P

Palacký, František (1798–1876), Czech historian and nationalist. During the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9 Palacký organized in Prague the first Pan-Slav Congress (see PAN-SLAVISM), which formed part of his unavailing attempt to obtain equal rights for the Slavic peoples under Austrian rule. Fearful of their vulnerability to German or Russian expansionist ambitions, at this stage he still viewed a more federalized (see FEDERALISM[1]) version of the HABSBURG EMPIRE as their best form of protection. Thus he argued that, within this wider structure, the Czechs should enjoy autonomous rule across territory embracing BOHEMIA, Moravia, and Austrian SILESIA. However, after the Austro-Hungarian AUSGLEICH was settled in 1867 at the expense of all the non-German and non-Magyar nationalities under Habsburg governance, he became an advocate of entirely independent statehood. Tomáš MASARYK later called him “the father of the fatherland,” not least because Palacký's inspirational contribution to the promotion of Czech NATIONALISM was further enhanced by the major history of early Bohemia that he published over the years from 1836 to 1867.

Pale of Settlement The regions of western Russia to which JEWS were restricted, beginning with areas of Poland annexed by CATHERINE II in the partition of 1793. The Pale subsequently came to include what are now Lithuania and Belarus, together with much of the Ukraine. Despite some minor concessions during the reign of ALEXANDER II, the limitations on Jewish residency became harsher in the final decades of the nineteenth century as ANTISEMITISM, together with policies of RUSSIFICATION, took stronger hold. By 1900 nearly five million Jews (around 95 percent of them being under Romanov rule) were confined within the Pale, living alongside far larger Slav populations. The Pale ceased to be operative during the course of World War I, and was formally abolished in February 1917.

Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Viscount (1784–1865), British Prime Minister (1855–8, 1859–65), Foreign Secretary (1830–4, 1835–41, 1846–51), and Home Secretary (1852–5). He entered politics as a Tory, and served as Secretary at War from 1809 to 1828. It was, however, from the 1830s to the 1860s – and after defecting to the Whigs – that Palmerston exerted most influence upon European affairs (see also BRITAIN AND EUROPE). He stridently asserted British interests, while promoting liberal values more consistently in the continental than in the domestic arena. He sought to protect the newly-won independence of GREECE and BELGIUM, and to frustrate absolutist royal pretenders in Portugal and Spain. During the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9 he showed sympathy for PIEDMONT-SARDINIA'S bid for freedom from the Habsburg Empire, even while remaining cautious about the need to maintain much of Austrian authority elsewhere. His fondness for gunboat diplomacy, most evident in colonial dealings, was indulged in a European context too during the Don Pacifico affair of 1850, when he used it to compel the Greek authorities to compensate a British subject who had suffered from an Athenian looting spree. Palmerston's pugnacity was further apparent in his enthusiasm for the CRIMEAN WAR. However, he played no direct role in the mismanagement of it that prompted ABERDEEN'S resignation as premier in 1855, and thus was well positioned to succeed him. Palmerston then proceeded to win from Russia the relatively favorable peace settlement of 1856. In 1864, shortly before death terminated his second premiership, the elder statesman fared less well over the SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN dispute, when his threats to counter any Austro-Prussian incursion into Danish territory were correctly assessed by BISMARCK as being hollow.

Panama Canal scandal (see under LESSEPS)

Pan-Germanism The principle or advocacy of political unification for the German-speaking peoples. As a movement, it emerged particularly strongly towards the end of the nineteenth century, reflecting not only discontent with the limited version of GERMAN UNIFICATION achieved by BISMARCK in 1870–1 but also anxieties over the rise of PAN-SLAVISM. Compared with the latter, it enjoyed the advantage of a clearer source of undisputed leadership as provided by the new GERMAN EMPIRE and, eventually, a better organizational basis as supplied mainly through the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband). Founded in 1894 and led by Heinrich Class, this body recruited particularly well among industrialists, teachers, and university students. It used a broadly racist rhetoric (see RACISM) to justify increases in army and navy expenditure that would enable Germany to pursue WELTPOLITIK, with a view to expansion both as a continental power “redeeming” (see IRREDENTISM) regions of Teutonic population across eastern Europe and as a colonial one developing new areas of “Germanization” overseas. As with the rival Slavic movement, historians have found it generally difficult to detect in Pan-Germanism much by way of precise or consistent territorial objectives. However, at the start of WORLD WAR I, Chancellor BETHMANN HOLLWEG'S “September Program” of 1914 outlined schemes for extensive German domination over MITTELEUROPA and Mittelafrika alike that directly reflected many of the League's pleadings. Even as late as March 1918, when the Reich was temporarily in a position to impose terms upon the new Russian Bolshevik regime at BREST LITOVSK, this spirit of Teutonic expansionism remained in the ascendant. Though its expression naturally became more muted following Germany's eventual military collapse elsewhere and during much of the period of the WEIMAR REPUBLIC, unapologetic Pan-Germanism returned with a vengeance under HITLER. It was now radicalized, particularly by reference to an even more brutal version of the ANTISEMITISM and anti-Slavism that it had long encouraged. In this form it became central to NAZISM'S vision of a so-called NEW ORDER, pursued on nothing less than a pan-European scale.

Pan-Slavism The principle or advocacy of political unification for the Slavic peoples. Its pursuit, largely from the 1830s until 1914, was not dominated by any single organization. Nor was it characterized by any substantial agreement as to which Slavs should assume a vanguard role, or indeed as to which should be included at all. Moreover, many who used the rhetoric of Pan-Slavism were, in reality, more concerned to free their own particular Slavic nationality from alien (usually Austro-German, Magyar, or Turkish) control than to implement broader schemes of collective racial liberation. The Russians were in a different and stronger position, where the tsarist regime, reluctant to encourage disruptive NATIONALISM elsewhere in eastern Europe, supported the Pan-Slavic cause only under circumstances where such action served its own distinctive ambitions in the BALKANS. The “western” Slavs were particularly influential early on, when greater unity was urged by figures such as the Slovak poet Jan Kollár and expressed through the Slav Congress that assembled at Prague in June 1848 (see REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9). The fact that Moscow was the venue for a second (and similarly inconclusive) Congress held in 1867 reflects the leading role increasingly assumed by Russians, most notably Nikolai Danilevsky and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. By then, however, tsarist suppression of the 1863 Polish revolt had shown the limitations of racial fraternity. It had also indicated a growing tendency for Pan-Slavism to privilege ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY over the CATHOLICISM of the western Slavs. In the early twentieth century, when a rival PAN-GERMANISM was even more vigorously asserting itself, the continuing frailty of Slav brotherhood was illustrated by the disarray into which the anti-Ottoman BALKAN LEAGUE of 1912 rapidly fell (see also BALKAN WARS). The deeply divided condition of central-eastern Europe in the aftermath of WORLD WAR I – including Russia in revolutionary turmoil, an independent Poland and Czechoslovakia, and a new southern-Slav (Yugoslav) state – appeared to extinguish Pan-Slavic aspirations. But, in a certain (essentially “Pan-Russist”) sense, these were revived during the later 1940s when STALIN sought to bring all the Slav peoples within a communist bloc whose intended geographical scope resembled that outlined by Danilevsky. Even so, the Yugoslav federation under TITO still managed to evade this Soviet attempt to impose a substantially unified system. (See also SLAVOPHILES)

papacy (see under CATHOLICISM; PAPAL STATES)

Papadopoulos, Georgios (see under GREEK COLONELS)

Papal States Territories located chiefly in central Italy over which the Popes enjoyed temporal sovereignty and whose possession, they argued, was essential to the untrammeled exercise of their spiritual authority. Dating back to the gift of the Lateran Palace by Constantine I in 321, the lands were at their most extensive in the late eighteenth century, extending from Terracina northwards to Ferrara, and including Avignon and the Venaissin in southern France. They were seized during the FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1789, but the Italian provinces were restored at the VIENNA CONGRESS. Thereafter, their fate was part of the broader history of ITALIAN UNIFICATION. Regarded as an obstacle by Italian nationalists, the Papal States were invaded in 1848–9 and a republic declared at Rome by MAZZINI and GARIBALDI. Pope PIUS IX was forced to flee, but was restored with French assistance that included a subsequent protective garrison. In the civil war fought between April 1859 and November 1860, much of the Italian peninsula came under the control of PIEDMONT-SARDINIA, with papal territory now being restricted to Lazio and Rome. Though Turin and then Florence served as temporary capitals for the kingdom of Italy proclaimed in 1861, VICTOR EMMANUEL II made plain from the outset of the new regime that its focal point must be Rome. However, the city could not be occupied so long as papal sovereignty continued to be secured by the French garrison. This was withdrawn in 1870, upon the outbreak of the FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. Troops under General Cadorna then entered Rome, which promptly became Italy's capital. Though the tiny enclave of the Vatican City (see MICRO-STATES[5]) was excluded from annexation, the Papal States as such ceased to exist at that point.

Papen, Franz von (1879–1969), German Chancellor (1932) and Vice-Chancellor (1933–4). During the WEIMAR REPUBLIC, Papen was a leading example of those aristocratic conservatives who cultivated nostalgia for the monarchist authoritarianism of the pre-1918 GERMAN EMPIRE. As the GREAT DEPRESSION[2] deepened and parliamentary control collapsed, President HINDENBURG appointed him in June 1932 to head “the cabinet of barons.” After Reichstag elections in July strengthened Nazi (see NAZISM) representation, HITLER refused to support Papen and unsuccessfully demanded the chancellorship himself. Though a second poll in November saw some weakening of the Nazi vote, such was the continuing deadlock that in early December Kurt von Schleicher replaced Papen. The latter then played a major role in the plotting that brought down this new administration and consigned the chancellorship to Hitler on January 30, 1933. Papen, the new vice-chancellor, now mistakenly believed that, in the quest to defeat the leftist revolutionary threat, it was he who would manipulate the former Austrian corporal rather than vice versa. When he resigned, the Führer relegated him to diplomatic missions, in Vienna (1934–8) and Ankara (1938–44). At the end of WORLD WAR II Papen was prosecuted in the first of the NUREMBERG TRIALS. Though he was acquitted by that tribunal, in 1947 a German denazification court sentenced him to an eight-year imprisonment. Following early release in 1949, Papen published his self-serving memoirs in 1952.

Paris, Pact of (see KELLOGG–BRIAND PACT)

Paris, Treaties of The most relevant agreements are best considered in three parts.

[1] 1814 and 1815. The two treaties imposed by the Allies on France during the final stages of the NAPOLEONIC WARS. The first (May 1814) aimed to maintain France as one of the great powers under the restored BOURBON DYNASTY and to reintegrate her into a stable Europe. Accordingly the treaty was not punitive, and article 2 allowed France to maintain her borders as of January 1, 1792. She thus retained Avignon and the Venaissin, formerly part of the PAPAL STATES, parts of the Rhineland, Savoy, and Montbéliard. Britain returned captured French colonies with the exception of Tobago, Mauritius, and Saint Lucia. Arrangements concerning Holland, Switzerland, and Italy prefigured those to be formalized at the VIENNA CONGRESS. Following NAPOLEON I'S brief return to power (see HUNDRED DAYS) and his defeat at WATERLOO, the second treaty (November 1815) was much harsher and sought to prevent a resurgence of military adventurism. The boundaries of France were reduced to those of 1790. Thus she lost most of the territories promised in 1814, while retaining Avignon and the Venaissin. A war indemnity of 700 million francs was also imposed, partly to fund a chain of seventeen frontier fortresses for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Additionally, France agreed to meet the costs for 150,000 Allied troops being garrisoned on its northern and eastern borders for a period of five years.

[2] 1856 (see under CRIMEAN WAR).

[3] 1947. The five treaties, all finalized in February 1947, imposed by the victors of WORLD WAR II on Nazi Germany's principal allies. The fact that each of these had made a separate peace and had transferred to the winning side before the end of hostilities contributed to the mildness of the settlement. Main features included provision for ITALY to make concessions concerning the northern Adriatic and the Dodecanese islands, and to abandon its colonial claims in Africa; for HUNGARY to be restricted to its 1920 TRIANON borders; for BULGARIA to regain its frontiers of January 1941; for ROMANIA to recover its pre-war territory apart from Bukovina and the southern Dobrudja (ceded to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria respectively); and for FINLAND to cede Petsamo to the Russians and revert to its 1940 frontiers. No formal settlement with Austria was made until 1955, nor with Germany itself until 1990.

Paris Commune Popular uprising in 1871 in the French capital after defeat in the FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. Following NAPOLEON III'S humiliation at SEDAN on September 1–2, 1870, a crowd stormed the National Assembly, a republic was declared, and a Government of National Defense was appointed until fresh elections could be held. While this new regime included those such as GAMBETTA who were prepared to fight to the last for besieged Paris, the majority of ministers sought an armistice that was agreed by BISMARCK on January 28, 1871. The desire for a peace settlement intensified after the February 1871 elections. These resulted in a victory for the royalist parties, and in an Assembly that elected the veteran THIERS as chief executive of an insecure republic.

