Acknowledgments

 

 

Work on this book has been a race against time. The idea for it came to me only six years ago—in a reaction, as I've noted, against the previous reading I'd been doing since Fred Winterbotham opened my eyes fully to what, in my wartime duty, I had been a part of, an element in. I could see that the project would be hugely demanding: to assess the effects of secret intelligence in all the major theaters of the war and render defensible judgments in readable prose would be a daunting undertaking for a much younger writer. I was then in my late seventies. In the time I had left, could I possibly conduct the intensive research and manage the vast reading that the writing would entail?

Fortunately, my genes have been kind to me, allowing me these six years, plus the requisite wits and energy, to get the job done. Yes, I would have liked months rather than just days at the Public Record Office, where Britain so efficiently stores its immense detritus of once-secret intelligence from the war. Yes, my stay with John Gallehawk, archivist at Bletchley Park, was all too short. Yes, I would have welcomed more time in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration files in College Park, Maryland—more time to allow NARA's World War II guru, John Taylor, and his associates to guide me through that labyrinth of information. Yes, I would have appreciated more opportunity to explore what I know are rich resources at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the Washington National Records Center and the United States Naval Institute in Maryland, and other such troves as the MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives in Norfolk, Virginia. And yes, there are scores of other books, articles and Web sites I would gladly have scanned as well as further interviews with the waning ranks of survivors from the war I could have pursued.

No complaints. I've had the six years to make the most of what I could accomplish. I'm fortunate in having Patricia, my wife of fifty-five years, hang in with me, not as a "golf widow" but certainly as a "writer's widow," and in addition give me great help in getting the manuscript ready for review. I'm grateful that my fellow Ultra Americans and my friends in Britain have rallied round to lend their support. And I'm most fortunate in having Richard Curtis as my ever-encouraging literary agent and Dan Slater as my ever-resourceful editor at Penguin Putnam. I thank all of you for giving me the great adventure of having my first book published as an octogenarian.

Now to notes on sources I have been able to call upon.

For general coverage of the war I've relied, of course, on Winston Churchill's magisterial six-volume history I've made a run-through of Samuel Eliot Morison's equally massive History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Primarily, though, I've concentrated on histories written after the walls of secrecy about World War II intelligence came down, histories that could begin to take into account the contributions of the codebreakers. My copy of John Keegan's The Second World War has fallen apart from overuse. Martin Gilbert's history with the same name has provided a diurnal record of the conflict—and supplied the most compendious and useful index imaginable. Otherwise, I've drawn snippets about the war from dozens of other writers—Accoce to Ziegler.

To my knowledge, there are no books aside from this one that regard the entire war from the perspective of the codebreakers. The five-volume British Intelligence in the Second World War, compiled by Harry Hinsley and three other historians, and nicely condensed by Hinsley into a one-volume abridged edition, focuses almost entirely on the war in Europe. Donald Lewin's Ultra Goes to War also deals with Europe, while his American Magic tries, less successfully, to cover codebreaking in the Pacific theater. The revised edition of David Kahn's great tome The Codebreakers includes an account of Allied successes against the "scrutable orientals" as well as rather cursorily added-on reports on the attacks against Enigma. Otherwise, writers have dealt with specific aspects of the story rather than overall assessments.

 

Introduction

Churchill's quote about the golden eggs: Oliver Hoare's booklet Enigma. Churchill's lines about "the secret war" are from his own Their Finest Hour.

The first, virtually unnoticed break in the secrecy about conquest of the Enigma came in Wladyslaw Kozaczuk's 1967 book, Struggle for Secrets, followed by Gustave Bertrand's equally unnoticed Enigma in 1973. It was Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, published in 1974, that first drew world attention to the Ultra program.

 

Chapter 1. Belligerents: Choose Your Code Machines

The brief history of cryptology borrows from David Kahn's The Code-breakers, Stephen Budiansky's Battle of Wits, James Gannon's Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies and Simon Singh's The Code Book.

The account here of the Battle of Tannenberg is condensed from Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, while the story of the Zimmermann telegram is from her book of that title.

Painvin's success: Simon Singh, The Code Book.

