War across the Pacific was not inevitable. At least as of June 1941, both Tokyo and Washington were intent upon avoiding such an eventuality. But whereas the Japanese thought war could be avoided if only the United States desisted from assisting Britain against Germany and intervening in Asia, American officials were fast establishing a global system of collective security to push back Germany and Japan to earlier positions. Given the success of American strategy, Japan’s only hope, if it were to persist in its Asian scheme, lay in establishing an impregnable empire so as to withstand the pressures of the United States and its allies.
Developments in the summer of 1941 confirmed these two trends. On one hand, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, commenced on 22 June, had the effect of adding the latter to the global American-led coalition. On the other, Japan’s decision to take advantage of the German-Russian War by invading southern Indo-China was designed to prepare the nation for an ultimate confrontation with the ABCD powers. Under these circumstances, only a break-up of that partnership or Japan’s reversal of southern expansionism could have prevented a Pacific war.
Hitler’s decision to nullify the Soviet non-aggression pact and invade Russian territory at once weakened Japan’s and strengthened America’s respective positions. It signalled the bankruptcy of Tokyo’s grand strategy, coalescing Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union as revisionist powers against the Anglo-American nations. Overnight the scheme broke into pieces, forcing the Japanese leadership to consider alternatives. Prime Minister Konoe understood that Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union would push the latter to seek the assistance of Britain and the United States, thus in effect adding the country to the Anglo-American coalition. As he wrote, the Soviet Union had been ‘driven to the Anglo-American camp’. That would further isolate Japan and might even involve it in a war against all these countries.1
The question, of course, was what was to be done. One drastic alternative would have been for Japan to recognize frankly the failure of its pro-German policy and, as Konoe said, reorient Japanese policy to effect a rapprochement with the United States. He reasoned that the Axis pact had outlived its usefulness; now that it had revealed its utter bankruptcy, Japan should release itself from it and seek an accommodation with the United States. As the prime minister wrote to Matsuoka in early July, Japan could never afford to go to war with both America and the Soviet Union; the two powers must be prevented from establishing a close relationship, and in the meantime Japan must have a continued supply of raw materials. All such aims necessitated a readjustment of Japanese relations with America. That would require that Japan make concessions in China and South-East Asia, but Konoe believed such concessions would be worth an improved relationship with the United States. In essence he was arguing for a return to an earlier pattern of Japanese foreign policy in which economic and political ties to America had been of fundamental importance.2
It is not certain that such reorientation, even if it had been implemented, would have prevented the American–Soviet rapprochement, or weakened the ABCD coalition. But at least it would have undermined the rationale for such a coalition, and the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union would have focused their efforts on the Atlantic and Europe. Japan might have maintained itself as the key Asian power but would no longer have been ostracized. The question of China would have remained, but there might have developed some understanding with the Nationalists. (Konoe believed a peace with Chungking would be an important part of the Japanese–American rapprochement.)
This was too drastic a scheme to be acceptable to Japan’s military, or to Matsuoka. For them, to go back to the framework of co-operation with the United States would be incompatible with the Axis alliance and entail giving up the scheme for establishing an Asian co-prosperity sphere. They were right, of course, and Konoe was asking them to reorient their thinking so as to accommodate the drastic turn of events overseas. From the military’s point of view, however, such reorientation was tantamount to yielding to American pressure and giving up the war in China as hopeless. They could not do so without risking loss of prestige and their privileged position in domestic affairs. Some army strategists, moreover, judged that the world was finally becoming divided into two fighting camps, with Japan, Germany, and Italy on one side and the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China on the other. In such a situation, it was too late for Japan to change sides, it was argued; what the nation must do was to consider the most appropriate strategy for the impending global war. Here, however, no consensus emerged for a speedy response. Some argued for joining forces with Germany to attack the Soviet Union, to destroy one corner of the emerging anti-Axis alliance. But most strategists urged caution, fearing that too precipitous a move in the north would drain resources away from China and South-East Asia. In fact, a prolonged war with the Soviet Union would itself necessitate an enlarged southern empire so as to secure continued supply of raw materials needed for the prosecution of the war. The best strategy, then, would be for Japan to be in a state of preparedness against the Soviet Union without actually going to war until the course of the German–Russian conflict became clearer. This was a strategy of opportunism – to wait till ‘the persimmon ripened’, as they said. The navy, on its part, was reluctant to go to war in the north right away. It retained its preoccupation with southern expansion as the first priority, and would agree only to preparedness against the Soviet Union. Here again, the basic factor that had to be taken into consideration was the possibility of a global war. As the navy minister pointed out, the imperial navy could possibly manage a war with the Anglo-American powers, but not against the combination of America, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was best not to provoke the latter and bring into being a de facto alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in contrast, insisted on quickly turning north, abrogating the two-month-old neutrality pact which he himself had negotiated with the Soviet Union. The German-Soviet War clearly meant the failure of his grand design, but far from being discouraged, he reasoned that the Axis alliance must take precedence over the Russian treaty. He went further than the army in advocating an immediate declaration of war against the Soviet Union. He was convinced that Germany would soon defeat the nation, and that by the end of the year it would also have brought Britain to its knees, before American intervention. Japan, therefore, should seize the opportunity to attack the Soviet Union. That entailed no risk of American intervention, whereas southern expansion would. If Japan waited too long, an Anglo-American–Soviet alliance would be perfected, and the nation would become even more isolated. The thing to do, then, was to act before such an alliance became firmly established. Matsuoka was correct in foreseeing that Japan’s move southward would eventually lead to a war against the three powers. Instead of stopping there, however, he reasoned that the nation must therefore turn north. To do nothing would solve nothing and would do irreparable damage to the Axis alliance.3
There was thus some logic to the views of the army, the navy, and the foreign minister. Their endless discussions in the last week of June were, in retrospect, the high point of prewar Japanese strategy. Earnest and serious discussion among the military, and at the highest echelons of the government, all reflected the sense of urgency. Japan’s top leaders realized that the world was at a crucial turning-point, and that its decisions would have fateful consequences for the course of the European and Asian wars. Between 26 June and 2 July, they continued to debate on the next steps Japan was to take, and the result of their deliberations was the crucial policy document (‘Outlines of fundamental national policy’) adopted at a meeting in the presence of the emperor, held on 2 July. According to the memorandum, Japan was to ‘construct the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere regardless of the changes in the world situation’. More specifically, Japan would concentrate on the settlement of the Chinese war, prepare for southern expansion, and try to solve the ‘northern problem’. In other words, both southern and northern strategies were to be pursued simultaneously; which came first would depend on circumstances, particularly the course of the European war. However, greater specificity was given to southern advance when the document referred to a 25 June decision by the liaison conference that had called for the stationing of Japanese troops in southern Indo-China. The 2 July memorandum stated that such action was part of the preparedness against the United States and Britain.4
In other words, the policy that emerged from the deliberations of late June and early July combined a determination to extend Japanese control to southern Indo-China with, at the same time, preparing for war against the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Since Japan was already fighting a war with China, what was visualized was the possibility of a war with four powers, plus probably Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. This sort of development was the very thing the Japanese had sought to avoid, and apparently they still believed it could be prevented by acting with lightning speed to entrench Japanese power in southern Indo-China. If that could be carried out without incurring foreign intervention, then Japan would have successfully enlarged its empire and be in a better position to fight an all-front war, should it become necessary.