Thiers' pursuit of peace negotiations was badly received in Paris, which still refused to accept defeat. Though it had faced a Prussian siege since the previous September (during which thousands had died of starvation, and even the zoo animals had been slaughtered for meat), the capital had grown ever more patriotic and politically galvanized. Several new radical clubs had emerged to form the Central Committee of the Twenty Arrondissements. This heightened radicalism reflected the past history of Paris, something that Thiers greatly feared. Centralization had strengthened the capital's position as a hub for political activity and debate. Here, too, lived large numbers of better-off ARTISANS, who had maintained a tight network of clubs and self-help societies, especially in such districts as Montmartre and Belleville. There were additionally the members of the NATIONAL GUARD, a civilian militia founded during the FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1789. While this body initially represented an attempt by the middle classes to protect themselves both from the people and from the government, its bourgeois composition had been severely undermined in the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9 when its ranks had been expanded to include the popular classes. Left to decline by Napoleon III, this militia was again massively boosted during the Franco-Prussian War to reach 300,000 members, drawn largely from the lower orders. Successive regimes had found they could not control Paris without its cooperation, and so it proved again.

Troubled by this situation, on March 18,1871 Thiers ordered troops into the city to seize cannon. This was perhaps an attempt to provoke a showdown with the National Guard, though the lack of military preparations suggests otherwise. Soldiers fraternized with the crowd, and killed their own commander. At this point, Thiers ordered the army to retreat to Versailles where his government now resided. By that evening, Paris was in a state of open insurgency. Anxious to regularize the situation, the National Guard authorized elections for a Paris Commune, a name which evoked the revolutionary legacy of 1792. These were held on March 26, and resulted in an overwhelming vote for the left due to the patriotism engendered by the siege, to the association of the right with the discredited Second Empire, and to the abstention of conservatives (many of whom had, in any case, taken refuge elsewhere). Politically, the 81 elected representatives of the Commune reflected the many colors of French SOCIALISM. Followers of PROUDHON rubbed shoulders with those of BLANQUI (Raoul Rigault, Théophile Ferré), as well as with latter-day JACOBINS (Charles Delescluze) and socialists of other varieties. Small wonder fierce quarrelling ensued. Predominantly young, these communards were otherwise a curious social mix. Most were artisans, but there was also sizeable middle-class representation. Significantly, few stemmed from the industrial and proletarian districts which were beginning to grow in northern Paris.

This Commune initiated a plethora of reforms. Within the social domain, the measures were largely of a practical nature, as the left had gradually fallen out of love with the UTOPIAN SOCIALISM popular in 1848. Overdue rents were cancelled, workmen were allowed to reclaim tools they had been forced to pawn, night work in bakeries was abolished, and factories which had fallen into disuse became available to workers' cooperatives. Even so, there was no appropriation of property, largely because the Commune did not want to antagonize middle-class support. It even maintained cordial relations with the Bank of France. In other respects, the Commune was more ambitious, though many schemes were paper reforms: it championed free, compulsory and secular elementary schooling, separated church and state, promoted women's rights, and encouraged artistic freedoms. As LENIN later reflected, despite the siege there existed a carnival atmosphere as people experimented with long-denied freedoms. Ultimately the Commune sought to project Paris as the embodiment of “the one and indivisible Republic,” a model of progressive democracy to be copied elsewhere in France.

Only in Lyon, Marseille, Grenoble, and a few other places did such copying actually occur. The Commune's propaganda was blocked and, more importantly, the nation (especially a peasantry traditionally mistrustful of Paris) was tired of war. On May 21 the government troops breached the key defenses, in the form of the barricades blocking the wide boulevards recently created by HAUSSMANN. There followed the so-called semaine sanglante, a week of slaughter which sent shock-waves far beyond France. After the siege, the Thomas Cook agency organized trips from Britain to Paris, more or less promising scenes of blood in the gutters. Possibly 10,000 Parisians were summarily murdered, 40,000 were arrested, and 5,000 militants were expelled, with many others fleeing into exile, notably to London. The Commune was thus a tremendous setback for French socialism, which did not begin to recover until the 1880s. However, it also proved inspirational to the European left more generally. MARX, BAKUNIN, and Lenin all studied it as a lesson in the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the right, 1871 remained a horror akin to that of 1789, a reminder of mob rule. When in 1940 PÉTAIN signed an armistice with the Germans, he did so partly in fear of a repeat. Some historians have suggested that the fate of the Commune effectively ended the cycle of revolutions in France, by demonstrating that the people were no longer indomitable, and that, unlike in 1830 and 1848, the country was now incapable of provoking upheaval in the rest of Europe.

Paris Congress (see under CRIMEAN WAR)

Paris Peace Settlement This centered on the terms that “the Allied and Associated Powers” sought to impose upon those whom they had defeated in WORLD WAR I. The Peace Conference that began at Paris in January 1919 was attended by 70 delegations, representing overall some two-thirds of the world's population. The challenge was enormous, especially because in Europe the war had produced the unexpected outcome of destroying not simply the GERMAN EMPIRE and the HABSBURG EMPIRE (with the fall of the Ottomans in Turkey – see TURKEY AND EUROPE – following shortly) but also the imperial government of their Russian enemy. Moreover, even if LENIN'S post-tsarist regime was excluded from the Conference, he and his BOLSHEVIKS still haunted the proceedings from afar by providing new inspiration for the potential spread of international COMMUNISM (see also RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1917; GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1918–19; SPARTACIST RISING; KUN).

The leading roles in Paris were initially assumed by four statesmen: CLEMENCEAU for France, LLOYD GEORGE for Britain, ORLANDO for Italy, and President Woodrow Wilson of the USA (the main “Associated Power”). However, from July 1919 until the end of the Conference proper in January of the following year matters were increasingly delegated to foreign ministers and ambassadors. Back in January 1918, Wilson had proclaimed his FOURTEEN POINTS (more immediately a program for winning the war than planning the peace) which encouraged expectations that the eventual settlement would have national self-determination as its chief principle. The president's faith in this would have made more sense if the most fundamental cause of the Great War had really been the frustration of the NATIONALISM of many smaller European peoples rather than the competing ambitions of some larger ones. Moreover, upon its arrival in Paris, the US delegation soon showed an underestimation of the ethnic complexities at issue, especially across the former Habsburg domains. This weakness was all the more damaging under circumstances where, during the immediate post-armistice period prior to the launching of the Conference, many nationalities had already consolidated positions of de facto advantage over their rivals. Wilson's problems were also compounded by the fact that the principal European victors naturally had agenda of their own. Though sympathetic to the smaller ethnic groupings on the continental mainland, the British saw in national self-determination the perils of a theoretically universalistic commitment that might damage their own imperial interests almost anywhere from IRELAND to India. The Italians, having been cheated out of a number of gains promised by the 1915 LONDON TREATY, now adopted self-interested stubbornness when contending over the questions that remained. As for the French, Clemenceau and his compatriots had no intention of granting Germany any principle of national choice that might hazard their own security.

The upshot was what Harold Nicolson called a “patchwork Wilsonism.” The gaps between its professions of principle and the realities of its implementation served during the 1920s and 1930s to undermine confidence in the legitimacy of the settlement, even on the part of some who had shaped it. At Paris, in contrast to the VIENNA CONGRESS of 1814–15, representatives of the defeated had made their appearances not in order to negotiate but simply to concede whatever was demanded of them. The severe provisions regarding Germany were detailed in the VERSAILLES TREATY, reluctantly accepted by the new WEIMAR REPUBLIC in June 1919. When imposing this diktat, the victors from the West were understandably mindful of the crudely annexationist policy which the Reich itself had pursued when, at BREST LITOVSK in March 1918, it had briefly found itself able to impose crushing peace terms on Bolshevik Russia. The other treaties produced by the Peace Conference were those of ST GERMAIN (with Austria, September 1919); NEUILLY (with Bulgaria, November 1919); TRIANON (with Hungary, June 1920); and SÈVRES (with Turkey, August 1920). The last of these became ineffective, however, amid the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and it was eventually replaced in July 1923 by the less punitive LAUSANNE TREATY.

While the return of ALSACE-LORRAINE to France was the most striking territorial adjustment in the West, matters were vastly more complex in central and eastern Europe. There any lasting success for the settlement would be largely dependent on the continuance of the curious power vacuum evident at the end of World War I. This was caused by the combination of German defeat on one hand and Russia's immersion in revolution and civil war on the other. It was only within such an artificial atmosphere that FINLAND, the BALTIC STATES (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, “rump” AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, YUGOSLAVIA, and an enlarged ROMANIA (the only one of these countries that had possessed full formal sovereignty in 1914) might have a firm prospect of flourishing as independent states after 1919. As things turned out over the next quarter-century or so, all of these lands would eventually become in various ways the victims of resurgent German and Russian ambitions, particularly as generated first by HITLER and then by STALIN. Meanwhile, some of the states in question proved to be just as multi-national, and generally just as intolerant of racial minorities (see RACISM), as the empires from which they had emerged. Some twenty million Europeans now lived as, effectively, foreigners under regimes dedicated to nation-statehood. Thus the reshaping of Europe that occurred around 1919 did not so much solve problems of ethnic conflict as reframe them within an altered context.

The Paris Settlement also influenced Europe's relations with the wider world. On the American front, Wilson became increasingly at loggerheads with a Congress that eventually refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty. It also vetoed US membership of the new LEAGUE OF NATIONS, which the president had deemed essential for future international peace. Thus his country now returned to an isolationist foreign policy in regard to Europe – one which lasted for twenty years and from which his fellow-citizens did not properly arouse themselves until WORLD WAR II was already under way. As for Britain and France, the dismantling of the German colonial empire marked the final stage in their own expansion into Africa (see IMPERIALISM). Under League of Nation's MANDATES, Togoland and Cameroon were each partitioned between them, and German East Africa (henceforth Tanganyika) came entirely under British administration. Until they encountered the growing force of Arab nationalism, these two powers also seemed to be the major beneficiaries from the collapse of Turkish authority in the Middle East. Operating broadly according to the SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT of 1916, the French took “mandated” control over Syria and Lebanon, while the British assumed similar responsibility for Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. The last of these annexations proved particularly problematic, precisely because the Balfour declaration of 1917 had encouraged a flow of Jewish immigrants who anticipated the early creation of a Zionist homeland within the Palestinian territory (see JEWS; ZIONISM).

“This is not a peace,” declared Marshal FOCH, “but an armistice for twenty years.” That judgment was too harsh, for the outcome of the 1919 negotiations did not render World War II inevitable. However, it is undeniable that the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the Paris Settlement contributed, alongside such later events as the GREAT DEPRESSION of the early 1930s, to increase the likelihood of an eventual renewal of major international conflict both in Europe and beyond. (See also Map 9)

parliamentary government (see under DEMO-CRACY)

Partitions of Poland (see under POLAND)

Pašić, Nikola (1845–1926), Prime Minister of SERBIA (1891–2, 1904–8, 1910–18); and then of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (see YUGOSLAVIA) almost continuously from 1921 to 1926. As founder of the peasant-based Radical Party, he pursued the goal of uniting all Serbs. He did this particularly through the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 (see BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA) and the BALKAN WARS of 1912–13, as well as through WORLD WAR I which was triggered by a Serbian crisis. After his country's defeat in 1915 and the fall of the sympathetic Romanov dynasty of Russia two years later, Pašić was driven towards closer cooperation with the South Slav leaders exiled from the Austro-Hungarian Empire (see HABSBURG EMPIRE). Between them they achieved, following the collapse of the CENTRAL POWERS, the “Yugoslav” solution that involved proclaiming in December 1918 a combined Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. At the PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT Pašić was charged with negotiating its precise frontiers. Thereafter he used his premiership of the new state to secure strong centralization, enabling the Serbs to continue as the dominant ethnic grouping in all its affairs. The resulting tensions, especially with the Croats (see CROATIA), forced Pašić's resignation shortly before his death.

Passchendaele, Battle of Name given to the July–November 1917 element in the third Battle of YPRES during WORLD WAR I, but often used to refer to the whole engagement. Haig, the British commander, had ambitious plans for a breakthrough that would capture the German-held railway junction at Roulers as well as U-boat bases on the coast of occupied Belgium. He also wished to relieve pressure on the French army, weakened by mutinies after the failed NIVELLE offensive. A massive preliminary artillery bombardment destroyed the drainage system and heavy rains turned the ground around the low Passchendaele ridge into a quagmire. By November the advance had gained only five miles at the cost of around 300,000 British losses, and created a salient that was difficult to defend. The Germans lost some 250,000 men. However, away from the Western Front, they had meanwhile captured Riga (September) and, with the Austrians, achieved victory at CAPORETTO (October). During the German offensive that began in March 1918 the British would temporarily abandon the gains made around Passchendaele, but without ever relinquishing Ypres itself.

