoons to establish an especially trained “bombing reserve” of eight men under an NCO. They were to be selected from the best, bravest, and steadiest men with greater-than-average height and arm reach, a description not unlike that of the earliest grenadiers. For trench assaults “grenadier parties” or “bomber parties” were organized. Led by an NCO, these comprised: two “bayonet-men” to clear trenches; sharpshooters; two bomb-throwers; two grenade-carriers with canvas buckets, sandbags, or baskets of grenades; and two spare men to protect the rear and replace casualties. Such parties were employed ahead of the main assault or conducted trench raids to take prisoners or destroy critical enemy positions. The bomber party would be supported by other troops. There were of course many variations of these tactics.
At night, the party would silently infiltrate the target trench with the bayonet-men forward. If the trench section was unoccupied the party would enter quietly. If it was occupied the bayonet-men might attack – preferably without firing – or the bomb-throwers would bomb the trench section, and the party would enter. The spare men or supporting troops would block one end – or both ends – of the trench and clear dugouts, with two grenades per dugout. The bombing party would move to the first trench angle in the opposite direction and bomb the next traverse (straight stretch of trench between angular turns). The bayonet-men charged around the corner to finish off enemy survivors and moved to the next traverse. In a large-scale assault there would be multiple bombing parties taking designated trench sections and the trench would be cleared in both directions. To supply sufficient grenades, bomb depots were established in the forward trenches and carrying parties organized to take them across no man’s land to the assault troops. Carrier relays trudged back and forth across the blasted ground with cases of grenades lashed to Yukon packboards. A brigade’s units held a 5,000-grenade reserve. Captured grenades were also used, on which bombing parties were trained.
In 1916 the doctrine was refined, emphasizing that bombing parties maintain their expertise with rifles. Bayonet-men were to be the primary means of clearing trenches, rather than routinely bombing each traverse without determining whether it was occupied. This was because such methods resulted in excessive grenade waste and could also lead to grenade fights, using up valuable time and inflicting high casualties on both sides. Bombing-party duties became more specialized, with one bomber focusing on short ranges and the other on longer ranges. During raids the throwers were now armed with revolvers, bayonets, knives, axes, and clubs rather than cumbersome rifles. They slung rifles with bayonets fixed during assaults, though. The Germans often outranged British bomb-throwers when using lighter egg grenades. The British countered this by using rifle grenades. Regardless of directives on bombing-party organization and tactics, units often differed in practice owing to their experiences.
On many World War I battlefields, the British had to confront and overcome pillboxes and other German fortifications; these often proved to be the linchpin of the enemy defense, so their suppression and capture was of paramount importance. During October 1917 New Zealand troops fighting in the grim Passchendaele battle were required to defeat a large emplacement known as Otto Farm. After outflanking it, the New Zealanders used Mills Bombs to kill or wound the occupants; as recounted shortly after the battle by one historian, “they burst in the confined space with a ghastly effect” (quoted in Harper 2007: 44). The central importance of grenades in combat can be gleaned from an entry from the War Diary of 1/8th Battalion, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment, for July 1, 1916 – the first day of the battle of the Somme:
Enemy first line reached and passed very quickly as also was the second. Only in one or two cases were any enemy seen in the two lines. Having plenty of casualties from machine-gun fire in enemy third and fourth line. All the third line men were temporarily held up by machine-gun fire but took it by rushes. From this point the fighting was all with bombs [grenades] along trenches. We reached our objective probably 35–40 minutes from zero hour and at once commenced consolidating and cleaning rifles. By this time the next battalion was arriving but had had so many casualties that they could not go through so helped consolidating. Many times we were bombed from this position and regained it until bombs ran out. We had to retire to the third line parapet and hold on with machine-gun and rifle fire. Parties were detailed to collect as many bombs as could be found (both English and German) and when we had a good store we again reached our objective. No supply of bombs were coming from rear so could not hold on and retired again. Held on to this position until relieved by a battalion from rear.
In the British Army, originally only sappers of the Royal Engineers were trained as bomb-throwers. This involved more than simply throwing hand grenades. The training included offensive and defensive tactics, transporting grenades, fusing them – a dangerous procedure with certain marks – and proper storage and protecting them from the elements in front-line positions. The reforms of 1915 directed that all officers and 12 NCOs from each rifle company attend divisional training courses conducted by the engineers on all aspects of grenades, both hand and rifle. They were to pass this on to their troops. Properly throwing a No. 23 Mills Bomb or any hand grenade was accomplished through a three-stage procedure, demonstrated by the three figures shown here (right to left). (1) The grenade is held in the right hand, ensuring the arming lever is firmly gripped. A finger is placed through the arming ring and it is pulled. (2) Facing the target, the bomber pivots his left foot toward the target. The right arm with the grenade is extended rearwards and downwards. The eyes are fixed in the direction of the target with the left shoulder pointing toward the target. Swing back as far as possible, allowing the left arm and foot to come up naturally as the right arm is swung toward the target. (3) The right arm is slung overhand, placing one’s weight behind it and his weight on the left foot, with the heel of the right foot raised. If possible, the fall of the grenade is observed until impact. The man on the right wears a ten-pocket grenade vest. A similar vest for fewer grenades was locally fabricated using a sandbag, web straps and rope. Holding up to 20 Mills Bombs each, 2-gallon canvas water buckets were used to carry fused grenades from fusing points in the rear; these were also carried by spare bomb-throwers during trench attacks and raids. Niches were dug in trench walls for ready grenades and marked with a sign – BOMBS. Resting on the trench step are two 2lb No. 7 Mk I heavy fragmentation grenades. There was a similar 1lb No. 6 Mk I light blast grenade, both obviously called ‘lemon grenades’. Beside them are three No. 16 ‘oval pattern grenades’; this crude friction-fused grenade was a stopgap, as insufficient numbers of Mills Bombs could be produced.