In retrospect, there was faulty logic behind such a decision. Since all parties in Japan were agreed on the imperative of preventing a war against the combined force of its potential enemies, in particular America, Britain, and the Soviet Union, every effort should have been made to establish clear-cut priorities and concentrate on preparedness against one enemy at a time. Matsuoka saw this clearly, and he sought in vain to persuade his military colleagues to reverse themselves about the planned invasion of southern Indo-China which, he predicted accurately, would ultimately lead to war with the Anglo-American powers. Instead, he thought the logic of the German alliance dictated that Japan first concentrate on a war against the Soviet Union. If Japan did so, and postponed its advance into southern Indo-China for six months, the nation would be in a far better position strategically. The supreme command, however, was all set to undertake the Indo-China invasion, and it was too late to reverse that decision. At the 2 July meeting in the presence of the emperor, the army chief of staff, General Sugiyama Gen, explained that an advance to southern Indo-China would serve to sever links between Chungking and the Anglo-American powers. Should the United States, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies retaliate by an embargo, Japan could respond by formally declaring war on China and take over these Western countries’ concessions and settlements in that country. In the meantime, Japan would continue to prepare itself for a possible war with the Soviet Union. But, Sugiyama noted, it would be best not to become involved in such a conflict while Japan undertook to expand southward and bring the Chinese war to conclusion. The chief of naval operations, Admiral Nagano Osami, added that southern expansion was necessary to prepare the nation for a possible war with the Anglo-American-Dutch forces. Hara Yoshimichi, president of the Privy Council, reverted to Matsuoka’s argument and asserted that Japan should avoid war with the United States and instead go to war against the Soviet Union. That was because sooner or later it would be necessary to combat the communist policy the Soviet Union was pursuing throughout the world, whereas there was no good reason for going to war against the Anglo-American nations. Despite such strong opinions, the conferees let stand the basic document, oriented both to southern expansion and preparedness against the Soviet Union.
Regarding the latter, the supreme command put into effect a plan of mobilization, to concentrate as many as sixteen divisions (about 850,000 men) in Manchuria to keep them in a state of readiness for a Russian war which was expected to come around 1 September. That assumed that at least one-half of Soviet forces in Siberia would be shifted to the German front, leaving roughly fifteen divisions to face Japan. The Japanese soon noted, however, that many more troops than anticipated were still remaining in eastern Siberia, so that Japan’s force level would also have to be augmented accordingly. All that would take time, and already in mid-July the General Staff was worrying that an offensive against the Soviet Union might not materialize till after winter. There appeared to be no imminent collapse of the Soviet government or a rout of Russian by German forces, so that if war should come soon, Japan would have to confront a Soviet force that had not been significantly depleted. In any event, the army high command assumed that Japan would have to step up its preparedness against the Soviet Union.5
Given such developments, the Japanese leaders might have postponed the invasion of southern Indo-China for fear that it might incur Anglo-American retaliation and enhance risks of war with them. Nevertheless, on 3 July, the day after the crucial policy guidelines had been approved, the army issued an operational order for the stationing of Japanese forces in southern Indo-China. The invasion was to proceed ‘peacefully’, that is, through agreement with French authorities; but if they refused, it would take the form of military action. In either case, the occupation of southern Indo-China was to take place around 24 July.
Little thought was given to possible Anglo-American intervention. As General Sugiyama told the emperor, the army did not expect British intervention; if there was to be bloodshed, that would involve fighting with French troops. As for the United States, no intervention was envisaged unless Britain became involved, which was considered highly unlikely, so long as Japan confined its operations to Indo-China, or at most to Thailand and Burma.
In other words, Japan was pursuing a two-front approach, even while its strategists recognized that it would be impossible to go to war against the combined forces of the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and Britain. This lack of consistency can be explained only by noting that neither preparedness against the Soviet Union nor expansion into Indo-China was believed to enhance the risk of war. In all likelihood, the supreme command thought that in the immediate future the German-Russian War would be the principal fighting in the world, and that its outcome would determine whether or not Japan, the United States, and Britain would become involved in an Asian conflict. Even if sooner or later war with the latter nations should occur, Japan would be in a more advantageous position for having incorporated Indo-China into its empire. The fact remains that little was done to keep the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American powers separated. That would have entailed making concessions to one or the other, but given the 2 July decision, it would now be extremely difficult to do so.
The only Japanese initiative vis-à-vis the United States at this time was the resignation of Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the formation of a new Konoe cabinet, established on 18 July. From Prime Minister Konoe’s point of view, the cabinet reshuffling, in particular the replacement of Matsuoka by Admiral Toyoda Teijirō, was meant as a signal to the United States. As noted above, Konoe had wanted to reorient Japanese policy after the German invasion of the Soviet Union but had been powerless to do so, and had accepted the 2 July decision. Even so, he was still hopeful of preventing a combination of America and the Soviet Union so that Japan could concentrate on a Russian war. To that extent his and Matsuoka’s views coincided; both preferred postponement of the invasion of southern Indo-China. Nevertheless, they were equally powerless to stem the tide once the momentum had set in. Under the circumstances, Konoe believed the best way of avoiding a crisis with the United States was to resume the conversations in Washington to indicate Japan’s sincere desire for an understanding with America. It was in that context that Konoe sought Matsuoka’s resignation, as the latter had come to symbolize Japan’s commitment to the Axis pact and an obstacle in the way of Japanese–American negotiations. To spare Matsuoka embarrassment, the Konoe cabinet resigned as a group on 16 July, and then two days later the third Konoe cabinet was established.
In retrospect, it is not easy to see if Matsuoka should have been singled out for the failure to accommodate the United States. After all, he had begun strongly to urge postponement of the southern strategy, and he remained hopeful that somehow Japan and the United States would be able to live in peace in the Pacific. Nevertheless, he was the architect of the Axis pact, and was extremely suspect in Washington. Moreover, even talk of a possible war with the Soviet Union did not mollify American officials. On the contrary, they conveyed their strong concern for such an eventuality; obviously, a Japanese attack on Soviet territory would compel the latter to fight a two-front war and might lead to German victory. For all these reasons Matsuoka was an unpopular figure in Washington, and Konoe sensed it. By organizing a new cabinet, he hoped negotiations with America could be renewed and lead to a better relationship across the Pacific. The idea was that Washington would see Matsuoka’s resignation as a gesture of goodwill on Konoe’s part towards the United States and be interested in reciprocating his overtures.