Paul I (1754–1801), Tsar of RUSSIA (1796–1801). He was the mentally unstable son and successor of CATHERINE II. Though tyrannical in disposition, he did attempt to alleviate some of the burdens imposed by SERDOM. He also clarified the law of succession to the Russian throne, essentially through the male line. In the context of war against France (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS; NAPOLEONIC WARS), Paul was briefly involved, during 1798–9, in the Second Coalition. He was murdered in a palace revolution led by his son, who succeeded him as ALEXANDER I.

Pavelić, Ante (1889–1959), head of the Ustaše and leader of the puppet state of CROATIA in WORLD WAR II. Vicious in temperament, he gravitated to far-right politics and in the 1920s was elected to the parliament of YUGOSLAVIA as a deputy for Zagreb, though he rarely attended sessions because of his contempt for DEMOCRACY. Following the establishment of a royal dictatorship by the pro-Serbian ALEXANDER I in 1929, Pavelić fled abroad and organized a series of terror camps for the emerging Ustaše, a paramilitary movement which advocated a violent mix of FASCISM, NATIONALISM, and CATHOLICISM. It was the Ustaše that assassinated Alexander in 1934. With the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, HITLER consented to the creation of a nominally independent state of Croatia, including Dalmatia and BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. As head of this Nazi satellite, Pavelić unleashed the Ustaše against JEWS, Orthodox Serbs (see SERBIA; ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY), and others seen as threats to Croatian purity. The resulting genocidal atrocities shocked both Italian and German observers. In 1945, with liberation imminent, Pavelić fled again, eventually making his way to Argentina and then to Spain where he died.

peasantry (see under RURAL SOCIETY)

Peninsular War Conflict in Iberia that formed part of the NAPOLEONIC WARS. This peninsula's strategic importance grew once NAPOLEON I had introduced, in 1806, a so-called CONTINENTAL SYSTEM centered on economic WARFARE aimed at subjecting Britain to maritime blockade. In November 1807 he mounted an invasion of Portugal, which had declined to secure its implementation. Early in 1808 he also offended his ally, Spain, by introducing forces charged with achieving improved compliance. In addition, Napoleon demanded the abdication of its king, and the transfer of his own brother (see BONAPARTE, JOSEPH) from the Neapolitan to the Spanish throne. These developments prompted an insurrection at Madrid which spread to the rest of Spain, and the landing in Portugal of a British army headed by Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of WELLINGTON). There he won a victory over General Junot at Vimeiro in August 1808, after which much of the action extended into Spanish territory too. Wellesley was then recalled to Britain, even as Napoleon took direct charge of the Iberian campaign for a few months towards the end of that year. Having restored control over Madrid, Bonaparte then left Marshal Soult to confront the new British commander, Sir John Moore. In January 1809 the latter was killed at Corunna, and it was not until April that Wellesley returned to the peninsula. Though he brought reinforcements, his numbers remained inferior to those of the enemy. Nonetheless, they more than held their own at Talavera in July, before coming under renewed pressure as well-trained troops led by Marshal Masséna were redeployed to Iberia. Wellesley's successful defense of the lines of the Torres Vedras near Lisbon eventually gave him the springboard for an offensive, once Napoleon had become embroiled in his disastrous Russian campaign of 1812. The most decisive British victory was that of June 1813, recorded against Marshal Jourdan at Vittoria, and by the end of the year the remainder of the Napoleonic forces were retreating over the Pyrenees. This outcome was due in part to the extensive activity of Spanish guerrillas, who may have accounted for half of the 164,000 casualties suffered by the French. Even so, traditional accounts of a “people's war” have overplayed their role – most fighting was done by militias and regular forces and the Spanish guerrillas terrorized civilians as much as they did the French. At the height of the Peninsular War, Napoleon was maintaining some 300,000 troops in Iberia, under circumstances where even more desperate needs existed in the central and eastern European regions of his faltering military empire. There was therefore much truth in his observation that, “The Spanish ulcer destroyed me.”

perestroika (see under GORBACHEV)

Pétain, Henri Philippe Omer (1856–1951), French hero of WORLD WAR I, who subsequently headed the VICHY REGIME (1940–4). Born at Cauchy-à-la-Tour in northern France as the son of prosperous peasants, he decided on the army for its financial security. He was an unexceptional officer, apart from his willingness to question his superiors and his unorthodox views on tactics, expressed in lectures at the École de Guerre in 1906, where he stressed the defensive capacity of firepower. Pétain was close to retirement when the Great War relaunched his career. He proved himself alert to the welfare of his men, and critical of wasteful offensives. In February 1916, having become a general, he took charge at VERDUN, not because of his knowledge of defensive tactics but simply because he was available. This battle, involving over a third of the army, proved a test of French resilience and ended in stalemate. Nonetheless, Pétain was acclaimed as the “Victor of Verdun” and seemed the obvious man to quell the mutinies that struck the army following NIVELLE'S disastrous offensive of spring 1917. Through the husbanding of troops, Pétain consolidated his reputation as a humane general, although he was a stern disciplinarian, and his later career illustrated the limited nature of his compassion. In March 1918 he was also developing a troubling pessimism, albeit one naturally hidden from public view. However, along with those other French generals promoted to Marshal in 1918–19, he was eventually fêted as an architect of overall victory.

In the 1920s Pétain was an obvious choice to elaborate French defense doctrine. On key military committees, he championed a strategy which resulted in construction of the MAGINOT LINE. He has subsequently been blamed for defeat in 1940, but unfairly. Under GAMELIN, commander-in-chief (1935–40), French strategy underwent a significant overhaul, and Pétain himself was not directing military operations in 1940. Immensely vain, he was by then harboring political ambitions. He was contemptuous of the liberal democracy that he had seen at close hand while serving in 1934 as minister of war, and he considered that the THIRD REPUBLIC had squandered the fruits of the 1918 victory. He especially despised the left-wing POPULAR FRONT elected in 1936, and harbored hopes that he might be called upon to lead his country. He thus accepted any government post, however minor, for instance the ambassadorship to Spain in 1939. Yet, as a soldier, he was respectful towards legality and spurned possibilities of a coup d'état.

The call came early in WORLD WAR II, on May 18, 1940. Prime minister REYNAUD, recognizing the desperate military situation, believed Pétain's appointment as his deputy would boost morale both in government and across the nation. Yet he had not reckoned on the Marshal's defeatism, dislike of politicians, and naivety about German intentions. Having become prime minister on June 16, Pétain signed an armistice with Germany six days later, and then on July 3 established his new government at Vichy. There, on July 11, he was accorded plenary powers as head of state in respect of the non-occupied portion of France. Pétain used his new-found authority to operate in COLLABORATION with Germany. He hoped to dilute the armistice terms, secure the release of prisoners of war, and negotiate a definitive peace settlement which would ensure his place in history. To these ends, he met HITLER at Montoire on October 24, 1940, but only platitudes were exchanged. Pétain thus increasingly trusted in his principal ministers, LAVAL and DARLAN, to improve Franco-German relations. However, in their search for collaboration they conceded more and more, much to the disgust of the French public. Yet such contempt was not generally directed against Pétain himself. In the chaos and humiliation of occupation, few doubted his patriotism. Some believed indeed that he was playing a double-game with Hitler and was secretly working with the Allies. A veritable cult of the marshal swept the nation, hampering the early growth of RESISTANCE. The reality was that through his National Revolution, an ambitious program of social engineering, Pétain was set upon moral regeneration. This had its positive side, but also involved the merciless maltreatment of Communists, freemasons and parliamentarians whom Pétain dubbed the “anti-France.” Moreover, Vichy colluded in the so-called FINAL SOLUTION, handing to the Germans some 75,000 Jews – only 3,000 of whom survived. Pétain had no direct hand in the deportations, but did not disapprove of what was happening. An unthinking racist (see RACISM), he believed that if this was what it took to deliver France then the sacrifice would be worth it. When in November 1942 the Allies invaded North Africa, he had the chance to quit Vichy, possibly to become leader of the overseas resistance. He chose to stay, believing his services were indispensable, despite the fact that civil disorder was rapidly overtaking France.

The treatment of Jews was so embarrassing that it was barely mentioned in 1945 when Pétain was tried on charges of high treason. He was sentenced to death, but his punishment was commuted to life imprisonment by DE GAULLE, head of the provisional government and once a protégé of the Marshal. Pétain spent his remaining years drifting into senility in his prison exile on the Île d'Yeu. After his death in 1951, supporters failed in their efforts to rehabilitate his reputation. Pétain wanted to be remembered for saving France both in 1914–18 and in 1940. Instead he was a limited individual, blind to his own shortcomings and a believer in his own mythology. His leadership of Vichy bitterly divided his compatriots, bequeathing a legacy that long continued to haunt France.

philhellenism Admiration for GREECE and its culture. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries such enthusiasm from many classically-educated Europeans (especially in western areas of the continent) became all the more significant because the Greeks themselves were now focusing on possible liberation from Ottoman Turkey (see TURKEY AND EUROPE). When the GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE broke out in 1821 what had hitherto been largely a movement of European literary ROMANTICISM assumed a sharper political edge. Philhellenes brought increasingly effective pressure on some of their governments to assist the rebellion, citing a range of liberal, humanitarian, nationalistic (see NATIONALISM), or religious justifications. A salient symbol of their activity was the English poet Byron's death (though from fever not combat) at Missolonghi in 1824. However, the most substantial reality to which their campaigning contributed was the decisive victory at the Battle of NAVARINO three years later, when the Turkish fleet was devastated by combined British, French, and Russian naval forces.

phoney war Term coined by an American newspaper to describe the opening phase of WORLD WAR II, covering the period from September 1939 until HITLER'S invasion of western Europe in April 1940. Equivalent labels were “the bore war” in English, la drôle de guerre in French, and der Sitzkrieg in German. During this period, to the people of Britain and France especially, the war in Poland seemed a long way off, a feeling reinforced by the inability of either ally to assist Warsaw militarily. Something of the spirit of APPEASEMENT persisted, as the British and French publics remained preoccupied with domestic concerns. Those who had left Paris and London for fear of attack returned home, reassured by the absence of the invasion or widespread bombing they had dreaded. In some degree the “phoney war” compromised public commitment to the war effort against Germany, as there was widespread antipathy towards blackouts, rationing, and other restrictions which appeared meaningless. However, historians are increasingly of the mind that little of this would have mattered if British and French troops had not been so swiftly routed in May–June 1940. While CHURCHILL did have time to inspire a new defiance amongst the British following the evacuation from DUNKIRK, French public opinion enjoyed no such breathing space before the establishment of PÉTAIN'S collaborationist VICHY REGIME. As it was, the preceding “phoney war” made the shock of rapid defeat in continental western Europe all the greater.

Piedmont-Sardinia Northern Italian state known formally as “the Kingdom of Sardinia” but more generally as “Piedmont.” It was established in 1720 when Austria compelled Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, to relinquish his recently-won kingship over Sicily in return for gaining the island of Sardinia from Spain. The kingdom's mainland territories, which included Nice and Savoy as well as Piedmont, fell under French control during the long period of warfare that began in the 1790s (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS; NAPOLEONIC WARS). But at the 1814–15 VIENNA CONGRESS Piedmont-Sardinia was fully restored, and indeed enlarged by annexing the former Republic of Genoa. The kingdom now held a vital strategic position as buffer between France and a HABSBURG EMPIRE that had acquired neighboring Lombardy-Venetia and established dynastic and military interests throughout the rest of the Italian peninsula. During the early nineteenth century the Savoy dynasty (with Victor Emmanuel I being followed by CHARLES FELIX) ruled in a reactionary mode. However, particularly following the accession of CHARLES ALBERT in 1831, supporters of ITALIAN UNIFICATION (see also RISORGIMENTO) looked increasingly towards Piedmont, as a state still possessing its own army and now experimenting with reform (e.g. a customs league extending to Tuscany and the PAPAL STATES). During the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9 Charles Albert granted a constitution (Statuto) and succumbed to the House of Savoy's longstanding ambitions concerning domination of northern Italy. His attempts to expel the Austrians from Lombardy led to defeats at CUSTOZZA and NOVARA, and prompted his replacement by VICTOR EMMANUEL II. Even so, Piedmont had retained its Statuto, as well as its political independence and a military capacity that enabled it to play some role in the CRIMEAN WAR of the mid-1850s. Thus it continued to provide a focus for the hopes of Italian NATIONALISM, despite the fact that both the king and his prime minister, CAVOUR, were chiefly concerned with establishing a highly centralized northern state, and even prepared to cede Nice and Savoy to France in exchange for NAPOLEON III'S assistance (see PLOMBIÈRES AGREEMENT). In the course of 1860 they found themselves confronted with largely unanticipated possibilities of more extensive unification, and adapted their policies to ensure the House of Savoy's sovereignty over the larger Kingdom of Italy that was eventually proclaimed for most of the peninsula (including the south) early in 1861. Its new monarch continued to be enumerated as “Victor Emmanuel II,” even though Piedmont-Sardinia now ceased to exist as such. He also embarked on a process of “Piedmontization” (extended to Venetia in 1866 and the Papal States in 1870) which encountered the kind of widespread opposition that indicated just how far the development of any truly “Italian” identity had yet to go.

pillarization Translated from the Dutch verzuiling, this term relates to the “pillars” (zuilen) that constituted a central feature of political and social organization in the NETHERLANDS from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s. In a country where potentially divisive currents of CONSERVATISM and of progressivism were both strongly apparent, the concept of pillarization reflected the elites' belief that their country's unity could best be safeguarded by granting a measure of formal institutional recognition to its diversity as well. Thus the competing interests of Catholic and Protestant interest groups (see CATHOLICISM; PROTESTANTISM), and of secular ones (see SECULARIZATION) in socialist and liberal forms, became channeled and mediated by recognizing such organizations as autonomous pillars which were none the less also capable of acting in combination to support some broader cohesion across Dutch society as a whole. This pillarization permeated not only the structuring of political parties but also TRADE UNIONISM, EDUCATION, the COMMUNICATIONS media, and much of leisure activity. Many of the traditional religious (and also regional) ties that had inspired this system slackened during the 1960s, and the merger that occurred in 1973 between the main Catholic and Protestant political movements was clearly symptomatic of a broader process of “de-pillarization” already developing by that stage.