The German Pioniertruppen (combat engineers) originally employed grenades, but they were soon in use by the infantry. There was no specified organization; units developed their own techniques in the form of ad hoc Stoßtruppen (shock troops). In 1915 the 6–8-man Handgranatetrupp (hand-grenade team) was specified for each platoon. Members were volunteers who demonstrated grenading skills, strength, and brashness.
Platoons in the defense positioned their Handgranatetruppen in a central location as a platoon “reserve.” If the enemy assault gained a trench section and the defenders were unable to eject them, the Handgranatetrupp conducted a local counterattack without orders. They also barricaded trenches to contain the enemy. Grenade boxes were dug into trench sides for immediate use, but it was found that the enemy sought these out for their own use. When the team attacked – and this applied to when entering enemy trenches – two grenadiers were in the lead, armed with all the grenades they could manage plus pistols, knives, and slung rifles with bayonets. The team leader was similarly armed. If pistols were not available, the leader covered the lead men with his rifle. They advanced in a crouch, enabling the leader to fire immediately over their heads. The rest of the team followed to the rear with rifles and bags of grenades. They remained one traverse to the rear, but kept the leader in sight and ready to resupply grenades and replace casualties. They advanced after grenading the next traverse, much like the British did. If the team was halted or had barricaded the trench, the two grenadiers manned the barricade covered by the leader and grenade-carriers from the first traverse to the rear.
In 1916 refinements were made. A Handgranategruppe (hand grenade squad) of nine men was employed, divided into two four-man Truppen. Each Trupp had two grenadiers and two grenade-carriers who doubled as covering men. If a heavy grenade barrage was necessary, all four threw. The grenadiers had pistols and the carriers had rifles, each man carrying at least six grenades. The rear team was rifle-armed and carried 25 empty sandbags for barricading. Rifle companies sometimes consolidated the three platoon-level Handgranategruppen into an assault unit to lead assaults or counterattacks. They were also used to conduct trench raids, mainly to capture prisoners. Raids tended to be well planned and rehearsed. This concept of hand-picked, experienced, aggressive specialist troops led to the formation of the first Sturmtruppen (assault troops) in the spring of 1916. Sturmtruppe volunteers often came from unit Handgranategruppen, but infantry units still fielded their own grenade subunits.
An overly camouflaged German grenadier prepares to throw a stick grenade. Being encumbered by camouflage, grenades, rifle, wire-cutter, and other equipment will restrict his throwing range. A concentrated charge (Geballte Ladung) with six stick-grenade heads secured around a seventh grenade with its handle sits ready for use. Note the friction igniter’s pull-cord pulled out of the grenade’s handle. (Tom Laemlein/Armor Plate Press)
The first squad of each rifle platoon was organized as grenade-throwers – escouade de grenadiers – and included a corporal, two grenadiers, two assistant grenadiers, two carriers, and one connecting file (spare). It could be split into two teams – équipe – each with a leader, grenadier, assistant, and carrier. Grenadiers could throw grenades up to 45m (49yd) with 2–3m (2–3yd) accuracy. All members could throw grenades and were armed with rifles, bayonets, knives, and pistols. Each battalion had an officer detailed from a company to train all grenadier squads. Any number of the battalion’s nine grenadier squads could be consolidated under his control to spearhead assaults. Grenade-throwers typically left their rifles behind during raids, but retained them for assaults to fight off counterattacks. Baskets and belts were provided to carry 30 grenades per thrower. The squads were employed for:
(1) defense of a trench section in close-range fighting;
(2) seizing a trench or its approaches in stages;
(3) grenading a trench section before the main attack;
(4) close-range fighting within an enemy trench system; and
(5) trench raids.
In defending a captured trench section, if possible a crater was blown inside the trench on the enemy’s side of a traverse and sandbag barricades erected on both sides of the crater and covered by grenadiers and riflemen. When seizing a trench, in a step-by-step trench clearing, a minimal number of grenadiers were forward and the rest to the rear to protect the party from countergrenading. Two carriers were positioned between the grenadiers and the rest of the squad to resupply grenades and immediately replace casualties. This was exhausting, and reliefs were frequent. Crowding in the trench was avoided. Except when actually engaged, the troops were expected to be quiet so enemy voices and movements could be detected. Trench raids were conducted by small, specially selected teams. These were trained to:
(1) occupy a small section of trench prior to the main assault;
(2) attack the head of a sap approaching a friendly trench;
(3) seize and hold or destroy a forward position under construction; or
(4) capture an outpost or small trench section to seize prisoners.