Herbert Yardley's Great War experience: his The American Black. Chamber.

William Friedman's breaking Pletts's machine: Ronald Clark's The Man Who Broke Purple.

As for Scherbius's Enigma, a number of cryptographic specialists, including Kozaczuk, Kahn and Budiansky, have described its inner workings in enthusiastic detail. The account here is a synthesis, drawing particularly from Bletchley Park veteran Peter Calvocoressi's Top Secret Ultra.

Several writers, including Robert Leckie in Delivered from Evil, have mentioned the connection between Elgar's composition and the naming of Scherbius's machine.

Disclosure by Churchill of Britain's breaking of the German naval code in the Great War: Kahn's The Codebreakers.

The inventions by Hebern, Damm and Hagelin, as well as developments by the Russians and the Italians, are described by Kahn in his The Codebreakers. Clark's book tells of the work of Friedman and Rowlett on an American machine. Ralph Erskine is the source of material on Britain's Typex.

Michael Smith in The Emperor's Codes reports Japan's work on code machines.

 

Chapter 2. Breaking the Enigma: Poles Show the Way

Of the many tellings of the Poles' cracking of the Enigma, I've relied primarily on Rejewski's account in the appendixes of Kozaczuk's Enigma, on Kozaczuk's own version and on Kahn's explanation, the clearest and most readable, in Seizing the Enigma.

The incident of the 1929 arrival of an Enigma-holding crate at the Warsaw customs office is from Kozaczuk.

For a fuller review of the stories of Hans-Thilo Schmidt and Bertrand, Kahn is also a good source.

Details of the Poles' course at Poznan and of their initial breaking of the Enigma are in Kozaczuk's Enigma, which includes Rejewski's description in the appendixes.

Rejewski's reminiscences of his final victory over the Enigma are from a typewritten copy collected by Jozef Garlinski, author of The Enigma War.

Bertrand's quote about "un moment de stupeur" is from his Enigma.

Peter Twinn tells of Dilly Knox happily chanting "Nous avons le QWERTZU" in his contribution to Codebreakers, edited by Harry Hinsley and Alan Stripp.

 

Chapter 3. Britain Takes Over the Cryptologic War

British Intelligence in the Second World War, by Hinsley et al, is the essential source of information on the Ultra work at Bletchley Park.

Andrew Hodges has written the fine biography Alan Turing: The Enigma, while Gordon Welchman has told of his own days at BP in The Hut Six Story. More on Welchman is reported in Nigel West's The Sigint Secrets.

Details of Alastair Denniston's contributions are from numerous sources, especially Kahn's Seizing the Enigma.

The report on Herivel's tip relies mostly on Michael Smith's Station X, while that on "cillis" is drawn from Welchman.

The Wrens' problems with the bombes: Diana Payne's essay "The Bombes," in Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers.

In Ultra Goes to War, Ronald Lewin tells of Welchman's organization plan for BP.

An entire section of Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers is devoted to various slants on Fish. Other useful texts: Michael Smith's Station X, Lewin's Ultra Goes to War and Singh's The Code Book.

These sources have been supplemented by personal research in the historical files of Bletchley Park, at Britain's Public Record Office (PRO) and at Hall Place, Bexley, Kent, where the Santa Fe intercept station was operated. Also by interviews with Pat Bing and Molly Brewster of the BP staff, with Anthony Sale, who rebuilt the Colossus as a BP exhibit, and with the late George Vergine, an Ultra American who worked on Fish and who left with me a copy of his own reminiscences of those days.

 

Chapter 4. BP Begins Exploiting Its "Gold Mine"

To the usual sources of Churchill, Winterbotham, Hinsley, Calvocoressi, Kahn, Lewin, Keegan and Gilbert, I've added Len Deighton and Max Hastings's Battle of Britain, Peter Wescombe's Bletchley Park and the Luftwaffe, R. V. Jones's Most Secret War and Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals.

The Welchman quote about the gold mine is not from his Hut Six Story but from his later essay "From Polish Bomba to British Bombe: The Birth of Ultra," in Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence, edited by Christopher Andrew.

The commander's quote about the Germans' knowledge of British shipping is from Hinsley et al.