Pillnitz, Declaration of Joint statement (August 27, 1791) of Frederick-William II of Prussia and Leopold II of Austria, made in the context of the FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1789, threatening intervention if MARIE-ANTOINETTE (Leopold's sister) or LOUIS XVI were harmed. Fears for their safety had grown following the failed flight to VARENNES. The guarded declaration was meant to strengthen the moderates inside France and to head off émigrés' calls for war. Thus it made intervention conditional upon the active support of all the major powers, which was very unlikely to be forthcoming. However, its results were opposite to those intended. Inside France it caused alarm and was taken as an affront to French sovereignty. By playing into the hands of the most bellicose elements, it ultimately contributed to the French declaration of war the following April.

Piłsudski, Józef (1867–1935), Polish soldier and statesman. Piłsudski's early experiences of left-wing politics under tsarist rule included a period of Siberian exile. Having visited Tokyo during the RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR in the vain hope of getting support for a Polish revolt against NICHOLAS II, he managed on the outbreak of WORLD WAR I to raise a legion of his compatriots to fight alongside the Austrian forces. In 1917, however, he was interned by the Germans who were far less keen than he to make the collapse of tsardom the occasion for restoring an independent POLAND. After his release in 1918, however, he went to Warsaw to assist with precisely that project. Having become provisional head of state and having also assumed overall command of the army as Marshal of Poland, Piłsudski then skillfully conducted the 1920 campaign of national defense against BOLSHEVIK forces (see RUSSO-POLISH WAR). He resigned his political headship at the end of 1922, but, especially in his capacity as marshal, soon grew exasperated with a scene of growing parliamentary-democratic instability. In May 1926 he launched a military coup that enabled him to operate a semi-dictatorship until his death. Although he had two spells as premier (1926-88, and 1930), it was chiefly through a nine-year tenure of the war ministry that he maintained such influence as he could whilst also becoming more frail in health. Any prospect of radical military reform was limited by his anachronistic attachment to cavalry and by his underestimation of air power. Tending to concentrate on foreign policy issues, he secured a non-aggression pact with STALIN'S regime in 1932, and two years later concluded a similar agreement with that newly established by HITLER in Germany. Neither of these compacts long survived Piłsudski's death.

Pius VII (1740–1823), Pope (1800–23). The son of noble parents, Luigi Barnabà Chiaramonte entered the Benedictine Order in 1756. He became bishop of Tivoli (1782), and then bishop of Imola and a cardinal (1785), before his election to the papacy as a compromise candidate. His pontificate was dominated by relations with France. Anxious to restore CATHOLICISM to the country after the DECHRISTIANIZATION of the revolutionary epoch, he agreed a CONCORDAT in 1801, though its terms were largely vitiated by the Organic Articles that the First Consul (the future NAPOLEON I) subsequently appended. Though Pius attended the latter's coronation as emperor in 1804, relations continued to deteriorate. The French occupied Rome in 1808, and the pope was then arrested for excommunicating those responsible. After being taken to Fontainebleau in 1813 he was bullied into agreeing significant concessions, though he quickly retracted these. Following Napoleon's fall, Pius worked until his death to restore the fortunes of the church, which was everywhere in disarray. Assisted by the negotiating skills of CONSALVI, he secured the return of most of the PAPAL STATES at the VIENNA CONGRESS and agreed a series of generally favorable concordats with several states. He used his personal prestige, bolstered by his courageous stand against Napoleon, to enhance the status of the papal office.

Pius IX (1792–1878), Pope (1846–78). Born into an aristocratic family from Ancona, Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti served briefly in the papal diplomatic service before undertaking a series of pastoral offices, latterly as archbishop of Spoleto (1827–32) and bishop of Imola (1832–40). He gained a reputation as a reformer and supporter of ITALIAN UNIFICATION, and was elected Pope against opposition from conservatives. However, “Pio Nono” rapidly lost popular support during the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9 and was forced to flee from Rome in disguise. Restored with French military assistance (1850), he was nonetheless unable to prevent the PAPAL STATES from being whittled away, until his temporal authority was restricted to the Vatican City (see MICRO-STATES[5]) by 1870–1. Although overshadowed by the progress of Italian unification, his pontificate was hugely significant ecclesiastically for the assertion of ultramontanism – the centralization of authority upon the papacy. Thus he took it upon himself to define the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (1854), and through his Syllabus of Errors (1864) to deny the compatibility of CATHOLICISM with LIBERALISM and progress. He also summoned the first of the VATICAN COUNCILS which defined the doctrine of papal infallibility with respect to ex cathedra statements regarding faith and morals. This gave rise to schism with the Old Catholics in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland and provided an impulse towards the KULTURKAMPF conducted by BISMARCK. Nevertheless, popular religiosity flourished during his pontificate. He promoted the emotive cult of the Sacred Heart, while Rome blossomed as a pilgrimage centre. His geniality, wit, and relaxed manner made him a popular icon. He oversaw the establishment of numerous new dioceses and missions as well as the re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in England (1850) and the Netherlands (1853). Although theologically conservative and ill-at-ease with nineteenth-century social, economic and intellectual trends, Pius did much to restore the personal popularity of the papacy and to energize a spiritual resurgence amongst Catholics.

Pius XI (1857–1939), Pope (1922–39). The son of a factory manager, Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti was ordained in 1879. His scholarly abilities were reflected in his appointment as prefect of the Vatican library in 1914. Brief spells as nuncio in Poland and as archbishop of Milan immediately preceded Ratti's pontificate. As pope, he sought to promote the church's active social involvement – for example, through Quadragesimo anno (issued in 1931 as the best known of his teaching encyclicals) and through the encouragement of indigenous CATHOLICISM outside Europe. His efforts to deal with the dictators of the inter-war period had less success, and arguably eased their consolidation of power. Though the LATERAN TREATIES agreed with MUSSOLINI in 1929 settled the status of the Vatican City (see MICRO-STATES[5]), Pius's earlier interventions in Italian party politics had hindered the formation of any united front against FASCISM. Similarly, his CONCORDAT with HITLER (1933) bolstered the latter's prestige and hampered Catholic opposition to NAZISM, though by 1937 the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge was condemning the Third Reich's violations of that agreement. Pius approved FRANCO'S victory in the SPANISH CIVIL WAR. He unequivocally condemned atheistic COMMUNISM in 1937, but his efforts to end religious persecution under STALIN proved unavailing.

Pius XII (1876–1958), Pope (1939–58). Ordained in 1899, Eugenio Pacelli followed a family tradition of papal diplomatic service. His appointments as nuncio in Munich (1917) and Berlin (1920) gave him first-hand experience of German affairs, and he was responsible for a series of CONCORDATS with the Llsquänder of Bavaria (1924) and Prussia (1929), and then in 1933 with Austria and with Germany's new Nazi regime (see NAZISM). Elected on the eve of WORLD WAR II, he used his diplomatic experience in efforts first to avert and then to end the conflict, calling for an international peace conference. Although he inaugurated extensive relief operations for war victims, he has been criticized for a failure to denounce Nazi policies (especially towards the JEWS) in terms that were sufficiently clear or forceful, in sharp contrast to his trenchant opposition to COMMUNISM. Defenders have argued that stronger public condemnation might have provoked even worse persecution of the Jews, as well as further restriction of the church's own pastoral functions. Although occluded by his wartime role, Pius's pontificate was also significant for efforts to promote scholarship through the use of modern historical methods, for greater involvement of the laity, and for some limited ecumenical initiatives with respect not only to the eastern Uniates but also to the Orthodox churches (see ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY) and other non-Catholic Christian denominations (see PROTESTANTISM).

place names These present European historians with a minefield of potential confusion. Taking cities and towns as leading examples of changing nomenclature, we can see that such shifts have sometimes been conditioned by decisions internal to the relevant countries: thus Norway substituted Oslo for Christiania and Turkey replaced Constantinople with Istanbul, while Russia offers St Petersburg–Petrograd–Leningrad as well as Tsaritsyn–Stalingrad–Volgograd. Since political and linguistic hegemony are so deeply entwined, it is understandable why changes of national sovereignty too have involved the kind of re-labeling that turned FIUME into Rijeka or DANZIG into Gdansk. States possessing two or more official languages have regularly added to the mixture, in the way that Belgians use Mons in French for what is Bergen in Dutch. Exonyms (or names used chiefly within languages foreign to the location) also complicate matters, as exemplified by the anglophone tradition of treating Livorno as Leghorn. Further difficulties arise over the naming of broader geographical areas or features. For example, recent decades have witnessed bitterly contested claims to the label of MACEDONIA, even while the discrepancies between Alto Adige and SOUTH TYROL, or between La Manche and a more sharply expressed English Channel, no longer stir quite as much antagonism as once prevailed. (See also CAPITAL CITIES)

Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918), Russian revolutionary and intellectual, credited with introducing his country to MARX'S version of COMMUNISM. As a young man he abandoned a possible career in the army, to involve himself in the underground politics associated with the POPULISM of the movement known as “Land and Liberty.” In 1880 he was forced into exile, and then spent much of his later life in Geneva where he published several important works on SOCIALISM. Disillusioned with populism, he was drawn to Marxism and in 1883, alongside other Russian exiles, helped to establish the Group for the Emancipation for Labour which eventually became the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (1898). Plekhanov was convinced that Russia was moving away from its agrarian base (see RURAL SOCIETY) to become a capitalist bourgeois-dominated society, hence ready for revolution, and it is understandable that LENIN should have been drawn to his ideas. However, when in 1903 the Social Democratic Party split between BOLSHEVIKS and MENSHEVIKS, Plekhanov sided with the latter faction. Independent-minded, he supported the Russian war effort in 1914, and in 1917 returned to his homeland where he opposed Lenin's takeover (see RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1917). By then his influence was marginal, and he died a year later, exiled in Finland.

Plombières agreement This was made between NAPOLEON III and CAVOUR, chief minister of PIEDMONT-SARDINIA, at a secret meeting held in July 1858 six months after the failed ORSINI PLOT against the French emperor. Though they shared the aim of freeing northern Italy from control by the HABSBURG EMPIRE, their motives were essentially different. Whereas Cavour was seeking to enlarge the Piedmontese kingdom, Napoleon was intending that France should replace Austria as the key power in the region, as well as extending its own influence in the Mediterranean. Notions that either man was fully committed to the cause of ITALIAN UNIFICATION should be treated with caution. At Plombières it was agreed that Cavour should provoke a war with the Austrians under circumstances which would make the latter appear as the principal aggressors. This was intended to facilitate the international acceptability of French intervention on the Piedmontese side. If all went well, Piedmont would receive Lombardy, Venetia, the duchies of Parma, Modena and Lucca, and the Marches; Tuscany and parts of the PAPAL STATES would form a Kingdom of Central Italy under the Duchess of Parma; the pope would rule over a much reduced territory based around Rome; and the Kingdom of the TWO SICILIES would be left untouched. A new Italian federation would loosely combine these four states, and (as a sop to Catholic opinion in France) the pope would be offered its presidency. It was additionally agreed that France should receive Nice and Savoy, and that a cousin of Napoleon III should marry the daughter of VICTOR EMMANUEL II of Piedmont. These secret plans were formalized by treaty in December 1858. Thereafter Piedmont sought a pretext for hostilities that would also ensure the guaranteed NEUTRALITY of the other great powers. While Plombières thus paved the way for the onset of the FRANCO-AUSTRIAN WAR that began in April 1859, the actual course of the ensuing struggle meant that the terms of this agreement became incapable of implementation when hostilities ended.