Trench raids were to be rehearsed, a detailed reconnaissance conducted, routes selected, covered positions selected for grenadiers, each sub-unit assigned specific tasks, a resupply system arranged, and coordination made with the covering infantry and artillery.
French grenade use in the assault was documented in an after-action report filed by a defending German infantry regiment in late 1915:
The first French attacking line consisted of a thin skirmish line equipped with hand grenades. As soon as this had reached our front line trenches, attacking columns in close order left the enemy’s trenches. These consisted either of parties about 50 strong, formed in columns of fours, or irregular lines in close order. For purposes of close combat, the French were armed with bayonets and hand grenades. Whereas in the trenches the fighting was principally carried out with hand grenades, in the open country the bayonet was successfully employed by the companies of our regimental reserve during the counterattack. (Quoted in Bull 2007: 42)
American doughboys creep through no man’s land equipped with hastily made grenade carriers fabricated from sandbags, a common practice among all the belligerents. They most likely carry French-made grenades, the Americans’ primary source of grenades. (US Army)
The AEF arrived in France in 1917–18 without any suitable grenades, or even grenade training, although earlier observers had reported their need. Copies of French grenade manuals were translated into English. Doughboys were provided with French F1s and British Mills Bombs. Both countries took the opportunity to rid themselves of the less-than-successful grenades still in stock. Once in France, AEF divisions established grenade schools, often run by French instructors. Divisions training in the States commenced grenade instruction. Few US-made grenades saw combat, and French and British grenades remained the doughboys’ mainstays. The Americans, who were largely trained by the French and used translated French manuals, employed variations of these techniques. There was some British influence in US divisions serving alongside British formations.
Trench-warfare tactics would endure as doctrine into the 1930s, but by 1939, with the recognition that mobile warfare was more likely, they began to fall from favor. During World War II grenades continued to play a key role on the battlefield, and could provide decisive. On November 23, 1943 Sergeant Thomas C. Derrick of the Australian 2/48th Infantry Battalion withstood enemy grenades and employed his own to win the Victoria Cross at Sattelburg, northeast New Guinea. According to the London Gazette of April 24, 1945:
Sergeant Thomas Currie Derrick, D.C.M., was in command of a platoon of a Company of Australian Infantry ordered to attack a feature from the township of Sattelburg. For over two hours many unsuccessful attempts were made, under heavy fire from enemy strong points at the top of a precipitous cliff which the Company had to scale to reach the objective. The task appeared impossible, and shortly before last light the Company was ordered to retire. Sergeant Derrick requested, and was granted, permission to make one last attempt. Moving ahead of his forward section he personally destroyed with hand grenades an enemy post which had been holding up this section. His second section were heavily attacked by machine guns and grenades from six enemy posts. Without regard for his personal safety he went ahead of the leading men and with grenades so completely demoralised the enemy that they fled leaving weapons and grenades. The Company was thus enabled to gain its first foothold on the precipitous ground. Then on four separate occasions Sergeant Derrick dashed forward and threw grenades at a range of 5 to 7 metres until the remaining three posts were silenced. In all he reduced ten enemy posts, and from the vital ground he captured the Battalion moved on and took Sattelburg. Undoubtedly the capture of Sattelburg was due to Sergeant Derrick’s fine leadership and refusal to admit defeat in a seemingly impossible situation. His outstanding gallantry, thoroughness and devotion to duty were an inspiration not only to his platoon and company, but to the whole Battalion.
Finnish soldiers prepare to throw German-supplied Stg 24 stick hand grenades. The man to the left is pulling the cord of the friction igniter to activate the delay train. During the 1939–40 Winter War the Finns used grenades gathered from all over Europe. During the 1941–44 Continuation War against the Soviet Union, they mainly used German and captured Soviet grenades. (Tom Laemlein/Armor Plate Press)
For all practical purposes there were no formalized grenade tactics; it had become an individual weapon. Of course, small assault and tank-hunter teams were utilized when assaulting fortifications and built-up areas, but were less rigidly organized.2 The grenade provided the infantryman’s “pocket artillery” and was considered an essential, basic weapon along with the rifle, bayonet, and light machine gun. The war’s belligerents employed very similar grenade techniques, mostly based on the two-man team. Either man could throw the grenade; the other protected the thrower, provided suppressive fire, and observed the flanks to detect enemy movement.
Since World War II grenade employment has changed little; with years of standardization practices within alliances and extensive combined training between armies, they have much more in common than not. Western armies and partner armies that have trained worldwide use very similar tactics and techniques. Stun grenades have come into wide use by both military and police forces for counterterrorist operations. They too can cause casualties among hostages and other non-combatants if used improperly – mainly hearing and vision injuries.