Unfortunately, the tactic did not work. Within three days after the formation of the new cabinet – which retained all but four of the preceding cabinet ministers – the supreme command presented Konoe with a list of three demands: adherence to the 2 July decisions, the implementation of the southern and northern policies without delay, and observance of the spirit of the Axis alliance. The demands amounted to asking Konoe to confirm the twin policies of undertaking the invasion of southern Indo-China while at the same time mobilizing forces for war with the Soviet Union. The prime minister meekly acceded to the demands, thus from the outset nullifying his efforts for a rapprochement with the United States. He and his defenders would subsequently justify his action by saying that he had hoped to delay war with the Soviet Union by shifting the military’s attention southward through a promise of Indo-China invasion, while at the same time resuming talks in Washington so that the southern strategy could also be forestalled. If so, he was too naive, trusting in the good sense of the military as well as in America’s flexibility. In the event, the occupation of Indo-China would be carried out as planned, and the United States would retaliate immediately.6
The last ten days of July were crucial in determining the future of Japanese–American relations. Already on 21 July, Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles warned the Japanese that their occupation of Indo-China would be incompatible with the negotiations going on between the two countries. Through ‘Magic’, the code-breaking device that had now become operational, American officials had known of Japan’s intention to occupy southern Indo-China, an action which they believed would seriously affect the situation in South-East Asia and must be resisted. American policy after the German invasion of the Soviet Union a month earlier had been quite forceful and clear-cut. The United States welcomed the new development, Roosevelt agreeing with Churchill that, in the latter’s words, ‘Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid’.7 The government in Washington immediately started planning for extending lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, and in the meantime Roosevelt released part of the latter’s assets, frozen after the Soviet invasion of Finland in late 1939. ‘If the Russians could hold the Germans until October 1’, he said, ‘that would be of great value in defeating Hitler’. In that connection, the president wanted to discourage any Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, warning Prime Minister Konoe in a personal message on 4 July that any such action would jeopardize the negotiations in Washington and undermine the peace in the Pacific.8
The United States, in short, was already seeing itself as being tied to the Soviet Union in the European war. It could help the latter by shipping aid goods and by frustrating Japanese attempts to take advantage of the German assault to attack the Soviet Union from the rear. In that connection, Japan’s southern advance would be welcome inasmuch as it might divert resources from the north and make less likely an impending Japanese war with the Soviet Union. Instead of acquiescing in Japanese occupation of Indo-China, however, the Roosevelt administration decided to throw obstacles in its way, thus in effect choking off Japan from both northern and southern options. The main instrument was to be economic, in particular the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States. Just as the United States was unfreezing Soviet assets to enable the latter to fight Germany, it would make it impossible for Japan to obtain funds with which to purchase goods in America, especially much-needed oil. A total cessation of exports to Japan was not visualized, however. What Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, and others had in mind was that henceforth Japan would require an export licence whenever it wanted to buy American commodities. Moreover, some small quantities of low-octane gasoline could still be sold to Japan so as not to provide the latter with an excuse for going into the Dutch East Indies. Nevertheless, the intent of such measures was unmistakable.9 The United States would take steps to deter Japan both from attacking the Soviet Union and occupying Indo-China. Such warning was explicitly communicated to Tokyo so as to leave little room for doubt about America’s serious intentions. If additional evidence was needed, the 7 July agreement between the United States and Iceland provided it; it gave American forces the right to occupy Icelandic territory, which action was carried out on the same day. It brought American military intervention in the European war a step closer to realization. Thus it was clear that the United States was acting as a de facto ally of both Britain and the Soviet Union, and as a de facto foe of Germany. It was presenting Japan with a choice of either being included in a list of its foes or of returning to the negotiating table so as to redeem itself and gain American goodwill and trade.
Konoe should have taken such warning seriously, but he was too weak to stop the momentum. On 14 July Japan had presented a note to the Vichy regime, demanding the right to station troops in southern Indo-China, and five days later the new foreign minister, Toyoda, gave Vichy the deadline of 23 July. Regardless of Vichy’s response, the supreme command was determined to carry out the invasion, and plans were completed for the dispatch of necessary troops on 24 July. Vichy’s acceptance came on the 23rd, and thus a ‘peaceful’ landing on the Indo-China coast was accomplished between 28 and 30 July. In retaliation, on 25 July the United States ordered the freezing of Japanese assets. The following day, Britain and the Philippines followed suit, and on 27 July New Zealand and the Netherlands did likewise. The ABCD encirclement of Japan was virtually complete.
Why did the Japanese leadership fail to foresee this? The United States had given ample and explicit warning to Tokyo to desist from occupying Indo-China, and yet neither the civilian government nor the military took it seriously. Foreign Minister Toyoda asserted on 24 July that he thought the United States would not impose a total embargo on oil even after the freezing of Japanese assets, and that in any event he hoped the United States would be interested in resuming talks in Washington for adjustment of diplomatic relations. The military, on their part, appear to have reasoned that the occupation of Indo-China would not present a casus belli to America so long as Japan stopped there; it was not yet intending to invade Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines, and so the United States and Britain would not take drastic action that could further escalate the crisis. Such complacency, of course, was treated to a rude shock through a series of counter-measures adopted by the ABD powers. In addition, steps were being taken to consolidate further American support of China; since Japanese control over the whole Indo-China peninsula was designed to cut off one vital link between Chungking and the outside world, the United States would retaliate by establishing a military advisory corps in Chungking. The decision to do so had been made on 3 July, but initially it was intended for overseeing the implementation of the lend-lease programme. Now, however, it came to have more military significance. In addition, on 23 July the president authorized the stationing of volunteer airmen in China, consisting of some 100 pilots under the command of Claire Chennault, who would fly 500 aircraft for the Chinese air force. Also at this time, Roosevelt decided to call the Philippine army into federal service and to create a new Far Eastern command for the defence of the islands.10
Given such decisive steps, the conclusion is inescapable that the Japanese leaders seriously misjudged American determination to resist any further change in the status quo. By their complacency, they further solidified the ABCD coalition, to which the Soviet Union was now being added. From this time on, the confrontation between Japan on one hand and the ABCD powers on the other became even more pronounced than earlier, so that if war were to be avoided it would be incumbent upon Japan to try to break up that coalition, or otherwise to join it. It did neither.
America’s stiff measures had at least one effect on Japanese policy. The supreme command in Tokyo became less and less sanguine about the prospect of waging a successful campaign against the Soviet Union. Given the deteriorating condition of Japanese–American relations, the nation would have to be prepared for a grave crisis in South-East Asia which could lead to war against the ABCD powers. Under the circumstances, even the die-hard exponents of the northern strategy began showing signs of hesitancy, the more so as the German assault on the Soviet Union was not proceeding as smoothly as had at first been anticipated. Despite such misgivings, the General Staff went ahead with the planned deployment of sixteen divisions in Manchuria, concentrating on the Siberian border. They were, however, to avoid provocative action that could cause Soviet retaliation and lead to war. Since earlier a possible attack on the Soviet Union had been planned for early August, such caution, coming on the heels of America’s economic sanctions, meant there would be no chance for undertaking the northern strategy. On 9 August, the army supreme command formally accepted the inevitable, concluding that it was impossible to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. As the General Staff reasoned, there was little chance that Germany would be able to defeat that country by the end of the year, and in the meantime the situation vis-à-vis the United States was growing more and more serious. International conditions, in other words, had changed since 2 July, and therefore the guidelines adopted that day would no longer be adequate.11
Between 2 July and 9 August, then, a crucial reversal of Japanese strategy had taken place. From preparedness for an impending offensive against the Soviet Union, the supreme command reverted to a more passive stance in the north. Sixteen divisions would still be mobilized, but they would not be engaged in any action for the time being. Henceforth, Japanese strategy would focus on a possible conflict with the ABCD powers. In this sense, 9 August may be taken as the point of no return as far as Japanese–American relations were concerned.
The United States contributed to that turn of events by instituting a de facto embargo on oil. The freezing of Japanese assets, announced on 25 July, had been followed by a week of intensive work by State department, Treasury, and other officials to set up a machinery for implementing the order. The idea, which Roosevelt approved, was to let the Japanese apply for export licences which would then be examined on a case-by-case basis and necessary funds released from blocked Japanese monies to purchase the goods. Oil, too, would be dealt with in this fashion. But the processing of applications for licences and release of funds took time, and the matter was overseen by Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state, who refused to release funds, intent upon punishing Japan for its southern expansionism.12 The result was that Japan never got any oil after 25 July, a fact that even Roosevelt did not find out till early September. But the Japanese were under no illusion about the matter. They now realized that a total oil embargo was being put into effect. Japanese strategy would now have to take that development into consideration.
The feeling of a fatal clash with the United States mounted in the first week of August. Officers of the General Staff began talking of an impending war against the Anglo-American powers, and Prime Minister Konoe himself told the war and navy ministers that matters stood ‘only a step this side of entering into a major war’.13 They reasoned that the American oil embargo would force the nation to look for alternative sources of supply in South-East Asia, which would necessitate military action to incorporate the region into the empire. But such action would inevitably draw the United States, Britain, and the Dutch into war. Thus, Japan must be prepared to fight against the ABD powers. The oil embargo was seen as tantamount to an act of war, and Japan would respond by its own military action.
At least the Japanese were careful to avoid a two-front war; they would not provoke the Soviet Union while they prepared for a new war with the ABD powers. But they recognized the futility of separating these latter nations. They were seen as a united coalition, so that Japanese strategy would have to envisage a war against them all. The war was expected to come in late November or early December. This was because the total oil embargo by the United States made it imperative to act before the navy’s oil reserve was depleted. In other words, Japan’s strategists had at most four months to devise a plan of attack.