Hinsley tells of his post-Glorious improvement in status with the Admiralty in his essay "Bletchley Park, the Admiralty and Naval Enigma," in Codebreakers.

Frederick Pile's quote about Dowding: Deighton and Hastings.

Hitler's furious response to the bombing of Berlin: Lewin. His quote about the losses from a Channel crossing: Gilbert.

The doggerel about the local scorn BP males had to endure: Irene Young's Enigma Variations.

The Brauchitsch quote is from Liddell Hart's The German Generals Talk, and that of Kesselring from his A Soldier's Record.

Churchill's words about the German leaders' passing the buck to Goring is from his Their Finest Hour.

The debate over Churchill's competence as a wartime leader is covered at length by Christopher Hitchens in his article "The Medals of His Defeats," in The Atlantic Monthly, April 2002.

Much of the section on O'Connor's victory in North Africa follows Barnett, with Ultra details from Hinsley. The section on Matapan is told well by Sebag-Montefiore.

 

Chapter 5. Battle of the Atlantic: Cryptologic Seesaw

Since Harry Hinsley not only wrote the official history of British intelligence in World War II but also played a major role in winning the fight against the U-boats, his writings were a main source for this chapter.

David Kahn's far more readable account in Seizing the Enigma was especially useful concerning the efforts of Hinsley along with Turing and his associates in Hut 8 to engineer the capture of materials that broke open the tough German naval codes.

As a general history of the U-boat war, Barrie Pitt's Time-Life book, The Battle of the Atlantic, proved a good source.

My report on B-Dienst's successes in breaking British Admiralty codes borrows from The Battle of the Atlantic by Terry Hughes and John Costello, and from Patrick Beesly's Very Special Intelligence.

If my accounts of the methods used by B-Dienst and, conversely, by Turing are understandable, thank Budiansky's Battle of Wits and Sebag-Montefiore's Enigma: The Battle for the Code for their skillful explanations.

Rolf Noskwith's own memoir of breaking the Offizier code is included in Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers.

The section on the war against Germany's surface raiders synthesizes material from Hinsley, Kahn, Calvocoressi and Hughes and Costello, as does the section on Shark.

Martin Gilbert recounts the story of the German sailors trapped within the Tirpitz.

Hinsley is the source for the Admiralty's fears of defeat in early 1943.

The report on the Petard's capture of U-559, and on the sacrifice of Fasson and Grazier, condenses Kahn's account in Seizing the Enigma.

The climax of the Atlantic battle reflects the very full treatment in Michael Gannon's Black May.

Again, research at the PRO strengthened my accumulated knowledge of this long and sanguinary struggle.

 

Chapter 6. When Superior Intelligence Was Not Enough

Among its offerings, the Internet presents a translation in English of the whole of Mein Kampf. My reading left me wondrous of how opposing leaders during the war could have so ignored its import.

The facts about Paul Thummel and other British agents on the continent are from Hinsley et al.

Churchill's quote doubting that Germany would attack the Soviets is from his volume Their Finest Hour, as is his "lightning flash" conversion to believing it would happen. His riposte about Hitler invading hell is cited in Nicholas Bethel's Russia Besieged.

Hinsley details Britain's intelligence heads' resistance to the idea of a German attack on the Soviets and their turnaround to accepting the idea that Hitler might be anticipating "a lightning victory."

Churchill's lines about Hitler's tantrum over the coup in Yugoslavia are from Their Finest Hour.

As noted, the section on William Stephenson and William Donovan draws, rather gingerly, on William Stevenson's overblown biography of Stephenson, A Man Called Intrepid, and, more confidently, on H. Montgomery Hyde's The Quiet Canadian. Nigel West's Counterfeit Spies documents the incredible fictionalizing by Stevenson of his near namesake's story.

The section on Crete owes much to John Keegan's The Second World War for its historical coverage and to Hinsley for the codebreakers' role. Churchill's Their Finest Hour is again the source for his quotes about Crete and about Moscow being saved by the delayed start of Barbarossa.