In the defense, grenades were thrown when small groups of enemy or crew-served weapons were detected. Concealed approaches (gullies, ditches, vegetation, dead space – low ground not under observation or fire, etc.) would be grenaded. Antipersonnel obstacles which the enemy was attempting to breach would be grenaded, as the enemy was delayed and perhaps bunched up. Grenades were especially valuable when close-range fields of fire were restricted. When defending steep hills, riflemen had to expose themselves more to fire downhill. Grenade barrages were effective against attackers caught in the open or pinned down. If even a small part of the attack force was routed by concentrated grenades and followed by grenades, it could cause a general withdrawal.
In the Pacific, Japanese infiltration of Allied lines was common. They also probed positions in an effort to cause automatic-weapons crews and even riflemen to reveal their positions. Rather than being fired upon, infiltrators would be grenaded without revealing positions. Grenades were sometimes inserted in ration tins with the lever on the outside, the pin pulled, and rolled down clear hillsides. In August 1943 a company of 1st Battalion, 162nd Infantry was cut off and surrounded for two days by the Japanese at Salamaua, New Guinea. The company repelled nine Japanese assaults and was low on ammunition, including grenades. At night the Japanese probed and attempted to infiltrate. There were also wild animals in the area and since the company was low on grenades, rather than waste one on a pig or land crab, they first threw a mud-ball (rock, wood chunk) at the sound. If the noise continued it was an animal. If it stopped it was an infiltrator and a grenade followed. In desperate situations and out of grenades, the Americans threw rocks with shouts of “Grenade!” to give the attackers pause. Unverified reports have claimed attackers were run off by throwing rocks with occasional grenades added. There were instances when Japanese troops threw smoke grenades and shouted, “Gaz!”
Soviet front-fighters (frontoviki) armed with PPSh-41 submachine guns prepare to receive an attack. An F-1 and two RG-42 hand grenades sit ready for use in the straw-camouflaged position, what the Germans called a “Russian hole” (Russischloch or Rusloch). (From the fonds of the RGAKFD in Krasnogorsk via Stavka)
In the attack at least two grenades were carried by most individual combatants. Four and more were frequently carried and designated individuals might carry more, with further grenades held in reserve. Units newly committed to combat frequently underestimated the quantities of grenades necessary and their rate of expenditure. The final assault on enemy positions was often preceded by a grenade barrage from the last available cover within range. A shower of grenades just before the charge added to the shock effect. Care had to be taken to await the grenades’ detonation before springing to one’s feet. Smoke grenades might be ignited before the fragmentation-grenade barrage. This blinded the enemy, preventing him from seeing attackers. However, the smoke could hamper the attackers by masking obstacles, booby traps, and even enemy positions. They could become disoriented and move in the wrong direction.
Bunkers, pillboxes, and covered positions were routinely grenaded, often with two grenades if large. Clearing trenches and lengthy gullies and ravines was conducted similarly to World War I techniques. There were variations between armies, but differences were minor and units developed their own based on experiences, terrain, and enemy tactics. Trench clearing, and building and other fortification clearing, was – and continues to be – typically conducted by 2–5-man teams. The trench was grenaded and then entered by the team, who fired in both directions. Two men held the entry point and provided covering fire. The lead man threw a grenade down each trench traverse and after the detonations, fired down the trench and advanced. At least one man covered him. Other men provided covering fire at surface level, while another protected the clearing team’s rear.
Attacking a bunker or pillbox required close coordination. Seldom could one or two men take a bunker alone. It required supporting machine-gun and rifle fire, not only to suppress the target bunker, but also positions covering the bunker itself. The attackers needed to approach from the flanks not covered by other enemy positions, unless they were effectively suppressed, including with mortars and smoke. Every effort had to be made to attack the rear (side) entrance and not firing ports, unless left with no recourse. Multiple grenades and large demolition charges were necessary. Use was made of double grenades – two grenades taped and/or wired together. American troops sometimes taped a 0.5lb TNT charge to a Mk II frag. On Luzon US paratroopers found Japanese Type 91 hand grenades fired from “knee mortars” which had not exploded because the arming pins had not been pulled. Paratroopers removed the spent propellant container and taped them under their own Mk II frags.
A World War II US soldier at Cassino in Italy handles a German concentrated charge (Geballte Ladung) made up of a central Stg 24 stick grenade as a detonator and six grenade heads secured to it with wire or twine. Together they contained 42oz TNT. Often captured foreign hand grenades with the fuses removed were used as the outer charges. Concentrated charges were thrown in tank treads or on engine decks and tossed into firing ports. The concept was developed in World War I as one of the first German AT weapons. (Tom Laemlein/Armor Plate Press)
Room clearing was undertaken by at least two men, preferably backed by one or two cover-men. The building’s construction was important to consider, be it thatch, boards, brick, cinderblocks, or concrete. If walls could be fired through, doing so would be most effective before the attackers entered the room. Doors were battered, kicked, or blown in. Soldiers entering the room moved away from the door so as not to be silhouetted. They had to be prepared to react to any situation encountered. As other team members entered the room they were instructed to shout “Coming in,” and “Coming out” when exiting.