Pobedonostsev, Konstantin (1827–1907), Russian jurist, statesman, and close advisor to Tsar ALEXANDER III. Like his own father, Pobedonostsev pursued an academic career, studying law, and teaching jurisprudence at Moscow University (1860–5). During this period he also became tutor to the future tsar, whereupon he established a strong foothold in the imperial court. He later taught the young NICHOLAS II as well. In 1872, he was named a member of the State Council which oversaw all proposed legislation, and eight years later became director general of the Holy Synod. He enjoyed a formidable influence over Alexander, who came to the throne in 1881 following his father's assassination. Pobedonostsev's reactionary repudiation of ideas of “Westernization” became manifest in a policy of RUSSIFICATION that included the encouragement of semi-official POGROMS (see also ANTISEMITISM). He also pursued a series of other deeply conservative policies, including a tightening of censorship and a crackdown upon dissent, real or imagined. Pobedonostsev resisted any attempts to dilute tsarist autocracy, but was marginalized after the RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905.

pogroms Derived from a Russian word meaning “riot” or “devastation,” these were antisemitic disturbances that periodically occurred within the tsarist empire. Though controversy exists about when they first erupted, pogroms were certainly widespread in the three years immediately following the assassination of ALEXANDER II (1881), which the popular press blamed on the JEWS. Concentrated particularly in Ukraine and southern Russia, these attacks drew on the traditional wellsprings of popular ANTISEMITISM and were further encouraged by the institutionalized hostility of officials who did little to curb the violence. The pogroms prompted widescale Jewish MIGRATION, both to other parts of Europe and to the USA (see also ZIONISM). Further outbreaks erupted during the period 1903-6, when the regime clamped down on supposed revolutionaries, as well as during the RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR which unleashed extensive ethnic violence. The term pogrom has been applied additionally to the campaign of anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by NAZISM, especially in the genocidal form of the FINAL SOLUTION.

Poincaré, Raymond (1860–1934), President of France (1913–20) and Prime Minister (1912– 13, 1922–4, 1926–9). Trained as a lawyer, he entered politics as a moderate conservative deputy for the Meuse in 1887. An opponent of BOULANGER, he was highly critical of the government during the Panama Canal scandal (see LESSEPS), not surprising perhaps given his thrifty nature. Holding a series of portfolios from 1893 onwards, he was a guarded politician, only supporting Dreyfus (see DREYFUS AFFAIR) when it seemed prudent to do so, though he did have some advanced views on animal rights and FEMINISM. In 1902 he helped found the centre-right Alliance Démocratique, which became the most influential voice for CONSERVATISM within the THIRD REPUBLIC and provided the bulk of the deputies in the BLOC NATIONAL. In 1912 he became premier, and was elected president the following year, in which capacity he did much to prepare France for war. Contrary to what the Germans claimed, during the JULY CRISIS of 1914 he was not “Poincaré-la-guerre,” who unnecessarily stoked the fires, but a cautious negotiator who wanted to ensure that, if war came, it would be one of national defense supported by the French people. Towards the end of WORLD WAR I he became eclipsed by CLEMENCEAU, and was subsequently disappointed by the latter's failure to impose even tougher terms on Germany at the PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT of 1919. Having stood down as president in 1920, Poincaré returned as prime minister in 1922, whereupon his hard-line policy towards Germany resulted in the RUHR OCCUPATION. Forced out of office by the CARTEL DES GAUCHES in 1924, he returned to head a Government of National Union in 1926, when he was viewed as the only man capable of restoring confidence in the franc. In large measure, Poincaré owed his political influence to his moderate conservatism which reflected the aspirations of the French middle classes and peasantry who had no wish for profound social change.

Poland A country of central-eastern Europe, bounded to the north by its Baltic coastline. During the modern period the history of its mainly Catholic and Slavic inhabitants (currently estimated as numbering some 38 million) has been much shaped by the rival ambitions of their Russian neighbors to the east, and of their Prusso-German and Austro-German ones to the west and south. From the early fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth century the kingdom of Poland had been a leading power, but thereafter its numerous and self-serving class of nobles and gentry (see SZLACHTA) frustrated decisive government. The upshot was contraction of its frontiers in the face first of Swedish advances and then of even more fatal depredations by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. In 1772 this trio undertook a first joint partition of much of Polish territory; in 1793 Russia and Prussia made further seizures; and in 1795 all three were again involved in a final partition of the remaining “rump.” The Poles then remained without any state of their own until 1918.

In the course of the NAPOLEONIC WARS the French emperor aimed to gain tactical advantage over the partitioning powers by supporting a form of Polish revival. Thus, following the 1807 TILSIT treaty, he established a duchy (see WARSAW, DUCHY OF) under the rule of the king of Saxony – but the arrangement did not survive Bonaparte's defeat of 1813 at LEIPZIG. After much wrangling at the VIENNA CONGRESS of 1814–15, the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians continued to share the earlier spoils. Though Tsar ALEXANDER I was frustrated in his bid to obtain all of pre-1772 Polish territory, the Russian portion was somewhat enlarged and remained the most extensive. It was now designated as the Kingdom of Poland (or “Congress Poland”), and given a two-chamber legislature. However, since Alexander retained the monarchy for himself, effective autonomy was strictly limited. His successor, NICHOLAS I, proved even more repressive, and in November 1830 there began a Polish rebellion that lasted for nearly a year (see also REVOLUTIONS OF 1830–2). Having suppressed it, the tsarist regime abolished the minor concessions to constitutionalism previously made. One further outcome of the events of 1830–1 was the “great emigration” (see MIGRATION) which involved such figures as Prince Adam CZARTORYSKI and the poet MICKIEWICZ. This helped to make Paris in particular a base from which the exiles could continue to champion the cause of NATIONALISM. Similar discontent was also evident within the other Polish areas under foreign control, and particularly in Austrian Galicia where in 1846 an unsuccessful insurrection also led to the ending of the independent city-statehood conceded exceptionally to Kraków since 1815.

Though Poles were prominent in the widespread European REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9, their own nationalist aspirations derived no direct benefit from these upheavals. Risings in Warsaw, Kraków, and Posen (Poznań) – against Russian, Austrian, and Prussian authority respectively – were all quite speedily suppressed. Failure was due not simply to the superior resources of the three controlling powers but also to the rivalries that limited the Poles' own cooperation with Czechs, Ukrainians, and other subject nationalities. More encouraging was the offer of amnesties made in Congress Poland after the accession of Tsar ALEXANDER II in 1855. His limited reform program, implemented principally by Aleksander Wielopolski, soon aroused greater expectations than the regime was prepared to accommodate. Early in 1863 a National Committee dominated by “Red” radicals launched an insurrection, essentially conducted as a guerrilla war, which persisted until May 1864. Having crushed this with assistance from Prussia, the tsarist authorities abolished the sham Kingdom of Poland (henceforth relegated to the status of the “Vistulaland” provinces) and emancipated the peasantry essentially as a means of undermining the position of the dissident gentry. They also introduced policies of RUSSIFICATION, which the Prussian regime too began to impose upon its own Polish areas. In contrast, with the condition of the HABSBURG EMPIRE becoming increasingly fragile during the 1860s, this was also the epoch when Austria yielded to the Poles of Galicia some substantial autonomy in such matters as education and official language usage. Here, moreover, Polish CATHOLICISM was a less problematic issue than in areas where it clashed with Prussian PROTESTANTISM or with Russian attachment to ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY. Hence the Austrian-controlled region was best fitted to provide, especially in Kraków and Lwów, the most fertile environment for cultivating distinctively Polish cultural aspirations during the remaining half-century or so of partition. In the political and economic developments of the late nineteenth century it was, however, Congress Poland that retained the most crucial role. This main portion of the partitioned territory contributed significantly to the tsarist regime's increasing emphasis on INDUSTRIALIZATION, particularly with regard to coal, iron, steel, and textile production. It was also the cradle for the principal political groupings that would eventually compete for control of an independent Poland: Roman Dmowski's National League (later the National Democratic Party) and PIŁSUDSKI'S Polish Socialist Party.

Achievement of renewed statehood only became possible when the military and social strains imposed by WORLD WAR I pitched each of the three partitioning empires into collapse during the course of 1917–18. In the conflict most Poles had sympathized with Piłsudski's efforts to promote eventual independence by assisting Austria against Russia. Once the latter had fallen to the BOLSHEVIKS and the territorial greed of the CENTRAL POWERS had also become increasingly evident (see e.g. BREST-LITOVSK, TREATY OF), the major western belligerents became freer to endorse the restoration of Polish sovereignty. Even with that political backing, the independent regime (known as the Second Republic, as successor to that operative from 1772 to 1795) which Piłsudski began to establish in late 1918 remained in peril, particularly from the Soviet threat. During the PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT the question of Poland's western borders was the object of much wrangling, not least between the major victors themselves. The compromises which were generated, particularly over the DANZIG CORRIDOR and eventually over Upper Silesia too, did little to resolve the tensions between Poles and Germans. As for the eastern frontiers, these were determined less by diplomacy than by the eventual outcome of the RUSSO-POLISH WAR of 1919–21 – a struggle which at one point came close to threatening the loss of Warsaw but which ended in substantial advance against defeated Soviet forces and in the establishment of a border well to the east of the so-called CURZON LINE previously favored by the western powers. Since other frontier disputes also fermented with Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, the new Poland, though substantial in territory, found itself vulnerable to almost complete encirclement by potential enemies. This was the context in which Piłsudski, whose most crucial post was eventually that of war minister (which he held from 1926 until his death in 1935), increasingly entrenched a form of government that marginalized parliament and operated in a semi-dictatorial fashion.

As HITLER'S revisionist threat to European stability grew in the late 1930s, Britain and France were driven to offer “guarantees” of assistance to Poland. However, once the German leader had secured with STALIN the NAZI–SOVIET PACT of August 1939, these proved devoid of effective content. Within days Hitler had used the Danzig problem as pretext for launching what became WORLD WAR II, and within weeks the Poles had again become victims of Russo-German partition. For the next five years or so, they would suffer from the state-sponsored TERRORISM practiced both by the SOVIET UNION (e.g. in the KATYN MASSACRES of 1940) and by the Third Reich. The brutality of the latter was certainly exemplified in the German suppression of the Polish Home Army's WARSAW RISING of 1944, but was also supremely apparent in the Nazi campaigns of persecution against the Polish JEWS (including the destruction of the WARSAW GHETTO in 1943) and in the use of Poland as the principal killing ground for the so-called FINAL SOLUTION (see also CONCENTRATION CAMPS). The advance of the RED ARMY in 1945 was barely a “liberation,” and the Anglo-American failure at the YALTA and POTSDAM CONFERENCES to block Stalin's demands upon the country was viewed by many Poles (and perhaps especially by those exiles who, encouraged by influential patriots such as SIKORSKI, had fought alongside the Allies) as a further betrayal.

In the event, Poland was given a westwards shove across the map of Europe, with an eastern frontier now driven back roughly to Curzon's markings and a border with defeated and punished Germany conversely advanced to the ODER–NEISSE LINE. No less significant, however, was the fact that now, and for the next forty years, Polish destinies would be largely determined by Moscow and by the continuing presence of Soviet military units. Thus much of the nation's history under COMMUNISM can be readily summarized by reference to the periods of rule conducted by successive supporters of the Kremlin: GOMULKA (1945–8, 1956–70), BIERUT (1948–56), and GIEREK (1970–80). The era of General JARUZELSKI (1981–90) proved more complex. Back in 1956, the unpopularity of the postwar regime had produced disturbances in Poznań which were eventually overshadowed by the onset of the broader HUNGARIAN RISING. These had nonetheless hinted at currents of opposition which would become thereafter increasingly sourced by nationalist resentment at Russian dominance, by peasant dislike of the communist regimentation of RURAL SOCIETY, by pressure from urban workers for better recognition of TRADE UNIONISM, and by Catholic defiance in the face of Soviet attacks on the church. Following the election in 1978 of a dynamic Polish pope, JOHN PAUL II, and the spread in the early 1980s of the SOLIDARITY movement far beyond the Lenin shipyard of Gdańsk (Danzig), the nation administered by Jaruzelski was in the vanguard of those within the Eastern bloc who were ready to seize the opportunities for greater autonomy eventually offered by the wind of reformist change emanating from the Kremlin under GORBACHEV'S leadership.