This was not an easy task, given the abrupt decision not to go through with the Soviet strategy and the suddenness with which the United States confronted Japan with its economic sanctions. Although war with the combined ABCD powers had been envisaged for some time, as of early August there had been no comprehensive master plan, integrating army and navy thinking. Each service had worked out its own blueprint, but no agreement had been reached between the two. The sudden crisis of late July forced the services to change their ideas seriously so as to develop a detailed, comprehensive plan of attack. It was not till 6 September, however, that such a plan was adopted by the top leaders.
It will be unnecessary to trace here changing army and navy strategic concepts in detail. The important point is that by August 1941, both services foresaw a ‘southern strategy’ involving the whole region of South-East Asia: the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. The army was primarily interested in first assaulting Malaya as a stepping-stone to the Indies, whereas the navy preferred attacking the Philippines on the way to the Dutch empire. In both instances, the resource-rich Dutch East Indies was an ultimate goal, but the army was convinced that military action in Burma and Malaya would have a vital effect on the course of the Chinese war, whereas the navy’s primary focus was on the United States and for that reason an attack on the Philippines was considered of primary importance. The disparity in army–navy thinking reflected the former’s continued preoccupation with the war in China and the latter’s concern with the American war. In either case, however, what was being developed was a comprehensive anti-ABCD strategy.
It was in this context that the navy broached the possibility of an air attack on the United States fleet in Hawaii. Both the army and the navy agreed that an American war would involve air and naval power to a far greater extent than a war against Chinese, British, or Dutch forces, and they recognized America’s intrinsic superiority in this regard, which could force a long, drawn-out conflict in the western Pacific even as Japanese forces were engaged in the conquest of South-East Asia. For this reason some, particularly those around Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, had studied the possibility of attacking the naval base at Pearl Harbor, with the aim of destroying the fleet stationed there. He shared with his colleagues, both in the navy and the army, their view that Japan had no chance to win a prolonged conflict with the United States and its allies. Of course, some talked of a ‘hundred years war’ with the West, but that was not to be taken literally. Even those who were convinced of a long-term struggle recognized that what Japan must do was to take advantage of the European situation and to make the most efficient use of its limited resources, especially oil. Yamamoto’s idea was to gamble on a quick assault on the United States fleet in Hawaii to obtain a temporary tactical advantage, and then to use the time thus gained to build up a more secure empire in the western and southern Pacific. The Pearl Harbor strategy was presented by navy strategists to their army counterparts on 22 August, and the latter accepted it, in their turn finalizing detailed plans for the mobilization of forces for action in Malaya, the Philippines, and the Indies.14
Even at this late hour, however, it appears that there was disagreement between the army and navy regarding the Japanese–American crisis. While the navy now had a concrete plan of attack on Pearl Harbor, it refused to commit itself totally to a war with the United States. Its attitude was that if war should become inevitable, then the best strategy was to attack the United States fleet first, but that war was by no means inevitable yet. Much depended on the course of the European conflict and on diplomatic talks in Washington. The army, on the other hand, had come to the conclusion that diplomacy was hopeless, and that war should be faced as an immediate prospect. Mobilization would take time, at least a month, and once it was started it would be extremely difficult to turn back the clock. The army, therefore, wanted an explicit policy from the government for going to war against the ABD powers by a certain date. Clearly, there were important differences concerning a possible compromise with the United States. The navy on the whole stressed the resumption of oil shipments, so that if Washington should agree to it, the main casus belli would have disappeared. For the army, however, it was not enough to obtain oil once again. Far more at stake was Japan’s control over China and South-East Asia, that is, the new order in East Asia. Since it was very unlikely that the United States would ever reverse its support of China or its ABCD alliance, Japan would have to go to war if it meant to persist in its scheme for the Asian order.
As if to confirm the consolidation of the alliance, Roosevelt and Churchill conferred in person off Newfoundland during 9–14 August. The Atlantic Conference cemented the two powers’ strategic ties, although the only published product of the meeting was the Atlantic Charter. President Roosevelt was reluctant to declare war on Germany, as Churchill wished, for fear of dividing domestic opinion; but otherwise he frankly discussed how the United States could best help Britain defeat Germany and prevent Japanese intervention. On this second point Churchill proposed that the United States, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies issue parallel warnings to Japan to the effect that further Japanese encroachment on the south-western Pacific would bring about their counter-measures. Such warnings would formalize the ABD entente and confront Japan with a stark choice of either holding the line or risking war with all three powers. While Japan’s holding the line would still mean its presence in China and Indo-China, at least it would enable the Western powers to concentrate on the Atlantic theatre of war. The United States delegation, headed by Roosevelt and including Under-Secretary Welles, agreed with the idea in principle but believed the time was not quite propitious for a final showdown with Japan. American strategy was to avoid war with Japan by maintaining a firm stand, but not to precipitate a crisis that could lead to war in the immediate future. This was a very fine line to draw, but Roosevelt and Welles believed the stringent economic sanctions, plus the very fact of the Atlantic meeting, would deter the Japanese from rash action.
In the end the American and British delegations agreed on a statement that President Roosevelt would communicate to Ambassador Nomura, warning that ‘various steps would have to be taken by the United States’ in retaliation against further Japanese military action, ‘notwith-standing the President’s realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan’. This rather clumsily phrased statement did not explicitly commit the United States to enter into war if Japan should invade British or Dutch possessions in Asia, but it indicated additional sanctions against such aggression. The content of the warning was less important than that it was to constitute part of a parallel action by the three governments. The British and Dutch governments would issue similar warnings, so that the Japanese would be under no illusion about the solidarity of the tripartite entente. This point was underscored when the Atlantic Charter was issued after the end of the conference. As Alexander Cadogan, Britain’s under-secretary of foreign affairs, noted, warnings to Japan ‘must be read in conjunction with the Joint Declaration, which will give the Japanese a jar’.15 This was because the Atlantic Charter constituted a statement of principles the two powers shared – principles which they implied would also be supported by those struggling against the Axis powers.
In view of its symbolic and strategic significance, it will be well to examine the Charter in some detail. It consisted of eight ‘common principles in the national policies’ of the two countries ‘on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world’. First, ‘their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other’. Seemingly a simple statement, it not only sought to contrast the Anglo-American nations’ peaceful and purely defensive intentions in the war in sharp contrast to the Axis powers’ aggressive acts, but would also be a signal to other belligerents, in particular the Soviet Union, that they should likewise refrain from seeking territorial aggrandizement as a result of the war. This point was further emphasized in the second article, which asserted that ‘no territorial changes’ should be made ‘that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned’. This principle would nullify the territorial changes Germany, Italy and Japan had imposed on their neighbouring peoples, but could be potentially troublesome in that the Soviet Union could be expected to seek changes in Europe and Asia to enhance its security. Third, the Anglo-American powers ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see Sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them’. This was the familiar self-determination principle, to be applied for the time being to those ‘who have been forcibly deprived of’ these rights. It was meant to refer to peoples in Europe and Asia occupied by Axis forces, but it could also be relevant to such lands as Taiwan and Korea where, it could be argued, the indigenous populations had been ‘forcibly’ subjected to Japanese rule. Of course, the Japanese could use the same principle to argue, as they would during the war, that the ABD powers themselves, if they were to be true to the principle, would have to restore sovereign rights to their colonies. In the immediate circumstances of 1941, however, the third article was intended to assure people in occupied territory that their rights were uppermost in the minds of the leaders of the democracies.