Since the US involvement in Vietnam the employment of reconnaissance and other small direct-action teams has been widespread in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other special operations. A 4–12-man team in enemy territory needs every advantage it can gain. A small team cannot survive for long if pinned down by a larger enemy force with reinforcements on the way. It must immediately break contact and evade the enemy. Immediate-action drills – break-contact drills – are crucial. Grenades provide firepower advantages. A technique developed in Vietnam was the “peel back” or “banana peel,” allowing a team to quickly break contact with a superior enemy.
When engaged, the immediate response was for all who could bring their weapons to bear on the enemy to open fire. If the enemy fire was heavy, standard operating procedures often specified that every man was to fire up to five magazines while the grenadier rapid-fired his 40mm grenade launcher. The goal was to gain fire superiority and keep the enemy’s heads down as the team disengaged. For a flank engagement, the team turned in that direction and opened fire. On order the team conducted a “peel-back.” The pointman emptied his magazine, threw a grenade, and ran to the rear while reloading, as the second man emptied a magazine and threw a grenade. One of these grenades may have been a WP to blind and panic the enemy. Odd-numbered men stepped to the right and even-numbered to the left to leave a “lane” down the formation’s center. Some men might grenade to the flanks to discourage outflanking attempts. Each man would peel-back after firing and take up a position to the rear on-line to mass the defenders’ fire or repeat another peel-back. This would continue until the leader ordered them to run for it and smoke grenades were popped to hamper the enemy in finding their trail. A Claymore mine or grenades with 1-minute delay fuses might be set on the back-trail, as well as trip-wired grenades. The pointman and tail-gunner usually carried pre-rigged Claymores or grenades.
The US Revised Color-coding System (MIL-STD 709C) was adopted in May 1976 to standardize ordnance identification within NATO and is based on the US Standard Color-coding System introduced in January 1961. This system is used by many non-NATO countries.
| Grenade type | Body color | Band/marking color(s) |
| Fragmentation | OD | Yellow |
| Incendiary | Light red | Black |
| Smoke, burning-type | Light green | Black* |
| Smoke, WP | Light green | Yellow band, red markings |
| Chemical, riot control | Light gray | Dark red |
| Stun | OD or black | Light green band, white markings |
| Practice | Light blue | White** |
| * Colored smoke grenades’ top marked in smoke color. | ||
| ** Light brown band indicates low explosive marking charge. | ||
In Vietnam US reconnaissance teams (RTs) of 4–12 men were assigned to long-range patrol/Ranger companies, Special Forces special projects, MACV-SOG, SEALs, and Marine force reconnaissance. These small independent-action teams operated in enemy-controlled areas, often out of range of artillery, and attack or extraction helicopters required considerable time to arrive on-station. RTs avoided contact with the enemy, who actively sought them. For a small team to be discovered deep within enemy territory was a situation to be avoided. A compromised team was on its own for some time. While well trained and heavily armed, they were always outnumbered and as additional pursuit forces were marshaled, often outmaneuvered – no matter how skilled and agile they were. Various types of grenades were often used in unconventional manners never prescribed in manuals to give them an edge. M61 (M26A1 with safety clip) and M67 frag grenades could be attached to the sides of M14/M16 rifle-magazine pouches secured by a snapped strap. Two frags could be carried inside a pouch. Some RTs used World War II M1937 six-pocket BAR belts, each pocket holding four M16 magazines or three grenades. Four grenades could be carried in a 1qt canteen cover. Some troops carried grenade arming pins in boonie hat camouflage loops and helmet camouflage bands to re-pin unthrown grenades or disarm grenade-based booby traps. Owing to the dense vegetation, the man on the right is throwing a frag underhanded. Inexperienced VC/NVA rear area troops encountered by RTs could be panicked by a shower of grenades and automatic fire. Larger, beer can-sized smoke and chemical grenades could not be carried in the same manner, so were typically attached to rucksacks. The arming levers were inserted through rucksack equipment loops and the lever easily bent to secure it. M18 colored smoke grenades (OD body, smoke-colored top) were provided in red, violet, yellow, and green. Red meant danger, that the RT was engaged or warned away approaching extraction helicopters. Violet and yellow were commonly used to mark pick-up zones or the RT’s location when supporting gunships arrived. Green was seldom used being difficult to spot in the vividly green jungle. AN-M8 white smoke grenades (pale green body, yellow band) were used for screening when breaking contact. It required 10–20 seconds to develop an effective screen. RTs had to be careful when “popping” white smoke as helicopters marked targets with white phosphorus rockets and a cloud of white smoke might be fired on. Any color of smoke caused disorientation to pursuers at night. An AN-M14 thermite incendiary grenade (red body) was carried for each radio in the event it had to be destroyed. They could also be thrown at night to illuminate an area 200m (220yd) in radius or start brush fires as an RT withdrew under pursuit. M7A2 tear-gas grenades (gray body, red band) discouraged pursuing enemy as they seldom possessed gasmasks. Tear gas could panic even experienced troops. One technique, about to be deployed here by the man on the left, was to pre-wire a white smoke and a tear-gas grenade together, secure them to a 15–20ft parachute suspension line (“550 cord”), ignite both grenades, and run while dragging it behind the team. M34 white phosphorus grenades (pale green body, yellow band, “fragment” segmentations) created an immediate smoke screen and threw gobs of burning WP up to 20m (22yd) to strongly discourage pursuit. They were difficult to throw sufficiently far within dense vegetation. On the ground is a Chinese Type 67 stick grenade, which frequently resulted in duds. In the 1930s it was copied in Manchuria by the Japanese as the Type 98 (1938).