In the aftermath of the REVOLUTIONS OF 1989–91, the Solidarity leader WAŁESA held the Polish presidency from 1990 until 1995. Having himself become increasingly autocratic, he narrowly failed in his bid for re-election and was replaced by the former communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The latter served two five-year terms of office from 1995 to 2005, after which time the predominant tone of Polish politics tended to be set by the centre-right. The final withdrawal of Soviet troops had occurred in 1994, and five years later Poland had become (alongside Hungary and the Czech Republic) the first former member of the WARSAW PACT to enter NATO. The nation's involvement in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION was also consolidated by admission to the European Union in 2004, since when Poles have been particularly active in the currents of cross-border labor mobility. In April 2010 the country suffered a tragic blow when its president, Lech Kaczynski, and a large number of its other civilian and military leaders were killed in a plane crash near Katyn, while travelling to a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the 1940 atrocity.

Polignac, Jules, Prince de (1780–1847), French diplomat and First Minister (1829–30). After emigrating during the FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1789, he returned and participated in several royalist conspiracies. He escaped from prison in 1814 in time for the BOURBON restoration. His ultraroyalism ensured him a favored place under CHARLES X. Thus Polignac became foreign minister in August 1829 and president of the Council the following November, heading an unpopular aristocratic and clerical government that made itself even more disliked through its failure to tackle economic distress. He encouraged the king's reactionary policies, including the attempts to govern as an absolute monarch, which led to Charles's fall early in the REVOLUTIONS OF 1830–2. Arrested and imprisoned, Polignac was quietly released by Louis-Philippe (see JULY MONARCHY) in 1837.

Polish corridor (see DANZIG CORRIDOR)

Polish–Soviet War (see RUSSO-POLISH WAR)

Politburo meaning “political bureau,” was the chief policy-making body of the SOVIET UNION, as well as being an organ of government eventually imitated by other communist states in the Eastern bloc. It was formalized by the BOLSHEVIKS at the 8th Party Congress of March 1919. Members were determined by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, though in practice the Politburo was the supreme body, and its authority stretched down to the very bottom of the organization. Its size of membership varied over time, ranging from a handful to more than twenty. These representatives were supposedly elected, but in practice the Politburo determined its own composition, especially under STALIN. Between 1952 and 1966 the Politburo was renamed the Presidium, though its functions largely remained the same. It abdicated its powers to parliament in 1990, and was officially wound up as the USSR moved towards dissolution the following year (see also EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1989–91).

Pompidou, Georges (1911–74), President of France (1969–74). Son of a schoolteacher from the rural Cantal, Pompidou fought in the 1940 campaign, spending the remainder of World War II teaching at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris. Afterwards, he made a career as a financier, developing the trust of President DE GAULLE who in 1962 appointed him prime minister instead of the independent-minded Michel Debré. Little known outside banking circles, Pompidou was regarded as the president's satrap, embodying the Gaullist notion of the premier as a subservient figure. Yet Pompidou was his own man and was influential in shaping the economic policy of the FIFTH REPUBLIC. During the STUDENT REVOLTS OF 1968 he helped resolve the crisis in a conciliatory fashion. This irritated de Gaulle who sacked him, yet in 1969 he was the General's obvious presidential successor. In ensuring a smooth transfer of power, Pompidou's election helped consolidate the institutions of the Fifth Republic, yet in terms of ideology and policy his presidency was little more than an addendum to de Gaulle's. The principal difference was his willingness to allow the UK to join the European Community in 1973 (see EUROPEAN INTEGRATION). Pompidou might have achieved more in the way of economic and social modernization, but his life was cut short by cancer in 1974.

Popular Fronts Broad coalitions of communist, socialist, and other leftist or centrist groupings, encouraged in July–August 1935 by the 7th Congress of the Comintern (see THE INTERNATIONAL) to combat the rise of FASCISM. During the early 1930s, in what the Communist movement termed the “Third Period,” STALIN had pursued a hard-line policy of “class against class,” actively preventing any tactical alliances with social-democratic parties which were denounced as “bourgeois” and “fascist.” However, with HITLER'S arrival in power and the spread of extreme right-wing parties through much of Europe, Fascism was at long last identified as “the bitterest enemy.” Communists were thus encouraged to align themselves with socialists and “progressive” bourgeois elements. In the event, Popular Frontism only assumed real influence in France and Spain, together with Chile where a reformist government survived from 1938 until 1947.

The French and Spanish Communist Parties welcomed the Comintern's change of policy, both of them being shocked at the way in which the Austrian Social Democratic Party had been forced in 1934 to use violence so as to defend democratic freedoms against the authoritarian impulses of DOLLFUSS. In France the Communists had already signed a pact of joint action with the Socialists (July 1934). In 1935 the RADICAL PARTY, fearful of losing seats to the left in the forthcoming general elections, joined this Popular Front which adopted a progressive platform. Expectations of change raised the hopes of French workers, who in spring 1936 participated in a spontaneous strike movement prior to the Front's victory at the polls. Led by BLUM, the new government pursued a radical agenda, outlawing right-wing leagues and nationalizing key industries. Through the MATIGNON AGREEMENTS of June 1936 it regulated labor–capital relations and got France back to work. However, Blum was undermined not only by big business but also by the Communists' own reluctance to participate directly in government. They chose instead to sit on the back benches sniping at his policies, especially his refusal to intervene militarily in support of the sister Front in Spain. Forced to devalue in 1937, Blum resigned. After returning briefly to the premiership in March 1938, he gave way to DALADIER whose administration effectively marked the end of the French Popular Front.

In Spain, a Popular Front struggled on for another year. This had been formed in January 1936 under the leadership of AZAÑA, as an uneasy coalition of Socialists, Communists, trade unionists, republicans, Catalan nationalists, and anarchists. In the elections held the following month, it secured a narrow victory. The Popular Front pursued a policy of social reform, but was wracked by internal divisions. In July 1936 it was confronted by General FRANCO'S Nationalist coup which triggered the SPANISH CIVIL WAR. Whereas in France the Popular Front capitulated under economic and political pressures, in Spain it had literally to do battle – receiving some Soviet support but fighting against forces much more amply aided from Italy and Germany. Even under those conditions, it remained committed to social reform, promoting collectivization, nationalizations, and the secularization of public life. Yet by March 1939 it had been defeated militarily, thus opening the way for Franco's dictatorship.

By encouraging these Popular Fronts, Moscow seemed to have placed Communist parties at the forefront of the fight against Fascism. However, this was also a policy that had distracted attention from Stalin's GREAT PURGES, and had barely prepared the world for the volte-face which he would soon perform by agreeing the NAZI–SOVIET PACT in August 1939.

population Calculating the size of Europe's population for much of the modern period is fraught with difficulties. Demographers have to contend with fluctuating geo-political boundaries and migratory shifts (see MIGRATION), as well as with evidence of dubious quality. While in the early modern period most countries started to collate registers of births, marriages and deaths, these were not necessarily kept up to date and have not always survived. A number of states, for military and fiscal purposes, also compiled censuses (France began in 1539, Norway in 1623), but until well into the nineteenth century these were rarely undertaken on a nationwide basis or with adequate regularity. Such census evidence also suffers, for example, from human error and from people's unwillingness to register, especially in cases of illegitimate birth.

Notwithstanding these problems, there is agreement that Europe underwent a demographic revolution during the modern period. In 1750 its overall population (including that of European Russia, a region posing particularly formidable problems to compilers of data) lay in the range from 120 to 140 million. By 1800 it had grown to around 180–90 million and, in the next fifty years, took another leap to 274 million. In 1900 the figure was 423 million, quite apart from nearly 200 million persons of European birth or descent living by then in other continents (see also IMPERIALISM); and in 1950 the tally stood at 548 million. By the first years of the twenty-first century Europe contained 730 million people, or approximately a tenth of the world's population. This was possibly a peak, from which forecasters at the United Nations were already projecting some four or five decades of future decline.

Rates of increase have varied enormously from country to country. The population of the British mainland (thus excluding Ireland) grew rapidly: 10.5 million in 1801; 20.8 million in 1851; 39.9 million in 1901; 48.8 million in 1951; and 57.1 million by 2001. Germany, too, witnessed sizeable growth. On unification in 1871 its demographic strength stood at 41 million, and had risen to around 68 million by 1914. The pace of increase was slower, for example, in Spain and post-unification Italy, though the latter case witnessed considerable overcrowding in the south which placed enormous pressure on the land. In late-nineteenth-century France growth all but disappeared, causing widespread anxieties. A population which on the eve of the Revolution of 1789 numbered some 26 million people had enlarged by 1870 to a figure approaching 40 million, but it then continued at around that same level until a post-1945 baby boom. European Russia had the largest population of all, estimated at 64 million in 1870 and at nearly 100 million by the end of the nineteenth century. The equivalent tally for the Soviet successor state had expanded to 158 million by 1951, and to around 290 million at the time of communism's collapse in the early 1990s.

A rising population prompted disquiet on the part of Europe's elites who feared social breakdown and rising death rates. In 1798 the Cambridge political economist and clergyman Thomas Malthus published his Essay on the Principle of Population (much enlarged in 1803), in which he argued that population had the potential to grow on a geometric basis, doubling in size every 25 years, while food and other resources were limited at best to a merely arithmetic progression. It was thus incumbent on individuals to postpone marriage and refrain from sexual activity until they could properly support a family, so constituting what he termed a “preventive check”; otherwise a growing population would outstrip the labor market and cause wide-scale poverty, inviting the “positive checks” of war, famine, and disease to intervene and regulate the situation.

Though Malthus was perceptive in his recognition of demographic trends, his apocalyptical forecasts were not realized. Growth was sustained, and resulted from falling death rates rather than rising birth rates. The latter appear to have decreased in France, Britain, and the German states in the first half of the nineteenth century. In eastern Europe and Russia birth rates were higher than in the west, as people generally married earlier, yet here too the trend was downwards. For instance, the USSR generated in 1950 a mere 20 babies for every thousand of the population. Indeed, during the second half of the twentieth century, European birth rates generally continued to fall – not least in those regions where, despite the prevalence of CATHOLICISM, couples were increasingly inclined to use the sheath or the pill in defiance of the church's ban on contraception (see SEXUALITY).

As to death rates, these have declined substantially over the modern period. A greater number of children were surviving the first five years of life, and there is evidence to suggest that European families were beginning to cherish their offspring much more than previously, even if many peasant families continued to use wet-nurses and thus to run risks that quite often became tantamount to infanticide. Average life expectancy in western Europe also increased steadily. In France, it rose from 47 years in 1900 to 60 in 1940, whereas the overall death rate fell from 27 per thousand in 1870 to 13 per thousand by 1951. Over the same period, the mortality rate in Russia/USSR declined from 35 to 10 per thousand.

One possible explanation for this trend is that pestilence became less common. Pandemics still troubled Europe, but were not as frequent as in the past: the last major plague in Spain was in 1685; in Austria, 1713; and in Italy, 1743. Once the waterborne nature of cholera was grasped in the mid-nineteenth century major cities undertook improvements in their sanitation and sewerage systems. Tuberculosis and smallpox were the other great killers, though their prevalence was slowly contained by the use of vaccines. By the 1850s, 80 percent of all French children were being inoculated against smallpox; and by the 1890s most were protected against diphtheria. From the 1940s the increasing application of penicillin (originally discovered by Alexander Fleming in 1928) proved crucial to combating a wide range of bacterial diseases. The gradual introduction of health screening in the 1960s also played a part, as did the modernization of hospitals which were no longer places simply for the poor and the terminally ill. Even so, the emergence of AIDS in the early 1980s (almost immediately after the eradication of smallpox had been proclaimed) was a salutary reminder that modern medicine could not cure everything – and perhaps also that a return of pandemic influenza due to viral mutation was long overdue (see also “SPANISH” INFLUENZA).

Perhaps more important still in the fall of death rates were improved food supplies. Famine did not disappear altogether, yet its intensity became less acute. In the eighteenth century, the most threatening years were 1740–1, the early 1770s, and 1788–9. In the nineteenth century, famine struck in 1816–17 and the late 1820s, and then again in 1846–7 when it helped to precipitate the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9. Thereafter it became less common, being largely confined to the backward parts of southern and eastern Europe (e.g. Spain in 1856–7 and Russia in 1893–4). In the twentieth century European famines were primarily man-made, for instance that which ravaged the Greek, Dutch, Ukrainian, and Polish parts of Nazi-occupied Europe during 1943–4. The gradual disappearance of famine has been credited to several factors which affected various parts of Europe at different times: the gradual increase in cultivated land, assisted through schemes of drainage and enclosure; improvements in farm technology, such as the introduction of the tractor; the disappearance of SERFDOM from RURAL SOCIETY; and the planting of new crops, along with the widespread adoption of the potato which proved hardier and more nutritional than wheat. Improved transportation and the growth of trade also contributed (see also COMMUNICATIONS).