 

Chapter 7. The Spies Who Never Were

Any account of the double agents who served Britain while convincing the Nazis they were serving them must begin with J. C. Masterman's The Double-Cross System. Since it was drafted soon after the war's end but not authorized for publication until 1972, it can only hint at the Ultra secret. That aspect is well covered by Hinsley. Other books that proved to be useful sources: Kahn's Hitler's Spies, Cave Brown's Bodyguard of Lies, Jeffrey Richelson's A Century of Spies, Ewen Montagu's Beyond Top Secret Ultra and Ernest Volkman's Spies: The Secret Agents Who Changed the Course of History.

I'm indebted to Nigel West's Operation Garbo for additional information about Garbo-Pujol and the belated recognition given his incredible wartime services.

Tricycle—Dusko Popov—also could not get his memoir, Spy/Counterspy, approved for publication until well after the war. The pro-FBI counterattack against his version of his failed attempt to alert the U.S. to the approach of the Pearl Harbor raid is detailed in Thomas Troy's "The British Assault on J. Edgar Hoover: The Tricycle Case" and in B. Bruce-Briggs's "Another Ride on Tricycle."

 

Chapter 8. The U.S. Tackles Japan's Codes

This chapter in particular benefits from personal research at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration facility.

Sources for the story of William and Elizebeth Friedman, include Ronald Clark's The Man Who Broke Purple, Kahn's The Codebreakers and Frank Rowlett's The Story of Magic.

My account of Joseph Rochefort and his Hypo operation is also compiled from many sources, led by his own oral history recorded by navy scribes. Others: Edwin Layton's And I Was There, Jasper Holmes's Double-edged Secrets, Lewin''s The American Magic, Winton's Ultra in the Pacific and Kahn's The Codebreakers.

The reference to Admiral Stark's memorandum to FDR is from Joseph Persico's Roosevelt's Secret War.

Among the scurrilous publications claiming that FDR conspired in the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor in order to bring the U.S. into the war, my favorite dart target is Mark Emerson Willey's Pearl Harbor: The Mother of All Conspiracies. Refutations abound, as noted in the text, including books by Prange, Wohlstetter, Keegan and Persico, among others.

Source for the near misses in sounding the alert: Kahn's The Code-breakers. The account of Ralph Briggs's reception of the East Wind message is by Ellsworth Boyd in the November 2000 issue of Primedia's World War II magazine.

John Prados's Combined Fleet Decoded supplies a clear analysis of Japanese thinking behind the raid.

Layton's memoir expresses his indignation at the treatment of Kimmel and Short.

The admiral who in Prange's interview scanted the Japanese destruction at Pearl Harbor was Claude C. Bloch.

Admiral Morison's quote about Pearl Harbor being a "strategic imbecility" is from his The Rising Sun in the Pacific.

Layton and Prados expressed sharp criticism of MacArthur for the follow-up losses on Luzon.

In the use of Japanese names, I've followed the Western practice of putting the surname after the given name. In Japanese style, it's the reverse.

The section on Baron Oshima relies mostly, as mentioned, on Carl Boyd's Hitler's Japanese Confidant. Also, Bruce Lee documents in his book Marching Orders the incredibly diverse flow of information provided by the Magic summaries placed daily on the desks of General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson.

 

Chapter 9. North Africa: A Pendulum Swung by Codebreakers

The terrible story of Bonner Frank Fellers was not to be overlooked by writers. Kahn tells it in a couple of his books. Welchman dwells on it. So does Cave Brown. They all gave me aid in forming my own account.

Both Welchman and Kahn tell of Seebohm's field intercept unit and its fate.

A prime source for coverage of the North African battles is Barnett's The Desert Generals, despite his obvious animus toward Bernard Montgomery.

Rommel quotes are from The Rommel Papers, edited by Hart with the aid of Rommel's family. Kesselring's quote is from his A Soldier's Record.

The Edgar Williams and William Mather quotes are from Nigel Hamilton's Monty: The Making of a General.

Hinsley is, as ever, indispensable in pinning down specific decrypts that were of great benefit to British generals. His quote about the number of submarines and recon aircraft based on Malta is from his answer to a question following his 1993 lecture at a Security Group Seminar.

The section on Operation Torch is compiled from Keegan, Gilbert and Lewin, with Ultra information from Hinsley and from Omar Bradley's autobiography.