The fourth principle was in many ways the most important: ‘they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity’. An amazing statement of economic internationalism, this article indicated that ‘economic prosperity’ was a goal common to all countries, and that the attainment of this objective required the opening up of the entire world’s resources and markets for their access. The statement was a ringing reaffirmation of those principles that had been subverted, distorted, or abandoned by various countries throughout the 1930s. The United States and Britain themselves had not been blameless in this regard, so that the two leaders’ endorsement of this article meant that their governments were willing to take the initiative to bring the world economy back to the more open conditions prevailing before the Depression. The British government was reluctant to commit itself to a wholesale reversion to internationalism; the 1932 Ottawa agreement on imperial preferences was still the framework evisaged for the foreseeable future to protect the economy after the devastations of war. The clause ‘with due respect for their existing obligations’ was inserted to take account of this. Nevertheless, the article on the whole clearly indicated that the renewed American stress on the Open Door would emerge once again as a guiding principle in the postwar world. Equally important, the statement assured that even the Axis nations need not worry about their impoverishment or exclusion from economic opportunities after the war. Because Germany and Japan had rationalized their aggression by identifying themselves as ‘have not’ nations, the Atlantic Charter sought to reassure them that they would enjoy access to trade and raw materials after the war on an equal basis. To Japan in particular, the principle was addressed as a way of promising that it could obtain all the oil, iron, and other materials it needed if it stopped its aggressive behaviour and its scheme for an exclusive Asian empire.
The next item on the Charter continued the fourth article’s economic theme and asserted the two countries’ commitment to ‘the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the objective of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security’. This was an interesting statement in that it reasserted traditional liberal principles, but in a form modified because of the crisis of capitalism during the Depression. The idea that governments must concern themselves with labour standards and social security was relatively new and was not an intrinsic part of classical liberalism. Both in the United States and Britain, however, the disastrous consequences of the economic crisis had produced the recognition that the state must aim at improving working conditions and caring for the welfare of all people. In a sense this commitment was reinforced as non-liberal states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union were seen to be pursuing such objectives in a non-democratic framework. These totalitarian nations appeared to be successful in obtaining the support of the masses through social welfare programmes, and if the democracies were to meet their challenge, they too would have to implement similar programmes.
The sixth, seventh, and eighth articles sought to give specificity to the shape of a ‘future peace’ that would come ‘after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny’. Although Japan was not mentioned, clearly there would be no peace until after its imperialism, too, was destroyed. The peace that would follow the Axis defeat, Roosevelt and Churchill declared, must be such as to ‘afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries’, to ensure that ‘all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want’, to enable ‘all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance’, and to ‘lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments’. This was a sweeping enunciation of the principle of collective security that would rule the world after the war. Like the post-First World War doctrine of collective security, the new vision emphasized the inviolability of national boundaries, arms control, and freedom of the seas. All such principles would be implemented and safeguarded through ‘a wider and more permanent system of general security’, the Atlantic Charter added. This was Wilsonianism pure and simple, in its stress on territorial integrity and on collective action to punish its violators. Coupled with the preceding articles that referred to economic principles, the last three summed up the internationalist aspirations of the two governments, as well as their determination that those aspirations should survive the disasters of the 1930s.
Because the Atlantic Charter was essentially a reaffirmation of Wilsonian internationalism, it is not surprising that contemporary observers found little new in it. Typical of American public reaction was an essay that appeared in the New Republic in late August. ‘The peace aims announced by Messrs Churchill and Roosevelt’, it stated, ‘aroused little enthusiasm in either country. Their general tenor had long been taken for granted’. At the same time, however, the writer noted that other people around the world would be pleased with such a clear statement of war aims. ‘Populations of the conquered countries certainly may be encouraged by the assurance of the two greatest democracies that they intend to disarm the aggressors and restore self-government’. The Japanese militarists, on their part, ‘may find more difficulty in convincing the people that Britain and America are out for conquest and that Japan needs to fight for raw materials’.16
That was a correct reading of the Atlantic Charter, but it was not necessarily how it impressed the Japanese. A staff officer of the General Staff commented that the Atlantic Charter was tantamount to America’s declaration of war, and that the eight articles signalled the Anglo-American powers’ intention of world conquest through the maintenance of the status quo as defined by liberalism. Others particularly took note of the eighth article in which the two democratic leaders had asserted, ‘Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential’. That sounded like a call for the disarmament of the Axis powers and the establishment of an Anglo-American police force to preserve peace. Thus, whether through liberalism or through military power, the United States and Britain would seek to continue to dominate the world. The leading Tokyo newspaper, Asahi, devoted considerable space to an analysis of the Atlantic Charter. The paper’s New York correspondent asserted that unlike Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the new declaration frankly aimed at disarming only the enemy nations, with the result that America and Britain would retain police power throughout the world. In other words, he said, the declaration was tantamount to clearly expressing the two nations’ intention of ‘world domination’. Regarding the Atlantic Charter’s reference to equal economic opportunity to be provided victors and vanquished alike, the Asahi correspondent was adamant that it simply implied Anglo-American capital’s control of world markets, since in a situation of open competition few doubted that the two countries would win. The Charter, then, was a de facto declaration of war which the United States and Britain clearly intended to win, as well as an assertion of postwar leadership in world economic and military affairs. Very similar views were expressed by the newspaper’s London correspondent.17
Although extreme, such views served to define, for the Japanese, the growing crisis in which they found themselves. As a front-page news report of Asahi noted, the Atlantic Charter aimed at maintaining ‘a system of world domination on the basis of Anglo-American world views’. In order to solidify such domination, the two democracies were trying to isolate Germany and Italy in Europe, whereas in Asia they were supporting China and the Dutch East Indies to keep them from accepting Japanese policy. Furthermore, the Anglo-American leaders appeared interested in dividing Japanese opinion so as to undermine Japan’s war preparedness. Thus put, the document clarified the nature of the confrontation between the old order dominated by the Anglo-American powers and the forces that opposed it. If the Japanese did not wish to submit to a Pax Britannica or Pax Americana, the Asahi noted, then they must be willing to defend their nation even at the risk of war. On the other hand, if war were to be avoided, Japan would have to be prepared to accept the Anglo-American terms substantially if not totally. The logic was quite clear: the Japanese were being challenged by America and Britain to choose between going back to the earlier framework of co-operation with them, or refusing to do so and isolating themselves from the rest of the world except for the Axis partners.18
The Japanese army leaders were quite correct, then, in arguing throughout July and August that the nation faced the parting of ways, and that it must choose between war or accommodation with the United States. Since accommodation would be unacceptable, the army reasoned that the only alternative was war, and it grew progressively impatient both with the navy, which was making war plans without a definite commitment to implement them, and with the civilian leadership that appeared incapable of making up its mind regarding the question of war or compromise. Actually, at this time Prime Minister Konoe was toying with the idea of a personal meeting with President Roosevelt. He saw it as one last desperate effort to prevent war. In order to do so, Japan should be willing to offer some concessions regarding the East Asian order, presumably indicating a willingness to withdraw troops from Indo-China. If, after all such efforts, no compromise could be arrived at, then the Japanese would be able to persuade themselves and the world that they had done everything possible to avoid war but had failed.19
Konoe intimated this scheme shortly before the Roosevelt–Churchill meeting to Japan’s military leaders. Navy Minister Oikawa endorsed it right away, whereas War Minister Tōjō reluctantly gave his support, saying the army would respect the prime minister’s last-minute effort to avoid an American war, but that if nothing should come of it the nation must resolutely be prepared to go to war. A cable to Ambassador Nomura was sent on 7 August to seek a summit meeting. But since Roosevelt was about to attend his own summit conference, America’s response was not forthcoming right away. Secretary Hull, who stayed behind in Washington, told Nomura that he saw no point in holding such a meeting between the president and the prime minister unless there were to be a drastic change in Japanese policy. When Roosevelt returned from Argentia Bay, he immediately transmitted to Nomura the warning that he had promised Churchill. The language was somewhat modified and did not include the crucial phrase ‘notwithstanding the President’s realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan’. Instead, Roosevelt warned that further aggressive acts by Japan would compel him to take measures ‘toward insuring the safety and security’ of the United States. The message was coupled with an expression of interest in meeting with Konoe if Japan were to suspend its ‘expansionist activities’ and agree to ‘peaceful plans’ for the Pacific on the basis of the principles for which the United States stood. Such plans and principles would be essentially those the president had just enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. In other words, Roosevelt would insist that Japan return to liberal internationalism if it sincerely desired to restore a peaceful relationship with the United States.