It has been further speculated that in the nineteenth century, for western Europe at least, war was less destructive as armies were better disciplined and campaigns more limited in scope. This is a dubious proposition, and certainly does not hold good for the following period when Europe twice underwent the experience of “total war.” The death toll directly attributable to WORLD WAR I approached 10 million – and even that figure expands dramatically if we add not only the impact that the “Spanish” influenza of 1918–19 had upon peoples already debilitated by conflict but also the killings and hunger associated with the RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR of 1917–21. It should be remembered too that the war losses affected disproportionately the most “active” and productive elements of the population. Nor should the large number of shell-shocked and permanently injured be forgotten. The death toll from WORLD WAR II was even greater. It is possible that, across the globe, the conflict cost at least 50 million military and civilian lives. Indeed, it was the totality of the WARFARE – including arbitrary violence, strategic bombing, deportations, slave labor, and the so-called FINAL SOLUTION – that made non-combatant deaths so frequent. What is remarkable is that neither world war interfered with underlying growth, even if in the 1920s governments panicked at the prospects of depopulation, often taking severe measures against abortion and birth control and flirting with eugenics. One possible explanation for continued growth is that the horrors of war may have increased the attractions of family life and parenthood, though this hypothesis is difficult to test.

Whatever the case, the impact of Europe's burgeoning population was manifold. It furthered, for example, the processes of INDUSTRIALIZATION and URBANIZATION, and contributed to migration as well. In the post-1945 period, as the indigenous increase slowed, numbers were boosted by the arrival of immigrants from former colonies (see DECOLONIZATION). As the population became more multi-cultural, its demographic profile also evolved. People married later in life, if they married at all, and divorced more readily; they had fewer children, usually no more than two or three as distinct from the overall nineteenth-century average of around nine; they treated sex more as a source of pleasure than of procreation; and they expected to live longer. Retirement, with an active life beyond the age of 60, would have been incomprehensible to most Europeans in 1800, yet two centuries later this had become increasingly taken for granted. More uncertain, though, was the extent to which state-funded WELFARISM could afford the higher pension and health costs associated with the increases in elderly population.

populism A style of politics emphasizing the allegedly incorruptible virtues of the common people. Its most important modern European manifestation was the widespread revolutionary movement that developed in late-nineteenth- century Russia. Though influenced by the ideas of MARX and the events of the PARIS COMMUNE, Populism was inspired principally by native sources that included the writings of HERZEN, CHERNYSHEVSKY, and BAKUNIN. It has been described as “a set of shared attitudes and mindset” which saw the people (narod), by which it effectively meant the peasantry (see RURAL SOCIETY), as being the salvation of Russia. After the emancipation from SERFDOM in 1861, the Populists (or Narodniks) hoped that the peasants, guided by the intelligentsia, would develop traditional institutions such as the MIR and ARTEL to achieve a transformation of Russia along socialist lines, but omitting any essentially bourgeois-capitalist stage of development as required by Marxist analysis. In 1874, under the influence of the moralist Peter Lavrov, their supporters (often university students and including many women) adopted peasant dress and “went to the people.” This effort at creating a genuine mass movement in the countryside encountered only police persecution and peasant hostility or indifference. In 1876 Populists urged the peasants of Chigirin in the Ukraine to take up arms against their landowners, claiming disingenuously that the Tsar approved of this, but their revolt was brutally crushed. Becoming ever more radicalized, Populism split into several branches, one of which, called “Land and Freedom” (see also PLEKHANOV), gravitated towards TERRORISM. This divided, in turn, into “Black Partition” and “the People's Will,” with the latter achieving the assassination of ALEXANDER II in 1881. Thereafter the resulting repression, combined with growing acknowledgment by Russian radicals of the potential importance of the urban proletariat, weakened the Populists' position. Nonetheless, some of their tactics and of their engagement with distinctively peasant concerns were sustained into the early twentieth century by the SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY PARTY.

Porte, the Sublime Synonym for the court and government of Ottoman Turkey, derived (via French translation) from the title which was officially used by the imperial regime itself and which alluded to the administration of justice from the “High Gate” of the palace.

Portugal Situated on Europe's southwestern corner, this country is bordered by SPAIN to the north and east, and by the Atlantic Ocean to the west and south. Recognized as an independent kingdom in the twelfth century, Portugal became during the early-modern period one of Europe's foremost maritime powers, acquiring territories in Africa, Asia, and South America. However, its position was challenged by the Dutch and, most critically, by the Spanish who effectively ruled it in the period 1580–1640. After reasserting its independence, Portugal experienced mixed fortunes, never recovering its former pre-eminence. It held some strategic importance during the NAPOLEONIC WARS when France exerted pressure on Lisbon to join the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. Having been refused, NAPOLEON I ordered an invasion in 1807, which prompted British intervention led by WELLINGTON and the onset of the PENINSULAR WAR that lasted in Iberia until 1814. During it, the royal family from the House of Braganza was transferred to the safety of Brazil. There it remained until 1821 – one year before that major colony converted itself into an independent empire. While Portugal was grateful to Britain for repelling French encroachments, it resented the persistence of British influence after 1815. A revolution in 1820 thus looked to assert the country's autonomy through the adoption of a liberal constitution, along with the overthrow of the Inquisition and the remnants of feudalism. There ensued a century punctuated by civil war, revolution, and repeated experiments in constitutional monarchy that pitted liberals and conservatives against one another. In the 1890s Portugal was still backward economically, and suffered humiliation overseas when Britain thwarted plans to appropriate the lands linking the colonies of Angola and Mozambique (see IMPERIALISM). Bankruptcy was declared in 1892 when the Lisbon government was unable to repay foreign loans. Ineffectual autocratic rule and the assassination in 1908 of King Carlos I, together with his son, exacerbated the sense of crisis. Two years later the Portuguese Republican Party orchestrated a revolution that ousted the monarchy. There followed a liberal constitution and an assault on the pervasive influence of the church (see ANTICLERICALISM; CATHOLICISM), though the Republicans proved incapable of overhauling the economy.

During WORLD WAR I limited intervention on the side of the Allies in 1916 did nothing to improve the country's prestige, and in 1919 there was an abortive monarchist coup. In 1926 another rebellion resulted in an authoritarian Second Republic, which then became in 1932 the ESTADO NOVO (or “new state”) under SALAZAR. Though his right-wing dictatorial regime possessed semi-fascist features (see FASCISM), he managed to avoid any direct Portuguese embroilment either in the SPANISH CIVIL WAR or in WORLD WAR II. He was succeeded in 1968 by CAETANO, whose refusal to liberalize at home or to accept DECOLONIZATION abroad prompted a successful revolt by junior officers in 1974. Under the skilful leadership of SOARES, Portugal then began a transition to liberal democracy (1974–6), though this was marked by considerable political instability. Independence was also granted to its African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, long beset by guerrilla fighting; the last of Portugal's overseas possessions, Macao, was returned to China in 1999. Regional autonomy was additionally bestowed on the islands of the Azores and Madeira (1980) which had hitherto been governed from the mainland. Meanwhile, Portugal had become a founding member both of NATO (1949) and of the EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (1960). In 1986 it transferred from the latter into the European Community (see EUROPEAN INTEGRATION). This helped to promote political stability, foreign tourism, and some measure of economic modernization. Even so, by the early twenty-first century Portugal (with a population currently estimated at some 10.7 million) still remained the least prosperous country in western Europe, with a continuing heavy dependence on traditional agricultural practices (see also RURAL SOCIETY).

positivism Belief that the methods of the natural sciences provide the principal, or even sole, model for attaining reliable knowledge. Such thinking was all the more significant, particularly in the nineteenth century, because it penetrated so many different areas of European intellectual and cultural activity by proclaiming (in contrast to ROMANTICISM) that science provided the main paradigm of progress. A properly scientific understanding of society, for example, would also yield predictive certainties upon which, in turn, wise future actions could be readily built. Much of this conviction was already apparent in the “positive philosophy” of SAINT-SIMON, even before Auguste Comte (1798–1857) gave it wider currency simply as “positivism.” The latter linked the term to the idea of civilizational advance by depicting mankind as liberating itself first from theology and then from metaphysics, before reaching a higher state of truly scientific consciousness. All this suggests how positivism converged with other currents contributing to mid-nineteenth-century SECULARIZATION, including those that drew similarly from the eighteenth-century ENLIGHTENMENT. Just like the philosophes, positivists were often more notable for their over-confidence than for their critical modesty. To search for consistency in methods of cognition was one thing, but it was quite another to suppose that the results of this empiricist process must necessarily generate some unitary pattern incorporating final answers to complex questions (thus ending up with something that often looked more like credulity secularized than religion abolished). The dogmatism of the world history offered by MARX and ENGELS, centered upon deterministic causal explanation by reference to “scientific” materialism and the dynamo of CLASS conflict (see also COMMUNISM), was one of the most influential products of such hubris. Similar positivist tendencies were also strongly apparent in the rise of SOCIAL DARWINISM. Towards the turn of the century such developments stimulated some writers (e.g. Wilhelm Dilthey on the philosophy of history, and Max Weber on sociology) to offer more balanced assessments of the senses in which the “human” sciences defied mere absorption into the “natural” ones. Meanwhile, however, even much of literature and art had fallen beneath the positivist spell – as shown by the fact that, during the great epoch of realism and NATURALISM around 1870, such figures as Émile Zola often argued that novelists and painters should treat their own endeavors as forms of quasi-scientific “experimentation” approximating to laboratory procedures. The subsequent and countervailing movement of cultural MODERNISM, centered broadly on the period from 1890 to 1930, is often interpreted as having at its core a revolt against the ascendancy of such positivism. By that stage the Newtonian model of science that had dominated the imagination of the philosophes and their nineteenth-century successors was itself crumbling in the face of another revolution in physics, associated with the even more mysterious images of microcosm and macrocosm now being offered e.g. by Max Planck and Albert Einstein. Partly for that reason, the philosophical positivism that did survive into the twentieth century generally assumed a more rigorously critical form. However, with the notable exception of those who in the 1920s founded the so-called Vienna Circle, the leading practitioners were henceforth more regularly active in anglophone settings rather than in continental Europe.

Potsdam Conference This was the final Allied summit of WORLD WAR II (see also TEHRAN CONFERENCE and YALTA CONFERENCE), held near Berlin from July 17 to August 2, 1945 under the codename Terminal. STALIN and US President Truman were in attendance throughout, but CHURCHILL'S electoral defeat led to his replacement by Clement Attlee towards the end of July. The issues before the delegates were essentially fourfold: the preparation of peace treaties with Germany's allies; the immediate and medium-term future of Germany; the circumstances of Japanese surrender; and the fate of POLAND. This last subject caused considerable disagreement. Both the Americans and British were angered that Stalin was proposing to advance the Polish frontier as far as the western (as distinct from eastern) branch of the Neisse river (see ODER–NEISSE LINE) and that Moscow was controlling a pro-Soviet Polish administration. In the event, the Allies recognized this as the legal government of Poland, thus ending the legitimacy of the London-based government-in-exile. A joint communiqué issued at Potsdam eventually confirmed that the Oder–Western Neisse Line should henceforward constitute the German–Polish border, and further approved the expulsion of those Germans living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (see also MIGRATION; ETHNIC CLEANSING). As to Germany itself, the Potsdam proceedings effectively legitimized Soviet control over nearly half its territory. They also covered the Allies' plans for denazification, democratization, the payment of REPARATIONS (to go essentially to the Soviet Union), the criminal prosecution of leading Nazis (see NUREMBERG TRIALS), the decentralization of the economy, and the division of Germany and Austria each into four occupation zones. The work of negotiating peace settlements with Germany's defeated partners was handed over to a newly formed council of foreign ministers, and eventually completed through the 1947 PARIS TREATIES. Regarding the Far East, the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 articulated the terms for Japanese surrender. This was to be unconditional, and to involve full disarmament. In discussions with Stalin, Truman alluded to the existence of atomic weapons, though the Soviet leader already knew about these. When Japan refused to surrender, the whole world became aware of them as the USA bombed Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) during the week after the Potsdam meeting. Stalin meanwhile opportunistically declared war on the Japanese on August 8, but Tokyo's prompt capitulation two days later thwarted his territorial ambitions in the Far East. Overall, Potsdam revealed the lack of mutual trust within the Grand Alliance, while the array of confusing issues and the level of misunderstanding between the participants also shed light on the difficulties historians encounter when addressing the origins of the COLD WAR.

Poujade, Pierre (1920–2003), French right-wing politician, briefly influential in the FOURTH REPUBLIC. A stationer from St-Céré (Lot), Poujade was in 1940 an early supporter of PÉTAIN and DORIOT, although he later left France to serve with DE GAULLE. In 1953, angered that shopkeepers like himself had to collect purchase taxes, he established a protest movement, the Union de Défense des Commerçants et des Artisans, which two years later became a political party, the Union de Fraternité Française (UFF). This stood for the defense of the small man against the rapacious interests of the state, for the preservation of an old world dominated by small businesses, and for the retention of empire. Recruiting among peasants, petit bourgeois, discontented leftists and Algerian settlers, it won 53 seats in the 1956 elections. Success was fleeting. Poujadist deputies were naïve and poorly disciplined, and many voters were put off by the UFF's underlying RACISM, resort to violence, and lack of a specific program. Poujade lost his seat in 1957 and retreated from politics. Never directly fascist in the sense that some critics claimed, Poujadisme was a protest against economic modernization, and a forerunner of the FRONT NATIONAL led by LE PEN.