 

Chapter 10. Turnaround in the Pacific War

Details of the Japanese double delay in changing JN-25 come from Lewin's The American Magic and Edward Van Der Rhoer's Deadly Magic.

Layton's memoir sets forth clearly the effects of Doolittle's raid, as does Frederick Parker's A Priceless Advantage, from the United States Cryptologic History available on the Web. Yamamoto's quote about the "disgrace" of the raid is from Layton.

As cited, Prados's Combined Fleet Decoded proved a valuable resource for understanding all the Decisive Battles of the Pacific war.

Sources for the treatment of the Battle of Midway include Rochefort's own Reminiscences, Layton, Holmes, Kahn and particularly Prange's Miracle at Midway.

The David Kennedy quote is from his essay "Victory at Sea," in the March 1999 issue of The Atlantic Monthly.

Admiral Nimitz's postbattle praise of Rochefort is from Winton's Ultra in the Pacific.

In addition to the sources cited, the section on MacArthur's Port Moresby operations includes details from Edward Drea's MacArthur's Ultra and William Manchester's American Caesar.

 

Chapter 11. USSR: Intelligence Guides the Major Victories

Most of the sources here are cited in the text. Otherwise, Jozef Garlin-ski's The Enigma War supplied information on the Red Three as well as the Red Orchestra.

Alexander Foote's quote is from his Handbook for Spies.

Material on the Cambridge ring came from Phillip Knightley's The Master Spy, among other sources.

My main source on Richard Sorge is Robert Whymant's Stalin's Spy.

The David Glantz quote is from his The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II.

Keegan supplied Hitler's quote about kicking down the Russian door, while Gilbert contributed the Hitler lines about flouting the Hague Convention rules and the führer's plans for Operation Typhoon.

Rundstedt's quote is from Hart's The German Generals Talk, as is that of Kleist.

Churchill's exchanges with Menzies are from Gilbert. Hitler's Directive 41 is drawn from V. E. Tarrant's The Red Orchestra. For my brief summary of the battle for Stalingrad I've relied mostly on Glantz.

The Cairncross quote about Moscow's acceptance of his information is from Michael Smith's Station X.

Zhukov's counsel to Stalin is from Keegan.

Tarrant is the source for the account of the breakup of the Red Orchestra, seconded by Shareen Brysac's Resisting Hitler. The postwar treatment of Rado, Foote and Roessler is also from Tarrant.

John Taylor at NARA helped me dig far enough into the files on Martin Bormann to discount Louis Kilzer's claim that Bormann was the main source of anti-Nazi information.

 

Chapter 12. Smiting the Axis's Soft Underbelly

Again, most references are identified in the text. In addition to the works by Keegan, Gilbert and Hinsley, Robert Wallace's Time-Life book, The Italian Campaign was a useful source.

At the Public Record Office, copies of the most significant decrypts, such as those warning of Kesselring's planned attacks at Anzio, were efficiently delivered for review.

Kesselring quotes are, once more, from his memoir.

Churchill's quip about Anzio turning into a stranded whale is from his Triumph and Tragedy.

As noted, details about Mark Clark's megalomaniacal decisions in Italy are from Eric Sevareid's Not So Wild a Dream.

 

Chapter 13. The Coming of the Ultra Americans

Supplementing my own memories, I've interviewed or corresponded with a number of other Americans who participated in the Ultra program. The unpublished memoirs of Walter Sharp, Jim Nielson and George Vergine were especially helpful.

Joan Nicholls's book is England Needs You: The Story of Beaumanor Station. Diana Payne's comments are from her chapter in Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers.

Thomas Parrish's The Ultra Americans was a useful, if disjointed, source.

 

Chapter 14. Up the Island Ladder Toward Tokyo

The historical narrative here follows Keegan, while coverage of the cryptologic developments synthesizes Layton, Drea, Holmes, Prados and Winton, plus personal research at the National Archives.

The quote about Nimitz's staff being unable to read the enemy mail is from Edwin Hoyt's How They Won the War in the Pacific.