Given such a stand on the part of Roosevelt, Konoe’s scheme was doomed to failure from the beginning. And yet, during the second half of August, the two leaders continued to exchange messages, and there was much talk of a possible summit conference. This was because both sides, for different reasons, clearly wanted to avoid a showdown. The Japanese would not go so far as to embrace the entire principles of the Atlantic Charter, viewing them as a unilateral list of America’s traditional beliefs with little regard for other countries’ special needs. As the Japanese government noted in a message transmitted to Washington on 28 August, certain nations such as the United States that were endowed with superior economic and geographical advantages should be more understanding of other countries and co-operate with the latter in a more equitable distribution of material resources. Japan, in other words, was struggling for its needs and for security, an objective it was finding more and more difficult to accomplish because of the ABCD encirclement. Nevertheless, despite such differences, Konoe believed a compromise settlement was possible. Because of the lateness of the hour, he believed a personal meeting with Roosevelt alone would defuse the crisis atmosphere and might conceivably lead to a more stable relationship across the Pacific.
President Roosevelt, on his part, was interested in the idea of a summit meeting with Konoe, but not necessarily because he believed a long-lasting settlement of the crisis could be achieved. For him it would be unthinkable to give up the basic principles, but at least a meeting with Konoe would give time for the United States armed forces to be better prepared for a possible war. The president’s enthusiasm, however, was not reciprocated by Hull, who believed no summit meeting would be useful until some fundamental issues had been discussed beforehand. Moreover, he was worried lest the meeting affect the solidarity of the ABCD entente and drive China out of desperation to the Japanese. If the Chinese should feel they were being betrayed by the Americans, such an outcome would not be unthinkable, Hull believed, and could even lead to releasing Japanese forces out of China for use southward.
At this time there would seem to have been some justification for such fears. When the Atlantic Charter was announced, Quo Tai-chi, the foreign minister, declared, ‘China believes the final destruction of the forces of aggression can most swiftly be achieved by bringing about the defeat of Japan, first through a tightening of the encirclement of which Japan herself is the sole architect’. It was an excellent expression of the Chinese belief in the strategy of encirclement through the ABCD alliance. For that very reason, however, there was some unhappiness that the Americans and the British appeared to be carrying on a bilateral conversation without taking the Chinese into their confidence. As reported by British Ambassador Clark Kerr in Chungking, Chiang Kai-shek ‘is feeling sore because the declaration [the Atlantic Charter] was followed by [a] joint message to Stalin while none was sent to Chiang Kai-shek, who claims that China’s defence against Japanese attack is just as important as Russia’s against Nazi attack, and that he deserved special mention’. This sort of complaint was a perennial one, but the Chinese felt extremely uneasy when, upon returning from the Atlantic Conference, President Roosevelt was reported to be in constant contact with Japanese officials. The fear that the United States might ‘sell China down the river’ in order to buy a temporary peace in the Pacific was genuine, and at this time it fell to the British to assure the Chinese that no such possibility existed. As Richard Law, permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs, told Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador in London, at the end of August, it was ‘inconceivable that the United States should have any idea of selling China down the river’. On the contrary, ‘the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, the United States, and indeed China herself, were all engaged in fighting the same enemy even though there was no declared alliance.… We were all fighting the same war whether in Europe or the Pacific, and events in Europe would prove to be decisive in the Pacific as well as in Europe’.20
Given Chinese sensitivity about any sign of the weakening of the ABCD entente, the American government had to tread very cautiously in considering a summit meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe. Nevertheless, the United States might have gone through with the meeting if the Japanese side had been solidly behind Konoe and willing to modify significantly its policy in Asia. Such was not the case, and in the final analysis the aborting of the summit conference must be attributed to the unwillingness of Japan to change course.
For it was during the crucial weeks of late August and early September 1941 that the Japanese leadership finally decided on war. Even as Konoe and his supporters were trying desperately to avert a crisis with the United States through his meeting with President Roosevelt, the supreme command’s army and navy sections began a series of intensive discussions to arrive at a consensual decision concerning the timing and scale of preparedness for war against the ABD powers. As noted above, the navy had believed that war preparedness could be undertaken without a national decision for war, whereas the army believed a definite commitment to go to war was needed before mobilization of necessary forces could be implemented. After daily meetings, the two sides finally reached a compromise at the beginning of September. It was to the effect that Japan should complete war preparedness by late October and decide on war against the ABD powers if no diplomatic settlement had been arrived at by the first part of the month. In other words, war preparedness would be followed by a decision for war, but in the meantime diplomatic efforts would be continued to see if war could be avoided. The army’s and the navy’s viewpoints were neatly balanced in the compromise. The formula was written into a document, ‘Guidelines for implementing national policies’, which was formally adopted at a leaders’ conference in the presence of the emperor on 6 September.
That document may be regarded as a virtual declaration of war by Japan. It clearly implied that war would come unless a peaceful settlement could be worked out with the United States and Britain. In an appendix to the document the minimal terms acceptable to Japan were spelled out; if those terms were not met, then war would come. Japan would insist, first, that the Anglo-American powers desist from extending military and economic aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime; second, that they refrain from establishing military facilities within Thailand, the Dutch East Indies, China, or the Far Eastern provinces of the Soviet Union and from augmenting their forces beyond their existing strength; and, third, that they provide Japan with resources needed for its existence by restoring trade relations and offering friendly co-operation with Japan as the latter undertook to collaborate economically with Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. In return for such concessions on the part of the United States and Britain, Japan would be willing to promise not to undertake further military expansion in Asia and to withdraw its troops from Indo-China ‘upon the establishment of a just peace in East Asia’. Furthermore, it would be prepared to guarantee Philippine neutrality and refrain from hostile action against the Soviet Union so long as the latter observed the neutrality treaty.
The 6 September guidelines were interpreted by some, the emperor and the prime minister for example, as sanctioning one last effort to negotiate with the United States in order to avoid war. The emperor emphasized this point both at the meeting of the top leaders held on that day, and also at his prior conferences with Konoe, Sugiyama, and Nagano. The emperor’s approval of the guidelines may, therefore, have been intended as a way to encourage further diplomatic endeavours. For the military, however, the decisions clearly signalled war. The best statement of the army’s views is a document the General Staff prepared for the 6 September meeting. The war was defined as one against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, its purposes being ‘expelling American, British, and Dutch influences from East Asia, consolidating Japan’s sphere of autonomy and security, and constructing a new order in greater East Asia’. Japan intended to establish a close military, political, and economic relationship with other Asian countries, whereas the ABD powers sought to obstruct the attempt, the paper noted. They stood for the status quo in the name of the defence of democracy, in reality trying to prevent Japan’s growth and development. If Japan should give in, America’s military position would be further strengthened, and the nation would become even more subordinate to its influence. In such a situation, war was inevitable. The army document frankly recognized the difficulties Japan faced in going to war. The ABD powers had entered into a de facto military alliance with China, and moreover those four nations appeared eager to effect a similar entente with the Soviet Union. In other words, there was the likelihood of Japan’s becoming engaged in war with five powers, in northern and southern Asia as well as on the China mainland. That was a formidable undertaking but, the army document noted, not entirely hopeless if Japan should be able to occupy quickly important strategic locations in the south, develop their rich natural resources, create a region of long-term self-sufficiency, and continue to co-operate with Germany and Italy, for these steps could conceivably lead to British defeat and the break-up of the Anglo-American alliance. That was conceded to be a remote possibility at best, but the alternative would be to persist in a state of uncertainty in which Japan’s oil reserves continued to dwindle while American naval strength would come to exceed Japanese. Thus, Japan would come under greater Anglo-American control even without a fight. For all these reasons, war was a gamble that had to be taken.21
The navy, too, was in essential agreement with the army viewpoint. As Nagano explained to the emperor, Japan had the choice of doing nothing, which would lead to its collapse within a few years, or going to war while there was at least a 70 or 80 per cent chance of initial victory. A diplomatic settlement with the United States that merely bought a temporary peace for one or two years was unacceptable; therefore, to build for a longer-term peace, the nation must resolve to go to war. Should war come, Nagano explained at the 6 September meeting, Japan should quickly occupy strategically important and resource-rich areas so as to establish a firm zone of power as a base for engaging in a long, drawn-out war. In other words, initial successes would not be enough to cripple the enemy’s will, but they were imperative to enable the nation to prepare for a long war. In order to achieve a quick initial victory, war should be declared as soon as possible.