US Army troops in Vietnam, 1964. The man to the left and the other in the upper left carry universal M14 rifle magazine pouches. On both sides were loops (for arming levers) and snap-straps for carrying M26 hand grenades. The same pouches would later accommodate M16 rifle magazines and M67 grenades. Two grenades could also be carried inside the pouches in lieu of magazines. (US Army)
This US M61 fragmentation grenade was manufactured in May 1969. The M26A1 and M61 were widely used in Vietnam and supplied to all Free World forces. They were also license-made by Australia (M26A1, M26A2 delay), Israel (M26 – their designation for the M26A1 – and M26A2 delay), Portugal (M312), South Africa (M26), UK (L2A1, L2A2), and West Germany (DM41 Splitterhandgranate; see above). Israel and South Africa use the M26 body on their MA/AP65 and M791 rifle grenades, respectively. US-made M26s were used by Brazil, Canada (M26, M26A1, M26A2 delay, M61), Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Japan, Liberia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. To throw a clip-fitted grenade, it is gripped in the normal manner, the clip rotated to unlatch the lever – this can be done with the thumb of the hand gripping the grenade – the pin pulled, and the grenade thrown. The clip was removed from grenades used as booby traps so the enemy would not disarm it by simply re-latching it. A problem emerged, in that many soldiers trained on grenades without clips, but when issued clipped grenades in Vietnam failed to unlatch the clip. The enemy might find and return it. This occurred during a firefight the author was involved in, when a team member failed to unlatch a clip. We expected it to be returned, but it never was. (USAF).
Owing to their design, size, and pull-type arming pins, most grenades are adaptable to booby traps.3 The commonest means of activating booby traps is by tripwire. One method is to securely fasten a grenade to a stake or tree across a path or building entry, and attach one end of a tripwire to the arming pin and the other to a solid object. A pull on the tripwire will pull the grenade’s pin to detonate after the normal delay. The tripwire can also be fastened to a limb hanging across a trail to detonate when pushed out of the way. A second method is to fasten a tin can horizontally to a tree. A tripwire is attached to the grenade so as not to interfere with the arming lever, the grenade is inserted in the container with the lever inside, and the pin pulled. When the wire is tugged the grenade is pulled out and the lever flies off. Another method is to remove the fuse assembly and replace it with a pull-release, tension-release, or pressure- (AKA push-) release mechanical firing device. Yet another method is to place a grenade under a discarded weapon, dead body, ration container, or desirable object. When the object is lifted off the grenade, which has its arming pin removed, the lever is released, and it detonates after its normal delay. Sometimes the delay train is removed to provide an instantaneously detonating booby trap. This cannot be easily done on many grenades.
During World War II, zero-delay grenades could also be left behind for enemy soldiers to recover and attempt to use. The British accused the Italians of deliberately leaving booby-trapped grenades on the battlefield, but they were mostly duds. Grenades as booby traps were often incorporated into obstacles to hamper their breaching or removal. Booby-trapped grenades were also placed on avenues of approach to delay the enemy and provide warning of his approach. Smoke and incendiary grenades could be used for warning. Booby traps could be used to hamper intelligence personnel and others attempting to recover abandoned equipment. Booby-trapping landmines with grenades was widespread.