Firsthand observations of cryptologic work on Guadalcanal have been supplied by Philip Jacobsen's Web history, The Codebreakers. An associate of Joe Rochefort at Hypo, Jacobsen was transferred to Guadalcanal and helped operate a field intelligence station there.

The main sources on MacArthur are Manchester and Drea. The Juro quote, as an example, is cited by Manchester, as is The General's order to Eichelberger.

To John Kennedy's own account of PT-109, Kahn, in The Codebreakers, adds details about coast watcher codes and the Japanese failure to break them.

The story of Yamamoto's fall has been written up repeatedly. Kahn's version in The Codebreakers is a good one.

Rochefort's downfall is taken from his own oral history as well as from the memoirs of Holmes and Layton.

Vice Admiral Lockwood's quote is from Winton.

 

Chapter 15. France: Invasions from North and South

The account here of the Allies' Normandy landings and of the deceptions accompanying them has been compiled from many sources, including my own readings of relevant decrypts at the PRO. For additional coverage of the Sigint side I'm indebted, of course, to Hinsley, but also to Cave Brown, Kahn, Welchman and Lewin.

Oshima's involuntary spy role is from Boyd.

General Blumentritt's quote is from Hart. Jodl's estimate of divisions held in the Pas de Calais is from Masterman.

William Stephenson's Magic Group is described by Stevenson, while Jones's Most Secret War tells of the air traffic simulator. The Ronald Wingate quote is also from Jones.

The Don Bussey quote: Smith's Station X. That of Omar Bradley is from his A General's Life.

The part played by Britain's double agents is, again, mainly from Masterman.

Churchill's proposals for Russia-countering alternatives to the Riviera landings are in his Triumph and Tragedy.

Rundstedt's brash words about making peace are quoted from Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret.

The incident involving Melvin Helfers's meeting with George Patton is related in Robert Miller's August 1944. So is Bradley's meeting with Morgenthau. Miller is the source for Hitler's order for a new offensive and for Kluge's end.

Principal source for the section on the Riviera invasion: William Breuer's Operation Dragoon.

 

Chapter 16. CBI: Winning the "Forgotten War"

In his massive book Burma: The Longest War, Louis Allen, a British veteran of that war, tells more than anyone other than a specialist or a fellow vet would be interested in absorbing. But Allen, fluent in Japanese, does give a rounded history by recording both sides of the conflict.

General William Slim's memoir, Defeat into Victory, presents a much more readable account from his perspective. Philip Ziegler's Mountbatten devotes chapters to Lord Louis's part in the campaign. Joseph Stilwell's The Stilwell Papers offers a vinegary account from his vantage point.

The China-Burma-India volume from Time-Life Books' World War II history is a useful source. The editor is Don Moser.

Eric Sevareid's Not So Wild a Dream gives penetrating glimpses of the war from his visits to India and China.

Sigint information has been culled from Michael Smith's The Emperor's Codes, Alan Stripp's Codebreaker in the Far East, Hugh Den-ham's essay "Bedford-Bletchley-Kilindini-Colombo," in Codebreakers, and Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret.

Churchill quotes are from his Triumph and Tragedy.

 

Chapter 17. Europe: The Bitter Fruits of Complacency

Hinsley's chapter "The Check in the West" is a compendium of the troubles Allied generals brought upon themselves, often by not heeding their intelligence providers. Montgomery's rueful quote about not clearing the Schelde estuary is from his Memoirs and is also cited by Hinsley.

Other sources are noted: Cave Brown, Miller, and Peter Harclerode's Arnhem. The brief account of the Hürtgen Forest struggle borrows from Miller and from General James Gavin's 1979 article in American Heritage magazine. Oshima references are from Boyd.

Some details such as Eisenhower's attendance at his valet's wedding on the day of the Ardennes attack come from Charles Whiting's Ardennes: The Secret War.

The Churchill quote is, once again, from Triumph and Tragedy, and that of Rundstedt is from Hart's The German Generals Talk.