Given such discussions and the final decision taken in the presence of the emperor, there was little chance that Konoe’s meeting with Roosevelt, even if it should materialize, would be successful. He would have to come back with substantial American concessions to satisfy the army and navy supreme command, and he would have to do so by early October. The conferees at the 6 September meeting agreed that in order to facilitate Konoe’s last-minute efforts, military preparedness till early October would be undertaken discreetly so as not to provoke the United States, but that after that time plans must be put into effect to go to war by early November. Everything, then, would depend on what happened in the month following 6 September. On that very day, Konoe conferred in secret with Ambassador Grew and urged on the latter the importance of meeting with Roosevelt as soon as possible. The American ambassador agreed and sent an urgent cable to Washington to transmit Konoe’s sincere wishes for peace. But the Japanese military remained sceptical. On 7 September War Minister Tōjō privately expressed his view that the United States would insist on Japan’s denouncing the Axis pact, withdrawing from China and Indo-China, and observing the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China. Those terms were unacceptable to the army, and even if Japan were to grant them so as to purchase peace, it would not last long, for the United States would take advantage of it to strengthen itself and assault Japan. Given such thinking, even Konoe began to grow pessimistic about the chances of a fruitful meeting with Roosevelt.22
War with the ABCD powers, then, was daily becoming a reality. Both the army and the navy began their specific preparations for mobilizing their forces, with a focus at this time on a southern strategy: a simultaneous attack on Hong Kong, Malaya, the Philippines, Guam, and the Dutch East Indies. The navy, of course, was also finalizing its strategy for attacking the United States fleet in Hawaii. These offensive assaults in combination were expected to ‘cripple the main bases of Britain and America in East Asia’ while at the same time establishing a condition of ‘autonomy and security’, which in turn would enable Japan to ‘subjugate China’. In carrying out its southern attack, the army supreme command pointed out, Japan was at an advantage in that the indigenous populations had long been suppressed by whites and had therefore developed a friendly attitude towards it. The ABD powers, therefore, would find it difficult to resist the Japanese offensive. The former, on the other hand, could try to divide Japanese forces by encouraging Soviet moves in the north, a possibility that could be prevented if Japan struck in the south for a quick victory in the coming winter, since during the cold months no large-scale military action could take place in the north. The strategy, then, was to act speedily in South-East Asia by diverting some of the forces and resources from China, while keeping open the possibility of a northern campaign in the following spring. It was hoped that the whole southern offensive would last for about five months, by which time Japanese troops would have completed the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, British Borneo, Guam, and Hong Kong.23
It was around this time that the supreme command began in earnest a study of the administration of occupied territory. It was realized that the occupation of South-East Asia would present problems different from that of China, and staff officers had been dispatched to the region to observe local conditions at first hand. Officials of the Planning Board had for some time been collecting data in preparation for economic planning for the area, and they were becoming increasingly insistent on an early decision for war in view of the rapid depletion of mineral supplies in the wake of the American embargo.
War, then, would mean fighting against the ABD nations in addition to China. It could be avoided only if Japan and the United States came to some agreement, but such agreement would no longer be a bilateral arrangement, for the United States was more firmly than ever committed to an entente with the anti-Axis powers so that its negotiating stand would have to embrace positions acceptable to the British, Dutch, and Chinese, as well as to Americans. It was thus inevitable that China should continue to be a key to Japanese–American differences.
From the American perspective, there was little point in coming to any understanding with Japan that did not include the latter’s commitment to withdraw from China. As seen above, the State Department’s negative response to the idea of a meeting between Konoe and Roosevelt was based on the fear that it could drive China out of the ABCD entente. Roosevelt reiterated to Ambassador Nomura that any agreement with Japan would have to be endorsed by Britain, China, and the Dutch. And it was extremely unlikely that the Chinese would accept anything less than Japan’s evacuation of China and observance of Hull’s four principles. Throughout the crucial month of September, both Roosevelt and Hull made it abundantly clear to the Japanese that the United States would not budge from this position. Nomura clearly understood this; as he cabled Tokyo on 12 September, the main difficulty in Japanese–American negotiations lay in the latter’s emphasis on withdrawing Japanese troops from China, a matter on which both American public opinion and the Chinese government insisted. The ambassador suggested that the only way to come to terms with America would be through an explicit promise of withdrawing forces from China within two years. He correctly judged that the China question was the main obstacle. Both in order to assure the Chinese that there were no back-door negotiations between Tokyo and Washington at their expense, and in order to gain as much time as possible while American forces were being readied for military action, it was necessary for the United States to revert time and again to the issue of Japanese presence in China.24
The Japanese recognized this, and on 13 September the liaison conference discussed the minimally acceptable terms on China. They included continued stationing of Japanese troops in certain parts of Inner Mongolia and north China in order to effect ‘co-operation’ between the two countries for the maintenance of order and security against Communist and other subversive activities. Japan would be willing to evacuate its troops from the rest of China and support the merging of Chiang Kai-shek’s and Wang Ching-wei’s governments. Manchuria, of course, would remain independent. Economic co-operation for ‘developing and utilizing resources necessary for national defence’ would be effected. In other words, Japan would continue to retain its special position in China, which from the army’s point of view could not be given up. If the United States should reject these terms, then Japan must be willing to go to war.25
By the same token, such terms were clearly unacceptable to America. Although the language was somewhat modified, the American side was unimpressed when they were transmitted on 23 September. At a meeting with Nomura on 2 October, Hull bluntly told the ambassador that he saw little point in holding a summit conference, and reiterated the four principles. Again, China was the crucial question. Without further concessions on Japan’s part on this point, it was extremely unlikely that any agreement could be reached with the United States – a contingency that could only mean war. If war were to be avoided, therefore, the Konoe cabinet would have somehow to persuade the army to commit itself to withdrawing from China, an impossible demand at this late hour. Thus the Japanese army seized on Hull’s 2 October message as a virtual rejection of the peace efforts and pressed Konoe to give up the idea of a summit conference. As the army leaders saw it, the United States was reiterating its basic principles merely in order to gain time, and for Japan to continue to negotiate would only play into its hands. At a meeting of 5 October, the top army leaders resolved that there was no point in further continuing talks with the United States, and that war should be decided upon. The next day, Tōjō and Sugiyama agreed that the crucial decision should be reached by 15 October.