Prague, Treaty of (see under AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR)

Prague Spring Abortive attempt made in 1968 to liberalize communist CZECHOSLOVAKIA. At the start of the year, against a growing backdrop of economic stagnation and protests from intellectuals, Alexander DUBČEK was made party chairman. A pragmatic reformer, he intended to modernize COMMUNISM by incorporating the views of those outside the party. To this end, he relaxed media censorship and in April published an “Action Program.” This gave hope for further freedoms, expressed in the Two Thousand Word Manifesto authored in June by the journalist Ludvík Vaculík. These attempts to promote economic reform and political decentralization worried the SOVIET UNION. Moscow's fears lest this “Prague Spring” should weaken the WARSAW PACT, militarily and politically, were shared particularly by ULBRICHT as leader of the GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. When Dubček refused to bow to Kremlin demands, 500,000 Warsaw Pact soldiers crossed into Czechoslovakia on August 20. It is now known that hardliners in the Slovak Communist Party invited the Soviets to invade, though this was not pivotal in the Kremlin's thinking. Unlike what occurred with the HUNGARIAN RISING of 1956, the government ordered its people not to resist, though there were several outbreaks of violence. Dubček was arrested and taken to Moscow, but it was agreed he should remain in office until the situation was under control. In April 1969 he was replaced by HUSÁK, who annulled earlier reforms and undertook a purge of intellectuals. The one reform which survived was the country's federalization (see FEDERALISM[1]) into separate Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics. The crushing of the Prague Spring was condemned by liberal democracies and led many Western left-wing sympathizers, who had taken to the streets in 1968 to protest against the Vietnam War, to question communist values. Within Czechoslovakia itself, reformers, notably those congregated around Charter 77, understood that the system would never be able to reform itself, and that it had to be replaced, albeit peacefully. This was eventually achieved in the “velvet revolution” of 1989 led by HAVEL (see also REVOLUTIONS OF 1989–91).

Pressburg, Treaty of Agreement (signed December 26, 1805) between France and Austria made during the NAPOLEONIC WARS in the aftermath of the latter's defeat at the battles of ULM and AUSTERLITZ. Austria lost land gained earlier at CAMPO FORMIO and LUNÉVILLE. Blocks of Venetian territory were attached to the kingdom of Italy whose ruler was NAPOLEON I himself; and French de facto possession of Piedmont, Parma, and Piacenza was recognized de jure. Outside Italy, Austrian possessions, notably Swabia and the Tyrol, were redistributed to France's German allies, Bavaria, Württemberg (both erected into kingdoms) and Baden (made a Grand Duchy). The treaty accordingly did much to destroy the HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.

Primo de Rivera, Miguel (1870–1930) and José Antonio (1903–36). Father and son, these two were leading figures in the right-wing politics of SPAIN during the 1920s and 1930s. Miguel was a wealthy aristocrat who followed his own father into the army, serving in several overseas campaigns, including Cuba, the Philippines, and the Rif. Promoted to brigadier-general in 1911 and later captain-general of CATALONIA, this hard-headed patriot and indefatigable womanizer was increasingly concerned by what he perceived as national disintegration precipitated by anarchism, demands for Catalan autonomy, parliamentary instability, industrial unrest, and the economic downturn that followed the World War I. Defeat of the Spanish army by the Berbers at Anual in 1921 was a further humiliation that spurred Miguel into action. On September 23, 1923, he launched a military uprising (pronunciamiento), which enabled him to assume dictatorial powers alongside the monarchy. This arrangement was accepted by ALFONSO XIII who had no wish for the Cortes to investigate the military catastrophe in Morocco. More a pragmatist than an ideologue, Miguel instituted a quasi-fascist state (see FASCISM), abolishing political parties, jailing his opponents, and pursuing paternalistic social policies. In 1925, with the assistance of the French, he re-established control in Morocco and instituted a civilian government committed to a huge and unsustainable public works program. Never enjoying a popular base, he was increasingly opposed by intellectuals, businessmen, soldiers, and former parliamentarians, all of whom resented their loss of influence. In January 1930, amid an economic downturn and suffering from ill-health, Miguel resigned and retired to Paris where he spent much of his remaining months drinking and whoring. In opposition to the SECOND REPUBLIC (1931 onwards), his proto-fascist ideas were then much more fully developed by his eldest son, José Antonio. In October 1933 the latter, who had trained as a lawyer and had become impressed by the dynamism of MUSSOLINI and HITLER, created his own broadly imitative version of their movements. This FALANGE ESPAÑOLA was soon taken over and adapted by FRANCO for the purposes of his own leadership of the Nationalist cause. Early in the SPANISH CIVIL WAR José Antonio was captured and executed by the Republicans. A personality cult devoted to him still subsists in contemporary Spain, even though in 2005 the socialist government ordered the removal of the last public monuments established in his honor.

proletariat (see under WORKING CLASS)

Protestantism This term derives from Latin protestari, with a meaning focused more on acts of positive “witness” than on “negative “protest” in any modern sense. It denotes those Western Christian denominations that define themselves in contradistinction to Roman CATHOLICISM by reference to the principles of the sixteenth-century Reformation. Some of these groupings date back directly to that epoch, including Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anglicans, as well as smaller sects such as the Mennonites and Hutterites. But many others appeared at later stages too. Within present-day Europe the overall tally of Protestants comes to around 120 million, with a relatively strong presence sustained throughout the modern period in Scandinavia, northern Germany, and parts of Switzerland, as well as in mainland Britain and Northern Ireland. In some cases such as the Anglican one, Protestantism has continued to provide the basis for an “established” or “state” church, enjoying particular privileges. The wide range of denominations at issue provides the base for a great variety of practices and structures – for example, with episcopacy preserved in some instances and abandoned in others. Though they also show considerable theological diversity, all these Protestant groupings have nonetheless tended towards preaching a faith that claims to recapture the authenticity of early Christianity, from which “Roman” beliefs and practices had allegedly departed by the time of Luther and Calvin. Thus there is generally emphasis on the supreme authority of Scripture as “the revealed word of God” and on the doctrine of “justification by faith alone”. A further stress on the “priesthood of all believers” helps to explain why the lay contribution to the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs has been much greater than among Catholics. Also notable is the contribution that Protestant scholars made, particularly during the later nineteenth century, towards applying more sophisticated methods of historical analysis to biblical evidence (see also MODERNISM[2]). In social action, as well as in theological matters, Protestantism has manifested both radical and conservative extremes. While the more monolithic organization of the Catholic Church has not always worked to its advantage, the sheer fragmentation of the Protestant ones has often limited the impact of their engagement with public issues. Even so, there has been a significant record of involvement in campaigns for the abolition of the slave trade, the promotion of temperance, and the protection of TRADE UNIONISM, and, more recently, in those aimed at resisting the growing SECULARIZATION of moral debate about such topics as SEXUALITY.

Proudhon, Pierre (1809–1865), French socialist thinker (see SOCIALISM), often credited with being the originator of ANARCHISM. Born into rural poverty, Proudhon trained as a compositor, becoming a journalist and prolific author. In 1848 he went into politics, winning a by-election, but he was no leader of men and spent much of his time being hounded by the authorities for his radical views. Frequently his philosophy has been reduced to the famous phrase “All property is theft,” which appeared in his 1840 volume What is Property? In truth, Proudhon had no wish to abolish property; rather he resented those members of the middle classes and haute bourgeoisie who lived off the labor and rents of others. His wish was to empower ARTISANS and peasants by giving them a stake in a society which would promote opportunity, independence and social equality, though such rights were not to be extended to women. Ultimately, he envisaged a moneyless world in which central government would be replaced by a loose association of communes. His beliefs, notably the opinion that a peaceful revolution was possible, increasingly contradicted those of MARX with whom he quarreled, but influenced BAKUNIN and the anarchist wing of the First INTERNATIONAL. Proudhon's philosophy found a particular resonance among French socialists, as so much of his thinking was conditioned by his own national context. It is sometimes said that the PARIS COMMUNE was an experiment of Proudhonism in action.

Prussia German state originating in the Brandenburg region of the southeastern Baltic coast. In 1701 Prussia was proclaimed a kingdom with Berlin as its capital, and then developed during the eighteenth century into a major European power. The militaristic ethos of Frederick II (“the Great”), who ruled from 1740 to 1786, was sustained thereafter by his successors within the HOHENZOLLERN DYNASTY and by the class of noble landowners and state servants known as JUNKERS. Towards the end of the century the state's territorial enlargement included annexations made through the three partitions of POLAND (1772, 1793, 1795). Between 1792 and 1795 Prussian forces fought against Revolutionary France (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS). When they returned to the fray in 1806, they suffered major defeat at JENA-AUERSTLSQUÄDT (see also NAPOLEONIC WARS). However, this spurred a series of military, political, and social reforms, which were associated with figures such as STEIN, SCHARNHORST, and HARDENBERG, and which proved vital to modernizing the state structures. After joining the final anti-Napoleonic coalition in 1813, Prussia was further strengthened by gains (especially to the west, in the Rhineland–Westphalian region) registered at the VIENNA CONGRESS of 1814–15, and by its vanguard role in the early-nineteenth-century INDUSTRIALIZATION of continental Europe. Although as yet Austria (see HABSBURG EMPIRE) remained the pre-eminent power within the GERMAN CONFEDERATION formed in 1815, Prussian leadership in developing the commercial potential of the ZOLLVEREIN exemplified an increasing rivalry between the two states. Despite the rise of NATIONALISM and of pressures for GERMAN UNIFICATION, FREDERICK WILLIAM IV (ruler of Prussia from 1840 to 1861) refrained from making a decisive bid for leadership of Germany during the REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–9 and their immediate aftermath (see OLMÜTZ AGREEMENT). However, Berlin's capacity for challenging Vienna became clearer after BISMARCK became minister-president in 1862. The joint military campaign waged by the two empires against DENMARK over the SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN question in 1864 proved to be a mere prelude to their own falling-out, as manifested by the AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR of 1866. Victory there allowed Bismarck to marginalize Habsburg influence over the German state system, to make the Prussian domain continuous from east to west by annexing such buffer-states as HANOVER, and to give the Hohenzollern monarch decisive control over the newly-formed NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION.

Similar success in the FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR of 1870–1 opened the way for inauguration of the GERMAN EMPIRE. Whether viewed as “little Germany” (on account of Austria's exclusion) or simply as “Greater Prussia,” this represented a major achievement for the upstart dynasty now headed by WILLIAM I. Henceforth he was “German emperor” as well as king of Prussia. Though again federal in structure (see FEDERALISM[1]), the post-1871 imperial system remained under the hegemony of its Prussian component, which comprised three-fifths of overall population. After the accession of WILLIAM II in 1888 and the dismissal of Bismarck two years later, this dominance and the militarism associated therewith generated increasingly reckless policies that made Imperial Germany the principal threat to European peace. Defeat in WORLD WAR I brought an end to Hohenzollern rule, and the 1919 PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT then left East Prussia cut off from the rest of its region through the establishment of the DANZIG CORRIDOR. Though Berlin continued as the national capital under the WEIMAR REPUBLIC, Prussia itself was reduced to merely provincial rank. Any effective role for it as a distinctive element was further diminished under HITLER'S regime. Following the victors' occupation of Germany at the end of WORLD WAR II, the Allied Control Council formally dissolved Prussia as a unit of administration in 1947.

Putin, Vladimir (1952–), President (1999–2008) and Prime Minister (1999–2000, 2008–) of RUSSIA. Born and educated in Leningrad, he studied international law before entering the KGB in 1975. He remained in its service until 1991, undertaking surveillance duties both in the SOVIET UNION and in the GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. During the early post-communist era he held increasingly important posts in the administration of his native city (now returned to its former name of St Petersburg), before transferring in 1996 to the staff of President YELTSIN in Moscow. The latter appointed him to the premiership in August 1999, and then unexpectedly resigned as head of state at the end of the year. Having replaced his patron initially on a temporary basis, Putin received more substantive endorsement through presidential polls held in March 2000. After re-election in 2004, he went on to complete a second term. When the constitution required him to stand down at that point, he returned to the office of premier – in which post he was widely viewed as wielding the upper hand over his presidential successor, Dmitri Medvedev. Even as a practitioner of “directed DEMOCRACY,” Putin has proved remarkably popular with the Russian electorate. After the increasing confusion of the Yeltsin years, his own period of ascendancy has been marked by a very limited tolerance for human rights, some significant measure of reassertion in Russian military power, and – at least until the global downturn that began in autumn 2008 – by an economic recovery that benefited particularly a number of business magnates closely associated with him.