 

Chapter 18. Closing In on the Empire

For sources here, a familiar cast reassembles. Holmes tells of the captures of intelligence materials, Layton of Fukudome's briefcase, Van Der Rhoer of the ships for Saipan, Prados of Japanese hopes for the Decisive Battle, Winton of the Marianas turkey shoot and Drea of Koiso's replacement of Tojo. To these add Thomas Cutler's The Battle of Leyte Gulf A navy career officer, Cutler capably dramatizes the battle but shows a fighting man's disdain for secret intelligence by never acknowledging the contributions of the codebreakers.

Cutler, however, can't pass up the story of Halsey's wrath aroused by the Task Force 34 query and tells it well.

The references to MacArthur's leaving two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers useless and details of his Leyte landing are from Manchester's American Caesar.

The Churchill quote about Kurita is from Triumph and Tragedy.

As noted, Drea's description of The General's Luzon maneuverings was most helpful.

Of the several tellings of the story of Ohnishi and the formalization of the kamikaze tactics, Cutler's is best.

 

Chapter 19. Europe: High-grade Decrypts Abet Allied Victory

In addition to a final surfeit of decrypt information from Hinsley, this chapter gains from Keegan's lend-lease facts and from Stephen Ambrose's account in his Citizen Soldiers of the seizure of the Remagen bridge.

The section on the air war technologies obviously owes much to R. V. Jones, with the final bit about oxen-towed Luftwaffe aircraft contributed by Hyland and Gill's Last Talons of the Eagle.

Ambrose's Eisenhower and Berlin is the chosen source for Ike's Churchill-annoying decision. The Allies' warning to the Soviets about Hitler's southwest offensive is from Hinsley.

The report on Hitler's V-weapons is, mostly, a briefer retelling of the relevant passages in R. V. Jones's memoir. The summary of Bohr's letter refuting Heisenberg is the New York Times article by James Glanz. Cave Brown is the source for the narrative on Norway's heavy-water production. Montagu's Beyond Top Secret Ultra contributes the detail of the warning from Tricycle's spymaster.

For information about the Nazis' jet plane developments I have relied on Hyland and Gill as well as Jones and Hinsley. The latter pair are also the chief sources for the account of the struggle against the V-weapons.

For the finale on the "Final Solution," the key source is, as noted, Richard Breitman's Official Secrets.

 

Chapter 20. In the Pacific: Last Battles, Final Decisions

I looked to Prados for facts about the Superfort benefits from the taking of Iwo Jima and to Winton for codebreaking details.

The code talkers' story: Singh's The Code Book.

The Superfort pilot's expression of gratitude: Winton.

Japanese plans for the defense of Okinawa: Van Der Rhoer.

Prados contributes the information on Colonel Holcomb and Admiral Spruance as well as the sacrificial mission of Japanese warships.

Drea is one source for the debate over potential casualties from a Kyushu landing, for MacArthur's opposition to changes in plans for the Olympic operation and for details of what awaited the invaders.

Douglas MacEachan's The Final Months of the War with Japan, available on the Internet, also details the awesome Japanese preparations to withstand the invasion.

Churchill's quotes about the costs of an invasion and the decision to drop the atomic bomb: Triumph and Tragedy.

As cited, McCullough's Truman provides a thorough treatment of the president's decision to drop the bomb.

The MacArthur reaction to news of the Hiroshima bombing is recalled in Horace A. Thompson Jr.'s interview with MacArthur's pilot, W.E. Rhoades. The interview transcript is in the MacArthur Memorial Archives.

Magic decrypts revealing the divide in Japanese attitudes toward peace: Van Der Rhoer, among others. As mentioned in the text, Robert Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender is a key source.

Effects of the "Fat Boy" bomb on Nagasaki: Gilbert.

Bull Halsey's line about handling an ex-enemy aircraft attack: Winton.

My brief section on the Venona project summarizes the fuller account in Budiansky's Battle of Wits.

 

Conclusion

Hinsley's quote is from his introduction to Codebreakers. The Ameringer quote is from his U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History.

Kahn on Admiral Anderson is from The Codebreakers.

Eisenhower's opinion that "Ultra was decisive" is cited by Winterbotham, while Churchill's assessment is from Harold Deutsch's essay "The Historical Impact of Revealing the Ultra Secret," in the journal Parameters.

Diana Payne's comment is from her essay "The Bombes," in Hinsley and Stripp's Codebreakers.