With the army taking such a strong stand, Konoe’s only hope in avoiding, or at least postponing, a fatal decision for war may have lain in the Japanese navy. If the navy could support his efforts for continued negotiation with America, he might be able to defuse the crisis. The navy, however, was internally divided. On one hand, Nagano was willing to go along with the army’s bellicosity, saying at a liaison conference of 4 October that the time for discussion had passed. The next day, however, the top navy officials came to the conclusion that ‘it would be the height of folly to fight with the United States on the issue of withdrawing troops from China’. From the navy’s standpoint, the army was forcing a war which would have to be the navy’s main responsibility, in order to retain its rights in China. Despite this scepticism, however, Nagano refused to speak resolutely against the army, fearing it would divide the services at a moment of national crisis. Navy Minister Oikawa, who shared his colleagues’ lack of enthusiasm for an American war, was no match for Army Minister Tōjō’s decisiveness when the two met on 7 October. The latter insisted that to accept Hull’s four principles was tantamount to reverting to the Washington Conference system, in particular to the regime of the nine-power treaty. Why had Japan gone to war in Manchuria and China? Tōjō asked, and answered his own question by saying that it had been in order to destroy the regime. The basic premise for the establishment of the Great East Asian Coprosperity Sphere lay in creating a system free from the treaty. This was another way of saying that Japan must persist in its anti-ABCD stand. Japan’s military presence in parts of China was at the very core of the new order, without which the Co-prosperity Sphere could never be established. On this point Japan should never yield. Navy Minister Oikawa was taken aback by Tōjō’s strong language, and tamely stated that the navy still stood behind the 6 September decision.
Immediately following their meeting, they proceeded to attend a cabinet meeting where Tōjō reiterated his strong views. Other cabinet members indirectly criticized such a stand, expressing pessimism about the state of national preparedness, but no firm decision was made to avoid war with the United States. Konoe nevertheless continued to try to persuade the army to accept a compromise on the question of troop withdrawal, but the army remained adamant about the 15 October deadline. The navy opposed the imposition of such a deadline but hesitated to contradict the army in the open, preferring to leave crucial decisions to the prime minister. In this way, Konoe found himself isolated, feeling that he was not being supported in his efforts to avoid war.26
High-level meetings held between 12 and 16 October persuaded the Japanese leader that all his endeavours had ended in failure. At a meeting held on 12 October at Konoe’s private residence, Foreign Minister Toyoda insisted that war could still be avoided through some compromise on the troop withdrawal question, but Tōjō reiterated his view that the time for talks had passed; there was no evidence that the United States was interested in a compromise with Japan. Navy Minister Oikawa said the decision for war or peace must be made by the prime minister, and that the navy would support diplomacy if that would work. Tōjō rejoined that even if the prime minister decided for diplomacy, the army could not blindly follow the decision. After all, he said, the supreme command was bound by the 6 September decision and preparations were proceeding for war. They could not be stopped unless there was ample assurance that negotiations with America would succeed – by 15 October. Foreign Minister Toyoda then said perhaps the 6 September decision had been premature, and Prime Minister Konoe added Japan could not possibly continue a war for more than a couple of years. He himself must persist in diplomacy, and if war should be the decision, then he would have to resign. Navy Minister Oikawa maintained his irresolute stance. Thus no clear-cut decision was arrived at. Then on 14 October, Tōjō made an impassioned speech at a cabinet meeting against making concessions on the troop withdrawal question. If Japan should submit to American pressure, he said, the fruits of the war with China would be nullified, the existence of Manchukuo jeopardized, and colonial control over Korea itself endangered. It would signal the nation’s return to ‘Little Japan before the Manchurian incident’. That was the crux of the matter. The army refused to return to the situation existing in the 1920s, something the United States was insisting upon. The question of Japanese troops in China had come to symbolize this conflict. There could be no compromise on that issue. Tōjō reminded the other cabinet members that the 6 September decisions still stood, and that according to them the nation was to have decided on war if no diplomatic settlement had been achieved by early October. Military mobilization had been going on in accordance with the guidelines, and it could not now be stopped unless agreement were reached with Washington concerning the troops question.27
Here, in stark simplicity, was the moment of decision forced upon the cabinet by the war minister. Tōjō was correct in saying that if war was not to be the decision, then the 6 September guidelines would have to be revised. Since the cabinet had been responsible for those guidelines, it was accountable for not having carried out those policies. Thus the only thing left was for the entire cabinet, including Konoe, to resign. The prime minister understood the logic. If war were to be avoided, then a new cabinet would have to start afresh, unencumbered by the 6 September decisions. Konoe, too, had his logic. For him, the most important thing was to avoid war with the United States, and all decisions, including those of 6 September, must be the means towards that end. He recognized that Japan had no chance of winning an American war and did not understand why the army insisted on it. He was acutely aware that no power, not even Germany, could be counted upon to come to Japan’s aid in its struggle against the ABCD combination. There was no point in going into a war which the nation was bound to lose. But he, too, realized that if peace at any cost were to be sought, a new cabinet would have to be organized. All such developments led inevitably to the cabinet’s resignation on 16 October. With it the idea of a conference with President Roosevelt, on the realization of which Konoe had pinned his hopes for peace, also evaporated.
Historians have debated whether the summit conference, had it materialized, would have achieved anything significant and prevented a Japanese–American war. It seems highly unlikely. On the American side, there would have been little cause for yielding to Japanese conditions for peace, particularly Japan’s insistence on retaining troops in China. Such a concession would not have been popular at home and would have embittered the Chinese, undermining the solid entente among the ABCD nations. On the other hand, the United States was clearly interested in ‘gaining useful time’, as Roosevelt said, and therefore a summit meeting with Konoe might have served to postpone a final showdown.28 The two leaders would certainly not have come to any tangible settlement, but some ambiguous agreement might have been made. It might have been unacceptable to the Japanese army, but Konoe, coming to recognize personally American resolve to stand by China, might have been emboldened to oppose the army more strongly. If Konoe had somehow been able to keep talking with the army leadership, winter might have arrived before Japanese forces were readied for action, and the supreme command might have decided to wait till spring. All this would have helped the United States in building up its armed strength for war. In other words, there might have been a way for the United States to keep encouraging Japanese hopes for some compromise without alienating the Chinese or actually giving in to Japanese demands at China’s expense. In this sense there may have been a tactical blunder on the American side.
REFERENCES AND NOTES
1. Yabe Teiji, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo 1952), 2: 299.
2. Ibid., 2: 308.
3. Matsuoka, Yōsuke (Tokyo 1974), pp. 1020–7.
4. Defence Agency, War History Division (ed.), Daihonei rikugunbu (The army supreme command; Tokyo 1968), 2: 305, 309–18.
5. Ibid., 2: 338, 353–4.
6. Yabe, Konoe, 2: 326.
7. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932– 1945 (New York 1979), p. 268.
8. Ibid., p. 278–9; Yabe, Konoe, 2: 308–9.
9. Dallek, Roosevelt, p. 274.
10. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 362–3, 398–9; Yabe, Konoe, 2: 329.
11. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 378.
12. Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941 (Knoxville 1985), pp. 154–5.
13. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 376.
14. Ibid., 2: 410, 418.
15. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945, David Dilks (ed.) (New York 1972), p. 397.
16. New Republic, 105. 8: 239 (25 Aug. 1941).
17. Asahi, 11, 16, Aug. 1941.
18. Ibid., 16 Aug. (evening), 1941.
19. Yabe, Konoe, pp. 338–40.
20. Utley, Going to War, p. 159; F 10904/280/10, F 136/280/10, F 8496/60/10, Foreign Office Archives.
21. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 427–9.
22. Yabe, Konoe, p. 365.
23. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 447–54.
24. Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan (Washington 1943), 2:571–2, 588–91.
25. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 462.
26. Ibid., 2: 504–12; Yabe, p. 378.
27. Daihonei rikugunbu, 2: 519–21.
28. Dallek, Roosevelt, p. 303.