A British Royal Marine throws an L83A1 training white smoke grenade in Afghanistan to screen his section. “Training smoke grenades” do not include zinc in their compound owing to its toxicity. They do not create as dense a smoke screen. The US M83 white smoke grenade serves the same purpose. Even so, they are sometimes used in combat. Note the horizontal web loops on his harness to carry hand grenades by their arming handles as well as attaching different carrying pouches. (Photo: Cpl Barry Lloyd RLC/MOD)
When dedicated AT weapons were not available, antipersonnel hand grenades were used instead against enemy armor by enterprising – or desperate – troops. Captain Nick Hallett recalled the desperate fight for Le Paradis, France, in May 1940:
The forward [British] section came in [to the village being defended], leaving their guns, and worse, their AT rifles. And for a bit there was … chaos … Eventually we had a brainwave, and ran out below the tanks’ angle of fire, and put Mills grenades in the tracks. It did not do the tanks much harm, but [it] frightened the drivers, and they ditched them. We got four that way … (Quoted in Sebag-Montefiore 2007: 286)
Britain fielded several unusual AT grenades between 1940 and 1943 relying on blast rather than shaped charges. They are addressed here as they were also used in antipersonnel roles. Introduced in June 1942, the No. 75 antitank grenade-mine or “Hawkins grenade” was actually a small landmine. This versatile munition could be buried as a landmine, thrown as an AT grenade, or used as a demolition charge. The Hawkins was fabricated from 1.2-pint cans measuring 6.55×3.75×2.25in. The exploders were under a metal pressure plate that when crushed by at least 300lb, the mine’s 18oz of Nobel’s 704B or ammonal or Burrowite (Mk I and Mk II), or TNT (Mk III), detonated. They could be thrown in front of vehicles, placed on a road, strung together at 2ft intervals (“necklaces”) and pulled across an approaching vehicle’s path, or placed under the front and rear end of a parked tank’s treads to detonate when it moved. When thrown on the ground they could land with the pressure plate up or down. Either way, a vehicle’s weight detonated them. They could be placed under railroad ties as a pressure mine or fastened to a rail with a delay fuse to cut it. Several could be linked with four wraps of detonating cord to destroy a section of track. As a grenade or demolition charge, a friction igniter, a length of safety fuse, and a detonator was inserted in one of the exploder holders. A Hawkins grenade was to be thrown onto a tank’s engine deck or in its tracks. One or two charges could break a tank track or destroy a soft-skin vehicle’s wheel. The little used late-war Mk III mine was similar to the Mk II, but was filled with TNT. Besides use by the British Army, the US Airborne and French Resistance used the Hawkins. The No. 75 was declared obsolete in 1955. It can be identified by its service-brown or buff body, red “filled” band, pink cap if filled with ammonal or Burrowite, and black markings.
The British No. 74 Mk II AT grenade, better known as the “sticky bomb” or “ST” (sticky-type), was quite unpopular. It was developed in early 1940 as a sabotage weapon by the War Office’s Directorate of Military Intelligence. The “ST” was offered to the Army, but considered too dangerous. Even so, they were soon issued to the Home Guard and Army, desperate for AT weapons. To use the No. 74 Mk II, a cover-retaining pin, near the handle, was pulled and the hemispheres opened and fell off – or might have to be shaken – while the grenade was held downward. The safety pin in the handle was then pulled while the arming lever was held against the handle. A warning tag was attached to the safety pin, reading “DANGER DO NOT REMOVE THIS PIN UNTIL READY TO THROW GRENADE.” The grenade was thrown and the arming lever flew off and ignited the 5-second fuse. The grenade stuck to the side of the tank, or anything else such as the bomb thrower’s uniform, and detonated relying on blast effect. It would not stick to a vertical or sloping surface if wet, muddy, or oily. Weighing 2.25lb, it could be thrown about 20yd or hand-emplaced to a firing port cover or pillbox door. If hand-emplaced it was smashed against the target with enough force to break the flask and the soldier had to withdraw at least 10yd before it detonated – another reason for its unpopularity. The “ST” saw little action with the British, but it was provided to the French Resistance. Australian troops in New Guinea found that it performed very poorly, quickly losing its stickiness in the tropics. It was withdrawn in 1943 due to deteriorating nitroglycerin and the glue drying out in storage.
The “ST” consisted of a 4.5in-diameter, two-piece, hinged, stamped-steel sphere. Inside was a stockinet stretchy cloth-covered spherical Bakelite flask filled with 20oz of Nobel’s 823 (nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin). An air space was left in the flask to allow the explosive to expand in hot weather. A retaining clip held the cover to the flask’s neck. The stockinet cover was thickly coated with especially sticky lime glue made from bird droppings. Two rubber projections in each half of the cover kept the sticky covering from coming in contact with the inside of the cover. The flask had a collar in which the handlelike delay fuse was fitted – the overall length was 9.5in. This also held the detonator inside the flask. (US Navy)
The British No. 75 Mk II “Hawkins” mine-grenade could be used as an AT landmine, AT grenade, or demolition charge. The pressure or striker plate on the top is shown in cutaway here to reveal the igniter holders, which when crushed by a vehicle detonated the mine. The tube-like igniters are not shown. A method used to blast an entry opening through a building’s wall was the “mouse-holing charge.” This was a wooden frame measuring 1×2ft and held against a wall by a slanted plank. Hawkins mines were fastened to each corner. A length of detonating cord was attached to each and linked in the center to a detonator fired by safety fuse. Three or more Hawkins could be fastened to the end of a pole and with only one primed with a delay fuse, used to attack fortifications as a pole charge. The US M7 light AT mine-grenade was developed from the “Hawkins” in 1943. (US Navy)
The British No. 82 Mk I “Gammon Bomb” was provided with a black stockinet bag that could be filled with up to 0.9kg (1.98lb) of plastic explosives as required for the mission, be it antitank, antibunker, or antipersonnel. A smaller quantity of PE might be used for knocking out a machine-gun nest. On some occasions, when used against personnel, gravel, nails, or scrap metal were pressed into the half-charge of PE before inserting it in the bag. It used the No. 247 “all-ways” impact-detonating fuse. The No. 82 Mk I was also used by the US Airborne in Normandy and by the French Resistance. The Gammon Bomb was declared obsolete in 1954. It can be identified by its black bag, buff collar, all-black cap (11.5in tape) or black cap with red top (4.5in tape). (US Army)
The No. 82 AT grenade or “Gammon Bomb” was developed by Captain Richard S. Gammon of 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment in 1941. The Mk I was adopted in May 1943 and the Mk II in September 1944. They consisted of an impact-fuse assembly and collar riveted to a stockinet bag, open on the bottom with elastic in the hem. A varied amount of plastic explosive as required for the task was pressed into a ball and placed in the stockinet bag. As an AT grenade a large amount was required as it relied on blast effect. The difference between the two marks was that the Mk II’s bag was made of rot-resistant material. The No. 82 used the same all-ways fuse as the No. 69 offensive grenade. Early versions had a 4.5in-long arming tape rather than the later 11.5in-long tape, adopted because of the danger posed by the short tape if the grenade was thrown at too short a range from the target.
The Soviets also made wide use of AT hand grenades (Ruchnaya Protibotankovyi Granata – RPG) during World War II. All were OD with black markings. The RPG-40 was a heavy AT blast-type stick grenade required to be thrown at very close ranges from a protected position owing to its blast and secondary fragmentation. Weighing 1.11kg (2.45lb) and measuring 200mm (7.87in) long and 95mm (3.74in) in diameter, it was only marginally effective, with a 20–25mm (0.79–0.98in) penetration, and was more effective as an antipersonnel blast grenade – except for its short throwing range. While soon supplanted by the RPG-43 and later the RPG-6, both shaped-charge weapons, the RPG-40 remained in service for antipersonnel and anti-bunker use.
AT hand grenades have all but disappeared since World War II. The United States, for example, never adopted an AT hand grenade. They are relatively ineffective against modern armored fighting vehicles, even light armor. The much more efficient single-shot, throwaway, shoulder-fired AT rocket launchers are much more effective than any type of AT hand or rifle grenade. One of the few post-World War II AT grenades was the RKG-3 (Ruchnaya Kumulyativnaya Granata-3). It was used through the Cold War and is still found in use. Fielded in 1950, it was replaced by the RPG-18 disposable AT rocket launcher in 1972, but has remained in use worldwide, seeing combat in Vietnam, the Arab–Israeli conflict, Iraq, and Afghanistan. China’s simplified version was the Type 3. Two subsequent versions offer improved penetration over the original’s 150mm (5.91in), the RKG-3E (170mm, or 6.69in) and the RKG-3EM (220mm, or 8.66in). The all-metal grenade contains a small stability drogue in its throwing handle to ensure it impact-detonates at the necessary aspect. Throwing range is 15–20m (16–22yd); the author threw some in Vietnam and found they penetrated almost 6ft in hard soil.
A US Army collection of grenades used by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. Note they are drilled with holes and bear embossing tape labels marked EMPTY. The top row are mainly “jungle factory” made using food and drink cans. The second and third rows include Soviet, French, and Japanese grenades among others, often “rebuilt” and modified with homemade, Soviet/Chinese, or American fuses. All were crude and as dangerous to the throwers as they were to the intended victims. (Tom Laemlein/Armor Plate Press)
Many countries, especially those in extremis, have employed expedient or improvised grenades to make up for shortages or supplement standard grenades. Partisans and guerrillas have also fabricated their own grenades. Expedient grenades were made by the troops of both sides during the Russo-Japanese War. With inadequate grenade stocks in the first months of World War I, all sides produced “trench grenades,” either in the frontline trenches or in unit ordnance shops and depots. The quality and variety was astonishing, ranging from jam tins full of gun cotton and nails with a safety fuse, to workshop metal-bodied grenades with friction igniters. A common type used by all sides was the “hairbrush” or “racket” grenade, a paddle-shaped piece of wood with a demolition block wired to the paddle end and a time fuse running the length of the hand with a friction igniter. Such grenades may also have been made by placing explosives or incendiary agents in suitable containers (cans, bottles, pottery jars, pipes, bamboo tubes, large-caliber cartridge cases, etc.) and attaching a simple time-delay fuse with a blasting cap. These may also have been fabricated by modifying other munitions such as small demolition charges and mortar rounds. Usually, a standard grenade fuse or burning-type safety fuse, often with a pull-type fuse igniter, was attached.
During World War II the Germans made numerous grenades with concrete bodies with a cavity accepting a small cylindrical demolition charge. The Germans also made stick grenades with a wooden handle and head, again bored to take a demolition charge. Such devices were sometimes unreliable, made of non-durable materials, and were poorly weather-sealed. They had to be handled with extreme caution and were generally considered only marginally safe to the user, even when new.
2 Osprey Elite 160, World War II Infantry Assault Tactics and Elite 124 World War II Infantry Anti-Tank Tactics.
3 See Osprey Elite 100 World War II Axis Booby Traps and Sabotage Tactics and Elite 184 World War II Allied Sabotage Devices and Booby Traps.